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Abstract

The government of security and safety constitutes a privileged angle from which to study the links among government, public policy and urban dynamics, particularly in places where neoliberalisation intersects with historical racial and class tensions – as is the case in many US cities. I am concerned with the connection between (racialised) security politics and the institutional transformation of local security policymaking. I use the case of Memphis (TN, USA), which is paradigmatic of the neoliberalisation of security and permanent ‘low-intensity’ austerity; present four practices and trends – ‘predictive’ policing, rhetoric about ‘community’ self-defence, safety ‘grants’ and the ‘mission creep’ of the militarised police department; and discuss continuities/discontinuities with regard to long-term trends of restructuring crime control in the USA. The case of security policymaking allows me to argue that austerity and neoliberal rule tend to replace public policy – intended as a course of action stemming from conscious choice by the government – with a complicated patchwork of state intervention/disengagement, whose ultimate effect is the ‘end of public policy’ proper.
Keywords
Urban policy; crime prevention; low-intensity austerity; public safety; United States.

Introduction
On February 1, 2017, citizens of Memphis (TN, USA) driving on Poplar Avenue and other major city streets were welcomed by billboards stating: ‘Welcome to Memphis. 228 homicides in 2016. Down over 500 police officers’ (Figure 1). Paid for by the Memphis Police Association (MPA), the powerful local union of police officers, the campaign intended to establish a direct link between a yearly spike in homicide rates and the reduction of sworn officers between 2011 and 2016 – to try and advocate more sworn officers, higher wages and more benefits. MPA had sponsored an even more explicit campaign in 2013: ‘Danger. Enter at your own risk. The city does not support public safety’, billboards read. Both campaigns inflamed accusations between MPA and local politicians, in a rush of leaders championing ‘zero tolerance’.

Figure 1. Memphis Police Association billboard in Poplar Avenue, Memphis. February 2017. Photo: Jessica Buttermore.
In (cities like) Memphis, urban security and safety (or public safety in American English)\textsuperscript{1} are especially controversial topics, which intersect with many others. The characteristic US patterns of urban safety – strong links between poverty, spatial segregation, aggressive policing and concentration of violent crime – intersect with historical racial and class politics (see Hinton, 2016; Camp and Heatherton, 2016). From a policy perspective, urban security is a field where the relations among government, public action and urban dynamics are especially tight. On the one hand, the government of security is a nodal dimension of the way public policy affects cities’ welfare and patterns of (in)justice (Morelle and Tadié, 2011; Tulumello, 2017b). On the other, safety is ‘delivered’ at the intersection of security practice with virtually every other area of public action (Chalom et al., 2001, ii). As such, the practices of security can be used as a synecdoche, a part of the whole, to understand recent transformations in public policymaking. The MPA billboards remind us of the way local politics drive local security policy; at the same time, security and safety have been restructured by global trends and neoliberalisation: the clash of such trends with local policies and politics will be the object of my study.

Theory-wise, I will build on critiques of neoliberal urban policy and austerity. While a great deal of attention has been devoted to discussing the extent to which the neoliberal state is one where politics are attacked (see, e.g. Blokker, 2014), my objective is to question the consequences of neoliberalisation and austerity over public policy. Is austerity a set of policies put in place to pursue neoliberal political goals? Or does austerity restructure the concept of ‘public policy’? I will use the case of neoliberalisation of security to argue that, in contexts characterised by long-term austerity rule, the very concept of public policy tends to fade out, being replaced by a complicated patchwork of state intervention/disengagement.

Beyond contributing to the scholarship on neoliberal policymaking, I intend to contribute to that about (racialised) security politics in the USA, by linking it more solidly to the study of institutional action, exploring how grand processes are activated in micro-dimensions of local policymaking. Not only is this endeavour capable of adding nuances to the understanding of security politics; it is also necessary for the goal of imagining, and enacting, alternatives – which need be built politically, but, at the same time, must be capable of institutionalisation, that is, of changing the dynamics of power engrained within the fabric of state organisation and action.

With the above goals, I will analyse the case of Memphis, which will help theorise because, against the backdrop of its regional context (the US urban South),

\textsuperscript{1} I shall follow the definition by the International Centre for Prevention of Crime, according to which urban security is a ‘public good delivered by the state under regular circumstances’ and urban safety ‘a subjective feeling of being secure as experienced by citizens’ (ICPC 2012, 3).
it is ‘paradigmatic’ (Flyvbjerg, 2006) of processes of neoliberalisation and austerity rule – and their consequences over urban security. I will present four security/safety practices – i) data-driven, ‘predictive’ policing, ii) calls for ‘community’ self-defence, iii) the use of safety ‘grants’ and iv) the ‘mission creep’ of the militarised police department – and emphasise continuities and discontinuities with regard to long-term trends of transformation of crime control in the USA. The case of Memphis will help foresee the ‘end of public policy’ embedded in austerity and neoliberal security making.

Before moving to the empirical exploration, the next two sections review critiques of austerity and neoliberal urban policy, in order to raise the question about what happens to public policy in the neoliberal state; and discuss recent transformations of security and safety as policy goals, with special emphasis on the US case.

Neoliberalisation, austerity and public policy

Neoliberalism is an elusive, if not ‘slippery’ (Springer et al., 2016, 1), concept. There is agreement that neoliberalism is a global ‘project’, which emerged in the late 1970s to restructure international capitalism (Harvey, 2005). With neoliberalism having been subject to adaptation and variegation over time and space (Brenner et al., 2010; Peck, 2013), some believe that its use to explain political and urban transformations in very different contexts runs the risk of giving too much power to one, among many, explanatory concepts (Parnell and Robinson, 2012; Baptista, 2013; Le Galés, 2016). Still, neoliberalism is a powerful explanatory concept, if the approaches to and methodologies for its critique are carefully designed. In particular, I have suggested that neoliberalism needs be understood in a multi-scalar fashion, focusing on its threefold nature of i) a global (and coherent) project, which is operationalised through ii) (ambiguous) sets of governmentalities – which are more evident at the national and supra-national level, e.g. in the work of institutions such as the World Bank or International Monetary Fund – and iii) (contradictory) policymaking, as evident on the local scale (Tulumello, 2016a). Such an approach emphasises, rather than specific arrangements and policies – which may or may not be activated in different geographic or temporal contexts –, neoliberalism’s ‘various roles in shaping state strategies, innovative modes of governance, and new forms of political subjectivity’ (Springer et al., 2016, 3).

