The Making of Modern Portugal

Edited by

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# Table of Contents

Acknowledgements ............................................................... vii

Introduction ........................................................................... 1
Unmaking Modern Portugal
Luís Trindade

Chapter One .......................................................................... 17
The Papers of State Power: The Passport and the Control of Mobility
Victor Pereira

Chapter Two ........................................................................... 44
Weak State and Civic Culture in Liberal Portugal (1851-1926)
Diego Palacios Cerezales

Chapter Three ......................................................................... 65
The States of Empire
Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo

Chapter Four .......................................................................... 102
Technological Modernization and Disuse in the Making of Contemporary
Portugal’s Capital: Street Lighting from the 1840s to the 1960s
Bruno Cordeiro

Chapter Five .......................................................................... 125
Liberal State and Images of Civil Servants
Joana Estominho de Almeida

Chapter Six ............................................................................. 149
Science, State and Society: The Emergence of Social Research in Portugal
Frederico Ágoas

Chapter Seven ......................................................................... 178
Time to Settle Down: Property, State and its Subject
Elisa Lopes da Silva
Table of Contents

Chapter Eight............................................................... 201
The Portuguese State and Modern Education: High School Management
and Student Subjectification in the 1930s and 1940s
Jorge Ramos do Ó

Chapter Nine............................................................... 225
State, Church and Society: The 1911 Law of Separation and the Struggle
for Hegemony over a Common Subject
Diogo Duarte

Chapter Ten ............................................................... 249
The System of Nationalism: Salazarism as Political Culture
Luís Trindade

Chapter Eleven ........................................................... 270
‘Portugal is Not a Poor Country’: The Power of Communism
José Neves

Chapter Twelve .......................................................... 290
‘The Most Revolutionary Law Ever Approved’: Social Conflict and State
Economic Intervention during the Portuguese Revolution (1974-1975)
Ricardo Noronha

Contributors................................................................. 311

Index ............................................................................. 314

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CHAPTER THREE
THE STATES OF EMPIRE
MIGUEL BANDEIRA JERÓNIMO

Introduction

On 19 February 1836, almost two years after the end of the Civil War that led to the re-establishment of a liberal regime, the Minister of the Navy and Overseas (hereafter MNO), Sá da Bandeira, submitted a report about the general conditions of the overseas African provinces to the Portuguese Cortes. In his view, the African provinces were mere ‘decadent fragments’ of a non-existent, ruined empire. The ‘Empire’ was ‘invaded and conquered by African Negroes’, characterized by a prevailing absence of Portuguese forces and by internal dissent (Sá da Bandeira 1836, 13-14). In 1872, José Francisco da Silva wrote that only ‘an act of audacity or rewarding ententes with the natives’ could be the cornerstone of a project of territorial expansionism outside Luanda. The socio-political, demographic and ecological realities of the empire left no other choice (Coronel João de Almeida 1930, 4). Later on, in 1877, in a context of increasing internationalization of African affairs, the Governor-general of Angola Caetano Almeida e Albuquerque described the few colonial outposts in the interior, either officially sponsored or privately driven, as ‘lost isles’ in a ‘boundless indigenous ocean’.¹

In January 1899, Mouzinho de Albuquerque, cavalry officer and governor-general of Mozambique until 1898, wrote that the ‘administrative processes’ through which the colonies had been governed until then ‘were con-substantiated in conventions and fictions’. According to him, the empire was formed by ‘extremely vast territories’, ‘formally ours’, in which ‘no influence was exerted’. The imperial and colonial authority was

¹ Report from Almeida e Albuquerque, 19 October 1877, in Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino, Secretaria de Estado da Marinha e Ultramar, Direcção-Geral do Ultramar, Correspondência dos Governadores, Angola, 1877.
based on ‘powerful chiefs connected to the Portuguese crown by fictitious vassalages’. The ‘system of govern’ was ‘formally liberal’: ‘improvised citizens elected, in a simulacrum of voting, a fictitious deputy, previously designated by the ministry and therefore unknown to his circle and ignorant of the land he represented’. The administrative landscape was made up of ‘municipalities created by decree’ only, ‘with no deputies electable with any decency, no electors knowing that they were such, not even a municipal budget to administer’. The history of the colonial empire was made by ‘glorious victories in which no single Portuguese soldier took part’. The conquest was based on ‘auxiliaries of resolute dedication that turned into declared rebels the following day’. The portrait of the imperial and colonial worlds could not be clearer: ‘many majors and colonels, several commanders, numerous dispatches, voluminous reports, abundant legislation, plentiful decrees, copious ordinances, a lot of inapplicable regulation’. It was an empire made of ‘words, words, words!’ Mouzinho de Albuquerque was the Prince of Denmark (Albuquerque 1934, 17-18).

In a report dated 23 February 1915, Governor-general of Angola Norton de Matos wrote:

we have been unable to occupy and control Angola: our campaigns have been limited to the organization of military columns that inflict more or less severe punishments to the revolted gentile, whose territory we want to occupy; once their military mission has reached its end, once they have won a few battles, made some prisoners, killed or shot a few natives, they retire and dismantle, leaving just a small fort here and there, poorly armed and even more scarcely garnished, which will soon be considered harmless by the local populations. (Matos 1945, 253)

In 1952, in their analysis of the political and administrative organization and the economic coordination of economic issues of Angola, Henrique Galvão and Carlos Selvagem denounced the existence of a ‘plethora of bureaucracy’, viewed as an outcome of a ‘traditional tendency of corporative systems’. Despite its magnitude and theoretical advantages, this plethora of bureaucratic agencies was seen to result in no effective informational control over the territory, its resources and populations. They were no instruments of rule and administration. The list of reasons supporting Galvão and Selvagem’s indictment included the diversity and variety of agencies; their dispersion, autonomous functioning (‘compartimentos estanques’) and the juxtaposition of responsibilities with previous or coeval, co-existing agencies; the lack of trained personnel and the ‘moral corruption’. All ‘subverted the intentions of the legislators’ and caused ‘disturbances and difficulties’. The existing plethora of agencies constituted more a ‘bureaucratic order’ than a ‘functional order of coordinated elements’. Galvão’s previous critical remarks regarding the lack of administrative coordination continued to resound. It was an ‘old machine of a bureaucratic type, outdated and naturally unstable’, ‘full of improvisations, more or less adventurous’. The same appraisals were made regarding Mozambique. Despite the blatant criticism, the need for a new order of colonial information and for new modalities of imperial and colonial management were emphasized. A new colonial State, indeed a new form of colonialism, was in need (Galvão and Selvagem 1952, 236-237, 350-351, 298; idem 1953, 177; Galvão 1949, 152-172 and 213-326).

This collection of examples illustrates and illuminates some of the main characteristics of the Portuguese imperial trajectory since the disintegration of the Luso-Brazilian imperial configuration in 1822, from the traditional shortage of military, economic, ecclesiastical, bureaucratic human and material resources to colonize, administer and control – which entailed the rule of the feeble – to the predominance of de jure over de facto realities (an empire of conventions and fictions, an empire in a map, an empire by decree) and the recurrence of episodes of pacification. These illustrations also reveal some of the facets of the historical process of the politico-administrative takeover of colonial territories, the process of the colonial State-formation, from the relatively low degree of autonomy from local powers (for instance due to the persistence of the Ancien Régime or due to local resistance) to the scarce social penetration and limited institutional territorialization of State-functions. Given these premises, the historical debate over the importance of the strengths and weaknesses of political authority within the colonial empire, already promoted regarding previous imperial configurations, is imperative, especially if it is able to clarify the complex political system of power in which the colonial State was articulated with other institutions (for instance the Church) and was based on modalities of negotiation and collaboration with local powers (via the distribution of prestige, labour and tax-returns).²

The Portuguese Empire-State devised a colonial State in order to attain two major, and to a certain extent interrelated, desiderata. First, the colonial State was fundamental to ensure the continuous recruitment, use and distribution (to public works and to private interests) of native manpower.

