Europeanization and its impact on the new democracies that joined the European Union. A comparative study of Portugal and Poland

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Abstract

This project aims to describe and compare the process of Europeanization of national foreign policies in Portugal and Poland in relatively comparable periods of transition of their political systems. It intends to make a combined study of institutional and legislative changes in these countries and to search for common patterns in the democratization and consolidation of democracy and subsequent integration with the European Union. It attempts to prove that the process of Europeanization in the field of foreign policy is tangible and voluntary (based on the strategic decisions of political elites and society’s support), despite the Member States’ efforts to keep this policy as their *domaine reservé*. The main aim of the dissertation is to identify a common sample of the Europeanization process in the pre-accession years and first post-accession years in both Portugal and Poland, despite the differences between both countries (e.g. character of non-democratic regime, timing of the regime change, country size and geographical location). Such a selection of cases shall prove that the indicated changes in the national foreign policy were caused by the Europeanization process and aims to eliminate additional factors that could distort the results of the study. It also covers the gap in the literature of the subject that tends to focus on the North-Western European countries.

This project focuses on two time periods: democratization/pre-accession and early membership. In this way the analysis touches upon the process of Europeanization of foreign policy from the very beginning (the moment of the regime change and the following policy change) and concludes when the two countries in question are fully respected Member States ready to take over the Presidency in the Council. It shows the first period of “one-way Europeanization” when Portugal and Poland, while aspiring to membership, download the policy lines from the European level without being able to shape them; and the full membership period
when both countries are also able to influence the European directions in the field of foreign policy and upload their priorities. The study identifies analogous phenomena in the national foreign policy change that appeared in the respective time periods after the fall of undemocratic regimes in both countries under research.

**Key words: Europeanization, foreign policy, Portugal, Poland**

Este projeto procura comparar o processo da europeização das políticas externas em Portugal e na Polónia nos períodos da transição política, relativamente comparáveis. O projeto tenta apresentar o estudo combinado das mudanças institucionais e legislativas nos respetivos Estados e encontrar padrões comuns no processo de democratização e consolidação da democracia, bem como a posterior integração na União Europeia.

O fenómeno de europeização é hoje frequentemente associado com a adaptação interna às pressões que emanam direta ou indiretamente da adesão à UE. Os investigadores analisam o impacto desse processo de surgimento e desenvolvimento de estruturas distintas de governança nos Estados-Membros. No entanto, mesmo se a europeização tem sido considerada como uma questão central para a compreensão da política contemporânea da Europa, não é fácil chegar-se a uma definição simples e concisa de europeização.

A nível nacional o processo de adaptação das políticas ditas “nacionais” em conformidade com as direções europeias ganha substância nas análises das novas propostas legislativas, na perspetiva da sua compatibilidade com as políticas europeias. Estas análises foram realizadas numa primeira fase pelos Ministérios dos Negócios Estrangeiros e os seus departamentos de cooperação europeia e, mais tarde, pelos departamentos de cooperação europeia no âmbito de Ministérios diferentes. O último nível foi também um símbolo de significado crescente de cooperação europeia e uma forma de europeização das administrações nacionais que serão também abordados neste estudo.

Embora a política externa seja muitas vezes apresentada como o campo exclusivo das competências dos governos nacionais, no entanto não é completamente resistente aos efeitos da integração europeia. A história da integração europeia mostra que houve muita resistência por
parte dos Estados-Membros contra a integração política que na prática cria domínios nacionais fechados, que os Estados não querem ver tocados ou afetados pelo processo de europeização. No entanto, a adesão as Comunidades Económicas Europeias / União Europeia tem tido um impacto importante na política externa de cada Estado-Membro. Além disso existem certas formas de cooperação no terreno e as posições comuns mostram que mesmo aqui o processo de europeização deixa a sua marca. Contudo, como a política externa traduz-se num campo muito sensível é “especial”, a sua europeização também é específica.

A dissertação prova que o processo de europeização no campo da política externa é tangível e voluntário (com base nas decisões estratégicas das elites políticas e no apoio da sociedade), apesar dos esforços dos Estados-Membros para manter essa política como seu domaine reservé. O objetivo principal da dissertação é tentar identificar uma amostra comum do processo de europeização nos anos “pré-adesão” e os primeiros anos “pós-adesão” em Portugal (1974-91) e na Polónia (1989-2011), apesar das diferenças entre os dois países (caráter do regime não democrático, o momento da mudança de regime, o tamanho do país e localização geográfica etc.). Tal seleção de casos deve provar que as alterações indicadas na política nacional foram causadas pelo processo de europeização e visa eliminar os fatores adicionais que poderiam distorcer os resultados do estudo. Para além disso, este estudo pretende cobrir a lacuna na bibliografia / doutrina sobre este assunto que tende a concentrar-se, essencialmente, nos países norte-ocidentais europeus.

Este projeto centra-se em dois períodos: democratização / pré-adesão e os primeiros anos na qualidade de Estado-Membro (até a primeira Presidência no Conselho). Desta forma a análise abrange o processo de europeização da política externa desde o início (mudança de regime e da mudança de política a seguir) e termina quando os dois países em questão são plenamente respeitados como Estados-Membros, prontos para assumir a Presidência no Conselho. Na primeira parte do estudo mostrar-se-á o período de “europeização de sentido único” quando Portugal e Polónia, enquanto aspiravam a adesão, ajustavam as suas linhas políticas ao nível europeu sem ser capaz de moldá-las. O Capítulo 2 apresentará primeiro a evolução política e a criação de um novo regime democrático em conjunto com o período de instabilidade política anterior à vitória dos partidos pró-europeus e a consolidação democrática. A volta pró-europeia nas direções da política externa dá origem ao processo de adaptação (downloading) das linhas da política externa que é uma das consequências da reorientação de ambos países na direção da
integração europeia. A análise baseia-se no modelo proposto por Smith (2000) que é usado para mostrar os efeitos da “europeização do sentido único” – a adaptação das políticas externas nacionais durante o período de pré-adesão. Este processo é caracterizado por implementar as normas e procedimentos europeus a nível nacional. O modelo propõe quatro indicadores deste processo: 1) socialização das elites políticas, 2) reorganização burocrática, 3) reforma constitucional e 4) aumento do apoio da sociedade para a cooperação política europeia na área da política externa. O modelo de Smith que indica a forma como a reorientação na política externa é produzida, centra-se nos aspetos técnicos da europeização, ao invés do objetivo do processo em si.

Em relação ao segundo modelo, de Miskimmon e Paterson (2003), este analisa a interdependência entre as políticas externas nacionais e as linhas da política externa comum, quando ambos os países, na qualidade dos Estados-Membros, são também capazes de influenciar as direções europeias no domínio da política externa (uploading). Este modelo propõe 4 elementos: 1) desenvolvimento institucional/multilateralismo exagerado, 2) definição da agenda europeia, 3) servir de exemplo e 4) exportação ideacional.

No que se refere às conclusões deste estudo, uma parte terá como base as entrevistas com diplomatas portugueses e polacos que participaram ativamente nos processos decisivos nos respetivos Ministérios de Negócios Estrangeiros e Representações Permanentes junto da UE ou por parte das Instituições Europeias (Comissão, Parlamento).

A dissertação aplica os modelos supra citados ao caso português e ao caso polaco e mostra similaridades entre os dois casos, apesar do grande número de diferenças entre os dois países e as disparidades bem visíveis no caráter da mudança política produzida.

Os dois países em análise mostram similaridades na sequência de acontecimentos durante a reorientação das políticas externas depois da queda dos regimes não-democráticos. Na sua transformação para a democracia tanto Portugal no final dos anos 70, quanto a Polónia por volta dos anos 80/90 do século XX viveram um período de instabilidade interna caracterizado por uma incerteza em relação à forma do futuro regime do qual dependeram também as linhas da futura política externa (“política externa como refém da política interna”). Depois da vitória das forças democráticas clarificaram-se as linhas da nova política externa e começou o “rumo à Europa” acompanhado pelas aspirações a adesão a CEE/EU. As largas negociações de adesão foram acompanhadas pela adaptação das linhas da política nacional sem possibilidade de moldar as
direções da política externa europeia. Finalmente o momento da adesão marcou uma mudança profunda do processo, dando a possibilidade a ambos os países de influenciarem a Cooperação Política Europeia/Política Externa e de Segurança Comum. Nestes primeiros anos “dentro da Comunidade” os dois países mostraram-se bem preparados para apresentar as suas posições e efetivamente formar alianças para passar as suas prioridades para um verdadeiro nível europeu.

Em resumo, esta dissertação mostra que a política externa não é imprescindível para uma europeização, no entanto, devido à sua particularidade este processo ocorre de um modo específico. O fenómeno da europeização da política externa aparece já no início do processo de integração europeia, no período anterior à adesão à UE. Na segunda fase, já na qualidade de Estado-Membro, a europeização da política externa torna-se num processo de dois sentidos – dum lado observado na política externa nacional inspirada pela política comum, e do outro na política europeia influenciada pelas pressões da política externa nacional. O estudo identifica os fenómenos e mecanismos análogos nas mudanças da política externa que apareceram nos respetivos períodos de tempo após a queda de regimes não-democráticos nos dois Estados sob investigação.

Palavras-chave: Europeização, política externa, Portugal, Polónia

Dysertacja opisuje i porównuje proces europeizacji polityki zagranicznej Portugalii i Polski w okresie transformacji systemów politycznych w tych krajach. Autor przedstawia analizę zmian instytucjonalnych i legislacyjnych w tych krajach i poszukuje wspólnych wzorców demokratyzacji i konsolidacji demokratycznej oraz późniejszej integracji z Unią Europejską. Próbuje udowodnić, że proces europeizacji w dziedzinie polityki zagranicznej jest wyraźny i dobrowolny (zachodzi poprzez strategiczne decyzje elit politycznych przy poparciu społeczeństwa), mimo wysiłków państw członkowskich, aby utrzymać tę politykę jako ich domaine reservé. Głównym celem pracy jest próba określenia wspólnego modelu procesu europeizacji w okresie przedakcesyjnym i we wczesnym okresie członkostwa Portugalii i Polski, mimo znaczących różnic między obydwoma krajami (typ reżimu niedemokratycznego, czas transformacji politycznej, wielkość kraju i położenie geograficzne). Dzięki takiemu
doborowi przypadków autor unika zniekształcenia wyników analizy przez dodatkowe czynniki i udowadnia, że wskazane zmiany w polityce zagranicznej są następstwem procesu europeizacji. Ponadto praca wypełnia lukę w literaturze przedmiotu, w sytuacji, w której większość badaczy skupia się na północno-zachodnich krajach europejskich.

Dysertacja obejmuje dwa okresy: transformacji demokratycznej w okresie przedakcesyjnym oraz na początkowej fazie członkostwa w EWG/UE. W ten sposób autor dokonuje analizy procesu europeizacji polityki zagranicznej od samego początku (transformacja demokratyczna i reorientacja polityki zagranicznej) i aż do okresu pierwszych lat członkostwa i objęcia Prezydencji w Radzie. Studium pokazuje pierwszy okres "jednokierunkowej europeizacji", kiedy aspirujące do członkostwa Portugalia i Polska dostosowują swoją politykę zagraniczną do kierunków wyznaczanych przez EWG/UE (downloading) bez możliwości wpływu na nie. Dalsza część pracy obejmuje okres członkostwa w strukturach europejskich, gdy oba kraje mają możliwość współkształtowania wspólnych stanowisk w dziedzinie polityki zagranicznej (uploading). Analiza ukazuje analogiczne zjawiska w zmianach polityki zagranicznej na szczeblu krajowym po upadku reżimów niedemokratycznych w obu krajach.

Słowa kluczowe: europeizacja, polityka zagraniczna, Portugalia, Polska
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Chapter One: Theoretical framework

1. Introduction

The Third Wave of democratization as described by Samuel P. Huntington brought numerous political regimes changes in the non-democratic countries (Huntington, 1991). The Third Wave was initiated by the Carnation Revolution in Portugal and within few years the process of democratization extended to Greece and Spain and later some 30 European, Asian, African and Latin American countries. The process of democratization gave end to authoritarian and totalitarian systems in a number of countries and – after the period of transition – established in their places pluralist democracies with open-market economies. The democratization of Portugal was the first that Huntington classified as Third-Wave. It was followed by two other Southern European countries: Greece and Spain. The process of democratization in Poland that started in 1989 was the first in the Central and Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Bloc. It launched the Third Wave in other countries of the region and was the basis of the decomposition of the communist alliance. Consequently, Portugal and Poland were forerunners of democratization – Portugal in the region of Southern Europe, and Poland in the Central and Eastern Europe.

The changes of political regimes in Portugal and Poland led to fundamental changes in numerous policy areas, including the so-called “high-policies” which reflected in the complete reorientation of foreign policy lines. Internal tensions between various political factions that wanted to take over the power were accompanied by the conflicts concerning the main lines of foreign policy. Mendes suggests even that in post-revolutionary Portugal foreign policy was a hostage of the internal situation in the country (Mendes, 2001). The political game to take over
the power in Lisbon was directly linked to the future positions of Portuguese foreign policy. The competing factions in the post-’74 Portugal represented alternative options which integrated internal systemic solutions with the directions in external relations of the country. The period of regime transition in Poland on the turn of 80s/90s created a similar dependency between the internal situation in the country and Polish foreign policy (Kuźniar, 2008), where the different options of Polish positioning on the international arena were strictly connected to the proposals for internal political solutions presented by various political parties.

The Third Wave of democratization was parallel to the period of intensive integration within the European Communities, in particular in the area of political cooperation and foreign policy. The beginning of the Third Wave and the democratization of Portugal coincided with the period of development in political cooperation with the Davignon Report and the establishment of European Political Cooperation. Although the 70s were generally described as the years of *Euro-sclerosis*\(^1\) the EPC was successful and put fundamentals for closer political integration in Europe introduced by the Single European Act in 1986. Further developments in the area of political cooperation were introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht that provided a legal basis for the EPC.

The integrating Europe was also itself a driving force towards democratization. Talking about the Third Wave, Huntington mentions this factor as one of the fundamentals for the democratic changes in Europe (Huntington, 1991). The rapprochement of Portugal to the EEC was blocked by the democratic clause putting democracy as *conditio sine qua non* of the membership. With the falling Portuguese empire the revolutionary Portugal turned into democracy and took the pro-European path in the foreign policy. In Poland the desire to join the Western-European structures accompanied the whole process of systemic changes (Kopstein and Reilly, 2000).

Since late 1970s one can observe two parallel processes: democratization of growing number of countries and European integration extending to more countries and enhanced political cooperation. The first one let establish democracy in almost every European country\(^2\) and the second allowed to create a transnational union ranging from the United Kingdom and Ireland to Malta and Cyprus and from Portugal to Finland and Greece.

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1. *Euro-sclerosis* is a description of a political and economic stagnation period in the EEC in the 1970s and the early 1980s.
2. Belarus is still authoritarian and Albania and Moldova remained non-consolidated democracies until recently.
With the increasing role of international organisations in world politics and supranational organisations gaining power at the cost of national states (Ribeiro de Almeida, 1998) in the last two decades, the interest of political science's scholars in such organisations grew as well. Consequently, the European integration, as the most advanced example of regional and supranational integration became one of the most popular subject under studies, in various aspects, dimensions, levels, time ranges and geopolitical approaches. As a result we have now access to a huge number of publications in the literature of social sciences, concerning the issue of European integration. The topic has been approached by historians (post-war political history of Europe, European integration during the Cold War), economists (free trade, customs union, common market, monetary union, European Central Bank, etc.), sociologists (European societies' attitudes towards the integration, European nations vs. one European nation, euro-scepticism, euro-enthusiasm), and – last, but not least – political scientists (political integration, nation-state decay vs. increasing role of international organisations, delegation of power, centralization/decentralization, regionalisation etc). Amongst all these relevant issues, one seems to be particularly popular in the group of scholars of European studies: Europeanization. This issue appears in more and more of recent publications, being undoubtedly one of the most common keywords appearing in the titles and/or abstracts of the research in the area of European studies (see: Featherstone, 2003). This phenomenon has its origins in the fast development of the integration in Europe – both: horizontally and vertically. The growing dynamics of the integration supplied the scholars with a bunch of absolutely new and unique issues to be studied. A number of so far steady-defined concepts (e.g. domestic/foreign policy, domestic market etc.) have also been modified by the changing reality. Europeanization became a keyword used commonly to describe a couple of processes in various areas of European integration; however, some of the aspects of Europeanization seem to have gained more interest in the eyes of researchers than the others. A few scholars carried on research on Europeanization sensu lato (Börzel and Risse, 2000), where they described the phenomenon dividing the studies on policies, politics and polity, while some other studies (Vink, 2003; Börzel, 1999) identified different level of Europeanization in diverse areas (“highly-Europeanized” and “less-Europeanized”). In fact, one may observe a certain co-relation between the number of studies in the areas considered as highly-Europeanized (e.g. environmental policy, transportation policy, CAP), which gather the vast majority of Europeanization studies, whilst the areas considered generally as less-Europeanized (e.g. foreign
policy, asylum policy, employment policy, “3rd pillar policies”) do not seem to attract the scholars so much. Nevertheless, the scarce number of existing studies shows that also these areas – in spite of being classified as less-Europeanized (or even not-Europeanized at all!) – can be highly influenced by the European Union (see: Koukis, 2001; Kamińska, 2007). This phenomenon may have its origins in the fact that the European integration has not gone ahead simultaneously in all the sectors and policies, that is to say: some fields were Europeanized faster and easier (European market), while the integration in the others was a long-lasting and difficult process due to the Member States' veto to cede their prerogatives to the supranational institutions.

The policies usually regarded as less-Europeanized are the traditional domains of national states and the European institutions have – theoretically – little influence on the decisions taken in these areas. On the contrary to the Europeanized policies that Bulmer and Radaelli (2004) show as undergoing positive or negative integration, the less-Europeanized areas are only consulted or coordinated at the European level. Nonetheless, with the process of European integration turning the Union to a more advanced structure and with the supranational bodies gaining more and more power with subsequent treaties, even the fields originally meant as exclusive national governments' domains and not “prone” to be Europeanized underwent the process of integration – although slow and with many obstacles, as national governments have been unwilling to pass the powers in these fields to the supranational institutions of the European Union.

This division to highly-Europeanized areas and the ones that are less vulnerable to the influence of the EU tends rather to be defended by the theoreticians of Europeanization. The study cases show quite often that the latter areas also undergo the process of Europeanization, however in a slightly different way than the first ones. In the first group it is usually the European Commission that «governs» by decisions, directives or regulations while in the latter group the process unfolds rather in the name of the integrity of state policy (e.g. foreign policy) with the European guidelines (e.g. European Political Cooperation, Common Foreign and Security Policy). Consequently, the process of Europeanization occurred also in the policies claimed to be not Europeanised, it simply had a different sample than the same process in the highly-Europeanized areas. This study is an attempt to show that putting foreign division to the basket

3 The former 3rd pillar, Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters (PJCC), was created by Maastricht Treaty and brought together co-operation in the fight against crime; it was originally named Justice and Home Affairs (JHA).
labelled «not-Europeanized policies» is not definitely right as national foreign policies of the EU member and candidate states can be influenced from Brussels.

Foreign policy is one of the most important national policies that happens to be as well considered as least-Europeanized, mostly due to the fact that the European Commission and European Parliament have had little power in influencing the policies of the Member States in this field, and in fact the 27 have been highly independent in conducting their foreign policies on their own. The decisions in the field have been taken by national governments and on the level of the European Union there have been only attempts of coordination, but never regulation\textsuperscript{4}. Despite the fact that scholars have been mainly interested in highly-Europeanized areas so far, we may observe a recent outburst of studies on Europeanization of foreign policy – both in general studies on Europeanization (George, 1996; Bache and George, 2006) and in the case studies of the Member States (Pomorska, 2005, 2007; Terzi, 2005; Tsardanidis and Stavridis, 2005). The authors of these works discover – surprisingly – that the level of Europeanization of foreign policies in the Member States is much higher than expected, and that the field that pretends to be an exclusive sphere of national administration turns out to have been substantially affected by the EU. Yet, the research, although developing dynamically, is still very scarce and limited to single European countries cases and specific time range (e.g. Greece on the Cyprus conflict with Turkey). Apart from that, the same as in general studies on Europeanization, the researchers have focused mostly on the Western-European Member-states (France, Germany), while the studies on other EU-countries are scarce.

2. Democratization definition

There are a number of definitions of democratization process, as there are also a number of theories concerning the characteristics of the transition to democracy. Democratization is defined as a process aiming to transform the existing form of government to democracy (or semi-democracy). As a result of deep reforms in the social and political sphere the political system turns into following democratic rules. Rummel claims there is no single process of democratization, since the origins, features and outcomes of the process differ (Rummel, 1996). Further studies on democratization processes and institutional theories were presented by Norgaard (2001), these are however beyond the objectives of this study.

\textsuperscript{4} The research concerns the time frame from 1974 to 2011.
2.1. Europeanization: a fashionable term

In recent years there has been growing interest in research on the issue of Europeanization. According to Featherstone, the Social Science Citations Index presents 32 articles on the subject of “Europeanization” between 1981 and 1995; between 1996 and 2001 the term was used in 84 publications (Featherstone, 2003). An emergence of research questions concerning the impact of the European Union on the Member States has been observed. There is an increase of studies analysing the issues of the domestic change brought by the EU in terms of policies, institutions and politics. This shift appears as a result of the advancing European integration process, which has been evolving since the original 6 Member States to the current 27 after several enlargements. Europeanization turned into a fashionable term amongst social scientists also because of the changes in the structure of the Union and the growing role of the European institutions, like the European Commission, the European Parliament or the Court of Justice of the European Union, which have been empowered during the progressing cessions of competences of the Member States' governments. Europeanization is also a popular term due to its potential for the normalization of European integration studies (Exadatyllos and Radaelli, 2009). It has a significant explanatory capability and may serve scientists as an excellent tool in the description of the European integration nature and development.

What does Europeanization mean? How does it affect the politics, the policy and the behaviour of the Member States on both domestic and European arena? What is the relation between Europeanization and European integration? Is Europeanization an effect of globalisation or regionalisation? Or if not, then what are the differences and borders between them? What are the mechanisms of change stimulated by Europeanization? What are the results of this process? With the growing number of Europeanization studies, these and many other questions were raised as regards the issue of Europeanization itself, to begin from its definition, through the scope of the countries, institutions and policies it affects, to end with the mechanisms of the change on domestic and European level that it brings about.

As Europeanization appeared with the developing regional integration in Europe, there is also considerable amount of researchers linking it with globalisation and/or regionalisation processes (e.g. Obydenkova, 2006). Again, this raises the questions concerning the nature of Europeanization: is it just a *sui generis* European process, or a typical pattern in the regional
integration organizations? Is it a consequence of global integrative trends and a growing power of international institutions or supranational organizations?

Many scholars complain that Europeanization is an unclear issue with numerous approaches and various formulations, which happened partly as a consequence of its rising popularity. There is a controversy whether Europeanization is a result of integration or is it itself a process of construction of a new European governing model (Koukis, 2001). Peter Mair (2004) noticed that Europeanization became a particularly fashionable issue, yet poorly and confusingly defined. The growing number of studies on the issue rendered a raise of multitude of definitions and term usages. In order to formulate more elaborate definitions a wide variety of conceptualisations was composed. A large part of them were used only in single publications which even worsened the situation. Consequently, the question of usefulness of such a confusing term was raised by Olsen (2003). The term's lack of conceptual clarity and firm theoretical underpinnings hinder uniformization of Europeanization studies, despite the frequent usage of the concept and an extensive empirical research already undertaken in the area.

Regardless the scholars' complaints concerning the obscurity of the term, Europeanization seems to be a promising research issue (Vink, 2003):

“The research agenda of Europeanization has undoubtedly enriched the study of European integration by pointing out some previously under-researched questions, particularly related to the domestic implementation of European policies. Scholars go at great lengths to explain the differences in transposition rates of European directives in EU Member States (...). However, the research agenda of Europeanization now focuses on wider changes in the 'organizational logic of national politics and policy-making' (...). Moreover, scholars increasingly study aspects of national politics that have traditionally been assumed less subject to European influence (...).”

2.2. What is Europeanization?

A precise definition of the term is necessary to conduct an analysis of Europeanization, otherwise any research attempts will remain futile (Kassim, 2003; Moumoutzis, 2007) and lead to confusion and elusive language (Radaelli, 2000b). According to Sartori (1970) conceptual analysis is fundamental, elseways the analyzed concept would generate mistakes in terms of the “ladder of abstraction” or would point to everything in a process of “concept stretching” (Radaelli, 2000b).
Europeanization is today most often associated with **domestic adaptation to the pressures emanating directly or indirectly from EU membership** (Featherstone, 2003). It is analyzed how this **process of the emergence and development of distinct structures of governance at European level impacts upon the Member States** (Risse, Cowles and Caporaso, 2001; Börzel and Risse, 2003). However, even if Europeanization has been regarded as “central to understanding of the contemporary politics of the continent” (Featherstone, 2003), a single and concise definition of Europeanization is not easy.

The approaches to the issue and necessary conditions for the development of Europeanization vary from author to author. Although Radaelli, as mentioned above, expresses some concerns as regards concept stretching, some other scholars argue that such different notions of Europeanization complement each other (Olsen, 2002; Harmsen and Wilson, 2000), especially that this dynamic phenomenon differs both in degree and in kind over time and over policy space (Koukis, 2001). Its features change depending on the unit under research and along the developing integration process, incorporating new actors, new institutions and new rules concerning the decision-making process at the European level of governance. Adcock and Collier order the variety of approaches by dividing them into background concepts and systematised concepts (Adcock and Collier, 2001). The first group contains the research referring to a wide range of Europeanization's dimensions (e.g. historical, cultural). On the other hand, Sittermann (2006) distinguishes the studies on Europeanization into three perspectives: 1) Historical Europe, 2) Cultural Europe and 3) Political Europe. From the historical perspective Europeanization reflects the “export” of European political institutions, political practice and “way of life” beyond the European continent through colonization and coercion (Featherstone, 2003; Olsen, 2003). It was also a synonym of “Westernization” on the Central and Eastern European countries “return to Europe” (Agh, 1999). The second perspective, called by Mair as “Informal Europeanization” appeals to the anthropological concept of national identities being modified by “common Europe” (Harmsen and Wilson, 2000). It also reflects a standardization of cultural practices and increasing cross-border contacts (Featherstone, 2003; Harmsen and Wilson, 2000; Mair, 2004). What is more, the scholars are still discussing Europeanization's scope, conferring whether it can be limited to the influence of the European Union on its Member States (Risse, Cowles and Caporaso, 2001; Börzel, 2002; Risse, 2001; Featherstone 2003) or should it be, on the other hand, approached from a wider perspective, taking into account historical and sociological conditions.
and intercontinental and intercultural dimensions (Howell, 2004; Flockhart, 2007). However, there is also a question of Europeanization occurring in non-member-states, like Switzerland, Norway – or candidate states during their candidacy period (e.g. Spain, Portugal, Turkey, Central and Eastern European countries etc.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1. Focus of articles on Europeanization, 1981-2000 (Featherstone, 2003)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural diffusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-national authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy and policy process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign relations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A broader understanding of Europeanization as a substantive theory has been present in European Studies (Wallace, 2000; Hobson, 2004; Olsen, 2002). Political scientists tend rather to constrain Europeanization to an EU domain (called by some as “EU-ization” or “EU-ification” – Wallace, 2000), concentrating on the impact coming from Brussels onto the Member States' policy-making. Most definitions of Europeanization place the European Union in the centre of debate, since the EU has given to it a more systematic, concrete and structured meaning, so much that at times Europeanization is viewed strictly as “EU-ization”. Per contra, Vink (2003) remarks that the reference to “institutional Europe” could worsen the attempts to define Europeanization as there are numerous important organisations apart from the EU, like OSCE, EFTA and the Council of Europe that actively take part in the policy-shaping in Europe, too. There appears also the ever since unresolved and regularly raised question of the limits of Europe and being European, which adds even more confusion to the studies due to its political sensitivity and an inevitable arbitrariness. Parallelly, Olsen (2002) offers a five-element typology of Europeanization: 1) changes in external boundaries, 2) developing institutions at the European level, 3) central penetration of national governance systems, 4) exporting forms of political organisation and 5) a political unification project. Olsen finds the fifth type, Europeanization as a political unification project, the most interesting, because it includes the other four meanings.
Diversely, Featherstone (2003) presents four different uses of Europeanization, outlining different trends of definitions in literature. Distinctively, there are eight different meanings of Europeanization in the proposal of Harmsen and Wilson (2000).

