NARRATING THE EUROZONE CRISIS:
REPRESENTATIONS OF GERMANY
IN PORTUGUESE MEDIA
AND ON THE STREETS

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RESUMO

A cobertura da crise da zona euro e o papel da Alemanha atraiu um vasto interesse no meio académico, embora os discursos dos média portugueses tivessem sido em larga medida ignorados na maioria dos estudos publicados. Actualmente, é reconhecida a influência dos discursos dos média na opinião publica e nas políticas públicas. Neste sentido, esta tese pretende analisar representações da Alemanha em dois tipos de média portugueses durante o crise da zona Euro: os jornais (nomeadamente Público e Jornal das Notícias) e manifestações de arte urbana portuguesa, juntamente com os sinais que foram emitidos durante protestos públicos, o que chamarei “média menores”.

Na sequência da crise financeira no início do século XXI, mais detalhes foram revelados sobre um excesso de dívida pública na Grécia no final de 2009 e no decurso do ano seguinte, surgiram preocupações acerca da situação financeira e as dívidas de outros países como Portugal, a Espanha e a Itália (GIPS): Daí as alegadas tentativas para ajudar e salvar os GIPS com vários pacotes de ajuda financeira.

A maneira em que a crise da zona euro foi sendo coberta pelos média nacionais tornou-se num assunto para muitas investigações académicas. Grandes estudos quantitativos a nível europeu, bem como pequenos projectos de investigação qualitativa focados no discurso dos média de um país específico, têm sido realizados. Surpreendentemente, Portugal nunca foi tido em consideração nestes estudos. Muitos projectos de investigação que têm explorado discursos dos média em apenas um ou dois países diferentes da UE concentraram-se na Grécia ou na Alemanha ou ambos. Em geral, podemos dizer que Portugal e os média portugueses foram amplamente ignorados na maioria dos projectos de pesquisa académica, salvo algumas excepções.

Como vários estudos sobre a cobertura dos média da crise da zona euro já fizeram notar, a Alemanha é frequentemente vista como sendo parcialmente responsável pela crise da zona euro (Young e Semmler, 2011) e pelo que são chamados “programas de austeridade” (Ntampoudi, 2014). Por esta razão é importante considerar não só a cobertura da média da crise da zona euro em geral mas também particularmente o discurso da média sobre Alemanha e o seu papel na crise.

O tópico de representações estereotipadas da Alemanha nos média externos já foi examinado em vários outros estudos. Atitudes críticas face à Alemanha aumentaram,
juntamente com o aumento de influência da Alemanha no século XX. Em consequência, observações hostis e até mesmo teorias da conspiração começaram a ganhar popularidade, atingindo um primeiro pico na Primeira Guerra Mundial e outro, intensificado, na Segunda Guerra Mundial.

De acordo com os estudos sobre discursos dos média contemporâneos sobre a Alemanha e o seu papel na crise da zona euro, uma imagem semelhante emerge com a representação da Alemanha como a principal ou mesmo única responsável pelas fricções políticas. Frequentemente, a Chanceler Angela Merkel é colocada no centro desta crítica, com imagens em que Merkel é retratada como Hitler, como foi o caso em certos média gregos.

Este processo de culpabilização também se encontra do lado da Alemanha: os países de GIPS, particularmente a Grécia, foram retratados pelos média alemães como "desorganizados", "preguiçosos", "indisciplinados" e "insidiosos" entre outros. Assim é pintado o contraste entre uma Alemanha alegadamente “trabalhadora” e uma Grécia pretensamente “indisciplinada”, invocando uma narrativa segundo a qual os Alemães teriam de pagar as dívidas da Grécia e do resto do sul da Europa.

Embora que não haja estudos sobre o discurso dos média portugueses sobre a Alemanha, existem alguns artigos e estudos que tratam o discurso público sobre a Alemanha em Portugal e também sobre protestos e mobilizações anti-austeridade em Portugal. É por esta razão que é importante "olhar para o discurso público' para além dos suspeitos habituais [...] O discurso político e o discurso de média que dominam hoje o chamado ‘discurso público’ é auto-reforçando” (Murray-Leach et al, 2014, pág. 54).

A fim de também não cair nessa armadilha, não pretendo olhar só para o discurso dos média portugueses tradicionais, mas considerar também outras formas de discurso público tais como a arte urbana e graffiti. Usando as pesquisas de opinião pública de Gallup World Poll, podemos constatar que apenas 30% em 2011, 29% em 2013 e 41% em 2014 dos portugueses questionados aprovaram a liderança alemã e em 2011 mais da metade dos entrevistados (55%) disseram que não sabem ou que recusaram responder a esta pergunta. O apoio à Alemanha entre 2011 e 2013 permaneceu estável, mas muitas pessoas mudaram de opinião de "não sei" / "recusar a responder" para uma desaprovação. A questão reside agora em saber se essa desaprovação se reflecte nos média portugueses, bem como na arte urbana e nos graffiti.
Para conseguir obter uma visão em ambas as narrativas – hegemónicas e alternativas - a análise inclui artigos de dois jornais portugueses, *Público* e *Jornal de Notícias* - dois jornais diários de grande circulação. Estes dois jornais pertencem a diferentes tipos de jornalismo, o que torna a comparação ainda mais interessante. Também foi incluído o estudo de média considerados menores: arte urbana, grafitti e sinais de protestos públicos, manifestações e ocupações.

Grafitti, arte urbana e imagens dos protestos serão agrupados sob o termo de “média menores”, média produzidos por actores subterrâneos que têm uma tendência para apresentar narrativas alternativas. Protestos públicos podem ser considerado como outra maneira de manifestar opiniões divergentes. Dependendo da perspectiva, estes protestos públicos podem ser também considerados como parte do discurso público. A comparação entre ambos os tipos de média (os dois jornais populares e os média menores) exigiu uma abordagem mista de método, combinando elementos quantitativos bem como métodos qualitativos.

A investigação para representações da Alemanha e da chanceler Angela Merkel nestes jornais foi feita para os artigos que foram publicados dentro do período de 11 de Março de 2011 (dia da manifestação da chamada “Geração à Rasca”) e 19 de Maio de 2014 (dois dias depois da saída de Portugal do programa de ajustamento económico da União Europeia). Quanto à arte da rua e à fotografia das faixas de protestos públicos, a escolha de um período de tempo bem definido foi mais complicada por causa da natureza efêmera de arte urbana, na medida em que datas exactas de existência de alguma espécie dessa mesma arte são especificamente difícil de definir.

A tese incorpora o “cultural effects theory”, que defende que a influência dos média sobre a opinião pública é dependente da situação social e a experiência pessoal de um indivíduo e que "o processo de construção de crenças e valores ao longo do tempo é auxiliada pela utilização generalizada de estereótipos", que são utilizados pelos jornalistas como atalhos (Grix & Lacroix, 2006, p. 376). Através de análise de narrativa - articulada com a abordagem inovadora da ciência social desta tese - duas narrativas prevalentes foram identificadas como tendo sido usadas consistentemente nos média principais e nos média menores, baseadas em representações estereotipadas.

A primeira narrativa é marcada por um discurso reducionista, no qual Merkel surge representada como uma *Doppelgängerin* de Hitler. A narrativa implica que Merkel quereria
estabelecer um "Quarto Reino" através da imposição de medidas económicas draconianas noutros países. Ambos os tipos de média aqui considerados representaram Merkel como uma antagonista ou usaram-na como uma sinédoque da Alemanha. Isto resultou muitas vezes em referências a Hitler e a Alemanha da Segunda Guerra Mundial, directas ou indirectas. Estas comparações não são apenas uma redução assustadora das atrocidades de Hitler, como também representam uma falácia (*reductio ad Hitlerum*) do ponto de vista retórico.

A segunda narrativa tem a ver com a percepção da desigualdade existente entre Portugal e Alemanha. Pela utilização de diferentes metáforas tais como o marionetista, o professor e o médico, a Alemanha é retratada como um poder superior que Portugal tem de respeitar e a que tem de obedecer. Este tipo de narrativa é exemplificado pela fábula de Esopo, a da formiga trabalhadora e da cigarra preguiçosa. No contexto de Portugal e da Alemanha, tal comparação resulta numa oposição da mentalidade do Norte (produtivo) à do Sul (ocioso). As metáforas do marionetista, do médico e do professor também se relacionam com a narrativa do Quarto Reino: Portugal é considerado como sofrendo de uma falta de soberania.

Usando a abordagem de Jack Lule dos sete mitos dominantes, é argumentado que muita da cobertura de notícias de Portugal e dos média menores é moldada pelo mito do bode expiatório. O enquadramento da Alemanha como um bode expiatório não é exclusivo dos média portugueses mas este mito também foi encontrado nos média de outros países dos GIPS. Por outro lado, é salientado que os média alemães retratam os países dos GIPS como preguiçosos e participam no processo de criação de bodes expiatórios mútuos. Porém, é sabido que todas as narrativas simplistas e a intenção de tornar figuras políticas ou países em bodes expiatórios só vai aumentar a percepção da clivagem entre o Norte e o Sul da União Europeia. Tal processo, em combinação com o aumento dos movimentos nacionalistas, poderia levar a uma desintegração europeia.

**Palavras chave:** análise de narrativa - média portugueses - representações da Alemanha e da Angela Merkel - crise da zona euro – graffiti e arte urbana
ABSTRACT

The media coverage of the Eurozone crisis and Germany’s role in it has received much academic interest, however the Portuguese media discourses have been largely disregarded in most studies. As this thesis suggests, it is important to be aware of media discourses because they play an important role in shaping public opinion and public policy making. In this sense, this thesis explores common narratives and representations that are used to make sense of Germany’s role in the Eurozone crisis (2011-2014) in various types of Portuguese media. In order to gain an insight in both hegemonic and alternative narratives, the analysis included articles from two major newspapers, Público and Jornal de Notícias, as well as minor media: street art, graffiti and public protests. It was assumed that that these two types of media would use different discourses on Germany but in fact, there were many similarities.

Through narrative analysis, two prevalent narratives have been identified that were used both in the press and in minor media. The first narrative was marked by a reductionist discourse. Merkel was represented as Hitler’s doppelgänger aiming to establish a “Fourth Reich” through imposing draconic economic measures on other European countries. The second narrative revolves around the perceived unequal relationship between Portugal and Germany. By the use of different metaphors such as the puppeteer, the teacher and the doctor, Germany is portrayed as a superior power that Portugal bows to either voluntarily or involuntarily. Using Jack Lule’s approach of the seven master myths, it is argued that much of the Portuguese news coverage and the minor media are shaped by the ancient myth of the scapegoat. Casting Germany as a scapegoat is not unique to the Portuguese media but this myth has also been found for instance in Greek media. Contrariwise, it is pointed out that German media portrays the countries commonly known as PIGS (Portugal, Italy, Greece, Spain) as lazy and participates in the process of mutual scapegoating, which could provoke dangerous consequences and lead to further European disintegration.

Key words: narrative analysis - Portuguese media - representations of Germany and Merkel - Eurozone crisis - political street art and graffiti
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PRELIMINARY REMARKS

Because this thesis deals with the Eurozone crisis and the relationship between Portugal and Germany, I wanted to make the paper accessible to as many people as possible. Therefore, I am writing in the English language while giving all quotes in the original language, may it be German or Portuguese. The translation of the quotes and titles in the English language can be found in footnotes. All translations are mine unless otherwise stated.

For reasons of clarity, I created two annexes. Annex 1 contains all the photographs of the street art works, graffiti and protest pictures that I am discussing. All photographs are from my personal collection unless otherwise stated. The source information for the photographs that are not my own can be found in the chapter “References” where I list all references subdivided in (academic) literature, newspaper articles and image sources in APA style.
1. Introduction

Ever since concerns about excessive sovereign debt in several European member states deepened, Germany has been portrayed by the international media as one of the main protagonists of the Eurozone crisis and Chancellor Angela Merkel as a synecdoche for the whole of Germany. One of the other main protagonists of the crisis in the mainstream media has been Greece, by and large a synecdoche for the whole of Southern Europe. These two protagonists have been played out against each other both on the level of international politics as well as various forms of media, which has resulted in a number of complex dichotomies that include North versus South, rich and poor, productive and lazy, among several others.

These dichotomies and the stereotypical representations of both protagonists have resulted in reciprocal discourses of blame. From the side of Germany, this means that Germany (and with it, the rest of the “economically healthy” European Union) has to pay for the reckless mistakes and lazy behaviour of Southern Europeans. From the side of Greece, this means that Germany is thrown back into its own WWII history, with discourses and narratives that imply that Germany wants to establish a new Nazi like Fourth Reich through imposing economic measures that often were considered to be draconic and economically destructive. Germany has been so prevailing in contemporary media discourse that it would be indeed quite impossible to speak about sense making (and with it, the narrating) of the Eurozone crisis without speaking about Germany.

Even though Portugal has always been located more in the periphery of the European Union, one would however assume that academic interest in Portugal and Portuguese perceptions of the Eurozone crisis would rise substantially, particularly with the prominent presence of Greece in the mainstream media. It is astounding to note that this, so far, has not been the case and it is exactly this gap that this thesis aims to research, explore and map out. The question is then not so much why it is the case that Portugal has largely been ignored in most academic studies on media discourses in the context of the Eurozone crisis, but rather whether the negative representations that seem to have shaped Germany during the Eurozone crisis in Greece can also be found in
Portugal. One part of this thesis therefore analyses newspaper articles written about Germany in two of Portugal’s largest newspapers (Público and Jornal das Notícias) from 2011 to 2014.

However, it is important to be aware of the fact that mainstream media discourses represent only one part of public discourses, that is they are one process that shapes and influences public opinion (Murray-Leach et al., 2014). In order to get a better understanding of different types public discourses, one could consider public opinion polls but research is also scarce on this field in Portugal. Hence, I decided to look at Portuguese street art and graffiti and photographs of the banners that were visible at public protests during the Eurozone crisis, three elements which together I shall call “minor media.” They do not necessarily represent public opinion, but they are indicative of subterranean actors that through the traditional media channels would not necessarily have the option to express their opinion. The decision to include minor media will allow for an exploration of both hegemonic and alternative narrative through the combination of media analysis and street art research in which the question will be asked how Germany is represented in the Portuguese media in the course of the Eurozone crisis; in particular which tropes and narratives are broached and how the narratives used by the Portuguese press compare to the narratives offered by minor media.

Alongside this contrastive exploration of two recurring narratives, it is the interdisciplinary approach that makes this thesis remarkable. The media analysis is informed by methods that are more commonly used in the social sciences such as data triangulation, mixed methods and narrative analysis, however the focus on recurring narratives, tropes and myths in the analysis is an approach that pertains more to the humanities. Indeed, it is nearly impossible to speak about media and media discourses without speaking about narratives, too: “Any discussion of journalism that does not account for storytelling and myth will miss a vital part of the news.” (Lule, 2001, p.3).

Even though the comparative approach was born out of the necessity to overcome the lack of secondary sources on Portuguese media studies during the Eurozone crisis, it is my hope that the combination of the two will lead to an interesting research project that will hopefully contribute to expanding the already broad horizon of comparative
studies. A direct consequence of dealing with this lack of secondary sources on Portuguese representations of the Eurozone crisis and Germany resulted in comparisons with the results of academic studies about Greek representations of the Eurozone crisis and Germany.

It should also be made clear that this is a Master’s thesis in Comparative Studies, which means that I have also refrained from going deep into the actual reality of economical or political matters. This means that questions such as whether or not the IMF rescue packages and its accompanying austerity measures were economically damaging and to what extent, was not a relevant research question, but rather one that should be left to researchers in the field of Economics. In this thesis, I am focusing mainly on narratives and representations in which only the perception of these packages and measures by both the mainstream media and minor media was taken into account.

This thesis therefore should not be considered a definitive, complete or exhaustive overview of Portuguese representations of Germany and Angela Merkel in the Eurozone crisis, but rather that it marks the beginning of various studies on this interesting topic that will incorporate many other research methods and Portuguese media.
2. Exploring Public Discourses: Representations of Europe and Germany during the Eurozone Crisis

2.1. Media Discourses on Europe

Media analysis has been used many times to examine the role of the media in European integration and European identity long before the onset of the Eurozone crisis. Even before the Euro was introduced as the common currency, Hardt-Mautner conducted a study on media discourses of the British press in relation to European integration and concluded that major British newspapers, especially tabloids such as the Sun, contributed to Anti-European sentiments (1995). The comprehensive volume *Europe in the Media* takes a more comparative approach; instead of focusing on one newspaper in one single country, Kevin looks at the results of numerous media research projects from various countries examining media representations of Europe and media reporting of European events (2003). Other studies examine the question whether a European public sphere has developed (Trenz, 2004) or whether national public media discourses have become europeanized (Meyer, 2005).

Following the financial crisis at the beginning of the 21st century, more details became clear about an excess of public debt in Greece at the end of 2009 and in the course of the following year, concerns were raised about other highly indebted countries such as Portugal, Spain and Italy (GIPS\(^1\) or also known as PIGS). Eventually, the IMF and the EU agreed to various sovereign state bailout packages and financial support measures. This has later been known as the *Eurozone crisis\(^2\)*, *Euro crisis*, *European Sovereign Debt Crisis* or simply as “the” crisis. In the following research, the term Eurozone crisis will be used as it clarifies that I am not referring to the current migrant crisis and it does not presume that the crisis has only been of economical nature but is

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1 The acronym PIGS refers to Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain. Later, the “I” for Italy was either replaced by Ireland or a second “I” was added - PIIGS. Because of the negative implications of the acronym PIIGS, Citigroups officials suggested the acronym GIIPS (Ovide, 2011). As this thesis does not contain any references to Ireland, I will use the neutral acronym GIPS.

2 For a more comprehensive overview of the economical and historical background of the Eurozone crisis, please see Pisani-Ferry (2014), Arestis and Sawyer (Eds., 2012) and Matthijs and Blyth (Eds., 2015).
indeed, as Roose, Kousis and Sommer define it, a “societal crisis”, that is “an unusual situation which is temporarily limited in which societal structures of general impact are perceived to be questioned and unstable” (2014, p. 2).

The way the Eurozone crisis has been covered and framed by national media has attracted much academic interest and both large quantitative European-wide studies as well as smaller qualitative research projects focused on media discourses of a single country have been conducted. One of the most comprehensive studies has been organized by the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism at University of Oxford. The project The Euro Crisis, Media Coverage, and Perceptions of Europe within the EU examined over 10,000 newspaper articles in 10 countries to find out how national media portray the Eurozone crisis and how public perception of the crisis has been influenced by media coverage. Newspapers from countries that were strongly affected by the crisis such as Spain, Italy and Greece as well as press from countries with a less severe sovereign debt problem such as Germany and The Netherlands were included in the research. As Picard observes in the related book The Euro Crisis in the Media: “The crisis was primarily framed within the metaphors of war, disease, natural disaster, construction, and games, and these metaphors have significant consequences for the conceptualisation of responsibility related to the crisis, with frames related to war, construction, and games involving human agency” (2015, p. 238-239).

Surprisingly, Portugal has not been included in the project from the Reuters Institute. It can be argued that Portugal is a country significantly smaller than its neighbour Spain and that therefore it was not included in most studies. However, as Tzogopoulos demonstrates, Greece and partially Ireland, two other smaller European nations, have received more media attention than Portugal (Tzogopoulos, 2013) and Portugal constitutes the other end of the European southern periphery, opposite to

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3 For reasons of simplicity, I will use the terms the media, the national media or the press in this thesis. I am aware of the fact that these terms do not describe one single actor but in fact describe countless different actors with diverse interests (adapted from Gottschalck, 2012, p. 2). I will also use the term the media in the broadest definition possible in order to include street art and graffiti. This decision will be discussed later in chapter 3.1.
4 In a comparison of media attention of economic newspapers dedicated to GIPS and Ireland, Portugal has received the least attention in the Financial Times and the Wall Street Journal and the second least attention in the Handelsblatt (Tzogopoulos, 2013, p. 72).
Greece and Cyprus. The omittance of Portugal and Portuguese media is a recurring issue in several comparative studies on media coverage of the Eurozone crisis. For instance, the anthology The Media and the Financial Crises (Schifferes and Roberts, Eds., 2014) that explores media coverage of the banking crisis and the Eurozone crisis comparatively and historically on an international level, mentions Portugal only four times - three times in a list of other indebted countries and one time as the location of a EU meeting.