² In the “third” Portuguese empire, as in previous imperial configurations, the advocacy of its political feebleness entails dangers of exceptionalism and the potential glorification of the empire (see the appropriation of Gilberto Freyre’s luso-tropicalism). A feeble political organization does not necessarily entail a weak political authority. See Bethencourt and Ramada Curto (2007, 1-18) and Bethencourt (2007, 197-254).
As was prevalent in other imperial and colonial politics, the management and provision of African labour and its transformation into a ‘State revenue flow’ (Young 1998, 105) was a central process in empire-building and colonial-formation. Labour (i.e., forced labour) was the pivotal mechanism of colonial extraction, the legalization of forced labour one of the backbones of the imperial undertaking. The ‘difficulties to make the natives work’ were the difficulties to make the colonial State work (Jerônimo and Monteiro 2012, 159-196). Second, the establishment of a colonial State apparatus was central to the institution of a modicum of taxation, from capitation taxes to a gradual emergence of a system of taxation. The imperative budgetary and fiscal self-sufficiency imposed to the colonies, that is the fiscal pact that was at the core of the transference of the costs of imperial expansion and colonial consolidation to the periphery – *conquest on the cheap* –, required an administrative structure capable of establishing, deploying and negotiating the execution of tax-exaction mechanisms. Although designed to meet other purposes (for instance, to reduce the costs of empire), the administrative reform devised by Rebello da Silva in 1869 entailed the elevation of tax-exaction to a primordial repertoire of administration (*Carta Orgânica das Instituições Administrativas nas Províncias Ultramarinas*, 1894). The expansion of, and the balanced articulation between, imperial sovereignty (actual hegemony over colonial territories, population and resources) and revenue (the production of forms of State revenues) were at the forefront of empire-building. They were also the fundamental causes for the spread of conflicts within the colonial empire, which promoted the material and organizational institution of security mechanisms (for instance, the pacification campaigns that we will address below), and also fostered the local organization of resistance and protest (Young 1994, 124-133; Herbst 2000, 64-66; Newitt 1999, 110-122; Gardner 2012).

Recognising but not exploring the different nature, dynamics and characteristics of the historical constitution of colonial administration within the constituent parts of the “third” Portuguese empire, this chapter traces the evolution of the colonial State, trying to identify some its fundamental aspects. Acknowledging the shortage of studies on fundamental aspects related to political, economic and socio-cultural dimensions of the history of the Portuguese colonial empire, namely with regard to crucial functions of the imperial and colonial administrations (from policing to education, from juridical to welfare responsibilities), this chapter aims to address some of the existent information and to signal some of the problems that need further and deeper enquiry. Among many other decisive issues that require a finer empirical and analytical understanding – such as the role of State *tradition* and of the *raison d’État* (their ideological foundations, institutional modalities and repertoires of power) –, much is unknown about historical processes that were central to the construction, consolidation and eventual demise (or transformation and appropriation) of the colonial State and its institutional apparatus. The historical nature and the dynamics of the imperatives of statecraft (hegemony, autonomy, security, legitimacy, revenue and accumulation) within the “new Brazils in Africa” are still to be accurately considered, colony-by-colony, through time (Young 1994, 35-40 and 95-140).

For instance, there is no proper history of the multifaceted forms of articulation between formal hierarchies of imperial and colonial authority and local patrimonial networks (and related processes of accommodation of existing political structures and mechanisms of rule), of the particular and contingent interaction between colonial statecraft and colonial societies (e.g. the political, socioeconomic or religious characteristics of African societies) or of the organization and institutionalization of colonial taxation (its multiple causes, mechanisms and consequences). The same is certainly true about the legacies of colonial State in each post-colonial formation. On a different level, the understanding of imperial and colonial bureaucracies (their major and minor players, and their multiple institutional levels of action) needs to go beyond organizational descriptions, prosopographic analyses or biographical portraits (Sousa and Almeida 2006, 109-126; Silva 2008). The study of the Leviathan qualities of the *bulamaturi* (“the crusher of rocks”), their actual manifestations and limitations (Young 1994, 1-2), requires finer enquiries to articulate these important organizational

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3 On the implementation of taxation in the metropole, see Chapter 2 in this book.

4 For a selection of new researches that address central subjects of the Portuguese imperial and colonial history, the majority of them still clearly understudied, see Jerônimo (2012c).

5 The work of Catherine Boone demonstrates the extent to which diverse patterns of rural political economy in Senegal, Ghana and Ivory Coast entailed different colonial states’ *modus operandi*: Boone (2003). For a comparative analysis of state traditions and trajectories see, among others, Badie and Birnbaum (1979, 171-217). For a masterful and thoughtful survey of the problem in Africa see Lonsdale (1981, 139-225).

6 For an important contribution see Chabal et al. (2002). For a recent comparative tour-de-force see Young (2012).
and institutional aspects with other political, social and economic problems.  

The pacification and privatization of colonial sovereignty

Despite their clear minimalism in regard to actual obligations, the formulation of the doctrine of effective occupation, and the associated stipulations of articles n. 34 and n. 35 of the General Act of the Berlin conference, a decisive moment in the diplomacy of imperialism, entailed consequences for the overall strategy in the establishment of a formal sovereignty in the Portuguese colonial empire. The doctrine of effective occupation, alongside the overall languages and methods of international colonial law, was fundamental to those who wanted to attain a double goal. On one hand, it was a guarantee of international legitimacy, a sine qua non for the recognition of a wanted imperial stand. On the other, it offered a sound legal basis that enabled the confirmation of proprietary claims to African territories (seen as terra nullius), which could no longer rest on claims of spheres of influence (Fisch 1988, 347-375; Young 1994, 96). A common good and a common interest were identified and regulated in a political and juridical manner.

Inter-imperial competition faced new guidelines. More than the guidelines with a view to promote territorial occupation, and the development of an administrative apparatus, Berlin provided the legitimate and the legitimizing mechanism for the ‘acquisition of sovereignty’ (Herbst 2000, 72). The international downplaying of the rights of discovery and the necessary replacement of the traditional rhetoric of historical rights led the Portuguese elites to enhance their imperial expansionist manoeuvres, which included political, economic but also religious and ecclesiastical drives and strategies. The missions of empire were manifold (Jerónimo 2012; Jerónimo and Dores 2012, 119-156). As Paiva Couceiro, a major colonial expert, summed up, ‘no allegations of property could be set forth when not based on positive facts of administration and of policing’ (1948, 10).

The international provisions that regulated the acquisition of sovereignty did not necessarily require a formal, developed, and expensive system of colonial administration. The territorialization of authority and hegemony could be attained in multiple ways, from the privatization or delegation of sovereignty to chartered companies to the treaty-making with local chiefs, preserving or destabilizing local balances of power. But those international provisions certainly provided a stimulus to colonial ambitions within imperial societies. The same happened in the colonies. For instance, in 1880, in Luanda, Henrique de Carvalho and others created the Sociedade Propagadora dos Conhecimentos Geográficos Africanos [Society for the Promotion of African Geographical Knowledge]. Pressure for expansion, economically and politically driven, was also a local reality, in a context of widespread European inter-imperial competition, in the north and east of Angola (in the Congo and in the Lunda), but also in the south, where German imperial ambitions emerged (Freudenthal 2001, 135-169; Wheeler and Pelissier 1971, 71-76).

