Content

Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 7

I Determinants and Effects of National Identity

Postmodern Ethnicity: Diversity and Difference
Albert F. Reiterer ............................................................................................................. 21

National Pride, Patriotism and Nationalism: Methodological Reflections and Empirical Analyses
Franz Hollinger, Jürgen Fleiß and Helmut Kesswies ....................................................... 45

National Identity and Attitudes towards Immigrants in a Comparative Perspective
Jorge Vila and Rui Costa-Lopes ....................................................................................... 71

Religion and National Identity in an Enlarging Europe
Miroslav Tříšek .................................................................................................................. 101

A Success Story of Creating National Identity in Tanzania: The Vision of Julius Kambarage Nyerere
Bernadette Müller ............................................................................................................ 125

Collective Representations of Atrocities and National Identity: The Case of Darfur
Joachim J. Savelsberg and Hollie Nyeth ........................................................................... 149
II From National to Transnational Identity

The Contingency of Europe’s Boundaries
Josif Langer ................................................................. 179

Austro-Hungarian Monarchy Memory Trace
in the Central European Countries
Magdalena Pescesi and Mihalov Babna .............................................. 201

Political Unification and the Purported European Society:
On the Social Basis of European Integration
Stefan Immerfall ................................................................. 221

All or Nothing: Identity Bonding to Europe, the Nation,
or Neither in a Changing Geopolitical Environment
Markus Hadler, Lyn Chun and Kiyotaro Tintori .................................. 237

National and Transnational Identities
of Intra-European Migrants
Michael Braun and Walter Müller ..................................................... 263

“Interethnic Alliances” and National We-Images:
An Analysis of Internet Fora Related to Sport and Migration
Dieter Reicher ................................................................. 289

Institutional Theories of Education
in Supra-National Society
John W. Meyer and Francisco O. Ramirez .................................... 311

List of Scientific Publications of Max Haller .................................. 331

About the Authors ................................................................. 351
National Identity and Attitudes towards Immigrants in a Comparative Perspective

Jorge Vala and Rui Costa-Lopes

National identity is one of the processes through which people build a collective identity, by sharing with others beliefs and memories about the nation. The International Social Survey Program (ISSP) of 2003/2004 on National Identity asked respondents the importance they attributed to a series of groups (professional, ethnic, religious and political group, gender, nation, family, region and social class) in terms of its impact on their personal self-definition. 12 percent of the citizens of a large number of European Union countries considered nationality as a factor with high importance to their self-definition, ranking only below family and professional group in the set of EU countries considered. In the same vein, 48 percent of EU citizens feel highly identified with the respective countries.

In this chapter we will investigate the association between the salience of a national identification and the contents comprised in that national identity and the attitudes towards those who do not share the same nationality, specifically towards immigrants.

This question builds on an initial premise that emerges from Social Identity Theory (SIT, Tajfel/Turner 1979). This theory considers that the organization of social reality into categories has an impact on the way we think and act. Specifically, the feeling of belonging to a social category or group is an important dimension of personal identity. Moreover, the integration of this membership in the individual’s self-definition often carries effects on the way we react to members of the group we belong to (in-groups) and the members of the groups we do not belong to (outgroups).

1 A previous version of this paper was included in the book National Identity, Inclusion and Social Exclusion organized by José Sobral and Jorge Vala and edited by Imprensa de Ciências Sociais using part of the datasets considered here.

2 Countries from the EU (at the time of data collection) present in ISSP: Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and UK.
However, not all groups have the same importance in our self-definition and, consequently, not all groups will have the same impact on the organization of our behaviour and attitudes. One of the factors determining the weight that a certain group has on the individual's behaviour, perceptions and attitudes is not only the group membership in itself but also the strength of the feeling associated to that membership, i.e. the degree of identification (Ellemers et al. 1999). On our part, we propose that the meanings associated with these identities determine the orientation and intensity of intergroup attitudes.

Given the importance that national identity assumes, as shown by the data referred above, one should expect it to have a significant impact on the way we construe our relationship between those who share and those who do not share our national membership. In fact, this issue, and specifically the relationship between national identity and attitudes towards immigration, is a topic of recurrent debate in the political arena in general (O'Rourke/Sinnott 2006). Thus, we approach an open issue and one which reaches today a particular acuteness.