The majority of the existing definitions in political science sticks to the concept of Europeanization as a change in Member States’ policies, practices and politics (Schmidt 2001) combined with the emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of governance (Risse, Cowles and Caporaso, 2001). Risse, Cowles and Caporaso (2001) and Scharpf (2000, 2002) expand this concept associating political, legal, and social institutions with political problem solving that formalize interactions among actors and of policy networks specializing in the creation of authoritative European rules. Featherstone (2003) goes further, referring to Europeanization as an adaptation of the institutional contexts in a wide sense (rules, procedures, norms and practices) in different political levels as a result of the integration dynamics.

Bulmer and Radaelli present Europeanization formed by processes of a) construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and sub-national) discourse, political structures and public policies (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004).

The mainstream of the research on Europeanization concentrates on the national adaptation to the paths drawn by the EU (Moumoutzis, 2007). Featherstone (2003) states that Europeanization is a domestic adaptation to the pressures emanating directly or indirectly from EU membership. March and Olsen declare that domestic adaptation as an answer to novum brought by “the European approach” is based on finding a new routine amongst the existing ones instead of developing a completely new mechanism (March and Olsen, 1989).

On the national level the process of adaptation of national policies to comply with the European directions based on the analysis of new legislative proposals in the perspective of their compatibility with the European policies. These analyses have been performed initially by the ministries of foreign affairs and their departments of European cooperation and later by the departments of European cooperation within different ministries. The latter level was also a symbol of growing meaning of the European cooperation and a form of Europeanization of national administration that will be dealt with further on in this thesis.
To sum up, Europeanization deals mainly with the impact of EU membership (actual or potential), but it means more than “mere integration” (Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003). It represents an adaptation of the national state systems, politics and policies of EU Member States to EU theory and practice (Vaquer, 2001), being a process, a cause and an effect. Nonetheless, numerous researchers emphasise that approaching Europeanization as a process only occurring in the Member States of the EEC/EU is incorrect, as the mechanisms of Europeanization also highly influence the neighbours of the Union, the candidate states and their close partners.

2.2.1. Typology of Europeanization

One of the earliest scholars of Europeanization, Robert Ladrech, defines the term as an incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that European Communities' political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy-making (Ladrech, 1994). Ladrech claims that Europeanization caused reorientation of domestic organizational logic, yet, it denied the possibility of this process leading to harmonization or homogenization of these different logics in different Member States. Perversely, it is the domestic structures, preceding Europeanization, that influence and reshape the pressures from Brussels. In this way Ladrech emphasizes the role of “bottom-up” approach based on “national-specific adaptation to cross national inputs” (Ladrech, 1994). This two-way Europeanization thread is continued by Risse, Cowles and Caporaso (2001), yet they underscore the “top-down” process from the EU to domestic level including two elements: political, legal and administrative changes in policy structures; and changes in “the nation-state, its society and economy as a whole”. The “bottom-up” perspective, as noted by Tanja Börzel, has been a common approach to Europeanization for decades (Börzel, 2003). The outcomes of the process and the effects on the Member States were the main concern of the scholars. The role of the latter on the European arena was a subject of a debate between the major theoretical schools: intergovernamentalist, neo-functionalist and multi-level governance (MLG). The first see the Member States as the key actors of the European integration and policy-making. It is the Member States that shape the process of integration to protect their economic interests (Moravcsik, 1991, 1998). On the other hand, the two other groups claim that a greater role in the European decision-making process falls to domestic interest groups (e.g. business, trade unions, regions) and
supranational bodies (European Commission, Court of Justice of the EU). These parties lobby towards a deeper integration which benefits their interests (interest groups) and extend their power (European institutions) (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, 1998; Hooghe and Marks, 2001).

Nonetheless, after the domination of the “bottom-up” approach scholars that look rather at the individual and institutional choices that create policy changes, there appeared more and more interest amongst the researchers to study the “top-down” Europeanization. The issue in question were the consequences of European integration for the autonomy and authority of the Member States (Börzel, 2003). Under these circumstances the paradigmatic approaches were also of a significant meaning: from the intergovernamentalist point of view the Member States, controlling the integration process over the supranational institutions, were empowered in the area of domestic affairs, removing them from the European institutions’ agenda and keeping them as a domain of unique control of the governments (Milward 1992; Moravcsik 1994); on the other side of the axis, neo-functionalists see European integration as a tool for domestic non-state actors (business, trade unions, regions) to reach the European level and try to influence the decision process omitting the Member States’ administration structures.

Table 2. Paradigms and the power relation between the EU and the Member States in the European policymaking process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paradigmatic approach</th>
<th>Relations EU – Member States</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intergovernamentalist</td>
<td>strong Member States vs. weak EU; controversial issues as a unique domain of national state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neo-functionalist</td>
<td>weaker Member States; non-state interest groups manage to put forward their interest to the European level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-level governance (MLG)</td>
<td>cooperation between the Members States, non-state actors and European institutions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Along the discussion between intergovernamentalists and neo-functionalists emerged a third stream that opposed to treating the correlation between Brussels and the Member States as a zero-sum game (Börzel, 2002). These researchers pointed out that within the process of European integration Member States have gone through a transformation that changes their attributes, but their role does not diminish although it does not grow, either; it is an evolution towards an increasing cooperation between the Members States, non-state actors and European institutions.
Having said that, one may try to put an order into these various concepts of Europeanization. Firstly, $E_1$, the “top-down” approach bases on downloading of the European policies and adapting to the decisions agreed on European level (Dyson and Goetz, 2002). Secondly, $E_2$, “bottom-up” Europeanization, figures on the uploading of domestic policies to the European level in order to reduce the implementation costs (Börzel, 2003) – the lesser the disparity between the European and the domestic policy, the easier it is to adopt the former for a member state. For that reason Member States attempt to compete at the European level for policies that conform to their own interests and approaches (Héritier, Knill and Mingers, 1996).

**Table 3. Typology of Europeanization**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Europeanization</th>
<th>Type of approach</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$E_1$</td>
<td>Vertical: top-down, downloading of European policies to the domestic level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$E_2$</td>
<td>Vertical: bottom-up, uploading of domestic policies to the European level in order to reduce the implementation costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$E_3$</td>
<td>Horizontal: cross-loading, learning process and socialization, incorporation of shared beliefs and norms to the domestic level</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The growing number of publications concerning the “top-down” Europeanization, studying the effects of European integration process on the EU Member States (Hix and Goetz, 2000; Risse, Cowles and Caporaso, 2001; Héritier et al., 2001; Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003) has later met an answer in the increase of analyses of the “bottom-up” Europeanization that carried out research on the phenomenon of active shaping of the European policies, institutions, and processes by the Member States' governments (Bomberg and Peterson, 2000; Börzel, 2001, 2003).

The link between both approaches, top-down and bottom-up, in the relationship between the EU and the Member States is the role of national governments as shapers and takers of EU policies (Börzel, 2001, 2003). Although supranational European institutions are relevant in the processes of decision making and monitor the implementation of the agreements, and even that non-state actors manage to reach the European level and put through some domestic policies into the European agenda, it is still the Member States' governments that are the key players in the decision making and implementation processes of European policies.
Kerry Howell distinguishes one other type of Europeanization: a cross-country process (Howell, 2004). Contrarily to the two previous types, E₃ comes up on the horizontal, and not vertical, level. In its essence cross-country Europeanization is a process of learning and socialization between the EU Member States. It derives from European integration, but is not controlled or steered by the EU institutions. It is more a question of assimilation of shared beliefs and norms along the decision-making process at the European level and their incorporation to the domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies (Radaelli, 2000a; Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004).

The third type – horizontal Europeanization is a more recent phenomenon occurring in the fields that in the initial phase of the European integration were left behind as exclusive domains of national governments. When the integration advanced and the Union started to embrace more and more sectors, including the ones that were originally outside of the integration process. After all, national governments were unwilling to pass their powers in their traditional fields to the supranational institutions. However, with the political pressures to deepen the integration, the Member States have developed a new approach which resulted in policy consultation and coordination in the fields that national governments still dominate over supranational institutions. In these fields the particular policy is not subject to European law and it is the national governments that are the key actors here, while the EU is just an arena of exchange of ideas.

Andersen and Liefferink call the European policy-making process a “reciprocal relationship” between political negotiations at the domestic and the European level (Andersen and Liefferink, 1997b, 1998). National governments are pressured by domestic actors to advocate their interests on European arena. While acting in conformity with the lines proposed by these actors, executives try to minimize unfavourable consequences at the domestic level. In this way national governments turn to intermediators between domestic and European actors. This cooperation connects the main national policy-shapers with European institutions and agents directly implementing the policies on the domestic level. Nevertheless, when domestic agents – policy takers – disagree with the decisions made at the European level, they may obstruct the implementation process at the domestic level, creating compliance problems (Börzel, 2000; Börzel and Risse, 2003). Such situations appear when domestic actors are not satisfied with the policies agreed at the European level and accuse the executives for having accepted high costs of policies implementation. On the other hand, national governments find themselves between wind
and water, being responsible for the performance to the European institutions (European Commission, Court of Justice of the EU). Therefore, the executives carefully analyse potential consequences of new proposals at European level and at the same time try to upload national policies to the European agenda to avoid additional implementation duties and to minimize the disparities between domestic and European level. Ian Bache summarizes the studies on Europeanization with a statement that one can only understand this process once they understand “what is being «downloaded» from the EU in relation to what is being and has been «uploaded» from Member States” and contextualises within broader international processes and independent domestic sources of change (Bache, 2003).

Nevertheless, there is an exception of the Europeanization being a two-way process: it is the Europeanization of the EU-candidate countries, described by Heather Grabbe as “one-way Europeanization” (Grabbe, 2001). In the 1990s and 2000s Central and Eastern European countries along the accession negotiations were obliged to accept and implement most of the acquis communautaire and the positions on foreign policy (acquis politique) in order to harmonize domestic policies with the perspective of the 15 EU-Member States. The same process had place before, during other countries' candidacy period. This process was however an
asymmetric relationship, because the candidate countries had no veto right nor any opportunity to negotiate the positions. In fact, the candidates were obliged to adopt some policies they could not shape. Attila Agh calls this Europeanization “anticipatory and adaptive” (Agh, 2003).

Some scholars of Europeanization, approach the term contrastingly to the above mentioned. Authors like Mair link Europeanization with “institutionalization of a distinct European political system” (Mair, 2004). In a collateral stream Harmsen and Wilson (2000) as well as Olsen (2003) understand Europeanization as EU Enlargement and the adaptation to the Western European State Model. In this context the scholars see Europeanization in the perspective of the end of transformation process and more as a modernisation process of less developed countries in order to reach the standard of the other Member States. This logic is followed by Magone (2000), who, analyzing the Portuguese case, refers to Europeanization as a factor facilitating the democratization of administration, using as a starting point the EU Multilevel Governance System (MLG) designed by Marks and Hooghe (2004). Thinking of Europeanization in this context is, however, seen as “extreme” by other authors. The common approach tends rather to see Europeanization as governance by negotiation that in the end leads to an agreement on EU policy (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004). Following this logic, and as indicated earlier, in this work the term Europeanization will be defined as process of changes in the countries' (Member States, candidates, neighbours, partners) institutions and policies along the process of adaptation to European common policies carried by the CE/EU institutions.

2.2.2. Geographical range of Europeanization

Similarly to the debates on the Europeanization's definition, there is no consensus among the scholars as regards the range of the phenomenon. Current studies on Europeanization tend to focus on the North-Western European countries. Nevertheless, the process of Europeanization is not limited to the EU members from that area, but concerns also more recent member countries from Southern Europe and the new members from the Central and Eastern Europe. In spite of this, research concerning the Europeanization in North-West Europe is vast and well-developed whilst the issues regarding the latter countries are understudied.

Obviously, having the advantage of longer experience, North-Western European studies in the field are the most developed ones. Vast majority of the research on Europeanization concerns
Germany (Börzel, 1999; Bulmer and Burch, 2001; Dyson and Goetz, 2002; Post, 2005), France (Ladrech, 1994; Cole and Drake, 2000), the United Kingdom (Bache, 2000; George, 2001) and Ireland (Keatinge, 1984). Conversely, there is a certain scarcity of research concerning Southern Europe and, above all, Central and Eastern European countries. This is not surprising, since it was in the North-Western Europe that the idea of European integration was born and the process was launched. Moreover, the Southern European countries that became EU members only in the 1980s and the new members entering in 2004 and 2007 have not had the same time to be studied (Goetz, 2006). Nonetheless, one can find interesting studies on Europeanization in the Southern Periphery in the works of Magone (2000), Featherstone and Kazamias (2000 and 2001), Costa Pinto and Teixeira (2002) and Morlino (2003). Recently there appeared studies on the Europeanization of Spanish foreign policy (Torreblanca, 2001; Jauregui, 2000), there is also some research on the Portuguese foreign policy, however mainly in the context of the Presidency in the European Council – in 2000 and 2007 (Robinson, 2010; Balao, 2010). Additionally, Ioakimidis, in his study of Europeanization in Greece, shows Europeanization resulting in the changes in the state institutions and its functions, decentralization and the development of civil society (Ioakimidis, 2001). Tanja Börzel describes the positive influence of the European Union on the relations between Spanish government and regions (Börzel, 2001), this issue is raised also in some other studies (Morata and Munoz, 1996; Magone, 1997; Dudek, 1998).

Carrying out research on Europeanization in the EU non-Member States, Hix and Goetz claim that “Europeanization is associated with voluntary patterns on policy and institutional transfer, learning and imitation rather than coercive adaptation” (Hix and Goetz, 2000). This shows explicitly that the phenomenon of Europeanization is not only limited to the EU’s territory, but goes beyond it. The process of Europeanization touches deeply the candidate states, as the EU exerts pressures similar to the ones towards the Member States. The difference is that the candidate states cannot influence the community law and shape it via uploading. This asymmetrical relationship with the EU during the pre-accession period appear especially at the accession negotiations, when the principle of conditionality gives the power to the Union to influence the candidates actions. On the other hand, the candidates are bound with the conditions given and do not have the power to pressure on the EU. By conditioning accession and the benefits like trade agreements and structural funds, the European Commission may put forward their points during the negotiations whilst this power is denied to the candidates' negotiators.
Research regarding the candidate states is sparse, but developing rapidly, especially in the area of Central and Eastern Europe, where it offers a modest, but interesting choice of studies. Attila Agh links Europeanization in the CEE countries with democratization, translated as transition and consolidation (Agh, 2002). Since new members did not take part in EU decision-making whilst they were candidate states, their Europeanization did not, in the accession period, include the important first step of the creation of EU rules, but only the second step of the implementation of these EU rules, which influenced domestic structures and policies, but created a certain asymmetry in the enlargement process (Dimitrova, 2005). Heritier calls the phenomenon a two-way street in the Western case and a one-way street in the CEE counties (Heritier, 2005). Grabbe notices that Europeanization in this part of Europe does not restrict itself to just the one domain of public policy, but also affects cognitive-normative structures in those countries (Grabbe, 2005). Consequently, Europeanization is not just a theory of EU enlargement, but also of the complex social dynamics surrounding such enlargement. It is easy to over-stress the role of the EU. Both EU institutions and CEE policy-makers tend to exaggerate the extent of EU influence for political purposes. Last, but not least, Schimmelfennig underlines that EU accession of the Central and Eastern European countries is not the end of the Europeanization process (Schimmelfennig, 2005).

Apart from the studies on Europeanization in the EU Member States and in the EU candidate states, there is also some research available on the countries that belong to neither of the groups. This is related in one way to the historical and cultural dimension of Europeanization mentioned in the first paragraph and includes the export of values of Europe/European Union. It is also in the name of cooperation in the area of economy, borders protection and visa policy and security that the countries not bounded by the EU neither by membership nor by the status of candidate decide to adjust in some extent their policies to the ones of the European Union. In this context Europeanization is presented by Gransow (1982), Hill (2001) and Headley (2007). There are also some studies on Europeanization of Balkans (Anastasakis, 2005), as well as quite a few publications concerning Norway and Switzerland (Church, 2000; Kux and Sverdrup, 2000; Claes, 2002; Ehs, 2007; Maiani, 2008).
Table 5. The geographical range of Europeanization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group of countries</th>
<th>Examples of case studies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU Member States</td>
<td>Germany, France, the UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU candidates</td>
<td>Poland, Hungary, Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU neighbours, partners</td>
<td>Norway, Switzerland, Balkan countries</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.3. Variations in the impact of Europeanization in various policy areas

Differences in the level of influence of Europeanization on the Member States' policies derive from the differences in the adaptive pressures coming down from the EU (Bache, 2003). The pressures from Brussels are adapted to the domestic environment, thus the results on the level and outcomes of the newly-shaped policies vary in different countries. Moreover, Olsen explains the differences in Europeanization's impact on national policies by the historically grounded variations among the institutional and legal system solutions that have been adopted in European states and shaped by different socio-historical and geopolitical processes combined with local approaches rooted in communities (Olsen, 2002). Thus, departing from different locus resulted in formulating different responses to adaptive pressures across the Member States which consequently caused differences in the level of Europeanization's impact on the Member States.

As indicated by Vink, in order to find out the level of Europeanization of national policies, it is necessary to learn “when and how Europe becomes involved in issues that are traditionally regulated at the national level” (Vink, 2003). Therefore, one needs to investigate on the European integration dynamics.

While carrying out research on EU's impact on different policies the scholars distinguished two major categories: negative and positive integration called by Scharpf as market-making and market-correcting policies (Scharpf, 1996, 1999). The market-making oriented negative integration has a deregulatory characteristics. Following the rationale of common market, it tries to overcome barriers to the free movement of goods, persons, capital and services. In this way it conduces to a decrease of the influence of national policy-makers in certain policy areas, basically connected to the market economy. On the other hand, positive integration is a process of re-regulation at the European level with the purpose of changing “the unwanted side-effects from liberalization processes, in particular from the free movement of goods, persons, capital and services” (Vink, 2003). Thus, market-correcting oriented positive
integration seeks to intervene in the economy and sets a new European model to which the Member States adjust. Positive integration uses “hard” instruments (directives, regulations) as well as soft ones (open method of coordination). The policies commonly influenced by this type of regulations are consumer protection, environmental policy, or safety at work.

Some authors add to these two types another: ideational (or “framing”) integration. It attempts to create a set of norms in more conflictive policy areas. In such areas, where there usually exists a disparity between Member States, a consensus is difficult to reach and therefore, the conclusions are mostly “vague and more or less symbolic” (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2002). The scholars disagree with the view that Europeanization occurs only as a process of complying with EU regulations or transposing and implementing EU directives. They present also another dimension that frames domestic beliefs and expectations, although in this case Europeanization is not so firm and broad. It can be observed on the level of national political debates and in the national policy-makers' actions and positions. Vink suggests, however, that this type of European impact is similar to the second type – positive integration.

In this way, depending on the policy Europeanization affects, one can distinguish its two dimensions, each of them consisting of two types. The first dimension differentiates positive (market-correcting, regulatory) and negative (market-making, deregulatory) integration, while the second category (strong, binding vs. weak, non-binding) indicates the power of influence of European level on national states. Table 6 presents some examples of policies categorization.

**Table 6. Types of Europeanization depending on the policy area (Vink, 2003)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Negative (Deregulatory)</th>
<th>Positive (Regulatory)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strong (Binding)</td>
<td>e.g. Competition policy</td>
<td>e.g. Environmental policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak (Non-binding)</td>
<td>e.g. Railways policy</td>
<td>e.g. Higher Education policy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Additionally, one must not forget that the EU's instruments on policy-shaping diverge depending on policy areas according to the degree to which the EU has developed institutions and competences. Nonetheless, as argued by Knill (2000), the Europeanization process and its mechanisms are prior to the nominal policy area in determining the domestic impact of EU policies.

Apart from the types of Europeanization presented above, Zaborowski adds another one,
present in the countries undergoing the process of democratization. “Normative Europeanization” or “Return to Europe” encapsulated “the very essence of the political and economic transformation” and set “the standard for nurturing democracy” (Zaborowski, 2002). European Community/Union, treated in this case as a political and cultural construction, was perceived by democratizing European countries as a realization of the idea of “Europe” that they wanted to join and belong to. Europeanization served as a model for the politically transforming countries, and Western-European democracy was the model to follow. This normative Europeanization “meant that these countries embarked on a number of internal reforms aimed at emulating the polices and standards of ‘core Europe’” (Zaborowski, 2002):

This process of Europeanization also proved to have a profound effect upon the general ‘style’ of foreign policies (...), which (...) have been marked by consensus-seeking and a preference for solving interstate conflicts by diplomatic means. In this context, it is important to note that in political discourse the term has often been used as a synonym for modernisation at home and benign behaviour and co-operation abroad.

Consequently, in the countries that undergo a change from non-democratic regime to democracy, Europeanization may have a different perception and understanding: it is a normative process of adaptation to the Western-European standards. It is also called “Return to Europe” as these countries had been European democracies in the past, but have lost this status with the regime change and a foreign policy that isolated them from the “core Europe”.

2.4. Necessary conditions for Europeanization

In the beginning of the negotiations on a policy the degree of Europeanization depends on the level of convergence of the Member States, the voting rules in the Council and the process of learning during the consecutive negotiation rounds. The bigger convergence of the Member States' interests, the higher chance for a national policy to be Europeanized. The procedure of unanimous voting and the shared understanding created in the subsequent negotiation sessions are also the factors that increase the potential of Europeanization (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004).

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See also: ‘Belonging to Europe’ given by Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Prime Minister of Poland, to the Council of Europe in Strasbourg on 30 January 1990; in Portugal these ideas were present e.g. in the electoral slogan “A Europa connosco” (Europe with us) by Partido Socialista in 1975.
2.4.1. The concept of “misfit” and “goodness of fit”

A fundamental issue in studies on Europeanization is the concept of “misfit” and “goodness of fit” (Börzel, 1999; Cowles et al., 2001). It describes the idea of adaptational pressure, claiming that Europeanization matters only if there is divergence, incompatibility, or “misfit” between European-level institutional process, politics, and policies, and the domestic level (Radaelli 2003). There is a relationship between adaptational pressure and change in domestic structures and policies. When the EU policy is already present in a member state it causes that adaptational pressure is low, which implies no need to change domestic institutions, as it is easy to absorb “Europe”. On the contrary, when the distance between EU policies and national ones is very high, it will be very difficult to implement European policy by the Member States in question. Hence, there will be inertia at the domestic level. Europeanization is only likely to result in domestic change if there is some “misfit” or “mismatch” between European and domestic policies, processes, and institutions. The lower the compatibility between European and domestic processes, policies, and institutions, the higher the adaptational pressure (Risse et al. 2001). The importance of misfit is also emphasised by other scholars (e.g. Cowles et al. 2001) that point it out as an indicator of expected EU pressure on domestic structures: the pressure is strong when the misfit is ample; limited misfit causes weak pressure. However, the authors claim that adaptational pressure alone is not a sufficient condition for change caused by Europeanization. They name five intervening factors also influencing eventual change and its degree: numerous veto-players in national systems, facilitating institutions, domestic policy-making and organizational structures, different level of domestic actors' empowerment and learning.

There are two types of misfits:

1. **policy misfit** – European rules and regulations vs. domestic policies. As policy misfits produce adaptational costs at the domestic level, Member States in order to reduce their compliance problems intend to synchronize their policies with the European level.

2. **institutional misfit** – is less direct than policy misfit. Europeanization challenges domestic rules and procedures and the collective understandings attached to them (e.g. privileging governmental decision powers vs. territorial institutions in highly decentralized states).
“Misfit” covers quite a broad range of elements. There is no absolute compatibility or mismatch. However, there are some areas where governments have been under little adaptational pressure from EU regulation (e.g. telecommunications). Yet, European policy has been often used to justify and legitimate change. Governments already seeking reform have been able to use European policy as an opportunity, rather than responding to a “pressure”.

3. Foreign Policy

The area of foreign policy has been an important field of study involving both International Relations and Political Science. Despite important changes in international relations that have broadened the range of actors, the scope of the issues and the complexity of the processes involved, it remains the case that much if not most of what goes on is in fact the product of the foreign policy behaviour of one or more states (White, 1989). Roy Jones claims that foreign policy “seems to penetrate all that is fundamental to continued human existence and to future human welfare” (Jones, 1970). States' foreign policies have huge influence on modern world's configuration and the process of globalisation has only increased its importance, despite the fact that the scholars keep announcing the decay of the nation state and the decrease of its role in the modern international relations (Guehenno, 1995; van Creveld, 1999; Howison, 2006). The Cold War competition, both wars in the Gulf and the war against Terrorism prove clearly the importance of foreign policy. Even the occurrences of – theoretically – local dimension, like the Kosovo issue, Kashmir conflict or Israeli-Palestinian wars have had great impact on the global level, especially since the beginning of the nuclear era.

White identifies two dimensions that give so much importance to foreign policy. First of all, analysing the actions of the states on the international arena we may explain some general tendencies and trends calling to individual states' behaviours and taking into account their internal specifications. On the other hand, taking it globally one may seek for explanations to the international relations in the international system itself (White, 1989).

What is foreign policy? In a simple definition foreign policy embraces all the external actions and relations of a state with other states, pursuing its aims in the international community (Manners and Whitman, 2000). It is an inevitable phenomenon whose function is to amend anarchical tendencies in the international system (Bessa, 2001). It is a public policy that preserves collective identities, separating the internal from the external sphere and in this way it is related
to the notion of identity of the communities (Aggestam, 1999). Strang claims that foreign policy is strictly connected with the states' sovereignty (Strang, 2007), being one of its fundamental tools in shaping the international arena, a key domain of a nation-state (Hill, 2003).

Foreign policy involves a vast number of actions on the international arena. To carry out its analysis, one needs to define the term, separating the “internal” from the “external”. This is, however, not an easy task, due to the constant changes in the international environment. What was once “foreign” becomes nowadays “domestic”. Such phenomena like economic or political integration (e.g. the European Union, NATO, NAFTA, ASEAN) have changed the so-far-agreed conditions of internal/external division.

4. European integration and foreign policy

The process of European integration in its initial stage did not have cooperation in the area of foreign policy as one of the priorities. The founding of the Council of Europe reflected this tendency with the fields of foreign policy and defence policy staying out of the organisation's status. Although the agreements establishing the Western Union, extended soon into the Western European Union included “Collective Self-defence” as an area of cooperation, de facto it was NATO with the USA that took control over the issues of defence in Europe in the peak of Cold War.

While founding the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951, European leaders were mainly concentrated on deep economic partnership, and the political aspect of the agreement was rather a general will of cooperation, but with no real view of passing political power to supranational institutions. The High Authority was formed to govern the community and its supranational character was the main innovation. With its quite broad competences the High Authority was to guarantee that the treaty rules were respected and the common market worked smoothly. It had no power in the field of external relations, as these were the exclusive domain of the Member States (Gerbet, 1999).

A big step on a way to political integration of Europe could be the treaty on the European Defence Community (EDC). This ambitious document, signed in 1952, although agreed on the intergovernmental level, was not ratified by the French Parliament which led all the plan to a setback.

Despite the problems in agreeing to a common position on the mode and range of
cooperation in the field of foreign policy (usually combined with defence policy), some European leaders still pushed forward new proposals of agreements. Newly created Temporary Assembly of ECSC was particularly active at working on the new arrangements. In 1953 the project of European Political Community was presented. Although it was applauded by federalists, the project was vastly criticized by national governments. The support for the idea of political and military integration decreased significantly (Zięba, 2007). When EDC failed to obtain ratification in the French Parliament, the project of European Political Community was put aside as well.