A clear-cut distinction between neoliberalism and liberalism (cf. Le Galès, 2016) is paramount to such a project. I find one of the dimensions that distinguish neoliberalism from classical liberalism² – possibly the defining characteristic of the

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² According to Le Galès (2016), while classic liberalism acknowledges that public provision may be more efficient than private markets for some goods, this is never the case for neoliberalism, which, however, believes that markets are not ‘natural’, but planned by the state; the need to enforce market logic implies that neoliberalism supports illiberal measures and reduces the centrality of the
neoliberal project – particularly useful in understanding contemporary policy transformations. This is the acknowledgement, made by neoliberal advocates, that the state needs be restructured, and not simply reduced, to enable generalised competition (Waquant, 2012; Le Galès, 2016). State regulation is key to guaranteeing neoliberal market deregulation (Brenner et al., 2010, 330) and neoliberal restructuring is made of complex and contradictory movements (Tulumello, 2016a) – while too often neoliberalism is equated to state roll-back, in contradiction, for instance, to the fact that public expenditure systematically grew under the Reagan and Thatcher governments (Garland, 2001, 100). Welfare state provision is traditionally the area where the neoliberal state withdraws, but examples exist of the use of welfare expansion (often through public private partnerships) to increase capital accumulation (e.g. Waitzkin and Hellander, 2016).

Austerity is considered a full-scale deployment of the neoliberal project (Blyth, 2013; Seymour, 2014), being itself quite an ambiguous governmentality enacted through contradictory movements of state restructuring, comprising welfare cuts and transference of public resources into markets – e.g. the recurrent bail-outs of financial institutions since the global financial crisis of 2007. Austerity has a multi-scalar nature and ‘transfers’ vulnerability (to economic and social shocks) from the national toward the local level (Sapountzaki, 2012): the urban scale and urban government are the loci where most costs of austerity fall – as evident in US long-term austerity urbanism (Peck, 2012) or in post-crisis austerity, European style (Cotella et al., 2016).

It has been discussed at length how neoliberalisation and austerity have affected the field of politics, fostering a ‘post-politicisation’ of the public sphere (Wilson and Swyngedouw, 2014): the neoliberal capitalist order is presented as inevitable and necessary, hence the neglect of the conflictual dimensions of economy and politics (Seymour, 2014; Blokker, 2014). But what are the consequences of neoliberal governmentalities for public policy? In order to provide some answers, a brief definition of ‘public policy’ is in order. Public policy is a ‘course of action’, that is, a ‘web of decisions’, pursued by the state (Hill, 1997, 6-10) and stemming from ‘conscious choice’ by the government (Hawlett, 2011, 15). I shall therefore define public policy as a process in time made of actions (or inaction) by public institutions, moved by a will – e.g. to address (or not) a problem. The depoliticisation resulting from neoliberal governmentalities does indeed affect the capacity of the state to ‘decide’ and the process upstream of the decision – political debate and conflict. I will use security and safety to argue that neoliberalisation and austerity also affect the process downstream, that is, state action/inaction patterns, focusing on recent transformations thereof.

freedom of individuals; neololiberalism is not concerned with concentration of wealth and monopolies; and finally, under neoliberalism (liberal and pluralistic) democracy is not a priority.
Changing patterns of security policymaking

Security and safety have historically been a state priority: the social contract of liberal democracies is founded on the premise that the state will guarantee security – for Neocleous (2007, 137), security is the ‘overriding interest’ of liberal state power. Indeed, security and safety are considered a (the?) crucial goal of public policy. I will focus on urban security, that is, policies of prevention of crime and violence put in place on the local scale. On this scale, security is evidently intertwined with wider issues of welfare and (in)equality. On one hand, ‘security is not the mere product of unequal political and social relations, it has an influence on urban dynamics and on the general degree of injustice in cities’ (Morelle and Tadić, 2011, 6). On the other, public policy can contribute to increasing safety by addressing structural issues at the root of crime (Tulumello, 2017b).

Battistelli (2013) summarised three drivers of change in Western strategies of crime control in times of globalisation: 3

• convergence among traditionally centralised and decentralised systems through means of decentralisation, localism and recentralisation (see also Recasens et al., 2013);
• participation, that is, both attempts at making police action more attentive to local requests and expectation that citizens become active agents of prevention (see also Herbert, 1999; Garland, 2001);
• privatisation, emergence of complex patterns of public-private partnerships and mergers of public and private practices (see also Amoore, 2013).

All in all, these trends have had generalised, if variegated, impacts and, according to critical scholarship, need be understood in relation to neoliberal state restructuring: (global) cities witnessed the exponential growth of public and corporate security sectors, more evidently after the terrorist attacks of the 2000s (Rossi and Vanolo, 2012 [2010]); and state power became harsher in order to enforce austerity and neoliberal rules (Seymour, 2014). At the same time, local governments had to face most of the burden of budget cuts: while city departments with powerful corporations (more often, police departments) were sometimes able to defend their budgets – thanks too to aggressive campaigning such as that undertaken by MPA (see Introduction) – many governments have ended up delegating the implementation of security solutions to citizens and local businesses (Peck, 2012; Trémon, 2013). These trends have sparked debate on the way the power of the state was changing: some believe that state sovereignty has been fading out (e.g. Garland, 1996), while others believe that recent trends are, if

3 Battistelli provides one among many historical interpretations of such processes from different perspectives, a field especially rich with regard to the USA and UK (see, e.g., Garland, 2001; Simon, 2007; Reiner, 2016).
anything, increasing the capacity of the state to control and enforce (e.g. Herbert, 1999).

These trends are particularly advanced in the USA, where the decline of the liberal, post-Second World War consensus has brought about the emergence of a new culture of crime control shaped by two coexisting, if contradictory, strategies: ‘preventative partnership’ – by which I refer to the effort to share responsibility for crime control and build a crime prevention infrastructure beyond the state – and [...] punitive segregation, which refers to the reliance upon measures, above all incapacitative imprisonment, designed to punish and exclude’ (Garland, 2001, 140, emphasis in the original; see also Herbert, 1999; Simon, 2007; Reiner, 2016). These strategies, particularly the latter, have been deeply embedded in racial and class politics: zero tolerance policing has been central to the enforcement of racial boundaries (Schneider, 2014; Camp, Heatherton, 2016); the history of mass-imprisonment is a racialised and class-driven one (Wacquant, 2009 [2004]; Hinton, 2016); and the spatial correlation of social ills, crime and aggressive policing is particularly evident (Friedson and Sharkey, 2015). In a parallel vein, Barrick suggests (2015, 899) that ‘racial thinking is inherent to the production and maintenance’ of US border security. All in all, from governing crime through justice and public policy, the neoliberal US state seems to govern, in partnership with non-state actors, through crime (Simon, 2007; Camp and Heatherton, 2016), creating and maintaining uneven patterns of security/insecurity among (racialised/class) groups and spaces.