In the first part of this chapter we draw a brief overview of the studies on national identity and its impact on attitudes towards relevant outgroups and we present the hypotheses underlying the two studies that were carried out. The second part presents the first study: using ISSP and ESS (European Social Survey) data, we analyze the importance of a comparative approach to national identification (identification with the nation vs. identification with Europe) in order to better understand its relationship with attitudes towards immigration. The third part presents the second study that analyzes the impact of the meanings of identification (nationalism vs. patriotism) on the opposition to immigration and on the perception of immigrants as a threat. This second study was based on ISSP data. This chapter is thus framed by three important perspectives on the approach to national identity that are exceptionally personified in the oeuvre of Max Haller (e.g. Haller 1999; Haller/Rosegger 2003; Haller et al. 2009): the comparative perspective, the relationship between national identity and European identity and the impact of the meanings of national identity. We combine these three aspects for providing a contribution to the understanding of attitudes towards immigrants and immigration.

National identity and intergroup attitudes: a puzzling relationship

Social psychology literature hesitates to associate ingroup identification and negative attitudes towards other groups (e.g. McGarty 2001). In fact, the main theory about the topic in this disciplinary domain, Social Identity Theory (Tajfel/Turner 1979), has elicited approaches and empirical studies with ambiguous or even contradicting results on this matter. This theory defines social identity as a part of the individual’s identity that derives from belonging to groups and the value associated with that group membership. One of the fundamental tenets of the theory is that individuals like to think positively about the groups to which they belong because their self-esteem derives, at least in part, from a positive social identity. On the other hand, a positive social identity depends on a positive evaluation of the ingroup compared with relevant outgroups. Thus, we can explain both the emergence of ingroup favouritism but also the derogation of other groups (outgroups) (Tajfel/Turner 1979). That is, building on this theory, we should assume that the higher the identification with a group, the higher the favouritism towards that group and its members and, most likely, the stronger the negative attitudes towards other groups and the people within them.

For example, in the specific case of the relationship between national identification and attitudes towards immigrants, in a study conducted with representative samples of four European countries (France, Germany, Great Britain and the Netherlands), Pettigrew and Meertens (1995) showed that the higher the identification with a nation, the higher the orientation for prejudice and discrimination of immigrants. Also Blank and Schmidt (1997, cited in Blank/Schmidt 2003) found empirical support for the existence of such a relationship using correlational data from national representative samples (ISSP 1995: Austria, Italy, Germany, Russia, UK and USA). More recently, Wagner and colleagues (Wagner et al. 2007) analysed the correlation between the level of national identification and the derogation of immigrants using longitudinal data from 600 German citizens.
Using two measure points, separated by four years, the authors showed that association to be indeed positive.

The question, however, may be more complex demanding a systematic analysis of the moderators of the relationship between ingroup identification and the derogation of significant outgroups. In fact, Hinkle and Brown (1990) reviewed 14 studies that tested the relationship between identification and intergroup attitudes and showed that this relationship was close to nil. Also Inglehart (1997), in a study involving 43 countries, presented a correlation between national identity and conservatism, but not between national identity and ethnocentrism. In the same vein, an analysis of the Eurobarometer 47.1 (1997), conducted in 15 European countries, did not reveal a significant correlation between national pride and attitudes towards people of a “different race, religion or culture” (Deschamps/Lemaîne 2004). To some authors, these results are consistent with the framework of Social Identity Theory since this theory did not state a direct relationship between ingroup identification and outgroup derogation (McCarty 2001; Mummendey 1995). This is, in fact, what the initial experiment by Tajfel and colleagues (Tajfel et al. 1971) showed using matrices that served to attribute points to an outgroup and an ingroup. The study demonstrated that people favour members of their groups in detriment of members of other groups when distributing positive resources. However, when participants were asked to attribute punishments to their ingroup and the outgroup instead of points, this phenomenon of ingroup favouritism ceased to manifest itself (Mummendey 1995). This study showed that this bias of favouring the ingroup is independent of what we feel about the outgroup. We can thus think of a dissociation between a feeling of positivity towards an ingroup and negativity towards the corresponding outgroup (Brewer 1999).

Notwithstanding, there might be conditions that facilitate an association between group identification and outgroup discrimination and that may help to explain results such as those from Pettigrew and Meertens (1995) in the context of migration. For example, Hinkle and Brown (1990) hypothesized that the relationship between identification and a negative bias towards other groups depends on moderating factors. These authors proposed that ingroup identification may have different meanings and developed a taxonomy of groups that includes two orthogonal dimensions: individualism vs. collectivism (see Triandis 1995) and the relational vs. autonomous orientation (orientation for comparison or not). Considering this taxonomy, Hinkle and Brown argue that the relationship between ingroup identification and negative attitudes towards other groups will emerge only for individuals or groups with a collectivist and relational orientation (salience of intergroup comparisons). Brown and colleagues (1992) present data supporting this hypothesis: the association between ingroup identification and intergroup bias was higher in the collectivist-relational quadrant than in any other quadrant. Also Mummendey, Klink and Brown (2001) showed that national identification and the derogation of other groups may be independent, but when the comparison between the ingroup and the outgroup is highly salient in a given context, then these circumstances do facilitate the emergence of a positive relationship between national identification and the derogation of other groups.

