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Happy Holidays to all our fellow members of RC-16! We are very pleased to offer you another issue of Theory, just in time for the New Year. In addition to section announcements and news, we have two substantive pieces for your reading enjoyment: The first, “Sociological Theory as Demilitarized Zone” by Brad West and Steve Matthewman, considers how sociological theory neglects the subjects of war and the military. The second, by Filipe Carreira da Silva, asks “Who reads Tocqueville today?” We hope you enjoy both papers and we wish you the best for a happy and productive 2017.

- Erik Schneiderhan and Daniel Silver
We would like to thank everyone who attended the mid-term conference in Cambridge and/or the Forum in Vienna (where we had a couple of sessions). We have now started the preparations for the World Congress in Toronto where we hope to see many of you.

It is difficult to ignore the troubling political shifts that are taking place across the globe, in particular the atrocities in Syria and the dire situation of so many refugees. Our meeting in Cambridge took place in the immediate aftermath of the EU-referendum, and since then we have had the US-elections. It will be important for us as a sociological community to reflect on these significant developments worldwide and their possible consequences for the future of liberal democracy. Hopefully, Toronto will provide such an opportunity. We will be shaping some of our session themes so that there is space to discuss the changes in the world around us.

Patrick Baert & Agnes Ku
In the 1960s and 1970s, Raymond Aron's *Main Currents of Sociological Thought* introduced Tocqueville to a generation of sociologists alongside Weber, Durkheim and Marx. Granted, Tocqueville never made it to the inner circle of the sociological canon (that was reserved for the Marx-Durkheim-Weber trio), but *Democracy in America* was generally acknowledged as a classic in political sociology and some of the most important sociological works of American sociology in the 1960s were Tocquevillian in character. Think of Seymour Martin Lipset’s *Political Man* (1960), or Reinhardt Bendix’s *Nation-Building and Citizenship* (1964). The late 1960s mark the peak of Tocqueville’s prestige in sociology. From that point onwards, Tocqueville’s influence and prestige among sociologists begins to decline in such a way that today he is barely mentioned in sociology classrooms. This brings me to the issue I wish to tackle in this paper. Why is Tocqueville dead in sociology today?

This is especially puzzling because in other disciplines, namely political science, he has never been more alive. *Democracy in America* is hailed as an undisputed classic of political philosophy, one of the key texts to understand American politics and society. What explains the simultaneous decanonization in sociology and canonization in political science?

Current explanations are either internalist or externalist. Internalist explanations emphasize aspects such as Tocqueville’s theoretical genius or his methodological lessons. This is exemplified by the Straussian quest for the hidden meaning of the work typical of neoconservative political philosophers. I will return to this later in my argument. Externalist explanations stress factors such as the institutional and cultural contexts in which the production and reception of his ideas took place. These have dominated the study of the reception of Tocqueville’s ideas in the social sciences.

More recently, some have tried to combine internalist with externalist approaches. For instance, American intellectual historian Mathew Mancini (2006) studies the “changing images” of Tocqueville for American intellectuals to conclude that Tocqueville and *Democracy* have exerted a broadly continuous influence from the 1830s to the present day.

I believe this to be insufficient. It fails to account for the significant variations of its impact over time.


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or across disciplines. For instance, Mancini has nothing to say about why *Democracy* (and Tocqueville) have been simultaneously canonized in political science and decanonized in sociology, as well as the variations in impact over time.

I think this is because there are problems with internalist and externalist approaches that their mere combination does not solve. Texts are assumed to be stable, fixed, and unimportant. Attention is drawn either to the human agents (involved in the production and interpretation of the text) or to the external factors shaping their choices. But texts are never stable. Texts are inherently unstable. To study their existence through successive material incarnations is anything but unimportant – it is essential to understand how meaning-making comes about.

In practice, this means one has to study the publication history of *Democracy in America* in search of evidence of how changes in the material form of the book are related to changes in its standing for a given community of readers – sociologists, political scientists or the American people in general. Some of this evidence is in the paratexts accompanying different editions of the book (e.g. introductions), some refers to editorial choices (e.g. edited versions), and some lies in the scholarly reception of these editions (book reviews – so paratexts that lay outside the book but refer to it). Here I focus on the case of the reception of *Democracy* by sociologists and political scientists in postwar America.