To the Portuguese, the internationalization of African issues that led to the Berlin conference reinforced the momentum for the nationalization of the empire (the creation of efficient conditions for the effective, even if restricted, occupation) and for the imperialisation of the nation (the promotion of the imperial and the colonial causes as a national imperative). From an economic point of view, the nationalization of the colonial economy was mandatory. Given the loss of the Luso-Brazilian empire and the progressive decline in slave trade, the plans to devise a new colonial economy, essentially aimed at the development of a plantation economy in São Tomé, Angola and Mozambique, also intended to enhance colonial sovereignty through a new geography of taxation in each colony, associated to the persistence of a traditional protectionist imperial policy (later epitomized by the tariffs of 1892), backed by specific metropolitan economic interests (for example, wine and textile industries) and always justified by grandiloquent declarations made by imperial nationalists. The political and economic processes of imperial nationalization were inseparable. The efforts to promote a new geography of taxation, based on a more stable and pacified commercial exchange and trade (via legal, technological, communicational and military procedures), were undoubtedly associated with a drive for territorial expansion. The motivations of the triangular strategy of territorial occupation of Ambriz, Bembe and São Salvador in Angola since 1855 are clear examples of this. The deployment of the State apparatus accompanied this rationale, of which the program of civilising stations is a telling illustration (Clarence-Smith 1985, 82, 85-86; Jerónimo 2012, 23-55).

The international idea of civilising stations, a term coined by Émile Banning, Leopold II’s main counsellor on African affairs, resonated in Lisbon. The Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa [Lisbon Geographical Society, 1875], one of the most important institutional springboards of

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7 For a set of examples of the work still to be done regarding the Portuguese case see Gann and Duignan (1977; 1978a; 1978b; 1979) and Kirk-Greene (1999; 2000; 2006). More recently see Méchat (2009).

8 For the Berlin conference see Förster, Mommsen and Robinson (1988)
imperial expansionism from the 1870s onwards, appropriated the expansionist idiom and repertoires set forth at the Conférence Géographique de Bruxelles, held in 1876, and the Portuguese civilising stations were created in 1881. Their existence was seen as the ‘most practical and humanitarian way that experience and science suggest’ of controlling the ‘component and adjacent territories’ of Portuguese overseas territories. They were also, perhaps above everything else, the fundamental political and ideological resource used to sustain Portuguese claims in the highly competitive imperial and colonial environment of the scramble for, and partition of, Africa.

Portugal looked for territorial expansion in order to civilise trade (that is, to turn commerce into a legitimate taxable enterprise) and to create the institutional conditions that could, at least in theory, civilise African populations, a major claim in the overall international competition for the legitimation of imperial expansionism. The expansion and the effectiveness of colonial sovereignty were justified as being the actual expansion of the conditions of and for civilization. The rationalization of economic circuits (which included the suppression of the slave trade and the reduction of contraband), the control of the political and economic agents (especially, but not only, of the native brokers), and the establishment of a modicum of infra-structural power of the colonial State (essentially materialized in fiscal and military structures) were claimed to be the fundamental institutional conditions to civilise trade and civilise the African populations. This was the fundamental context of the early imagination of the colonial State – a self-proclaimed civilising State – which was associated with political and economic maps that did not represent, or understand, local contexts and realities (Jerónimo 2012a, 179-181).

The turbulent frontiers (Galbraith 1959/1960) of empire, where international, inter-imperial, transnational and cosmopolitan forces (such as missionaries and businessmen, so fundamental in the articulation of international, metropolitan and colonial or imperial processes) abound in interaction with native societies, were crucial in defining the rhythm and success of political and economic nationalization of imperial territories. Similarly to what was argued regarding the series of crises of adaptation (Hopkins 1973, 125-126, 135-164; Law 1995) brought about by the socio-economic phenomena associated with the aftermath of abolitionism, these frontiers were surely agitated by the impact of late nineteenth-century imperial expansionism, being related to several important processes. The loci of resistance normally occurred at the nuclear nodes of the projects of commercial and administrative expansion and rule. One exemplary consequence was social banditry, one of the fundamental forms of peasant response to, and retribution against, the processes of white settlement and land expropriation and economic reorganization and exploitation associated with colonial expansion (Clarence-Smith 1979, 82-88; Isaacman 1977, 1-30). Among others, the famous cases of Mapondera and Dambukashamba, whose field of operation included the Mozambican-Zimbabwean frontier, illustrate how the history of the establishment of the colonial State is profoundly marked by local modalities of political, social, cultural and economic protest against the advent of colonial rule, its violent and exploitative modus operandi. Partially a response to these protest and resistance movements, the gradual consolidation of a routinized administration in the 1900s diminished the occurrence of social banditry (Isaacman 1976, 107-115). Another example was the voluntary migratory movements of protest, associated with turbulent and porous frontiers and also with the organization of a colonial polity based on active political repression and subjugation, economic exploitation (through taxation, land expropriation and forced labour exaction) and socio-cultural transformation (for instance of socio-religious nature, as Terence Ranger emphasized (Ranger 1985, 51-56; Rodney 1971, 509-536)). As elsewhere, the pax colonica faced constant and variegated resistance, from open protest (for instance through pamphleteering, the protest writing (Wheeler 1972, 67-87), revolts and insurrections to sabotages (of labour and productivity cycles or equipment), robbery and pillages, among others. With geographical variations within the empire and within each formal colony, the role of previous cultural ties and landscapes, the connections and dependencies of existing trade networks and the authority of former political allegiances continued to persevere despite the gradual emergence and consolidation of the colonial State’s apparatus. The diverse and widespread modalities of protest and resistance are certainly connected to this fact. Many of them, such as the hidden transcripts of resistance (Scott 1990) or the politics of survival (indirect forms of non-compliance) in colonial contexts (Ajayi 1968, 179-80, 189) are still understudied and require a collective effort for their proper socio-historical contextualization, if possible with a view to promoting an inter-imperial comparative assessment (Derrick 2008).

As José Francisco da Silva and many others acknowledged, as a project the empire required the establishment of mutual rewarding ententes between the Portuguese authorities and local powers. The frailties of the actual imperial sovereignty, the limits of colonial rule and the episodic nature of the demonstration of effective authority entailed a politics of

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9 See also the classics by Hobsbawn (1959, maxime 13-30; 1969).
cooperation with local native structures. Much remains to be done in order to understand the dynamic role of patterns of cooperation and conflict between the establishment of colonial administrative, military and fiscal structures and the development of local, native political communities. The 1880s and the 1890s were surely characterized by the establishment of rewarding ententes with African chiefs, first as a way to increase the evidence of presence, next to assert a logic of fait accompli (a set of anticipatory measures that aimed to prove precedence in occupation) and then to demonstrate compliance with the international agreements devised in Berlin. In the first two phases, the role of missionaries was crucial (their role was frequently more politico-diplomatic than religious), especially in the Congo, where the political, scientific, ecclesiastical and economic competition was vibrant and combined in many different and dynamic ways. The logic of occupation was essentially one of dispersion of postos militares (military posts), aiming at a modicum of influence, barely of administration, and based on local negotiation and cooperation. A path of indirect administration, which obviously had different natures and manifestations – from the mere presence of a military post to the negotiation and delegation of authority with a compliant local authority – was for instance visible since the 1850s in the Congo (Jerônimo 2012) and since 1890 in Bihe Plateau, Central Angola (Pelissier 1986, 69-74).