The failure of the negotiations blocked the way to fast political integration of Europe, which was the federalists' dream (Zięba, 2007). Instead, the functionalists' strategy of integration was adopted which meant however a much slower process than the federalist one.

Following a functionalist approach, in 1957 the Treaties of Rome were signed, creating the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). The EEC Treaty gradually moved the powers in the area of trade policy from the intergovernmental level to the supranational level. However, high policy remained traditional and honourable privilege of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs (Nuttall, 1992). In fact, the spirit of integration moved from the military and political one to the economic level. Political integration remained one of the goals of the Community⁶, but strong opposition from the national governments put it back. In that way the political aims were to be achieved via economical integration (Schmitter, 2008).

Domination of functionalists and their idea of the union based on the nation-states marked the debate on the integration in the following years. Subsequent proposals of political union (Fouchet's plan I and II) did not bring the integration any step further ahead, mostly due to the intransigent position of de Gaulle's France, and eventually ended with a fiasco.

The process of integration was in political crisis in late 60s. France strove for maintaining intergovernmental character of integration and vetoed the proposals of majority voting instead of unanimity. France refused to cede more powers to the EEC Commission, either. Institutional fusion of the 3 communities (ECSC, EEC, Euratom) and forming of one European Commission (and one European Community) stayed in the shadow of France's retreat from the military structures of the NATO which once again caused stagnation in the process of political integration.

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⁶ The Treaty stated in the Preamble that the Member States were “(...) determined to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe (...)

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The successor of Charles de Gaulle, Georges Pompidou, was more positive about political integration in Europe and initiated new talks on the union in 1969. In 1970 European Political Cooperation was established. It constituted political cooperation of Members of the European Communities with the aims to create a will for political union and coordinate common EC policies with the political development. The Member States adopted the strategy of gradual progress of integration with subsequent stages and improving common political actions. In this way EPC was inaugurated as a separated institution, not being a part of the EC. Davignon Report, which was the document constituting EPC, was only a political declaration and not a treaty and it was adopted to coordinate foreign policies which showed the resistance of the governments to cede powers to the Commission in those fields.

Despite the doubts EPC turned out to be a success and, together with the European Monetary System, was one of few positive areas of integration in the 70s during the time of Eurosclerosis. Although EPC was not a part of the EC, but a parallel system, the two were closely linked (George, 1996). The separation of economic and political issues was maintained until 1974 when the Arab States insisted on linking the two fields. This turned out to be the breakthrough and since then the co-relation became evident (George, 1996).

EPC became a milestone in the process of political integration of Europe. Its connections to the EC became a template during the works on the Single European Act. Although it was a procedure substituting for policy (Wallace and Allen, 1977), it allowed the Member States to formulate common positions in the field of foreign policy (e.g. the position on Middle East, the position at the CSCE, etc.).

However, EPC also failed a few times, as the Member States did not manage to agree on a common position (Afghanistan 1979, South Africa 1980s). All in all, EPC is perceived as a mostly successful project which led to extension of cooperation (George, 1996).

Despite initially favourable conditions to improve the political cooperation, the Single European Act, which gave a written basis to EPC, did not create a political union, due to the reservations of some Member States. Although the fall of the Communist Bloc and the changing geopolitical situation gave a momentum to enhance the political union, the Member States failed to agree both on Gulf Crisis and on Yugoslavia Crisis which raised the voices claiming that the EC is too diverse to accommodate within a single foreign policy (George, 1996). On the other hand, the supporters of common foreign policy blamed for the failure EC's inappropriate
mechanisms to deal with crises.

The Treaty of Maastricht and the transformation from the EC to the EU brought some crucial modifications to political cooperation. Despite strong German and French coalition and the desire of many Member States to extend the European Economic Community to the areas of foreign policy, military, criminal justice, judicial cooperation, EPC was not integrated to the EC. Instead a three-pillar structure was introduced, where the EC turned into the EU in the first pillar, while Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) became intergovernmental pillars (second and third, respectively). The Treaty in a way upgraded EPC operations, bringing its secretariat inside the Council of Ministers and providing it with legal basis. After the the Treaty of Maastricht entered into force, political cooperation in the European Union gained great momentum.

The Treaty of Lisbon made some substantial changes in the EU structure, mostly in the aspect of foreign policy. First of all the pillar system was cancelled, although some features of former second and third pillars were preserved. The powers of the supranational institutions in the field of foreign and security policy were extended, but the European Court of Justice does not exercise its functions in the field. The Treaty introduced the position of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy that is the main co-ordinator and representative of the CFSP and leads the European External Action Service. Nevertheless, the majority of decisions in the field of foreign policy is taken on the intergovernmental level.

5. **Europeanization of Foreign Policy**

Although foreign policy seems to be the domaine réservé for the national governments, it is not resistant to the effects of European integration and it “(...) is not a special case immune to Europeanization pressures” (Wong, 2005). The history of European integration shows that there has been much resistance among the Member States against political integration which in effect has created closed national domains, which states do not want to see touched upon or affected by the process of Europeanization (Manners and Whitman, 2000). Nevertheless, the membership in the European Communities/European Union has an important impact on each member state’s foreign policy and there exist certain forms of cooperation in the field and the common positions show that even here the process of Europeanization leaves its mark. However, as foreign policy is “not just another public policy” (Torreblanca, 2001), its Europeanization is also specific. Tonra
defines it as:

“a transformation in the way in which national foreign policies are constructed [following pressure for adaptation], in the ways in which professional roles are defined and pursued and in the consequent internationalisation of norms and expectations arising from a complex system of collective European policy making” (Tonra, in Manners and Whitman, 2000).

Europeanization of foreign policy turns up in four mechanisms: 1) national adaptation (downloading); 2) national projection (uploading); 3) elite socialization; 4) bureaucratic re-organization (Strang, 2007). The first mechanism bases on the constructivist logic of appropriateness (normative isomorphism) and induce the actors to adopt the norms dominating in institutional settings. Thus, the processes of learning and socialization might influence and modify the preferences of the decision-makers and their final choices might result from social interactions in the process of dealing with foreign affairs at a European level (de Flers, 2005).

National projection may reflect in downloading and implementing the decisions taken on European level by reactive states (complementing) or in uploading national solutions to the European level by active Member States (mirroring adaptation). The latter option is used by the Member States to amplify national interests that are transferred up and become community interests. It is also a way to avoid misfit between national and European level and costs of subsequent adaptation.

In the process of elite socialization the national preferences of the decision-makers may get modified or complemented by transnational European norms. In this way the Europeanization of foreign policy occurs through the Europeanization of decision-makers. The transfer of foreign policy to the European level requires structural reorganization from national foreign service to adjust to new conditions and be able to comply with the new reality of European cooperation on foreign policy. All these mechanisms have an impact on national foreign policies of the Member States, it is, however, difficult to separate them from each other.

From a rationalist intergovernmental perspective, Europeanization may occur when it offers benefits from the national government's perspective. That is to say that \textit{conditio sine qua non} for the Member States to agree on common actions in foreign policy is that such a solution would be more advantageous than a unilateral action. Despite the fact that the supranational institutions cannot turn into strong agents promoting Europeanization in this area, the process
occurs, however in a different – more voluntary and non-hierarchical way (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004). Europeanization of foreign policy depends on the convergence of the Member States interests which turns it into a horizontal phenomenon. Contrary to the deeply Europeanized areas, Europeanization of foreign policy is not a result of hierarchical governance, but because of horizontal exchanges between Member States' governments and the resultant learning of shared policy principles (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004).

Nonetheless, it is not easy to assess the European influence on the foreign policies of the Member States (Major and Pomorska, 2005), as national diplomats are not keen to admit to have been influenced by anything else than the national side. The indicators of change in foreign policy set out another difficulty (Osswald, 2005). What is more, the foreign policies are exposed to the influence of numerous factors simultaneous to Europeanization, therefore one should not associate every change with this process.

6. The hypothesis

Facing the shortage of the studies on the process of Europeanization of Member States' foreign policies, this study is an attempt to add some input into this vacuum. The scholars disagree to whether the field of foreign policy is exposed to the process of Europeanization or not. Most authors carrying out research on the process as a whole (i.e. embracing all the areas of Member States' policies) think that foreign policy is the field that has best resisted the influence of the EU’s institutions and remained as almost exclusively managed by national governments (although generally coordinated or consulted at the European level). However, as mentioned above, there is a growing number of case studies on Europeanization of foreign policy, which show the running process of Europeanization of foreign policies in the countries under study. How can these both contradicting positions co-exist? Who is right? Is foreign policy Europeanized? Is it the sign of nation-state's decay? Or is the nation state still conducting its foreign policy independently? My hypothesis assumes that foreign policy undergoes the process of Europeanization, although it is not as visible as in the other areas where the supranational bodies of the EU have quite an extensive power, but in a more discreet way, basing on the intergovernmental cooperation that has its reflection in political declarations and “soft law” (rules of conduct that cannot be legally enforceable; though they have a legal dimension in that they guide the conduct of the institutions, the Member States and other policy participants). Even
though the process unfolds in a different way than the Europeanization of other areas, it does exist which can be shown on the cases under study. Portugal between 1974-1991 and Poland between 1989-2011 will be taken as examples of democratizing countries that carried the process of European integration and Europeanization of foreign policies. Although there is a notable temporal and geographical distance between the cases under study, I will try to show common mechanisms that appeared in both of the countries and prove the Europeanization of foreign policy as a matter of fact.

7. Methodology

The study refers to the literature of the area, concerning theoretical approach to Europeanization, foreign policy analysis and general studies on foreign policies of the cases under research. The research is realized by the qualitative analysis of data with a critical approach. I will use process-tracing analysis and monitoring of shifting national foreign policy positions in light of repeated negotiations within the European cooperation in the area of foreign policy (EPC, CFSP). Content analyses of primary documents: legal acts, directives and resolutions have been conducted, as well as comparison of the legal acts adopted on the European and national level (“goodness of fit” analyses). The information received from the interviews with the diplomats from both countries in the capitals and in Brussels will be used, as well as the opinions of the European institutions' officials7.

The hypothesis assumes that the foreign policy undergoes the process of Europeanization, that is to say that one can explain the variations of national foreign policy by the influence of the decisions taken at the European level (EPC, CFSP). With this end in view the national foreign policy is taken as the dependent variable, while Europeanization turns into independent variable.

Despite the fact that Europeanization has been a very popular issue in the European studies, there exist only few positions concerning the Europeanization of foreign policy and their different scope and limited time range constrain their utility for this very study. Nonetheless, as a result of scarcity of similar studies, the monograph bases also on the interviews undertaken by the author among the officials of Portuguese, Polish and European administration in Lisbon, Warsaw and Brussels. These interventions let the author reach some other sources of information and

7 Annex 1 contains the list of the interviews conducted during the field study visits in Warsaw, Brussels and Lisbon.
significantly enriched the thesis.

The analysis of Europeanization of foreign policy cannot be studied on one level of analysis, but requires research on two levels: interstate (political cooperation between sovereign states) and supranational (political integration between states that assumes existence of an overriding authority).

7.1. The cases and the time range

The research will be an analysis of the Europeanization's of foreign policy in two countries: Portugal and Poland, within the time range 1974-1991 and 1989-2011, respectively. It is a most-similar-case research design with one representative of each of two meaningful groups (of relatively new EU Member States). Both of the countries were forerunners of the democratization process in their regions: Portugal begun the Third Wave which then followed in the Southern Europe (Greece, Spain) and Poland re-launched the Third Wave in the Central and Eastern Europe when in the domino effect the countries of the Soviet Bloc entered the path of democratic changes. Neither of the countries under study was a founding member of the European Communities, both of them joined the project of the European integration when it had already been launched and shaped in some way. Therefore, the development of the process of Europeanization of the foreign policies in these countries should be remarkably visible, as their starting point was different than the ones of the countries that had already been Member States. Thereby, it is easier to spot the differences in the original positions of the EEC/EU and the countries under study (“one-way Europeanization”, Grabbe, 2003). Considering the non-democratic past of the regimes of both countries before their application to the European Communities, expected discrepancies seem even more extensive. The period under study embraces the period of democratization after leaving behind non-democratic regimes (that launched the process of Europeanization), pre-accession years (and accession negotiations) and the early membership years until the first Presidency in the Council of the European Economic Community/European Union (which itself would be a subject for a separate study). Selected time frames provide us with an extended-in-time overview on the European cooperation in the field of foreign policy and let us observe the changing scheme of the cooperation, starting with the EPC, through the substantial changes introduced by the Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon, with the evolution towards the Common Foreign and Security Policy.
Portugal was the country that gave some new dynamics to the European Communities after the period of *Euro-sclerosis*. The negotiations' period and its eventual accession was a highly active time in the EC. Portugal became a member in the “Iberian enlargement” (together with Spain) and its accession substantially changed the configuration of the countries inside the European Communities. The process that begun in the late 1970s brought important changes to the EC’s structure, with the Single European Act in 1986, the year of Portuguese accession. However, the integration to the EC was not an easy process, having in mind the isolation of the country on the European arena during the dictatorship of António Salazar. Portuguese turn from Africa to Europe was a substantial alteration in the foreign policy of the country and was a long and complex process. This makes the studies on the adjusting of Portuguese foreign policy to European standards even more interesting.

Poland is one of the EU’s newest members. The “engine” of the changes that brought the end of the Iron Curtain and the Cold War quickly redefined its aims in the foreign policy to the integration with the Western-European structures (NATO, EEC/EU). However, similar to Portugal, it was necessary to alter the whole machine of foreign policy which had been aimed at Moscow before. The act of applying for membership and the negotiations coincided with complex and profound reforms of the European Union which deepened the integration and turned into a unique structure among international organizations. Polish way to the EU, the same as the ways of other 9 (11\(^8\)) newcomers, was a difficult process, since in the 2000s the amount of legislation at the European level was considerably high and the candidate countries had to apply the *acquis communautaire* not only at the declarative level, but were obliged to present measurable results of these actions to the European Commission, which by this time had become a very strong European player and demanded from the newcomers a high level of compatibility with the EU-15. This highly complex process of enlargement ended successfully in May 2004 with the accession to the EU of the 10 newcomers, having its epilogue in 2007 with the eventual accession of Bulgaria and Romania.

8. **Theoretical models**

Two theoretical models will be used in the study to analyse the process of uploading and downloading, that is to put national priorities of foreign policy on the European foreign policy.

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\(^{8}\) With Bulgaria and Romania joining in 2007.
The first element of Europeanization of foreign policy is downloading the European norms and procedures to the national level. Michael Smith proposed a model consisting of four indicators: elite socialization, bureaucratic reorganization, constitutional change and the increase in public support for European political cooperation (Smith, 2000). The first element, elite socialization is based on socializing of key decision-makers and trust-building in order to solve problems at the European level and reach a common consensus. In the result of long-term cooperation with other states common norms of behaviour and a common identity are created. The agreements reached base on interactions with other states where the rules of reciprocity, mutual responsiveness, confidentiality, consultation and respect are obeyed. The second element, bureaucratic reorganization, is a result of closer political cooperation that leads to prioritization of European issues within the domain of foreign policy. In this way the membership in the EEC/EU influences the national administrations of the Member States. Europeanization of foreign policy is in this case leads to a reorganization of the Member States' administrations that adapt to new circumstances of foreign policy-making within the EEC/EU. A further, third, element of the model reflects in the restructuring of the national law systems and constitutional laws with a view for a closer political cooperation at the European level. Finally, Smith notes an increase in public support for European political cooperation as the last component of his model. During the “one-way Europeanization” period, which happens in the phase preceding the accession to the European Communities, candidate countries are unable to upload their priorities into the European level and at the same time are obliged to download the European positions to national level, which can be criticized by the societies as a loss of sovereignty. Smith observes here a growing importance of public opinion in this regard.

Uploading national priorities in foreign policies to the European level is the second component of Europeanization of foreign policy. Miskimmon and Paterson proposed a model that presents a set of four methods used by Member States in this regard (Miskimmon and Paterson, 2003). The four manners in the process of bottom-up Europeanization of foreign policy are: institution building/exaggerated multilateralism, agenda setting, example setting and ideational export. Perceiving multilateral cooperation as a method of international problem solving and commitment to building democratic institutions in order to support a newly-born democracy is the first instrument in this model. Secondly, the Member States seeks to set the agenda of the
EEC/EU by proposing particular issues of national importance to the common European level. By setting the European agenda the leaders of the Member States try to focus the attention of the whole Community and influence their perceptions of what are the most important issues of the present-day. Then, the pace-setting in relations with particular third countries is another instrument for uploading national priorities to the European level. In this way Member States try to set example for other countries from the Community. Lastly, promotion of core European values like democracy and human rights is called by Miskimmon and Paterson as ideational export. Zaborowski calls it normative Europeanization or “Westernization” since it exports norms, procedures, institutions and ways of doing things according to the liberal democracy model.

9. The structure

The thesis is composed of four chapters. The initial part constitutes the theoretical introduction to the subject. It presents the definitions, objectives, methodology and cases to be studied. This component includes the organizational aspect of the study and the literature review in the area of Europeanization and foreign policy.

The second chapter is dedicated to the period of democratization and foreign policies reorientation in both of the countries under study. It analyzes the outcomes of the fall of non-democratic systems, the power struggle among various factions, their concepts of future foreign policy directions and the dependencies between the internal and external policies. The chapter includes the analysis of the Portuguese Revolution of 25th April 1974, the democratic changes and the reorientation of foreign policy, together with its adaptation to the lines of foreign policy presented in the European Political Cooperation. As a matter of comparison the chapter presents democratizing Poland and its struggles to adapt their foreign policy to the new reality after the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the end of the bipolar division of the World.

The third chapter contains the study of Portuguese efforts to influence the European Political Cooperation after having joined the EC in 1986 by including Portuguese national priorities, as well as integrating European priorities as own to Portuguese foreign policy. From the Polish side of study, the seven years of membership are included with the struggle of Polish politicians to expand the Eastern Dimension of the European Union's external actions in the new circumstances of EU-27 and after the internal reforms that lead to the raise of Common Foreign
The last section aims to summarize the analyses from the previous chapters that were to test the main hypothesis of the research in an attempt to prove whether the field of foreign policy is exposed to the process of Europeanization and, eventually, to which extent and how. It includes the conclusions taken from the case studies and tries to combine them to gain a pattern of Europeanization of foreign policy that could be useful in further studies on the issue.

10. The objectives of the thesis

The main objective of this study is to show the process of Europeanization of foreign policy of two new democracies that joined the European Union. The study explains shifts in the positions of Portuguese foreign policy and Polish foreign policy by the pressure from the European level. Both cases will be divided into two stages: 1) period of democratization and pre-accession – when the country transforms from a non-democratic regime to democracy; its foreign policy changes to pro-European; the negotiations with the EEC/EU; in the area foreign policy starts cooperation with the Member States; 2) early membership until their first Presidency in the EU Council – as a fully-fledged member the country begins to have impact on the European cooperation in the area of foreign policy.

It is expected that the shifts in positions of foreign policy in the first stage were substantial and featured the political transformation. New geopolitical reality and the swing to Europe brought revolutionary changes in foreign policy of both countries under study, although the changes were mostly a reflection of political positions of governments that were still unbound by the Treaties nor involved in the process of accession negotiations. Further on, the pre-accession stage is outlined by political declarations of will to join the EEC/EU. The negotiations of the accession conditions with the community and the necessary adjustments in foreign policy to match common European positions may be an example of “one-way Europeanization”, according to the conception of Heather Grabbe (2003), when the candidate countries downloaded the policies from the community which was the preliminary condition of enlargement.

The second stage presents involves the first years of membership in the EEC/EU. It is a period when the governments may finally shape the cooperation of the community in the area of foreign policy by influencing decisions of the Communities and fully enjoy the possibilities to upload national priorities of foreign policy to the European level. It is the period of adaptation to
new reality, but also the time to make use of the member's rights and take up first initiatives and proposals.

Table 7. The stages of Europeanization of Portuguese and Polish foreign policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Foreign policy</th>
<th>Portugal</th>
<th>Poland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>democratization and pre-accession</td>
<td>transformation, “swing to Europe”, adjustment to the EEC/EU</td>
<td>1974-1986</td>
<td>1989-2004</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Literature:


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Chapter Two: Democratization and Foreign Policy reorientation: Portugal and Poland towards Europe

1. Introduction

This chapter aims to present the changes in the foreign policies of Portugal and Poland after the fall of non-democratic regimes – the dictatorship overthrown by the coup of 25th of April 1974 and political transformation away from communism by the agreements of the Round Table in 1989. The two regimes differed substantially: while the dictatorial regimes of Salazar and Caetano were sceptical about European unification and concentrated on the cooperation with former colonies and communist People's Republic of Poland was allied to the USSR and was openly hostile to Western-European countries; despite of this one may observe similar processes in both countries after the fall of the aforementioned regimes. The democratization in Portugal of 70s/80s and in Poland of 90s/00s led to establishment of Western model of democracy in both countries. Throughout this process both countries considerably changed the main direction of their external relations, becoming pro-European with membership in the European Communities/Union as the ultimate objective. Although both countries seem very distant – not only geographically – this chapter will identify a number of similarities between them in the process of democratic transformation, the changes in foreign policy core objectives, the way to association agreements and roads to membership in the European Communities/Union. Although the time difference between mentioned processes in both countries is quite considerable – 1974-1986 between the fall of non-democratic regime in Portugal until its accession to the European Economic Community and 1989-2004 for the same process occurring in Poland, it seems that
many elements from the process of Portugal “swinging to Europe” can be found in the Polish case a decade and a half later. Chapter 2 of this thesis will present the similarities of the given processes in the periods of democratization, association and accession negotiations, while Chapter 3 will analyse Europeanization of foreign policy in the recently-joined Member States of the EEC/EU.

2. The regime change and the reorientation of foreign policy

2.1. The Carnation Revolution and the reorientation of the Portuguese foreign policy

Among the most significant changes that the military coup on the 25th of April 1974 brought to Portugal was a drastic reorientation of its foreign policy. The dictatorship – both in the form of salazarismo⁹ and marcelismo¹⁰ – preferred the Atlantic coast to the European continent and led the politics of colonial imperialism, favouring relations with Ultramar, the Overseas. On the other hand, the perspective of uniting Europe was rejected by Oliveira Salazar whose alliances with the Western Bloc were very cautious, turbulent¹¹ and limited to the cooperation in the fields of defence (NATO) and – to a lesser extent – economy (Marshall Plan, EFTA). Salazar's successor, Marcelo Caetano, declared himself to be more European – this was, however, in conflict with his plans towards Portuguese colonies in Africa that he meant to maintain (Castilho, 1998). In this way Caetano's European ambitions – whether true or false – were blocked by his imperialism in Africa (Moreira, 1973). In the period of dictatorship, while the common European project was born, Portugal stayed away from it, concentrating on the African colonies that were becoming more and more difficult to hold on to. Moreover, the non-democratic nature of Estado Novo, as well as stubborn colonialism were conditions disqualifying Portugal from the Council of Europe and were the reason for vast criticism in the international arena, above all on the forum of the United Nations, where even European partners like the Netherlands and Sweden condemned Portugal (Leitão, 2005).

The fall of the non-democratic regime and the systemic transition to the democratic 3rd Republic was also the moment of redefinition of Portuguese positioning in the bipolar world. The competition among various factions of the officers from Movimento das Forças Armadas

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⁹ A Portuguese term to call the period of dictatorship by Antonio Oliveira Salazar (1932-1968).
¹⁰ A Portuguese term to call the period of dictatorship by Marcello Caetano (1968-1974).
(MFA\textsuperscript{12}) debated not only the question of the future Portuguese political regime, but also the lines of foreign policy closely related to the new political system. The initial leadership by general Spinola was soon to become questioned and one could note the polarisation of the so-far united officials. The unstable political situation and changing dominant factions kept the Portuguese foreign policy in the background for almost two years. Nonetheless the struggle for power was not only decisive for the future shape of the Portuguese regime, but also for the fundamentals of its foreign policy and its political position in the bipolar world. The changing situation in Portugal was of high interest of international powers, due to the geostrategic position of the country. Its membership in NATO, American base in Azores and eventual decolonization and further developments in the African territories belonging to Portugal were hot issues both in the White House and in Kremlin. The turnout of the Carnation Revolution was to be decisive not only for the Portuguese political system and Portuguese foreign policy, but also for the global \textit{equilibrium} in the \textit{apsis} of Cold War. Whereas Americans sought a moderate change in the Portuguese foreign policy and tended to favour pro-democratic and pro-European factions, the Soviets promoted more radical leftist revolution, copying the solutions from the countries of “people's democracies” of the Soviet Bloc.

\textbf{2.2. The fall of communism in Poland. Democratization and its consequences for the foreign policy}

Similarly to Portugal, the process of democratization in Poland also brought many substantial changes to Polish foreign policy. The pro-Soviet and anti-Western European foreign policy lines were abandoned soon after the beginning of political transformation. Nonetheless the first period of this process was dominated by internal policy issues, while the external policy reorientation stayed more in the sphere of declarations and courtesy diplomatic visits than on the daily agenda of those in government. With the need for reforms in the entire political and economic system and numerous problems (hyperinflation, constitutional change, administration reform) the issues of foreign policy were withdrawn to the backyard and only due to the excellent skills of new minister of foreign affairs, Krzysztof Skubiszewski, the new direction of policy remained coherent and quite stable (Kuźniar, 2008).

\textsuperscript{12} Movimento das Forças Armadas – the Movement of Armed Forces; the group of officers that on 25\textsuperscript{th} April 1974 overthrew the government of Marcello Caetano and took over the power in Portugal.
The Autumn of Nations and the sequence of events in Poland disarmed the totalitarian regime and a large part of power slipped gently to the hands of the democratic opposition from the “Solidarność” movement. With the change of government, and soon with the change of regime, there was a swing in all the policies. Undoubtedly, one of the biggest changes was the reorientation of Polish foreign policy. The People's Republic of Poland created after the World War II under the auspices of Stalin's Soviet Union was forced to apply a totalitarian regime of communism – or people's democracy – and join the alliances and organisations created and ruled by the USSR: COMECON and Warsaw Pact that were the answers for the Western Bloc's Marshall Plan (and the OEEC) and NATO, respectively. Politically and economically dependent on the USSR and militarily controlled by Moscow, Poland, similarly to the other members of the Eastern Bloc, was forced to implement Soviet instructions and conduct foreign policy according to the orders from the USSR. Neither the COMECON nor the Warsaw Pact were organisations that served the increasing of cooperation and exchange among their members, but instead, due to their radiated model, served only to amplify the Soviet domination of the Bloc.

The early 80s were the beginning of the end of the Bipolar World. The clear victory of the capitalist democracies over the inefficient and indebted communist totalitarian regimes was coming to an end after 40 years of the Cold War. Gorbachev's perestroika was only a desperate

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13 Independent Self-governing Syndicate “Solidarity” - Niezależny Samorządny Związek Zawodowy “Solidarność”.
14 Nonetheless the communists still kept a substantial part of the power in the initial phase of political transformation in Poland – in the first government of Mazowiecki (12 September 1989 – 25 November 1990) the “powerful” ministries (Defence, Home Affairs) lied in the hands of communist officials.
15 The term referring to the communist countries of the Soviet Bloc; used by Marxist-Leninist to describe the regimes of these countries (also People's democracies) that were in fact dictatorship of communist parties maintaining the façade of institutions of parliamentary democracy.
16 Council for Mutual Economic Assistance – economic organisation established by the countries of the Soviet Bloc in 1949 as a counterweight to the Marshall Plan and the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) that aimed to pull away Central European countries from their economic relations with Western Europe in favour of the USSR and the countries of the Soviet Bloc.
17 Warsaw Treaty Organization of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance was founded after the signing of treaty of mutual defence in 1955 by the USSR and 7 Eastern European countries and was the counterweight to NATO.
18 By the presence of Red Army soldiers on the Polish territory as well as the Soviet “advisors” within the structures of the Polish Army.
19 All the contacts within the organisations had to pass by Moscow, any bilateral exchanges between the members avoiding the USSR were not allowed. In this way Moscow was the central point of the organisations and the cooperation functioned on the basis of radia from the capital of the USSR to the capitals of other members of the Bloc.
20 Perestroika was a political movement initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1985. By the slogans of transparency (glasnost') and acceleration (uskorene) it called for restructuring
attempt to maintain the Eastern Bloc alive, but soon it turned into a salvation programme for the USSR, leaving the other members of the Bloc on their own. The changes initiated by the Autumn of Nations\textsuperscript{21} showed that these plans were unfeasible. In Poland the talks of the so-called Round Table in February-April 1989 led to a peaceful transition to democracy and the launching of the programme of transition to a free-market economy. Hitherto alliances within the Soviet Bloc were formally still in force, but in reality the Autumn of Nations made them out of date, and the Soviet Union, which was the guard of the \textit{status quo} thus far, was no longer in condition to do so any more.

