The Evolution of Portuguese – Chinese Relations and the Question of Macao from 1949 to 1968

Moisés Silva Fernandes

Introduction

It is usually assumed that there is a need for formal diplomatic relations between two countries for bilateral interaction to take place. However, Portugal and Mainland China did not establish formal diplomatic relations for nearly 30 years, that is, from 1949 until 1979. Both countries were able, nonetheless, to carry out at an informal level political interaction in Macao. In order to reach this status both countries had to restrain from their highly nationalist official stands on Macao. In this paper we intend to provide theoretical framework for this special relationship and then to analyse its historical evolution.

Conceptual Framework of Analysis

In International Relations Theory it is usually assumed that two inter-
national actors are able to interact with each other only when they establish formal diplomatic relations. In this paper, however, we argue that even without formal diplomatic relations two countries may be able interact to preserve their interests through an informal modus vivendi. Indeed, the asymmetry of power in Macao between Mainland China and Portugal was unquestionable. However, China did not use its considerable power to change Macao's status. In fact, China moved always in such a way as to prevent the collapse of the Macao Portuguese Administration.

The Historical Evolution of the Relationship

Portuguese relations with Mainland China may be said to have gone through three phases between 1949 and 1968. Not surprisingly, these have been shaped by domestic political developments in Portugal, Mainland China, and in the international system.

The first phase was marked by Salazar's staunch refusal to recognise the Beijing regime. With the imminent collapse of the Guomindang regime, senior Portuguese officials, from the Foreign and Overseas Offices and the Macao Portuguese Administration, and Britain pressured Salazar to recognise the new Chinese regime, but he refused. ¹ Portuguese-Chinese diplomatic relations were thus broken with little ceremony.

Why did Salazar refuse to recognise the Beijing regime? Above any-

¹ Moisés Silva Fernandes, Política Externa Desequilibrada: Do Isolamento à “Cooperação Pura” nas Relações entre Portugal e a República Popular da China (RPC), 1949 – 1979 (Unbalanced Foreign Policy: From Isolation to “Pure Cooperation” in Relations Between Portugal and the People’s Republic of China, 1949 – 1979) (forthcoming)
thing else, his staunch opposition to communism. Based on his rural, conservative, and catholic view of the world, Salazar simply refused to recognise any communist government. Moreover, he knew that Macao had always been a flag of convenience for successive Chinese dynasties and regimes. Although Portugal claimed at an official level sovereignty over Macao, in fact the Beijing regime controlled Macao’s political, economic, financial, and commercial sectors. Local “representatives” of Mainland China’s interests persuaded and influenced, on behalf of the Chinese central and Guangdong provincial governments, local Portuguese administrators on various public policy issues in the enclave and on Portuguese overseas policy towards Macao. Third, Salazar knew that the British government would act as a “protecting power”\(^1\) of Macao to avoid any political upheavals or a change in Hong Kong’s status.

It is well known that the then Chinese Ministry of Trade founded the Nanguang (NóM Kwóng ( Trading Company, on August 28, 1949, in order to exert influence over local Portuguese administrators, under the pretext to enhance trade links between Macao and the People’s Republic of China and vice-versa. Despite the latter claim, Nanguang played a crucial role in breaching, with the connivance of the Macao Portuguese Administration, the Western embargo against Mainland China following her military intervention in Korea. According to a Nanguang’s official publication:

“Early at its founding, the company got very few export business to handle; instead through (an) individual way of trading, it mainly dealt (with the) purchase of special goods and materials required specifically by circumstances (in) Mainland China at that time”.

Moreover, during the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) mop up operations in Guangdong province in late 1949, the new Chinese political and military leaders gave political assurances to the Macao government that the enclave’s status quo would prevail. General Ye Jianying (Yeh Chien-ying), then head of the Chinese Military Affairs Control Commission, as well first secretary of the South China Sub – Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party, governor of Guangdong, first secretary of the Guangzhou Municipal Party Committee, and mayor of Guangzhou, appointed, on October 27, 1949, Dr. Ke Lin (O Lon): “to treat discreetly with our authorities all matters that are of common interest between Macao and Guangzhou”. On the other hand, General Wang Zhu (Wang Chu), commander of the Zhongshan military subdistrict, presented, through a third party, to governor Albano Rodrigues de Oliveira the new Chinese leaders’ policy towards Macao. This message stated unequivocally:

“1st, that the Chinese authorities will respect Macao’s neutrality and


that no one from the People's Liberation Army will attempt to enter Macao either in uniform or armed. 2nd, all fluvial and other types of communication links between Macao and China will continue as before, that the new Chinese authorities expect that the "Overseas Chinese" will be treated well by the Portuguese authorities, and that they will not ban peaceful demonstrations in support of the revolution. 3rd, the Portuguese authorities who wish to visit China are welcomed.¹

Portuguese—Chinese relations were so good in Macao, that much needed aviation equipment for Mainland China was sent from Macao to Guangzhou. Apparently, with the acquiescence of the Macao Portuguese Administration, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) underground organization in Macao was able to ship by boat aviation equipment, worth around USD $3 million, to Guangzhou, on January 24, 1950.² Unlike the British government who refused to handover to Mainland China airplanes belonging to the Guomindang's China Aviation Company, the Macao Portuguese administration consented that equipment belonging to the Macao Air Transport Company and to the China Aviation Company be sent to Mainland China.³


² "'Miss Macao' Airliner Hijacked: Assets Left in Hong Kong by Two Aviation Companies Protected", Aviation Today (Mainland China), no. 12 (September 1998), 69.

Bilateral contacts were reinforced with the appointment of He Xian (Ho Yin), chairman of the already very influential Macao Chinese Chamber of Commerce, as member of the then Macao Legislative Council "as the representative of the Chinese community," on August 25, 1955. Mainland China, on the other hand, accorded He Xian the status of "special guest" at the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference from the second session of its national committee, which was held in Beijing between January 30 and February 7, 1956, onwards. Besides this special status, Chairman Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai received He Xian and Cui Deqi (Chui Tak-kei), another prominent Macao Chinese leader. These contacts were so good that Sir Alexander Grantham, governor of Hong Kong, between 1947 and 1957, stated in his political memoirs:

"I always thought that the Macao government, or at any rate some of the personnel, had better liaison or side-door contacts with the Chinese authorities than we had, despite the fact Portugal did not recognize Beijing and that a diplomatic representative of the Nationalist government resided in Macao. In Hong Kong we virtually had none. I think the reason for this was that the Anglo-Saxon is more rigid and aloof and less subtle

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(4) Lei Pang Chu, op. cit.

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than the Latin".  

During this phase, China made also, for the first time, a public statement about Macao status. Due to some public pressure applied by leading Macanese, the Portuguese Administration decided to organize the Macao’s fourth centennial and to appoint an organizing committee in January 1955. The Chinese government did not react immediately. It waited until October 1955, when it launched a vigorous propaganda campaign against the planned celebrations. Moreover, when the governor of Hong Kong visited informally Beijing, Premier Zhou Enlai told Governor Alexander Grantham that the celebrations had to be cancelled, otherwise there would be problems in Hong Kong and Macao. As soon as the propaganda war started and the British informed the Portuguese government of Premier Zhou Enlai’s political intentions, the celebrations were cancelled. The most important outcome of this public rift was that Mainland China stated for the first time that Macao was “Chinese territory” and warned that “(t) he fact that Macao has not yet been returned to China does not mean that the Chinese people can tolerate the long continuation of the oc-

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2. The proposal to celebrate Macao’s fourth centennial was made by Jack Maria Braga, a leading Macanese figure born in Hong Kong, in a lecture delivered at the Lisbon Geographical Society “On the Projection of the Portuguese in Far East Through Macao”, on April 30, 1952. This lecture was published in this learned society’s journal Boletim da Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa, série 70, nos. 4 to 6, (April / June 1952), pp. 79 – 97. Braga’s proposal gathered immediate support from Salazar’s government, who placed some pressure on the Macao Portuguese Administration to hold the celebrations.

3. The celebration program and members’ list of the organizing committee were published in “Portaria da repartição do gabinete do governador Joaquim Marques Esparteiro, de 3 de Janeiro de 1955” (Decree from the Office of Governor Joaquim Marques Esparteiro, of January 3, 1955) Boletim Oficial de Macau (Macao Official Gazette), no. 2, (January 8, 1955), pp. 15 – 16.
cupation of Macao”. However, it did not do anything at all to alter Macao’s status.