The evident advantages brought about by the use of modern warfare equipment, capable of counter-balancing the equally evident scarcity of logistical instruments and resources for a stable, institutionalized and territorialized administration, enabled the continuation of a modicum of colonial authority, despite the recurrent protest and resistance. The military incursions that formed the occupation movements of the so-called pacification campaigns between c.1890 and c.1926 were as much a sign of the fragility of the political, economic and social backbones of the empire as they were a demonstration of power. They were based on local human resources, on the local and sporadic recruitment of African auxiliary soldiers, mostly supplied by local clients, as a result of the traditional politics of cooperation and alliance with local potentados, sometimes associated with strategies of divide-and-rule, of instigation and instrumental use of local divisions. For instance, in the major revolt of 1917 in Amboim, certainly related to the Portuguese administrative and economic advances (related to coffee production), the Portuguese troops had the help of 3,000 African auxiliaries (Pelissier 1986, 52-56). The

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10 For an excellent and useful example of what is still to be done regarding the Portuguese colonial empire see Newbury (2003).
In 1894 a similar move was made in Angola, where the Mossamedes Company was created (with German capital). Here, however, the delegation of the administration of justice, of the control of customs and of policing was not granted by the Portuguese government, contrary to what happened to the companies in Mozambique (Hammond 1975, 261; Clarence-Smith 1975, 192; idem 1979, 17-18; Wheeler and Pelissier 1971, 74). The political and economic scope of the functions and powers that these companies possessed in Mozambique was vast, clearly contributing to the general process of emergency, consolidation and spread of repertoires of direct and growingly unified colonial administration and rule. The pacification via military actions in Gaza (1895-1897) and in Barué (1902), the parallel establishment of the ‘imposto da palhota’ (but-tax), the 1901 policy of land ownership (in which all unoccupied land became property of the State), the 1904 creation of a Secretaria dos Negócios Indígenas ([Department for Native Affairs] exclusively focused on the administration of the colonized in a much more organized and specialized manner) and the 1907 administrative reforms designed by Aires de Ornelas added to the reasons that marked an increase of political integration, even if not centralization, of the colony (Araújo 1900, 221-265; Vail 1976, 389-416; Neil-Tomlinson 1987, 17-28; idem 1999, 109-128; Newitt 1995, 324-334, 345-346; Isaacman 1972; Papagno 1980; Enes 1893; Capela 1977). Although different in historical nature and in terms of their action, the cases of the oligopoly of Companhia União Fabril (CUF) in Guinea and the roças in São Tomé add to the examples of quasi-States within quasi-States (Clarence-Smith 1985, 88, 167-168; Nascimento 2002; Jackson 1990).

For a mobile interventionism: pacify, tax, subdue, pacify again (c.1900)

Noticeable efforts towards intensification of colonial sovereignty emerged at the beginning of the twentieth-century. In Angola, Governor-generals Eduardo da Costa and Paiva Couceiro faced the intense limitation of effective territorial occupation and control, exemplified by the still resonant rebellion of 1872 in the Dembos region, near Luanda, or by the undeniable autonomy possessed by local powers in the Congo, in the Lunda district or in the Libolo or South of the Cunene regions (Costa 1903; Couceiro 1948). The widespread uprisings in these two regions in the beginning of the twentieth century, exemplified by the Vau de Pembe massacre on 25 September 1904 (a consequence of the clash between the Cuamatos and the Portuguese), were simultaneously a cause and a result of the nature of Portuguese colonial rule (Felgas 1958, 101; Duarte 1999; Péllissier 1986, 249-255). They were a cause in the sense that they demonstrated the shortcomings of effective occupation and rule. The recognition of this fact promoted efforts to create the conditions for an effective colonial expansionism and the actual territorialization of colonial sovereignty. They were a result because the revolts and uprisings were also an outcome of the multiple violent movements of territorial expansionism (and economic disruption), albeit not colonization, that marked the imperial venture in late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the aforementioned pacification campaigns. Not surprisingly, since the 1890s, the Portuguese colonial empire was characterized by an ‘endemic unrest’, essentially in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea. The Ovimbundu, the Bakongo, the Papi, the old prazo chiefs, the Muslim communities and the Makua, among others, were the main protagonists of a widespread turmoil, ignited by diverse motivations but also fuelled by common grievances regarding taxation and forced labour conscription.11

In the beginning of the century, the old coastal, mercantile model of occupation (with some outposts, especially in the Angolan plateau areas), merely based on the taxation of goods leaving the colonies and on circumstantial ‘rewarding agreements’, still prevailed. The new formula of occupation was to be based on a more systematic territorialization of sovereignty, which should entail a form of military government, especially in Mozambique (in Zambezia, Mozambique and Nyassa districts) and in Angola (in the Lunda and Huila districts). Rebellion left no other solution (Costa 1903, 37-39). Interventionism, as Paiva Couceiro termed the policy that could change the state of affairs, was indeed scarce and limited. In Angola, it only gained momentum as a stable colonial policy under his administration (1907-1909). He devised a general system of occupation, whose leitmotiv was ‘peace and civilization via labour’, articulated around six penetration axes. These assumed a close relationship between communication and occupation. The existing communication routes and outposts should determine, at the time, the spatial distribution of the colonial administrative apparatus, which should be a mobile one, given the inadequate resources and the enormous scope of the responsibility. Both of these reasons, reinforced by ideological and celebrated military legacies of the 1890s pacification campaigns, led Paiva Couceiro to support a particular type of interventionism, based on the ‘use of armed police with the occasional use of force’. ‘Occupation’ and ‘administration’ were mobile, based on police operations and on military campaigns. As he summed up, with no ‘positive facts of administration and of police’ there

11 For a summary see Newitt (1981 57-68).
were no justifiable ‘allegations of property’. Predictably, this strategy provoked sequences of quarrels, which were followed by the creation of more or less temporary military-administrative outposts. This was the nature of the much-needed colonial sovereignty: pacify, tax (the hut-tax) and subdue (avassalar) the ‘insurgents’, pacify again. Political and economic strategies were indissoluble. The control of the territory and the appeasement and occupation of the turbulent frontiers, the pacification of the colonial polity and its signs of insurgency, the security of the existing markets, and the enhancement of colonial taxation only meant something together (Couceiro 1948, 9-10, 13-20, 22, 26).12

The establishment of a form of direct rule became more than a project in the early twentieth century. The widespread conflicts enticed occupation, occupation ignited resistance. Alongside the examples already mentioned above, some additional ones, namely Angola and Mozambique, can be mobilized. In Angola, since 1902, following the evolution of the Bailundo War, the Central Highlands region was progressively occupied. The dynamics of occupation-resistance-pacification-occupation was obvious. In 1902-1903, Mutu-ya-Kevela was able to form a coalition of local powers against the Portuguese, given the nefarious impact of the actions of the Boers and the Portuguese settlers and of the declining economic conditions (with regard to the rubber trade, for instance).

In the north of Angola, in the Congo district, after the expansionist moves of the last decades of the nineteenth century, a series of mobile attempts to control the region took place in the 1910s. The ‘endless revolt of the Congo’, as Pelissier stressed (2004, 251), involved a widespread civil war related to political (royal succession) and economic (evolution of rubber trade) causes, which were eagerly used by the Portuguese to tentatively redefine the local balance of power. The Lunda district saw many similar examples. In 1907, the Dembos region, autonomous since 1872, was subject to military occupation, which nonetheless did not end the local expressions of revolt. In Seles (1902) and Arboim (1917-1918) the increase of colonists, gradually supported by a civil administration, and the related political and economic impact led to violent outcomes (Wheeler and Christensen 1973, 53-92; Vos 2005; Felgas 1958, 157-159; Teixeira 1948; Macedo 1913; Magno 1937; Pelissier 1986, 44-45 and 52-56). At precisely the same time as the Arboim revolt, a rebellion erupted in the Barue Kingdom in Mozambique. This revolt soon acquired a pan-ethnic nature. It was a pan-Zambeian demonstration of protest and resistance to the intensification of politic-administrative (tax-exaction and forced labour recruitment, namely to build a road system in the area) and economic (land expropriation and general commercial burdens) dimensions (Isaacman 1976, 156-185).