After the fall of the communist regime, Poland began the transformation from a totalitarian People's Republic into the democratic 3\textsuperscript{rd} Republic. It sought to become one of the leaders in the region of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), determined to re-join Europe\textsuperscript{22} from which it had been separated by the Iron Curtain. The early 90s were a time of economic transformation to the free-market model, with shock therapy being applied by the finance minister, Leszek Balcerowicz. It was also the time when Poles were “learning democracy” with frequent government changes and political turmoil.

3. Foreign policy in Portugal and Poland under the non-democratic regimes

3.1. Portuguese foreign policy during \textit{Estado Novo}

Oliveira Salazar openly rejected the possibility to join the uniting Europe when the ECSC was \textit{in statu nascendi} (Salazar, 1959). The developing democratization in Europe, decolonization and dismantling of the European empires stood in contrast to the objectives of Portuguese foreign policy that kept as a crucial element the integrality of all the territories belonging to Portugal (Salazar, 1967). Franco Nogueira, Portuguese diplomat, explained that the Atlantic dimension was more important for Portugal than its European partners, saying that by abandoning Africa, Portugal would be doomed to pursue foreign policy actions necessarily \textit{via} Spain, which would make the government in Lisbon dependent on its traditionally un-trusted neighbour (Nogueira, of the Soviet political and economic system. It is widely perceived as the beginning of the transformation of the communist system in the USSR that led to the fall of communism in this country and in the whole Bloc.

\textsuperscript{21} A common name for the process of political and economic transformations in the countries of the Soviet Bloc that started in 1989 in Poland. It led to the fall of communism and democratization (in some cases unsuccessful) and the decay of Yalta order.

\textsuperscript{22} The common phrase used by Polish politicians, historians and philosophers claiming that after the World War II Poland was deprived of its natural belonging to Western European cultural zone and overtaken by the Soviets. See more: http://www.senat.gov.pl/K4/AGENDA/kszie/990505b.htm
Salazar believed Africa to be a natural priority for Portuguese foreign affairs and in the name of *Ultramar*, Portuguese relations with Europe were limited.

The scepticism of Salazar did not deprive Portugal of some forms of international cooperation. In the bipolar post-World War II world, where the USA and the USSR continued the Cold War, Portugal was an attractive partner for the two empires with its large strategic potential due to the geographical location of Azores in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean. This conditioned Portuguese membership in NATO, where the strategic issues (the U.S. military base in Lajes, Azores) dominated over the ideological doubts (non-democratic regime of *Estado Novo*).

Furthermore, on the level of economic cooperation – although Salazar rejected political integration initiated by ECSC in the name of ideological integrity (Salazar, 1967), Portugal benefited to some extent from some other projects of economical nature, like the Marshall Plan, and also became a member of European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) following in the footsteps of its traditional ally, the United Kingdom. The decision to join EFTA was, however, not unanimous – as a part of the government that supported the traditional autarkic line of Portuguese economy and trade exchange with the colonies, under the project of Portuguese Economic Space, rejected any involvement in the European cooperation. Notwithstanding, the government decided to join EFTA, as the membership conditions were quite favourable for Portugal (Mendes, 2001) and staying out would cause an even deeper isolation of Portugal in Europe. Xavier claims even that facing the impossibility to access to the Common Market due to the political incompatibility of *Estado Novo* to the Inner Six regimes, the accession to EFTA was a chance for Portugal to not to lose completely the European market in view of the integration processes occurring at that time (Xavier, 1970).

Marcelo Caetano, Salazar’s successor, had a similar vision of Portuguese foreign policy to Salazar. Nonetheless, Caetano sought to continue the imperial-colonial line in foreign policy and at the same time satisfy the growing group of critics of the regime from *Ala liberal* (Fernandes,

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23 Initially Portuguese government rejected the Marshall Plan (September 1947) just to change the position a year later and request the American aid (September 1948). See more: Rollo, 1994.

24 Portuguese Economic Space was the project supported by *ultramarinistas*, the Overseaers, that supported foreign policy based on cooperation with Portuguese colonies and isolationism in the relations with Europe. Portuguese Economic Space was a project of creation of a Single Portuguese Market. See more: Cunha, 2007 and Oliveira, 1963 and 1967.

25 Inner Six was an expression that started to be used in 1960s for the six Member States of the EEC (Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West Germany). Contrarily, the Outer Seven were the Member States of EFTA (Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom).
2006) by his policy of “continuity and renovation\(^{26}\)” (Castilho, 1998). Trying to achieve both aims: maintain the empire and strengthen relations with Europe, Caetano would confess in 1970 that “the choice between Africa and Europe is a false dilemma” (Caetano, 1971). Distinguishing European integration for economic movement leading to customs union (1) and political integration leading to European federation (2), Caetano claimed that Portugal had a lot to win in the first case and everything to lose in the second one.

British application for membership in the EEC, although vetoed twice by de Gaulle's France in the 60s, placed a risk that Portugal would lose its traditional ally and trade partner. The third UK application, accepted in 1970, made clear to the Portuguese government that British accession would be inevitable and encouraged Caetano to urge for an agreement with the EEC. As the Portuguese membership in the EEC would clearly be impossible due to the non-democratic system of government, the Portuguese would accept a free trade agreement with the EEC. The decision – although based on economic reconnaissance – raised serious opposition in governmental circles in Lisbon, as potentially risky for the Portuguese political system (Rollo, 1998). Following this logic, the Portuguese negotiators presided by Rui Teixeira Guerra presented a line that excluded any chance of future Portuguese membership in the EEC, following the doctrinal differences between *Estado Novo* and the principles of the EEC (Freire, 1981).

Nonetheless, it was the Atlantic that was crucial for Portugal in the views of both dictators and Europe was not among their priorities. The Portuguese Empire's foreign policy was concentrated on the Overseas, it had also a strategic alliance with the United States (defence/military cooperation, the base in Lajes) and maintained historically close relations with the United Kingdom. Relations with other partners were of secondary significance for the Portuguese authorities. Although the trade indicators proved a drastic change, while African colonies lost the role of main commercial partner of Portugal to Europe, the political aim of maintaining the Empire and regime determined the objectives of Portuguese foreign policy. The commercial agreements with the EEC and ECSC from 1972 confirmed these objectives, thus rejecting a possibility of future membership.

### 3.2. Polish foreign policy in the communist era (1945-89)

\(^{26}\) Continuity of principles, administrative order and political plan; renovation in methods. See more: Castilho, 1998, p.79-80.
After the World War 2 Poland fell into arms of the USSR which was enlarging their empire in Europe. Poland was ruined by the war, its population decimated and its elites annihilated by the oppressors (both Germans and Russians). The government was taken by the communists and trained in Moscow and the government in exile was no longer recognized in the international arena. Poland lost almost 1/5 of its territory and although it was moved 500 km to the West, with the rise of the Iron Curtain it lost its central-European status and slipped to the Eastern/Soviet part of Europe. For almost 50 years Poland remained a country dependent on the Soviet Union, with all the political decisions of Warsaw condued de facto by Moscow.

It was under such circumstances that the foreign policy of the People's Republic of Poland was created. While the key decisions were taken at Kremlin, there was little space of manoeuvre for the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych – MSZ). Although initially it tried to lead an independent foreign policy (e.g. willing to accept the Marshall Plan), it was Moscow that took the decisions and demanded from Warsaw absolute obedience (Grodzki, 2009). Although Poland kept its international entity, it was not sovereign, but deeply dependent on the Soviet Union, like the other communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Under these circumstances, when the country's government was steered from Moscow, one may not speak about Polish foreign policy, as the decisions in the MSZ were merely fulfilling orders coming from the Kremlin.

Since the creation of a totally Kremlin-dependent provisional government in April 1945 and political cleansing in 1945-47, Polish foreign policy represented positions similar to the Soviet ones in every area – in relation to the West and NATO, in the Near East conflict, as well as the actions towards Third World countries. The core reflection of this attitude appeared in the constitution of Polish People's Republic from 1976 that included a part saying that Poland “empowers friendship and cooperation with the USSR”. Soviet instructions were followed as regards Polish positions towards the Marshall Plan, COMECON and Warsaw Pact and the intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968. However the progressive degradation of the Polish economy and growing credit needs, led Poland – under the favouring circumstances of detente –

28 Polish politicians independent from communists and not sharing their views were persecuted, imprisoned and executed. The same applied to army officials and statesmen that did not want to recognize communists’ authorities. See more: Błażyński, Z. (1990). Mówi Józef Światło. Za kulisami bezpieki i partii 1940-1955, Warszawa.
29 See more: July Manifesto and Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation with the USSR from 1945.
30 Konstytucja PRL, 1976, art. 6.
to initiate some reforms in the system. These reforms were to become the beginning of the end of communism in Poland, as aptly foreseen by Huntington and Brzeziński in the 60s (Brzeziński and Huntington, 1964). The isolation of hard-liners within the communist party (PZPR31) and the politics of appeasement led to the creation of “Solidarność” and an uncontrolled increase of the anti-communist forces within society. The election of Karol Wojtyła as Pope John Paul II, and his pilgrimages to Poland, were a further factor in weakening the regime. Finally, the perestroika and the problems in the USSR led to the dismantling of the Eastern Bloc.

The growing opposition of society in the late 80s and the increasing rising position of “Solidarność” led to the negotiations of the Round Table regarding the future regime. After Gorbachev became the leader at the Kremlin and gave the green light to changes in Poland – through talks at a round table the opposition and the communist government agreed to semi-free elections in 1989 which in the end led to the democratization of the country, and consequently to the transformation to a free-market economy. “Solidarność” won all the mandates but one, in the semi-free parliamentary elections32 and although it was a communist general Jaruzelski to take the mandate of the president, one of the leaders of the opposition, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, became Prime Minister and formed the government. For the first time in 45-year history of the Soviet Bloc a non-communist politician stood ahead of the government in one of the countries of the Bloc.

In the last years of the People's Republic of Poland, its foreign policy was rather passive, due to the escalation of internal problems – both within the country and within the Bloc. The fall of the regime seemed to be the question of the time and the future shape of Poland and of the rest of the Eastern and Central European countries was unknown. This made any foreign policy actions difficult as Poland and the other members of the Eastern Bloc were already on the defence (Kuźniar, 2008). The internal problems of the Bloc and its members prevailed over the foreign challenges, and as another phase of the Third Wave of democratization begun, the world’s eyes turned into the Central and Eastern Europe.

The foreign policies of non-democratic regimes in Portugal before 1974 and Poland

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31 Polish United Workers Party – Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza.
32 Lower chamber (Sejm): 2/3 of the seats in remained in the hands of the communists and 1/3 of the deputies were to be elected; upper chamber (Senat): all the 100 senators to be elected. “Solidarność” won 160/160 mandates disputed in Sejm and 99/100 in Senat.
before 1989 turned away from Western Europe. The leaders of both countries preferred to cooperate closely with other partners, while integrating Europe was amongst the priorities of neither Lisbon nor Warsaw. Alternatively, Portuguese and Polish leaders in the given periods looked for close cooperation within the preferred groups of countries, Portuguese colonies and the Soviet Bloc, respectively. Both dictatorial Portugal and communist Poland considered their own partners better than the integrating Europe. Nonetheless, there were considerable differences between both regimes, ideologically and historically. Moreover, in terms of foreign policy in the aspects of security Portugal was member of NATO which was considered an enemy in Poland that belonged to Warsaw Pact. One should also remember that Polish foreign policy was highly influenced by Moscow, making the rejection to cooperate with the Western Europe not an independent decision, while Lisbon was a fully sovereign country and the choice of foreign policy lied in the hands of Portuguese politicians. All in all, the foreign policy lines towards Western Europe taken by the governments in non-democratic Portugal and non-democratic Poland were stable and did not give presumptions for change.

4. The breakdown of the political system and the change in the foreign policy. Options for a new opening

The fall of the non-democratic regimes in Portugal and Poland led to a major change in their foreign policies. It was also caused by the fall of the political organizations they were members of (PT: the loss of colonial empire; PL: the fall of the USSR and the dissolution of the Soviet Bloc). Democratization and geopolitical changes led the new governments in Lisbon and in Warsaw to introduce new order in the ministries of foreign affairs. Suddenly, there were numerous options available in their foreign policies that were suppressed and rejected by non-democratic governments. These options were to be considered, nevertheless frequently changing governments in the first difficult years of democracy did not assure stability for the diplomatic relations with other countries.

4.1. Portugal

4.1.1. The MFA and the reorientation in the foreign policy

The military coup on 25 April 1974 took away the power from Marcello Caetano and it fell into the hands of generals from the MFA. The coup was a surprise both for the government
and for the international powers, the CIA resident in London, Cord Meyer, said even that “when the Revolution happened in Portugal, the USA went out for lunch” (Maxwell, 1995). The happenings in Portugal made it the central element of the bipolar world (Magone, 1998). Furthermore, it turned out that the revolution changed not only the political regime of the country, but also its foreign policy which left its influence on the global order (Chrobot, 2007).

The political programme of the MFA in the field of foreign policy stated that “the Provisional Government will act basing on the principles of independence and equality among the states, of non-interference in the internal issues of other states, and of peace defence, expanding and diversifying international relations with friendship and cooperation as a base” (Programa do MFA). This meant a redefinition of foreign policy by ending colonial wars and decolonization, as well as the reopening of the relations of Portugal after the period of isolation on the international arena (Ferreira, 1993). The new governing institution – Junta da Salvação Nacional (JSN\textsuperscript{33}) – was seeking international recognition which was reflected in the point of the programme related to “respecting of international commitments and treaties in force” which evidently referred to Portuguese membership of NATO (Mendes, 2001). However, when it comes to the main lines of Portuguese foreign policy, there was no agreement between the factions competing inside the MFA. The supporters of general Spínola, elected president of the new Republic, desired a cooperation with the colonies and their gradual switching to eventual independence. On the other hand the sympathizers of Otelo Saraiva wanted to implement a Cuban model of governance in Portugal. On the contrary, the Portuguese Communist Party members with general Vasco Gonçalves called for a privileged alliance with the USSR and the Eastern Bloc. Finally, moderate officers like Vasco Lourenço and Melo Antunes looked for cooperation with Third World countries, whilst not ruling out the partnership within the Western Bloc.

Among main Portuguese foreign policy proposals after the Revolution there were: (1) neutrality and alliance with the Portuguese-speaking countries and Third World/Developing countries, (2) European integration (association or accession) and (3) cooperation with the Soviet Bloc.

**4.1.2. Neutrality and alliance with the Portuguese-speaking countries and Third**
World/Developing countries

Among the various options, the most promoted was a model of strong partnership with the territories of Overseas (still dependent on Portugal, but on the basis of more equal partnership – federation or semi-independent, but with strong political and economic cooperation). Although the officers from the MFA were predominantly against the colonial war, this does not mean that they were ready to cede independence to these territories. *De facto* some of the members of the MFA, centred around general Spínola, wanted to maintain control over the Overseas, including them in the federation under the government in Lisbon. Their independence was a question to be dealt in the future with the option of self-determination. The project included Brazil into the group – as traditionally close to *Mundo Lusófono*. Nevertheless, this option seemed hardly possible to realize, due to the hostile approach of the largest colonies (Angola, Mozambique) and a lack of deeper cooperation with Brazil in both economic and political terms (Carvalho, 1982).

4.1.3. The European path

The majority of newly-created political parties (PS³⁴ and PSD³⁵ *par excellence*) favoured the process of decolonization and preferred ceding total independence to the colonies and developing a partnership with Europe that was uniting – to join the European Economic Community as a full-member or become an associated member. This would mean a radical change in the Portuguese foreign policy, *id est* abandoning the traditional Atlantic direction and turning attention to the European continent, on which Portugal was left behind by the countries of Western Europe that were developing a more and more profound integration model. It was in particular PS and PSD that sought to set Portugal on the European path.

The project seemed particularly feasible for the developments from the 60s and early 70s when Europe became Portugal’s main economic partner, especially after the establishment of EFTA. However, the power during the PREC³⁶ was still in the hands of the MFA and the parties had still to wait for their turn.

³⁴ *Partido Socialista* – Socialist Party (centre-left).
³⁵ *Partido Social Democrata* – Socialdemocratic Party (centre-right).
³⁶ *Processo Revolucionário em Curso (PREC), Revolutionary Process in Progress* – was the period after the Carnation Revolution (25th April 1974) until the new Constitution was approved by the Constitutional Assembly (25 April 1976). In this period numerous groups from the left-hand side of the political spectrum to set up socialism in Portugal (so-called *rumo to socialismo*, course to socialism). It was a period of political instability when new-born democracy was put in question by various political and military factions that sought to build a leftist regime in the country.
4.1.4. The communists and the Soviet Bloc

In contrast to the two big parties, the communists from PCP\(^{37}\) favoured a strong alliance with the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc. The project had also some support among radical members of the MFA (Vasco Gonçalves). The idea to build socialism (or “people’s democracy”) in Portugal, was then a question of the regime model and foreign policy connecting the external policy to the internal one. There were numerous attempts to put Portugal on this way and they had their peak during the “Hot summer\(^{38}\)” of 1975. Nonetheless, after November 1975 with the fall of the V Provisional Government of general Vasco Gonçalves the next government introduced a more moderate approach and the threat of communist Portugal was dismissed.

4.2. Poland

4.2.1. The Round Table and the fall of communism in Poland. Consequences for the reorientation of foreign policy

Under the Agreement of the Round Table from April 1989 the communists were obliged to organize partly-free parliamentary elections in the summer that year – with the elections to the lower chamber – *Sejm* – free for 1/3 of votes and 2/3 reserved for the communists, and the elections to the upper chamber – *Senat* – being totally free. “Solidarność” used the given opportunity and took all the freely-elected mandates to *Sejm* (161 out of 460) and 99% of the mandates to *Senat* (99 out of 100). With the proceeding decomposition inside PZPR, the leaders of democratic opposition formed the new government with Tadeusz Mazowiecki as Prime Minister. This was the very first time after the WWII that a country from the Eastern Bloc was led by a non-communist. Although the “force” ministries were kept by communist generals\(^{39}\), the power was in the hands of the hitherto leaders of democratic opposition. Soon, with the retreat of communist ministers and with the election of Lech Wałęsa for president\(^{40}\), “Solidarność”

\(^{37}\) *Partido Comunista Português* – Portuguese Communist Party.


\(^{39}\) In the first government of Mazowiecki the communists took the strategic ministries: Ministry of National Defence (gen. Siwicki) and Ministry of Home Affairs (gen. Kiszczak).

\(^{40}\) After the shortening of the mandate of general Jaruzelski and the return to the formula of general elections for president in 1990.
gathered all the power in their hands.

In the new geopolitical reality – with the end of the Cold War, decomposition of the USSR and democratization of Central and Eastern Europe, with new neighbours\(^{41}\), and above all after all the internal changes, a new chapter was opening in Polish foreign policy. The process of democratization was ongoing and as the geopolitical change in the region and in the world was so dramatic in 1989 it was still unknown which will be the future Polish foreign policy, the same as the foreign policies of the other countries of the former Soviet Bloc, with Russia in the vanguard. The very first issue was however the future regime of the countries. Although the process of democratization was on course, almost 50 years of communism left a big mark on all the CEE countries and huge political and economic reforms were necessary to reach democratic standards.

### 4.2.2. Strengthening Polish relations with Western Europe

The fall of the Eastern Bloc and the \textit{de facto} decomposition of COMECON and the Warsaw Pact\(^{42}\) encouraged the Polish government to become an independent actor on the European stage. The supporters of strengthening ties with the Western partners were lauded and the pro-European route in Polish foreign policy started gaining ground. By ensuring closer contacts with Western European partners, Poland could make a “come-back” to Europe, from which it was separated after the WWII by the Yalta order\(^{43}\). Although it was only Germany that strongly supported Poland on the European path, with other Member States showing their apparent reservations (France\(^{44}\)), such cooperation found support among the vast majority of the Polish political class (Skubiszewski, 1997). Nonetheless, in the very first moments of the reborn Polish democracy the government of Mazowiecki was quite cautious at its approximation to the West, since Poland was still in the “zone of influence” of the USSR, with the Red Army within the Polish borders, and the communists controlling the army and security services.

\(^{41}\) After the decomposition of the USSR Poland has had on the Eastern border 4 neighbours (the Russian Federation, Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine) in place of one and after the split of Czechoslovakia – two (Czech Republic and Slovakia) instead of one in the South.

\(^{42}\) COMECON was dissolved on 28 June 1991 and Warsaw Pact on 1 July 1991. However, after 1989 both of these organisations were a mere façade.

\(^{43}\) The post-WWII world order was agreed on the Yalta conference, in February 1945, at a meeting of the leaders of the USA (F.D. Roosevelt), the UK (W. Churchill) and the USSR (J. Stalin).

\(^{44}\) France was not interested in changing the configuration of powers in Europe, was initially against the reunification of Germany, and soon also against the unification of the post-communist CEE countries to the Western structures (NATO, EEC).
4.2.3. Poland as regional power

Another option for the new guidelines of Polish foreign policy was regional integration in the Central and Eastern Europe, with the former members of the Soviet Bloc (excluding the USSR/Russian Federation). It blended in the concept of Intermarum formulated yet before the WWII by Marshal Piłsudski\(^45\). In this political plan, Poland would be the leader of a loose federation of the countries of the region of which borders started in Estonia and ended on the territories of former Yugoslavia. This vision had particular support of this part of establishment that wanted Poland to remain independent from the West and/or that were against participation in any supranational body (they preferred an association of countries to a federation). It was also based on the presumption that Europe cannot hold a zone of political vacuum and it went against the idea of some Western European countries who preferred to keep a “buffer zone” between the West and the USSR (Skubiszewski, 1993). However, it was not possible to realize such a strategy in the long term. Poland neither had the resources to do it, nor was it in the interest of the other CEE countries. Most of those interested in joining the EEC/EC and NATO were even discontented with Polish attempts for hegemony in the region. With time, this concept slowly evolved towards an equal cooperation of the CEE countries on their way to Euro-Atlantic integration. It was used in creating Central European Free Trade Agreement\(^46\), Visegrad Group\(^47\) and Central European Initiative\(^48\).

4.2.4. Partnership with the USSR/Russian Federation

Although communism was over and the Soviet Bloc was falling apart, there were still a few politicians who believed that there was a possibility to cooperate with the USSR/Russian

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\(^{46}\) CEFTA – signed in December 1992 by Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. It was meant to restore the economic exchange between the Central and Eastern European countries to a high level after a dramatic fall since 1989. It was also meant to establish a closer political cooperation under the name of Visegrad Group.

\(^{47}\) V4 (initially Visegrad Triangle with Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland) was an informal platform of political cooperation of these Central European countries to develop a common approach to the European Union and NATO and to give way for the membership in these organisations. The cooperation started in 1992 and lasts until today (4 countries since the division of Czechoslovakia in 1993).

\(^{48}\) Initiated as Quadragonale by Austria, Hungary, Italy and Yugoslavia in 1989, CEI was an institutionalized form of cooperation of the Central European countries and South-Eastern European countries. Czechoslovakia joined in 1990 (Pentagonale) and Poland in 1991 (Hexagonale). Since 1992 works as CEI. Its objectives are to improve cooperation between the post-communist countries with the Western-European ones. Currently the members are: Albania, Austria, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, FYROM, Hungary, Italy, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine.
Federation on equal rights. They were in favour of taking such a direction in Polish foreign policy that would recreate a partnership with Russia, but this time on the basis of a true partnership. This referred to an old concept of the Polish nationalists from before the WWII that were strong supporters of a harmonized cooperation and partnership with Poland's Eastern neighbour. The supporters of this course of foreign policy argued that privileged relations with Moscow would result in many advantages, both political and economic (Kuźniar, 2008). However, this option had little chances of success, due to the historical record and a big element of mistrust towards Russia among both Polish society and elites. In addition, there was no interest from the side of the USSR to give priority to relations with Poland. Furthermore, there were still a number of Russian politicians that treated Poland as before 198949.

4.2.5. **Special partnership with the USA**

The conviction that only the USA can be a trustful partner for Poland has been present in Poland since the declaration of 14 points in President Woodrow Wilson's speech in 1918 which point 13 assumed the resurgence of an independent Poland50. The “betrayal” of the UK and France in early September 1939 that limited their actions to declaring war on Hitler and led to a “phony war” left no sympathy for these countries in Poland. This was also the case with regards to the decisions taken at the Yalta conference, leaving Poland in the hands of Stalin. On the other hand, the USA always kept the image of the “gendarme of the world” and for many Poles they were the only trustworthy guarantee of Polish independence. That is why many Polish politicians saw the accession to NATO as more important than the accession to the EEC. That was above all the position of some right-wing parties. The alliance with the USA seemed also valuable in the context of the reunification of Germany and the issue of the Polish-German border51.

The new democratic governments of post-dictatorial Portugal and post-communist Poland faced a political momentum and an opportunity to redefine the main policies in external relations. The spectrum of new options included neutrality, alliance with the USSR/Russian Federation or

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51 The border on the river Odra (Oder) from 1945 was never recognized by Western Germany. After reunification there were certain fears in Poland that united Germany would try to redraw the border line with Poland. See more: Malinowski, K. (1997). Polityka Republiki Federalnej Niemiec wobec Polski w latach 1982-1991. Instytut Zachodni, Poznań.
European integration.

5. International dimension of internal changes

In the times of transformation, internal policy issues become more important, while external relations stay rather in the background. At the same foreign policies depend much on the outcomes from internal political resolutions. Although the new policies of Portugal post-'74 foreign policy and Poland post-'89 foreign policy stayed somehow in the background of the transformation processes, they were very important from the global point of view: the reorientation of Portuguese and Polish foreign policies would have a big influence on the new geopolitical map of Europe and the world. The effect was even stronger taking into account that when Portugal was revolting, almost simultaneously processes of political change began in Spain and Greece. Similarly, Polish political transformation was not unique, since it launched an avalanche of changes in the countries of the Soviet Bloc and led to a dramatic change in the geopolitical division of the world. These new arrangements in the foreign policies were important modifications in the international arena. That is why Portugal in 1974 and Poland in 1989 were on everyone's lips.

5.1. The international context of the Portuguese transition

The change of regime in Portugal and its possible consequences drew a lot of attention on the international arena. The bipolar world was in the middle of the Cold War and any changes in the configuration of the hostile camps were able to tip the balance and cause a chain reaction. The systemic rupture caused by the MFA and strengthened by simultaneous processes of democratization and decolonization of the very last European colonial Empire resulted in a deep state crisis (Maxwell, 1997). The revolution, the future regime of the Portuguese state and new lines of Portuguese foreign policy were a big issue on the contemporary Concert of Powers. The situation in Portugal was discussed in the fora of NATO, the EEC, as well as the Warsaw Pact. Undoubtedly, Portugal was the key topic on the backstage of world politics, in particular the question of decolonization and the tensions concerning the make-up of the future regime in 1975 (“Verão Quente”) (Teixeira, 2007). As a member of NATO and ally of the Western Bloc, Portugal faced political changes under pressure from the outside, with the Soviet Bloc supporting the fall of dictatorship and implementation of socialism, as well as decolonization followed by
communist revolution, while the Western countries supported democratization of Portugal and decolonization followed by the forming of democratic regimes in Africa. The outcomes of these processes, be it in Portugal, be it in the colonies, were of great significance for the order of the Bipolar World. What is more, the Portuguese Revolution caught the world powers by surprise which as a consequence made them stand up take notice of the Portuguese game being played by the MFA. Although there were attempts at interventions (the US submarine in Tejo River (Szulc, 1975)), at the same time Kissinger compared Soares to a Kerensky of Portugal (Huntington, 1997), gave a hint of the American inability to influence the sequence of events in Lisbon. The EEC, on the other hand, tried to use the double-support for democratic transition in Portugal, (1) by granting financial aid for restructuring political-economic regime and turn it into liberal democracy, and (2) by underlining the importance of democratic clause in relation to presumptive Portuguese EEC membership aspirations (Magone, 1997).