The remainder of the article will use the case of Memphis to discuss the implications of the trends discussed in this section for security and safety as public policies.

**Approach to case study and research methodology**

With case study research, the ‘strategy’ of case selection is a crucial aspect for theory building (Flyvbjerg, 2006). I shall use Memphis as a ‘paradigmatic’ case, which ‘highlight[s] more general characteristics of the societies in question’ (ibid., 232). The empirical discussion will show how, in Memphis, neoliberalisation of security and austerity rule are intense and ordinary, that is, deeply entrenched in local policy and politics. The kind of theorisation that such a case allows is the possibility of sketching a glimpse of the ultimate effect of processes that are elsewhere incipient or less straightforward.

What follows is based on field research carried out between January and July 2016. I have collected data from three main sources: i) documental analysis – policy documents, municipal decisions, institutional websites; ii) qualitative interviews and work meetings with policymakers and experts;⁴ and iii) analysis of

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⁴ Ten interviews (in one case the interviewee provided written answers to a list of questions) and three work meetings with: academicians (University of Memphis, Criminology and Criminal
Neoliberalisation of Security, Austerity and the ‘End of Public Policy’

the Mayor’s Weekly Digest Bulletin\(^5\) and local media, useful for the understanding of dominant political discourse and rhetoric.

**Memphis, South of USA: from late globalisation to ‘low-intensity’ austerity**

The paradigmatic value of Memphis is linked with regional transformations in the South of the USA. The historically slower economic development of the South of the USA has long been interpreted through the lenses of ‘distinctiveness’ and ‘exceptionalism’ of the ‘rural’, ‘religious’, ‘backward’, ‘dumb’ or ‘enduring’ South (see, among others, Reed, 1972; Goldfield, 1981). These explanations have been contested: Robinson (2014) exposed the stereotypical character of many such representations; while Peacock (2007) and Rushing (2009) discussed the peculiar patterns of globalisation of Southern cities. One should rather consider long-term patterns of uneven development, that is, the ‘quasi-colonial’ (Goldfield, 1981; Lloyd, 2012) economic and power relations between the core and periphery of the USA. This trajectory may be summed up as one of experimental political economic relations rather than of internal backwardness: Lloyd (2012) suggests that the South of the USA, and its cities, should nowadays be considered vanguards of neoliberalisation; hence their paradigmatic value with regard to the transformations for urban policy propelled by this.

Memphis (650,000 inhabitants) is the second biggest city in the state of Tennessee and the core of a metropolitan area (1,350,000 inhabitants) extending into the bordering states of Arkansas and Mississippi. Memphis’ recent history is characterised by the intersection of persistent White privilege with turbulent economic growth and corporate globalisation (Rushing, 2009). Demographically, Memphis is representative of a typical US metro, with a poorer, mixed, minority-majority central city surrounded by predominantly White and affluent suburbs, and significant patterns of segregation; while structural problems, social ills and racial tensions are especially acute (Lauterbach, 2016) – the metropolitan area and the city of Memphis are among the most unequal of the most unequal Western country (EIG, 2016). Memphis has been governed for decades (by Democratic mayors) with policies typical of the neoliberal city (cf. Sager, 2011) such as: trickle-down economics made of fiscal adjustment, tax reduction and attraction of corporate investment (see below); reliance on public-private partnerships in the management

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\(^5\) A weekly email with updates from the office of the mayor. I have analysed the emails sent during 2016. Registration at https://public.govdelivery.com/accounts/TNMEMPHIS/subscriber/new?qsp=TNMEMPHIS_5 [accessed 20/01/2018].

Justice); civil servants from city departments (MPD, Parks and Neighborhoods, Housing and Community Development, and Planning and Development); a retired criminologist and former consultant of MPD; an activist from the Mid-South Peace and Justice Center; and a lawyer, chair of Memphis Crime Commission.
of public services and goods;\textsuperscript{6} emphasis on city-marketing and the promotion of the city as a tourism and convention destination.\textsuperscript{7}

Memphis has been a city under the long-term rule of austerity urbanism, but not the shock austerity described by Peck as an “‘extreme economy', which in some cases is driving a fiscal crisis of the urban state’ (2012, 628). Memphis style austerity is rather a ‘low-intensity’, permanent one, which needs be contextualised in the framework of the US institutional system. US style federalism grants wide autonomy to local authorities, hence competences over matters, such as ‘public safety’, criminal justice or fire prevention, that in most Western countries are national or regional. At the same time, systems of metropolitan government and redistributive policies are basically absent (cf. Kantor, 2016) – particularly in conservative states such as Tennessee, while exceptions exist due to the autonomy of states. Fiscal burdens for local governments are only partly caused by the ‘downloading’ of austerity (Peck, 2012, 631) from the national and state level in the form of transference cuts; maybe more importantly, they also stem from horizontal relations of two kinds. Firstly, relations between cities/suburbs, and shifting tax bases due to the ‘White flight’. Cities like Detroit, New Orleans, Philadelphia, Baltimore and Saint Louis have lost up to two-thirds of their populations since the 1960s; but have continued to provide services for the entire metropolitan area (e.g. to companies, located in business districts downtown, providing white-collar jobs) and to the population most in-need – that which did not flee to the suburbs. Memphis has repeatedly expanded its territory through subsequent annexations in order to counteract population loss,\textsuperscript{8} with the result that it has kept its population stable but now covers an enormous area of 840 km\textsuperscript{2} – for comparison purposes, the land area of New York City (8,500,000 inhabitants) is a bit smaller than that of Memphis city – with the resulting costs of providing services and maintenance. Secondly, in addition to this, the ‘economic warfare’ propelled by city/city competition to attract external investments (Kantor, 2016), an out-and-out rush to the biggest cut of taxes for big companies and corporations – see, e.g., Memphis’ Payment In Lieu Of Taxes (PILOT) programme, which grants massive fiscal benefits to companies investing in the city.

An analysis of city budgets provides a picture of Memphis’ recent low-intensity austerity (Figure 2). Despite two waves of cuts, after 2005 and in the

\textsuperscript{6}E.g., the management of the main urban park (Overton Park) and the city-owned zoo has been recently transferred from the department Parks and Neighborhoods to two ‘conservancies’, NGOs whose boards are representative of the city business and third-sector.