An increasing colonial interventionism in the 1900s onwards was also visible in two other interrelated aspects: the tentative reorganization of the political and administrative frameworks that could enhance colonial rule and the introduction of legislation focused on colonial taxation. As we have noted in the beginning, the detailed history of this interrelated political and economic interventionism on colonial fiscal sovereignty (and on its political, social and economic causes and consequences) is yet to be done. We use the Angolan case as a mere illustration. In 1906, two important political interventions occurred. There was a new administrative framework, organizing the colony into provinces, circunscrições and concelhos and new legislation was approved to regulate colonial taxation, starting effectively in the economic year of 1907-1908 (Decree of 13 September 1906). As José Ferreira Diniz (provincial-secretary of Angola) stated in his historical appraisal of the meaning and function in Angola, the ‘native tax’, or imposto de cubatas, was ‘one of the most valuable analytical element to assess the intensity and the efficiency of administrative occupation’ (Diniz 1929, 136, 147). It was surely a crucial aspect of the colonial economies, given the nature of the fiscal pact. It was also seen as a proof of an effective administrative occupation.13

In 1913, another piece of legislation was crucial to the consolidation of colonial sovereignty in Angola: the legal definition of the circunscrições administrativas reinforced the role, and importance, of the native taxes. As Norton de Matos, the governor-general of Angola that promulgated the legislation, clearly emphasized, tax-exaction was a powerful way to demonstrate the utility of colonial administration. Its payment should be promoted and enforced as ‘an act of gratitude given the advantages and the protection’ that the native population supposedly received from the colonial State. Moreover, its payment was ‘the recognition and acceptance of Portuguese sovereignty’, and its intent was ‘more political than financial’. It was ‘the final act of occupation, pacification and administration’, a ‘guarantee of pacification, of complete and loyal submission of the sobado, and its full integration in our administrative existence’. This would ultimately bring about the ‘end of expensive military operations, of severe repressions, of an anarchical state of affairs, unproductive and

12 The model to be used was the set of instructions given to the administrative installation in Cuito.

13 For a contemporary overview see Gonçalves (1908). For Mozambique see Capela (1977) and, for a later period, Santos (2007).
establishment promotion was essentially replicated the aims of the 1913's doctrine, although introducing a per capita tax and stressing an important point: colonial native taxation was also an important mechanism to 'lead the native to the good habits of labour' (Diniz 1929, 148-150, 154). It was a powerful auxiliary in the promotion of labour, forced if necessary, as the foremost instrument of 'civilization' (Jerônimo, 2010). This civilising justification was reinforced by the promulgation of Regulamento do Recenseamento e cobrança do imposto indígena [Regulation for indigenous tax registration and collection] in 1920, which defined the native tax as the 'driving force of civilization' (Regulamento do recenseamento e cobrança do imposto indígena, 1920, 8, 18). In 1948, the taxes paid by African peasants amounted to around 68% of the colony's revenue (Heywood 2000, 73).

This official document was also important for another reason: it articulated taxation with the production of censuses. The statistical objectivation of the imperial world aimed to create an imperial informational order that could sustain a more rational and effective administration of the colonial realm (Jerônimo 2006, 29-32). Again, the constitution and deployment of investigative modalities – in this case the survey and enumerative research – is still to be studied in the Portuguese case. Like in other imperial formations, the survey and the census investigative modalities were technologies of rule that rendered the natives legible and manageable. They were crucial tools of imperialism (Cohn 1987, 224-254; idem 1996, esp. 3-15; Appadurai 1993, 314-339; Ittmann, Cordell and Maddox 2010, 1-21). As the Regulamento stated, the 'organization of a survey of the workers and of the military service, as well as of the production of statistics about livestock, crops, agricultural produce and industrial production of the natives, and about the areas of production', was another 'indispensable' activity 'to a good and progressive administration' (Regulamento do recenseamento e cobrança do imposto indígena, 1920, 7). However, as a later assessment by the director of the Statistical Department of Angola stated, the 'lack of interest' that the colonial bureaucracy showed concerning 'statistical record and data', the obstacles posed by communications and by the organization and publishing of the Yearbooks, and the 'decentralization' of information-production (each department of colonial bureaucracy had its own mechanism and classifications schemes) contributed to a problematic state of affairs regarding the production and potential instrumental use of imperial and colonial statistics in the colonial State's administration (Lemos 1936, 4, 9-11, 13-14).

When Armindo Monteiro visited Angola in 1930 (as undersecretary of State of the Ministry of Finance) and in 1932 (as Ministry of the Colonies and also as Director-general of Statistical Services in Portugal), he was able to notice the 'overwhelming shortage of elements available to public services in order to provide information about the country, and even about their own activity, in a cognizant manner'. The appalling state of the information, statistical and otherwise, on the workings of the colonial State, on the colonial population and society, on 'its physiological movements', and on colonial resources and economies was undeniable. The existing numbers did not result from 'uncontroversial and methodical record', they were 'pure estimates'. In 1932, Monteiro ordered the constitution of a Department of General Statistics. In 1933, he decreed the Carta Orgânica do Império [Organic Charter of the Empire] and the Reforma Administrativa do Ultramar [Overseas Administrative Reform]. All this legislation aimed to transform the imperial informational landscape, multiplying the loci of imperial and colonial information-gathering, organization and dissemination, diversifying its modalities and widening their core subjects and their practical aims, while centralizing these processes. The production of statistics related to the indigenous populations was to be a special concern, and the enlargement of the colonial State apparatus considered fundamental, in order to enhance knowledge on them.

In 1935, the creation of the Instituto Nacional de Estatística [National Institute of Statistics] included a department of colonial statistics. In the same year, the introductory note to the Statistical Yearbook elaborated and published in Angola by the understaffed Statistical Services (created in September of 1932) declared that the main problem for the constitution of a viable instrument to the understanding of, and therefore to the intervention on, the activities of the colony was the 'flaws of its informants', that is, the fragilities of the State apparatus, not the quality of information provided by native intermediaries (Anuário Estatístico, 1935). Only in 1940 did Angola have its first general census. This certainly contributed to the informational

14 See Regulamento das circunscrições administrativas da Província de Angola (1913).
15 The provincial-decree was from January 14, not January 22 as the title indicates.
and practical debilities of the fiscal devices and the related phenomena of tax-evasion, despite the growing rates and the gradual widening of the tax-exaction. It also impacted on the historical process of consolidation of State power (Heywood 2000, 38).

As briefly noted above, the tentative reorganization of the political and administrative frameworks that could enhance the consolidation of State power was a major concern since the 1900s. The institutional territorialization of the colonial State’s apparatus required new political and legal terminologies and guidelines, as it required renewed repertoires of rule. The languages of scientific colonialism consolidated internationally and started to gain some currency in Portugal, addressing issues such as the proper, modern models of colonial administration or its relation to local polities (for instance, direct versus indirect rule or centralized versus acephalous systems of power in African communities) (Dimier 2004; Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1964). Side by side with the colonial administrative frameworks, one of the main questions was related to the degree of autonomy of the colonial State and respective administration, which was traditionally rather limited. Until the decentralising measures promulgated by the new republican regime in the 1910s and the overall political and constitutional revision of the relationship between the empire-State and the colonies (namely article 67 of the 1911 Constitution), following some of the ideas and precepts formulated by António Enes or Eduardo da Costa, the central government in Lisbon controlled the elaboration of colonial budgets (for instance for public works or for the pacification campaigns), the design of land and fiscal policies, the development of programs for colonial development and, always crucial aspects, the production of labour legislation and the management of the ‘system’ of native labour.