Many research projects that have explored media discourses in only one or two different EU countries have focused on Greece or Germany or both. Greece is indeed an interesting example for many reasons. Not only has the general government debt (as percent of GDP) been higher than in any other EU country but Greece’s sovereign credit rating was also the first to be downgraded by three of the main rating agencies, Moody’s, Fitch and Standard and Poor’s, which explains why Greece has received more media attention. On the contrary, Germany “has emerged as the undisputed economic hegemon of Europe and displayed an exceptional robustness to the crisis” as the project description of one of the biggest research projects on the impacts of the Eurozone crisis in Greece and Germany, Fragmex, states on its homepage (“Fragmex”, n.d.). Fragmex is mainly concerned with different levels and processes of fragmentation and exclusion created by the Eurozone crisis and media analysis constitutes only one small part of their investigation. The Greek, the Germans and the Crisis (GGCRISI), a project coordinated by Jochen Roose (Freie Universität Berlin and Maria Kousis (University of Crete), analyzes Greek and German media coverage of the Eurozone crisis with the leading question: “Who is made responsible by whom on what issues and on what grounds in the debate on the Eurozone crisis?” (“The Greeks, the Germans”, n.d.) Lastly, George Tzogopoulos, has written several articles and a book about the media coverage of the Eurozone crisis. His work provides many insights in the representation

of Germany in Greek media and vice versa and provide interesting points of comparison between Greek and Portuguese media.

Less attention has been given to the other countries affected by the Eurozone crisis but there are still numerous studies concentrating on Italy and Spain, also because these countries have been included in much of the larger research projects mentioned earlier. There are however very little studies conducted on Portuguese media coverage of the Eurozone crisis. There are also many smaller research projects focused on media representations of the Eurozone crisis such as the thesis *The Eurocrisis – a European crisis? Analysis of the Media Discourse on the Eurocrisis in Newsmagazines in France, Germany and Great Britain* by Gottschalck (2012) and the article *How and why did we get here? A critical analysis of the discursive construction of the Eurozone crisis* by Petry (2013). However, these studies also do not focus on Portugal in particular but only name it in several enumerations of other countries. The same is true for the background paper *Crisis Discourses in Europe*, which summarizes and appraises current research in the form of a meta-analysis and is one of the main sources of this thesis. Even though this paper gives a thorough and critical overview of dominant discourses on the Eurozone crisis, Murray-Leach refers to Portugal only in two enumerations of crisis-ridden countries (2014). Lastly, a comparative study by Arrese and Vara-Miguel about economic metaphors in journalistic coverage of the Eurozone crisis (2015) does not mention Portugal even once. It would go beyond the scope of this research to discuss all research projects that have been conducted on media discourse on Europe and the Eurozone crisis. However, the examples that have been given illustrate the fact that even though there have been many insightful studies that discuss media discourses on Europe from various angles, Portugal and Portuguese media have been widely disregarded in most academic research projects on this matter.

Concerning representations of the Eurozone crisis in Portuguese media, two of the few exceptions are two articles by Duarte and Pinto who examined facets of linguistic modality in cartoons and opinion articles in Portuguese newspapers through a semantic-pragmatic analysis. Furthermore, Susana Santos gave several presentations about the Portuguese press coverage of particular events, like the visit of Chancellor Angela Merkel to Portugal. In cooperation with the Project Journalism and Society
(PJS) of the ISCTE University Institute of Lisbon, she started to conduct research on the way Portuguese media covered the Eurozone crisis but unfortunately, this large research project was never completed due to a lack of funding. Baumgarten also examined comments about the Greek crisis that were published in the Portuguese newspaper *Diário de Notícias* from 24 June to 25 July 2015 and she notes that some of the comments contain references to the Weimar Republic, Nazism, genocide and neocolonialism (2016).

On the contrary, some attention has been given to the representation of Portugal in the media of other European countries, namely by Irina Veríssimo Szeremeta (née Irina Fresco Veríssimo) and Luísa Aires (2015). In her master thesis, Veríssimo Szeremeta analyzed 25 articles taken from 5 different national newspapers and specifically the process of Othering and the construction of stereotypes in media communication (2013). She concluded that the foreign media discourse perpetuates the othering of the economically weak countries in the European Union by the usage of mainly pejorative terms and quests to find the one(s) responsible for the crisis (2013). It is problematic that there is only very limited research available on the way the Portuguese media discusses and analyses the Eurozone crisis because as Kandyla and de Vreese note: “European citizens rely on their national news media for information about EU affairs [and] [...] research has demonstrated that the news media have the potential to shape public perceptions of EU legitimacy, participation and public support for the European Union (EU)” (2011, p. 55).

### 2.2. Media Discourses on Germany

As several studies on media coverage of the Eurozone crisis have noted, Germany is often seen as Europe’s hegemon (Paterson, 2011; Bulmer and Paterson, 2013), consistent also with Gramsci’s description of the process of the hegemony of a political ideology:

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6 Spanish, Irish, British, French and Polish
it is the phase in which previously germinated ideologies become 'party', come into confrontation and conflict, until only one of them, or at least a single combination of them, tends to prevail, to gain the upper hand, to propagate itself over the whole social area - bringing about not only a unison of economic and political aims, but also intellectual and moral unity, posing all the questions around which the struggle rages not on a corporate but on a 'universal' plane, and thus creating the hegemony of a fundamental social group over a series of subordinate groups. (Gramsci, 2000, 205)

This results then in the image of a Germany that wants to create a “German Europe” (Beck, 2013) or that is even considered partially responsible for the Eurozone crisis (Young and Semmler, 2011) and also responsible for the crisis management and all decisions made regarding the so-called austerity programmes (Ntampoudi, 2014). As Tzogopoulos notes, the blame has shifted from the troika\(^7\) to the economically most powerful country, Germany (2012a, p. 2) and Germany is on the horns of a dilemma - whether it chooses to lead more or lead less, it will receive criticism either way (Ntampoudi, 2014). For this reason, it is important to not only consider the media coverage of the Eurozone crisis in general, but also particularly the media discourses on Germany and its role in the crisis.

As a matter of fact, media representations of Germany is a topic that has interested scholars also irrespective of the Eurozone crisis. Already in 1995, Hardt-Mautner warned that factors such as elitist discourse, national stereotyping and prejudice against other nations such as Germany existent in British press could impede the development of a “European identity” in Britain (1995, p. 199). The topic of stereotypical representations of Germany in foreign media has been examined in several other studies, one of the most important ones being a systematic empirical analysis by Grix and Lacroix who concluded that the British press indeed makes use of negative stereotypes, particularly in relation to Nazism and the war (2006). However, such anti-German sentiments date back further than the Second World War. While Germany was mostly thought of as a nation of “Dichter und Denker”\(^8\) in the 19th century, Germanophobia started to appear in the 1870s with the unification of Germany under

\(^7\) The term “troika” is used here to refer to the decision group created by the European Central Bank (ECB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Commission (EC), a term that has been widely used, especially in the countries more affected by the crisis.

\(^8\) Poets and thinkers
Otto von Bismarck as Chancellor (Kennedy, 1975; Scully, 2012). As Bertolette notes in a study of British magazines prior to the First World War:

British journalists could draw upon a rich heritage of demeaning German stereotypes in order to bolster national self-image at the expense of the German nemesis. Stereotypes also gained unwarranted currency in the public media through pseudoscientific racial theories and ethnological hierarchies that constituted the nineteenth-century paradigm of innate national character differences. (2004, p. vii)

With Germany’s rising power, the number of hostile comments started to soar as well, reaching a first peak in the First World War and further intensifying in the Second World War, partially due to anti-German propaganda by the Allied Powers.

Turning to studies with a focus on media discourses on Germany and its role in the Eurozone crisis, a similar picture emerges. First of all, this has been a matter of debate not only in academia but principally in newspapers. Both German and foreign press point out how Germany has become the “scapegoat of Europe” (Pfeffer, 2012), that is Germany is seen as the only one responsible for policy failures in the process of alleviating the Eurozone crisis. Referring to well-known national media like the Spanish newspaper ABC, the French magazine Challenges and Italian television, Ehlers et al. demonstrate in an article in the German magazine Spiegel how Germany is being criticised for neo-mercantilist policy decisions while it is simultaneously being praised internationally for its economic progress (2011). But also within Germany, opinions on how to overcome the Eurozone-crisis are divided: While there is an understanding that indebted countries need a bailout to save the euro, there are many German citizens who are more eurosceptic and are not sympathetic to the idea of providing financial aid, particularly from German funds (Tzogopoulos, 2013, p. 59-60). Angela Merkel is often put in the spotlight of this criticism as Chambers observes in an analysis of a cover of the British New Statesman magazine, which portrays Merkel as a terminator-like cyborg and labelling her “Europe’s most dangerous leader” (2012). Merkel acts as a synecdoche for the German government and is also often compared to the German Emperor Wilhelm II, Bismarck and Hitler.

In addition, negative stereotypes and generalisations have not only been used by foreign media to cast a negative picture on Germany but German media have also been
involved in this one-sided rhetoric. The dialogue between Greek and German media has been particularly heated. In a well-known incident in February 2010, the German magazine *Focus* published an issue with a cover showing the Venus de Milo with a raised middle finger and the title “Betrüger in der Euro-Familie.” The Greek newspaper *Eleftheros Typos* responded to this with a picture of Victoria, the Roman goddess who is on top of the Berlin Victory Column, holding a swastika (Tzogopoulos, 2015). Many references to Nazism such as with the word “Heil” and pictures of Merkel dressed up as Hitler with Nazi-uniform and toothbrush moustache followed but Wolfgang Schäuble, Germany’s Federal Minister of Finance, was targeted as well and portrayed as an “oppressor.” The emphasis on populist discourse in the Greek media is not surprising because most media are in economic difficulties themselves and journalists may also lack the necessary academic background for a thorough understanding of the Eurozone crisis (Tzogopoulos, 2015). As Tzogopoulos observes, “in such an anti-German climate fuelled by the political rhetoric of Greek politicians domestic media have naturally adapted a similar stance” (2015, p. 26). While the German media picked up on these negative representations, they participated in the mutual scapegoating, too. The GIPS countries, particularly Greece, were labelled as “unorganized”, “lazy”, “undisciplined” and “insidious” among others in contrast with hard-working Germany. “In this narrative, the side of accomplished economies and German citizenry, are ascribed the role of the conscientious tax-payer that has been working on low steady wages for many years and is now deprived of the fruits of this labour because of southern debt and EU administered bailouts”, Ntampoudi explains further (2015, p. 7).

However, a similar issue as in the research on media discourse on Europe emerges: Most articles and studies on media discourse on Germany only mention examples from Italian, Spanish, Greek or British sources but Portugal is missing again. The only notable exception is the short chapter “Portugal through the EMU

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9 Cheater in the euro-family
10 Due to language barriers, it is difficult to say whether there has been research done on other countries such as Spain and Italy in the respective languages.
11 When I was writing this thesis, Ana Luisa Mouro was writing her PhD thesis about a similar topic under the supervision of Prof. Ana Maria Ramalheira but at that moment there was no further information available.
Crisis: Setting a good example for Germany” by Freitas and Fernandes included in a report by the European Policy Institutes Network. However, this article is from June 2012 and only gives a very short overview of Portugal’s reaction to the Eurozone crisis and mainstream media discourses on Germany. Freitas and Fernandes note that

Many political commentators, economists, political scientists, and other specialists remain dubious about the role Germany has played in the Portuguese and European crises. Analyses diverge among commentators, but most of them agree that Berlin should curb its urge to punish debtor countries and adopt an inclusive policy by strengthening the community method, by fostering a supra-nationalist vision for the EU, and by promoting solid regulation mechanisms at the European level. [...] In the end, a gap is emerging between a Portuguese government that approves Germany’s requests for austerity under the troika method and an opposition and civil society that is increasingly losing faith in the belief that growing austerity under EU/German auspices will pay off for Portugal. (2012, p. 23)

To the best of my knowledge, there are no other studies conducted on representations of Germany in Portuguese media during the Eurozone crisis, which is the gap that this thesis aims to fill.

2.3. Assessing Portuguese Public Discourses on the Eurozone Crisis through Opinion Polls

Even though there are no studies on Portuguese media discourse on Germany available, there are some articles and studies on the Portuguese public discourse on Germany and anti-austerity protests and mobilisations in Portugal. It is important to note that public discourse (or public opinion) does not equal media discourse, even though these two terms are often interspersed with each other or even used interchangeably in academia as well as newspapers. It would go beyond the scope of this thesis to enter this broad and complex discussion here but I would like to clarify the way I use these terms. First of all, the term discourse is already ambiguous in itself and has many different definitions and implications. While in colloquial language discourse tends to mean something like “written or spoken communication or debate” (Oxford Dictionaries, n.d.), “[t]o discourse analysts, ‘discourse’ usually means actual instances of communicative action in the medium of language, although some define the term more broadly as ‘meaningful symbolic behavior’ in any mode” (Johnstone, 2008, p. 2).
For the purpose of this study, I subscribe to a very broad definition of public discourse or according to Murray-Leach et al., “public discourses” (2014, p. 54); they are essentially a form of “social interaction” and “processes that go into forming public opinion”\(^{12}\) (Murray-Leach et al., 2008, p. 6). Media discourses can be understood as a part of public discourses, that is processes that shape public opinion. As Murray-Leach et al. argue:

\[
\text{[...]} \text{one needs to ask whether the (mainstream) media constitutes public discourse (for it is often treated as such by both academics and policy makers [...]); is an example of or representative of public discourse (again, it often used as such) or is merely the mediator of political discourse to mass publics in a top-down non-dialogical relationship (comments sections and pages notwithstanding). (2014, p. 8)}
\]

For this reason, it is important “to look for ‘the public discourse’ beyond the usual suspects [...] The political discourse and media discourse that currently dominate the so-called ‘public discourse’ is self-reinforcing” (Murray-Leach et al., 2014, p. 54). In order to not fall into this trap as well, I shall not only look at mainstream media but I shall also consider other forms of media such as political street art and graffiti, which tend to provide discourses different from the hegemonic discourses often presented in mainstream media.

However, before discussing these minor media, I shall first look at public opinion polls because, as Mattes argues, “[p]olls aid in understanding general trends in public opinion” while the analysis of newspaper articles and public manifestations provide the context for these statistics (Murray-Leach et al., 2014, p. 26). This is especially important to consider in the case of Portugal for which hardly any previous research on media discourse on Europe or Germany is available. There are also not a lot of public opinion polls for Portugal available, showing again Portugal’s marginalization in the European (academic) context. Nonetheless, the Gallup World Poll\(^{13}\), a continuing

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\(^{12}\) This definition will later be refined in the context of narratives (see chapter 4.3).

\(^{13}\) Unfortunately, the Gallup World Poll is only accessible via a few (American) university libraries. For this reason, I cannot provide the complete statistics but only some numbers taken from openly accessible articles. Additionally, the question “Do you approve or disapprove of the job performance of the leadership of …?” that Gallup asked their participants does only give us a small indication of the trend of public opinion on Germany.

The number presented here are taken from two articles: Manchin, 2013; Möller & Parkes, 2012.
series of public opinion surveys by the renowned research and consulting company Gallup, can give us some clues. As before, we will use Greece as a point of reference and comparison.

In Greece, media discourses on Germany (see Tzogopoulos, 2012a, 2012b, 2013 and 2015; Ntampoudi, 2014, Scholl et al., 2014) have been overly negative and marked by negative tropes and scapegoating. In the case of street art and public protests it is difficult to generalize (an issue that will be addressed later) but there have been many attributions of responsibility towards Germany and negative portrayals (in particular of Chancellor Angela Merkel) in street art (Tulke 2013) and public protests (Barkin & Papachristou, 2012) as well. This is in line with the results of public opinion polls: In 2012, 79% of Greeks had a negative view of Germany, almost the same amount was afraid of the emergence of a Fourth Reich and 32.4% associated Germany with Nazism (Tzogopoulos, 2013, p. 134). The Gallup World Poll from 2007 to 2014 shows similar results: the approval of German leadership has declined over the years, hitting rock bottom in 2012 with only 16% of Greeks approving of German leadership. In 2014, the approval had risen again up to 29% but this is still low compared to the peak of approval in 2009 with 47% (2012, p. 13).

The Gallup World Poll has also included Portugal in their analysis, which shows that Portuguese people have a higher approval of German leadership (30% in 2011, 29% in 2013, 41% in 2014) than Greeks but specifically in 2011, more than half of the interviewees (55%) said that they do not know or refused to respond to this question. While in 2009 only 4% disapproved of German leadership, this number started to rocket in the following years to up to 40% in 2013 (Manchin, 2013). Support for Germany between 2011 and 2013 remained stable but many people changed their opinion from “don’t know” or “refuse to answer” to disapproval. The disapproval of German leadership goes hand in hand with the disapproval of the job performance of the leadership of the European Union, which also started to rise from 7% of disapproval in 2009 to 42% in 2013 (Manchin, 2013).

Concluding from these statistics, Portuguese public opinion on Germany and on the European Union declined during the height of the Eurozone crisis and the question
is now whether this disapproval is reflected in Portuguese media, street art and graffiti as well.
3. Hegemonic and Alternative Narratives

3.1. Street Art and Graffiti

As noted earlier, the media play a big role in informing public opinion but in order to deal with the issue that Murray-Leach et al. described (see the chapter “Portuguese Public Discourse on Europe and Germany”), I will not only look at media discourse but also at other cultural artefacts such as political street art and graffiti. It might seem unusual to examine newspapers as well as street art in the same study but, as Campos remarks, “They are the media, par excellence, for civil demonstrations, and particularly for those who have no access to other channels of communication and political expression” (2016, p. 313) or as Fischer and Abedi call them, a “small” (1990, p. 339) or “minor media” (1990, p. 337). A similar comment is made by Chaffee:

Because street art is universal in its reach, it should be viewed as a mass communication medium in a general sense. [...] It gives expression to groups that otherwise could not comment or support current or perceived social problems. [...] street art can shape and move human emotions and gauge political sentiments. Language and visual symbols help shape perception. Clichés, slogans and symbols - the substance of political rhetoric - help mobilize people. (1993, p. 3).

As mentioned earlier, Murray-Leach et al. also recognize the need for considering alternative narratives. As they argue, the media tend to provide “a discourse of elites - of foreign executives, of economists and financiers.” Even though the issues that European citizens face because of the crisis are addressed, “[n]ational and local politicians barely get to contribute to this discourse, let alone civil society – or ‘subterranean’ actors of any stripe” (Murray-Leach et al., 2014, p. 1). Graffiti and street art are created out of many different motivations and intentions but eventually, it is “a practice of creative disruption and distortion” (Tulke, 2013, p. 13), “a form of social diary, a visual history of marginalized and minority groups” (Tsilimpounidi, 2015, p. 71), “a battle over public space: who controls it and what it is used for” (Cedar, 2008, p. 104) between what one could call “subterranean actors” and the public on the one side and elites on the other side.
Before exploring the idea of street art and graffiti offering an alternative narrative further, I would like to clarify the terminology and the historical background. Etymologically, the word *graffiti* (plural of *graffito*) derives from the Greek γράφειν which means to draw or write, and has existed in the form of engravings, wall paintings and scratchings since ancient times. Already back then, it was “[…] a form of written communications that is invariably free of social restraints” as Peden comments in regard to inscriptions in Pharaonic Egypt (2001, p xxi). Scribbles and doodles on public walls with or without a political message have been found in many different countries and centuries but spray paintings such as *tags* developed later. These territorial signatures applied to a surface without authorization, which are nowadays commonly associated with the word graffiti, developed in the 1970s in New York City and Philadelphia and from there soon spread to other regions of the United States and to Europe (Pereira, 2005). As Cedar clarifies, these tags should rather be called *graffiti writing* and are closely linked to hip hop culture, using a stylized writing that can mainly be deciphered by an in-group (2008). As Joan Gari observes, one can differentiate between the North American graffiti tradition, which is mainly visual and linked to mass and pop culture, and the European graffiti tradition, which is primarily textual and more political and philosophical than its counterpart (Campos, 2014, n.p.).