For the purposes of *Democracy*, the postwar period begins right when Germany is surrendering to the Allied forces in late April, early May 1945. In April 16, 1945 the first, and most successful, edition of *Democracy* in the twentieth century hits the stands. You may be surprised, but it was near impossible to get hold of a copy of the book in New York in the 1930s. The last edition had appeared in 1912, and it was a hardbound, illustrated, low print run edition. For decades, access to *Democracy* was difficult and Tocqueville’s reputation suffered from it. But everything changes in the postwar period.

Of course, the context is different. The world changed dramatically in those years, and so did academia, including the social sciences, which become institutionalized to an extent hitherto unknown.

But we cannot ignore the text. The fact that the text was now available in hundreds of thousands of copies, introduced in such a way as to stress its sociological relevance, proved crucial for the “Tocqueville revival” of the 1950s. I refer to the early paperback editions of *Democracy*. The first, already noted, came out in April 1945 and was introduced by Philipps Bradley, a Queens College professor of political science who was, nonetheless concerned with Tocqueville’s “sociological insights”. Chief among these is Tocqueville’s seminal contribution to the study of race relations. Tocqueville is presented to the postwar generation of American readers as a classic: “a sociological inquiry into the implications of democracy.” (1945: xciv) Reviewers noted approvingly of Bradley’s progressive leanings. The overwhelmingly positive scholarly reception of the Bradley edition helped set the stage for hermeneutical encounters between text and readers in postwar America.

But as the Bradley edition made its way, another strand of editions plays a crucial role in the struggle over meaning of Tocqueville in the 1940s and 1950s. This other strand, however, is not ideologically progressive but distinctly conservative. This strand begins also in 1946 with the Oxford World Classics edition, perhaps the worst edition of *Democracy* ever to have been published. More than its typos and factual errors, this abridgement effectively sanitizes Tocqueville. Henry Steele Commager is the first of a line of editors to offer a celebratory vindication of Jacksonian America, with no mention of its racial tension and social contradictions. All dissonant chapters, including the famous “three races chapter” at the end of Part I, are swiftly eliminated. In the Introduction, Tocqueville is framed as a precursor of methodological individualism and an icon of political conservatism whose key political lesson lies in how to escape the dangers of the tyranny of the majority. Likewise, Richard Heffner's abridgment of *Democracy* (1956) pits Tocqueville against Marx: the ability of Tocqueville to go beyond Marx is traced back to his anti-egalitarianism and his rejection of the equation of equality and freedom, of democracy with liberty.
My argument is that these two editorial strands acted as material outlets for broader intellectual movements to appropriate *Democracy* for opposing ends. The pages and covers of *Democracy* became the focal point of two parallel attempts to re-assemble text and artifact in order to turn Tocqueville into an icon of conflicting political ideals and academic projects. The Bradley edition eventually wins over the conservative abridgments of the 50s and "Tocqueville, the sociological classic" gradually emerges in the following decade. Ironically, the Bradley edition falls victim of its success. After having helped train a generation of progressive-oriented social scientists by introducing them to Tocqueville’s political sociology, academic and commercial pressures mount to have its material form adapted to the *Democracy*’s recently acquired classic status.

As a result, a new edition of *Democracy* appears. In 1966, Harper and Row published the first English translation of *Democracy* since Henry Reeve’s 1830s translation. Behind this edition is J.-P. Mayer, the editor of Tocqueville’s complete works. The Introduction is by Max Lerner, whose *America as a Civilization* (1957) is, with David Riesman’s *The Lonely Crowd*, one of the two great popularizers of Tocqueville in the 1950s. Its publication in the summer of 66 is the editorial sensation of the season, with enthusiastic reviews in major academic journals as well as in the *New York Times*, *The Washington Post* and the *Chicago Tribune*.