The second phase may be called the era of local rapprochement with the Beijing regime and, at the same time, of gradual rupture with the nationalists in Taiwan. The heavy constraints placed on the enclave because of the absence of formal relations with the Beijing regime led the Macao Portuguese Administration to engage in a policy of constructive engagement and rapprochement with Mainland China. Three key decisions were made. First, the banning of anti-PRC activities in Macao, on September 3, 1963. Second, the cancellation of a broadcasting license to a Canadian media group to set-up an English-language private radio station in Macao with extensive links to the Guomindang. Third, the shutdown Taiwan’s office in Macao, in March 1965.

The Portuguese government was willing to make some overtures towards Mainland China because the latter had shown a steady interest in improving relations with the Macao Portuguese Administration and Portugal. In 1959, the Chinese central government invited Alberto Pacheco

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Jorge, Member of Parliament for Macao in the Portuguese National Assembly, and his wife to visit China. Salazar authorised the trip. During his 28-day private visit, Alberto Pacheco Jorge noticed that there was no propaganda in the official media against Portugal and her presence in Macao. Moreover, he was received by Marshal Chen Ye, Deputy Premier and Foreign Affairs Minister, who told him that: "the government of China has in great consideration and looks with greater empathy Macao than Hong Kong and expected that the Macao government had understood such circumstance." 17

A second "private visit" to Mainland China was organised at the end of 1959. This time, however, the Macao delegation was much bigger, and it included two Portuguese military officers and three local prominent civilians. The military officers, one from the Portuguese Navy and another from the Army, were NATO's first officers ever to visit China.1 Once again, Salazar authorised the trip. The delegation was received by Marshal Chen Yi and Liao Chengzhi, chairman of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission, on January 3, 1960, in the Foreign Affairs Ministry. At this meeting, Marshal Yi told his guests that the Chinese government needed a peaceful international environment to foster the country's development. Moreover, he referred to the expulsion of overseas Chinese from Indonesia and the border dispute between China and India, and argued for a peaceful settlement of both issues. Regarding Sino-American relations, Marshal Yi argued that the main obstacle to its improvement was

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the presence of the 7th American Fleet in the Taiwan Strait. He also referred to the Tibet question, and argued that India was wrong in granting political asylum to the Dalai Lama and in using Tibet "to make propaganda against China".  

It was in a context of rumours about India’s pending military takeover of Goa, that the Portuguese Overseas Minister, Adriano Moreira, tried to get Mainland China’s support for Portugal’s feeble position. In return, China would have access to the Mormugão Railway. This would open a second Chinese front on the Southwest part of the subcontinent, at a time when China and India were involved in a dispute over the latter’s North-east frontier. The plan proved to be, however, unrealistic. The Chinese Premier, Zhou Enlai, politely refused the Portuguese offer. His pretext was that Nehru would not use force to settle the Goa question.

Right after the Goa debacle, Portuguese decision-makers were for a moment forced to rethink their foreign and overseas policies. The impetus came from Salazar himself. In a major address to the Portuguese National Assembly on Goa, the Prime Minister hinted at a foreign policy review. Moreover, he argued, in broad terms, that Portugal ought to reduce its dependency on her traditional allies and strengthen instead her ties with

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1. “Para fazer propaganda contra a China”, in Ch’iê Leng Seong, Viagens de Um Mês por Terras Encantadoras (A Trip for a Month in Enchanted Places), unpublished private paper written by the editor of the pro-Communist Macao daily Dazhong bao (Tai Chung Pao), held by the family of Eng. Fernando da Silva Nunes, (May 15, 1960), p. 86.


Brazil and Spain and qualify her participation in the United Nations. Next day, in the midst of great emotions and several highly nationalistic speeches, the National Assembly approved a resolution that fully supported Salazar’s position and called for a foreign policy review.

Shortly after, Franco Nogueira, Foreign Affairs Minister, drafted a major policy review private paper for Prime Minister Salazar, without any intake from senior Portuguese diplomats. This document called for the strengthening of political and economic ties with Brazil, Spain, and the European Common Market in order to compensate for the split with Portugal’s traditional allies: the United States, the United Kingdom, and NATO. It called also for a decrease in Portuguese membership fees in NATO and for a substantial increase in the rent paid by the U.S. for its military base in the Azores. In addition, it envisaged the establishment of diplomatic relations with two communist countries: Poland and the People’s Republic of China. In Asia, it argued for the strengthening of ties with Japan, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand, and for an accommodation with the People’s Republic of China over Macao and Indonesia concerning East Timor. Regarding Africa, it called for the adoption of a policy of “divide and rule”, that is, the exploitation of local rivalries between Dakar and Conakry and between Kinshasa and Brazzaville to delay the Guinea – Bissauan and Angolan issues, respectively; and for the establishment of secret military pacts and economic arrangements with the

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governments of Rhodesia and South Africa to develop Mozambique. Finally, regarding Israel and the Arab States it envisaged a rapprochement with Israel, in part, to get aid for the development of Angola and Mozambique, and to rebuff hostile positions adopted by Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt regarding Portuguese colonial policy.