Street art on the other hand is harder to define because it is often used interchangeably with other terms such as *urban art*, *graffiti art* and *guerrilla art* etc. Several scholars agree that street art has many different forms of expressions in comparison to graffiti but is often more visual and not just focused on typography (Cedar, 2008; McAuliffe & Iveson, 2011). Street art often uses a wide array of materials and is meant to be understood by everyone instead of just the members of a closed community. However, street art is also used as an umbrella term encompassing all the other terms, even graffiti and graffiti writing. Due to these terminological problems, Ferrell goes as far as saying that “street art and graffiti are today defined by the very

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impossibility of defining them” (2016, p. xxx-xxxi). It is equally difficult to say how political statements fit into the picture and whether or when they should be considered street art or graffiti. In this thesis, I will work with both terms but I will use the term graffiti preferably when it comes to works that are “furtively placed in quick fashion with little artistic consideration” and that are “usually applied with aerosol spray paint, and the background surface is seldom prepared” (Chaffee, 1993, p. 7). Accordingly, I will use the term street art for more extensive works that involve other techniques than only spray paint, more artistic approaches and often a prepared background.

Political graffiti are not a modern Western invention but they can be already found in Antiquity in the form of wall inscriptions and “were typically the weapon of those politically less empowered in institutional terms” (Hillard, 2013, p. 115). Even though research is still scarce, there are several studies on the significance of socio-political graffiti and street art in various countries in the 20th and 21st century. For example, Chaffee has shown that street art has played a significant role in the process of democratization in Hispanic countries as a propaganda tool (1993). In the context of occupations and revolutions, street art and graffiti have been one of the ways to show civil disobedience and resilience. These spatial interventions are and “were the silent narrative accompanying acts of resistance yet were [are] themselves an act of resistance” (Peteet, 1996, p. 143) and are not only scribblings of individual actors. As McNichols remarks:

Graffiti art gets its rare power not only from its confrontational stance towards virtually any viewer who respects the “fourth wall” of the public stage that graffiti writers willfully disassemble, but from its occupancy of a peripheral position with respect to the society it criticizes. [...] This social frame of protest allows artists to produce works that express strong aesthetic values without fearing that their works’ aesthetics will be divorced from their underlying message. Their presence in our common, cluttered world rather than the blank slate of an art gallery repudiates our inclination to segregate aesthetics from the world it distills” (2006)
One well-known example are the critical murals that were painted on the West Bank barrier in 2005 by the famous street artist Banksy in the context of the Israel-Palestine conflict.\

Returning to the discussion of street art and graffiti as an alternative narrative of the crisis, it is first important to note that the impact a mural can have has changed in the internet age. While ephemerality and dependency on locality have been defining characteristics of street art and graffiti, works can now be easily recorded by the artist and by passers-by and shared via social network with a global audience. Interestingly, graffiti and street art has been picked up by newspapers as well through which the works receive an even higher dissemination. As Ferrel notes, “this widespread digitization [...] feeds back into the very processes through which such actions and images unfold, and alters their essential meaning” (2016, p. xxxiv). The power of street art and graffiti then lies in the way that a direct expression of an opinion can be spread to (possibly) many people, independently of gender, class or race but unfortunately, there is still little research on street art and graffiti as a form of social discourse and how they influence public opinion.

3.2. Political Street Art and Graffiti and Protests in Portugal

“Don’t read newspapers read walls!” [all caps removed] (Fig. 1, annex 1) is a graffito I found in the district of Lisbon in 2015 and it illustrates well the point made earlier of street art and graffiti being a type of media that offers alternative narratives beyond the discourse of elites ascribed to the printed press. The text is scrawled on the wall in capital letters in one colour without any apparent artistic ambition behind it; the main aim seems to be to push this opinion in the public space. This graffito is a good example for the first type of political graffiti that can be found in Portugal: the message

\[16\] Photos of these murals can be found online: Banksy at the West Bank barrier. (n.d.). The Guardian. Retrieved on May 11, 2016, from https://www.theguardian.com/arts/pictures/0,,1543331,00.html

In 2015, Banksy even made a satirical video in the form of a travel advert promoting Gaza as a prime tourist destination.

\[17\] All the following photographs can be found in annex 1.
outweighs the style and it is likely to be made by someone who does not consider himself or herself a (street) artist. In contrast, the second type are the more extensive and artistic works.

The research about street art and graffiti in Portugal is still very scarce but Campos demonstrated that mural paintings already appeared in the 1970s. During the authoritarian regime of the Estado Novo (1933-1974), walls were sometimes used by the political opposition to voice critical opinions against the regime under the danger of severe punishments (2016, p. 315). After the Carnation Revolution of 1974, many walls were painted by groups of ordinary citizens as Moore observes: “Tratavam-se de grandes murais com ligações aos murais mexicanos, albaneses, maoistas ou ainda soviéticos, sendo acompanhado de frases soltas, slogans e da expressão estética dos artistas” (as cited in Simões, 2013, p. 67). Public walls became a canvas for political communication and were appropriated by parties from the entire political spectrum, in particular by left-wing parties (Campos, 2016).

While these politically and ideologically motivated murals disappeared, American style graffiti was introduced to Portugal in the 90s by foreign artists and through hip hop culture. By the end of the 20th century, several Portuguese graffiti crews had been created and graffiti writing had gained considerable popularity, nurtured through a relatively high tolerance of illegal graffiti by the political authorities. As Campos proposes, “this period marks the beginning of a phase that involved the questioning of graffiti and its boundaries” and was followed by processes of artification (and later commodification) of graffiti and the development of Portuguese street art (2016, p. 306). By 2016, several art galleries, festivals and projects surrounding street art like the Galeria de Arte Urbana (GAU), Muro - Festival de Arte Urbana, Wool Festival etc. exist in various Portuguese cities and Lisbon is seen as one of the best cities globally for street art (Dixon, 2011).

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19 These were large murals with links to Mexican, Albanian, Maoist or even Soviet murals, accompanied by loose phrases, slogans and the aesthetic expression of the artists.
In the course of the Eurozone crisis, the graffiti scene has seen a new development: the politicization of graffiti, which will be discussed in the case study of this thesis. Even though these new works are reminiscent of post-revolutionary murals in their political nature, they differ in terms of authorship and context:

While the post-revolutionary mural was produced within the framework of political party propaganda and evidenced a clear ideological connection, the current version is completely different. These political demonstrations are generally illegal and are generated outside the sphere of the political parties, by isolated individuals or groups that are not involved in the political life. (Campos, 2016, p. 311).

These political works are visible to everyone on the streets and are being shared on various social media sites as well. However, one might still think that, at least in Portugal, street art and graffiti is a phenomenon too marginal to be considered by mainstream media and research. Nonetheless, it actually took centre stage in a debate about alleged censorship when the director of the Instituto de Ciências Sociais (ICS) of the University of Lisbon José Luís Cardoso suspended the journal Análise Social because of a visual essay containing political street art and graffiti. The essay “A luta voltou ao muro” (2014) by the social scientist Ricardo Campos briefly discusses the aforementioned politicization of graffiti and features several pictures of street art and graffiti criticizing the government, the troika and Merkel. The reason for the suspension and the withdrawal of the edition were the images that were considered “chocantes, ofensivas e de gosto duvidoso” by Cardoso (Lopes, 2014). While this decision was later reversed, this polemic attracted the media’s attention and among others, the television channel tvi24 (Oliveira, 2014) and several newspapers like Público (Lopes, 2014), Observador (Carriço, 2014) reported and commented on this incident and showed the images in question.

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20 There are too many pages and blogs to mention here but among others, there are the following pages just dedicated to street art and graffiti in Portugal: “Street Art & Graffiti Portugal”, “Street Art Seekers Imaginarios”, “Street Art Portugal”, “Street Art Lisbon”, “Graffiti Portugal” (all Facebook), “Street Art Portugal”, “Arte Urbana Portugal” (Tumblr), etc. (accessed March 27, 2016).

21 The fight has returned to the wall.

22 shocking, offensive and tacky
Another outlet for voicing dissenting opinions are public protests, demonstrations and occupations. Depending on the perspective, these public protests can be part of the public discourse as well. As Teune explains: “The public sphere is considered as a contextual factor to and a target for protest events and the individuals involved. In this perspective, protest is part of public discourse and a resource that is used to feed alternative views and formerly hidden issues into the public sphere.” (2016, p. 277). These forms of civil mobilisations have also been considered a part of *subterranean politics* - “politics that is not usually visible in mainstream political debates” (Kaldor, Selchow, Deel & Murray-Leach, 2012, executive summary). While the Greek civil society already became active in May 2010, large-scale protests in Portugal against austerity measures only started in 2011. Similar to the history of political graffiti and street art, there had been a period of relative absence of political activism\(^\text{23}\) in comparison to the political involvement during the Revolution. As Baumgarten remarks, “the Portuguese protest of the *Geração à Rasca* (‘The Desperate Generation’) on 12 March 2011 was the biggest demonstration in Portugal since the Carnation Revolution of 1974” (2013, p. 457). Consequently, the government’s proposal for the fourth Stability and Growth Pact known as *PEC IV* for curtailing public spending was rejected in the parliament and the Portuguese Prime Minister José Sócrates had to resign. However, due to rising borrowing costs, an external intervention in the form of assistance from the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) seemed unavoidable.

The elections on 5 June 2011 resulted in a coalition government between CDS – Partido Popular\(^\text{24}\) and the PSD\(^\text{25}\), led by Prime Minister Pedro Passos Coelho, which tried to strictly adhere to the austerity measures required by the troika. On 15 September 2012, another large protest was staged by a movement called “Que se lixe a troika”\(^\text{26}\)

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23 In particular from 1995 onwards (see Accornero & Ramos Pinto, 2015, p. 498)

24 People’s Party

25 Partido Social Democrata (Social Democratic Party)

26 Screw the troika
(QSLT), mobilising over 500,000 people in Portugal and abroad27 (Baumgarten, 2013). Angela Merkel, being perceived as the head of the troika28, faced protests during her first state visit on 12 November 2012 as well but, according to Bergfeld, only “a couple of hundred leftists” attended the protests (Baumgarten, 2013). The protest organized by the QSLT movement ran under the slogan “A Merkel não manda aqui! Panos pretos contra a troika!”29 and called on citizens to wear mourning garments and cover windows, cars and shops, etc. with black fabrics. Statues and trees were also covered with black cloths with the writing “Basta”30 (Fig. 2) and other parties like the PCTP-MRPP31 (Fig. 3) and trade unions like the CGTP32 joined the protest as well.

It would go beyond the scope of this research to discuss the whole Portuguese history and development of political activism related to the Eurozone crisis but as argued before, public demonstrations and protest can tell (an) alternative narrative(s) of the Eurozone crisis in contrast to the media. Mass demonstrations are also connected to political graffiti because public walls have been used to announce protests and strikes. For this reason, the protest pictures and protest writings, that is the imagery and slogans employed by the protesters, will be considered in the case study of this thesis as well. Political street art, graffiti, protest pictures and writings will be grouped under the term of minor media, media produced by subterranean actors that tends to present alternative narratives to mainstream media.

3.3. Portuguese Media Landscape

It was argued earlier that street art and graffiti provide narratives different from the hegemonic discourse that the mainstream media tend to present. The operation of

27 The QSLT organized another large-scale mass demonstration on 2 March 2013 but afterwards the amount of social movement activism started to decline (Carmo Duarte & Baumgarten, 2015).
28 In fact, Angela Merkel is not one of the official representatives of the troika.
29 Merkel does not command here! Black cloths against the troika!
30 Enough
31 Partido Comunista dos Trabalhadores Portugueses (Portuguese Workers' Communist Party)
32 Confederação Geral dos Trabalhadores Portugueses (General Confederation of the Portuguese Workers)
media companies and the selection criteria of journalists has been explored by many researchers and is a topic of immense academic discussion. Prominently scrutinized by Herman and Chomsky in the propaganda model, they maintain that elitist discourse and the marginalization of dissenting opinions in mass media is a result of several “filters”, like mainstream media belonging to large corporations and being depended on advertising (1988/2011, p. 2). Herman and McChesney also point out that the commercialisation of mass media leads to the “centralization of media control”, “tends to erode the public sphere” and “[creates] a culture of entertainment” (Herman & McChesney, 1997, p. 8-9). Herman and Chomsky’s research is mainly based on media in the United States but several authors point out that the same is true for European media (see Picard, 2015, p. 1) even though there is no comparable study available for Portugal. However, there are some indicators that the ideas of Herman and Chomsky are applicable to the Portuguese press as well.

Since the 1980s, a few private major media groups, the Portuguese state and the Roman Catholic Church dominate the Portuguese media landscape and own most newspapers, television channels and radio stations. All major groups except the holding Media Capital are owned by Portuguese companies but they are supported by foreign-held capital to varying degrees (Correia & Martins, 2016). A changing (digital) media environment and the Eurozone crisis offer further challenges as Costa e Silva observes:

This crisis period and its aftermath has also been critical in regard to the increasing lack of transparency concerning ownership, patterns and financial processes. [...] the need for capital in the Portuguese media has evidently been exacerbated [...] This, in turn, advances the influence of financialization on Portuguese media groups. (2014)

The question of elitism and impartiality in the Portuguese media is obviously much broader and too extensive to be discussed here but I would like to give a short overview of the Portuguese media, specifically of the newspapers examined in this thesis.

Television is still the most popular medium and in a survey by the Entidade Reguladora para a Comunicação Social (ERC), 66% of the respondents indicated that television news programmes were their primary source of information on the news and 16% said that they were their second most important source. Only 16% indicated that
journals were their most important source of information (8% for both printed as well as online journals) but printed journals were the second source of information for 29% and online journals for 17% of respondents (Entidade Reguladora para Comunicação Social, 2015, p. 8). According to the Associação Portuguesa para o Controlo de Tiragem e Circulação, Correio de Manhã (125,878 and 112,100 newspapers distributed on an average day33), Jornal de Notícias (85,354 and 62,638), Público (33,829 and 29,258) and Diário de Notícias (29,568 and 17,414) have the highest circulation among the general paid daily newspaper. Expresso has the highest circulation (113,910 and 85,849) among the general paid weekly newspapers and Visão (102,691 and 72,749) and Sábado (75,647 and 54,914) among the general paid weekly magazines (Associação Portuguesa para o Controlo de Tiragem e Circulação, 2016).

For this thesis, a newspaper analysis has been chosen because there are already several studies on the representation of Germany in the national press of other countries, which provide an interesting point of comparison. Furthermore, newspapers are easily accessible and even though television is the most popular medium in Portugal, many Portuguese consider newspapers (both offline and online) to be an important source of information on the news as well. The aim was to understand and analyse the narratives present in mainstream media and therefore two paid daily newspapers with a very wide circulation have been chosen: Jornal de Notícias and Público. These two newspapers belong to different types of journalism, which makes a comparison even more interesting. While Jornal de Notícias bears “popular” features, Público can be considered a quality newspaper (Correia & Martins, 2016). They are also owned by two different media groups: Público by Sonaecom and Jornal de Notícias by Controlinveste and while the readership34 of the first newspaper is concentrated more in the centre and south of the country, Jornal de Notícias is read more in the north (Correia & Martins, n.d.). The initial goal was to include Correio de Manhã and Visão, however, while the municipal newspaper archive of Lisbon has printed copies available, there is no digital

33 The first number refers to the second bimester of 2011, the second refers to the third bimester of 2014. These two time periods have been chosen because of important political events that took place during this period (see chapter on methodology).
34 Unfortunately, there is very little research available on the readership that these two newspapers cater to.
database that could be used for a keyword search and websites like the online press archive of SapoJornais only store the title page of each newspaper or magazine.
4. Research Methodologies and General Approach

4.1. Introduction

This thesis aims to explore the narratives that are told about Germany's role in the Eurozone crisis across different types of Portuguese media. In order to consider traditional hegemonic as well as alternative narratives, I examined selected mainstream newspapers but also political street art and graffiti, protest writings and pictures. The main question is: How is Germany represented in the Portuguese media in the course of the Eurozone crisis? Which tropes and narratives are broached and how do the narratives used by the Portuguese press compare to the narratives offered by minor media? Methodologically speaking, I used data triangulation, which is an approach taken from the social sciences and can be defined as “the practice of using multiple source of data [data triangulation] or multiple approaches to analyzing data to enhance the credibility of a research study” (Salkind, 2010, p. 1537). That means that I examined different sources of data, political street art/graffiti and protest pictures/writings in the form of a case study and then I compared these narratives with the results found in the subsequent qualitative newspaper research. Data triangulation has the advantage that “findings can be corroborated and any weaknesses in the data can be compensated for by the strengths of other data, thereby increasing the validity and reliability of the results” (Hales, 2010, p. 14). As explained before, political street art and graffiti, protest pictures and writings have been included as well because as explained in chapter 3.2, an increase of political graffiti and public protests has been registered during the Eurozone crisis in Portugal and these types of minor media tend to provide alternative narratives.

There are many different theories and models about the ways that the media influence individuals and society as a whole but for the media analysis to make sense we need to assume that the media indeed inform public opinion. A well-known theory that supports this assumption is the cultural effects theory. This means that the media does not influence public opinion in a direct, immediate way35 or indirectly through

35 In contrast to the hypodermic needle model (see Watson & Hill, 2015).
opinion leaders\textsuperscript{36} but it is a “slow, cumulative build-up of beliefs and values through which we understand the world” (Glover, 1984, p. 10). The cultural effects theory also maintains that this influence is dependent on the social situation and personal experience of an individual and that “the process of building-up beliefs and values over time is aided by the widespread use of stereotypes”, which are used by journalists as shortcuts (Grix & Lacroix, 2006, p. 376). As Grix and Lacroix suggest in a study on German stereotypes in the British press, “the long-term effects of exposure to national stereotypes can lead to their ‘embeddedness’ in the national psyche” (2006, p. 376).

4.2. Approaching Minor Media: Methodology of the Case Study

Researching street art and graffiti is a complicated undertaking for several reasons. Even though street art is not as ephemeral anymore as it was before the internet age, there is no central archive of all the works in a specific place. As much research lies more in the area of reception studies focusing on public opinion about graffiti and policy decisions, there are also not many studies analysing contemporary street art and graffiti in regards to the presented discourses and iconographies. Consequently, there are hardly any theories on how to approach and analyse street art and graffiti in that respect but I shall focus myself on the metaphors and narratives that are implied in the street art works and graffiti writings.

The material that I analysed in this thesis has been taken from the internet and from my personal collection. I have been taking photos of street art and graffiti since I came to Portugal in September 2013 and by the time I finished this thesis in September 2016, my collection\textsuperscript{37} contained almost 800 graffiti and street art works. Most of my photographs are taken in Lisbon but I have also travelled to other regions in Portugal where I collected street art and graffiti on the way. However, relying on my own collection alone would have made the research very limited and therefore I tried to find photographs of street art works and graffiti on the internet as well. There have been a

\textsuperscript{36} As described in the multistep flow model (see Watson & Hill, 2015).
\textsuperscript{37} Most of this collection can be found online: http://facebook.com/lisbonstreetart
few articles about Portuguese street art and graffiti in the context of the crisis in foreign newspapers that I used as a starting point. In the preparation for this thesis, I also looked through blogs, Facebook pages, Tumblr accounts and similar websites that document the street art scene in Portugal and I contacted researchers, street artist and organizations that have been involved in the street art scene like Galeria de Arte Urbana (GAU), Lisbon Street Art Tours and Wool Festival, asking whether they know any works with references to Germany.