\textsuperscript{7}E.g., the city has recently accepted 12 million dollars from anonymous private donors to install a multi-coloured lightning system in the Hararan bridge over the Mississippi River. From the Mayor’s Weekly Digest Bulletin: ‘the lighting of these bridges will be a major positive step for our city’s image – and a major positive step for the pride we all take in being Memphians’ (14/06/2016).

\textsuperscript{8}A complicated institutional patchwork exists in the US. The typical metropolitan area (including Memphis) is made up of a central municipality of ancient incorporation, suburban municipalities (most of which incorporated recently) and unincorporated lands managed directly by the county.
aftermath of the global economic crisis, the city budget has always recovered – partly because of the annexations (the last in 2010-2011) – and remains overall stable. But the distribution of expenditure has seen a constant growth in two items, the Memphis Police Department (hereafter MPD) and fire protection, and constant cuts to the departments responsible for urban and social policy. As of 2016, two-thirds of the budget was allocated to fire and police (Table 1), while funding allocated to the departments of Planning and Development (a city-county department funded under Grants and Agencies) and Housing and Community Development was so sparse that the activity of these departments was entirely dependent on external grants (interviews with two city administrators). This implies that, while the MPD has had the possibility of planning in the long term and, for instance, experimenting with technology solutions, welfare and urban policy are implemented through short-term interventions, making use of grants available for priorities decided at the national or state level (see Tulumello, 2017a). In short, although the discussion of security policies will make this point more evident, austerity in Memphis does not only consist of cuts to public policy, but rather a complex set of movements and restructuring thereof.

Figure 2. Expenditure (general fund) of Memphis City’s departments (1.0 = expenditure in 2005; adjusted for inflation). Own elaboration of adopted city budgets (www.memphistn.gov/Government/FinanceDivision.aspx).
Table 1. Expenditure (general fund) of main city departments, 2016 Adopted Budget

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>% of total budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police Services</td>
<td>38.06%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire Services</td>
<td>26.27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parks and Neighborhoods</td>
<td>7.86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing and Community Development</td>
<td>0.68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Works</td>
<td>3.41%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Grants and Agencies</td>
<td>9.64%</td>
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<tr>
<td>of which, Planning and Development</td>
<td>0.23%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Governing security and safety in Memphis**

The low-intensity, long-term austerity described in the previous section constitutes the backdrop for the following discussion on urban security. At the same time, the public and political demand for safety is among the reasons for the steady shift of resources toward security, in Memphis and virtually everywhere else in the USA – cf. Garland (2001, 142ff) regarding the new practices of control, and their resonance with shifting public and political opinions about crime. As summed up by a city administrator and a high-ranking MPD official, interviewed:

Public safety is such a hot issue and such an important issue for the general public. […] Public safety in schools is what I think gets the most attention and is most important to a general citizen. They don’t wanna hear you’re taking money from the police. Across the US in some cities, let’s say Memphis… violent crime rates are going up. Our call volume is going up, more people are calling the police. […] We have to respond to supply and demand. There are more demands on law enforcement to provide all these services like you discussed [welfare and social policy].

The current mayor, Jim Strickland, was elected on a platform of zero tolerance and crime reduction. An excerpt from his Weekly Digest Bulletins (12/05/2016) provides a picture of the political discourse:

If you saw or read any of my recent interviews about crime in Memphis, you probably heard me say the word ‘unacceptable’. This isn’t just a word I use as a crutch: It’s precisely how I feel about the level of crime in our city. Simply put, I will not accept this as the norm as your mayor. […] But we also want to let the criminals know, through our words and our actions, that these are not their
streets. These are our streets. And everyone should know that city government, from my office to every man and woman on patrol, is laser-focused on keeping our streets safe.

Indeed, Memphis suffers from very high crime rates: the homicide rate (recently ~20 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants a year) is 4 to 5 times the national average – the highest in the Western world. The links of crime with racial politics and social problems are particularly tight. On the one hand, in accordance with what happens all around the urban USA, crime and violent crime are concentrated in the poorer, Black neighbourhoods, and are predominantly ‘intra-communal’ (Tulumello, 2016b; 2017a). On the other hand, the politics of security are interlinked with the politics of race (more on this below), aggressive policing in Black neighbourhoods being a recurrent cause of tensions and strife – Black Lives Matter protests in 2016 provided a stark picture of this.

The intersection of crime, poverty and social problems would suggest that violence be addressed by attacking its structural, social, economic and cultural roots through coordinated local, metropolitan, state and federal efforts (ibid.). In the absence of such efforts, the MPD has become the nodal element of the entire local governmental action, while urban security policymaking has been restructured under the rule of neoliberalisation and austerity, as the following discussion will show. The following is not a comprehensive account of the local policies for crime prevention in Memphis (which could be found in Tulumello, 2017a), but a discussion of the practices that underpin the movements and shifts characterising public policy under austerity and neoliberal rule.

**Predictive policing: technology-driven securitisation**

Data-mining and algorithmic profiling have become central to neoliberal governmentalities and security practices (Introna and Wood, 2004; Amoore, 2013). This happened at the intersection of two trends (Townsend, 2015): the growing contamination between the public and private sector; and the falling cost of data, technological and computation resources. Data analysis and advanced technology provide policymakers and the public an illusion of objectivity, which is particularly appealing in times of fiscal constraint and requests for accountability (Ferguson, 2012, 269; Townsend, 2015). Predictive policing is the most comprehensive way in which data and algorithms have permeated urban security. A hyper-technological version of hot-spot policing,\(^9\) predictive policing analyses historical spatial patterns of reported crimes and real-time CCTV data to decide where and when police patrols should be deployed with preventive function. While predictive policing

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\(^9\) The rationale of hot-spot policing is grounded on the evidence of concentration of crimes, in US cities, in ‘very small places’: ‘the appeal of focusing limited resources on a small number of high-activity crime places is straightforward. If we can prevent crime at these hot spots, then we might be able to reduce total crime’ (Braga et al., 2014). This rationale has been the object of critiques: for instance, Hope (2018) suggests that laws of crime-concentration may well be ‘statistical chimeras’.
seems effective against property crime (Ferguson, 2012), whose patterns are partially explained by risk-benefit calculations of the rational offender, the reality is very different when it comes to violent crimes. A chief of detectives (Beck, 2009) summarised the arguments used in making the case for predictive policing, suggesting that it is useful for improving efficiency and reducing costs in times of recession – before admitting that it remains useful in times of growth; maintaining that data-analysis makes a ‘neutral’ and ‘technical’ issue of crime; and comparing predictive policing to forecasts used by distribution and retail corporations, praising the approximation of public policy toward business practice.