The administrative dynamics of the colonial State was determined by the Ministry of the Navy and Overseas (from 1911 onwards Ministry of the Colonies). This strict centralization of the empire-State did not prevent, however, the continuity of a longstanding reality in each colonial domain: the considerable degree of autonomy of local powers and the prevalence of mechanisms of cooperation or of episodic coercion. The latter were the sine qua non of a modicum of colonial administration. Despite the power of the Governor-general, who possessed a considerable degree of autonomy in the decision-making process (on political, economic and military affairs), and despite the formal regime of centralization, local realities prevailed. The legislation approved in 1914 aimed to transform the situation. The principles of administrative and financial autonomy of each province were laid down by the Organic Laws of 15 August 1914. The structure of the colonial administration, which comprised conselhos do governo [government councils] composed by local representatives (including the filhos do pai, sons of the country), aimed to promote a decentralized form of government, able to adapt to new circumstances and to sustain a new and much-needed imperial and colonial dynamics, one with a view to effective administration. The enhancement of local participation and the normalization of the participation of traditional authorities were some of the declared concerns and purposes. Their role in the establishment of a territorialized colonial State, on the founding of a new geography of taxation and on the organization of a system of native labour recruitment (based on compulsory mechanisms) was clearly recognized. As usual, these reformist projects failed to secure the necessary conditions to facilitate an effective materialization of the proclaimed objectives and the established legal norms. The multiplication of administrative instances was not accompanied by the multiplication of prepared colonial bureaucrats (Jeronimo, forthcoming; Newitt 1981, 175). Moreover, the traditional ‘superfluity of politics’ and ‘insufficiency of government’ (Smith 1970, 23) in the metropolis (thirty-three governments between 1890 and 1926) and in the colonies (for instance, in Mozambique, between 1890 and 1921 there were twenty-six governor-generals; from 1921 to 1926, four were the High-Commissioners) also contributed to the rather limited impact of these policies.

Nonetheless, the previous centralising tendencies, and their negative consequences, were confronted with the promulgation of a series of colonial organic charters (only properly executed after World War I). One of the novelties was the creation of the High-Commissioners’ regime. The 1920s legislation – namely the Bases Orgânicas de Administração Civil e Financeira das Colónias [Guidelines for the Civil and Financial Administration of the Colonies] of October 9, 1920 – conferred new and extended responsibilities to the colonial political authorities and enabled local budgetary control, including the raising of loans, which supported the period’s economic modernization, for instance in the promotion of infrastructures. This led to considerable debt and spiralling inflation. Decentralization and autonomy were the fundamental drives. A certain degree of legal autonomy regarding issues such as labour, land or native policies in general was also obtained in these new imperial political arrangements. The period of Norton de Matos, undeniably associated with the expansion of civil administration, was marked by efforts to increase the
colonial State’s autonomy regarding Lisbon. One of the milestones of his administration was the concession of a monopoly to Diamang, a company with French, South African and Belgian capital, in 1921. Apart from the exclusive rights to diamond prospecting and extraction, Diamang was granted the administration, policing and other social responsibilities in the Lunda, in Eastern Angola. Again, and despite the tentative erosion of native authorities (and their replacement by Portuguese administrators), the delegation of sovereign functions continued to be an option in an administration that had modernising and developmental tendencies (especially focused on communication infrastructures). Diamang should provide the ‘necessary amounts to subsidize the first stage of the efforts of development, of occupation, of administration and civilization’ that was under way, at least as a declared intent.

The tentative replacement of the predominance of mobile, military rationales in the political organization of the colonial polities by a civil model, based on the territorialized administration, included the continuity of such solutions, even though Norton de Matos aimed to restrict their potential of denationalization. For instance, the terms of the concession to the Cabinda Company (created in 1903) were redefined and those of the Mossamedes Company were tentatively altered, aiming to correct ‘a serious error of colonial administration’ that enabled ‘organizations and pretensions’ that could ‘damage our sovereignty’. Again, the actual realizations did not match the grandiose plans and the modernising precepts of the colonial policies of the time. Scarc capital (private or public) to invest, almost inexistent colonization (irrelevant emigration, despite a minor increase in the number of colonists), incomplete political authority and fragile economic and financial intervention are some of the reasons that, as always, explain the outcome (Matos 1926, 146-162, 211-226, 262-268 and 279-327, quotations at 307, 288; Cleveland 2008; Clarence-Smith 1985, 129-130).

More or less the same happened in Mozambique. The post of High-Commissioner, first attributed to Manuel Brito Camacho (between 1921 and 1923), again afforded a certain degree of politico-administrative and economic autonomy to the colony. A significant divergence was nonetheless visible regarding Angola: the role and power of the chartered companies was immense. The feudality of the colony was hard to overcome, and a new administrative order hard to establish. The formation of a modern colonial State was dictated by the nature, the characteristics and the duration of the sovereign and monopolistic States (the concessions), as it was by the action of the Banco Nacional Ultramarino [National Overseas Bank], created in 1864. The territories of Manica and Sofala, controlled by the Mozambique Company, were only under the direct administration of the colonial State since 18 July 1942. Like his Angolan counterpart, Brito Camacho also aimed to transform the economic landscape in Mozambique, facing constant obstacles, not only from within but also from British and South-African interests, focused on controlling the main loci of maritime and land transportation (namely the control of the Lourenço Marques port facilities and railway) and also, obviously, in benefiting directly from the colony’s administration eagerness for capital (Newitt 1995, 374-377). The famous ‘Hornung contract’ with the Sena Sugar Estates Ltd. (which involved the recurrent issue of state provision of African labour to private companies, up to 3 000 men per year, during 20 years) is a good example of the local (African and Portuguese), regional, inter-imperial and international political and economic dynamics that conditioned the establishment of a de facto authority of the colonial State and some of its plans to redefine its policies (Camacho 1926, 73-116; Head 1980, esp. 34-35, 50-51; Vail and White 1980, 215-216). As in Angola, the serious economic problems brought about by international and colonial processes in early 1920s created the conditions for a policy reversal that would take place over the next years.

The development of late colonialism

The Military Dictatorship of 1926 immediately brought about the reinstatement of centralizing doctrines and policies. The major objective of the Minister of the Colonies João Belo (1926-1928), military and former colonial administrator in Mozambique (where he spent almost three decades), was to organize a response to the troubled state of affairs. Side by side with other important measures that aimed to nationalize the colonial domains, increase the colonial State’s intervention and authority – namely the definition of new organic laws regarding civil and financial colonial administration, the Estatuto Político, Social e Criminal dos Indígenas de Angola e Moçambique [Political, Criminal, and Civil Statute of the Natives of Angola and Mozambique], 1926 and 1929, or the Estatuto Orgânico das Missões Católicas Portuguesas de África e Timor [Organic Statute of Portuguese Catholic Missions in Africa and Timor], 1926 –, Belo clearly saw the economic and financial relative autonomy of the regime of the High-Commissioners as the primordial error of previous imperial and

16 Norton de Matos was governor-general (1912-1915) and High-Commissioner of Angola (1921-1924). For his first incumbency in Angola see Dáskalos (2008, especially 55-58 and 169-189).
colonial policies. Centralization was the way out, the only one available to a new Imperial order, which would be given a legal substance with the Colonial Act of 1930 – the document that turned the historical mission to colonize into a constitutional precept and obligation – and with the legislation that followed, namely the above mentioned Organic Charter of the Portuguese Colonial Empire and the Overseas Administrative Reform, both of 1933 (Smith 1974, 653-667; Silva 1989, 101-152; Alexandre 1993, 1117-1136).