Unfortunately, I also could not attend the protests and demonstrations myself but many photographs of these events can be found online and I was in contact with field researchers as well. Most photographs have been included in newspaper articles and I am aware that therefore the selection of the photographs is based on editorial decisions. Obviously, it is impossible to make any generalisations from these findings as I do not know how prominent certain representations were during the protests. However, it is possible to comment on the protest pictures and protest writings themselves, as visual artefacts, and they can give us some indications about the discourses present in Portuguese society about Germany and its role in the Eurozone crisis. Two other limitations are that for most works I do not know when they were created and who the author or artist was but unfortunately, this is a common issue in street art and graffiti research that is hard to overcome. Secondly, I also do not know where most of the works are - or were - located, implying the context in which the work was originally presented is missing. In particular for political street art or graffiti, the location can make a significant difference: political street art or graffiti placed in a small alleyway obviously does not have the same public reach and implications as a work placed next to the parliament. It is important to be aware of these limitations but the focus of this research lies on the narratives implied in the works themselves, regardless of the quantity of Portuguese street art works and graffiti about Germany.

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4.3. Analyzing Narratives: Methodology of the Newspaper Analysis

The newspaper analysis consisted of a mixed-method approach, combining both elements from quantitative as well as qualitative methods. As Macnamara notes:

Qualitative content analysis is difficult and maybe impossible to do with scientific reliability. But qualitative analysis of texts is necessary to understand their deeper meanings and likely interpretations by audiences – surely the ultimate goal of analysing media content. So a combination of the two seems to be the ideal approach (2005, p. 5).

The first step was a search in the online archives on the homepages of the Jornal de Notícias and Público in order to gain an initial understanding of the volume of articles that might be relevant and highlight differences between the selected newspapers. The search was performed using the keywords “Alemanha”, “Alemanha crise”, “Alemanha Europa”, “Alemanha euro”, “Merkel” and “Schäuble” within the time period of 11 March 2011 and 19 May 2014. This time period was not chosen arbitrarily: 12 March 2011 marks the day of the Geração à Rasca demonstration, a large event that marked the beginning of a series of civil mobilisations. The date 18 May 2014 was selected because two days before Portugal had officially exited the Economic Adjustment Programme of the European Union. Unfortunately, the search engine settings in the online archives were limited; it was not possible to search for all words related to Germany (like “German”) at the same time and particularly in Público, the location of the search term cannot be specified (e.g. only in the title, only front page) and it was not possible to exclude local editions, supplements and extraneous sections like classified ads. For this reason, the resulting number of articles that contained the respective search terms was too high for a qualitative analysis of all articles to still be feasible.

40 Initially, it was planned that the research project “Projecto Jornalismo e Sociedade” from the ISCTE university institute, which has been examining the top news and journalistic tendencies in the Portuguese press since 2012, would provide me with the data of their project by February 2016 that I wanted to use as a starting point for my thesis. However, by the time the literature review was written (April 2016) the data was still not available and I had to proceed with a different approach.

41 “Germany”, “Germany crisis”, “Germany Europe”, “Germany euro”

42 For example, the search term “Alemanha” yielded 4583 results in Jornal de Notícias.
In order to narrow down the number of articles, various searches using keywords from the narratives implied in street art/graffiti and protests were performed within the time period of the 11th of March 2011 and the 19th of May 2014. Among others, the following keywords have been used: “Merkel Hitler”, “Wir sind das Volk”, “Merkel Nazi”, “Merkel nazista”, “Merkel manipular”, “Merkel Terceiro Reich” and “Merkel marionetista.”

Afterwards, a second search was performed using only the neutral search terms “Alemanha” and “Merkel” and the time period was narrowed down to one day before and two days after five public events: 12 March 2011 (Geração à Rasca protest), 3 May 2011 (Portugal’s Agreement to the Economic Adjustment Programme), 15 September 2012 (first QSLT protest), 12 November 2012 (second QSLT protest against Merkel’s visit) and 17 May 2014 (Exit of the Economic Adjustment Programme). These five events have been chosen on a timeline of a multitude of events related to the Eurozone crisis and a higher amount of references to Germany among the coverage of these particular events was expected. The protests have shown to elicit strong emotions in relation to Merkel and the entrance and the exit of the Economic Adjustment Programme built the frame of the conflict.

When searching for articles with the search terms “Alemanha” and “Merkel” on the aforementioned dates, Jornal de Notícias showed 150 results and Público 66. The resulting numbers of articles for the search using keywords from the narratives was 11 (Jornal de Notícias) and 171 (Público). This discrepancy is due to the fact that in the search engine of Público it was not possible to specify that two search terms should actually be located in the same article and not only in the same newspaper edition. For this reason, newspaper editions containing for example the word “Merkel” in one article and “Hitler” in another had to be sorted out manually. The articles were then systematically classified, based on the headline, illustration, subheading and head

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43 “We are the people”, “Merkel nazi”, “Merkel manipulate”, “Merkel Third Reich” and “Merkel puppeteer”
44 A search with the search term “Schäuble” had been performed as well but as the number of results was not very high (only 59 results in Jornal de Notícias) and a big overlap between the articles containing the word “Alemanha” and the “Schäuble” was assumed, the search with the search term “Schäuble” was not taken into consideration.
paragraph, and articles not relevant to the topic\textsuperscript{45} or duplicates were sorted out. There was a significant overlap between the articles containing the keywords and the chosen dates and consequently, the remaining sample contained 129 articles.

First, these articles were analysed quantitatively to offer some empirical evidence and information about the amount and types of articles. Following the steps proposed by Hodgetts and Chamberlain (2014, p. 385-391) for analysing news media, I tried to look for inductive and deductive themes, keywords, metaphors, patterns, tropes and I tried to identify recurring narratives.\textsuperscript{46} By making a network diagram (Fig. 1, annex 2), I was able to systematise and visualize the connections between different narratives and articles in the two respective newspapers. For the approach of the analysis I was taking clues from narrative analysis. It is important here to emphasize that I decided against conducting a discourse analysis (or similar methods) because then it would have been possible to examine only a very small number of articles. With the mixed-method approach I was using, focusing on recurring narratives, I was able to cover a greater number of articles while still being able to examine them on a more than just quantitative basis.

The term narrative analysis or narrative inquiry describes a set of essentially qualitative research methods that revolve around storytelling and processes of sense-making and is part of the multi-disciplinary area of narrative research. While narrative analysis is more used in the social sciences, narratology is often applied in literary theory and criticism, as well as in film theory. Even though narratives have been used as an object of study a long time before narrative research, the attitude towards narratives changed in the second half of the 20th century: during the so-called narrative turns\textsuperscript{47}, the

\textsuperscript{45} For example, most articles that mentioned the search terms only one time or included references to Germany in a different context (not relevant to the Eurozone crisis) were excluded.

\textsuperscript{46} I am aware of my own bias in selecting and identifying these narratives. However, the reliability of the analysis could have only been increased by the use of an investigator triangulation, that is the use of more than one investigator.

\textsuperscript{47} “Instead of one narrative turn and one new attitude towards narrative, we can rather speak of at least three different turns and attitudes. Within literary studies, the narrative turn began as early as the 1960s and signified a structuralist, scientific and descriptive rhetoric in the study of narrative. In historiography, the turn to narrative theory indicated criticisms of naive narrative historiography and more generally “the value of narrative in representing reality” (Mink 1987; White 1987). The narrative turn in social sciences began later, in the early 1980s and encompassed entirely different issues: positive appraisal of narratives
omnipresence and importance of narrative as a phenomenon of study in itself, generally speaking, was recognized and theorized (Hyvärinen, 2008). The importance of narratives has also been noted by Roland Barthes:

The narratives of the world are numberless. Narrative is first and foremost a prodigious variety of genres, themselves distributed amongst different substances - as though any material were fit to receive man's stories. Able to be carried by articulated language, spoken or written, fixed or moving images, gestures, [...] news item, conversation. Moreover, under this almost infinite diversity of forms, narrative is present in every age, in every place, in every society [...] narrative is international, transhistorical, transcultural: it is simply there, like life itself. (1977, p. 79)

There is not one approach to narrative analysis nor a fixed definition for the term narrative itself but for the purpose of this research, I shall take up the definition by Branigan: “narrative is a way of organizing spatial and temporal data into a cause-effect chain of events with a beginning, a middle and end that embodies a judgment about the nature of events as well as demonstrates how it is possible to know, and hence to narrate, the events” (1992, p.3). What is important is “what happens to whom” (the story) and “how the story is told” (the discourse) (Car, 2008, p. 150). Additionally, Kozloff in researching narratives on television notes that “how the story and discourse are affected by the text’s placement within the larger discourse of the station’s schedule” is another important layer (1992, 69). In the case of newspapers, this would be the placement of the article in the newspaper, or broadly the context. However, due to the scope of this thesis it will not be possible to pay much attention to this.

Narrative analysis has often been used to study personal oral or written accounts like journals, interviews and autobiographies but using this methodology to examine print news is not completely new either. News can be seen as one way of making sense and explaining how the world works, how a certain issue arose and how it can be tackled. By doing so, the journalist uses narratives and is, as Lule points out, “part of a long storytelling tradition” (2011, p. 3). There is an academic debate of whether “objective” articles providing factual information (hard news) can be considered as such, a general anti-positivist and often humanist approach to the study of human psychology and culture (Plummer 1983, 2001; Bruner 1991; Riessman 1993).” (Hyvärinen, 2008, p. 449)
narratives. However, many researchers agree on the fact that “news do not simply 'select' and 'report' on topics from the outside world (and cannot be fully objective for that reason) [but] news 'constructs' events and relationships between groups of people” (Hodgetts and Chamberlain, 2014, p. 381) and as Fulton explains, hard news “[exemplify] a specific kind of narrative in which the narrative voice is deliberately elided” (2005, p. 228) and consequently, one can indeed argue that all news is a form of narrative.

People use narratives as a way of “retrospective meaning making” (Chase, 2005, p. 656) and in this research, I was interested in the way people make sense of the Eurozone crisis through narratives, specifically what role is attributed to Germany during this process in the Portuguese press and in street art. This means that I did not always look at the overarching narrative of the news article because Germany was not always the focus of the article; sometimes a certain narrative was only implied in one sentence by the usage of a specific metaphor or picture. I focused on the most prominent narratives about Germany and Merkel in the newspaper articles and compared these to the narratives present in the case study. Due to the number of articles, the context and political background of the commentators could only partially be taken into consideration and not every article could be discussed in detail. However, the intention was to show which narratives about Germany and Merkel can be found in the two newspapers within the given time frame and how they are being discussed. Because there is hardly any research on the representation of the Eurozone crisis in Portugal, no comparisons could be made on this level and the results are not generalizable to all Portuguese media. In other words, this research only looked at the articles in which references to Germany were made but not at the articles that discussed the Eurozone crisis without making a reference to Germany.

In the following chapters, I will first describe the graffiti, street works and protests pictures and writings with references to Germany. Afterwards, I will present

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48 As I am not an expert in Portuguese politics nor Portuguese media, it would go beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss the political orientation of the commentators in order to understand the motivation behind certain statements. Therefore, the political orientation was only taken into account when the commentator is a politician.
some quantitative data obtained from the newspaper analysis and give a short overview of the narratives and metaphors that were broached in the newspaper articles. Lastly, I will offer an in-depth discussion of the most common narratives and metaphors and demonstrate how these narratives are presented in the selected newspapers and minor media.
5. Case Study: Representations of Germany in Portuguese Street Art, Graffiti and Public Protests

Since the 20th century, a wide variety of street art works and graffiti writings - from simple, illegal tags to major artistic, commissioned murals - can be found in the Portuguese urban landscape. However, as mentioned before, with the Eurozone crisis came the reappearance of political graffiti and street art as “the expression of an active citizenship” (Campos, 2016, p. 311). These political graffiti and street art works might engage with the Eurozone crisis by criticizing general living conditions and circumstances like unemployment (Fig. 4) abandoned houses and evictions (Fig. 5 and Fig. 6) and low wages (Fig. 7). Furthermore, there are many works addressing inequality and the disproportionate share of capital like the stencils by Dalaiama (Fig. 8), suggesting that Portugal’s (economic) future looks dire (Fig. 9 and Fig. 10) and showing solidarity and unity with Greece (Fig. 11).

While these are some general recurring themes that can be found in political graffiti and street art in the Portuguese urban landscape, for this thesis the question who is being blamed for the Eurozone crisis is more important. Three main actors can be identified in the street art works and graffiti that I found: Portuguese politicians/the government, the troika and Angela Merkel. The responsibility might be attributed to all three actors at once (Fig. 12), only focusing on one or two of them or to right-wing politics in general (Fig. 13). The former Prime Minister José Sócrates is at the centre of criticism of the Portuguese government like for example in a stencil that caricatures Sócrates with the slogan “For a poorer country” (Fig. 14).

The artist Nuno Reis, also known as Nomen, who has been active in the Lisbon graffiti scene since 1989, has been particularly outspoken. In 2013, he started to put up

49 It has to be noted here that certain negative representations of Germany and Merkel are not unique to street art, graffiti and protests but they can be found on social media as well (B. Baumgarten, personal communication, May 30, 2016).
50 There is some uncertainty about the dates of Nomen’s works: the photos of the posters were put on the Facebook page of Clan dos Gatugas on the 21st of November 2013 but on Nomen’s portfolio the posters are dated to 2014.
posters showing several Portuguese politicians behind bars with the text: “Clan dos ‘Gatugas’ - talvez um dia”\textsuperscript{51}, suggesting that politicians like José Sócrates and the former Minister of State and Foreign Affairs Paulo Portas should be imprisoned (Fig. 15). In a piece for a cultural event on the Rossio square in Lisbon, Nomen also attributes responsibility explicitly to the troika (Fig. 16). The painting shows two hands held together by a chain and praying to a watchful eye in the top part of a pyramid. The hands with the flags of Portugal, Greece, Ireland and Spain symbolize the GIPS countries that have to beg the European Union for forgiveness and leniency. The whole scene is surveyed by the Managing Director of the IMF Christine Lagarde represented as a witch. Next to the pyramid is a text stating that the troika is “aquela coisa que nos pôs ‘ao corrente’ da situação actual…”\textsuperscript{52} Another graffiti writer criticizes that Portugal has lost its sovereignty, 39 years after the end of the dictatorship (Fig. 17).

Moving on to the focus of this case study, the representation of Germany in Portuguese street art and graffiti, I have found ten graffiti and street art works in Portugal with a reference to Merkel and her role to the Eurozone crisis.\textsuperscript{53} One motive was found three times, so in total there are eight different images. In these images, six themes have been identified: Merkel and Nazism (1), Merkel and the Troika (1), Merkel manipulating Portuguese politicians (2), Merkel as a thief (1), Merkel go away (3) and Merkel as someone to be feared (1). However, no graffito or street art work with explicit references to Germany or other influential Portuguese politicians like Wolfgang Schäuble has been discovered.

Probably the most famous work was done by Nomen in cooperation with Slap and Kurtz on a wall in the Lisbon neighbourhood of Amoreiras, where it is legal to spray and paint. It portrays Angela Merkel as a puppeteer in a theatre steering puppets

\textsuperscript{51} Clan of the “Gatugas” - maybe one day. “Gatugas” is a wordplay with “gatunas” (thieves) and “tugas” (Portuguese people)
\textsuperscript{52} Troika: that thing that put us ‘on the current’ of the present situation.
\textsuperscript{53} I have found one more mural but as it was made in 2016 and portrayed Merkel in the context of the refugee crisis. Therefore, it was not taken into account. It can be found here: https://ctrlaltrua.com/2016/01/25/ibisco-do-teatro-a-transformacao/#jp-carousel-869
Additionally, I have found one etching by the famous Portuguese street artist Vhils portraying Merkel but it is located in Berlin. http://sicnoticias.sapo.pt/cultura/2012-01-06-artista-portugues-vhils-retrata-angela-merkel-numa-parede-em-berlin
with the faces of Paulo Portas and Pedro Passos Coelho (Fig. 18). Interestingly, the mural even caught the attention of major newspapers like Jornal de Notícias (“Passos e Portas como marionetas”, 2012) and Diário de Notícias (Salvador, 2012), which reported on it and most likely helped to spread this metaphor to a bigger audience. Next to the stage on the left is a remark that reads “this mural was realized without external help” and to the right, the artists ask the beholder directly: “How long do you still want to watch this show? ‘Our’ debt continues to grow!” The cynical artwork asserts that Portugal does not need external help; the austerity policies that the government willingly enforces are neither going to save Portugal nor lower their debt. Nevertheless, the Portuguese politicians are only partially accountable because they are represented as being controlled or manipulated by Merkel in the name of the European Union.

Another mural that refers to the relationship between Merkel and Portuguese politicians shows Passos Coelho grudgingly kissing Merkel’s buttocks (Fig. 19). Above it is a sentence that reads “Este beijo deixa-nos tesos.” This wordplay could be translated to either “This kiss leaves us stiff” or “This kiss leaves us without money.” The Portuguese politicians are trying to curry favour with Merkel but, as the mural suggest, this ingratiation is not going to help Portugal financially. Instead, the mural calls for a “greve geral”, a general strike. The red figure next to it, the symbol of the Portuguese left-wing socialist political party BE54, indicates that the strike is presumably supported by this opposition party. This link between left-wing parties and the usage of graffiti as means of political communication has already been observed in the time after the revolution, when murals were used by parties of the entire political spectrum but especially by parties leaning more to the left.

Related to this mural is a painting by Bruno Nogueira (NEK), which shows Merkel running away with a money bag (Fig. 20). Merkel is represented as someone who cannot be trusted and who financially profits of Portugal’s crisis. Maybe for this reason, two graffiti writings (Fig. 21, Fig. 22) demand that Merkel should leave. In the eyes of the creators, Merkel has too much influence on Portuguese policy decisions and should stay away from Portugal. It might be this strong influence that leads another

54 Bloco de Esquerda (Left Block)
graffiti writer to the association of Merkel with Hitler. In a stencil (Fig. 23) that I have found two times in Porto and one time in Coimbra, Merkel is portrayed doing the Nazi salute. As explained before, the association between Merkel and Nazism is not uncommon and has been found in Greece as well. Furthermore, this stencil also criticizes the troika by stating “nem Merkel nem troikas”\(^5\) - both the troika as well as Merkel seem to have too much power and influence over Portugal. This might be one of the reasons why another graffiti writer expresses her or his fear of the German Chancellor (Fig. 24).

Interestingly, several foreign newspaper articles\(^6\) feature both pictures of political street art and graffiti as well as photos from protests and strikes to illustrate the seemingly tight atmosphere and the rise of anti-German sentiments in Portugal in the height of the Eurozone crisis. This connection between protests and graffiti is already visible in the time after the Portuguese Revolution when walls were used to announce public demonstrations, strikes and protests (Carius & Soromenho-Marques, 2014, S. 103). Nowadays, the graffiti writer might call on the viewer to “fight and organize yourself” (Fig. 13) or even call for a revolution (Fig. 25) or announce a specific protest or strike (Fig. 19, Fig. 26). Such a graffito is often signed by a specific party, like the aforementioned BE (Fig. 19) or organizations like the JCP\(^7\) (Fig. 26).