According to Teixeira, during the period of democratization in Portugal, on the margins of a struggle concerning the shape of the future regime, another tough struggle took place: for the aims and strategic direction of the newly-born Portuguese democracy on international arena (Teixeira, 2007). During the unstable period of the Provisional Governments the strategic aims of Portuguese foreign policy were hardly defined – one could note, however, a tendency towards closer cooperation with former colonies.

5.2. Polish transformation and external factors

Systemic transition from communism (“real socialism”) to democracy was ongoing since spring 1989, however the results, above all the very final shape of the Polish regime was uncertain. This was caused by a number of factors, of which the most important were the future of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Bloc and the result of the negotiations between “Solidarność” and PZPR. Internal problems of the USSR, disintegrating tendencies inside the country and its possible decomposition, finally its instability (August Putsch\textsuperscript{52}) as a result of internal tensions between the communists, army officials and secret service led to a loss of potential control of the USSR over its hitherto “zone of influence” in Central and Eastern Europe (Paczkowski, 2004). The real (but not formal) fall of the Bloc with the loss of power by the communists in the

\textsuperscript{52} The attempt of coup d'état from August 1991 by a group of hardliners in the Communist Party of Soviet Union. The objective was to stop Gorbachev's reforms. Although the attempt fell in 2 days it destabilized significantly the Soviet Union and resulted in dissolution of the country.
majority of its Member States happened when the leaders of the USSR were standing still, as they were facing serious problems within the USSR, while the trend for independence was growing (par excellence in the Baltic states, as well as the Caucasian soviet republics) and factions were fighting for power in the Kremlin. This resulted in a deep weakening of the Soviet position in the Bloc and in effect gave a “green light” for the democratic transformation in the CEE countries. At the beginning of this process, in 1989/1990 nobody was talking about the possibility of leaving the COMECON or Warsaw Pact, however this soon became a reality in 1991, with the further destabilization and weakening of the international position of the Soviet Union.

The democratic reforms in Poland (as well as in neighbouring countries) were observed with sympathy in the Western World, however also with a dose of uncertainty. Nonetheless, all the suggestions by the CEE countries, who were willing to join the Euro-Atlantic structures, such as NATO or the EEC, were taken with deep reservations. One talked even about a “deterrence strategy” by the members of the latter two organisations (Kuźniar, 2007). Nonetheless, a change of approach to the CEE countries was noted very soon, as e.g. NATO stopped treating these countries as potential enemies (Kupiecki, 2000). A platform of cooperation was launched under the name of North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)53. On the other hand, the EEC were concentrated on the deepening of integration instead of enlargement and the attempts made by the CEE countries were met with a cool stance from the EEC Member States (Kuźniar, 1992). Nevertheless, in August 1991, after the fallen coup in Moscow, the Communities' Member States changed their attitude and decided to privilege the relations with the Eastern new-born democracies, granting them with association treaties (Plonka, 2003).

6. Internal factors for change in the foreign policy

Although the consequences of the reorientation of foreign policy after the regime changes in Portugal and in Poland had a great impact on the international equilibrium, it was the internal situation in both countries that influenced these reorientations. After the fall of non-democratic regimes the new government that took over the power found itself in a new situation: when taking decisions they had to be aware of the democratic scrutiny of the electors. The future shape of the regimes in Portugal and Poland and the model of economy that both countries would apply

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53 NACC was a consultative forum initially launched by German-American initiative. Established on 20th December 1991, it gathered NATO countries and 9 CEE countries; soon the forum was enlarged by the Commonwealth of Independent States countries as well as Georgia and Albania.
was interconnected to the choice of foreign policy.

6.1. Internal factors. The foreign policy of Portuguese Provisional Governments

Among more and less feasible options for the future Portuguese foreign policy it was the obligation and right of the Provisional Governments to choose and implement them in the Period of Revolution in Course. Until the parliamentary elections the power was in the hands of the Junta that was dependant on the MFA. The legally established political parties rushed to elections, but not all the members of the MFA shared their view, claiming that Portugal needed a period of military governance to implement the achievements of the revolution (Mattoso, 1993). During this time the Provisional Governments were created as executive power, however JSN kept most of their powers.

The foreign policies implemented by the Provisional Governments (1st-6th) were conditioned by the MFA (Ferreira, 1988). Mendes divides them into three groups: (1) pro-Western (1st, 3rd Provisional Governments), (2) pro-Third-World (4th, 6th Provisional Governments), and (3) pro-Soviet (2nd, 5th Provisional Governments) (Mendes, 2001). The first option was presented by Mário Soares that opted for a democratic Portugal that cooperated with the Western World and entered the mainstream of European integration. The second one accomplished by Melo Antunes, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, was a strategy of neutrality and non-alignment. The third option, assumed by the Prime-minister Vasco Gonçalves, was in line with the internal policy orientation that sought to build socialism in Portugal, based on the Soviet model (Cunha, 2007).

The founding father of the pro-Western approach followed by the first and the third Provisional Governments was Mário Soares, contemporary Minister of Foreign Affairs. His numerous contacts within the community of European socialists, par excellence in West Germany54, let Soares gain sympathy for the new Portuguese regime and win some supporters and allies with regards the Portuguese future accession to the EEC. In this context Soares undertook his visit in Brussels in the beginning of May, 1974, with the hope of getting Portugal access to the community’s funds and intensify Portugal-EEC relations, substituting the Agreement on Special Relations from 1972 by an association agreement (Magone, 1998). Nonetheless the democratization of Portugal was a conditio sine qua non on the Portuguese way

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54 Partido Socialista was founded there in Bad Münstereifel, West Germany, in 1973.
to integration, since the Member States made it clear that “the Community is open to other European nations that share the same ideas and objectives” which was mentioned in the Davignon Report in 1970. At the same time the EEC followed a strategy of supporting democratic changes in Portugal that sought democracy as the ultimate consequence of the Carnation Revolution. In the end of 1974 Soares once again expressed the will to have closer relations with the EEC both in the quality of Minister of FA and as a leader of PS. In November Portugal submitted a proposal of a deeper cooperation with the EEC, while in December Soares said to Le Monde that Portugal needed to get closer to the EEC (Cunha, 2007). However, the radicalization under the government of Vasco Goncalves put the future of democracy in Portugal in question and suspended the rapprochement. Facing the incoming elections to the Constitutional Assembly, the EEC renewed its pressure on Portugal for democratization of the revolutionary regime (Magone, 1998). The government was still negotiating the new agreement with the EEC and despite some calls for accession, there were only talks about a free-trade agreement. These talks were frozen with a gradual radicalization and isolation of the government of Vasco Goncalves. After the new government was nominated, headed by Pinheiro de Azevedo, negotiations were continued and the EEC, satisfied with the progress of political situation in Portugal, agreed to make available 180M ECU for the Portuguese government to support economic development of the country (Bulletin of the EC, 1975).

To sum up: during the pre-constitutional period Portuguese foreign policy was undefined and characterised by hesitancy due to the tensions within the MFA and the uncertainty regarding the future Portuguese political regime. The radical elements of the MFA were a threat for democracy and prevented the EEC from compromising basing on the democratic clause. Taking over the government by the moderates opened the way for democratic elections in Portugal and led to an agreement with the EEC. Mendes suggests that at that time Portuguese foreign policy was a hostage to the internal situation in the country (Mendes, 2001).

The Carnation Revolution was presented by Samuel Huntington as the beginning of the Third Wave of democratization (Huntington, 1991). The outcome of the process was uncertain along the whole revolutionary period – until the first free parliamentary elections in 1976 and the forming of the 1st Constitutional Government of Mário Soares (although the military forces left their mark on the regime until constitutional revision in 1982). During the whole period of

instability on the way to democracy the influence of the European Communities was remarkable. Lawrence Whitehead called this process “convergence in democratization” (Whitehead, 2002), referring to Portugal, Greece and Spain, the countries that opened the Third Wave of democratization according to Huntington's classification. As the distance in the democratic norms between the EEC and the new democracies was huge, the adjustment of the latter was inevitable, were they to become future members of the Communities. According to Magone, the democratic conditionality of the EEC was fundamental for establishment of the Portuguese democracy. Its adaptation to the European norms was still happening during the negotiations for the membership.


The victory of “Solidarność” in the 1989 semi-free elections launched an avalanche of democratization in Poland. Soon, with the new non-communist Prime-Minister and government, the country initiated the process of political and economic changes from a totalitarian communist regime with a central-planned economy, to a democracy with a free-market economy. In December 1989 Poland came back to its historical name “Rzeczpospolita Polska” leaving behind the communist “People's Republic of Poland”. Constitutional changes established the rule of law and removed references to the alliance with the Soviet Union (Chruściak, 1994). On 27 January 1990 PZPR was substituted by a social democratic party (SdRP) which gathered moderate members of the communist party and maintained a big influence on the political arena of the country during the transformation. At the same time the army officers controlled the ministries of national defence and of interior, while the secret service kept surveillance of the opposition parties.

With the change of geopolitical situation of Poland, a fundamental change in Polish foreign policy was also expected. The latter was, however, dependent on the results of the transformation, which were quite unclear in the beginning of the process, in 1989/1990. The presence of the communist army officials as ministers in the government, the office of President

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56 Socjaldemokracja Rzeczpospolitej (Socialdemocracy of the Republic of Poland).
57 In 1993 and 2001 SdRP and their successor SLD won parliamentary elections and formed governments. Their candidate, Aleksander Kwaśniewski, former youth minister(1985-87), won the presidential elections in 1995 (defeating Lech Wałęsa) and was the president of Poland in 1995-2005.
in the hands of gen. Jaruzelski, the author of martial law and communist leader in the 80s, and an unclear impact of the secret service on the political events were the main obstacles for a coherent and clear expression of the aims of Polish foreign policy (Kuźniar, 2008). The communist generals in the government and the Soviet army camping in Poland put in question the democratic future of the nascent Polish Third Republic. The obscure internal situation of Poland, the unknown consequences of the systemic transformation and the shape of the future regime inhibited the development of a long-term vision in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These obstacles made it difficult for the new minister of foreign affairs, Krzysztof Skubiszewski, to make Poland an independent international actor, as well as a credible and important partner in Europe and the world.

Under the circumstances of tough political tensions that were growing after Wałęsa's call for “war on the top”, with the rivalry inside “Solidarność”, communists' aspirations to regain lost power and the ambiguous actions of the secret service, various concepts for a new Polish foreign policy appeared, particularly in the first phase of transformation, i.e. in 1989-91, until the first completely free elections to the parliament.

The Autumn of Nations and the semi-free elections from June 1989 substantially changed the geopolitical position of Poland and led to a reorientation of foreign policy. First of all, the regained sovereignty from the USSR let Polish governments to reconstruct all the fundamentals of Polish external contacts. Prime-minister Mazowiecki, in his first exposé in the parliament, on 12 September 1989, underlined that “the relations based on sovereignty and partnership are more stable than an order based on domination and force” (Mazowiecki, 1989). Both Prime-minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs presented a pro-European approach, however the circumstances forced them to lead a realpolitik that tried to balance the pro-Western sympathies with the Eastern Bloc heritage. That is why until 1991 when the first free elections took place, Polish foreign policy was in a process of manoeuvring between its partners in the West, former allies from the Eastern Bloc and the USSR. Although in the long-term the aim of Polish foreign policy was to join the Western structures, in the beginning of the democratization process Polish governments

58 The conflict between Lech Wałęsa and Tadeusz Mazowiecki (contemporary Prime-minister) and between the left-wing and right-wing politicians inside the “Solidarność” syndicate. Started in the beginning of 1990 when Mazowiecki took over leadership in the camp of democratic opposition and Wałęsa found himself on a side track. Wałęsa became a fierce critic of the government. The conflict ended up with Wałęsa and Mazowiecki as rivals for the presidential elections in October 1990 (won by Wałęsa) and the division of “Solidarność” movement for more radical right-wing parties and centre/left-wing parties.
were cautious and still developed some cooperation within the falling Eastern Bloc (COMECON and Warsaw Pact until their dissolution). The governmental changes and the conflicts within “Solidarność” often obstructed the plans of Skubiszewski. A lack of experience at the international level of some of the leaders frequently led to the creation of inconsistencies in the lines of Polish foreign policy. At the same time, the uncertain political future of the region forced Polish politicians to act carefully and sometimes even timidly.

A complicated geopolitical situation of the CEE in transition was a big challenge for the Polish ministry of foreign affairs. The question of reunification of Germany and the recognition of the Polish-German border on Odra (Oder) river led Poland to seek support in Moscow and Washington. Soon, the issue of the retreat of Soviet soldiers based in Poland caused clashes with the USSR and Germany. At the same time COMECON and the Warsaw Pact were undergoing further deconstruction. What is more, in that very moment the situation in Poland changed, when gen. Jaruzelski was put under pressure and left his function and Lech Wałęsa was elected president in October 1990. At the same time communist generals were dismissed from the functions of ministers of national defence and interior and were substituted by the members of “Solidarność”. This led to less pressure from the pro-Soviet faction, both because of their weakness in Poland and due to the problems in the USSR. Nonetheless, the internal tensions continued, as the “war on the top” escalated. These events deepened the instability in the Polish political arena.

Basically, in the period of democratic transformation (understood as the time since the first semi-free elections in 1989 until the first free elections in 1991) Polish foreign policy despite numerous ideas, was often hesitant and cautious due to the tensions inside the country and uncertainty of the future shape of the regime, as well as because of an unstable international situation. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was in hands of Krzysztof Skubiszewski, both in the government of Mazowiecki and Bielecki. The first one led a policy based on balance between the West and the East. Special relations with Kohl's Germany were counterbalanced by the consultations with Moscow and Polish reaffirmation of the obligations coming from the

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59 Since Germany wanted to transport Soviet soldiers transiting through Poland.
60 With the changes in all the Eastern Bloc and particularly when Vaclav Havel became president of Czechoslovakia, Wałęsa started pressing on Jaruzelski to leave the function of president. As the communism was over and Jaruzelski had no democratic mandate, “Solidarność” called for free presidential elections. See more: Dudek, A. (2005). Historia polityczna Polski 1989-2005, Arcana.
61 On 6 July 1990 Czesław Kiszczak and Florian Siwicki were substituted by Krzysztof Kozłowski and Piotr Kołodziejeczyk.
membership in the COMECON and Warsaw Pact (Skubiszewski, 1997).

While in the government of Mazowiecki, minister Skubiszewski tried to take the Western-European direction in foreign policy since the very beginning. It was reflected through developing relations with the EEC. On his first visit in Brussels, Mazowiecki negotiated a possible Polish association to the EEC. Skubiszewski emphasized the EEC as the long-term objective of Polish foreign policy in his exposés (Skubiszewski, 1997). The minister called for a European unity and presented the EEC as a tool for that. In May 1990 Poland presented an application to open the association negotiations which started in December. However, the EEC Member States were quite sceptical about the process which Wałęsa called “substituting the Iron Curtain with a silver one”. It was only with the failed coup in Moscow, in August 1991, that the EEC saw the risk of the non-democratic turn in the Eastern Europe and accelerated the negotiations. Finally, the “Europe Agreement” was signed on 16 December 1991. The preamble “recognizing the fact that the final objective of Poland is to become a member of the Community” (Europe Agreement) was a significant success of Polish diplomacy. On the other hand, an accession application to the Council of Europe (CoE) submitted in January 1990 waited for approval until late 1991. The membership in this organisation was to be a symbol of successful democratic transformation in Poland. However, the high standards of the CoE required free democratic elections as a precondition for membership. This condition was not fulfilled by the semi-free elections in 1989 neither by the free presidential elections in 1990 and only with the free parliamentary elections in October 1991 did Poland become the 26th member of the Council of Europe. Apart from relations with the EEC and the CoE, Poland was quite active on the forum of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)\textsuperscript{62}. In the beginning this forum seemed to have become an important organisation in Europe that would connect both the Western countries and the former members of the Eastern Bloc. However, initial Polish ambitions soon decreased, as the Euro-Atlantic vision became the main direction of Polish foreign policy (Zięba, 2010).

7. The reorientation of foreign policy during the process of political transformation

As a consequence of the fall of non-democratic regimes in Portugal in 1974 and in Poland

in 1989 these countries faced not only a political transformation to democracy, economic transformation to a free-market economy, but also a substantial change in foreign policy. The first years of transformation were the time of struggle between the factions for the future shape of the regime. Although external relations stayed somehow in the background of the mainstream clashes, there is no doubt that the aim of the factions struggling for power was not only the shape of the future political and economic regime, but also the new position of Portugal and Poland in the international environment, future alliances and main direction of foreign policy.

7.1. Regime change in Portugal and uncertainty over new foreign policy options

The process of Europeanization in Portugal of 1974-77 was launched from the bottom by the military coup. The first step was the overthrowing of the dictatorship and setting up of a democratic regime. It was the condition sine qua non of the eventual Portuguese membership in the EEC and also the reason why the Portuguese attempts to approach the EEC had been so far rejected. Decolonization allowed Portugal not only to decrease the enormous effort and engagement in Africa and take over the obstacle on the way to European integration, but also let Portuguese foreign policy be recreated and enabled a fresh look on the “Europe” issue, that had been consistently rejected in the Portuguese ministry of foreign affairs.

Europeanization of the Portuguese foreign policy started from the bottom, with the political parties implementing their programme which presented the issue of European integration as a priority. It was unclear in the very first moment after the coup when various factions clashed. Once democratic representatives were elected, the decision was taken, and Portuguese foreign policy took a clear turn towards Europe. Europeanization was then a clearly sovereign choice of the democratically elected Portuguese government and not an inevitable or independent process. It was a conscious decision of the Council of Ministers that reoriented Portugal from the Atlantic and launched the Europeanization process.

Nonetheless, the Member States of the EEC were not unanimous with regards to Portuguese accession. The accession application presented in March 1977 opened the negotiations that were to become a true test for the young Portuguese democracy. We may say that the Europeanization of Portuguese foreign policy in 1974-77 was strictly connected to internal policy, and depended par excellence on the shape of the future regime. Once the democratic route was taken, the European option seemed natural for the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and was vastly supported in the parliament. In this way, the first period of the Europeanization of Portugal was closely associated with democratic transition.

7.2. The fall of communism in Poland and the new opening in foreign policy

The first years of democracy turned out to be a tough period for the newly-reborn Polish nation. Nonetheless, the ambitious plan to make up for the lost half-century and catch up with developed countries was maintained, even though the changes of government were very frequent (6 in 5 years) and the parliamentary majority unstable due to the parties fragmentation\textsuperscript{63}. Even the post-communist party reformed their foreign policy programme and was now one of the greatest supporters of the Euro-Atlantic approach. Germany, with chancellor Kohl in particular, were strong supporters of Polish aspirations, but presumed accession to the Euro-Atlantic structures was still the melody of the future. However, the big step was made by handing out the EC accession application and by intensifying cooperation with NATO.

8. Adoption of the European direction in the foreign policy

After the foundations of the new regimes were laid and the most urgent internal issues were solved, the international situation of the countries had to be cleared. After the period of unstable foreign policy and frequently changing approaches, came the consolidation of democracy and time to set the direction for the external policy and the country's positioning in the international environment. It seemed a less difficult task than finding solutions for the internal problems and there was a general consensus among the most relevant political parties in Portugal and Poland regarding the foreign policy direction. Except for a few minor euro-sceptical political groups (PCP and MDP-CDE\textsuperscript{64} in Portugal; ROP\textsuperscript{65}, Samoobrona and LPR\textsuperscript{66} in Poland) generally the political parties supported the pro-European orientation in foreign policy and this was the line taken by the governments chosen in democratic elections\textsuperscript{67}.

\textsuperscript{63} In the 1991 elections due to the lack of threshold clause representatives of 29 parties and political groups won parliamentary mandates.
\textsuperscript{64} Movimento Democrático Português-Comissão Democrática Eleitoral, Portuguese Democratic Movement-Democratic Electoral Commission.
\textsuperscript{65} Ruch Odrodzenia Polski, the Movement of Restauration of Poland.
\textsuperscript{66} Liga Polskich Rodzin, the League of Polish Families.
\textsuperscript{67} Even the euro-skeptical government of Jan Olszewski (the first Polish government after the free elections in 1991) nominated K. Skubiszewski for the minister of foreign affairs who was a definite euro-enthusiast.
8.1. Europe with us. Pro-European shift in the Portuguese foreign policy

The democratic elections to the Constitutional Assembly in 1975, and the second, parliamentary, elections that were held a year later – were plebiscites that turned out to be decisive for the future shape of the Portuguese regime as well as the strategic choices in foreign policy. Both elections gave victory to PS and, with PPD and CDS receiving a strong support as well, the European future was to be fulfilled during the Portuguese Third Republic. The 1<sup>st</sup> Constitutional Government headed by Mário Soares strongly defined the new strategy for Portugal, leaving behind the colonial empire and giving Portugal a European origin (Teixeira, 2007). With the application for membership in the Council of Europe, the government sought for an international acknowledgement of Portuguese democracy. The financial protocol with the EEC signed on 20<sup>th</sup> September 1976 helped Portugal to combat the economic crisis that overwhelmed the country after the revolution. Portuguese membership in EFTA was also an advantage. Additionally, a protocol on free-trade was signed with the “possibility of evolution”. These steps, seen in Lisbon as a prelude to an EEC-membership application, were followed by a “European tour” by Mário Soares who decided to pay a visit to every EEC-Member State, to convince the head of states and governments to take a positive view on the Portuguese membership application in the nearest future. In February 1977 Soares visited the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark and Italy, while a month later he went to West Germany, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Belgium. During these visits the Prime-Minister stressed the factors linking Portugal to Europe and expressed a firm intention of Portugal to become a member of the EEC (Cunha, 2007). Once the objectives of the tour were reached and with a favourable position of the majority in the parliament, the 1<sup>st</sup> Constitutional Government of the Portuguese Third Republic submitted the EEC-accession application on 28<sup>th</sup> March 1977 (Soares, 1999; Cunha, 2007). Finis coronat opus one may say, as the democratization of Portugal seems to have received stable fundamentals and a revolutionary period was ended. However the last step to finish the revolution, was also the first step in a new direction for Portugal: on the way to Europe.

8.2. Euro-Atlantic reorientation of Polish foreign policy

The democratic elections to the Parliament in 1991 were a landmark for the creation and stability of Polish democracy. However, Poland was now only at the beginning of the way to integration with Western Europe. Nonetheless, both the president and the new government –
having a democratic mandate – advanced with further steps towards a Euro-Atlantic reorientation in foreign policy. The three governments of the first mandate parliament, headed by Jan Olszewski, Waldemar Pawlak and Hanna Suchocka, concentrated rather more on urgent internal issues, such as economic and political reforms. Foreign policy was still important, but the fact that the politicians concentrated on home affairs helped Krzysztof Skubiszewski to maintain a stable and coherent approach. The Association Treaty came into force only in 1994, but some provisions were already working in 1992. At the same time Poland tightened the cooperation with Czechoslovakia and Hungary (Visegrad Group) and together appealed to the EEC for a political dialogue and recognized the aspirations of these countries to become full members of the EEC and participate in the planned Common Foreign and Security Policy (Zięba, 2010). In June 1993 the European Council in the conclusions of the meeting in Copenhagen agreed that “the associated countries in Central and Eastern Europe that so desire shall become members of the European Union” and formulated the criteria necessary for accession (Copenhagen criteria). At the same time minister Skubiszewski confirmed that “connecting to the European Community remains a strategic objective for Poland” (Skubiszewski, 1997). Following election results in 1993 the government changed, but the new minister of foreign affairs, Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, maintained the pro-European line. There were some initial doubts, due to the fact that the new government was formed by post-communists, but the policy changes did not affect the main direction in the external relations. Following the Association Agreement that came into force in February 1994, the Polish government submitted an official accession application on the 8th of April 1994 in Athens.

Parallel to the intensification of cooperation with the EEC/EU, Poland had to update its security strategy, particularly because the security system up to that point in Europe was falling apart at the turn of 80s/90s. Initially, with the uncertain future of the Warsaw Pact, the Polish government declared the fulfilment of the obligations deriving from the agreement. Soon, facing the dismantling of the Yalta order and the decomposition of the Soviet Bloc, new directions for Polish foreign policy appeared. Considering possible solutions, where the Partnership with Russia was still an option, and with the desire to avoid a “security vacuum”, Poland firstly tended to bet on CSCE as a reinforced security system. The cooperation under CSCE was developing well until

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1993 at when a period of stagnation occurred (Kuźniar, 2001). This caused a further reorientation of the European security system and with the developing contacts between the NATO countries and the CEE countries, initially under the NACC forum and later launched by the Partnership for Peace Programme. Furthermore, NATO Member States at first refused to give any guarantees of future membership opportunities for the former members of the Warsaw Pact, but the determination of the latter combined with the change in the US administration and a lack of objection from Russia, gave a new momentum to future enlargement.

9. “One-way Europeanization” of foreign policy during the pre-accession years

Analyzing the process of Europeanization in the EU-candidate countries Heather Grabbe (2003) concluded that in this particular case, the given process happens only in a one-way dimension. During the period of candidacy these countries were obliged to accept and implement *acquis communautaire et politique* in order to harmonize domestic policies with the policies of the EU Member States. This asymmetric relationship was called by Agh “anticipatory and adaptive” (Agh, 2003). Although Grabbe referred to the Central and Eastern European countries that joined the Union in the Big-Bang Enlargement, it is clear that this process may be pointed out by observing history of the European integration, taking in to consideration previous candidate states, as well as current ones.

One-way Europeanization of foreign policy is characterized by downloading of the European norms and procedures to the national level. Michael Smith proposed four indicators of this process: elite socialization, bureaucratic reorganization, constitutional change and the increase in public support for European political cooperation (Smith, 2000). Smith’s model indicates the way in which the change in foreign policy is produced, it focuses on technical aspects of Europeanization rather than on the aim of the process itself. Following paragraphs apply this model to the Portuguese and Polish case and show similarities between the two countries, despite large number of differences between both countries and disparities in the character of political change produced.

9.1. Elite socialization

Smith argues that national policy decisions are not made in a vacuum, but are the result of

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70 Bill Clinton substituted George Bush as the president of the US.
interactions at national level and with other states. The level of socialization of key decision-makers and the trust it establishes are fundamental for solving the problems and coming to a consensus at the international level. Institutionalization and long-term international cooperation creates common norms of behaviour and “ways of thinking and doing things”, as well as a common identity (Smith, 2000). This “culture of compromise” also consists of reciprocity, mutual responsiveness, confidentiality, consultation and respect for other Member States (Smith, 2000).

The socialization of Portuguese elites begun very early, with the “European tour” of Mário Soares in 1977. The Prime Minister visited the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark and Italy, and afterwards France, Germany, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Belgium. Moreover, Soares' contacts within the European socialist movement made his process of socialization rapid and profound. And although Portuguese politicians were disappointed with being left behind on the accession of Greece and the decisions taken by the leaders of other countries, they soon initiated the process of building alliances within the EEC for rapid accession of Portugal. The Portuguese mission to the EEC grew substantially and their officials closely monitored the process of policy-making in the Communities (Gonzaga Ferreira, 2001).