The 1930s Colonial Act envisioned the establishment of a unified empire-State, the greater Portugal, in a period of growing internationalization of imperial affairs. To the Portuguese authorities, the labours of the League of Nations and the International Labour Organization bred new problems that needed to be addressed and understood (Jerónimo and Monteiro 2012, 159-196). The regime of High-Commissioners was abandoned, the relative autonomy of the colonies suppressed, a measure that was also intended to limit the power of the white settler community. The conciliation between centralizing and autonomist programs of colonial administration, the politico-economic realities of the empire-State and the nature and characteristics of the colonial situation proved impossible to achieve. Centralization became the rule, nationalization the grand motto. The political and economic administration of the colonial empire returned to Lisbon. The predominance of metropolitan interests became a central principle, guided by a muscular economic nationalism (Jerónimo, forthcoming; Alexandre 1993, 209, 212). The premises of the corporative regime were extended to the colonial empire (Decree n. 27552 of March 1937) and reinforced the process. Fixed prices and quotas were defined to promote the coordinated production and commercialization of raw materials (the regime of culturas obrigatórias, since 1937) – cotton, sugar, coffee, maize, palm oil – which in some cases entailed the creation of monopolistic companies such as the Cotonang in Malange, Angola (Pitcher 1993; idem, 1995, 119-143; Isaacman 1996; Fortuna 1993). Following the Belgian model, certain ‘cotton areas’ with single concession-holders with exclusive rights of purchase from native producers, at fixed prices determined by the colonial State, were also created in Mozambique. In the 1940s, twelve cotton concession-holders existed in the colony (Vail and White 1980, esp. 273-275).

Besides the establishment of a ‘colonial pact’ and the establishment of imperial autarky (by the Organic Charter), the Colonial Act and the following legal and political measures entailed a clear effort to end the delegation of sovereignty that was a traditional mechanism of expanding political and fiscal authority over the colonies. In this process, among many other important policy transformations, one is particularly noteworthy: the tentative creation of a professional colonial civil service that could improve a centralized colonial bureaucracy and assure a considerable degree of autonomy of the colonial State from local powers and interests, and their respective initiatives. This bureaucratic reformulation also aimed at a redefinition of the network of intermediators and cooperative bodies in African communities. This process nonetheless entailed the political and economic incorporation and use of tradition titleholders and traditional authorities (under the supervision of the colonial bureaucracy), which continued to function as brokers, as tax-collections, as labour recruiters and other crucial roles. In some areas, this form of indirect rule was still predominant in the 1950s (Heywood 2000, 85-86).17

The post-World War II period was marked by renewed institutional, legal and administrative frameworks, in the metropolis and in the colonies. Following similar historical patterns in other imperial formations, the Portuguese colonial empire also revealed a ‘second colonial occupation’ (perhaps, a first), which entailed a significant expansion in the ‘scope of activity and scale of operation’ of the colonial State (Low and Lonsdale 1976, 12; Young 1998, 105). A committed transformation in the nature and modus operandi of the administrative, technical and specialized instances that governed the colonial empire and the promotion of new modalities of imperial legitimation were mandatory, given the rising pressures of anti-colonial nationalist movements and of international criticism over the resilience of imperial polities, among other important factors. The growth of revenues of the colonial State (due to the expansion of its geographies of taxation in the preceding decades and also to the colonial economic boom in the war period) allowed some room for manoeuvre regarding the expansion of the State’s orbit. The gradual redefinition of the fiscal pact towards an increasing metropolitan investment reinforced this tendency. Government planning and economic intervention by the colonial State was the rule, development the motto. But despite evidences of accommodation of imperial and international languages and methods of good government – a welfare colonialism based on models of State-directed economic development, political incorporation and social and cultural modernization –, the Portuguese case continued to reveal some of its longstanding attributes (Jerónimo and Pinto, forthcoming). Portuguese late colonialism was organized around a ‘repressive version of the developmentalist colonial State’, as Frederick Cooper aptly described it (Cooper 2002, 62).

Despite the celebration of doctrines of historical imperial exceptionality –

17 For the general economic policy see Clarence-Smith (1985, 146-190).
from the **civilizing mission** (Jerónimo 2010) to the 1950s appropriation of Gilberto Freyre’s *Luso-tropicalism* (Castelo 1999) — the colonial empire continued to be characterized by exclusionary native policies (on land, economic production, labour, education and citizenship) that engineered and administrated social, cultural, economic and political difference in its interior.

The legal persistence of the *indigenato* until 1961 (Cruz 2005) and of forced labour for public purposes until 1962, year of the Rural Labour Code that suppressed *de jure* all forms of compulsory labour, and of the abolition of compulsory crop growing among other important measures, are sufficient evidence of this (Jerónimo and Monteiro 2013). Contrary to what happened in other imperial formations, in which a decrease in ‘coercion in labour mobilization’, and the opening up of some ‘opportunities for political participation’ and for ‘social ascension’ were noticeable, the Portuguese case failed to replicate other reformist paths (Young, 1998, 106). In this respect, the formal re-creation of *regedorias* (according to local customs) was a telling demonstration (Portugal, Ministério do Ultramar, 1961). Contrary to what happened in other imperial formations, the Portuguese colonial State was never capable of ‘indigenizing itself’ (Darwin 1999, 74), not even to win hearts and minds in increasingly difficult circumstances regarding its own *legitimate* existence. But it was certainly effective in promoting forms of decentralized despotism (Mamdani 1996). No equal citizens, many different subjects.18

The 1950s saw important changes that aimed to modernize the empire-State and the colonial State, both at the metropolitan and colonial levels. In the metropolis, on the one hand, the legal end of the colonial empire was determined by the constitutional revision of 1951, whereby the Colonial Act of 1930, following two early reforms – Revision of 1945 and the Carta Orgânica do Império Colonial [Organic Charter of the Colonial Empire] in 1949 –, was incorporated in the constitution, therefore conflating the two existing legal frameworks (imperial and metropolitan) in a single document in order to sustain the claim of national unity. Colonies were now ‘overseas provinces’ and principles of political assimilation and economic integration were reinforced. A new ‘juridical construction of the empire’, as the former minister of Colonies José Ferreira Bossa foresaw in 1944, was a crucial move given the new international historical circumstances. The greater Portugal, a single political and economic polity, was a legal reality, even if one where the dual citizenship regime prevailed. The ‘necessities of the development and welfare’ of the overseas provinces were consecrated as priorities, as the article 159 of the Constitutional Revision declared and the 1953 Overseas Organic Law reinforced (Wilensky 1968; Silva 1989).