In our view, it is important to focus on studies that have shown the moderating role of the representations about the nation on the relationship between national identity and negative outgroup attitudes. For example, some studies indicate that when a country is represented as a set of entities (Billiet et al. 2003) and not as a unique entity, the odds of a positive relationship between identification and outgroup derogation are smaller. One could in fact invoke this hypothesis to explain the absence of a relationship between national identity and negative attitudes towards immigration in Switzerland and the UK (ISSP 2003/2004), the same happening in Belgium (see Billiet et al. 2003), countries often construed as a set of entities. Moreover, it is important to consider the representation of the history of the nation as an important factor in the relationship between national identification and outgroup derogation (Citrin et al. 2001; Liu/Hilton 2005). Within that vein of emphasizing the role of the prevalent representation of the history of the nation, Kelman (1997) examined the relationship between national identification and perspectives of peace or outgroup hostility in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

It is also within this context of the nation’s history representations that we proposed an explanation for Portugal emerging often as an exception, in regard to the relationship between national identification and negative outgroup attitudes. In a study about racism in Portugal (Vala et al. 1999), as well as in a study using data from ISSP 2003/2004 (from eight European countries) or even the study using data from ESS-2/2004 (see Vala et al. 2008) we consistently obtain, contrarily to what happens in the set of the other European countries, a dissociation between the degree of identification and negative attitudes towards immigrants. In our interpretation, the
activation of national identity in Portugal makes the “luso-tropicalist” ideology of colonization salient (i.e. the idea that Portuguese have a natural ability to relate to people that are seen as different – a trait that would explain the unique character of Portuguese colonial relationships) and inhibits the expression of explicit negative attitudes towards those coming from the ex-colonies (even though the same doesn’t happen with less explicit attitudes; see Vala et al. 2008). Within the several trans-national datasets and the studies we have conducted so far, only one exception was found: a study on the memory about the discovery of Brazil in which it is shown that those who identify more strongly with Portugal have a more negative image of the slaves and the Indians than those who identify less (Vala/Saint-Maurice 2004).

In the present study, we examine two sets of hypotheses not yet tested in the literature on this domain. The first set of hypotheses builds on previous studies on comparative identity, analyzes its impact on attitudes towards immigration and studies its role within the relationship between values and attitudes towards immigration (Ramos/Vala 2009). The second set of hypotheses points to the impact of the meanings of national identity on attitudes towards immigration. Specifically, in this second case, we study the effect of national identity construed as patriotism vs. nationalism on attitudes towards immigration. We argue that the consequences of national identity on intergroup attitudes are better understood when national identity is studied in a comparative context; moreover, we argue that what is equally or more important than the degree of national identification on intergroup attitudes, are the contents included in this national identity.

Comparative identity, values and opposition to immigration

Ros, Huici and Gomez (2000) noticed how most of the work focusing on social identity and intergroup comparisons and differentiations point solely to a social identity built on binary comparisons between an ingroup and an outgroup. Ros and colleagues introduced, then, the concept of comparative identity proposing that when one studies the consequences of group identification, one should take into account the relations between social self-identifications at different levels of abstraction. It should be clear that the comparative component of social identity does not point here to the existence or inexistence of a comparison with outgroups but instead to the importance that identification with ingroups at different levels of abstraction may mean. Thus, comparative identity may be defined as the comparison between degrees of identification with two groups in different levels of inclusion (e.g. identification with a specific nation and with Europe). Ros and colleagues sustain that simultaneously considering identifications with more than a category/group allows to better understand intergroup attitudes. Similarly, Haller (1999) had already pointed at the importance of considering both national identity and European identity to better understand the attitudes towards European integration.

In this study, comparative national identity is analysed comparing the degree of identification with the country and with Europe. We test the hypothesis that the higher the comparative national identity (i.e. the higher identification with the country than with Europe), the higher the opposition to immigration, a hypothesis not yet tested within the analysis of the relationship between national identification and attitudes towards immigration. On the other hand, and following previous studies that have shown that egalitarian values facilitate the acceptance of immigration, while conservation values facilitate its opposition (Ramos/Vala 2009), we examine the hypothesis that comparative identity represents the mediating role on the relationship between social values and opposition to immigration.