The Association Agreement between Poland and the EEC in 1991 was the first step to establish routine meetings on the highest political level and cooperation on the level of directors of political departments and ambassadors. Although this political dialogue was quite limited, it gave an institutional basis for contacts and exchange of views. Nonetheless, the real breakthrough came in 1994 with the establishment of a political framework to cooperate with candidate states. It introduced regular meetings at top political levels. The Mission of the Republic of Poland to the EU grew in personnel and tasks and became a crucial liaison between Warsaw and Brussels. To facilitate communication and speed up the decision-making process the network of Correspondance Européenne (COREU) was installed in the Mission. Kamińska (2007) claims that the key players in the process of “translating European norms to the national level” were officials from ministries and local governments. This allowed the Polish elite get to become accustomed to the mechanisms and behaviours in political cooperation at the European level. Although not being able to influence the CFSP directly, Polish elites had some notable input into the discussions. An early start of their preparations for participation in the CFSP allowed Polish administration to get actively involved in cooperation from the moment of accession.
According to Portuguese and Polish diplomats\textsuperscript{71}, the processes of socialization of the elites were fundamental for the European integration of both countries. Thus, the Europeanization of foreign policy occurred also through the Europeanization of foreign policy-makers. In the decision-making processes it is the elites who take the responsibility for, and choose the directions of the state’s policies, so having them “on board” the European project was crucial for consensus building at the international level. Capacity building and a strong civil service in these states allowed them to work well in the new political environment of European integration.

9.2. Bureaucratic reorganization

In his model Smith (2000) argued that the structures dealing with foreign policy in national administrations of the EU Member States are influenced by membership itself. The closer political cooperation becomes the more the prioritization of European issues will be observed on the national level. The bureaucratic changes at the level of policy-making appear in institutions that are closely related to the Europeanization of foreign policy. On this level Europeanization occurs as a national institutional and procedural adaptation to the EU resulting from the requirements of cooperation at the European level. One of the clear results of this process is the expansion of national diplomatic services, both at national (foreign ministry by itself) and international level (external missions).

The process of bureaucratic reorganization in Portugal was initiated in 1974/1975 with the fall of the dictatorship and decolonization. However, initially the reorientation of Portuguese foreign policy was not accompanied by the restructuring of state administration. The state was accused of leading a passive integration in relation to internal structures (Pires, 1985), that is to say national structures of Portuguese administration were not exposed to necessary internal reforms which later raised the costs and duration of this process. With the accession negotiations advancing, the reforms in the Portuguese administration accelerated. Most of the ministries created directorates-general for European affairs (DGAE) which were horizontally coordinating the issues related to the accession and membership in the CEE. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs itself underwent a couple of structural changes. The same applied to the unit coordinating European affairs: the Commission for European Integration was created in 1977 (Correia, 2006). Nonetheless, subsequent governments modified the structure by introducing the Ministry for

\textsuperscript{71} Interviews in winter 2009 and autumn 2010.
European Integration (VII Constitutional Government), which was eradicated by the next government which left European coordination in the hands of the Secretary of State for European Integration. Apart from these changes, there was a notable growing number of experts in international law and European policies which improved the quality of the actions of the ministries in the process of European cooperation. All these newly-created bodies had basically a similar role: to analyse the compliance of Portuguese legislation and policies with existing European equivalents. This procedure applied also to new legislative proposals in Portugal.

The reorganization of Polish foreign policy administration was a huge process of changes implemented on numerous levels and was related, firstly to the reorganization of the government in the new regime (early 90s), and later to the inclusion of the EU issues to their competences (late 90s/early 00s) (Kamińska, 2007). This also refers to the establishment of new central institutions that coordinated European issues, which at the EU level are denominated by ministers for European issues (usually deputy foreign affairs ministers or secretaries of state). In Poland this role was firstly given to the government's plenipotentiary for European integration and foreign aid (1991) and which in 1996 was substituted by the Office of the Committee for European Integration (Urząd Komitetu Integracji Europejskiej, UKIE). Moreover, most of the ministries created a department for European integration or a unit of coordination for European policy which improved the quality and speed of reaction in the process of cooperation at the European level. The closer political cooperation became, the more new officials became involved in it which resulted in the substantial growth of the national diplomatic service (Smith, 2000).

Concerning general aspects of the bureaucratic reorganization inspired by the process of European integration there remains the question of to what level could the analysis of legislative compliance be complete. First of all some doubts may be raised on the level of exhaustion of the analysis done by the lawyers from the ministries of foreign affairs, as well as the lawyers from the departments for European cooperation in various ministries. In other words, what are the limits of the scope of compliance of European and national law that might be put into analysis? Secondly, some officials put into question the credibility of such analyses when there is a clash of interests between the European and national level, that is to say when the EU and Member States’ interests diverge. This occurs particularly in the situation when juridical departments’ opinions contradict political departments’ opinions within the same ministry.

72 Interviews with diplomats, winter 2010.
9.3. Constitutional change

Political cooperation provoked discussions on constitutional laws in some EEC/EU Member States. The requirements of political cooperation at European level caused high political costs for national governments. However, they indicate the real level of pro-European positions of national leaders who managed to restructure national law systems in order to reach some progress on closer political cooperation.

The original version of the post-dictatorial Portuguese Constitution from 1976 did not include any reference to the EEC, and – on the contrary – emphasized claims of sovereignty that were hardly in line with accession to a supranational organization. This text was, however, a compromise that reflected the Portuguese internal situation where the political forces opposing accession were quite strong. The first Constitutional revision from 1982 aimed at the modification or eradication of the articles that could turn into an obstacle on the way to accession to the EEC (Guedes and Coutinho, 2006). The amendments were a recognition by the Portuguese law system of the norms coming from international organizations of which Portugal was member. The revision of 1982 anticipated the requirements of EEC membership, namely the secondary right of the Communities that did not have to be transposed legally after the accession in 1986. Further amendments in 1982 strengthened political pluralism, limited the president's prerogatives and abolished the Revolutionary Council which was one of the last elements of revolutionary legislation. The Law on National Defence subordinated the army to the government, which was the last step to depoliticize military officials (Maxwell, 1995).

The accession negotiations in the area of CFSP involved issues concerning the adjustment of Polish legislation to the Title V of the Maastricht Treaty, European Council conclusions and Justice and Home Affairs Council conclusions (Raport, 2002). The discussion referred also to the cooperation with third countries and non-governmental organisations, consular protection, relations with third countries, sanctions and other negative EU instruments. The negotiations were rather fast in comparison to other policy areas.\textsuperscript{73} Poland committed to implement all the acquis in this field and no temporary clauses were established. Poland declared the convergence of national foreign policy with the objectives of the CFSP and adjusted the laws and procedures to be coherent with demarches, declarations, positions and sanctions. There was no need for

\textsuperscript{73} In this chapter the negotiations were opened on 10 November 1998 and closed on 6 April 2000.
amending the Polish Constitution since when it was adopted in 1997 the legislator foresaw the future accession of Poland to the European structures. Article 90 gives sufficient framework for Polish accession to the European Union (Mik, 1999), allowing the transfer of national competences to international organizations after a decision by Polish Parliament and an agreement of the electorate in a referendum (Dzialocha, 1996).

9.4. Increase in public support for European political cooperation

During the period of pre-accession to the European Communities/Union candidate countries find themselves in the difficult position of being obliged to adopt rules they cannot influence. Public opinion is affected by this asymmetry and often perceives the situation as a loss of sovereignty by the state and a dictate of Brussels instead of a political development. Smith noted the growing importance of public opinion in modern European states and kept their reactions towards political cooperation at the European level as the last element of his model.

The state of knowledge of Portuguese society of post-25th April concerning European integration and the accession negotiations was very poor. This partly resulted from the lack of (or failed) information campaign on the part of the governments. In the surveys carried out in early 80s around 44% of the respondents did not have a clear opinion on the Portuguese accession to the EEC (Bacalhau, 1986). On the other hand, the respondents who expressed their opinion were mainly favourable to accession – 41% considered accession as something positive, while only 13% were against. Similar results showed a survey concerning political cooperation at the European level: around 50% did not have any opinion, but the ones with clear views mainly supported cooperation (29%) and only 11% were against.

Polish public opinion favoured Polish accession to the CFSP as a matter of general support for the European integration and Polish accession to the European Union. Although there were some groups of eurosceptics that saw the threat of loss of independence by accession to the EU, these views were not shared by the majority of Polish citizens. During the 90s, Polish public opinion shared some fears concerning the Europeanization of Polish foreign policy as it was viewed as a loss of sovereignty. Although public opinion in Poland was quite negatively oriented towards the common foreign policy in the EU (Osiecka, 1999), this trend changed with time and in the early 2000s Polish citizens in the main accepted the participation of Poland in the CFSP (Kamińska, 2007). The latter tendency was strengthened after the accession with the support for
10. Conclusions. The reorientation of foreign policy during democratic transformation

After the fall of the non-democratic regimes in Portugal and Poland both countries embarked on a path of democratization. However, the first years of transformation were marked by many questions and doubts concerning the shape of their new regimes, and it was not clear whether it would result in a democracy. This depended on external factors, such as the changes in Portugal and in Poland which were considerably influenced by the international environment and the balance of powers maintained during the Cold War. The changes of regimes, and consequently of foreign policies, would alter the stability of the bipolar world. There was a mere possibility of outside intervention, but the cases were hot topics in international fora. Portugal had to abandon the colonial empire – it was the last European country to do so. At the same time, being a NATO-member and holding US bases in the Central Atlantic, it was an important country from a geopolitical point of view. Its sudden change of orientation could ruin international balance as well as cause a chain effect in neighbouring Spain.

Poland was a member of the Eastern Bloc and it was the country that started the chain reaction of its decomposition. As a co-author of the Warsaw Pact’s dissolution, Poland was responsible for the change of the balance of power in Europe. This event gave rise to a “security vacuum” in the heart of Europe which soon had to be filled. As the CSCE did not fulfil these hopes, Poland and the other countries of the region turned towards NATO.

At the same time, internal factors were crucial for the shape of the new regimes. In Portugal it was the officials from the MFA, which took over power during the coup, and the future of Portugal depended on the balance of power amongst factions. The same applied to foreign policy: although all relevant political parties presented a pro-European line, it was only after free parliamentary elections that these visions could be pursued. And for this, the Portuguese had to wait two years, until 1976.

In Poland the shape of the future regime lied in the hands of army officials from the communist party that agreed to share power with the democratic opposition, but maintained almost all the most important functions in the country (president, ministries of defence and interior, majority in the lower chamber of parliament). Political changes went together with economic changes which made the transformation more complex. Although the opposition
controlled the government, it was only after the free parliamentary elections of 1991 that it
gained an independent position.

Both Portugal and Poland reoriented their foreign policies significantly after democratic
transformations. The first years after the fall of the non-democratic regimes were marked by
uncertainty and a variety of options for the potential direction in the foreign policies of both
countries. However, soon the elites gave priority to the European orientation of foreign policy.
Integration into the European structures became a primary objective of the governments. An
important fact worth noting was that it was a conscious decision and the wilful action to choose
this course, among many other available options and directions to follow. The Europeanization of
foreign policy after democratization did not happen by chance or as a certain consequence. It was
a planned strategy of the elites who concluded that this was the most useful and advantageous
solution.

With the process of accession negotiations going ahead, the Europeanization of foreign
policy in both candidate states was also notable in the sphere of elite socialization, bureaucratic
reorganization, constitutional change and the increase of public support for European cooperation
in the matter of foreign policy. The intensification of contacts and cooperation with the EEC/EU
accelerated the socialization of officials from Portugal and Poland and made them recognize
themselves as part of the Community. At the same time, the restructuring of the state
administration produced faster and more efficient information flows and accelerated the process
of decision-making in relation to European cooperation. Eventually, the legal systems of both
countries had to be adjusted to the new reality of membership in a supranational organization.
Both countries foresaw this phenomenon and in advance shaped their law in order to harmonize
it, with membership of the EEC/EU in mind. Finally, although the societies of both countries
were initially uncertain about accession and political cooperation in the area of foreign policy,
they became more favourable towards it when the process of accession negotiations was
advancing and enlargement approaching.

All the above mentioned indicators show that the Europeanization of foreign policy in the
pre-accession period is not reduced to the change of policy objectives and adjustment of positions
to the common European lines, but the process has a strong technical aspect in the sphere of

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74 The democracy was uncertain between 1974 and 1976 in Portugal and between 1989 and 1991 in Poland. Only
after free parliamentary elections the process of democratic consolidation started.
elites, society and administrative and legal structures. Similar outcomes of the process in such different countries as presented above gives a certainty, that the process of Europeanization of foreign policy is a general phenomenon, not limited to one Member State, that occurs (despite doubts) and is voluntary and stimulated by democratically elected elites (and not accidental).
Literature:


Chapter Three: European integration: Membership and Europeanization of foreign policy

1. Introduction

Having outlasted all the political turbulences and managed to reject the non-democratic threats to the fledgling regimes, Portugal and Poland entered the path of democratic consolidation of their new political systems. The reorientation of national foreign policies, which left behind the ghosts of the past and pushed ahead full-steam towards European integration was another symbol of change of eras. After the struggle of negotiations, modernisation, adjustment and preparations, the governments in Lisbon and Warsaw rushed to accession in the European structures. The road to the integration seemed clear and the membership feasible in a short period of time. The Portuguese expected accession in early 1980s together with Greece and possibly Spain (Gonzaga Ferreira, 2001). The integration seemed to be within easy reach as the hardest part had already been behind. Polish leaders were convinced to join the European structures in late 1990s, a couple of years after the beginning of the democratization process in 1989 (Kuźniar, 2008). With the way to NATO clearly outlined, the way to the EU seemed same clear.

These hopes soon proved to be miscalculated and the moments of accession of both countries came more than a decade after the non-democratic regimes were abolished. The Portuguese did not manage to catch the EEC train with Greece and were made to observe the Greek accession while standing in the queue with Spaniards. The negotiations were more complex than they had appeared and the foot-dragging neighbour did not help in improving the
tempo.75

In the early 90s Poland was in the vanguard of the democratization process in the region and this gave national politicians the impression that the process of European integration was feasible in few years. With strong support of the USA and Germany, accession to the European Union seemed less than a decade away (Popowski, 1997). However, with the Member States preferring, at this moment in time, to deepen political integration and opposed to widening the EU, the Polish European dream had to be delayed.

Finally the moment came and Portugal joined the European Communities, together with Spain, in 1986 – full 12 years after the Carnation Revolution. This was 5 years after Greece and just in time to negotiate the new format of European integration outlined in the Single European Act.

In the case of Poland this process took 15 years and eventually in May 2004 Poland entered the European Union with 9 other countries and the European Union grew to 25 Member States. 2,5 years later Bulgaria and Romania completed the phenomenon called “Big-Bang enlargement”.

The accession confirmed the democratic character of the political and economic transformation (Cunha, 2007; Turkina and Suszhko-Harned, 2011), and it was the crowning achievement of the democratization processes in both countries. Full membership created a number of new opportunities for further development of the newly acceded countries. From a political point of view it was an elevation in status on the international arena. Cooperation at the European level was also seen as a chance for a more complex, visible and strong position in the world (Pijpers et al., 1988). The new members were now in the same club as the rich and powerful world-powers. Portuguese leaders were now seated at the same table with all the key Western-European players. Exclusive membership in the club of the 12 gave Portugal more visibility and impetus on the international stage. Polish membership in the enlarged EU confirmed its European identity and empowered its position in Central and Eastern Europe.

At the same time accession brought higher standards and expectations from national foreign policy-makers (Zięba, 2007). The new members were now part of a bigger community and had to develop positions and take actions of a much bigger scope than ever before. The

75 Portugal was ready for an accession in the early 1980s, but had to wait for Spain who initially delayed the negotiations – see more: Pinto and Teixeira, 2005.
mechanisms of European Political Cooperation and Common Foreign and Security Policy resulted in the expansion of external relations of new Member States to new zones and became much more complex than before the accession. This situation required more resources and efforts from Portugal and Poland to “follow the community train at cruise speed without risking the creation of unnecessary political difficulties for the country” (Proença, 1988). Both diplomatic corps had to recruit more civil servants and communication channels had to be improved. The objective of affirming the European identity in foreign policy and the unanimity in the positions were strived for through solidarity and harmonization among the Member States.

Membership in the European Economic Community/Union opened up new chapters in the foreign policies of the new Member States. Although this field has been perceived as a domaine réservé of national states with limited influence of European integration on it, European Political Cooperation and the Common Foreign and Security Policy have been the instruments that paved the way for agreements on common positions of Member States in certain dossiers (Lenschow, 2006). The mechanisms of downloading common statements to the national level, resulted in their adoption as national ones by the Member States. This was, however, not a new phenomenon for Portugal and Poland since during the association and candidacy period their foreign policies had already been adjusted to the common statements/positions under the EPC and CFSP (Gonzaga Ferreira, 2007; Kamińska, 2007). However, this “one-way Europeanization” ended with the accession to the European Economic Community/Union. Membership gave the new members an opportunity to influence the common statements/positions by uploading and promoting some dossiers that were absent or not emphasized by the Community before. New members could now actively participate in proposing new issues to the European agenda, shaping common European positions and benefitting from the resonant voice of the Twelve/Twenty-Seven Member States together, far louder than single voice of one country.

2. National adaptation to the European Political Cooperation/Common Foreign and Security Policy

Since Portugal and Poland did not participate in the process of establishing the mechanisms for a common foreign policy, they had to accept and adopt it immediately upon accession (European Political Cooperation and Common Foreign Policy, respectively). The process of adaptation and adjustment to European positions was a challenge for both countries.
Due to the fact that foreign policy has been seen as an exclusive domain of national states, it was a difficult exercise for the governments of both countries to partially give up this privilege, particularly given that democratic authorities had only enjoyed it for a bit more than a decade (Major, 2005).

3. The concerns related to joining the EPC/CFSP

European integration in the area of foreign policy brought not only new opportunities, but also fears concerning national foreign policies of Portugal and Poland. Many policy-makers were afraid that once the countries would become full members, their national priorities would not reach the European level and traditional relations would be abandoned, due to their absence on the European agenda (Hermenegildo, 2008; Góralczyk, 2003).

Accession to the European Communities was generally positively perceived in the perspective of Portuguese foreign policy (Cunha, 2007). However, there were a few reasons that made policy-makers feel uncomfortable about accession. Primarily, it was feared that upon entering the community Portugal would have to adapt its foreign policy along the lines drawn out in the European Political Cooperation, in the way that would force Portuguese leaders to resign or limit their attention to traditional Portuguese zones of interest. This led to the belief that close Portuguese relations with their former colonies in Southern Africa, Latin America and Asia would lose their momentum. Finally, there was also some dose of anxiety in the context of their partnership with the USA, since Portugal had a strategic alliance with this country and was not interested in loosening the relationship with the American superpower. Instead, it was thought that the interests of bigger Member States would outweigh those of smaller states. In this way Portuguese national interests could face marginalization when put in the melting pot of EPC.

Regarding Poland, on the eve of accession some politicians warned of a loosening of relations with their Eastern partners who were still behind in the democratization process (Ukraine, Belarus) and without prospects of EU membership. Polish leaders were also concerned about potential worsening of conditions in cooperation with the Russian Federation. Furthermore, the threat that Polish foreign policy objectives would be sacrificed by big players in the EU was considered real. Poles still remembered the words of French President, Jacques Chirac, suggesting that Central and Eastern European countries remain silent76 on world politics (Giblin,

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76 In 2003 when Poland joined the USA in the intervention in Iraq, Jacques Chirac said that “Poland missed a chance
Finally, Polish leaders expressed their concerns about the future of their partnership with the USA. Since the late 90s Western Europe had showed more independence towards the US in foreign policy. European positions presented in international arena were sometimes in contradiction with American ones. Since the USA was a trusted Polish partner, the cooling down of this close relationship would be against the Polish *raison d'Etat*.

### 3.1. The first steps

As both countries had been accepted as observers before their accession, Portuguese and Polish diplomats were able to learn the European mechanisms of agreeing to common statements/positions during the pre-accession periods.

Portuguese participation in European Political Cooperation started in 1983 with the foreign minister participating in the Council meetings. It was a passive participation, due to the fact that at the time Portugal did not have the status of observer until it was granted only in 1985. Exceptionally, in 1984 Portugal participated as a full member in the EPC dialogue with Latin America in San José, Costa Rica. Portugal, together with Spain, were invited to the meeting by the hosts and it was one of the signs of recognition of the important role that both countries play in the region. Another exception was cooperation with Southern Africa when Portugal was treated as a full member. Portuguese owed their participation due to the numerous Portuguese citizens living in the region. One further exception was granting full membership status to Portugal in the negotiations on the Treaty on European Political Cooperation. In this way Portugal could have influence on the future shape of foreign policy cooperation. Portugal joined the EPC at the level of full member on the day of accession to the EEC, 1 January 1986.

Regarding Poland, EU accession negotiations on the CFSP chapter were opened on 10 November 1998 and closed as one of the first ones, on 6 April 2000 (Kral, 2005). The main direction of Polish foreign policy after democratic transformation generally stuck to the outlines indicated by common positions. Poland committed to adopt all the *acquis* in the area of CFSP and did not ask for any transitional solutions (*Raport*, 2002). Since 1994 Poland participated in political dialogue. Since 2000 Polish representatives took part in the “15+6 dialogue” (EU+6 NATO European non-EU countries) and “15+15 dialogue” (EU + 12 EU-candidates + Norway, Turkey and Iceland). In 2003 Poland declared its wish to participate in the European Headline
Goal which was the basis for the creation of the European Rapid Reaction Force. Poland also had the opportunity to participate in the discussions on the future shape of the CFSP at a Convention and during the Intergovernmental conference in 2001. Poland joined the CFSP on the day of the accession to the EU, 1st May 2004.

3.1. Traditional zones of interest

Portugal had their traditional interests in Mundo Lusófono, in the former colonies on the East and Southern coast of Africa (Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, São Tomé and Príncipe), in Brazil, East Timor, Macau, Goa, Diu and Damão. In Europe Portugal maintained their long-established alliance with Great Britain. The strategic partnership with the USA was bound by the US military base in Azores. During the 70s Portugal developed closer relations with West Germany, who supported Portuguese aspirations for the EEC membership. A habitually distrustful position towards Spain softened as the two countries made simultaneous efforts to join the Communities.

Polish foreign policy had always depended on their two big neighbours – Germany and Russia. After the democratization process took place in 1990s the attitude towards Germany changed substantially – from conventional reluctance to close cooperation under the umbrella of numerous programmes (e.g. Weimar Triangle\textsuperscript{77}, regional cooperation etc.). Germany was the fiercest supporter of Polish accession to the EU. Poland cooperated also with regional partners – Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, and – to a certain extent – with the Baltic states. Poland seemed particularly interested in Eastern European cooperation – with Ukraine, Belarus and Russia.

3.2. Policy change

The main policy change since the accessions of Portugal and Poland to the EEC/EU was the expansion of their foreign policies into zones where they previously had none or little interest. Participation in EPC/CFSP enabled the presence of these countries in regions with whom contacts had been occasional and trivial. At the same time, cooperation in Europe changed the approach to the traditional zones of interest in both countries. It was noticed that these relations

\textsuperscript{77} Committee for supporting French-German-Polish cooperation established in 1991 by ministers of foreign affairs of the three countries in order to improve cooperation between these countries. See more: Szpor, 2011.
could be improved by changing their bilateral status to a European one by putting them onto the European level. In this way the external relations of Portugal became more complex and globally far-reaching through the downloading of common positions from European Political Cooperation, but at the same time Portuguese interests in the world were strengthened through the uploading of national priorities to the European level. The same happened with Polish foreign policy after the Big-Bang enlargement of 2004. Common Foreign and Security Policy substantially extended the range of Polish external relations, while bringing core issues from national foreign policy to the level of the European Union gave them more visibility and a better starting position in negotiations.

3.2.1. Downloading of European policy to the national foreign policy agenda

Portugal joined EPC in the period of Cold War and the moment of the swan-song of the Soviet Bloc. The accession to EPC gave relations between Portugal and Central and Eastern European countries a new quality and became a forum for exchanging contacts and presenting positions. Portugal was particularly active in drawing attention to Soviet attempts to isolate the EEC and the USA (MNE, 1986). In this context Portugal took a prudent position and tried to avoid any possible tensions within the Euro-Atlantic alliance that would be profitable to the Soviet Bloc. At the same time the Portuguese government clearly pointed out the cases of violation of the principles of Helsinki Final Act (MNE, 1987). During the Autumn of Nations in 1989 Portugal advocated political dialogue and supported its institutionalization in Poland and in Hungary (MNE, 1989). Nonetheless, while Portugal strongly supported the processes of democratization, it insisted that the Twelve maintain aid to developing countries, especially in Africa and Latin America, arguing that the new opening with Eastern Europe should not decrease EEC initiatives in the former regions (Hermenegildo, 2008). Through the EPC and according to the principle of democratic conditionality Portugal established partnerships and closer political and economic cooperation with the Central and Eastern European countries following their democratization (MNE, 1990). Lisbon showed the successful process of democratization in Portugal as an example for the emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe. This approach was presented during the Portuguese president’s visits to Hungary and Czechoslovakia in 1989 (Vasconcelos, 1991). Portuguese authorities expressed the view that the process of democratization in the region should not penalize EEC relations with Latin America and Africa.
(Soares, 1990). In the context of relations with Eastern Europe Portugal played an active role during its participation (since 1986) in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Proença, 1988). Portugal supported the clear and united position of Western countries during the conference (MNE, 1986). Lisbon called for the respect of human rights and criticized violations on the part of countries of the Soviet Bloc that breeched the provisions of Helsinki Final Act (MNE, 1987). In 1988 Portugal sought a common strategy for the Twelve for the incoming CSCE meeting in Vienna. Lisbon favoured an equilibrium between the East and the South in the external relations of the EEC. Nonetheless Portugal got more and more involved in the relations with the CEE countries and withdrew its reservations towards closer cooperation of the EEC with the latter (Vasconcelos, 1996).

Membership in the European Economic Community made Portuguese governments pay more attention to the Mediterranean, something that was not in the spectrum of Lisbon's interests before. Although located on the Iberian Peninsula, Portugal has no access to the Mediterranean and the countries of the Maghreb, Mashrek and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have not been among the priorities for Lisbon's external relations prior to the accession to the EEC. The French initiative for a Mediterranean conference in 1983 integrated Portugal as observer and Lisbon saw it as a convenient solution without prioritizing this direction in foreign policy (Vasconcelos, 1996). It was European Political Cooperation that brought Portugal closer to the Mediterranean. With the growing presence of Mediterranean issues in the agenda of the EPC, the interest for the region in Portugal grew both under EPC and in bilateral dimensions (Vasconcelos, 1992). Integrating the group of Southern-European members of the EEC Portuguese foreign policy underwent a process of “mediterranization” (Vasconcelos, 1996). With the re-launch of the French proposal for Mediterranean cooperation, Portugal participated as a full member in the 5+5 cooperation established by the Rome declaration in 1988. Portugal became part of the coalition of Southern European members of the EEC, together with France, Italy and Spain, that stood for a deeper cooperation and establishment of closer ties to in the Mediterranean region (MNE, 1990).

The issue of the Middle East marked its presence in the Portuguese foreign policy significantly through EPC. Regarding the Iran-Iraq conflict, Portugal kept neutrality and advocated for a United Nations mandate for mediations (MNE, 1988). Portugal's positions taken towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict were in line with EPC. Lisbon supported the peace
process, the arrangement of the international peace conference and worked together with the Twelve and other states to elaborate a solution acceptable to both sides of the conflict.

When in 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait, the Portuguese government adopted an identical position to the ones approved by the Twelve under EPC, which condemned the attack and demanded an immediate retreat of Iraqi soldiers from the occupied territory. In order to break the deadlock of the conflicts in the region, Portugal called for a global approach to peace, security and cooperation in the Middle East by promoting political dialogue and an international peace conference to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Portuguese delegation participated actively in bilateral negotiations and sent humanitarian aid to the region (MNE, 1991).

The first years of Portuguese participation in EPC led Lisbon to a conclusion that the country benefits from the participation. This participation “does not mean a diminished possibility of affirmation of Portugal's particular points of view; rather it means a greater scope and impact for its external action” (Vasconcelos, 1991).