On the other hand, the constitution of the *Gabinete dos Negócios Políticos* [Cabinet for Political Affairs] (1959) marked the reorganization, and enhancement, of an institutional network of information and intelligence gathering, which comprised the Foreign Affairs Ministry, the Political Police (PIDE) and other agencies that operated at the colonial world (Silva 2008). This novel *empire of information* was to be the backbone of repressive developmentalism, and should prepare the empire-State and the colonial State to deal with the changing historical contexts, marked by the rise of emigration to the overseas provinces (Castelo 2007), by the related novel political and economic role played by the white communities (Pimenta 2008), and by the intensification of anti-colonial manifestations (raising questions of internal and external security). Another example of the ‘imperialism of knowledge’ (Cooper 1997, 64) that characterized other imperial formations, the new empire of information included the creation of ‘study’ sections to focus on the production of specialized knowledge about several imperial subject-matters, and therefore to enhance the decision-making process regarding imperial and colonial policies (Jerónimo and Pinto, forthcoming).19

The ‘imperialism of knowledge’, and its association with a repressive and developmentalist colonial State, was also a local phenomenon from the 1940s onwards, as the initial statement of Henrique Galvão and Carlos Selvagem demonstrated. The territorialization of the colonial State’s bureaucratic apparatus was supported by the creation of administrative instances dedicated to the mobilization of investigative modalities of knowledge production about colonial realities that could be given instrumental use by programs of economic development and projects of political control (e.g., counter-insurgency ones). For instance, in Angola, as Galvão and Selvagem duly noted, ten departments addressed financial and economic issues (from public works to scientific domains such as geology and forestry), several *juntas* dealt exclusively with the management of the coffee, cereal and cotton production and trade. The bureaucratization of the overseas world also included political goals. The forced incorporation of *mestiços* organizations into para-governmental agencies, designed to control, and curtail, the process of constitution of political parties was an

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18 For an excellent comparative analysis of the dynamics of political and administrative incorporation in the Portuguese and French empires, see Keese (2007).

19 For the formation of scientific knowledge in Portugal related to imperial affairs see Ágoas (2012) and Castelo (2012).
example. Similar operations were tentatively applied to the catholic ecclesiastical instances, with a view to turn them into civilizing agents of the colonial State. The ‘plethora of bureaucracy’, as technical and specialized services multiplied, was formed, resulting from multiple motivations (scientific, military, economic and financial, political), and being associated with numerous groups and institutions possessing diverse interests and intents, from the promotion of a scientific takeover of the empire to the strategic creation of solid foundations to resist decolonizing pressures (Galvão and Selvagem 1953, 350).

The 1950s also saw the beginning of several developmental plans that were devised to modernize the imperial and the colonial worlds (Pereira 2012). The expansion, rationalization and professionalization of colonial governance and respective bureaucracy, the appropriation of international languages of welfare colonialism and the promotion of State-planned and State-directed economic development were parallel, frequently combined processes. Despite its characteristics and shortcomings, the 1953 six-year Plano do Fomento [Improvement Plan] combined State-coordinated and State-managed social, political and economic rationales, in which issues such as community development, rural welfare and development, (re)settlement projects and ethnic colonization, the moral and spiritual advancement of native communities, transfer of technology and techniques, political and economic integration and exploration were addressed. Subsequent plans would emphasize this feature. Colonial interventionism was now a multifaceted program.

A good example of this combination of political, socio-cultural and economic intents that characterized the social engineering imagination of the late colonial State were the colonatos (native and European State-directed and managed, rural settlement schemes), the exemplary model of the core premises of late colonial development. Another example of this integrated conception of developmentalism were the aldeamentos (native colonatos). Beside purposes such as the control of migration and labour mobility, the coordination of agricultural produce or the promotion of western forms of family, the aldeamentos were also governed by a clear military-strategic reasoning, that is, the establishment of safe areas where nationalist, insurgent influence could be contained and counteracted. They were part of a larger anti-insurgency package (Bender 1973, 235-279; idem 1978, 104-107; Jerónimo and Pinto 2012c). The ‘plethora of bureaucracy’ of the late colonial State was created to meet these multifaceted programs. The formation of intervention teams of Serviço Psico-Social [Psycho-Social Services] or the creation of Juntas Provinciais de Povoamento [Settlement Provincial Departments, 1961] – both focused on the

propagation of modern techniques of agricultural production but also of codes of hygiene, for instance – are two outcomes of the developmental drive that aimed to induce rapid but strictly controlled social transformation within the empire that since 1951 was one no more; after the Constitutional Revision (Soares 1961; Junta de Investigações do Ultramar 1964; Bender 1978, 159-160, 165-196).

They are also an illustration of the scope of activity and the scale of operation of the late colonial State, in a context in which the war (1961 onwards in Angola, 1963 in Guinea, 1964 in Mozambique) also added to the provinces’ economic dynamism, given the enlargement of colonial markets (to meet the rising European demand, also a result of metropolitan emigration) and the increase in public expenditure (on public works, sanitary facilities, communications, etc.). The formation of a colonial ‘security State’ was one of the fundamental elements, simultaneously a cause and a consequence, of the particular type of repressive developmentalism that characterized Portuguese late colonialism. Alongside many other consequences, the spread of the military conflict in Portuguese Africa reinforced the informational and institutional operations of the late colonial State, enhancing its repressive and its developmental combined nature, which would constitute one of the legacies to independent States and postcolonial societies (Mahoney 2003, 165-198; Young 1988, 25-66).

Conclusion

The historical trajectory of the colonial State since the emergence of new imperialism – oversimplifying, from a ruthless extractive action and arbitrary deployment of authority, essentially based on tax-exaction and forced labour recruitment, to a developmental, welfare colonialism – was obviously a multifaceted and dynamic, often contradictory and ambiguous, process. The move from a ‘night-watchman State’, focused on maintaining an orderly status quo, towards a ‘proactive’, ‘dense’ and ‘big State’ – driven by a modernizing impetus that could enhance its legitimate existence and could meet the political, moral and economic challenges of the post-World War II world, and marked by the multiplication of “parapolitical institutions” and by a drive to promote administrative and culture uniformities in the colonies – was dissimilar in each imperial formation and in each colony (Darwin, 1999, 76-78). This comparative, inter-imperial and inter-colonial history is yet to be made. The comparative history of this process in the “third” Portuguese empire also remains to be done. The historical analysis of aspects such as State autonomy (vis-à-vis
international, metropolitan and colonial interests and organizations), bureaucratic rationality (the development of the proactive, planning and coordinating, interventionist State, from political to economic and socio-cultural aspects), social penetration (the territorialization of State authority and its institutional framework, from military to judicial and educational presence) and governmental legitimacy (internal, regarding African but also European settlers, and external, regarding international organizations, transnational movements and other States, including post-colonial ones) in each colony is still missing.  

Notwithstanding regional variations, local specificities and historical particularities (that need to be detailed and explored), the history of the colonial State in the Portuguese colonial empire is the history of the constitution – with uneven manifestations, evolution and impact (namely the obvious rural versus urban divide) – of a repressive developmentalism (Jerónimo and Pinto 2012c). Perhaps the depiction of the African colonial State as ‘the purest modern form of autonomous bureaucratic autocracy’ (Young 1994, 160) derives from an overemphasis on some of its characteristics. Based upon a ‘modus vivendi accommodation’ with local societies, the rewarding ententes that impacted negatively on its autonomy, the colonial State had, for the most part of its existence, a patent restricted authority. Given the recurrent shortage of human and material resources to effectively administer the colonial realms and given the active resistance to its authority by multiple constituencies (internationally, at home and abroad), the colonial State possessed a moderate and incomplete influence, producing a manifest uneven (under)development. Considering the bureaucratic heterogeneity of institutions and actors (with different motivations and contexts of action), even in an authoritarian regime, the empire-State and the colonial State did not constitute a monolith, a uniform corpus of doctrines, policies and actual decisions, without contradictions and internal conflicts. Nor were they examples of bureaucratic rationality or efficiency. However, the history of the “third” Portuguese colonial empire would be manifestly incomplete without a proper study of the colonial State as a pivotal actor in its historical formation.

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21 For a critical assessment of Young (1994) see Berman (1997, 556-570, at 564).


Chapter Three


Sá da Bandeira. “Relatório”, in Memorial Ultramarino e Marítimo 1, March, 1836.