As mentioned earlier (chapter 3.2), most of Portuguese civil society became active in 2011, staging the Geração à Rasca demonstration on 12 March 2011, but it seems that references to Germany only became more prominent with the protest Que se lixe a troika on 15 September 2012. While references to Merkel were not completely absent in 2011 (Fig. 27), the demonstrations were mainly directed against the Portuguese government and pointed out issues like raising unemployment. Later, the protests developed a more European dimension and from mid-2012, the amount of references to Germany started to increase (B. Baumgarten, personal communication,

\(^5\) Neither Merkel nor troikas
\(^7\) Juventude Comunista Portuguesa (Portuguese Communist Youth)
May 30, 2016). On 12 November 2012, when Merkel made her first state visit to Portugal, a protest was organized against Merkel, or more specifically against what Merkel represents:

E Angela Merkel representa a Europa da austeridade, a Europa nas mãos do poder financeiro, a Europa dos directórios, do poder político não sufragado, a Europa cada vez mais sujeita a instâncias internacionais que promovem a destruição das nossas economias e sociedades. Angela Merkel é uma das figuras de proa da ideologia que nos impõe a pobreza, o desemprego, a precariedade e a destruição do estado social, tendo a troika e os governos troikistas como armas. [...] Angela Merkel simboliza tudo isto. Por isso, queremos deixar muito claro que não manda aqui. Nunca votámos nela. Recusamos a austeridade.58 (“Que se Lixe a Troika”, 2012)

This statement is reflected in many of the protest pictures and writings: protesters use posters reiterating the slogan of the protest “A Merkel não manda aqui”59 (Fig. 28) or simply state “Merkel fora de Portugal”60 (Fig. 29). As explained earlier (chapter 3.2), the QSLT collective also called upon Portuguese citizens to wear a mourning dress, which is reflected in another protest writing that reads “Merkel ist tödlich”61 (Fig. 30). Merkel is made responsible for the economic decisions that were enforced by the Portuguese government without the direct democratic approval by the Portuguese population. The wish to have a say in the decisions made about the future of Portugal is also reflected in a poster reading “Wir sind das Volk”62 (Fig. 31). Therefore, another banner calls upon Merkel to get out and to take Passos Coelho with her (Fig. 32) and two other protest pictures (Fig. 33, Fig. 34) take up the puppet theme earlier presented in the mural by Nomen. The Portuguese politicians, principally Passos Coelho and Portas, are seen as merely executing the will of European authorities and

58 And Angela Merkel represents the Europe of austerity, the Europe in the hands of financial power, the Europe of directories, non-elected political power, the Europe increasingly subject to international bodies that promote the destruction of our economies and societies. Angela Merkel is one of the leading figures of the ideology that imposes poverty, unemployment, precariousness and destruction of the welfare state, with the troika and troika governments as weapons. [...] Angela Merkel symbolizes all of this. So we want to make it very clear that she is not in charge here. We never voted for her. We reject the austerity.
59 Merkel is not in charge here.
60 Merkel out of Portugal
61 Merkel is deadly
62 We are the people. This is a slogan that was used during the Monday demonstrations in East Germany in 1989 and 1990 against the government of the German Democratic Republic. Whether the background of this slogan was actually clear to the protesters and whether the aim was to actually appropriate this slogan remains unclear and the message is therefore a bit ambiguous.
disregarding the Portuguese citizens. Another group of protesters holds up a German cheque of 34,400,000,000 payable to the IMF/troika and “signed” by the Portuguese people (Fig. 35), which insinuates that the external financial aid, that Portugal has received as part of the Economic Adjustment Programme⁶³, is not desired or necessary and should be returned.

Lastly, the theme of Nazism is visible on several posters and banners as well. Merkel is represented in a pig costume in front of the flag of the Nazi party NSDAP (Fig. 36) or shown with a toothbrush moustache like Adolf Hitler (Fig. 37, Fig. 38, Fig. 39). At least two puppets of Merkel wearing a black T-shirt with a swastika⁶⁴ and “Merkel Hitler” written on it (Fig. 28, Fig 40) were also being carried by protesters during the second QSLT demonstration. Another poster shows photos of Merkel and Passos Coelho next to António de Oliveira Salazar and Hitler (Fig. 41), implying that Merkel and Passos Coelho are dictators. In Figure 36, Merkel is also portrayed with a toothbrush moustache and the armband of the Nazi party. Together with three skeletons (IMF, ECB, EU), Passos Coelho and Portas, she sits around a table piercing a large piece of meat in the form of Portugal with forks. Another more indirect reference to Nazism is made on a poster with the writing “Arbeit macht frei”⁶⁵ (Fig. 42), a slogan known for being used on the entrances of Nazi concentration camps.

As already mentioned, there are some limitations to this case study, some that are specific to the object of study, street art, graffiti and protests, and other limitations that apply to case studies and qualitative research in general. It is difficult to say whether the number of street art works and graffiti with references to Germany (or rather to Merkel) that were found is low or high. On the one hand, it can be assumed that most works were created at the height of the Eurozone crisis in 2011 and 2012 when also most protests took place and that many of these street art works and graffiti have disappeared by now. On the other hand, we do not know for sure if and how many

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⁶³ The Economic Adjustment Programme for Portugal is the official term for what is more commonly known as the Bailout Programme.
⁶⁴ The T-shirt does actually not have the swastika on it that was appropriated by the Nazis, which is right-facing and turned by 45 degrees, but it shows the swastika used as a propitious symbol in Buddhism, Hinduism and several other religions.
⁶⁵ Work sets you free
works have been wiped out and when most of the works examined here were actually created. It might be that there are (or were) many more street art works and graffiti with references to Germany and its role in the Eurozone crisis but it is also easy to overrate this phenomenon. News reports like the aforementioned articles by Finke (2012), Fischer and Hamann (2015), which use photos of street art and protest banners against Merkel to illustrate the apparent growing resentment against her policies, can easily create the impression that Portugal’s walls are filled with such criticism even though this is not actually the case. As Tulke explains, this might at least apply to Greece: “Für den Fall Athen kann ich sagen, dass die Repräsentation von Merkel in Street Art und Graffiti in der Regel eher überschätzt wird.”\(^{66}\) (J. Tulke, personal communication, May 5, 2016).

It is important to keep this point in mind in order not to make generalizations, however the negative references that have been found are in line with the previously discussed results of public opinion polls. Furthermore, this thesis is mainly concerned with the narratives themselves, regardless of quantity. Contrariwise, the absence of certain narratives is also indicative: While there are many statements, both in graffiti as well as protests, which indicate the disapproval of Merkel and “her” politics by a certain part of Portuguese society, no references to Germany in general or Germany's Federal Minister of Finance Wolfgang Schäuble have been discovered. The references to Merkel were partially very unspecific like “Merkel fora”\(^ {67}\) but the street art works and graffiti, protest pictures and writings have also highlighted two very interesting, recurring themes that I will expand upon in chapter seven after giving a short summary of the quantitative and qualitative results the newspaper analysis: Merkel as the Master of the Puppets and Merkel and the *Fourth Reich*.

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\(^{66}\) In the case of Athens, I can say that the representation of Merkel in street art and graffiti is rather overestimated.

\(^{67}\) Merkel [get] out

6.1. Overview of the Quantitative Results

The first striking difference between the coverage of Jornal de Notícias and Público is the number of articles published with references to Germany and Merkel: More than half of the articles of the final sample were published by Público (91 articles) whereas in Jornal de Notícias only 38 articles were considered relevant in the given time frame and criteria.

Looking at the absolute number of articles published over time (Fig. 2, Annex 2), it can be seen that the coverage of Público was more consistent: surrounding all five events that were selected, there had been articles published with references to Germany or Merkel with a peak surrounding the days of Merkel’s state visit. In Jornal de Notícias, no relevant articles could be found surrounding the date 3 May 2011 (Portugal’s Agreement to the Economic Adjustment Programme) and on 15 September 2012 (first QSLT protest). Also on the other two dates, there had been less than four articles per day. It was only when Merkel visited Portugal that references to Germany and Merkel in Jornal de Notícias’ articles soared and even more articles were published than in Público at that time. In both newspapers, there were more references to Merkel than to Germany in the context of the Eurozone crisis.

Furthermore, there is also a striking difference in relation to the types of articles that were published in the two respective newspapers (Fig. 3, Annex 2). While the coverage of Público is dominated by opinion pieces by a relative majority of 42%, in Jornal de Notícias, most references to Merkel and Germany can be found in news stories. Jornal de Notícias also contained more relevant letters to the editor and more articles that fell into the category “other” than Público. The latter is not very surprising because it seemed that in general Jornal de Notícias featured more articles and pieces of information that could not be classified as a classical news story, opinion piece or letter to the editor. The relative majority of articles related to Germany in Público could be found in the opinion section (“Espaço público”), followed by articles in a section called
on the first pages. In *Jornal de Notícias*, most articles could be found on
the first pages of the newspaper (“Primeiro plano”).

As mentioned earlier, full objectivity in journalism is an ideal that cannot be
fully achieved but the articles that have been classified as news stories were mainly
trying to convey factual information and therefore can be considered as being relatively
neutral. In most of the cases, these news stories did not point to a specific narrative or
contained only indirect references to the role of Germany and Merkel in the Eurozone
crisis. The letters to the editor in both newspapers were overly negative in regards to
Germany and Merkel while the opinion pieces were offering critiques that frequently
discussed the positive and negative sides to a certain event or situation.

The most interesting finding from this analysis is the different agenda setting of
the two newspapers. As Fulton notes:

> The news agenda, then, sets out the issues for debate and concern, but also
> confirms the myths and stories that we already believe to be true or obvious.
> Clearly, different newspapers will have different agendas, largely implicit, often
> controlled by owners and senior editors. News consumers will not only be
> attracted to those news products whose agendas align with theirs but are also
> likely to model their personal agendas of significant issues on those of the
> papers they read. (2005, p. 223-224).

While I did not examine all articles with references to Germany and Merkel
during the Eurozone crisis, it seems that for the editors of *Jornal de Noticias* (in
comparison to *Público*), Germany and its role in the Eurozone crisis was not a salient
topic before and after Merkel’s state visit. Before that event, there was no relevant
opinion article in *Jornal de Noticias*, only three news stories and two letters to the
editor. These two letters were principally negative and criticized Germany’s and
Merkel’s involvement in the Eurozone crisis but the news stories can be seen as neutral.
The visit then could have acted as a kind of catalyser for *Jornal de Noticias* to pick up
on public anger and disgruntlement and to introduce a new antagonistic character,
Angela Merkel, in their narrative of the Eurozone crisis. Nevertheless, while *Jornal de*
Notícias jumped on the bandwagon with the extensive coverage of the state visit and repeated much of the criticism voiced against Germany and Merkel in protests and street art, it did not seem to follow up on this coverage. There was only one more article, an opinion piece, published after Merkel’s visit within the given timeframe and selection criteria. Contrariwise, Público contained various types of articles about Germany throughout the selected time period, indicating that Público already attributed importance to the role of Germany and Merkel in the Eurozone crisis before the onset of most civil mobilisations.

6.2. Overview of the Qualitative Results

As noted earlier (chapter 4.3), narratives are a way of “retrospective meaning making” (Chase, 2005, p. 656) and the aim of this research is to understand what role is attributed to Germany in the sense-making process of the Eurozone crisis in various types of Portuguese media. Looking back at the case study on Portuguese street art, graffiti and protests, it became clear that Germany was not mentioned explicitly but the two main themes actually focused on Merkel. The Chancellor was portrayed as a puppeteer steering and manipulating Portuguese politicians and it was implied that Merkel was similar to Hitler. References to these two themes could be found in the newspapers as well but in general, the image that was offered in the press, was more nuanced and diversified. Like in street art and protests, the focus was often on Merkel as the antagonist - and not Schäuble\textsuperscript{70} or Germany - or Merkel was presented as a synecdoche for Germany.

Apart from the aforementioned themes, there were four themes that were prevalent in the newspaper articles. First of all, there is the metaphor of Portugal being a good student. This metaphor implies that Portugal is obedient to its teacher Germany

\textsuperscript{70} It is surprising that there almost no references to Schäuble even though he is also a strong advocate for austerity measures and has been targeted in the Greek media (Tzogopoulos, 2015). The reasons for the focus on Merkel instead of Schäuble or other politicians is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, one possible explanation is that Schäuble did not visit Portugal in the time period that was examined (2011-2014) but he did make a state visit to Greece in July 2013.
and eagerly wants to comply to all demands in order to reduce its debt. Furthermore, Germany\textsuperscript{71} is also often compared to a doctor. In this metaphor, the GIPS countries are seen as being sick; they are patients, who need external help to alleviate their pains. Although the metaphors describing the relationship between Portugal and Merkel differ, both tell a similar story. The metaphor of the puppeteer focuses more on Portuguese politicians than on Portugal but regarding the aspect of power relations it is similar to the aforementioned metaphors. Whether it is in the form of teacher/student, doctor/patient or puppeteer/puppets, all three metaphors belong to the same narrative: they juggle the Germany and Portugal in order to tell a story of a relationship marked by superiority and submission.

Another common theme centres on allegation of imperialism against Germany. The idea is that Germany’s power is increasing while Portugal is losing its sovereignty. In this narrative, Merkel is described as an unelected, dictatorial leader who wants to create a “German Europe” with Portugal becoming (or already being) a mere province of Germany. Even though there is no direct reference to Nazism in this theme, the idea of Portugal being governed from abroad from an unelected leader - Merkel - implies this. The while the other three aforementioned narratives are not directly based on German history.

The lines between the themes are not always unequivocal because they tend to blend into each other but in summary, one can say that there are two main narratives dominating Portuguese media discourse: The first narrative refers back to Germany’s recent past and implies that Merkel wants to establish a sort of “Fourth Reich.” The second narrative is not directly based on the history and focuses on an allegedly unequal relationship between Portugal and Germany. These two narratives will be analysed in the following chapter. Lastly, many articles in Público mention the theme that Germany or Merkel are the ultimate symbol of austerity and that they are the only ones responsible for the cuts in Portuguese public expenditure.

\textsuperscript{71} Alternatively, this teacher or this doctor can also be the troika or another European institution.
7. Narrating Germany’s Role in the Eurozone Crisis

7.1. Reviving Old Ghosts or Merkel and the Fourth Reich

Shortly before Merkel’s official state visit, a group of over 100 intellectuals and artists published an open letter declaring the Chancellor a persona non grata\textsuperscript{72} on Portuguese territory. The authors see Merkel as “the chief promoter of the Neoliberal doctrine which is ruining Europe” and claim that her policies “have left the Portuguese economy [in ruins]” (“Open letter to Angela Merkel”, 2012). By 7 pm on 12 November, this letter had received 4226 signatures. Two different points get interspersed here: On the one hand, the letter accuses Merkel of making political decisions in Portugal even though she was not elected by the Portuguese population. On the other hand, the letter also states that a “majority of the Portuguese population blatantly disapproves of this government and the way in which it is destroying the country, supported by the troika and yourself” (“Open letter to Angela Merkel”, 2012). Judging from the comments on the website, the supporters are not only Portuguese but also from other European countries, including Germany. Interestingly, the term “outros povos irmãos”\textsuperscript{73} is used to refer to these countries, which is reminiscent of communism and in particular the way the countries of the Warsaw Pact called each other. It is one more indication that a lot of the criticism comes from the left political spectrum.

Both Journal de Notícias as well Público feature this narrative of Portugal being governed from the outside. Starting with Jornal de Notícias, this narrative is especially brought forward by the readers. There are three different letters to the editor and one survey with people on the street and in all cases Merkel is accused of governing in Portugal and implying that Portugal’s democracy is weakened: “A visita da chanceler alemã, Angela Merkel, a Portugal vem demonstrar que a nossa soberania nacional perdeu os seus valores democráticos”\textsuperscript{74} (D. Reis, 2012, p. 15). The perceived loss of

\textsuperscript{72}literally meaning a “person not welcome”

\textsuperscript{73}However, this term is not found in the English, Greek and Italian translation.

\textsuperscript{74}The visit of German Chancellor Angela Merkel to Portugal demonstrates that our national sovereignty has lost its democratic values.
democracy and sovereignty leads two other readers to the comparison with Germany’s most notorious dictator Adolf Hitler: one reader asks whether Passos Coelho\textsuperscript{75}, Sócrates, Hitler, Angela Merkel and Cavaco had to pass a psychological test (Mdureira [sic], 2012, p. 13) and another reader compares Germany to a railway engine that determines the pace of the other countries and notes:

O resultado da imposição política alemã para alemão ver transformou a Europa num estado generalizado de exceção, de retração económica. Através da austeridade, Hitler chegou onde chegou... A Alemanha de Angela Merkel, com o seu “bigodinho” económico, que não tenho dúvidas: caso a Europa de segunda velocidade entre em bancarrota, o ovo da serpente eclodirá!...\textsuperscript{76} (Colaço Santos, 2012, p. 17).

The reader alludes to a scene in Shakespeare’s \textit{The Tragedy of Julius Caesar} in which Brutus compares Caesar to a serpent’s egg that must be destroyed before it hatches (1599). In other words, it is implied that Merkel has similar intentions as Hitler but uses economic measures eventually leading to bankruptcy of the GIPS instead of military strength. It might not come as a surprise that the \textit{German question} is evoked in the height of the Eurozone crisis. The German question is a term with changing definitions and both a political as well as historical dimension but as Spohr Readman notes, there are five main aspects to this debate or concept: German unity, identity, civic culture, power and Germany’s place (2004, p. 48). While in the first half of the 20th century, the main issue was how to achieve a balance of power between European nation states with a military strong Germany in the middle, the question has shifted in the context of the Eurozone crisis. As Kundnani argues, the German question “has now re-emerged in ‘geo-economic’ form” (2015); that is what role an economically strong Germany should play amidst indebted countries in the Eurozone crisis.

The two opinion pieces published on the day of Merkel’s visit and two days after offer a slightly more nuanced, yet still dire picture of the Chancellor: Fernando Santos

\textsuperscript{75} Additionally, Passos Coelho is compared to Josef Mengele, a physician who was working in Auschwitz concentration camp.

\textsuperscript{76} The result of the German policy enforcement for German sees transformed Europe in an overall state of emergency, economic downturn. Through austerity, Hitler arrived where he arrived... Angela Merkel’s Germany, with her economic "mustache", I have no doubt: if second speed Europe [the PIIGS] goes bankrupt, the serpent's egg will hatch!...
describes her as: “Candidata a tomar conta da Europa substituindo a legitimidade democrática de um qualquer processo vindouro pelo oportunismo da opressão econômico-financeira de estados alvos de desgovernação própria durante décadas.”

However, he also remarks that placing Merkel at the centre of criticism only draws away the attention from the Portuguese government (2012, p. 14). Another commentator, Manuel Serrão, expresses a seemingly common fear among the Portuguese population - that Portugal is turning into a mere province of Germany: “o único mandato internacional que parece ter é o de ‘mandar’ em nós como se Portugal já fosse mais um ‘lander’ da sua República Federal. Aqui o medo é que este pesadelo se venha a tornar realidade, mais depressa do que alguém sonha” (2012, p. 16). Most of the criticism focused explicitly on Merkel which might not be so surprising because, as mentioned earlier, most articles were also published on the days surrounding Merkel’s state visit. Nevertheless, the harshness of the accusations is striking when compared to the fact that they were almost only found on those specific dates and that there are only two articles defending Merkel: “O recurso à troika [...] teve um responsável: a maioria PSD-CDS-PCP-BE [...] Angela Merkel não teve nenhuma culpa; pelo contrário, até tentou ajudar” (Santos Silva, 2014, p. 19; c.f. Fiel, 2012, p. 18).

_Público_ evokes this narrative as well but conveys a different image. First of all, it is noteworthy that the narrative first appears in a news story on the day that Portugal agreed to the Economic Adjustment Programme. The news story is one of 14 articles in which _Público_ picked up on the narrative before Merkel’s state and it covered an intervention by the trade union federation CGTP by mentioning a banner that read “No one voted for Merkel” (Soares and d’Espiney, 2011, p. 8-9). In contrast to _Jornal de Notícias_, _Público_ also picked up on the open letter to Merkel, summarizing the

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77 Candidate to take over Europe by replacing the democratic legitimacy of any future process by opportunism of economic and financial oppression of target states with misgovernment during decades,

78 the only international mandate that [she] seems to have is to govern us as if Portugal was already another "lander" of its Federal Republic. Here the fear is that this nightmare will become reality faster than anyone dreams.