The 1960s mark the peak of Tocqueville’s prestige in American sociology. Published in the 1830s, the truth is that almost half of the scholarly production on Tocqueville appears between 1950 and 1968 (Drescher 1968: 200). In my view, this fact cannot be dissociated from the specific material form the text assumed in this period: paperback, cheap and framed in politically engaged ways.

The contrast with sociology today could not be more striking. *Democracy in America* is simply not regarded today as crucial to the training of professional sociologists, most textbooks in sociology and sociological theory do not mention it, and sociologists are much more likely to offer genealogies tracing their research to the work of Du Bois, Harriet Martineau or Jane Addams rather than Tocqueville. Changes in culture and organization of American sociology in the last fifty years are important but not enough to explain the demise of Tocqueville.

The contrast with political science is instructive. In political science, interest around *Democracy* is thriving. This interest and enthusiasm is certainly related to the way political science in America, namely political philosophy, has been taken over by the neoconservative movement in the last few decades. But, I argue, it cannot be fully understood if we ignore the work by neoconservative political philosophers around the book itself. A new wave of reissues was published in the 1990s early 2000s, with editors framing the book as a classic in political philosophy. Like in the 1950s, these agents have a clear ideological agenda.

Under the conservative sponsorship of the Bradley and the John Olin Foundations, Harvey Mansfield produced in 2000 a new translation and edition of *Democracy* for University of Chicago Press, perhaps the most important of these reissues. Hailed as “Tocqueville for the neo-cons”, this edition was not reviewed in any major sociological journal but it received an enthusiastic reception in neoconservative outlets. In the Introduction, Mansfield and Debra Winthrop apply Straussian hermeneutics to explore the hidden meaning of the text. The tyranny of the majority, absent from the second volume, suddenly becomes the central problem around which the whole of *Democracy* revolves and the most pressing political problem afflicting America today. The “three races” chapter instead of being about race relations is reframed as a discussion on “pride”, the “unstated” theme of the chapter. The fact that Tocqueville himself never uses the term is of little import for the Straussian interpreter.

I conclude by elaborating my answer to the puzzle of the contrasting destinies of Tocqueville in sociology and political science (see also Silva and Bucholc 2016; Silva and Vieira 2011; Silva 2015).
The meaning of Tocqueville’s magnum opus and its relative standing in the canon of each discipline has been anything but constant: rather, it has changed markedly since its publication in the 1830s. There have been many Tocquevilles, especially since 1945. Behind each Tocqueville, we find a historical context, collectives of agents motivated by political and intellectual reasons, and different editions of the work that provide those agents with a key instrument to advance their ideas and interests. By following the book, one witnesses an ever-changing artifact, whose mutations reflect the cultural work of social agents deeply involved in the politics of the book, which they often see as part and parcel of the politics of disciplines or political movements.

In order to account for this variation in the meaning of Democracy one needs to pay more attention to the book as a thing, a material object, a mobile artifact and look for, and explain, the differences in the way the book is introduced, edited, and graphically presented.

For most of the twentieth century, the arbitrary relation between signifier and signified emphasised by Saussure and his followers led us to think that ideas were essentially a matter of language, and power akin to a language game. Since the 2000s, there has been a growing awareness of the limitations of this position. Pragmatism teaches us that there are instances in which the relationship between signs and their referents is far from arbitrary, i.e. it involves a reference to the world. Icons, such as portraits or statues, formally resemble their objects. This formal resemblance between the signifier and the signified, however, need not be tangible. A book is a representation of the ideas of its author, and its author’s standing in collective memory cannot be properly understood without a reference to it. Ideas are not free floating signifiers; they have a materiality of their own.

Classics are not arbitrary symbols that obtain their meanings purely from their relationships to other classics in a canon. Rather, a canon is a theoretical space of relations where positions are occupied not by floating, arbitrary signifiers but by material signifiers. As a text-artifact-metaphor, Democracy is one such material signifier. The concepts it signifies, even if not predictable, are far from arbitrary. They draw upon the properties of the signifier – the form, weight, shape, size, material, colour, and discourse of each unique copy from each edition. This means that its death among sociologists today refers to its demise as a social object. It no longer has the common meaning it once had and is, for the same reason, unable to turn the reader into a certain kind of sociologist. Yet it also means that if sociologists are indeed to bring it back to life we need to work together around its text, material form, and metaphorical standing.