One of the great surprises of this bold policy review, was what Portugal would be willing to offer Beijing in return for the establishment of diplomatic relations. According to this memorandum:

"... it should not be excluded the possibility of diplomatically recognising China, based on neighbourly relations. This last case will depend on China’s acceptance, which is not deemed to be hard, especially if it is followed up by negotiations over Macao as a free port, a condominium whose features remain to be decided, or even a change in sovereignty, with the maintenance of symbolic ties with Portugal". ¹

To condition Salazar's decision on how to proceed on these controversial policy issues, the Lisbon daily Diário Popular (People's Daily) published an editorial praising Mainland China and urging the establishment of diplomatic relations between Portugal and Mainland China in order to recover Goa. ² Most likely, this editorial was published under the instruc-


² "China milenária" (Millenary China), Diário Popular (Portugal), Year 20, No.6.916, (Janeiro 12, 1962), p.16.
tions of Franco Nogueira to enhance the acceptance of his paper by
Salazar.

Although this policy review was not implemented, the Portuguese
central government would, however, eventually agree to demands made by
the Macao Portuguese Administration to accommodate Mainland China’s
interests in the enclave. After an incident between Portuguese and Chi-
nese communist military vessels, that led to the detention of seven Guo-
mindang “sailors” (secret agents) in Macao’s territorial waters, on June
28, 1963, governor António Lopes dos Santos started to have meetings
with local “representatives” of the Chinese community aligned with Bei-
ing. According to the former governor:

“Immediately after the occurrence of the incident..., while talking
to Ho Yin (He Xian (I realised the great advantage of starting contacts
with Mr. O Cheng – ping (Ke Zhengping (, virtual representative of the
People’s Republic of China (PRC ( in Macao and manager of Núm
Kwông (Nanguang ( Trading Company, the commercial outpost of the
PRC in Macao. The contacts took place from then on but with a reserved
character and in the official residence of Santa Sancha. I always consid-
ered them of the highest importance. For about three years, the best per-
sonal relationship was maintained amongst ourselves, although obviously
on an unofficial basis, and with the full knowledge of the Overseas Minis-
ter and of Dr. Salazar. Other than that, Mr. O Cheng – ping (Ke Zheng-
ping) only contacted the governor in cases considered to be serious, ma-
inly related to the activities of the Taiwan consular office (Special
Commissioner’s Office for Macao (, or when he received instructions from
the Guangdong government, usually through letters written in Cantonese
and already translated into Portuguese, of which he was the holder, always addressed to 'Mr. António Lopes dos Santos’ by the Foreign Office of the Guangdong Government. During my tenure, three problems (the delivery of seven Guomindang agents to the Chinese communists, the granting of a broadcasting licence to a Canadian company with extensive links to Taiwan and the activities of the latter entity’s office in Macao (were raised with relative frequency by Mr. O Cheng – ping (Ke Zhengping) or Mr. Ho Yin (He Xian), who always came with Mr. Roque Choi, who explained them in Portuguese”.

Besides these liaisons, the Portuguese authorities accommodated many of Mainland China’s interests throughout these decades. In the beginning of the 1950s, the Portuguese central government interceded with the American government and CHINCOM, NATO’s secret committee in charge of following up the Western blockade against China, to reduce the economic and trade embargo against the latter. In the 1960s, it complied with requests from Mainland China to ban anticommmunist activities in Macao, which took place in 1963, and to closedown Taiwan’s office in Macao, in 1965.

The third phase took place during the Chinese “Cultural Revolu-

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1 António Adriano Faria Lopes dos Santos, “Da varanda de Santa Sancha; memórias do ex-governador António Adriano Faria Lopes dos Santos” (“From the Verandah of Santa Sancha; Memoirs of the Ex-Governor António Adriano Faria Lopes dos Santos”), Revista de Cultura (Macao), No. 16, (October/December 1991), p. 183.