79 It is certainly possible that articles referring to this narrative were published before or after Merkel’s visit but at least in this sample, no other references to Merkel and Hitler could be found.

80 Confederação Geral dos Trabalhadores Portugueses (General Confederation of the Portuguese Workers)
intentions and demands of the supporters (Ribeiro, 2012, p. 17). Another news story from 8 December 2012 gives an account of an interview with the leader of the PCP\textsuperscript{81} Jéronimo de Sousa who had explained why he was going to participate in the manifestation against Merkel’s visit: ‘‘Não para chamar nomes, mas para afirmar a nossa soberania’ perante alguém que parece vir ‘visitar a colónia’’\textsuperscript{82} (Lopes, 2012, 17)\textsuperscript{83}. The author of the article, Maria Lopes tries to take a neutral stance towards the statements by de Sousa, that is her own opinion has been deliberately omitted in this article.

Nevertheless, Público still takes a stance on the narrative and while the narrative is evoked most of the times in order to criticize Germany or Merkel, there are also a few instances in which the narrative is questioned. Similar to statements in Jornal de Notícias but already published in August 2011 is an opinion piece by José Loureiro dos Santos. As a general and expert in military strategy, he eyes Merkel’s political course suspisciously and argues that Merkel is not the weak leader that she is sometimes thought of being. Instead, Loureiro dos Santos suggests that Merkel has a clear strategy and is a governor who wants to defend German interests and impose her will on other European states in order to transform Europe into a new German empire:

\[\ldots\] com uma estratégia surpreendentemente astuciosa, aparentando indecisão e fraqueza, o que Merkel está realmente a tentar fazer é \[\ldots\] procurar atingir o objectivo que nem o Kaiser nem Hitler conseguiram alcançar: posicionar-se como a sexta grande potência global do próximo futuro com assento no restrito grupo de governo mundial, o que só será possível se a sua vontade política se alargar incontestada a todo o continente europeu ocidental, até às praias do Mediterrâneo e do Atlântico.\textsuperscript{84} (2011, p. 31)

\textsuperscript{81}Partido Comunista Português (Portuguese Communist Party)
\textsuperscript{82}‘Not to call names but to affirm our sovereignty’ towards someone who seems to come to ‘visit a colony’
\textsuperscript{83}The notion of a loss in sovereignty can also be found in other articles that cannot be all discussed in depth here, for example see: Loff, 2012b, p. 53.
\textsuperscript{84} [... with a surprisingly astute strategy, pretending indecision and weakness, what Merkel is really trying to do is seeking to achieve the objective that neither the Kaiser nor Hitler managed to reach: to position itself as the sixth major global power in the near future with a seat in the restricted group of the world government, which will only be possible if her political will extends unchallenged to the entire Western European continent, until the beaches of the Mediterranean and the Atlantic.
This statement is very similar to the articles that appeared in *Jornal de Notícias* over one year later; particularly Manuel Serrão made a similar supposition. However, unlike *Jornal de Notícias*, *Público* published another opinion piece one week later, which - among other things - discusses Loureiro dos Santos’ statement. José Manuel Fernandes points out that Loureiro dos Santos spoke out what many people had been thinking but no one dared to say out loud (2011, p. 31). Furthermore, Fernandes refers to the political commentator and journalist Simon Heffer who had published a column arguing that “Germany is using the financial crisis to conquer Europe” and welcomes the reader “to the Fourth Reich” (Heffer, 2011). Fernandes sees these two statements as being exaggerated but he also does not take up a clear stance on the narrative in general.

He criticizes the proposal of a European economic government that was announced after a summit meeting between Merkel and Sarkozy in August 2011 because it would lead to a loss in sovereignty for indebted countries like Portugal and this solution could awake sleeping demons: “Uma coisa é certa: quem defende que a boa solução passa por acelerar em direcção a formas de governo não consensual pode estar a acordar demónios adormecidos”85 (Fernandes, 2011, p. 31). By the manner he criticizes the plan of an economic government, he slides into a double discourse: Even though he distances himself from the references to the Fourth Reich, his statements about being careful in order not to awake sleeping demons pertain to the same narrative.

This type of double discourse is seen in other articles as well. For instance, the political commentator and writer Vasco Pulido Valente also refutes the notion of Merkel being Hitler or the German emperor Wilhelm II but then compares a map of the EU with German-occupied territories in 1943, observing that they almost coincide:

Claro que a sra. Merkel não é Hitler ou o imperador Guilherme II e não quer hoje, como ontem, dominar a Europa. Mas basta comparar o mapa da Alemanha nazi em 1943 com o mapa da UE para se descobrir um ponto interessante: tirando menos de meia dúzia de excepções, os dois quase coincidem. Se em vez

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85 One thing is certain: who argues that the good solution is to accelerate towards forms of nonconsensual government may awaken sleeping demons.
The choice of a map from 1943 is obviously not arbitrary but the implication is here that while Germany does not seek military dominance anymore, it still desires power on a political level in Europe. Furthermore, this quote also shows how Merkel is used as a synecdoche for Germany and the two are blamed interchangeably. As the journalist Jorge Almeida Fernandes observes: “Quando se ataca Merkel, visa-se a Alemanha” (2012b, p. 22). There were only a few articles, in which other countries or politicians were mentioned. For example, Schäuble, who was also seen as a culprit in Greek newspapers (see Media Discourse(s) on Germany) is only mentioned in three articles: in a news story about new developments in the Eurozone crisis (Arriaga e Cunha, 2012, p. 14-15) and two opinion pieces (Ferreira & Stinerock, 2012, p. 31 and Fernandes, 2013, p. 48+49). In the article by Ferreira and Stinerock, Schäuble is criticized as well as the former French president Nicolas Sarkozy: “A excessiva austeridade imposta por Merkel e Sarkozy à generalidade dos Estados-membros da UE e, muito em particular, aos países periféricos está a resultar numa enormous catástrofe econômica que cada vez mais faz temer o pior” (Ferreira & Stinerock, 2012, p. 31).

Interestingly, the narrative brought forward by the commentators seems to change during and after Merkel’s state visit. While in Jornal de Notícias, the narrative surrounding Germany’s past and the perceived loss of Portuguese sovereignty was mainly used in the coverage of Merkel’s visit, Público’s coverage contained only a few references to this narrative. There was no direct comparison with Hitler and Nazi Germany though a few articles still accused Merkel of being a dictator or colonialist.

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86 Of course Mrs. Merkel is not Hitler or the Emperor Wilhelm II and does not want today, as yesterday, dominate Europe. But just compare the map of Nazi Germany in 1943 with the EU map to find an interesting point: taking less than half a dozen exceptions, the two almost coincide. If instead of a military map, this map was political, it would accurately describe the strength of democracy in ‘Europe’.

87 When one attacks Merkel, one is aiming at Germany.

88 See also Ferreira, 2011, p. 39.

89 The excessive austerity imposed by Merkel and Sarkozy to most Member States of the EU and, in particular, the peripheral countries is resulting in an enormous economic catastrophe which increasingly makes one fear the worst.

90 One news story (Guimarães & Rodrigues, 2012, p. 2-3) and one opinion piece (Esteves Cardoso, 2012, p. 45) made reference to the Third Reich, saying that allusions to Hitler were used by protesters.
While the right-wing politician and law professor Diogo Freitas do Amaral argues that “a União Europeia já não é, infelizmente, baseada na igualdade dos Estados, mas na sua desigualdade: manda quem pode, obedece quem deve! A UE transformou-se numa ‘ditadura sobre democracias’” (2012, p. 6), Pulido Valente questions the motives behind Merkel’s visit: “O que vem ela cá fazer? [...] como chefe da Alemanha, fiscalizar o estado das colónias? [...] este espectáculo vexatório mostra [...] o domínio da dama sobre o que por irrisão ainda se continua a chamar ‘União Europeia’” (2012b, p. 56).

What can also be seen in these quotes, is how Germanophobia is often attended by Europhobia and does not seem to restrict itself to a certain political group or orientation. In a three-page feature article, Jorge Almeida Fernandes discusses various attacks directed against Merkel and examines how the Fourth Reich rhetoric is used by British nationalists:

“Quarto Reich” é uma expressão cunhada pelo historiador britânico Andrew Roberts num romance (The Aachen Memorandum, 1995) que retrata uma futura União Europeia colonizada pelos alemães, a quem só os “patriotas britânicos” resistem. É uma retórica que delicia os eurocépticos ingleses nas guerras contra a UE e contra o euro: germanofobia e eurofobia andam a par. (2012b, p. 22)

Surprisingly, while the title asks “Temos razões para detestar Merkel?” Almeida Fernandes only cites non-Portuguese commentators (2012b, p. 22). It does not become clear who “we” is and the article gives the impression that Merkel and Germany are only being attacked by Italian, British and French journalists and politicians but not in the Portuguese media. Nonetheless, Almeida Fernandes’ article is a good example of a critical reflection on the issue. Instead of simply adhering to a pre-existing narrative, he reflects on the history and German home affairs while giving voice to both critics as well as supporters of Merkel.

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91 Unfortunately, the European União Europeia is no longer based on equality of states, but in their inequality: rule whoever can, obey who should! The EU has become a ‘dictatorship over democracies’!
92 What is she doing here? [...] as head of Germany, inspecting the status of the colonies? [...] This vexatious spectacle shows [...] the domination of the lady over what, in derision, is still called ‘European Union’.
93 “Fourth Reich” is an expression coined by the British historian Andrew Roberts in a novel (The Aachen Memorandum, 1995), which depicts a future European Union colonized by the Germans, that only “British patriots” resist. It is a rhetoric that delights the British Euroskeptics in the wars against the EU and against the euro: Germanophobia and Europhobia go hand in hand.
94 Do we have reasons to hate Merkel?
There are also other articles critically questioning the dominant narrative, particularly the notion of Merkel trying to establish a Fourth Reich. For example, Almeida Fernandes reminds the reader of the problem of historical analogies in another article: “As analogias históricas nem sempre iluminam o presente. Também podem cegar [...] para discutir o euro e a austeridade é recomendável não invocar o fantasma de Hitler, que apenas serve para mistificar.”\(^\text{95}\) (2012a, p. 29). Another commentator, the historian José Pacheco Pereira, also points out that this type of criticism also draws off the attention of Portuguese politicians and internal issues\(^\text{96}\):

O ódio a Merkel concentrará as atenções na Alemanha, na Europa, nos factores externos da nossa miséria [...] A senhora tem responsabilidades, mas convém não nos iludirmos: o mal está cá, o diabo exterior não pode esconder a corte de demónios interiores que nos assombram. [...] De quem é a responsabilidade da crise de 2011? Sócrates em primeiro, segundo, terceiro, enésimo lugar, e no lugar enésimo mais um acrescenta-se Passos Coelho.\(^\text{97}\) (2012, p. 45)

While Merkel is still held to account, Pacheco Pereira refuses oversimplification but adopts a recurring trope taken from the Gothic scene. Whether it is the “diabo exterior”\(^\text{98}\) (Pacheco Pereira, 2012, p. 45), “demónios adormecidos”\(^\text{99}\) (Fernandes, 2011, p. 31), “fantasmas adormecidos”\(^\text{100}\) (Assis, 2011, p. 36) or “o fantasma do Hitler”\(^\text{101}\) (Almeida Fernandes, 2012a, p. 29), these are all formulations that are used to refer to Germany’s past. They represent a common trope to refer to World War II and in particular to refer to Hitler and Nazi Germany. As Devetak explains, “Hitler [...] is not just a monster, he is also an exemplary ghost, an evil revenant” and this trope has been used many times to show how for example “the First Gulf War was fought as if it were Hitler rather than Saddam Hussein that invaded and occupied Kuwait” (2005, p. 634).

\(^{95}\) Historical analogies do not always illuminate the present. They can also blind [...] for discussing the euro and austerity it is recommended not to invoke Hitler’s ghost, which only serves to mystify.

\(^{96}\) See also Esteves Cardoso, 2012, p. 45 and Fiel, 2012, p. 18 (Jornal de Notícias).

\(^{97}\) The hatred against Merkel will direct the attention to Germany, to Europe, to the external factors of our misery [...] She [Merkel] has responsibilities, but we should not deceive ourselves: the evil is here, the foreign devil can not hide the courting of the interior demons that haunt us. [...] Who is responsible for the 2011 crisis? Socrates first, second, third, nth place and one after the nth place Passos Coelho.

\(^{98}\) external devil

\(^{99}\) sleeping demons

\(^{100}\) sleeping ghosts

\(^{101}\) the ghost of Hitler
Consequently, Macmillan argues that the Eurozone crisis is yet another context in which “Hitler is effectively portrayed as Merkel’s evil, gender-shifting double” (2014, p. 32).

Depictions of Germany under Merkel as a kind of *Fourth Reich* usually follow the rationale that after Germany’s failure in the first two World Wars, it now tries to take control over Europe (or even over the world) through economic measures\(^\text{102}\) (Pisa, 2012). Not only are these comparisons a daunting belittlement of Hitler’s atrocities, rhetorically speaking they present an *association fallacy* (*reductio ad Hitlerum*)\(^\text{103}\). The reasoning is that Merkel is an undemocratic ruler, Hitler was a dictator and therefore Merkel is Hitler - already the first premise in this argument is fallacious and reductionist on many levels. However, as Ingebretsen reminds us, comparing Merkel with Hitler has little to do with her actions: “the guilt of the monster usually has little to do with any specific action. Indeed, who the monster is matters less than what role in the civic drama he is to play, and what sorts of scenes [...] the monster’s identification makes possible” (1998, 26).

As Brock and Lopes argue, Hitler comparisons should also not be overrated. Such references to Nazism are not restricted to Germany and German leaders but have been used to cast a slur on a public person in many different contexts (Macmillan, 2014, p. 32) and “Hitler’s moustache has been appropriated by global visual culture way beyond the context of Germany” (Brock & Lopes, 2013). For example, most recently, the candidate for the Republican nomination for President of the United States Donald Trump has been compared to Hitler (Wright and Krieg, 2016). On the other hand, such slurs deepen existing stereotypes and expose xenophobic tendencies (Brock and Lopes, 2013), especially in the case of Germany, a nation that is still strongly involved in the process of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*\(^\text{104}\).

\(^{102}\) There is even a conspiracy theory that Angela Merkel is Eva Braun’s and Adolf Hitler’s daughter. A corresponding search (“Hitler”, “Merkel”, “daughter”) on google yields about 294,000 results. For a discussion of this conspiracy theory, please see Macmillan, 2014, p. 32.

\(^{103}\) The term “*reductio ad Hitlerum*” (Latin for “reduction to Hitler”) describes the rebuttal of an argument (or a person) through a reference to Hitler.

\(^{104}\) The term *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* refers to the process of coming to terms with one’s past, particularly the struggle to come to terms with Germany’s past of the Holocaust and National Socialism.
Consequently, such images can also have a further negative impact on European integration. As Macmillan explains in her analysis of prominent discourses on Germany:

The ‘Fourth Reich’ discourse can be read as a Gothic narrative in that it depicts contemporary Germany, and Chancellor Merkel in particular, as monsters endangering the so-called ‘European home’ [...] [and] is another symptom of the perception of a split between a comparatively prosperous and solvent Centre–North axis on the one hand and an indebted, crisis-ridden Mediterranean/Atlantic axis on the other. (2014, p. 35)

The reasons for emergence of this narrative are manifold but the usage of this narrative in Portuguese newspapers does not come as a surprise. Even though Portugal was not invaded during the Second World War like Greece, the atrocities of Nazi Germany are still in the collective memory of both countries. In his book Mehr Süden wagen105, Schoepp reminds us that the situation is complicated by the fact that the remembrance of dictatorial regimes is still very strong and consequently, the resistance against undemocratic influence from the outside as well106 (2014, p. 98-99). Schoepp alludes here to an intervention in the Portuguese parliament on 15 February 2013 in which Passos Coelho was interrupted by protesters singing “Grândola, Vila Morena”, a song by Zeca Afonso commonly associated with the Carnation Revolution. In conclusion, the narrative surrounding allegations of Merkel wanting to create a Fourth Reich and a perceived loss in Portuguese sovereignty, has been widely used in Portuguese media. References appeared in street art, graffiti and protests as discussed earlier (chapter 5) and in newspapers, but the narrative did not seem to take the same proportions as in Greece (chapter 2.2). Several articles also alluded to this narrative without explicitly mentioning Hitler or Nazism. Interestingly, Jornal de Notícias’ journalists only picked up on the narrative during Merkel’s visit, probably because they knew that it would appeal to a wide audience, while Público brought up and discussed the narrative throughout the examined time frame.

105 Venturing more South
106 Schoepp alludes here to an intervention in the Portuguese parliament on the 15th of February 2013 in which Passos Coelho was interrupted by protesters singing “Grândola, Vila Morena”, a song by Zeca Afonso commonly associated with the Carnation Revolution.
7.2. The Ant and the Cicada or other Tales of Superiority and Submission

The next narrative is mainly concerned with different tropes illustrating the power relationship between Portugal and Germany. Before expanding on the portrayals of Germany in Portuguese media, one has to regress a bit further and consider a certain popular narrative on the GIPS countries in Germany. This type of narrative is best exemplified by the fable of the zealous ant and the lazy cicada\textsuperscript{107} by Aesop. While the cicada spends all summer singing, the ant stockpiles food for the winter. When the cold season arrives, the cicada is hungry and begs the ants for sharing the provisions that it had gathered. Following this allegory, the GIPS would represent the cicada that has lived carelessly and lavishly and now, in time of need, has to beg the industrious Protestant European north for financial assistance. In this narrative, the European north is also cast as a victim because if it would refuse help, the profligacy of the GIPS would threaten the prosperity and stability of the whole Eurozone, particularly the European north (c.f. Tsoukala, 2013, p. 244). A good example for such a discourse is a statement made by Angela Merkel on a CDU-rally in Meschede (North Rhine-Westphalia) on the 17th of May 2011:

Es geht auch darum, dass man in Ländern wie Griechenland, Spanien, Portugal nicht früher in Rente gehen kann als in Deutschland, sondern dass alle sich auch ein wenig gleich anstrengen – das ist wichtig [...] Wir können nicht eine Währung haben und der eine kriegt ganz viel Urlaub und der andere ganz wenig. Das geht auf Dauer auch nicht zusammen. [...] Ja, Deutschland hilft, aber Deutschland hilft nur dann, wenn sich die anderen anstrengen.\textsuperscript{108} (as cited in “Euro-Krise: Merkel attackiert”, 2011; also see Macmillan, 2014, p. 30).

The narrative of the lazy cicada\textsuperscript{109} can also be found in the German press. It may target all GIPS countries but the focus is often on Greece. In an article on the

\textsuperscript{107} In some versions the cicada is a grasshopper, which is the fable that Tsoukala uses to illustrate the relationship (2013, p.243-244). Tsoukala also notes that this allegory was used by Yanis Varoufakis to explain how European decision makers frame the Greek crisis (2013, p. 244).

\textsuperscript{108} It is also about not being able to retire earlier in countries like Greece, Spain, Portugal than in Germany, instead everyone should try a little bit to make the same efforts – that is important [...] We can’t have a common currency where some get lots of vacation time and others very little. That won’t work in the long term [...] Yes, Germany is going to help, but Germany is only going to help if the others make an effort.

\textsuperscript{109} It has to be noted that there are not only negative narratives about the south but as Baumeister notes “Der Süden ist längst ein Instrument in unseren Köpfen, er wird benutzt. Für die einen ist er eine
framing of Greece in the Eurozone crisis in the German tabloid *Bild*, Mylonas criticizes the “vilification and racialization of the Greek people” (2012, p. 667) and the frequent usage of culturalist explanations in public discussion (2012, p. 655):

The culturalist frame produces “what Greece is” and aims at grounding the capitalist crisis as a crisis that concerns a particular nation state and as a crisis that is caused by the particularities and the shortcomings of the Greek society. Greece is defined according to popular stereotypes stressing the idle, carefree, and comfortable lifestyle of countries with “warm climate” (2012, p. 662).