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The study of war and the military is a relatively neglected field within sociological theory. Various reasons have been offered to explain this absence. The Enlightenment project serves as an obvious starting point. Imbued with the ethos of the Enlightenment, sociologists looked to the future as a source of legitimacy, stressing social progress and human perfectibility. The modern dream included an end to organised violence (Joas, 2003). Early sociologists believed that militarism and mass violence were more salient phenomena in the comparatively barbaric pre-modern and early modern eras. There was good reason for this belief. As Tiryakian (1999) notes, the discipline’s foundation by scholars like Saint-Simon and Comte coincided with the close of the Napoleonic War. This ushered in a century of relative European peace. One consequence of this is that sociologists have failed to fully appreciate the connections between war and social life (Joas, 2003; Shaw 1999).

Malešević (2010) makes an interesting intervention here, asserting that some early sociological writings (and the social conditions in which they were writing) were militaristic, for example the work of Ludwig Gumplowicz, Gustav Ratzenhofer and Lester Ward. This militarism is also evident in the work of the early American sociologists like William Sumner and Pitirim Sorokin, as well as in parts of Georg Simmel’s writings. For Malešević (2010) it was only following the horrors of the Second World War that a new pacifist sociology was formed. The “founding fathers” [sic] of Marx, Weber and Durkheim, who seldom mention war (cf. Barbalet 2010), were selected and established as a new canon to serve this peaceable end. Following this classical model, sociology in the second half of the twentieth century largely concerned itself with capital, the state and globalism rather than war, the military and nationalism, even though these concerns are on the one hand thoroughly interrelated and on the other have distinctive characteristics requiring a specific analytic focus.

Wartime Sociology
War has also shaped sociology in more direct ways that have contributed to analytic neglect of military matters. The First World War stunted the development of sociology, with a number of emerging intellectual traditions in Europe suffering the loss of a generation of scholars, in particular that associated with Durkheim. The Second World War also challenged the discipline by raising questions about sociology’s societal relevance for the war effort. As Parsons and Barber (1948:247) note in the American context, while law, economics and psychology were heavily used by the state during the war, sociology was a peripheral discipline lacking ‘a clearly recognized sphere of technical competence which would have made it a matter of course for those in authority to call upon their services, even where they were potentially valuable’.

In the immediate period following the Second World War a sociology of war and the military appeared to be ascendant. Two separate but significant literatures emerged. The first concerned itself with the institutional aspects of the military, particularly with the identity and role of the professional soldier. This is evident in the 1946 thematic issue of the American Journal of Sociology on ‘Human Behavior in Military
Society’. In many cases this scholarship was led by ex-soldiers who had returned to the discipline and often rested on observations made during their service. As an illustration of this phenomenon, note Ralph Turner’s (1947) early publication ‘The Navy Disbursing Officer as a Bureaucrat’ which was drawn from the role conflict he experienced as a junior officer in charge of payroll during his service on the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Lexington in the Pacific. However, Turner like most other veterans in the discipline, did not sustain interest in military matters, and due to the political environment we did not see a similar surge in scholarship following the Vietnam War. A sociology of war and the military also appeared through publications from government-funded scholarship during the war. This includes Shils’ (1950) surveys of German prisoners of war which pointed to the influence of group solidarity over ideology for effective fighting behaviour; research in the media effects of propaganda by Columbia University’s Bureau of Applied Social Research led Lazarsfield and Merton (Merton and Lazarsfield, 1950); and the sociological methods utilised by Marshall (1947) to establish the low rate of fire by soldiers on the frontline, even when they were themselves endangered.