In Memphis, predictive policing was implemented without political discussion. According to my interviewees, it was an independent decision made by the MPD. In the words of a high-ranking MPD official, interviewed, ‘smart policing is the way the law enforcement kinda does business now’.

There isn’t a lot of public discussion about it. It’s like the public has not been given a lot of thought for the most part. Why that is? I guess we could probably speculate, I think some of it because it is technical, some of it because, at a certain level, the public is actually comfortable with it as the technology has sort of expanded (former MPD consultant, interview).

The program Blue CRUSH (Crime Reduction Utilizing Statistical History), a partnership between the MPD and the University of Memphis, was launched in 2006 with technologies by IBM and local corporation SkyCop, and deployed citywide in 2007. Since 2011, preventive policing under Blue CRUSH has been reduced due to a falling number of sworn officers.

Policymakers claimed Blue CRUSH successfully reduced crime and its creators were awarded locally and nationally. Indeed, some categories of crime, mostly property crime, dropped when compared to 2006. However, 2006 was characterised by an anomalous peak in crime; and a comparison of five years of application with the previous five shows a drop in property crime but an increase in violent crime (Vlahos, 2012; Tulumello, 2016b, 17) – my interviewees admitted the program could hardly be effective with reference to crimes, such as murder and aggravated assault (the most common violent crime in Memphis), without a statistical pattern. A high-ranking MPD official and a former consultant, interviewed, claimed that after 2011, with the reduction of scope of Blue CRUSH, violent crime went up: but data provided by the MPD showed that violent crime went down.  

10 The newspaper Commercial Appeal awarded the consultant who led the design of the program, while the MPD won the 2009 award for Excellence in Law Enforcement Communications and Interoperability (large cities) by the International Association of Chiefs of Police.

11 Monthly numbers of violent crimes reported and cleared, and commissioned officers, January 2012 – June 2016 [MIMEO; data provided by MPD].
Two arguments place predictive policing in the context of long-term transformations of US security policymaking. First, in relation to city budget priorities, not only was Blue CRUSH instrumental in shifting resources from urban policy to the police – not a novelty in recent US history – but its intensive technological requirements created the necessity to transfer massive funds to two corporations: because of technology, policing itself can become an instrument of accumulation.\textsuperscript{12} Second, with regard to racial politics, the geography of Blue CRUSH action is both uneven and contradictory. Aggressive ‘hot-spot’ policing is performed almost exclusively in Black neighbourhoods – the Mid-South Peace and Justice Center has denounced the role of Blue CRUSH for territorial stigmatisation (interview with an activist). This confirms how ‘evidence-based’ and scientific arguments have long been used to increase police presence in minority and low-income neighbourhoods.\textsuperscript{13} Blue CRUSH cameras, instead, are almost exclusively allocated to business, touristic and affluent areas of the city (Figure 3), in part because wealthy communities have been buying cameras for their neighbourhoods (member of Memphis Crime Commission, interview; Mayor’s Weekly Digest Bulletin, 17/06/2016). This shows, on the one hand, how crime control has become an instrument for building an image of a ‘safe’ city for tourists and city-users; and marks, on the other, a novelty with respect to the long-held notion of certain ‘local communities as urban villages characterised by dense networks of personal social

\textsuperscript{12} Revolving doors have happened too: an MPD officer among those who selected SkyCop is now VP of Sales of SkyCop. See www.skycopinc.com/about and www.dailyhelmsman.com/archives/who-watches-the-watchmen/article_c1897253-79ea-5417-a8b7-c6aaed21b66.html [accessed 20/01/2018].

\textsuperscript{13} See, e.g., how CompStats has racialised zero tolerance policing in New York (Jefferson, 2016) and the role of mapping in ‘encoding racial governance’ in the Juvenile Court Projects in Seattle (Brown, 2017). See also Hinton (2016, 17-26).
ties’ (Sampson, 2002, 219) that need no policing\textsuperscript{14} – an issue which links to the next topic.

**Community: from social work to self-defence**

‘Community’ now reigns as the modern elixir for much of what allegedly ails American society (Sampson, 2002, 213).

The concept of community has a long history in US discourses about social disorder and crime control. In the 1930s the ‘community approach’ to crime was promoted by local governments trying to conceptualise the city not ‘as a battlefield of war [on crime] but rather as a network of social agencies that could foster a safe and satisfying civic life’ (Appier, 2005, 192). While under the hegemony of penal-welfarism after the Second World War, community approaches were largely replaced by ‘professional’ approaches led by police (see Garland, 2001, 27-51), the decline of the New Deal consensus brought about a new focus on ‘community’. The characteristic nature of such new emphasis can be exemplified by the cases of community policing and ‘crime tips’.

In the theoretical model of community policing, which emerged as a response to the crisis of the professional model of policing, not only does police work focus on problem-solving at the neighbourhood level; it involves citizens in the decision-making process to ‘reach a shared understanding of local public safety’ (Thomas and Burns, 2005, 74). In practice, community policing in the USA has taken on quite different meanings, being associated with a wide range of practices, such as aggressive order maintenance, nuisance abatement and problem-oriented policing (Goetz and Mitchell, 2003), for both organisational reasons, such as the difficulty in convincing officers to act as ‘social workers’ (ibid.), and because of the difficulty in implementing social prevention amid local political and institutional frameworks oriented toward repression (Tulumello, 2017a). In Memphis, the MPD is engaged in two practices which are considered community policing, the Neighborhood Watch\textsuperscript{15} and the Community Outreach program, designed after the Blue CRUSH with the aim to ‘communicate to community in general that you’re changing the strategy’ (former MPD consultant, interview). In these programs, however, no co-decisional process is institutionalised. In the words of a high-ranking MPD official, Community Outreach is the space ‘where the community has an opportunity to say anything that’s on their mind’ (interview) – meaning that officers are free to decide whether or not their actions will be

\textsuperscript{14} At least since Jane Jacobs’ *Death and Life* (1994 [1961]) the idea that control needs be provided by the ‘natural proprietors’ of streets, that is, residents and business owners has become mainstream. Berman has shown as Jacobs’ ‘pastoral’ neighbourhood was quintessentially White and middle-class (1988 [1982], 324).