Culturalist explanations date back to Antiquity but were mainly popularised by Montesquieu and other writers of the Enlightenment. In his treatise *The Spirit of the Laws* (1752), Montesquieu introduced the so-called meteorological climate theory, which propagated the idea that the climate influences the way of living, the physique, character traits and societal structures of the people of a certain area. According to Montesquieu’s theory, cold and hot air has a different effect on the “external fibers of the body” and “[people] are therefore more vigorous in cold climates”, they have “more courage; a greater sense of superiority” and the “inhabitants of warm countries are, like old men, timorous” and weak but more sensitive (1748, “Book XIV”).

Applied to the Eurozone crisis, the different climate would thus be (partially) responsible for the lack in financial foresight and idleness that the European south is

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Krisenmetapher, für die anderen eine Projektionsfläche ideologischer Hoffnungen” (Schoepp, 2014, p. 40). (The South has long been an instrument in our minds, it is used. For some, it is a crisis metaphor, for others a projection of ideological hopes.)

110 For example, Aristotle and Hippocrates attributed cultural differences between Europe and Asia to differences in climate (cf. Günzel, 2004, p. 70-72).

111 e.g. Jean-Baptiste Dubos, Comte de Buffon and later Johann Gottfried Herder who expanded Montesquieu’s theory (c.f. Vyverberg, 1989; Günzel, 2004). The meteorological climate theory is also related to 19th and 20th century environmental determinism (c.f. Gregory, et al., 2011).

112 These statements were not specifically about Portugal, Greece, Spain and Italy but his description of “typical” southern and northern characteristics is similar to statements about these countries in the media discourse.
accused of. However, Montesquieu was already criticized for his theory by his contemporaries. Anne Robert Jacques Turgot noted that the “influence of climate has produced only paradoxes” and “physical and climatic causes act only indirectly” (Garrett, 2014, p. 599). Through culturalist explanations, a classic Us vs. Them mentality is created (Petry, 2013, p. 1) and as Manuel Loff, a commentator from Público, remarks, existing biases are brought to light by the crisis and utilized as a means of propaganda: “Merkel sabe bem que a forma mais eficaz de conquistar apoio é de apelar ao preconceito, às ideias feitas, histórica e sociologicamente erradas, partilhadas por grupos habitualmente maioritários das sociedades” (2012a, p. 37). According to Mylonas, cultural explanations are also used to draw off the attention of more complex issues: “By diverting the public discussion from a critique of global capitalism, the culturalist explanations of the crisis legitimize neoliberal emergency politics (There-Is-No-Alternative doctrines introduced by neoliberal technocrats) for the restructuring of social institutions in different localities in expense of democracy and in favour of the capital” (2012, p. 661).

When it became clear that the Greek crisis was aggravating and other countries had to join the European Stability Mechanism as well, Passos Coelho’s government was quick in asserting that Portugal was different from Greece and tried to avoid the Greek stigma: “Não queremos o mesmo tratamento que a Grécia porque não estamos na mesma situação [...] Ao contrário da Grécia temos conseguido reduzir o défice”113 (Passos Coelho cited in C. Reis, 2012). With several affirmations of this kind (Magone, 2014, p. 353) and a strict enforcement of the austerity measures required by the troika, Portugal wanted to distinguish itself from Greece, which constituted the negative example.114 As Freitas and Fernandes note, “Portugal’s reassurances [sic] calmed the financial markets, the troika, and the country’s European partners” (2012, p. 23) and

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113 We don’t want the same treatment as Greece because we are not in the same situation [...] Unlike Greece we have managed to reduce the deficit.
114 In a study on Portuguese policy responses to the Eurozone crisis, Magone concluded that “Portugal tried to present itself as a positive example, a ‘good pupil’ which implements the necessary structural reforms in order to achieve a more competitive economy. It used Greece as the opposite negative example that Portugal was not. However, during this process of change by stealth it became clear that Portugal is still closer to the Greek model to that of more developed economies” (2014, p. 358).
Portugal became once more known as “the good student” or “the good pupil” (Magone, 2014, p. 353).

Opponents of the policy decisions of the Passos Coelho administration rejected the claim that “Portugal is not Greece” and criticized the government for a lack in solidarity towards Greece. The introduction of strict austerity measures and structural reforms was mocked in a poster by BE in which the Passos Coelho administration is described as “Eine Regierung[,] die Deutscher [sic] als die Deutsche [sic] ist” (Fig. 43). Thus, the austerity measures are not seen as European, as a requirement by the troika, but as German. Furthermore, the criticism is that the Passos Coelho administration is overzealous. While strictness, dutifulness and prudence are characteristics that are often attributed to Germans, in particular to the Merkel administration, the rigid reforms by the Passos Coelho administration made it “German.” Because of this attitude, Portuguese ministers of the government have been accused of being submissive.

In street art, graffiti and protests, Passos Coelho and Portas were often compared to puppets that are being controlled from the outside. In this narrative, Merkel is being seen as a puppeteer holding the strings and not giving any other option to the Portuguese government apart from following her orders. The metaphor of the puppeteer itself is very old and has been famously described in Plato’s *Allegory of the Cave* and the metaphor has been used many times in politics. Plato did not use the image of the puppeteer as a way of criticizing politics, but rather interpreted the cave as a show of

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115 The metaphor of the good student was already used to described Portugal’s successful accession to the European Union, two presidencies of the Council of the EU in 1992 and 2000 and its macroeconomic stability in the 1990s (Braga de Macedo, 2003, p. 170).

116 In German “Musterschüler” and in the Portuguese public discourse “bom aluno”

117 As mentioned earlier, this can also be seen in street art (Fig. 11).

118 This poster is from 2015 but I decided to include it nonetheless because it demonstrates that the narratives that I am discussing are also part of the public discourse after Portugal’s exit of the bailout programme.

119 A government that is more German than the German government.

120 Above and behind them a fire is blazing at a distance, and between the fire and the prisoners there is a raised way; and you will see, if you look, a low wall built along the way, like the screen which marionette players have in front of them, over which they show the puppets. [...] And do you see [...] men passing along the wall carrying all sorts of vessels, and statues and figures of animals made of wood and stone and various materials, which appear over the wall?
shadow puppets, guided by an invisible puppeteer implying a fundamental humanity’s lack of controlling or understanding their own fate. As Hannah Arendt points out in The Human Condition: “Plato was the first to introduce the division between those who know and do not act and those who act and do not know, instead of the old articulation of action into beginning and achieving, so that knowing what to do and doing it became to altogether different performances.” This ultimately is what separates “the rulers from those over whom they rule” (Arend, 1998, p. 223) a distinction based upon Plato’s own personal experiences with household slaves, a concept which entails a similar division. It is clear that this distinction, whether real or perceived, is a distinction that to this day plays a substantial role both in politics and in the coverage of politics by the media, giving way to the perverse transformation of politics and political discourse into manipulation by the rulers of those over whom they rule. In recent times, during the Arab revolution, the former Egyptian president Mohamed Morsi was accused of being a puppet of religious leaders (Kraidy, 2013).

When considering this narrative in the research of Público and Jornal de Notícias, the puppeteer narrative provides a striking example of a connection between street art and the press. On 12 November 2012, the day of Merkel’s state visit, Público featured a photograph of the aforementioned mural by Nomen, Slap and Kurtz (Fig. 18) on their title page portraying Merkel as a puppeteer guiding her puppets with the faces of Pedro Passos Coelho and Paulo Portas (Fig. 44). On the photograph, only a part of the mural is shown and it is partially obscured by a tree but the mural with its characters is still well recognizable. Interestingly, Público does not elaborate on the picture and does not even mention the artists of the street art work. In fact, the whole issue does not contain any addressing this narrative nor does the metaphor of the puppeteer appear in any of the articles examined121, both Jornal de Noticias and Público. One can only guess but the picture might have been chosen because its high visual resonance was most likely going to attract the attention of potential buyers.

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121 At most, the narrative is hinted at in a statement by Alberto de Castro (professor of Economics at the Catholic University) in Jornal de Noticias who sees Angela Merkel as the most important international figure of 2012 “Parece ser a pessoa que puxa as cordelinhos fundamentais” (She seems to be the person who pulls the fundamental strings) (“Gaspar é rei”, 2013, p. 4).
The journalists of *Jornal de Notícias* and *Público* did not choose the metaphor of the puppeteer to address the power relationship between Portugal and Germany. Instead the aforementioned metaphor of the good student, the metaphor of the patient and made general remarks about Passos “obeying” Merkel have been used. In *Público*, there were only two direct references to the good student metaphor. In an opinion piece discussing the state budget for 2013, the journalist Sofia Rodrigues quotes the parliamentary leader of the opposition party PS\textsuperscript{123} Carlos Zorrinho: “Se continuar a optar por ser um bom aluno de Merkel teremos uma flagelação da economia e da sociedade com consequências imprevisíveis”\textsuperscript{124} (2012, p. 44). In another article, it is the former Portuguese Finance Minister Vítor Gaspar who the historian Manuel Loff calls “estudante marrão”\textsuperscript{125} (2012b, p. 53).

In *Jornal de Notícias*, the metaphor was exclusively used in relation to the coverage of Merkel’s state visit and correspondingly, Merkel was portrayed as the teacher. For example, a photo with Merkel and Passos Coelho accompanying a relatively neutral news story by Gina Pereira was described with the caption: “O ‘bom aluno’ e a ‘professora’ almoçaram juntos no Forte de São Julião da Barra” (2012, p. 2). In another news story, it becomes clear that the metaphor of the good student is not used as a form of appreciation or pride when Ana Paula Correia notes “Angela Merkel chega hoje a Lisboa para dar apoio público ao seu aluno mais bem comportado. [...] Mas que fatores políticos e económicos sustentam essa relação suserano/vassalo a remeter para a estrutura de poder da Idade Média?”\textsuperscript{126} (2012, p. 2). While Portugal became internationally known as a good student or a success story for introducing rigid structural reforms and reducing debt, Correia sees the policy decisions of the government as form of submission to Germany.

\textsuperscript{122} One could ask the question why these metaphors appear only in the newspapers and not in minor media. However, answering this question would only result in mere speculation instead of a foundation in academic reasoning.

\textsuperscript{123} Partido Socialista (Socialist Party)

\textsuperscript{124} If we still choose to be a good student of Merkel we will have a scourging of the economy and of the society with unpredictable consequences.

\textsuperscript{125} nerd student

\textsuperscript{126} Angela Merkel arrives today in Lisbon to give public support to her most well behaved student [...] But which political and economic factors support this relationship of overlord/vassal to refer to the power structure of the Middle Ages?
Turning to the last metaphor, the apparent superiority of Germany in relation to Portugal is emphasized once more. Neither Jornal de Noticias nor Público refer to Portugal as a patient but instead, Merkel is seen as a doctor who prescribes a bitter pill. The state visit is called by authors of both newspapers a medical consultation (Gaspar, 2012, p. 49; Fiel, 2012, p. 18) and Teresa de Sousa, a journalist at Público, mentions “receitas impostas por Berlim” (2011, p. 6). If Merkel is a doctor, then Portugal is a patient who needs to be treated. The metaphor of a patient or a sick man (of Europe) has also been attributed to Greece (Pauly, Reiermann & Schult, 2014) but also Portugal has been called the “third debt crisis patient” in the British press (Baker, 2011). The metaphor itself has already been used before the Eurozone crisis and was applied to other countries facing economic difficulties. Even though it is hard to trace back where the metaphor originates it seems to have been coined by Russian Czar Nicholas I to describe the state of the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century (“The New Sick Man”, 2013).

Apart from these metaphors, Jornal de Noticias and Público also contained several other statements implying an unequal relationship between Portugal and Germany. They cannot be discussed all in depth but in all cases the focus is on the Portuguese government that allegedly obeys Merkel’s orders: “Pedro Passos Coelho vai obedecendo ao que lhe mandam, provavelmente com uma larga reserva mental” (Pulido Valente, 2012a, p. 56). A journalist from Jornal de Noticias remarks that Merkel came to legitimize the policies introduced by Passos Coelho’s government (“Figura do dia: Angela Merkel”, 2012, p. 48) and Pulido Valente from Público asks about the reason for Merkel’s visit: “Espevitar Cavaco? Aplicar um beijinho no jovem Passos Coelho, para ele não perder a coragem (esperemos que Paulo Portas não caia na asneira de se submeter a esse horripilante exercício)?” (2012b, p. 56). Like in the metaphor of the puppet, it is implied that Passos Coelho is merely executing Merkel’s

127 Germany was known as the sick man of Europe in the 1990s.
128 Pedro Passos Coelho will obey the ones who govern him, probably with a wide mental reservation
129 Trim Cavaco? Give a kiss to the young Passos Coelho, for him not to lose heart (hopefully Paulo Portas does not fall into the mistake of submitting to this gruesome practice?)
will and the former president, Aníbal Cavaco Silva, is going to get “trimmed” for keeping a more critical distance (c.f. Freitas & Fernandes, 2012, p. 22).

The metaphors of the puppeteer, the doctor and the teacher relate insofar to the narrative of the Fourth Reich as Portugal is seen to be lacking sovereignty. It is not always possible to make a clear distinction, however in the overarching narrative there is a stronger emphasis on an apparent unequal relationship - the submission of Portugal - or the Portuguese government - to a superior Germany that sets the example for Portugal.

7.3. The Master Myth or Playing the Blame Game

In the coverage of the Eurozone crisis, Portuguese journalists used two different narratives in relation to Germany and in both narratives, Merkel represents the antagonistic character, who is being condemned because she is seen as the ultimate advocate of the infamous austerity measures. The first narrative is a classic Gothic narrative, in which the fear of the development of a Fourth Reich under Hitler’s doppelgänger Angela Merkel is evoked. With the words of Macmillan, Germany and Merkel are represented as “monsters endangering the so-called ‘European home’” (2014, p. 35). The second narrative is more similar to a fable with opposing characters of unequal power, a symbol for an increasing North-South divide in the European Union. The metaphors used for this relationship are changing but they always describe one character involuntarily or voluntarily bowing to a stronger, superior character from the outside. As shown, it reflects the criticism of and the resistance against the austerity policies of the Portuguese government, which in turn are linked to the lazy cicada narrative popularized in the German media. Surprisingly, these two narratives were found in street art, graffiti and protests as well as in newspapers, even though the metaphors used differed in some cases. Lastly, implicit in both narratives is the recurring theme that Merkel (or Germany) is the ultimate symbol of the despised austerity and that she did not only encourage these neoliberal economic measures but also forced them upon the Portuguese people, causing poverty and hardship.
This theme was already addressed directly by the organizers of the second QSLT protest (see chapter 5) and is also explicitly mentioned in Público. On 11 March 2011, a satirical article in Público announced that “Novas medidas de austeridade vão ser ditas em alemão”\(^{130}\) and stated that these measures were enforced by Merkel (Henrique, 2011, p. 5), implying that PEC IV is intrinsically tied to Germany and the German Chancellor. It is also claimed that the austerity measures are Merkel’s measures (Gomes, 2012, p. 54), that she inspired and defined the draconian austerity (“Uma chanceler”, 2012, p. 44) and Teresa de Sousa notes: “Em Lisboa, o rosto da chanceler transformou-se no símbolo de uma austeridade que foi imposta ao país, que o atirou para o empobrecimento acelerado e que lhe recusa qualquer porta de saída”\(^{131}\) (2012, p. 3). In the most extreme case, Leonete Botelho compares Merkel to a negative King Midas, that is instead of turning everything into gold, Merkel is allegedly turning everything into stone: “estas últimas visitas de Angela Merkel parecem-se sempre a um toque de Midas, mas ao contrário: onde a senhora de ouro toca, tudo se transforma em pedra, austera e pobre”\(^{132}\) (Botelho, 2012, p. 7). The issue here is that the focus is shifted from a thorough and objective discussion about appropriate economic measures and possible solutions for the Eurozone crisis to a hunt for a culprit, a scapegoat. An opinion piece by the political scientist João Carlos Espada is in line with this critique and acts as a slight counterbalance to the previous articles:

Mas tenho alguma dificuldade em compreender que a responsabilidade dessa política seja atribuída à chanceler alemã, para já não dizer à Alemanha ou aos alemães. Já foi dito e repetido, mas parece ser ciclicamente esquecido, que chegámos onde chegámos pelo nosso próprio caminho. [...] Atribuir as responsabilidades a “estrangeiros” é um clássico recurso autoritário e autárquico que não fica bem a uma sociedade aberta e tradicionalmente hospitalreira como a portuguesa.\(^{133}\) (2012, p. 45)

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\(^{130}\) New austerity measures will be said in German

\(^{131}\) In Lisbon, the chancellor’s face became the symbol of an austerity that has been imposed on the country, which threw it in accelerated impoverishment and refused any exit.

\(^{132}\) These last visits by Angela Merkel always looked like a touch of Midas, but contrary: where the lady of gold touches, everything turns into stone, austerity and poor.

\(^{133}\) But I have some difficulty in understanding that the responsibility of these policies is attributed to the German Chancellor, not to say Germany or the Germans. It has been said and repeated, but seems to be cyclically forgotten, that we got to where we got on our own way. [...] Assigning responsibilities to
Surprisingly, this theme could not be found in this form in *Jornal de Notícias*. In a news story, it was merely noted that Merkel supported the new package of austerity measures PEC IV (Amorim, 2011, p. 6) and a previously mentioned letter to the editor implied that Merkel is trying to gain more power through imposing economic measures on other countries (Colaço Santos, 2012, p. 17).

News is not just a factual representation of reality, a simple objective information, but they are embedded in a social and cultural context and in a capitalistic society they represent a cultural commodity that is deliberately produced with the aim to be sold (Fulton, 2005, p. 3). Additionally, news has various societal roles and in fulfilling these roles they tell a story (Lule, 2001, p. 37). Although not the same as fictional texts, “they [news narratives] are distinctively narratives in the sense of being shaped into stories or myths about the ‘way things are’” (Fulton, 2005, p. 242). Now I would like to go one step further and discuss how a major part of the coverage of Germany’s role in the Eurozone crisis is shaped by the ancient myth of the scapegoat. I am using the term myth here differently from the common definition of an “invented story” but following Lule’s definition “a sacred, societal story that draws from archetypal figures and forms to offer exemplary models for human life” (Lule, 2001, p. 15). The importance of myths has been discussed by many other scholars with varying definitions and implications depending on the academic field. In the context of media studies, one has to mention Roland Barthes’ definition of myth as a type of speech, a metalanguage: “what must be firmly established at the start is that myth is a system of communication, that it is a message. This allows one to perceive that myth cannot possibly be an object, a concept, or an idea; it is a mode of signification, a form” (1957, p. 1). In his seminal work *Mythologies* (1957), Barthes explores myths in popular culture and, drawing upon Saussure’s concepts of semiology, he discusses the role of myths in the construction of (bourgeois) ideologies and argues that myths “[abolish] the complexity of human acts, it gives them the simplicity of essences” (1957, p. 16). While

"foreigners” is a classic authoritarian and autarkic feature that does not fit to an open and traditionally hospitable society as the Portuguese.

addressing post-structuralist criticism\textsuperscript{135} of Barthes’ theory, Fulton expands Barthes’ definition of myth in the context of media:

The Barthesian idea of myth can therefore be reinterpreted simply as narrativised ideology, the formulaic articulation and naturalisation of values, truths and beliefs. What media narratives achieve is precisely this kind of mythologising, the presentation of ideological positions as if they were natural and normative. (2005, p. 7)

Also important is Lule’s emphasis on archetypal characters. As the scholar Vladímir Propp points out in his analysis *Morphology of the Folktale* (1928/1968), there are 31 irreducible narrative elements and 7 basic characters (dramatis personae) such as the villain, the hero, the helper in Russian folk tales. However, as Lule argues, such basic characters can also be found in newspaper articles, implicit or explicit, and “given life in narrative, they help create the fundamental, archetypal stories that are at the heart of human storytelling” (2001, p. 15). Journalists are also not always aware of these myths and use them unintentionally because, as Car notes, they can be deeply embedded in their mindset (Car, 2008, p. 161).