This work has had some enduring influence on the discipline, for example on the emergence of small group sociology and public opinion scholarship. However, rather than contributing to a greater disciplinary awareness of war and the military within contemporary society, the influence of this scholarship has tended to be limited to providing a foundational influence on the field of military sociology. Morris Janowitz as founding chair of the Research Committee on Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution (RC01) in the International Sociological Association largely set a research agenda in the field with a sustained focus on military organization, training and civil-military relations. Subsequently we saw this research tradition led by Charles Moskos and today David Segal and others continue it through a myriad of studies on recruitment, professional identity and civilian lifestyle, field performance, and race and gender equality in the military. The strength of such work is that it pays empirical attention to institutional cultures and the practices of social actors, particularly through documenting the diversity of attitudes towards military matters and highlighting the differing cultures and individuals within its institutions. As such, military sociology has avoided seeing the military as simply a mirror of dominant ideologies. However, the internal focus on the military by the field has seen it typically neither acknowledge nor critique the social and political consequences of the Western military-industrial complex. While military sociology will often address civil-military relations in terms of civilian oversight, tensions and role conflict, it does not directly analyse the dynamics of civil society per se and thus only has a narrow conception of its influence.

A second literature took as its point of departure the determining role played by the United States in the Second World War, and the subsequent entrenchment of a massive military establishment and a permanent armaments industry in that country. This work concerned itself with the changing nature of military consciousness and hierarchy in the Cold War era. The most eminent scholar in this area was C. Wright Mills. For Mills the Cold War arms race was the defining characteristic of post-WWII society, providing the military with a new prominence and alignment with other elites. As outlined in The Power Elite (1956), part of this condition involved the convergence of military, state and corporate interests, groups and cultures. For Mills, this led to a legitimization and normalization of a war consciousness within civil society, something he would refer to as a ‘military metaphysics’. This organizational and cultural shift required sociology to give greater attention to war and the military, a point he elaborated on in his all-but-forgotten work The Causes of World World Three (1958). The Power Elite would remain influential in the discipline but it has generally been taken up in the study of the state and industry, with the military, if considered at all, taken as a dependent variable beholden to these other spheres (a strong sociology resists military subordination).

Towards a New Sociology of War, the Military and Civil Society

There is a danger in over emphasising the neglect of war and the military in sociological theory. For example, armed conflict has been a core concern in the work of sociological theorists such as Anthony Giddens, Michael Mann and Charles Tilly. However, overwhelmingly this scholarly attention appears within a historical comparative framework. The focus on the foundation of the modern state, for example, grants military organizations major causal roles in pre-modern modes of political rule. As such
this work can be read as locating war and the military as historical phenomena rather than a continuing presence in the shaping of contemporary social relations.

Sociological theory also appears in the analysis of war and the military through the interdisciplinary field of Peace Studies, for example in analysis of the causes of wars, as well as in the attempts of the field to develop strategies for conflict resolution and to advance alternative worldviews to those which emphasize militarism. The influence of sociological theory within Peace Studies has been important in providing an alternative to the dominant rationalist conception of power within the International Relations field. However, war and the military from this perspective are too often presented as mere ciphers of other specific political and social forces, such as networks of elites, the power of the state or the rationale of global capitalism. As such we seldom find within this literature an empirical concern with the institutional aspects of the military or a comprehension of war as a historical event which actively shapes, in contrast with reflecting, contemporary social relations and social structures.

We suggest that this epistemological weakness is also evident in the related recent post 9/11 literature on the militarization of Western culture. While this scholarship has the potential to develop upon Mills’ idea of a military metaphysics and to highlight complex interconnections between the military and civil society, it is typically based on assumptions about military culture and the nature of social and political change. We do not deny that social problems emerge from a militarization of culture, but we do suggest the need for a theoretical framework which can allow for systematic investigations into the extent, form and consequences of militarization. This includes the appreciation of a normative comprehension of conflict that could examine the diversity of social outcomes from war and an account of the multiple and changing nature of military culture. The former might relate to historically acknowledging democratic outcomes associated with warfare, and the latter to the increasing professionalization of military roles.