To analyse the effects of national identity and comparative national identity on opposition to immigration, we used data from the ISSP-2003/2004 collected in Switzerland and Portugal, using aditional questions that we added to the basic questionnaire. These additional questions derived from a collaboration between the Institute of Social Sciences of the University of Lisbon (ICS-UL) and the team of social psychologists of the University of Lausanne. This collaboration and the comparison we are examining here emerged from the interest of contrasting two countries that can be distinguished in terms of the relation each country has towards the European Union, an institution that represents the values considered in the analysis. Thus, we contrast a country that has a stable and consolidated membership in the European Union for more than twenty years (Portugal) with a country that is not formally part of it and limits its relationship to bilateral treaties and limited economic integration (Switzerland).

To analyse the relations between comparative national identity, values and opposition to immigration we used data from the ESS-2/2004 obtained in Portugal, Switzerland and Poland. In this case, we used questions
included in the basic questionnaire about social values and opposition to immigration and two complementary questions, included in the Portuguese, Swiss and Polish version of the ESS, resulting from a collaboration between ICS, FORS (University of Lausanne) and the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences. In this case, we had the opportunity and the interest of including Poland in the comparison scheme. Thus, continuing this interest of observing whether these relationships depend on the relation each country has towards the European Union, we added to the two previous countries, a country that had only recently joined the EU by the time of data collection (Poland).

Comparative identity and attitudes towards immigration

The impact of national identification on opposition to immigration was analysed through multiple regression analyses considering as independent variables the measure of identification but also two indices on beliefs about immigrants. One of these indices aggregates different variables that seek to assess the preoccupation with immigration at the level of instrumental aspects (threat perception at the economic level, economic relative deprivation, negative interdependence at the economic level); the other index assesses symbolic aspects related to immigration (the perception that immigrants are a threat at the cultural level; procedural relative deprivation). The variables measuring symbolic and instrumental aspects related to opposition to immigration were introduced in the regression analysis as control variables of the effect of national identity.

Table 1: Effects of national identification and instrumental and symbolic aspects on opposition to immigration in Portugal and Switzerland (standardized regression coefficients)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Portugal</th>
<th>Switzerland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National identification</td>
<td>ns.</td>
<td>ns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrumental aspects</td>
<td>.32*</td>
<td>.17*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbolic aspects</td>
<td>.22*</td>
<td>.51*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>.19*</td>
<td>.38*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: ns. = non significant effect; * p < .001

As described in Table 1, national identification in Portugal and Switzerland is not a significant predictor of opposition to immigration. As we mentioned above, this result might be related with the luso-tropicalist beliefs in the case of Portugal and with a representation of the country as a set of entities as opposed to one entity in the case of Switzerland. However, this result may simply indicate a dissociation between national identification and the derogation of other groups, as discussed and shown in previous studies (see Mummendey 1995; Brewer 1999), which would indicate that national identification does not necessarily lead to negative attitudes towards other groups or countries. Finally, this result might indicate that national identification, as other identifications, should be measured in a comparative way when the goal is to assess the consequences of the salience and accessibility of a given identification on intergroup relations. May it be that when identification with the nation is higher than identification with a superordinate category of the same field, then intergroup attitudes become negative? That is the question we now address.

---

4 We appreciate the scientific collaboration of Dominique Joye from FORS, University of Lausanne and Franceszek Sztabinski and Pavel Sztobinski from the Polish Academy of Sciences.

5 National identification was assessed with the following indicator “How close do you feel to” Portugal/Switzerland. Answers were coded to vary between 1 (Not at all) to 4 (Totally). (see Mummendey 1995; Brewer 1999)

6 “Do you think the number of immigrants nowadays should be […]”. 1 (Increased a lot) to 5 (Decreased a lot).

7 Economic threat perception – “Immigrants are generally good for the Portuguese/Swiss economy”, with answers being coded from 1 (totally agree) to 5 (totally disagree); Economic relative deprivation – “Comparing with the immigrants economic situation, how do you evaluate your economic situation? Your situation is […]”, 1 (Much better than the immigrants) to 5 (Much worse); Negative interdependence – “Which of the following statements better corresponds to your opinion”, where possible answers were: “Portuguese/ Swiss workers have interests incompatible with immigrants’ interests” vs. “Portuguese/ Swiss workers and immigrants should defend their interests together.”