\textsuperscript{15} A national program that encourages organised groups of citizens to take responsibility for watching their neighbourhood, reporting suspicious activities and distributing information among their neighbours.
influenced by the feedback. In this context, the discursive use of community seems to be instrumental in reducing ‘pushbacks’ (in the words of a former MPD consultant, interviewer) to aggressive policing tactics deployed under Blue CRUSH (cf. Tulumello, 2017a).

‘Coproduction’ is a concept used to advocate the use of ‘crime tips’ (Cook, 2011). In Memphis, two crime tip systems exist: Cyber Watch, part of Blue CRUSH; and Crime Stoppers, which is managed by a non-profit organisation and offers rewards to tippers. The latter is particularly interesting for its discourse about community. On the website, ‘unsolved crimes’ are listed together with CCTV images of the criminals. The website states no taxpayer funds are used (private donors fund the rewards) and summarises the ‘benefits’:

- A greater awareness in the community that there is a crime problem.
- A willingness by the community to fight back against crime if it is given the opportunity and motivation.
- Improved relationships between police, media, and the community.

The individual tipper can feel part of a double community, the local community ‘with a crime problem’, and the community of crime ‘fighters’. Community, here, becomes a space of inclusion and exclusion, defined in relation of otherness (see Young, 1990, 12) to the criminal visualised by CCTVs. Lippert and Wilkinson (2010) commented on this otherness, showing how these systems, backed up by the illusion of objectivity provided by technological devices, identify ‘crime’ with certain crimes; and construct the criminalisation of certain offenders – in the case of Crime Stoppers, crime basically equals Black and Brown men wanted for business robbery.

In Memphis, the return of the community has taken on very different discursive devices when compared to the past. While early community approaches emphasised state-promoted social work and local networks (Appier, 2005), the new emphasis lies in ideas of self-organisation, communication with authorities and ‘coproduction’; and rather than the creation of ‘meaningful’ civic life (ibid.), the goals vary from the justification of aggressive policing to the promotion of informing. Contradictions emerge once the discourse around community is analysed in light of racial politics. We saw above how the traditional idea of (White, affluent) communities as the place of social control is made more complex by the use of technological devices for crime prevention. The discourse is radically different when it focuses on minority communities, as exemplified by the following quote from an interview with an MPD official:

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I envision a community where the community is policing itself and you don’t need law enforcement to come in because they are not allowing individuals to sell dope by their homes or harbour fugitives... or harbour any type of ill activity that spills out in the community.

This community – that of majority-Black neighbourhoods where the crime rate is high – is, firstly, defined as the space for potential self-organisation and cooperation with law enforcement; and, then, blamed for being the ‘harbour’ of illegal activities – thereby justifying repression. These movements, of protection and activation, of request to step forward and blaming, are revealing of the governmentalities of crime government under neoliberal and austerity rule, of the way contradictory presence/absence patterns of the state find justification in the capacity and faults of ‘communities’ divided by race and class.

Grant making: the geography of policy from needs to best bid

Among the choices that a government has to make is the spatial geography of public policy, which can be studied by way of focussing on the resulting distribution in space of resources and services (cf. Soja, 2010). The geography of public policy is both a component and a driver of socio-spatial justice – e.g. redistributive policies invest in the least favoured areas to reduce disparities, while trickle-down policies invest in the most competitive areas expecting wealth to leak toward other areas. I have previously shown the contradiction of the geography of Blue CRUSH surveillance with the geography of security priorities, for a mix of political decisions to invest in the touristic and commercial areas – in accordance with the trickle-down development policies of the city – and the varying capacity of different communities to invest in their self-protection.

The shift away from the conscious decision on the geography of public policy is exemplified by the Neighborhood Crime Prevention Grant, created in 2013 to spend part of the revenue collected through traffic tickets issued by red light cameras. Neighbourhood groups can apply to fund small safety projects (up to $2,500) – security cameras, lighting and clean-up, and awareness events are the most common initiatives.

The guidelines of the program emphasise the fact that higher priority is given to ‘projects/activities serving low and moderate-income groups, living in high-crime areas’ (Division of Parks & Neighborhoods, 2014, 2). However, the highest density of projects is located in the district of Midtown, one of the districts in the city where crime is lowest (Figure 4).

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17 The grant was managed until 2016 by the department of Parks and Neighborhoods and has since moved to MPD.
18 I have analysed 46 projects funded during the first 5 cycles (2013-2016; ~120,000$ total) (data City of Memphis, acquired via FOIA request).
Beyond (rather than?) a political decision to favour certain areas (such as the Blue CRUSH cameras), the use of grants themselves determined this output. Projects are evaluated according to: need for the project, applicant capacity, project quality and operational feasibility (ibid., 5). The ‘applicant capacity’ item requests that applications show that ‘the agency has sufficient capacity to carry out the project/activity’, that is, ‘possess[es] sufficient experience to carry out the proposed project/activities and past grant experiences’, as well as ‘fiscal capacity and group infrastructure to implement the project/activities’. On the map, a concentration of projects is visible in the Cooper-Young neighbourhood, a majority White, affluent district in the core of Midtown. In the last round of funding in 2016, the neighbourhood was awarded six grants, thanks to the idea of ‘zoning’ the neighbourhood and writing six applications. According to the neighbourhood newspaper, cameras are expected to reduce ‘by 50%’ petty thefts from porches and cars, and burglaries (Schebler, 2016) – not really the main concerns with crime in Memphis.

At the same time, the most affluent neighbourhoods in east Memphis have ignored the program, submitting few applications. Two tentative explanations can be brought forward. Firstly, the small endowment of the grants seems to have been of little interest to neighbourhoods that had written cheques for thousands of dollars to buy Blue CRUSH cameras:

I feel like communities that are richer or have more resources or that sort of thing [...] don’t reach out for our funds as much as organisations that are less rich... Because they may have decided they can use their own money or they have decided that that’s not enough money; because, say, they have a bigger purpose, they have decided they wanna go big; so they are putting all their own resources into it (project manager, interview).

Secondly, neighbourhood cohesion seems an important factor together with wealth in determining project-writing capacity: Cooper-Young and most Midtown neighbourhoods are ‘liberal’ communities undergoing recent gentrification processes, where community pride and organisation are particularly strong.