Much of the recent sociological theorising of emergent forms of warfare and changes in modes of organised violence though has occurred relatively independent or at the margins of the established intellectual traditions we note above. It has included illuminating investigations into transformations in the gender and racial constitution of the military, an increasing use of the military for ‘humanitarian’ interventions in international conflict, the growth of terrorist acts and fighting by non-state actors in international hostilities, the civilian impacts of the ongoing War on Terror, attempts within the armed forces to redress entrenched discrimination practices within their own ranks, and the emergence of new technologically-mediated modes of warfare. Such work has been led by respected scholars such as Anthony King, Martin Shaw, Joseph Pugliese, Sinisa Malešević and Catherine Lutz. Notwithstanding the significant empirical insight and important theoretical advances made by such work, collectively it is characterised by a lack of programmatic direction, without which we argue that war and the military is likely to remain marginalized within sociological theory.

While this note is not the place to outline a complete program, we will conclude by arguing that the relationship between war, the military and civil society needs to be more properly comprehended. Specifically, we suggest that a robust sociological theory in the area should subscribe to a symmetry principle in which war and the military are comprehended through an application of analytic logics in ways which holds a consistent comprehension of civil society and its influence in the shaping of society. Rather than subscribing to a containment perspective in which there is a strict separation of war and the military from civil society, sociological attention should instead be the porousness between the two. One of the most serious consequences of the neglect of war and the military in sociology and our failure to acknowledge a driving force of modernity is the way it downgrades the discipline’s explanatory power to appreciate the military’s profound influence on everyday social practices. Another way of thinking about this is to suggest that a strong sociology of the war and military should move beyond event-based thinking. While it is valid to consider wars like Vietnam as events, the social, financial and environmental costs do not end when the conflict does. Consequently, social analysis should not stop either. For instance, hundreds of thousands of American troops suffered major physical and psychological trauma in that war. Four decades after war “ended” US veterans’ payments are rising. The effects of ordnance and defoliants raining down on Vietnam have had multi-generational consequences there too. In very
The focus on events, those visible ruptures that transcend everyday thought and action, is understandable. But it may take the focus away from processes and everyday activities, which are not always as obvious. Only when we consider processes – militarization as doing – do we begin to develop a strong sociology of war and the military, for it is only then that we start to see military influence in its fullness. As noted above, discussions of militarization are not absent from existing sociological literatures, though it can mean many things, and often lacks conceptual specificity. This includes the production of anxieties, the provision of memories, and ways of doing and thinking that impact upon wide regions of civic life (Turse 2008). It also includes the normalization of military products, the promotion of military interests as universal ones, and their inculturation into daily life such that people are influenced by, or dependent upon, military values and institutions (Enloe, 2000: 2-3). A more multi-dimensional understanding of militarization would not only focus on cases of cultural shifts in the direction of militarism, but the manifold ways that the military influence culture. Technology transfer from military to civilian worlds constitutes an obvious element. As Mariana Mazzucato (2013: 177) has illustrated, almost all of the ground-breaking technology contained within Apple’s “i” products owes its existence to US military expenditure. The iPod’s click-wheel, dynamic random access memory cache (DRAM), liquid-crystal display (LCDs), lithium-ion batteries, micro hard drive, microprocessor, and signal compression emanate from military sources, being developed by such entities as the US Army Research Office, and the Department of Defense. These technologies all fed into the iPod Touch (2007), iPhone (2007) and iPad (2010), which were supplemented by cellular technology, Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP), Hypertext Mark-up Language (HTML), the internet, Global Positioning System (GPS), multi-touch screens, and Speech Interpretation and Recognition Interface (SIRI). Again, a host of players in the state-security nexus are responsible for their development, including the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and the US Navy. Such has been Apple’s success that in 2011 its revenue eclipsed the US government’s operating cash balance, but, as Mazzucato (2013: 174) writes, this commercial success is built on martial origins: ‘From its humble beginnings selling personal computer kits to its current place as the leader of in the global information and communications industry, Apple has mastered designing and engineering technologies that were first developed and funded by the US government and military’.