8 Symbolic threat perception: “The culture and values left by our ancestors will disappear if immigration in our country is not strongly controlled.” Procedural relative deprivation: “In general, authorities are more sensitive to immigrants’ problems than to the problems of people like you”. In both cases, answers coded to vary between 1 (totally disagree) and 5 (totally agree).
Following Ros and colleagues’ hypothesis (Ros et al. 1987; Hucic et al. 2003) about comparative identity and extending it to the context of attitudes towards immigration, we propose that the higher the differentiation, in identity terms, between the nation and a superordinate category such as Europe, the higher the orientation to discriminate a relevant outgroup, such as the immigrants. Thus, if we measure national identity comparing it with the European identity, we shall obtain a measure of comparative national identity that better reflects the salience and the cognitive and emotional accessibility of this dimension of social identity.\footnote{Comparative identification was operationalized in an item that resulted from the subtraction of the item of Identification with Europe (“How close do you feel to Europe?”) from the item Identification with Portugal/Switzerland.}

We can now move further in the understanding of the role of comparative national identity in determining attitudes towards immigration. In this new analytical phase, we propose that the salience of comparative national identity derives from values, i.e. is sustained by a specific constellation of values and is inhibited by another set of values. Moreover, we also propose that this comparative identity functions as a mediator of the effects of social values on the evaluation of immigration phenomena.

In a study about the relationship between values and attitudes towards immigration in five countries (France, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal and the UK), it has been shown that in all analyzed countries with the exception of Portugal, the values defined by Schwartz (1992) as self-transcendence values (comprehension, tolerance, concern for others and concern for nature) negatively predict opposition to immigration. It was also shown that the values of conservation of social order (respect for tradition, religion, family and social conformity) positively predict, in all five countries, the same behavioral orientation (Ramos/Vala 2009).

Thus, and besides the exception for Portugal, we can propose that these values are associated with comparative national identity and the effect of values on opposition to immigration may be mediated by that same dimension of social identity. Accordingly, values, as normative dimensions of social life, would be action-guiding principles (action in this case being opposition to immigration), and this effect would be mediated by the salience of a particular type of cognitive and emotional factors; social identity (in this case – comparative national identity).

To test this hypothesis, we used data from three European countries (ESS-2/2004 – Portugal, Poland and Switzerland) for reasons explained above. In the model we tested, the values of universalism\footnote{Respondents indicated how similar they thought the person described to be to themselves: “A man/woman that considers important that all people in the world be treated equally”; “A person who believes that everyone should have the same opportunities in life”; “A man/woman that considers important to listen to people who are different from himself/herself”; “A person that even when disagrees with someone, still wants to understand that person.” Answers were coded to vary between 1 (“Not at all like me”) to 6 (“Exactly like me”).} (the subset of self-transcendence values closely related to the concern of everyone’s well-being) and conservation are considered predictors of opposition to immi-

| Table 2: Effects of comparative identification and instrumental and symbolic aspects on opposition to immigration in Portugal and Switzerland (standardized regression coefficients) |
|---------------------------------------------|------------------|------------------|
| Comparative Identity | Portugal | Switzerland |
| Instrumental aspects | .08* | .10* |
| Symbolic aspects | .32* | .16* |
| Adjusted R² | .20* | .39* |

Notes: *p < .001

To analyze the effect of comparative identity on opposition to immigration, we use the same statistical procedures and the same control variables used previously. In this case, we observe (Table 2) that the higher the comparative identity, the higher the opposition to immigration, even when we include in the same model, variables measuring symbolic and instrumental aspects known to be potent in the explanation of attitudes towards immigration. Notice, however, that the impact of comparative identity is significantly lower than the impact of threat perception both at the symbolic and instrumental levels. Despite the historic and current structural differences, the same pattern of response is obtained in Portugal and Switzerland.
The model predicts that the higher the conservation, the higher the comparative identity; and the higher the comparative identity, the higher the opposition to immigration. It also predicts that the higher the universalism, the lower the comparative identity and the lower the opposition to immigration.

These hypotheses were tested using statistical principles proposed by Baron and Kenny (1986). As we can see in Figures 1, 2 and 3 our hypotheses are clearly verified for all countries concerning the values of conservation. Concerning universalistic values, the hypothesis was only verified for Switzerland.

Results show, in all countries, how the salience of national identity by opposition to the European identity (comparative national identity) derives from values of conservation and also that comparative identity is one of the processes sustaining the relationship between conservation and opposition to immigration. The hypothesis that this same comparative identity is related to universalistic values and mediates its impact on opposition to immigration was confirmed only for Switzerland.

Thus, for Poland and Portugal, nationalism and europeism are independent from universalistic values, but are positively associated – in the case of nationalism – or negatively associated – in the case of europeism – to the values of conservation of social order. Probably in both countries, and despite their different historical paths and timings of European Community integration, beyond conservation, the meaning of Europe is more heavily shaped by “instrumental” than universalistic values.

As a whole, these results indicate that to understand the impact of national identity on the relation with other groups it is insufficient to study the salience of identification, even though comparative identification represents an empirical advancement on this domain. It is within this context that we propose that to understand intergroup attitudes derived from national identification, one should know the meanings associated to national identity.

11 Respondents indicated “to what extent do you think [country] should allow people of a different race or ethnic group from most [country] people to come and live here.” Answers varied between 1 (Allow many) to 4 (Allow none).