2 The China Committee (CHINCOM) was set up after the Washington Five – Power Talks Conference, held in August 1952. Although Portugal was not invited to this conference, it became a member of CHINCOM due to British pressure. CHINCOM’s main role was to oversee the implementation of the Western embargo of “strategic materials” against Mainland China, North Korea, and North Vietnam.
tion”, which occurred between 1966 and 1968. The People’s Liberation Army protected Macao from a Red Guard invasion. However, the incidents that took place in Macao in 1966 and 1967 prostrated 〈ketóu〉 totally the local Portuguese administration before the local communists and Mainland China.

To prevent the invasion of Macao by rebellious Red Guards, General Huang Yongsheng 〈Huang Yung-sheng〉, Commander of the Guangzhou Military Region, replaced all 10,000 – border guards between Zhongshan and Macao and nearby islands by soldiers loyal to him and the Guangzhou Military High Command. In addition, he ordered the naval blockade of Macao by the PLA Navy. ① Upset by the stringent security measures undertaken by General Huang Yongsheng, violent clashes took place between the rebellious Red Guards and the PLA in the Zhongshan area and nearby islands. More people were killed and injured during these violent clashes than in the incidents in Macao between the Portuguese security forces and local maoists.

In return for the PLA’s “protection”, four senior officers of the Macao Portuguese administration were sent back to Lisbon. ② In addition, all Guomindang organisations in the enclave – namely, the Macao Chinese General Federation of Labor Unions, the Chinese Refugees Aid Association and Dr. Sun Yat-sen (Sun Zhongshan) (Memorial House,


② The Commander of the Portuguese Military Garrison, Mota Cerveira, the Head and Deputy Head of the Macao Police Department, Galvão de Figueiredo and Vaz Antunes, and the administrator of the Taipa Island Municipal Council, Rui Andrade.
among many others — were banned and closed. Moreover, the Macao Portuguese courts were utterly subdued, the British Consulate was closed down, and the Portuguese military garrison was forced to apologize to local Chinese organizations.¹

The only Macao institution that stood up to the local maoists was the Roman Catholic Church. Despite all the pressure applied by the Macao Portuguese administration and local maoist organizations upon the Roman Catholic Church, Bishop D. Paulo José Tavares refused to give in to the demands made by the maoists. They wanted the Roman Catholic schools to hire communist teachers to teach Mao Zedong Thought, an heresy to the Roman Catholic Church. This led inevitably to major policy rifts between the Diocese and the Portuguese Governor of Macao, Brigadier-General Nobre de Carvalho. The latter sided with the local maoists and attacked in public and in private Macao’s Bishop. The main Roman Catholic newspaper, O Clarim 〈The Bugle〉, and magazine, Religion o e Pátria 〈Religion and Motherland〉, were suspended for publishing uncensored pastoral messages. Governor Nobre de Carvalho demanded from the Portuguese central government the replacement of Bishop D. Paulo José Tavares by a more conciliatory one. However, Bishop Tavares was able to secure his position. He was backed — up by the Vatican and by prominent Macao Roman Catholic Church’s Chinese priests. Deeply influenced by the spirit of Vatican II, Bishop Tavares gradually “localised” the government of the Macao Diocese with Chinese priests who had an excellent

knowledge of local politics and were able to speak Portuguese, Cantonese and Mandarin, in the 1960s.

Anti-Portuguese activities by local maoist organizations stopped only in August 1968. An high level cadre from the Chinese Foreign Affairs Ministry arrived in Macao and instructed local maoist organizations to put an end to the public challenges to the Portuguese Administration. In addition, he reminded them that Beijing did not approve or sanction, for that matter, the activities of local communist organizations that tended to erode the power of the Macao Portuguese Administration. He added that the "one country, two systems" policy was in place and that the local Chinese organizations had to respect and obey it.

Conclusions

Despite the non-existence of formal diplomatic relations between Lisbon and Beijing, the Portuguese and Chinese governments were able to reach an informal modus vivendi that reflected both countries overall interests in Macao. In the case of Mainland China, its political, trade, economic, and financial interests in Macao. In the Portuguese case, the maintenance of the mythical unity and integration of the Portuguese empire. Due to the ambiguous nature of Macao’s status and in order to avoid overt clashes over it, both governments made very few statements on the enclave.
PORTUGUESE - CHINESE LANDMARKS

1514  – Less than a hundred years after Zheng He’s last naval expedition, the first Portuguese ships arrive at the Chinese coast near Guangdong province.