The change in Polish foreign policy brought by the European integration added political actions in the geographical areas that were of little interest for the country so far. Poland engaged in the European programmes concerning African countries at many levels. Poland also contributed more than seven hundred experts for civilian missions (mainly in Africa), which made Poland the sixth largest contributor in the EU (Kamińska, 2007). Poland participates in European cooperation with Africa and the members of government take part in the EU-Africa summits. Poland joined the European Union's development and humanitarian aid programmes. This refers also to special aid and trade relationships with developing countries. Numerous African countries received Polish humanitarian aid. Since 2004 Angola was a priority partner for Polish development aid. In assisting the realization of the Council Joint Action 78 Poland sent 131 soldiers to Democratic Republic of Congo under the auspices of EUFOR in 2006. Polish participation was applauded by European Commissioner, Louis Michel, that emphasized the importance of the partnership with Africa 79. African countries have never been in the scope of Polish interest but through the process of Europeanization of Polish foreign policy, they started to cover this region in a concrete context.

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Through the EU partnership with Asia under the frame of Asia-Europe Meetings and ASEM Regional Forum Poland tightened the relations with Asia-Pacific countries. Indonesia received financial support from Poland after the tsunami in 2004. A Polish Medical Mission was sent to Iran after the earthquake in 2005. Polish foreign policy in Asia is based on the EU document *Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnership* from 2001, the key aim of which is to overcome the unfavourable balance of trade in the region.

Poland tried to get further involved in cooperation with Latin America and the Caribbean through the working groups on ACP. On the basis of the Cotonou Agreement, signed by the EU and ACP countries in 2000, Poland embarked on a new form of relationship with the ACP. On the occasion of EU-ACP summit in Peru, the Polish Prime-Minister met with the presidents of Brazil, Mexico and Colombia – to underscore the priority partnerships in the region. In 2008 the Polish Prime-Minister visited Peru and Chile. In 2009 the Polish president met with the Colombian president and the vice-president of this country paid a visit to Warsaw. Bilateral relationships with these countries have developed to regular high-level consultations and senior-officials meetings. A key Polish objective was to promote positive effects of EU enlargement by emphasizing the complementary aspect of EU-ACP relations. By doing this, Poland wished to refute the widely-held opinion that Central and Eastern Europe was in competition with the ACP to access financial grants from the EU.

With the re-launching of Barcelona process and the French initiative for the Union for the Mediterranean in 2008 Poland became part of a deeper cooperation between the Mediterranean countries. Poland has a rich history of relations with some southern-Mediterranean countries in the context of cooperation of the Soviet Bloc with leftist regimes (Libya, Algeria). This new framework for cooperation gave Polish foreign policy-makers a chance to return to the markets that were lost during the systemic transformation in the early 90s.

Poland has used common European foreign policy as a framework to play a more active and influential role within the EU and does so by creating a wider international interest (Kamińska, 2007). It is through these actions that Poland has been trying to establish itself as a key player in the EU, joining the traditional key decision makers and seeking support for the uploading of Polish priorities to the European agenda.

3.2.2. **Uploading national priorities to EPC/CFSP**
Uploading national priorities to EPC/CFSP is one of the methods to avoid the realization of EEC/EU candidate countries concerns that their national priorities in foreign policy would get marginalized after the accession. This would happen when all the previously agreed positions – acquis politique, as obligatorily adopted by all the Member States would dominate over the interests brought to the community by new members. However, the candidates could avoid this scenario when becoming members by bringing national foreign policies to the European forum and integrating them into EPC/CFSP.

3.2.2.1. Portugal: promoting relations with Lusofonia

Portugal used European Political Cooperation to improve relations with its non-European partners, par excellence in Southern Africa, former Portuguese colonies, the United States and in Asia. Through the European Economic Community's external relations Portugal managed to keep closer to the zones that were “relevant for their historical experience and geo-strategic situation” (MNE, 1986). Two areas in the world that were of Portuguese particular interest as an EEC Member State were Latin America (given primary importance of Brazil) and Southern Africa (Vasconcelos, 1991).

The flag-ship of Portuguese foreign policy exported to the European Political Cooperation were their relations with Africa, above all with former Portuguese colonies and South Africa. Portuguese historical ties with these territories made the country play an important role – it frequently played the role of intermediary between the EEC and African countries. Portuguese diplomats managed many times to put African questions onto the European agenda. Since the very beginning of Portuguese participation in the EPC Lisbon worked to avoid an escalation of the sanctions towards the apartheid regime of the Republic of South Africa (RSA). This country had a substantial number of Portuguese and Portuguese-speaking citizens and Lisbon wanted to ban further sanctions that would deteriorate the situation of the Portuguese diaspora and which could lead to a destabilization in the region (Proença, 1988). As an alternative Portugal supported further political and diplomatic pressure over the South-African government and a political dialogue with oppositional parties (MNE, 1986). This position was confirmed by Portugal in 1987 through their disagreement with economic sanctions and their urging the establishment a political dialogue between the government and opposition. Portuguese determination in this quest let to the avoidance of further sanctions on RSA (MNE, 1987). At the same time Portugal was of
the opinion that finding a solution for Namibia would “decompress the situation in the region” (MNE, 1987). Portugal appealed also for financial aid to Angola and Mozambique and for increasing political contacts with both countries. In the following years Portugal maintained the same political line and called for negotiations to lower the tensions and break the political deadlock. Nevertheless, the use of economic sanctions was perceived as counterproductive and Portugal opposed these measures consistently, promoting diplomatic actions and political dialogue with Pretoria. The Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs proposed realistic and pragmatic positions towards the regime, attempting to block any attitudes that would widen the gap between the parties involved and lead to radicalization of the latter (MNE, 1988).

In 1988 Portugal led the delegation of the EEC to negotiate the independence of Namibia and the withdrawal of foreign military forces in Angola (Hermenegildo, 2008). In the same year Portugal introduced two issues to the European agenda: Angola and East Timor. Regarding the first country, Portugal presented a reconstruction plan to consolidate peace through development. Portugal called for a common action from the EEC and gained support among the Member States (MNE, 1988). Then, in 1991 Portugal completed the mediation between the two sides of conflict (UNITA and government) which was concluded by Acordos de Paz para Angola signed in Estoril in 1991. Portugal lead the mediating troika that included the USA and the USSR. The Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs called for a “mini-Marshall Plan” for Angola. Following the support given, Portugal kept insisting on the presence of Southern African issues in the European agenda. Consequently, the government of Aníbal Cavaco Silva sent observers to watch the elections in Namibia in 1989 and supported Namibian independence aspirations. The recognition of an independent Namibia in 1990, as well as the EEC invitation to this country to join the Lomé Convention, was one of the successes of Portuguese diplomacy in the EEC. Portuguese efforts to find a solution for the Republic of South Africa via political dialogue and disagreement for EEC's further economic sanctions for this country were also successful at the turn of the 80s/90s. The role of Portuguese authorities (also within the troika at the level of senior-officials – political director generals) in positively concluding the conflict and a leading role of the EEC in the process were decisive (MNE, 1989). In 1990 after the dismantling of the Soviet Bloc, weakening of the USSR and the end of the Cold War, the attention of the EEC turned naturally towards Central and Eastern Europe, since radical political and economic transformations were taking place in the countries of the region bordering the EEC. Moreover, with the reunification of
Germany and the end of a bipolar world there was a high risk that the Twelve would lose interest in Africa and focus on close European neighbours. This gave Portugal new momentum to defend established EEC relations with African partners. The government from Lisbon constantly pressed its European partners to maintain favourable relations with Africa, emphasizing the positive results of this cooperation such as the nascent political pluralism in Angola and Mozambique, and progress in abolishing apartheid in the Republic of South Africa (MNE, 1990). In the latter case, in view of further developments towards regime liberalization, Portugal proposed lifting EEC sanctions on the country (MNE, 1991). Thanks to Portuguese initiatives under EPC the EEC issued official communications to express the Communities' satisfaction regarding the beginning of democratic reforms in the former Portuguese colonies (Vasconcelos, 1996).

The meeting in Costa Rica in 1984 was the beginning of the San José Process - an institutionalized interregional political dialogue with Latin America (Santander and De Lombaerde, 2007). Due to the recognition of its fundamental importance in the relations between Latin America and European Communities, Portugal was invited to participate by the hosts, even though it was not yet participating in the European Political Cooperation (the same as Spain who was also invited). Portugal was a key player in this process through good long-term relations with Brazil, the biggest country of the region. Throughout the years of cooperation, Portugal always defended human rights and tried to support democratization processes. In this context Portugal sought out alliances within the Twelve to support the Contadora Group\textsuperscript{80} that was formed in 1983 by Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela to promote peace in Latin America (Hermenegildo, 2008). Also, the meetings with the Rio Group\textsuperscript{81}, especially two summits in 1988, were fora where closer relations with the countries of the region could be sustained and developed. Portugal tended to strengthen its ties with these countries by organizing regular political consultations and cooperation in the areas of economy, culture, science and technology (Hermenegildo, 2008). Lisbon played an active role in promoting dialogue, democracy and peaceful solutions to the conflicts in the region (MNE, 1988). It was highly interested in strengthening the relations between the EEC and Latin America by establishing a new institutional framework. It also promoted political dialogue in the region to solve disputed issues and avoid the use of force in the

\textsuperscript{80} Initiative launched in 1983 by the governments of Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela to discuss multilaterally peaceful solutions to regional conflicts in Central America.

\textsuperscript{81} Permanent Mechanism of Political Consultation and Consensus Building was established on 31 December 1986 by Argentina, Brasil, Colombia, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. Rio Group holds annual meetings of Heads of States and Governments and of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs.
conflicts, which could ruin the developing democratic reforms in the countries of the region. Iberian enlargement of the EEC was a crucial moment in the Communities’ relations with Latin-American countries which was reflected in the annex to the Treaties that indicated the intention to develop and improve relations and cooperation with these countries (Vasconcelos, 1996). These countries, Brazil *par excellence*, tried to use Portuguese accession to develop closer relations with the EEC (Jaguaribe, 1989). Portugal also supported democratic reforms in Chile and Nicaragua. The continual meetings with the Rio Group – although the issues mostly discussed were of economic nature – were the main platform for political cooperation between the EEC and Latin America, where Portugal, together with Spain, looked for an increased rapprochement between the two regional organizations. A notable success of the EEC in bringing peace and establishing democratic norms in the region was to a large extent as a result of Portuguese-Spanish cooperation.

Another essential issue that Portugal brought to the EPC was East Timor. It was a *novum* that Portugal contributed to enrich the content of EEC external relations and Portuguese diplomats succeeded in keeping the issue on the European agenda (Hermenegildo, 2008). This topic was raised by Portugal in 1986 on the occasion of an EEC-ASEAN meeting. Portugal looked for support from the side of its European partners and solidarity that would add another dimension to the EEC’s response. Support was forthcoming and a common position of the Twelve called for a just, negotiated and internationally accepted solution for East Timor (Hermenegildo, 2008). In the late 70s and early 80s Portuguese efforts in the United Nations and approved resolutions were not supported by the EEC Member States that abstained in the voting while the biggest support was granted to the initiatives by countries from the Soviet Bloc, which caused an embarrassment for Portuguese diplomacy (Vasconcelos, 1996). After the accession to the Communities, Portugal sought for a change of attitude in the Twelve through permanent lobbying for support under the EPC. The negotiations were difficult since the case of Eastern Timor raised great opposition in Indonesia, which was one of the most important partners in the EEC-ASEAN dialogue. The first declaration of the EEC on the Timor issue was published in 1988 during the Greek presidency in the Council (Ferreira-Pereira, 2007). The EEC brought this issue to the level of the United Nations presenting a common stand and calling for a solution. Portugal managed to maintain the issue on the EPC agenda, which also brought it to the attention of the European Parliament (MNE, 1989). Portuguese diplomacy linked the Timor issue to the
defence of human rights by the EEC. After the massacre in Dili in 1991\(^{82}\) the Timor question gained more visibility in the international arena and became an important issue on the EPC agenda. Constantly providing the Twelve with information concerning East Timor, Portugal started to be perceived as an expert on the issue and the other Member States granted support to the Portuguese attempts to solve the East Timor problem. Thanks to the Portuguese initiative the EEC showed great concern for East Timor, which was expressed a number of times in the United Nations and Commission of Human Rights fora. Portuguese pressure on Indonesia and its influential role within the EEC was essential in putting the issue to the EC-ASEAN forum (MNE, 1991).

3.2.2.2. **Poland: developing European cooperation with the Eastern neighbourhood**

With the Eastern expansion of the European Union in the 2000s Poland seemed a natural leader in the region of Central and Eastern part of the Old Continent. Since the main areas of interest in Polish foreign policy concentrated on the EU’s Eastern border countries (Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Russia, Georgia), after 2004 enlargement when the Union “went East”, the CFSP would move East, too. A lack of particular relations in other regions of the world made Polish policy-makers focus on deepening cooperation with its Eastern neighbours. By joining the CFSP, Poland was granted access to a new instrument empowering their cooperation in the region. Natural allies in the EU regarding Eastern relations were the new Member States from the region (the Baltic states, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania). It was already in the pre-accession period that Poland started to work on alliances within the EU to put national priorities on the European agenda under CFSP. A non-paper with Polish proposals concerning policy towards new Eastern neighbours after EU enlargement was published one year before accession showing the future direction of Polish actions in the CFSP (Non-paper, 2003). Although the effort failed, mostly due to insufficient support among the “old” Member States, it was a signal from Poland about its aspirations in the area of European foreign policy and a lesson to learn for Polish diplomats.

By actively favouring the development of relations with EU Eastern neighbours, Poland managed not only to achieve a status rise as a core European partner of these neighbours, but also

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\(^{82}\) On 12 November 1991 the Indonesian army attacked East-Timor pro-independence demonstration and killed around 250 protesters. This raised a wave of support for independent East Timor. See more: Jardine, 1999.
strengthened its own position in the European Union. Raising the question of Ukraine and Belarus, Poland managed to keep these countries on the EU agenda and gave visibility to the Eastern borders of the European Union. In this way the process of national foreign policy uploading benefited both the EU relations with the Eastern neighbours and the Polish position in the European structures.

Previous Polish efforts in promoting the Eastern neighbourhood in the EU came to fruition during the Orange revolution in Ukraine in 2004 and during the presidential elections in Belarus in 2006 and 2010. Regarding Ukraine, Poland was active in bringing back democracy to Ukraine after falsified 2nd round of presidential elections. Polish Members of European Parliament pushed the Parliament to appeal for honest elections (Resolution, 2005). Polish and Lithuanian presidents engaged in mediations to negotiate a democratic solution between the rival sides. Poland also managed to involve the European Union's Foreign Affairs Commissioner, Javier Solana, in the negotiations.

In the case of Belarus after the elections in 2006 the European Council adopted a statement lamenting that Belarus was “a sad exception on a continent of open and democratic societies” and took restrictive measures against Belorussian officials (Council Conclusions, 2006). In 2010 in a joint statement the Foreign Ministers of the Czech Republic, Germany, Poland and Sweden declared that “there can be no business-as-usual between the European Union and Belarus’ president, Aleksandr Lukashenko, after what has happened since the presidential election in Belarus (…) continued positive engagement with Mr. Lukashenko at the moment seems to be a waste of time and money. He has made his choice — and it is a choice against everything the European Union stands for” (Joint statement, 2010). The participation of German and Swedish partners in this initiative were of particular importance, because they gave the statement a stronger tone as being a common appeal of “new” and “old” Member States.

In the European Parliament Polish members took efforts to put the Eastern issues on the EU agenda. Thanks to them the Parliament approved a resolution on Ukrainian elections in 2004 that was preceded by a European Council declaration (Kamińska, 2007). The Delegation to the EU-Ukraine Parliamentary Cooperation Committee and the Delegation for Relations with Belarus were chaired by Polish members during two mandates (2004-2009 and 2009-currently). Polish members were at the same time the biggest national groups in these delegations.

The Polish position was strengthened, especially in the context of Eastern issues. Poland
started to be perceived not only as an advocate of the issues related to the Eastern neighbours, but also as an expert on the topic. Promoting common European values, like democracy or freedom of speech, this recently-democratized country proved to be an example of a successful transformation and “exporter” of values. Although both projects eventually failed – Belarus remained “the last dictatorship in Europe” and the Ukrainian democratic movement became divided and lost the next elections, the first step was taken. It laid foundations for an empowered EU-Ukraine cooperation and created a common CFSP project – border assistance mission between Ukraine and Moldova. Furthermore, an EU Action Plan for Ukraine as agreed, as well as Ten Points for Closer Co-operation which contained such instruments of cooperation like early consultation, promised deepening trade and economic relations between the EU and Ukraine, further support of Ukraine’s WTO accession, financial assistance and visa facilitations. A Free Trade Area was established. It also left the “possibility of closer co-operation in the area of foreign and security policy and in key sectors”. Last, but not least, a visa facilitation regime was agreed mostly thanks to the efforts of Polish authorities. Regarding Belarus, Polish diplomatic actions resulted in the introduction of a visa ban for high-level officials of the regime in 2006 (Council Regulation, 2006). These sanctions were later extended in cooperation with the Czech Republic (Council Regulation, 2008) and the list remained open and was ready for expansion by the EU if necessary (Gromadzki, 2006).

One further step on the way to promote cooperation with EU Eastern neighbours was launched in 2009 as “Eastern Partnership”. This Polish-Swedish project was supported by the then Czech Presidency of the Council and was another successful attempt in pushing the EU further to the East. The project included the Ukraine and Belarus but also Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova. Russia was initially invited to participate, but rejected the offer.

Poland was also very active in promoting regional partnerships and cooperation with Ukraine and Georgia. During the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008, Polish president together with his counterparts from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, presented a declaration condemning the actions of Russian military forces against sovereign Georgia. Poland was intensively lobbying within the EU for an adequate response that would be more than just mere statements (Declaration, 2008). As a consequence of this rapid reaction, France, holding the Presidency of the Council at the time, undertook diplomatic steps to reach a cease-fire agreement and bring the war to an end. Poland continued lobbying for support for Georgia. The result of this alliance had
its impact on the Eastern Partnership proposal that ranged not only initial partners of Eastern Dimension (Ukraine, Belarus), but included also Georgia and Moldova that both suffer from territorial conflicts with Russia.

Polish accession to the EU and to CFSP changed the perspective of relations with Russia. Being a part of the Twenty-Seven Poland significantly influenced the way that the EU cooperated with the Russian Federation. After 1989, Polish relations with its largest Eastern neighbour was a story of ups and downs with periods of close cooperation alternating with rapid cooling of relations. Upon accession to the EU, Poland got a great chance to strengthen its position towards Russia, since bilateral relations were now transferred to EU-Russia relations under CFSP. The close relations of the European Union with Russia on a high-level were nothing new, but Poland added a new dimension and brought a substantial change to these contacts. These new circumstances caused a reformulation in the position of the whole Union towards Russia. Eastern Enlargement of the Union and the accession of the countries from the territory that had been seen by the Russian Federation as its zone of influence, resulted in a worsening of relations with the former and numerous cases where the Kremlin expressed dissatisfaction with the integration of Eastern and Central European countries with the Union. Polish engagement in the Union’s foreign policy – actions in Ukraine and Belarus par excellence – were in opposition to Russian attempts to bring the two countries back to close cooperation with Russia. The Kremlin saw Polish activities as anti-Russian (Grodzki, 2009). As a result Poland faced repercussions in bilateral relations. In 2004 Russia claimed the expiry of the agreement on navigation in the Strait of Baltiysk that borders with Russian exclave Kaliningrad Oblast (Bugajski, 2010). Russia blocked navigation of Polish units on the strait that is the main connection of Polish cities lying along the Vistula Lagoon with the Baltic Sea. It was a flagrant breach of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea from 1982 (Bugajski, 2006). In 2005 the Kremlin took many actions aimed at discrediting Poland that were regarded as the consequence of Polish engagement in Ukraine and

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83 On the occasion of the 60th anniversary of Yalta conference where W. Churchill, F. Roosevelt and J. Stalin took the decisions on the territorial division of Europe after WWII Kremlin praised the results of the agreement that is perceived in Poland as a treason of the Western allies that let Poland slip into the zone of influence of the USSR. Soon after that Russia turned down Polish request on the documents concerning Katyn massacre from 1940 where in a mass execution of Polish prisoners of war the Soviet secret police NKVD murdered around 22,000 Polish nationals.

In May 2005 Russia disregarded Poland during the celebrations of 60th anniversary of the end of WWII.

In November 2005 Russia put embargo on the import of Polish meat arguing that it did not meet Russian hygiene standards. Although a control action from the European Commission confirmed that the norms were met, Russians kept the embargo in force.
Belarus. These actions of the Kremlin finally found a response, through the Polish veto on negotiations on the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between the EU and Russia. Following the fiasco of Polish-Russian negotiations in November 2006, Poland blocked the mandate for the talks on PCA. However, the Russians still tried to negotiate the agreement with some Member States bilaterally, though ultimately they were unsuccessful. This was a test for the Union's solidarity and although under huge pressure, Poland managed to shape the position of the 27 and the Union remained firm in defending Poland. In this situation the President of the European Commission, Durão Barroso, expressed his disappointment with Russian embargo and pointed out this was a discriminative action. The embargo was lifted in 2008 and only then Poland revoked its veto. Another source of controversy between Warsaw and Moscow was the construction of the “Nordstream” pipeline that would connect Russia with Germany on the bottom of the Baltic Sea, but omitting Poland. The contract between Berlin and Moscow was signed in 2006 despite the protests of Warsaw. This project put in question the Union's solidarity and received widespread criticism in Poland. Nevertheless, Poland did not manage to convince the other Member States to block the initiative, which resulted in many comments putting in question Union's solidarity in energy policy. In general, Polish relations with Russia were difficult, because Putin's Russia returned to a neo-imperialist foreign policy towards its neighbours, traditionally seen by the Kremlin as countries compliant towards Russia. The situation worsened with Polish accession to NATO, and when the Bush administration announced plans to build a missile shield on Polish territory (Hildreth and Ek, 2009). Polish policy towards its Eastern neighbours was in conflict with Russian activities. The engagement of Polish officials in the Ukraine and then in Georgia during the war in August 2008 was in conflict with the Kremlin's intentions in these countries. Putting these two countries on the EU agenda was a great success of Polish diplomacy, but at the same time oriented Russia negatively towards Poland. Although bilateral relations improved in 2010, a number of issues remain still unresolved\(^{84}\). Nonetheless, Poland actively sought for the “multilateralization” of relations with Russia and successfully brought the issues from the bilateral level to the European one. In these actions Poland looked for support from its traditional partners in Central and Eastern Europe – Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia and the Baltic states.

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\(^{84}\) Poland still did not receive from Russia the documents concerning Katyń massacre; Nordstream may prevent the development of the seaport in Szczecin; Russian authorities still disallow navigation of Polish vessels on the Strait of Baltiysk.
The aforementioned examples of contributions to institution building and success in multilateral cooperation within the EU, clearly display Poland’s ability to upload its preferences to the EU level (Kamińska, 2007). Both the successes and failures in the “Easternization” of the CFSP enabled Polish diplomats to learn the methods of cooperation on foreign policy at the European level by building alliances, submitting proposals and ensuring support to the latter.

3.2.3. Ways of uploading national policy to the European level

Having presented the change in EPC/CFSP caused by the uploading of national priorities by two new Member States, I would like to analyze the tools that were used by Portugal and Poland to influence the decisions taken at the communitarian level. In literature concerning the Europeanization of foreign policy there is a model proposed by Miskimmon and Paterson that presents the methods used by Member States to upload national interests to the EU (Miskimmon and Paterson, 2003). The researchers came up with four main instruments of bottom-up Europeanization: institution building/exaggerated multilateralism, agenda setting, example setting and ideational export.

3.2.3.1. Institution building/exaggerated multilateralism

The first instrument, institution building, reflects a state's commitment to building democratic institutions in order to support a newly-born democracy. Through involvement in such institutions, states continuously seek multilateral solutions to international challenges. Exaggerated multilateralism appears when a bilateral problem is transferred to a multilateral level in hope for a better chance of finding a solution.

Portugal focused on promoting institution building in the regions where Lisbon was perceived as expert. Portugal participated as a full member in the San José summit in 1984 that launched the process of institutionalized interregional political dialogue between the EEC and Latin America. The cooperation within Contadora Group and Rio Group, apart from their economic aims, had the long-term objectives of creating conditions for democracy and lowering the tensions in the region of Latin America. This was a particularly delicate issue, since many countries in the region had held dictatorial regimes with the silent support of the United States that wished to avoid their falling to communism at the peak of the Cold War. In this context, establishing a new institutional framework between the EEC and Latin America was one of the
aims strongly supported by Portugal that sought to strengthen relations with the latter. Similarly, Portuguese mediation in Angola and the peace agreement, were considerable efforts that assisted the search for a peaceful solution to this long-lasting conflict. By lifting the negotiations to the multilateral framework (with participation of the Angolan government, UNITA, the United States, the USSR and Portugal), Lisbon intended to improve the chances for finding an agreement.

Portuguese diplomatic actions in relation with the Republic of South Africa also aimed to support the gradual democratization of the country. The Portuguese veto towards further sanctions against Pretoria was calculated as an invitation to negotiated transition from apartheid to democracy. The Portuguese supported multilateralization on this issue as they believed it was the most effective way of pressuring the Southern African government to put an end to discriminative practices.

One of major successes of Portuguese diplomacy in the 80s and 90s of the past century was raising the issue of East Timor and launching negotiations with Indonesia. Portugal firmly managed to maintain the issue on the EEC agenda, which resulted in its elevation to the EEC-ASEAN level, and furthermore to the United Nations. On the latter forum, Portugal was extremely active, especially through the speeches made by the delegations from the countries holding the Presidency in the Council. Lisbon sought to influence these speeches and to include the question of East Timor and violations of human rights in this territory. In this way, from a Portuguese-Indonesian bilateral issue, East Timor became a relevant topic discussed both on the inter-regional and global level.

Polish activities in Ukraine and in Belarus, aimed at promoting the idea of democracy building, were successful examples of institution building. Although they were failed attempts, a deepened cooperation between the EU and Ukraine was established and the norms for a future common projects were defined. Bringing relations with Ukraine and Belarus to the EU level gave them a new multilateral dimension. This exaggerated multilateralism involved the CFSP High Representative in Ukraine. Furthermore, the frequent appearance of Belorussian issues on the European agenda were thanks to the multilateralization of relations of Eastern Member States (Poland and Lithuania) with Belarus. A visa ban for high-level Belorussian officials for the whole

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85 The war started in 1961 when Angola was still a Portuguese colony. After Portugal granted independence to Angola in 1975 the war between the factions (UNITA, MPLA and FNLA) broke out again.
EU was an effect of Polish attempts to extend the policy towards Belarus from the bilateral level to the Twenty-Seven. Also, relations with Russia, in particular during the meat embargo and Polish veto to PCA negotiations between Brussels and Kremlin, were a result of the multilateralization of Polish-Russian relations. Bilateral issues were transferred by Warsaw to the EU-27 level and there were attempts to deal with it in the wider context of relations between the EU and Russia. A similar pattern was used during the Russian invasion of Georgia when the Polish president, in alliance with other Eastern-European heads of states, urged the initially hesitant French Presidency of the Council to intervene and take up the mediation of the conflict which eventually took place.

Through the Eastern Partnership Poland sought the creation and implementation of *Comprehensive Institution Building* Programmes (CIB) in the 6 countries covered in the Partnership. In May 2010 Moldova, as the first of these countries, signed an agreement with the European Commission to start implementing a CIB, and in November of that year, a Framework Document for 2011-2013 activities was signed. Poland actively helped in implementing those agreements by providing Moldova with technical (experts, analyses) and political support.

### 3.2.3.2. Agenda setting

Agenda setting is the ability of national leaders to transfer issues of national importance from their agendas to the European agenda. In this way the leaders of EEC/EU Member States try to focus the attention of the whole Community and influence their perceptions of what are the most important issues of the present-day. This ability to influence the salience of topics on the communitarian agenda has come to be called the agenda setting tool, and has been used to upload national priorities to the European level, particularly during a country's 6-month presidency in the Council (that is, however, not included in this study).