12 In Portugal and Poland, only the effect of conservation is significantly mediated by comparative identity: Portugal (Sobel test = 4.31, p < .001); Poland (Sobel test = 5.24, p < .001).
National identity, patriotism, nationalism and attitudes towards immigration

The hypothesis that we now focus is to know whether national identity is or is not invested with different meanings in social thought and if those meanings correspond to different intergroup attitudes.

As we know, the distinction between nationalism and patriotism is common both in social psychology (e.g. for a review, Worchel/Coutant, 1996; Mummendey et al. 2001) and in political science (e.g. Huddy/Khatib 2007). Although some literature in the field associates patriotism with, simultaneously, feeling of connection/bond to the country, solidarity and civic virtues, as well as to beliefs of country superiority and guidance/orientation toward competition (e.g. Spinner-Halev/Theiss-Morse 2003), it is relatively consensual today that these are distinct dimensions. Thus, namely after the work of Kosterman and Feshbach (1989; see also Feshbach 1987) and Staub (1997), patriotism has been associated with a strong emotional connection to a country and its symbols and nationalism has been related to national identity contents like beliefs about the nation's superiority and orientation towards competition and domination (Sidanius et al. 1997; Bar-Tal 1993; Karazawa 2002). It is in this vein that Staub (1997) distinguishes between blind patriotism (or nationalism) and constructive patriotism (Schatz et al. 1999). Nevertheless what is really important in our analytic perspective is to know if this distinction is present in common sense, even in an implicit way, and also to know whether these two dimensions of the content of national identity have different consequences in intergroup attitudes, specifically on the relations between national and non-national people.

The multidimensionality of contents of national identity has been shown, for example, in Feshbach and Sakano (1997)'s study which was developed in the USA and in Japan and that obtained similar factorial structures for both countries in terms of four factors (patriotism: “I'm proud of being [...]”; “Being [...] is part of my identity”; nationalism: “Considering the moral and material superiority of [...] other countries should have forms of government similar to ours”; “The greater the influence of [...] in other countries, the better they are”; internationalism: orientation towards international cooperation; and civic liberties: orientation towards civic rights defense as the freedom to express negative points of view about the country). These results were globally replicated in Japan by Karazawa (2002). In turn, Huddy and Khatib (2007) in a study using data from the National Social Survey (USA 1996), found three orthogonal factors: national identity (degree of identification), patriotism and nationalism.

There are a few studies that not only analyzed national identity contents' multidimensionality, but also analyzed the relation of those dimensions with xenophobia and ethnocentrism. For example, results of a study about national identity and intergroup attitudes on South Africa (Duckitt/Mphuthing 1998) revealed that nationalism, but not patriotism, is correlated with ethnocentrism. In turn, Dowds and Young (1997), in a study using data from ISSP, showed that only exclusive nationalism correlates with xenophobia. Also, Blank and Schmidt (2003), in a study developed in Germany, empirically distinguish nationalism and patriotism and show that patriotism is associated with greater tolerance and nationalism is associated with lower tolerance towards different minorities, namely foreigners.

As a whole, results from these previous studies allow the formulation of the hypothesis according to which common sense distinguishes between patriotism and nationalism, and that this first view of national identity is dissociated from negative positions towards immigration and perception of
threat, and the second favors negative evaluations of immigration and the perception of immigrants as a threat both at the symbolic level and at the level of resources.

To study these dimensions of national identity and their impact on attitudes toward immigration we used data from ISSP-2003/2004 collected in France, Germany and United Kingdom. These countries were chosen for exemplifying three different approaches to state integration policies (Bourhis et al. 1997). In fact, France represents a variation of an assimilation ideology, Germany represents a typical ethnivist ideology and the UK is an example of a civic ideology (see also Fetzer 2000).

The indicators of nationalism and patriotism that were used were in most part based on Kosterman and Feshbach (1989)'s scales. As dependent variables we measured both opposition to immigration and perception of symbolic threat (values and customs) and realistic threat (economic and resources level) associated with immigrants (Stephan et al. 2005).

The first step of our study consisted of a set of Confirmatory Factorial Analyses of national identity contents' indicators. Following the literature described above, we proposed the hypothesis that these contents are organized in two correlated factors. Results show that, indeed, in each and every country we obtained a solution with one factor of nationalism and one factor of patriotism. We performed Confirmatory Factorial Analyses in each country and analyses of the goodness-of-fit indices showed a very good fit to the data in all of them (see Figures 4, 5 and 6).