This conclusion adds some dimensions to existing commentaries on the effects of the shift from policies toward grant-making. Grants tend to create ‘hindrances’ (Myers and Goddard, 2013) for community development by increasing bureaucratic requirements, obliging local actors to focus on priorities defined by funding agencies rather than community needs, and constituting an unstable landscape of available resources (ibid.) – these problems are present in the work of social policy departments in the city of Memphis, which rely almost exclusively on state and federal grants for their action due to local austerity (cf. Tulumello, 2017a). The case of the Neighborhood Crime Prevention Grant adds a spatial dimension, showing how grant-making can become spatial inequality by design. Rather than supporting local communities considered most in need,
schemes of this kind favour those parts of the city that already have the capacity and experience to write and implement projects.

![Figure 4. Initiatives funded by the Neighborhood Crime Prevention Grant compared with the distribution of wealth. Own elaboration of data City of Memphis (MIMEO and http://memegis.maps.arcgis.com/home/index.html, accessed 20/01/2018).](image)

**‘Mission creep’: police as the state’s last resort**

The growth of the police department is not a phenomenon of the last decade. Police services have been growing much faster than in other US cities since the 1970s and the size of the MPD has doubled between 1989 and 2006 (Warren, 2015) – consistent with national trends of White flight and stigmatisation/policing of inner cities. Recently, the Blue CRUSH implementation has driven the growth of MPD: between 2006 and 2011, the budget of the MPD increased by 11% (cf. Figure 2), the number of sworn officers increased by a fifth,\(^1\) and overtime was widely used for preventive patrols (former MPD consultant and activist from Mid-South Peace and Justice Center, interviews). After 2011, the number of sworn officers decreased because of attrition and resignations due to reduced benefits, and is once more at the same level it was in 2006 resulting in the billboards by MPA (see Introduction). Irrespective of staffing trends, funds are never enough for the police department. During 2011-2015, the growth of the MPD budget (+2.5%; cf. Figure 2) was driven by investments in technological

equipment: body-wear cameras, in-car viewing systems and an updated radio system (high-ranking MPD official, interview). According to an activist from the Mid-South Peace and Justice Center (interviewed), ‘there’s never a scenario where they are not asking for more money. Ever.’ When crime goes up, calls are made to invest more in the police; when crime goes down, it is said police forces should grow to keep up the good job.

In addition, since the 1980s the federal government has provided funding and equipment to police forces under the provisions for the ‘war on drugs’ and, after this, the ‘war on terror’ (Harwood, 2014) – this happened in counter trend to the downloading of austerity in other fields – boosting the shift of local politics toward policing from the top down. The MPD has become a militarised machine. For instance, during the summer of 2016, after the Pulse shooting in Orlando and the shootings of police officers in Dallas and Baton Rouge, heavily armed squads in tactical gear were deployed in congested traffic locations – a measure to ensure ‘community safety’ in the words of MPD officials.20

As with many other places, the militarisation of the MPD has meant increased mistrust in poor and majority-minority communities. Despite the idea of some of my interviewees (an MPD official, a member of the Crime Commission and a former MPD consultant) that people in Black communities ‘like police presence’, the picture is more complex. It is true that, in some Black neighbourhoods, some groups – especially the elderly – have been requesting more police presence against violence.21 In other places, other groups have a different perception of police action, which an activist from the Mid-South Peace and Justice Center, interviewed, defined as ‘occupation model’. Indeed, occupation is in the mind of Blue CRUSH and zero tolerance advocates:

I mean, there’s a lot of gangs and drug related things. [...] Blue CRUSH or data-driven [policing], may not be [effective], but proactive policing? You know, you know the neighbourhood, you know where the craps happened. If you’re not gonna do something about it besides just waiting until every call comes in, you’re not going to improve anything. So you got to get to know the neighbourhood, know the people. The neighbours are got to be willing to talk. You know, you’ve got to really saturate an area to improve... prevent bad stuff from happen[ing] (member of the Crime Commission, interview; emphasis mine).

21 I refer to observant participation carried out in Klondike-Smokey City in the context of the participatory development of a local comprehensive plan – in partnership between the Community Development Corporation and the University of Memphis (work coordinated by Antonio Raciti and Laura Saija).
So, you know, we may deploy extra resources to Foote Homes [a public housing neighbourhood, where a 15-year-old girl had been killed few days before the interview] to avoid another 15-year-old, 7-year-old or 5-year-old being gunned down by some kind of senseless gun violence. Ok? [...] I am sure there may be someone in Foote Homes that says: ‘this is occupation!’ But we call it public safety, in the best interest of public safety (high-ranking MPD official, interview).

The city has recently used the ‘regulation of drug/gang-related lingering or loitering’ (Code of Ordinances, sec. 10-8-9) to enforce six ‘safety zones’ – massive deployment of police in ‘high crime’ and ‘gang’ areas –, the most evident version of the militarisation of Memphis. That all six safety zones are located in Black neighbourhoods should not come as a surprise.

I have elsewhere emphasised how in (many US cities like) Memphis, the preconditions for crime are generated in the absence of social and urban policy at the local, metropolitan, state and federal level (Tulumello, 2017a). Militarisation, as well as overall policy efforts of the local government, should be comprehended at this intersection. High crime rates, media communication that emphasises almost exclusively crime and the racialisation of public debates about crime generate public demands for safety; and the city, which in the context of low-intensity, long-term austerity has scarcely enough room to plan policy prevention in the long-term, is put under huge pressure to act quickly (ibid.). Zero tolerance is the ‘obvious’ answer, advocated by virtually all actors – as evident in the discussions following the MPA billboards (see Introduction), the Mayor’s Weekly Digest Bulletin or local press.

At the same time, however, the same interviewees that have been advocating that the number of officers should grow again to 2011 levels or more (a high-ranking MPD official, a former MPD consultant and the chair of the Crime Commission) are aware that dealing with these problems, including poverty, homelessness and mental health issues, which produce the root causes of violent crime, is beyond police capacity. And they are also aware of the fact that state retrenchment in other areas have obliged the MPD to deal with many direct consequences of such problems – the MPD has developed a number of ‘community’ programs of all sorts, from attempts to build trust in the police, to charity programs, to the Crisis Intervention Team, a partnership that aims to de-escalate violent events involving people facing mental health challenges.