1555  – Portuguese start to settle Macao.

1849  – August  – Macao becomes de jure a Portuguese colony under the hardline policies of governor Ferreira do Amaral.

1887  – December  – Under British pressure, the Qing dynasty signs an unequal treaty with Portugal. In this treaty China recognises Macao as a Portuguese dominion.

1947  – April  – Portugal relinquishes all its extraterritorial rights in China.

1949  – October  – Founding of the People’s Republic of China. Salazar refuses to recognise the Beijing regime, despite political pressure from the British government, the Portuguese Foreign and Overseas ministries, and the Portuguese Administration of Macao.

1950  – January  – Around USD $3 million worth of aviation equipment, belonging to the Macao Air Transportation Company and China Aviation Company, is sent from Macao to Guangzhou with the help of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) underground in Macao and the consent of the Portuguese administration.

1952  – June  – Portuguese Overseas Minister, Sarmento Rodrigues, visits Macao. July / August  – Border clashes between Macao and China due to the tightening up of the Western embargo against Main-
land China and new legislation regarding gold trade in Macao.

1955 - January - After some public pressure by leading Macanese figures, namely Jack Maria Braga, the Portuguese administration appoints a committee of prominent Portuguese, Macanese, and Chinese to organize Macao's fourth centennial celebrations. October - The Macao Portuguese administration cancels the enclave's fourth centennial celebrations after Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai places heavy political pressure on the British and Portuguese governments to stop the event.

1959 - March / April - The Member of Parliament for Macao in the Portuguese National Assembly, Alberto Pacheco Jorge, and his wife, visit Beijing at the invitation of the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs. During their visit, they have a meeting with Marshal Chen Yi, Deputy Premier and Foreign Affairs Minister.

September - Border guards clash on Sino-Indian frontier.

1960 - January - A five-member Macao delegation visits China and has meetings with marshal Chen Yi and Liao Chengzhi, chairman of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission.

1961 - December - In order to avoid the military takeover of Goa by the Indian government, Adriano Moreira, Portuguese Overseas Minister, proposes to the Chinese central government the use of Mormugão railway in Goa to transport Chinese military in return for Chinese support on the question of Goa.

1962 - January - Salazar addresses the Portuguese National Assembly on the Goa debacle and talks in broad terms about a foreign policy review. Franco Nogueira, Foreign Affairs Minister, drafts a private memorandum that calls for major overseas and foreign policy reviews.
ing Mainland China it proposes the establishment of diplomatic relations between Lisbon and Beijing. In exchange for Mainland China’s acceptance of the Portuguese proposal, the Portuguese government would be willing to handover Macao to Beijing.

July / August – Mário Rosa, deputy editor of the Lisbon daily Diário Popular (People’s Daily), visits China and Beijing at the invitation of Guangming ribào. He is granted an interview by the last Chinese emperor, Henry Pu Yi, in the Great Hall of the People.

October – Sino-Indian War.

1963 – September – Anti-Mainland China activities are forbidden in Macao by the Portuguese Administration.

1964 – January / February – Right after the establishment of diplomatic relations between France and Mainland China, Franco Nogueira, Portuguese Foreign Affairs Minister, proposes to Salazar the recognition by the Portuguese government of the Beijing regime. After some backroom dealings Salazar rejects Nogueira’s proposal.

March / April – José de Freitas, journalist of the Lisbon daily Diário Popular (People’s Daily), visits China. His attempts to conduct interviews with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai are unsuccessful.

1965 – March – The office of the Special Commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China (Formosa/Taiwan) in Macao is shutdown to appease Mainland China.

1966 – 1968 – The “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution” takes place in Macao. The Portuguese administration caves in to all demands made by local communist organisations and the Guangdong Foreign Office. However, the People’s Liberation Army takes all the necessary steps to
avoid the invasion of Macao by rebellious Red Guards. A senior cadre of the Chinese Foreign Affairs Ministry visits Macao and instructs local Chinese organizations to stop their activities against the Macao Portuguese Administration and reminds them that the "one country, two systems" policy is in place.
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