13 Nationalism Indicators: “I prefer having Portuguese identity than the nationality of any other country in the world”; “The world would be a better place if people in other countries were similar to Portuguese people”; “In general, Portugal is a better country than most other countries”; “People should support their country even when the country is wrong”; “Portugal should defend its interests even when that can lead to conflicts with other nations”. Patriotism Indicators: “How proud are you of Portugal in each of the following: the way the democracy works; its political influence in the world; economic achievements; its social security system; its fair and equal treatment of all groups in the society; its history.”

14 Since for this analytical step we were using items from the basic questionnaire, common to all countries, we were able to include more countries in this analysis and it would not be informative or practical to perform analyses in each country individually.

15 One item that would theoretically be included in the factor of Patriotism was excluded (Proud of “its history”) as a preliminary analysis indicated that the model would fit better to the data if this item wasn’t included.

16 For all three countries: X2(34, N between 1,065 and 1,161) < 270.53, p<.001; CFI > .92; GFI > .96; AGFI > .95; RMSEA < .07.
In Figure 7 we see that the differences between countries are small but statistically significant. Germany presents the lowest levels both of nationalism and patriotism while UK presents the highest scores of both nationalism and pride in the socio-political system functioning (patriotism).
The next step in the analysis consisted of correlating these two dimensions of national identity contents with attitudes towards immigration. In order to do that, we used multiple regression analysis with the dimensions of nationalism and patriotism as independent variables. Two socio-demographic variables (schooling and age) and the degree of comparative identification were considered as control variables (see Table 3). Using the same countries used in the previous analytical step, the results of the first regression model show that the higher the schooling, the lower the opposition to immigration and threat perception. The comparative identification also significantly predicted attitudes toward immigration, in a way that the more salient the national identity compared to the European, the higher the opposition to immigration and threat perception.

The second regression model presented in Table 3 tested the impact of nationalism and patriotism in attitudes towards immigration. The results revealed that, in line with the hypothesis formulated, nationalism is greatly associated with opposition to immigration and with perception of threat (both at the symbolic and realistic level). In turn, patriotism is associated...
with lower opposition to immigration and lower perceptions of threat. In other words, as more pride is expressed toward the national socio-political system functioning, less opposition is manifested to immigration and less are the immigrants considered as threat. Our hypothesis predicted a simple dissociation between patriotism and attitudes towards immigration. However, results show that patriotism can facilitate positive attitudes towards relevant outgroups, like immigrants. This result needs more development in the future. For example, it would be necessary to understand if the association between patriotism and attitudes towards immigration happens through a lower intolerance or a higher tolerance towards immigrants.

Conclusions

In this chapter we addressed the issue of the extent to which the salience of identification with a country is associated with negative attitudes towards those who do not share that nationality, namely immigrants.

In this vein, we examined two sets of hypotheses. The first set of hypotheses takes on the studies about comparative national identity (operationalized here as identification with the country minus identification with Europe), analyzes its impact on attitudes towards immigration and examines its role within the relationship between values and attitudes towards immigration. The second set of hypotheses proposes that the impact of national identification on attitudes towards immigrants depends on which aspect of national identity is considered. Specifically, in this case, we studied the effect of national identity represented as patriotism vs. nationalism on attitudes towards immigration.

Comparative identity, values and attitudes towards immigration

The results clearly showed that the higher the comparative national identity (that is, higher salience of identification with the country than with Europe), the more negative the attitudes towards immigration. Results showed also that the impact of values of conservation on attitudes towards immigration is mediated by comparative national identity: the higher the adhesion to the values of conservation, the higher the comparative national identity and the more negative the attitudes.

Our hypothesis that the impact of universalistic values on attitudes towards immigration would be mediated by comparative national identity was only verified with the Swiss sample: in this case, we observed that a higher universalism leads to a lower comparative identity (i.e. to a higher identification with Europe) which leads to more positive attitudes towards immigration.

In Portugal and Poland, universalistic values are associated with a positive attitude towards immigration, but this relationship is not mediated by comparative identity. That is, in these two samples, a higher identification with Europe than with the country is dissociated from universalistic values. This dissociation between comparative national identity and universalism does not facilitate the European project, since this ideal demands indeed solidarity beyond national borders. Thus, it is important that future research identifies, in a more enlarged set of countries, the values on which comparative national identity builds within the European context. This will allow for a better understanding of the two patterns of responses we obtained (Switzerland, Portugal and Poland).177

At the theoretical level, our results contribute to clarify the impact of national identity on attitudes towards immigration by showing that such identification has a negative impact only when it overcomes the identification with a supra-national category. Stating differently, the identification with a superordinate category, such as Europe, provides an enlargement of “our world” The results we obtained suggest, in fact, a new hypothesis to be considered in future studies: the double identification with the nation and with Europe will provide, simultaneously, a feeling of protection from the uncertainty generated by a globalized world, and a feeling of wide inclusion and openness to “others”, even if not European. The first feeling is provided through identification with the nation and the second through identification with the superordinate category.