This double trend – the exponential growth of the police department with its aggressive approach, balanced by attempts at creating occasions for social outreach – makes Memphis a particularly interesting case to (re)think general trends of transformation of security policymaking in times of neoliberalism and austerity. On one hand, it confirms the existence of contradictory dimensions – zero tolerance and community partnerships – in the emerging cultures of control (cf. Garland,
2001). On the other, once we consider these dimensions under the light of changing institutional and political arrangements, it is quite evident how the ‘community’ side is systematically side-stepped by repressive measures. In the framework of budget and political priorities shifting away from social policy and toward policing – and from police toward technological devices and private corporations – social problems become security issues (cf. Tulumello, 2017a, 24-25). A former MPD consultant, interviewed, called this process a ‘mission creep’ for the MPD (and police departments around the US). Mission creep has two direct implications for public policy. First, many issues are dealt with inefficiently – e.g. pilot projects of alternative sentencing for youths condemned for non-violent offenses have proved to be cheaper and more effective in preventing recidivism than imprisonment (activist from Mid-South Peace and Justice Center, interview). And, second, mission creep jeopardises police work itself, already under strain as a result of the crisis of the professional model: police officers, who are trained to enforce the law, end up being the only street-level bureaucrats in entire areas of the city (cf. Hinton, 2016); and are expected to perform tasks they are not capable of in contexts where they are perceived as threatening presences. Whether this, together with the absurdly high number of contacts between officers and population in certain neighbourhoods, can help explain police violence together with (if not better than) the unaccountability of violent events is a question that deserves specific research.

Conclusions

Memphis is not exceptional to urban USA. The low-intensity, long-term austerity described here is the reality of many cities, particularly inner, minority-majority ones – possibly more diffused than Peck’s catastrophe austerity (2012)? Neither exceptional, nor ordinary, Memphis is ‘paradigmatic’ (Flyvbjerg, 2006) of processes of neoliberalisation in the field of urban security or, in other words, a case where austerity under neoliberalisation is especially relevant to understand policy transformation – particularly in the context of changing socio-economic relationships in the US urban South. I shall not conclude by generalising present global trends from those observed in Memphis; comparative research would be necessary to verify the extent to which similar processes are reproduced, variegated or contradicted in other places – as research on security policy diffusion has been doing (see Lidskog and Persson, 2012; Hier and Walby, 2014). Rather, my aim is to understand the theoretical meaning of such trends as a ‘pure’ local version of global transformations and hence unravel the potential, yet extant, implications of the generalisation of such global transformations in the urban sphere.

22 Numerous hints exist of the complexity of the geography of local austerity. Consider, for instance, government austerity and growing social polarisation in ‘well-off’ cities such San Francisco, Los Angeles or Seattle, which have not suffered fiscal crises recently (Donald et al., 2014, 8-11); or the findings of Lobao and Adua (2011), which show how austerity tends to emerge from ‘high capacity’ governments first.
The processes described here deeply affect the realm of politics: from the depoliticisation embedded in the ‘belief in technological solutions to intractable social problems’ (Crary, 2013, 41), to discrimination and racialisation embedded in zero tolerance and aggressive policing. The deployment of cameras in White neighbourhoods versus ‘safety zones’ in Black neighbourhoods is evidence of the way urban security has become a means to govern and reproduce socio-economic relationships (cf. Simon, 2007; Camp and Heatherton, 2016; Hinton, 2016): reassuring the rich, policing the (racialised) poor.

Through the focus on neoliberalisation and austerity, I intended to link political dimensions with local institutional practice; connecting scholarship on racial politics with more institutionalist (often constructivist) approaches – e.g. Garland’s discussion (2001) of state adaptation amid the emergence of new ‘cultures’ of crime control. Beyond the restructuring of politics, what happens to public policy, intended as a course of action stemming from conscious choice by the government? If we take seriously the goals stated by policymakers, the practices analysed show a number of problematic issues, which make it hard to distinguish any conscious course of action moved by intentional choices. First, technology, from a means to an end, becomes an end in itself: the fact that it is effective or not in pursuing the stated goals is never verified. Second, despite massive investments in police, the state claims it has no resources to ensure safety in those neighbourhoods where crime problems are higher and ends up calling on ‘communities’ to become responsible for their self-defence. In Memphis and more generally in the USA and the Anglophone world – see the British ‘community safety’ (Gilling, 2001) – ‘community’ tends to become a space of contradiction: it is rhetorically affirmed as the scale for policy delivery, at the same time as it becomes the main argument for state retrenchment in those areas most in need of public action. Third, through grant-making the state can disengage from the decision on the spatial allocation of resources, with the possible result that the geography of public policy plainly contradicts its stated goals. And, fourth, while policymakers entitle the police to deal with the problems public policy is retrenching from, they create the very conditions to make a police officer’s job untenable. The blatant contradiction of (stated) goals with (actual) effects brings us back to the political dimension: it suggests that goals may often not be those declared and confirms that privatisation and state reduction (in some fields) tend to become goals per se in an ideological environment shaped by neoliberal ideas (cf. Herbert, 1999, 166).

All in all, we have seen complex patterns of continuity and discontinuity with long-term trends and hegemonic ideas of crime control and urban security, confirming that the implementation of the neoliberal project, even in places where it is particularly advanced, is shaped through ambiguous governmentalities – as particularly evident in discourses about community – and contradictory policies more than through specific policy arrangements. These issues, together, constitute what I consider the central paradox of urban security under austerity rule and
Neoliberalisation of Security, Austerity and the ‘End of Public Policy’

neoliberalisation: the more security is conceived of as the core goal of public action, the less it becomes a matter of public policy in the governmental practice. Urban security is proclaimed to be what public policy must attempt to achieve, but it becomes one of the main drivers of the ‘end of public policy’, progressively replaced, beyond privatisation and retrenchment, by contradictory movements in absence of any conscious, and explicit, choice.

In conclusion, this conceptualisation of the ‘end of public policy’ can be used as an analytic instrument to understand (places like) Memphis; but can also constitute a scenario of possible futures embedded in recent transformations elsewhere. While the neoliberalisation of urban policy is especially advanced in the USA, some have suggested that, elsewhere, it is a process among many that help to explain current urban transformation; and that the full-scale deployment of austerity is a recent process (Baptista, 2013; Le Galès, 2016; Tulumello, 2016a). As such, the case of Memphis can be used to raise a ‘warning’ about what the consequences of present action could be. The full package of US urban security practices could hardly be sold to, say, the average European city nowadays – see, for example, how urban security has been kept solidly as a matter of public policy in Lisbon (Tulumello, 2017a). However, against the background of post-crisis political economies of austerity, European style (Blyth, 2013; Seymour, 2014), hints exist of shifts in the direction we have described in this article. It is my contention that not only do paradigmatic cases such Memphis help us improve our theoretical knowledge of the matter; they also help raise awareness of what the ultimate effects of incipient phenomena may soon be elsewhere.

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