A second way into a strong sociology of war and the military is through a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between representation, belief and action. One area that sociology has been willing to commit to the study of war and the military is around propaganda and media portrayals of conflict. The traditional emphasis in this scholarship, though, has been on “strong effects”: the power of the propagandist to manipulate citizens to embrace military causes. In more recent media research there is an appreciation of the active subject, of performative and contingent aspects of media portrayals and interpretations of war. In relation to military-public relations, this involves mapping how such military strategies are providing an ample supply of compelling but sanitized footage and technical information or permitting the embedding of journalists with troops plays itself out with the media’s institutional restrictions and industry demands. There has also been growing awareness of the ways in which divergent narratives are constructed through the public sphere to consider how the cultures of civil society can overcode military conventions and interests.

One example is Philip Smith’s (2005) analysis of the different national narratives of the Iraq war, the Gulf war and the Suez crisis in the public spheres of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Spain. Contrary to dominant academic theories of warfare that he sees as privileging economic and material interests, Smith argues that narrative understanding itself can be the reason that warfare is chosen by the state over alternatives like diplomacy. As significant as this research is, we can push the point about symmetry further in comprehending the complexity of relationships between war, memory and commemoration. The dominant understanding of commemoration is that it is a channel for playing out ruling ideologies and reinforcing national identities. Here ritual is thought of in universalist ways. The problem with this conceptualization is that it neglects the power of ritual and remembrance in shaping the past and, as such, present society (West, 2015). In contrast, we suggest that war commemoration in
itself can be considered an active agent in broader cultural understandings. The cultural historian Jay Winter (2006), for example, has argued that the new egalitarian and relatively decentralized forms of remembrance established in the aftermath of the First World War established a cultural template for remembering and understanding of the past more broadly. While these commemorations certainly reflected the egalitarian military ideologies of the era, they also derived from, and promoted, civil societal traditions that existed in tension bourgeois traditions of heroism and valor that continued to resonate in the era.

Conclusion
For the most part, sociological theory has ignored the subject matter of war and the military. It has seldom made for more than a footnote in the scholarship of our biggest thinkers and it is largely absent from our textbooks. The sociological neglect of war and the military has been typically attributed to the time and place of the discipline’s origins or its (misguided) pacifist orientation which begins in earnest mid-twentieth century. This sequestering downplays the ongoing role of war, military autonomy and military power, in terms of both resource control and their influence over our world. In order to redress this situation, we have argued for a multi-dimensional understanding of the relationship between war, the military and civil society, one that avoids seeing war and the military as subordinate to other social, economic and political forces. This calls for a programmatic rather than a piecemeal approach, one which places the war and the military at the centre of our explanatory schema of contemporary society.

References
The Association of Black Sociologists (ABS) recognized professor Jualyne E. Dodson with their 2015-2016 lifetime distinction A. Wade Smith Award for teaching, mentoring and service.

***

Daniel Chernilo has been promoted to Full Professor of Social and Political Thought at Loughborough University.

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In this new book Dave Elder-Vass argues that our economy is neither overwhelmingly capitalist, as Marxist political economists argue, nor overwhelmingly a market economy, as mainstream economists assume. Both approaches ignore vast swathes of the economy, including the gift, collaborative and hybrid forms that coexist with more conventional capitalism in the new digital economy. Drawing on economic sociology, anthropology of the gift and heterodox economics, this book proposes a groundbreaking framework for analyzing diverse economic systems: a political economy of practices. The framework is used to analyze Apple, Wikipedia, Google, YouTube and Facebook, showing how different complexes of appropriative practices bring about radically different economic outcomes. Innovative and topical, Profit and Gift in the Digital Economy focusses on an area of rapid social change while developing a theoretically and politically radical framework that will be of continuing long-term relevance.

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This book is an investigation of the cultural work involved in the social process of achieving and maintaining legitimacy as a not-for-profit arts or media organization in the twenty-first century. Within this work, Larsen advances an approach to studying organizational legitimacy, emanating from within cultural sociology. More specifically, he analyzes the legitimation work done in public service broadcasters in the Scandinavian countries of Norway, Sweden, and Denmark, the Norwegian National Opera and Ballet, the Oslo Philharmonic Orchestra, and the Metropolitan Opera in New York City.

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