As a whole, these results show that, to understand the impacts of national identity on the relationships with other groups, is insufficient to take into account the salience of identification, although comparative identity

---

177 It should be noticed that ESS does not have direct questions about national and European identification. Moreover, the ISSP wave on National Identity does not have questions on values. The results presented here were possible only due to collaboration between these specific countries.
represents a significant empirical advancement in this domain. It is within this context that we propose that the understanding of intergroup attitudes derived from the identification with the nation requires knowledge about the meanings associated with national identity.

Meanings of national identity and attitudes towards immigrants

A confirmatory factorial analysis allowed the identification of two dimensions of the meaning of national identity, theorized by several authors (namely Kosterman/Feshbach 1989; but also Staub 1997): nationalism and patriotism. With the regression analyses we verified that, independently from the immigration policy of each country and controlling for socio-demographic factors and comparative identity, nationalism is strongly associated with opposition to immigration and with threat perception, both at the symbolic (values) and the realistic (safety and economy) level.

However, and surprisingly so, patriotism is associated with a lower opposition to immigration and a lower threat perception. What factors may facilitate this positive association between patriotism and positive attitudes towards immigration? We propose the hypothesis that the pride in the socio-political functioning of the country generates a feeling of safety that dissociates immigration from threat. In this case, the other is no longer represented as a threat and its presence may be seen as a resource.

The research presented here on the meanings of national identity (patriotism and nationalism) and its impact on attitudes towards immigration are stimulating to the extent that they show the importance of the contents associated with a modality of identification to understand the meaning and the personal and social repercussion of this same identification. In this sense, it is important to deepen the diversity of the identitary contents in general, and those that are associated with national identity in particular (Rothi et al. 2005). Specifically, we suggest the study of the impact of the representation of the nature of the nation on attitudes towards immigration, opposing a civic with an ethnon representation of the nation (Lewin-Epstein/Levanon 2005; Brubaker 1992).

In fact, considering the theoretical reflection about the nature of the nation, we find two dominant orientations with an impact on the conceptualization of national identity: one orientation that associates national identity to an ethnic and genealogical perspective of the nation; and another one that associates it with a civic and territorial perspective (for a discussion see Habermas 1994; Smith 1999). The first assumes a primordial community and its perpetuation through descendancy. National identity is, in this case, mostly an "intrinsic" and natural issue based on linguistic and cultural roots and common psychological and social characteristics. The second perspective construes national identity as a political community, associated to a defined territory, and accentuates the legal dimension of the common institutions.

Between these two opposing perspectives, some others, with subtle nuances, have been developed, such as the one that proposes that national identity is based on a combination of sub-groups, that are organized through institutions and civic participation originated in several processes, namely migratory processes (Castles/Miller 1998).

Moreover, it will be important to examine the relationship between these representations of the nature of the nation and the relations people maintain with other groups, namely with immigrants. Our argument is that opposition to immigration and the perception of immigrants as a threat will build upon an ethnon conception and not on the civic. Some of the questions at the 2003 wave of the ISSP could help on the empirical test of that hypothesis. However, they did not allow to reconstruct those two conceptions with enough clarity. We hope that a new edition of the module of ISSP on national identity takes on this issue again and deepens it, continuing the pioneering work coordinated by Max Haller.

To sum up, this work revealed not only the diversity and complexity of the concept of national identity, but also the importance of its salience and its contents for a better understanding of attitudes towards immigration and immigrants. In a more general way, this study suggests that, in order to understand the impact of identification with a given group on the relations with other groups, it is important to know not only the degree of identification but also the meanings of identity.

References

National Identity and Attitudes Towards Immigrants


Le Monde (2010, January 7), L’identité nationale: le débat s’est bien focalisé sur l’immigration. http://decodeurs.blog.lemonde.fr/2010/01/07/identite-natio-


Smith, Alan (1999), Nações e nacionalismo numa era global [Nations and nationalism in a global era], Oeiras.


Vala, Jorge/Briz, Rodrigo/Lopes, Diniz (1999), Expressions dos racistas em Portugal [Expressions of Racists in Portugal], Lisboa.


Wagner, Ulrich/Christ, Oliver/Schmidt, Peter/Pettigrew, Thomas F./Becker, Julia
(2007), A Longitudinal Test of the Relation between National Ingroup Evaluation and
Outgroup Derogation, Unpublished manuscript.
Patriotism, and Ethnocentrism”, in: Bar-Tal, Daniel/Straub, Ervin
(eds.), Patriotism in the Life of Individuals and Nations, Chicago.