In his case study of eternal stories in the *New York Times*, Lule identifies seven *master myths*: the victim, the scapegoat, the hero, the good mother, the trickster, the other world and the flood. As he maintains, these myths shape news coverage and can be found regularly in the daily press (2001, p. 22). In the context of the Eurozone crisis, the myth of the scapegoat is most interesting although it is necessary to expand Lule’s definition of this myth:

Myths of the Scapegoat tell in a dramatic fashion what happens to those who challenge or ignore social beliefs. Myths of the Scapegoat ridicule and degrade. They vilify and shun. [...] As myth, news too degrades and demeans those who are deemed to threaten the comfort of those in control or those who stray too far from accepted social practice. Political activists, religious sects, criminals, radicals, and many others can be cast as scapegoats in the news. (2001, p. 23)

The element of ridicule and vilification is certainly present in the narratives about Germany and Merkel in the Portuguese press. However, Lule’s definition places

\textsuperscript{135} Post-structuralism criticized Saussure’s distinction into merely two levels of signification, the signifier and the signified (c.f. Fulton, 2005, p. 6-7).
an emphasis on people who are already on the margins of society due to their actions and beliefs. Looking at other definitions, a scapegoat does not always need to be an outcast. It can be anyone who is subjectively perceived as a culprit for often complex issues and is therefore denounced by society. It is a target for the unloading of public anger and blame based on a certain constructed social image. This is in line with the biblical origin of the term scapegoat. In the “Book of Leviticus”, it is described how the sins of the Israelites are symbolically placed on an innocent goat that is later being sent into the desert.

One of the most notable works to pull the concept of the scapegoat into the 20th century was the classic and highly influential *The Golden Bough: A Study in Comparative Religion* by James George Frazer, a social anthropologist who first published his work in two volumes in 1890 but continuously expanded his work, with the third edition, published between 1906-15, comprising 12 volumes. *The Golden Bough* is a wide-ranging work incorporating mythology, religion and sacred rites and traditions from all over the world and the 9th volume published in 1913 is devoted entirely to the subject of the scapegoat.

Here, Frazer defines the scapegoat as someone “upon whom the sins of the people are periodically laid, may also be a human being” (1913). In Frazer’s anthropological approach, the scapegoat is not necessarily a human being, but could also be a god or some other invisible spirit. The scapegoat, with its implied expulsion of evil and purification, often goes hand in hand with the beginning of a new year, preceded or followed by a period of lawlessness in which all but the worst crimes are socially condoned.

Even though Frazer analyses the scapegoat as an anthropological and religious phenomenon, the whole process of scapegoating is not only an exotic phenomenon that happens in ancient or far-distant cultures but also has a substantial implied psychological thought process as Landes argues: “It [the term scapegoat] has come to mean anyone who must bear responsibility symbolically or concretely for the sins of others. Psychologically, the tendency to find scapegoats is a result of the common defense mechanism of denial through projection.” (1993, p. 859). The process of
scapegoating might have religious or ritualistic origins, but it is still in our largely post-religious European society, a fundamental, universal human phenomenon.

Germany’s and Merkel’s actual guilt of the development of the Eurozone crisis is a topic for a different study but the conducted media analysis suggests that Germany and Merkel are turned into a scapegoat through the usage of the two previously identified narratives. By alluding to Nazi Germany and constructing a narrative surrounding the assertion that Portugal is being governed from an outside force, the articles concentrate themselves on the search for a culprit instead of a thorough discussion of the causes and solutions for the crisis. The same goes for the submission narrative: the responsibility is shifted from the Portuguese government to Germany or Merkel. Most visible in the metaphor of the puppeteer, the politicians are seen as being deprived of their own Mündigkeit. As is the case with the student and patient metaphor, the puppets cannot be seen as fully responsible for their actions because they are merely executing the will of someone else.

However, the process of scapegoating happens on both sides. While the Portuguese media turns Germany and Merkel into a scapegoat, the German press uses the lazy cicada narrative to turn the GIPS countries into a scapegoat (c.f. chapter 7.2) and to make them responsible for the Eurozone crisis. This blame game is reflected in a statement by the sociologist Boaventura de Sousa Santos in an interview with the magazine Visão at the end of July 2011 who attributes moral superiority to Portugal. Statements from prominent political figures such as Merkel about Portugal's lack of productivity and general southern laziness have also resulted in the following quote from Boaventura de Sousa Santos who seems to interpret Merkel's quote as a pars pro toto (in which he takes Merkel's quote as representative for the whole of Germany) and compares Germany's perception of Portugal's laziness to Germany's war crimes from the second world war:

Não tenho vergonha de o dizer publicamente: podemos ser preguiçosos, podemos não saber como nos governar, mas não matámos 6 milhões de judeus e ciganos. Tenho pena de o dizer, mas tenho de o dizer. O nacionalismo puxa o

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136 Majority - meant here in the Kantian sense, the ability to think for oneself.
The same dynamic exists in other countries as well. In the representation of Greece in the German media, Mylonas explains that a “configuration of the Greek people as economic villains of the Eurozone provides a scapegoat, where public frustration of EU citizens, related to anti-labour and anti-welfare politics, can be channelled” (2012, p. 651). On the other hand, scapegoating Germany is also a technique used in the Greek media and in the political discourse of Greek politicians (Tzogopoulos, 2012b, p. 6-7). Through this act of mutual scapegoating and stereotyping, internal others (“those that belong to the same political entity with the ingroup”, Triandafyllidou cited in Galpin, 2012, p. 4) are created which in turn “will risk a breakdown in European solidarities, identities and signal a re-assertion of national interests and identities” (Galpin, 2012, p. 6).

However, the mutual scapegoating does not stop here. In an opinion piece, Assis quotes the former Chancellor of Germany Helmut Schmidt who implied in a speech at a congress of the SPD that Germany itself is partially responsible for the scapegoating and the resurgence of anti-German sentiments:

Helmut Schmidt [...] ousou mesmo afirmar o que nenhum não alemão pode dizer — que, pelo seu passado, a Alemanha não é encarada como um país normal, criticando incisivamente aquilo que designou como a “vanidade nacionalista” de alguns dos seus actuais governantes. [...] Mas as palavras do antigo chanceler têm um significado preciso — a Alemanha não deve contribuir, pelo seu comportamento altivo e egoísta, para ressuscitar fantasmas adormecidos em toda a Europa. (Assis, 2011, p. 36)

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137 I'm not ashamed to say it publicly, we may be lazy, we may not know how to govern us, but we didn't kill 6 million Jews and Gypsies. I'm sorry to say it, but I have to say it. Nationalism draws nationalism. Europe has always been this. And that is what I'm afraid of.

138 Germany and GIPS are not the only scapegoats in the coverage of the Eurozone crisis but as Scholl et al. point out: “In the multilevel polity of the European Union there are two kinds of scapegoats at hand: EU institutions which have proven to be comparatively weak in interfering in national debates (Hoesch 2003; Gramberger 1997) and governments of other countries who focus their attention and their publicity activity on their respective national electorate. Therefore, blaming EU institutions or other national governments in the national public sphere is fairly safe.” (2014, p. 5).

139 Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party)

140 Helmut Schmidt [...] even dared to assert what a non-German cannot say - that, by its past, Germany is not seen as a normal country, criticizing pointedly what he termed as the "nationalist vanity" of some of
Thus in this case, the scapegoat is even being blamed for becoming a scapegoat. Tzogopoulos’ conclusion also applies to the Portuguese case: “mutual scapegoating tactics [...] cannot contribute to a better vision for the future” (2012b, p. 9).

Or in other words, the simplification that is implied in the process of scapegoating is a reduction of the complexity of reality and implicates a persistent refusal to perceive reality as such. Furthermore, the strategy of scapegoating is a risky one; the various possible, hypothetical consequences of which are often out of control of the ones instigating this destructive, disruptive process. In this case, one might think of problematic consequences including but not restricted to: a possible exit of Portugal from the EU; fraught diplomatic relations between Germany and Portugal; reciprocal, systematic and reductive negative profiling and stereotyping between people from Portugal and Germany, which then also might affect a strained access to employment and complicates a smooth integration in society in the case of migration between either country. In the context of this thesis, the question is not so much whether these consequences already have or still might materialize or not but rather the importance of being aware of the risks that are inherent to reciprocal processes of scapegoating and its accompanying narratives, the instigators of which might cause damage or change that once set in motion, like a snowball rolling down a mountainside and turning into an avalanche, that will be hard to stop or undo.

its current rulers. [...] But the former Chancellor's words have a precise meaning - Germany must not contribute, by its haughty and selfish behavior, to revive dormant ghosts across Europe.
8. Conclusion

At the beginning of this thesis, I criticized the omission of Portugal in many media and public discourse studies on the Eurozone crisis and I pointed out the lack of research on representations of Germany in Portuguese media. My main interest was to get an insight into Portuguese public discourses on Germany through various types of media. For this reason, I first looked at general Portuguese media discourses on the Eurozone crisis and related public opinion polls. Due to the lack in secondary research and limitations in regard to minor media, my approach had to be more exploratory. Nevertheless, I tried to deal with the limitations by combining quantitative with qualitative methods, looking at different types of media and comparing my findings to similar research projects on Greek media. What followed was a thorough narrative analysis and comparison of common tropes and narratives in minor media as well as traditional media. Drawing upon the assumption that mainstream media present a type of hegemonic elitist discourse that often vastly differs from the discourses by civil society and subterranean actors (to use Murray-Leach et al. term; 2014, p. 1), I decided to not only look at the newspapers Público and Jornal de Notícias but also at street art, graffiti and protest writings and pictures.

Surprisingly, this was not the case. There was a high convergence in regards to the themes and narratives presented in both types of media. However, the true discrepancy was to be found between the hegemonic political discourse from the centre-right Passos Coelho administration, which is supportive of Merkel and the austerity politics from the troika on the one hand, and the critical discourses that can be found in all of the media that were examined for this research on the other hand. Apart from certain metaphors such as Merkel as a doctor or Portugal as a good student that were only found in newspaper articles, I identified two narratives that were commonly used both in the news coverage and in minor media: the narrative of the Fourth Reich and the narrative of submission and superiority. Even though the initial focus was on representations of Germany in the Eurozone crisis, both narratives focused on Merkel as the main antagonist. References to Germany were either completely omitted or they were used interchangeably with references to Merkel, giving the impression that Merkel acts as a synecdoche for Germany.
While the narratives that were used were the same, the discourses (“how the story is told”) across the different types of media were not. The minor media presented the narratives without mincing matters, several images of Merkel doing the Nazi salute and with a toothbrush moustache were found in street art, graffiti and on banners in public protests, whereas the press tended to use a more nuanced discourse. Furthermore, there were some differences notable between the two newspapers. While the quality newspaper Público published articles about Germany’s role in the Eurozone crisis throughout the entire time period that was examined (11.03.2011-19.05.2014), most of Jornal de Notícias coverage was focused on Merkel’s state visit to Portugal. Both newspapers contained articles that subscribed to or even advocated the two narratives, but Público contained a few articles that tried to question and scrutinize these narratives. It was expected that a quality newspaper such as Público would provide a more nuanced coverage though it came as a surprise that Jornal de Notícias mostly abstained from using populist discourses as seen in the Greek press such as depicting Merkel as Hitler.

Lastly, I looked at Jack Lule’s theory of seven master myths and examined whether these myths were present in the news coverage and minor media. Lule’s definition of a scapegoat is very restricted because it only considers persons or groups, who are already at the margins of society. Therefore, I expanded upon this definition and showed that the myth of the scapegoat indeed shaped many articles, street art, graffiti and protest images. Similar to the relationship between Greece and Germany, scapegoating techniques were used on both sides: While the Portuguese media make use of the two previously mentioned narratives to turn Germany into a scapegoat, Portugal and other southern countries are often portrayed as lazy and lavish in the German public discourse.

It is important to be aware of the narratives and myths that eventually shape public opinion because they can be an obstacle in the discussion of the structural solutions for the Eurozone crisis as these narratives can also influence public policy making (Tsoukala, 2013, p. 242). Furthermore, simplistic narratives and mutual scapegoating only increase the perceived North-South divide in the European Union and with the rise in national socialist movements such as the Greek party Golden Dawn it could lead to European disintegration.
It is for these reasons that the lack of research on Portuguese public discourses, specifically media discourses, on the Eurozone crisis is so problematic and I would like to suggest that both general quantitative studies and qualitative studies are needed. Future quantitative research should look at the ways various newspapers portray and make sense of the Eurozone crisis and how Portuguese public perception of the crisis has been affected by the media coverage (such as the project The Euro Crisis, Media Coverage, and Perceptions of Europe within the EU that was mentioned in the beginning, chapter 2.1). Future research also has to account for the fact that television is still the most popular medium and that it therefore might have a stronger influence on public opinion. A more qualitative approach could be for instance a discourse analysis of specific articles that can pay closer attention to the context in which a certain discourse is presented, the political background of the author and the target audience in order to understand the motivation behind certain statements.

More comparative approaches are needed as well, for example between representations of Greece and Portugal in German media, linked to the question whether Portugal might have received a different treatment by the troika due to its portrayal as a good student in European media. Lastly, the comparative approach to minor media and newspapers in this thesis proved to be very insightful and the convergence or divergence between different hegemonic and minor media (also for example in social media) should be explored further. Even though mainly used in the social sciences, narrative analysis should receive more attention in the humanities as well and with shrinking funding for humanities departments all over the world, it is even more important to consider interdisciplinary approaches and not shy away from discussing contemporary political and social issues.

Only by the combination of different qualitative and quantitative methodologies and interdisciplinary approaches one can gain a better understanding of the way the Portuguese make sense of the Eurozone crisis and what role the media coverage plays in the formation of public opinion on the challenges ahead. From a journalistic perspective, a recognition of myths and narratives and how they might influence the reporting is important; not to completely avoid them but to be aware of them and question them.
LITERATURE


NEWSPAPER ARTICLES


**IMAGE SOURCES**


ANNEX 1

PHOTOS
Fig. 1 - Graffiti writing with tag, district of Lisbon (own collection), creator unknown

Fig. 2 - Cloth with writing, Porto (‘Merkel é «persona non grata»’, 2012), creator unknown
Fig. 3 - Protest banner “Merkel fora de Portugal” by PCTP-MRPP, district of Lisbon, ("Merkel é «persona non grata»", 2012), creator unknown

Fig. 4 - Sticker, district of Lisbon (own collection), creator unknown
Fig. 5 - Paint ("houses yes! evictions no!"), Praça da Alegria, Lisbon (own collection), creator unknown

Fig. 6 - Stencil ("It’s a Portuguese house without certainty", reference to the song “Uma casa portuguesa” from Amália Rodrigues), location unknown, maismenos.
Fig. 7 - Stencil ("work a lot, gain little and conform!"), district of Lisbon (own collection), creator unknown

Fig. 8 - Stencil, district of Lisbon (own collection), Dalaiama
Fig. 9 - Graffiti writing ("Lass alle Hoffnung fahren, du, der immer noch daran glaubt. Portugal ist gestorben. Ruhe in Frieden"), location and creator unknown ("Street Art in Portugal", 2012).

Fig. 10 - Mural, Calçada do Lavra, Lisbon (own collection), creator unknown
Fig. 11 - Stencil ("We are all Greek"), district of Lisbon (own collection), creator unknown

Fig. 12 - Three graffiti writings, district of Lisbon (own collection), creator unknown
Fig. 13 - Stencil ("Right-wing politics... Until when are you letting steal? Fight and organize yourself?"), district of Lisbon (own collection), creator unknown

Fig. 14 - Stencil ("For a poorer country", location and creator unknown, ("Street Art in Portugal", 2012)
Fig. 15 - Poster (“Clan of the ‘Gatugas’ - maybe one day”), 2013 or 2014, Cais Sodré, Lisbon, Nomen (“Clan dos Gatugas, 2013).

Fig. 16 - Painting, 2012 or 2013, Rossio, Lisbon, Nomen (Nomen, n.d.)
Fig. 17 - Stencil, Barreiro, Lisbon (own collection), creator unknown

Fig. 18 - Mural (“This mural was realized without external help”, “How long do you still want to watch this show? “Our” debt continues to grow!”), Oct. 2012, Amoreiras, Lisbon (own collection), Nomen, Slap and Kurtz
Fig. 19 - Mural “This kiss leaves us stiff/no money.”, Date, creator and location unknown (“Street Art in Portugal”, 2012)

Fig. 20 - Painting, 2012, Location unknown, NEK (Bruno Nek Qtwo Nogueira, 2012).
Fig. 21 - Graffiti writing “Merkel [get] out”, location and date unknown, creator unknown (collection from Ricardo Campos)

Fig. 22 - Graffiti writing “Go to hell - Merkel” (Wordplay with “Bardamerda” (expression used to express repulsion or disdain), Date, creator and location unknown (Fischer & Hamann, 2015).

Fig. 23 - Stencil “Neither Merkel nor Troikas”, district of Porto (own collection), creator unknown
Fig. 24 - Stencil/graffiti, Coimbra, date and creator unknown (Hendrik, 2013)

Fig. 25 - Stencil “Athens to Lisbon. Revolution now”, district of Lisbon (own collection), creator unknown

Fig. 26 - Writing “In Abril go to the street! Troika out of here! We will fight! The values of April are the future of the youth!”, Setúbal, creator unknown, (collection of Helena de Sousa Freitas)
Fig. 27 - Sign on the left in the middle “Go to hell - Merkel”, 15.10.2011 (Nogueira, 2013)

Fig. 28 - “Death to the Troika! Merkel Nazi, Street! Down with the government of national treason PSD/CDS!”, “Association to Combat Precariousness: Troika Government Street”, “Screw the troika! Merkel is not in charge here”, 12.11.2012, (“Portugiesen empfangen”, 2012)
Fig. 29 - “Merkel out of Portugal” 12.11.2012 (“Photo Gallery”, 2012)

Fig. 30 - “Merkel is deadly”, 12.10.2012, (“Photo Gallery”, 2012)
Fig. 31 - “We are the people”, 12.10.2012, (JPP, 2012)

Fig. 32 - “Merkel get out! and take Passos [Coelho] with you”, 12.10.2012, (Centenas de pessoas”, 2012)
The number eleven refers to the eleven ministers (excluding the prime minister) in the XIX Constitutional Government of Portugal (before 24 July 2013).
Fig. 35 - “Pay with this cheque 34,400,000,000 to the FMI/troika. Place: Portugal. Date: “12 Nov. 2012. Signature: The Portuguese people”, 12.10.2012, (JPP, 2012)

Fig. 36 - Angela Merkel, 12.10.2012, (JPP, 2012)
Fig. 37 - “Merkel go to hell!!”, collection of Britta Baumgarten, 12.10.2012,

Fig. 38 - “Once again, no!”, 12.10.2012, (“Photo Gallery”, 2012)
Fig. 39 - collection of Britta Baumgarten, 12.10.2012

Fig. 40 - Adolf Merkel, 12.10.2012, ("‘Raus hier!’", 2015)
Fig. 41 - Adolf Hitler, Angela Merkel, António de Oliveira Salazar, Pedro Passos Coelho, 12.10.2012, (“Manifestação”, 2012).

Fig. 42 - “Work sets you free”, 12.10.2012, (JPP, 2012)
Fig. 43: Poster by the Bloco de Esquerda, February 2015 (“Cartaz do Bloco”, 2015)

Fig. 44: Title page of Público (12.11.2012) with a photo of the mural by Nomen, Slap and Kurtz
ANNEX 2

GRAPHS & DIAGRAMS
Fig. 1 – Network diagram of narratives and recurring themes in Público and Jornal de Notícias
Fig. 2: Absolute number of articles published

Fig. 3: Types of articles published