Portuguese efforts to shape the European agenda were quite successful during the whole period from accession in 1986 until their first Presidency of the Council in 1992. Since 1984, Portugal promoted EEC dialogue with Latin-American countries, and found in Spain an important ally in these efforts. The initiatives of cooperation with the Contadora and Rio Groups were subject to permanent Portuguese attention within the EEC. Lisbon and Madrid defended a privileged relationship between the EEC and Latin America, since the isolation of the EEC from a part of the world deeply tied to Europe in terms of history, culture and language, and that is
almost exclusively democratic, would be against the interests of the EEC (Vasconcelos, 1996).

These same conditions applied to Portuguese actions in view of the Communities' relations with sub-Saharan Africa. With France and the UK focusing mainly on the zones of their exclusive interests, that is on their former colonies, Portugal became an advocate of intensifying contacts and improving relations with the Southern part of Africa. The Portuguese initiative on Angola, and peace negotiations, together with Foreign Minister's, João de Deus Pinheiro, proposal of a “mini-Marshall plan” kept the region on the EPC agenda for a long time. The same applied to Lisbon's initiatives towards the Republic of South Africa, Namibia and Mozambique, where Portuguese citizens were particularly numerous.

Portugal's major success as an EEC agenda setter was the case of East Timor. This issue was absent during EPC discussions before the Portuguese accession mainly due to the importance of Indonesia as a partner in EEC-ASEAN relations. After 1986, Portugal insisted on introducing the issue to the EEC forum and step by step managed to convince the European partners to put it under discussion. The Greek Presidency of the Council in 1988 presented a declaration on East Timor in search of an internationally supported solution, and soon the issue was brought to the 43rd General Assembly of the United Nations. The EEC Member States managed to agree on a common position only after the massacre in Dili in November 1991. Portugal always emphasized the human rights component in East Timor and kept the issue on the EEC agenda.

Poland took a number of successful actions to put Belarus, Ukraine, and to some extent Georgia, on the EU agenda. Polish Members of the European Parliament called for a resolution on the manipulation of the Ukrainian general elections in 2004 and succeeded in convincing other MEPs to introduce the resolution, which was preceded by the Irish Presidency of the European Council declaration and followed by a European Council declaration on the issue. Polish efforts to put Ukrainian issues on the European agenda were successful during the Orange Revolution of this country at the turn of 2004 and 2005. The personal engagement of numerous Polish politicians (including former presidents Lech Wałęsa and Aleksander Kwaśniewski) resulted in the mediations between the sides by the EU High Representative, Javier Solana.

Since accession to the EU in 2004, Poland has taken the lead in the Union's cooperation

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with Belarus. Although the relations with Lukashenka's government have been a series of ups and downs, Poland actively engaged in attempts to introduce democracy and the rule of law in this country by cooperating with the Belarusian opposition. Polish government, supported by other Central European countries and the Baltic states, constantly highlighted breaking of democratic rules by the Belarusian authorities. Following these actions and the EU declaration on the elections in Belarus that considered them not free, the Union decided to support, financially and organizationally, the NGOs and independent media in this country. The sanctions against Belarusian officials were adopted by the EU after the intervention of the Polish Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (Kamińska, 2007). Polish Members of the European Parliament were also actively engaged in lobbying on Belarusian issues. As a result of their actions, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the Belarusian elections\textsuperscript{87}. The same institution presented Aleksandr Milinkiewich, the leader of Belarussian opposition, with the Sakharov Prize\textsuperscript{88} in 2006.

In the European Parliament, Polish Members chaired the delegations to the EU-Ukraine (Andrzej Zapałowski, 6\textsuperscript{th} mandate, vice-president, and Paweł Kowal, 7\textsuperscript{th} mandate, president) and the EU-Belarus Parliamentary Cooperation Committee (Jacek Protasiewicz, president). The two delegations contained a number of Polish MEPs from various political factions. Furthermore, the Foreign Affairs Committee, where the issues concerning relations with the Ukraine and Belarus were frequently put on the agenda, was presided over by Jacek Saryusz-Wolski (6\textsuperscript{th} Mandate).

Polish lobbying in the European Council on issues related to the EU Eastern neighbourhood noted a major achievement with the launching of the Eastern Partnership in 2009. The success of this Polish-Swedish initiative, that enjoyed full support from the contemporary Czech Presidency in the Council, as well as the active support of the Baltic states and other Central European countries, was an important victory and crowned Polish efforts in promoting the Union's relations with its Eastern neighbours.

Kamińska claims that “Poland is “dominating” the Belarus and Ukraine issues within the EU institutions” and bringing Belarus and the Ukraine to the EU agenda was a major success in uploading national foreign policy priorities to the European level.

\textsuperscript{87} The European Parliament resolution on the situation in Belarus prior to the presidential elections on 19 March 2006.

\textsuperscript{88} Sakharov Prize – established by the European Parliament in 1988 and named after Soviet scientist and dissident Andrei Sakharov. The prize aims to honour individuals or organisations who dedicated to defend human rights and freedom of thought.
3.2.3.3. Example setting

Example setting, another tool in the box of uploading national foreign policy to European level, is based mainly on setting an example for other EU Member States in order to promote national ideas. In this case Portugal and Poland acted as EU-pace-setters in relations with particular countries that were a matter of interest for both of them.

The role of Portugal as an example setter in the EEC again focused on relations with Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa and East Timor. In the first case, Portugal tried to emphasize the significance of the Latin-American countries as partners of the EEC. Together with Spain, Portugal tried to give a new impetus to cooperation by raising the level of the Rio Group meetings by sending ministers to the meetings, and satisfying the ambitions of Latin-American ministers who had often expressed disappointment with the lack of presence of ministers from the EEC Member States (usually only the country holding Presidency in the Council was represented by a minister).

Portugal made intense efforts to bring Sub-Saharan Africa closer to the EEC. As an example setter, Lisbon issued a declaration of congratulations after each successful democratic election in former Portuguese colonies. Portuguese mediations in Angola and actions in relation to Namibia were a vanguard of the EEC. Lisbon was also the first country to firmly reject further sanctions on the Republic of South Africa, instead promoting a political dialogue in order to encourage a democratic transition in the country.

In the case of East Timor Portugal, again, was the EEC pace-setter. Facing the reluctance or unwillingness of other Member States, Lisbon was actively involved in the process of supporting the right to self-determination for the nation of Mauberes since the very beginning of accession to the EEC in 1986. These efforts were not warmly welcomed in the Community as they feared the deterioration of contacts with Indonesia, but Lisbon insisted and made the protection of human rights in East Timor one of its essential components.

Poland tried to set an example for other EU Member States in contacts with the Union's Eastern neighbours. Facing a regression in the rule of law in Belarus, and a progression in dictatorial efforts of Aleksandr Lukashenka, Poland promoted democratic values by cooperating with the NGO sector in Belarus as well as financing and co-organizing projects and programmes on civil society and human rights (Kamińska, 2007). Poland supported Belarusian students that had been suspended or expelled from their universities for participation in pro-democratic
activities, granting them with scholarships and opportunities to continue their studies in Poland. The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs initiated exchange programmes between Polish and Belarusian universities. Together with the European Commission and Lithuania, Poland supported the European Humanities University that was closed by Belarusian authorities in 2004, and reopened in Vilnius where it continued its activities in exile. Poland granted financial and technical aid to Belarusian free radio and TV channels. The first independent Belorussian TV channel (also the first channel in the Belarusian language \footnote{Belarusian media use Russian language for their programmes.}) “Bielsat TV” launched in December 2007 and was mostly financed by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The programme was developed in Poland, with the support of Lithuania, Sweden and the Netherlands. Poland adopted visa sanctions for Belarusian high-level officials in 2006 and strongly supported the Union's decision in this matter which came shortly afterwards.

Regarding Ukraine, Poland supported the visa facilitation process for Ukrainian citizens. Poland set an example to the other 26 EU Member States by issuing visas for Ukrainians free of charge \footnote{Before Polish accession to Schengen in December 2007.}. After Polish accession to Schengen, the prices for Schengen visas for Ukrainians were put on a very low level and Local Border Traffic \footnote{In the zone of 30 kms from the border; see more: Regulation (EC) No. 1931/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 laying down rules on local border traffic at the external land borders of the Member States and amending the provisions of the Schengen Convention.} was introduced in order to facilitate cross-border exchange.

3.2.3.4. Ideational export

Ideational export means the promotion of core EEC/EU values, like democracy and human rights, at the international level in conjunction with key partners. It can also be called normative Europeanization, or defined by a popular term of “Westernization” since it exports norms, procedures, institutions and ways of doing things according to the liberal democracy model.

Portuguese diplomatic actions under the EPC were always designed in line with the respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law. The initiatives that Lisbon took within the EEC were also an attempt at recovering at least partially the influence that Portugal had lost in the international arena during the fall of the colonial empire (MNE, 1986). Portuguese actions towards the countries of Southern Africa were aimed towards the democratization of these
countries and application of the values shared by the EEC Member States. These reasons underpinned the declarations of Portuguese governments after each successful democratic election in a former Portuguese colonies, as well as in the process of supporting Namibian democracy and self-determination by the people of East Timor. Regarding Angola, Portugal proposed a plan for peace consolidation through development (MNE, 1988). In relation to Mozambique, Lisbon delivered the necessary political support for president Chissano to maintain his democratic achievements in this country (MNE, 1987).

The promotion of European values was one of the key objectives for the Eastern Partnership initiative, included in the general policy of the EU to promote democracy and ensure regional security. The objectives in the long term were the empowerment of new-born democracies in the unstable moments of the early years after the transition and reinforcement of the process of civil society building in order to convert those countries in to secure and loyal partners in a neighbouring region on the external border of the EU (Chrobot, 2009). Through the Eastern Partnership and projects like “Belsat TV” and intensive economic, cultural and scientific contacts, as well as through Local Border Traffic, Poland sought to promote democratic transitions in the neighbourhood and support the nascent civil society, pushing for more coherent actions at the EU level (Kamińska, 2007).

3.3. Seeking alliances within the Community/Union

The simultaneous Portuguese and Spanish negotiations for, and eventual accession to the EEC were a breakthrough in bilateral relations between both countries. Portugal had been traditionally distrustful towards its bigger neighbour who had historically attempted, on numerous occasions, to incorporate the territories on the Western part of Iberian Peninsula (Barreto, 2002). On the other hand, Spain disregarded Portugal and concentrated on cooperation with bigger European and world powers, like France and the USA. The process of accession negotiations that ran parallel in both countries broke the ice between the governments in Lisbon and Madrid as they realized they were on the same boat. Their dual accession to the EEC in 1986 created new conditions for bilateral relations that became more intense and diversified (Pires, 2009). For the first time since World War II, Portugal and Spain shared the same aims in foreign policy (Vasconcelos, 1996). With the consequent programmes for regional cooperation (e.g.
Interreg\(^{92}\) among the peripheral regions in both countries, cross-border cooperation and economic exchange, the relationship between the two Iberian countries soon became much closer and cordial. Since 1983, bilateral meetings and cooperation became commonplace through the realization of bilateral summits to discuss common problems and interests, aimed to “achieve a stronger cooperation between Lisbon and Madrid”, particularly in European fora (Magone, 2006). After Spain and Portugal joined the European Economic Community in 1986 the cooperation of the two countries in shaping European foreign policy grew significantly, especially in defending close relations of the Community with Latin America, a region of particular interest for both Iberian partners. The cooperation with the Rio Group, promoting EEC-LAC\(^{93}\) relations, and the coordination of positions towards the Maghreb countries were remarkable examples of these actions.

Upon becoming a full member of the European Economic Community Portugal joined the “Southern coalition” within the EEC, cooperating intensively with France, Greece, Italy and Spain, to strengthen the Southern dimension of the Community as a counterbalance to the Member States lying more to the North of Europe (Germany, Benelux, the UK, Ireland). This was notable in developing cooperation in the Mediterranean area, the continued dialogue with the Arab states, and attempts at finding a solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Portugal also enhanced cooperation with France due to their common aims towards former colonies in Africa. Instead of competitive actions, diplomacies of both countries agreed to cooperate, aiming at bolstering EC engagement in Africa. The United Kingdom was often a key partner in these activities including members of the British Commonwealth in EEC programmes towards Africa. Portugal aligned its policies with these countries who sought deeper cooperation with former colonies (often accused of neo-colonialism) and led the EEC to sign the Lomé Conventions (I-IV) which was designed to provide a new framework of cooperation between the EEC and developing ACP countries.

At the same time, Portugal had to face the presence of various interests within EPC that sometimes were competitive in relation to theirs. German intentions to improve the relations with the Soviet Union and the Bloc were turning the attention of the Twelve to the East. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was one of such attempts. Although Portugal

\(^{92}\) An initiative of the EC that was established in 1989 to stimulate interregional cooperation.

\(^{93}\) Latin America and the Caribbean.

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did not have particular relations with Eastern European countries, Lisbon tried to play an active role in the negotiations.

After the Big-Bang enlargement, Poland tried to cooperate closely with Germany. Moreover, key allies for Polish designs towards the Eastern neighbours of the Twenty-Seven were found among the countries that joined the Union simultaneously. Polish leaders set numerous forms of regional cooperation in various configurations – working together with Visegrad group (Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia) and the Baltic countries. The Visegrad Group and the Baltic countries were key for promoting enhanced cooperation with Ukraine. The engagement of top level politicians from the aforementioned countries was crucial in launching the Eastern Partnership initiative and in ensuring funding for it in the EU budget. The support of Czech diplomacy and members of the European Parliament from Czech Republic, Lithuania and Slovakia resulted in numerous condemnations of Aleksandr Lukashenka, as well as the imposition of an entry ban on Belorussian authorities. The same actors were also important during the war in Georgia in 2008 when Poland lobbied for common EU action to stop Russian intervention. Their support and pressure on the Twenty-Seven made the French Presidency take steps in order to cease hostilities and force the retreat of the Russian army from the territory of Georgia.

Both Polish and Portuguese diplomats, as well as the officials serving in the European institutions admit that the process of the European integration substantially changed the functioning of the regional cooperation in Europe. This regional cooperation acquired a new dimension within the European Union, promoting closer partnerships of the neighbouring countries and creating new (institutionalized or not) forms of cooperation, such as Iberian summits, “Southern coalition”, Visegrad Group, CEFTA, etc. This level of regional “working together” would not be possible without pervasive process of Europeanization, claim the diplomats. These forms of regional cooperation vary in frequency of meetings and their effectiveness, which mostly depend on the ad hoc common political interests and current circumstances. The cooperation is very close in some periods and it generates very strong lobbying at the European level, but in the long-term this is neither deep nor close institutionalized form of policy-making at the European level. In fact, it is the Europeanization of political

cooperation that swallows up regionalization (except for legally bound organizations such as Benelux).

4. **Relations with the USA facing relations with the EEC/EU**

Although the change in Portuguese foreign policy under EPC was remarkable, the process of Europeanization did not put in question close cooperation between Portugal and the United States. Portuguese leaders clearly expressed the importance of the privileged relationship that Lisbon had with Washington (Ferreira-Pereira, 2007). After the dismantling of the Portuguese colonial empire, Washington became the most important element of Portuguese Atlanticism (Vasconcelos, 1996). One of the main fears of Portuguese politicians was weakening of relations with the USA in face of the Europeanization of Portuguese foreign policy. This was the scenario that the governments in Lisbon wanted to avoid, since the partnership with the United States was a fundamental part of Portuguese defence policy. In the European debate on transatlantic relations, Portugal defended the position that the EEC-USA relations were the key element in the international activities of the Community (MNE, 1990). In this way, Portugal aimed to prevent any possibility of detachment between the USA and the EEC. The approval of the “Transatlantic declaration” (*Transatlantic Declaration*, 1990) was warmly welcomed by Portugal, who saw the agreement as “corresponding to the Euro-Atlantic reality” (MNE, 1990). Despite Portuguese concerns with regards to a possible breakdown in USA-EEC cooperation that would impact the Portuguese strategic partnership with the former, Lisbon was able to influence the Communities' positioning towards the USA – one that maintained close cooperation and at the same time left the Portuguese-American partnership unchanged.

Polish accession to the European Union was accompanied by the same fears that bothered the Portuguese two decades earlier. After 1989 Poland became one of America’s most devoted allies and this trend went further after Polish accession to NATO in 1999. During the Bush administration, Poland supported American intervention in Iraq in 2003, standing in opposition to the Union’s key players like France and Germany (but in line with the UK) which caused numerous unpleasant comments that presented Poland as an American “Trojan horse” in Europe and led French President, Jacques Chirac, to a statement that Poland (and other EU-candidate countries from the region: Czech Republic and Hungary) “missed an opportunity to stay silent” (Evans-Pritchard, 2003). The president of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, commented
on the situation saying that “efforts of European diplomats and of the Commission to reach a peaceful solution for Iraq were dashed after the leaders of a group of European states signed a letter supporting Bush's policy towards Baghdad” (“letter of 8” and declaration of the Vilnius Group) (Kisielewski, 2004). Further criticism at the European level was directed to the decision to purchase new fighters for the Polish air force. This lucrative contract was won by the American F-16 that defeated French Mirage 2000 and the Swedish-British Grippen. The decision again raised critics among Western-European politicians. Nevertheless, Polish governments managed to combine a pro-European line in foreign policy with their strategic partnership with the USA. The late 2000s saw a rapprochement between the EU and the USA give way to a return to close Euro-Atlantic cooperation. Polish diplomacy was competently conducted in European corridors and managed to stay in line with European foreign policy lines indicated by the CFSP and maintain the strategic alliance with the United States that was seen as a key partner in Polish defence strategy.

5. Conclusions

This chapter aimed to show that the process of Europeanization of foreign policy took place against the Member States’ efforts to keep foreign policy as their exclusive field of competences (Manners and Whitman, 2000). In the first years of membership in the EEC/EU it involved downloading to the national level of some positions in areas where the preliminary stances of these new Member States were unclear or non-existent due to the lack of interest of the latter in the region or issue in question. Further in the chapter I explored the other side of the process where the uploading of national interests was dealt with. In this case the new Member States transferred their priorities to the European level in order to give them a new approach and a wider dimension.

In the accession years both Portugal (1986) and Poland (2004) were fully prepared to participate in political cooperation in foreign policy – in the forms of European Political Cooperation in the former, and the Common Foreign and Security Policy in the latter case. The period of time between initiating accession negotiations and the moment of accession were used by the administrations of both countries to adapt to the mechanisms inside the Community/Union in foreign policy making and in line with positions adopted by the EEC/EU. These were the years of “one-way Europeanization” identified by Heather Grabbe (2001), when the candidate
countries had to adjust their policies to the ones adopted by the Member States. After accession, both Portugal and Poland became full-members of the Community/Union, which gave them an opportunity to not only follow common standings on the international arena, but also to actively participate in the process of shaping them. Both countries brought to the EEC/EU new approaches and objectives.

Portugal adhered, almost without reservations, to a procedure which facilitated its re-inclusion into the international community. EPC constituted an external counterpart to the domestic process of democratization after the isolation imposed by the dictatorship. The integration of Portugal into the European foreign policy level resulted in the introduction of numerous, earlier inexistent issues to Portuguese external policy. Intensive, although waving relations of the EEC with the countries of the Soviet Bloc became integrated in the Portuguese political agenda with the EPC. Furthermore, Portugal actively joined the work on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and Helsinki Final Act. Also, the Mediterranean Sea, that was not an area of particular Portuguese interest before 1986 turned into an important region, especially through Portuguese cooperation with the other Southern-European Member States.

In the first year of membership Portugal had already developed the capacity to intervene and deal with its priorities, in particularly concerning the issues traditionally linked with Portugal (MNE, 1986). With the integration of Portuguese foreign policy in European Political Cooperation Lisbon managed to maintain its specific links to Portuguese-speaking countries. The latter was the line taken in foreign policy in which Portugal was recognized as an expert within the EPC. By bringing these issues to the European level, Portugal managed to reestablish political links with former colonies and at the same time gave them visibility at the European arena (Hermenegildo, 2008). One of the most important issues brought to the EEC by Portugal was East Timor and its expected independence. Portuguese governments lobbied in favor of a common European position in this case during many years of membership.

Participation in the EPC, let Portugal defend its national interests and extend Portuguese external policy into further international fora by enhancing its visibility (Hermenegildo, 2008). Portugal actively contributed to the EPC and thanks to an intensive diplomatic work managed to shape the lines of the European foreign policy and include some nationally relevant issues to the European agenda.

Polish adaptation to the Common Foreign and Security Policy was facilitated by the
earlier long participation in the political dialogue with the EU. Integrating the CFSP meant for Poland introducing some policies towards regions that had not played any important role in their national foreign policy before. Cooperation with African states, humanitarian and development aid was a completely new dimension added to the Polish foreign policy with the accession to the European Union. Participation in the political dialogue and economic cooperation with Asia, under the framework of ASEM meetings was another added value by the CFSP. Strengthening partnerships with Latin American countries under the ACP cooperation in the Union elevated Polish relations with the countries of America, Caribbean and Pacific to a higher level. Last, but not least, the Union for Mediterranean and closer cooperation with the countries of the Northern Africa region also addressed Polish foreign policy in this region.

After breaking through the initial scepticism towards the CFSP Polish governments realized this was a great instrument for achieving goals and gaining influence in the EU (Kamińska, 2007). Polish expertise in relations with Eastern European countries made Poland a leader in the Union in relation to these issues. The Eastern Partnership was a form of institutionalization of the idea of cooperation with the Eastern-European countries and it was a big success of Polish diplomacy to make it happen at the EU level. Poland became a bridge between East and West and its growing ability to build alliances in the Union made its potential for shaping the European foreign policy come to fruition.

The EEC/EU regarded as a global actor has been an organization acting in every region of the world. The additions of Portugal and Poland to their ranks let these countries become members of a global player and extended and developed their national foreign policies in a number of areas which had been absent on their national agendas before. At the same time, adaptation to the mechanisms of EPC and CFSP allowed Portugal and Poland to shape European foreign policy by introducing national priorities and integrating them at the European level, giving them a new dimension and higher visibility.
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Chapter Four: Europeanization of foreign policy – final conclusions

1. Meeting of the research objectives

This project aimed to analyze the process of Europeanization of foreign policies of Portugal and Poland: two new countries who started the democratization wave in their regions and consequently entered the path of European integration. Portugal was the initiator of the Third Wave of democratization by Huntington that started the movement of abandoning non-democratic regimes in the South of Europe. After a short period of political instability the new elites decided to join the European project. Poland was the democratic frontrunner in Central and Eastern Europe – the region that during the Cold War was dominated by communist regimes steered from Moscow. The political and economic change that started in 1989 let Poland reorient their foreign policy and “come back” to Europe after almost 50 years of isolation.

The study concentrates on the analysis of the shifts of national foreign policies resulting from the pressures from the European level. This policy convergence is the top-down adaptation of national structures and processes in response to the demands of the EEC/EU. Downloading from the European level to national level occurs after a sustained period of structural and procedural adaptation. On the other hand, my research also analyzes the modifications to European policy in the area of external relations, appearing as an added value by the two newcomers to the European Economic Community/Union. This foreign policy uploading process is a bottom-up projection of national ideas, preferences and models from the national to the supranational level.
The selection of cases: countries that represent different geographical regions of Europe (two extremes of the European Union, in fact) and have a different recent history, including the nature of non-democratic system and diverse time line of the processes of democratization and European integration, serves to limit the role of external factors in the process of Europeanization of foreign policy. In other words, choosing case studies not related by close political relations, geographic location, political regime and alliances makes the phenomenon of Europeanization of foreign policy a general mechanism that applies in new democracies that joined the EEC/EU.

The division of the analyzed time period to the pre-accession and full membership periods allowed me to investigate separately the reforms and adjustments on the national level that were expected from Portugal and Poland in the quality of candidate states and new initiatives taken at the European level that were promoted by Portugal and Poland in their capacity of Member States. This structural move allowed the observation of processes under different circumstances, independently from one another. This proved the thesis that such a process is not a regional or temporal phenomenon, but may occur in any country that undergoes processes of democratization and European integration.

The analysis of foreign policies of the countries under study presents substantial shifts in positions in the first stage (democratization and pre-accession), which is referred to in the Chapter Two of this publication. As expected in the research objectives these shifts were results of political transformation and a new geopolitical reality. The “swing to Europe” brought revolutionary changes in national foreign policies. Then, necessary adjustments in foreign policy were necessary as results of the accession conditions negotiated with the EEC/EU. This “one-way Europeanization” was obligatory for the candidate states to match common European positions by the time of accession. Afterwards, already in their capacity of Member States, Portugal and Poland started uploading their priorities and strategies in external relations to the European level. The first years of membership were well used by both countries in influencing political cooperation within the EEC/EU and making use of the member's rights and take up initiatives and proposals.

2. The research conducted

The initial part of the research consisted of a thorough analysis of literature on Europeanization and the current state of play in this area. In the further part I studied closely the
orientation of foreign policy of Portugal and Poland after the non-democratic periods in these countries had ended. The investigation included qualitative data analysis with a critical approach and process-tracing of the directions in national foreign policies of democratizing Portugal and Poland, as well as observation of the shifts in these policies related to the process of European integration and adaptation to the positions contained in the EPC and CFSP. Content analyses of the documents were an important part of the study. Finally, numerous interviews with diplomats of all ranks were conducted in Lisbon and during field visits to Warsaw and Brussels.

The literature review showed in the very beginning quite a scarce number of publications concerning Europeanization of foreign policy. The few monographs that deal with this issue concern France, Germany and the UK – the key European players. On the other hand, the studies on the peripheral states are almost absent in the literature, which can be also due to their relatively recent participation in the European integration process. All the above increased my motivation to study the given cases in order to cover the countries absent in the research on Europeanization and complete the studies on this process.

While conducting the research I had to face a number of problems that are present in all Europeanization studies as well as ones related to the complexity of the analyzed field of foreign policy. First of all, political scientists have problems with a clear definition of the Europeanization process. There is a variety of approaches and even such classics like Featherstone or Radaelli admit this fact – there is a risk of conceptual stretching as well as excessive narrowing of the definition on the other hand (see Chapter One, par. 2.1 and further). There is also no agreement among the researchers on the scope of the process of Europeanization – whether it appears only in the fields where the Community/Union has exclusive competences, or can be also observed in the shared fields (the ones where the European Commission shares power with the Member States) or even in the high-policy areas that are *domaines réservées* of the governments (Wong, 2005, 2006, 2007; Tsardanidis and Stavridis 2005; Major and Pomorska, 2005).

One of the aims of this thesis is to show that foreign policy field in which the Member States have exclusive competences95 can also be subject to the process of Europeanization. This process occurs in a more discreet way, basing on the intergovernmental cooperation that has its reflection

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95 The office of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon was provided with mainly representative and coordinative functions.
in political declarations and “soft law” (rules of conduct that cannot be legally enforceable; though they have a legal dimension in that they guide the conduct of the institutions, the Member States and other policy participants). Even though the process unfolds in a different way than the Europeanization of other areas, it does exist and can be seen in the cases under study. Chapter Two of the thesis shows that the candidacy period is the time when “one-way Europeanization” (Grabbe, 2001) appears to adjust the directions of national foreign policies to the European ones and this is done by downloading the latter to the national level. On the other hand, being a full member of the community gives the right to shape the common positions of the EEC/EU which happens with the process of uploading national priorities to the European level (Chapter three). In this regard Europeanization is taken as an independent variable, while national foreign policy as a dependent variable. To analyze both projects I used two theoretical models – 1) downloading by Smith and 2) uploading by Miskimmon and Paterson (Chapter One, par. 7.2).

3. Research outcomes

The results of this study add some new answers to the discussion on the process of Europeanization in various policy fields. The selection of cases and time frames in the thesis aimed to study the process in a different environment, that is to say in different geographical, political, historical and sociological circumstances. That is why I chose such distant countries as Portugal and Poland. At the same time, both of them were precursors of the democratization process in their regions – Southern and Central-Eastern Europe, respectively. The selection of time range aimed to take into account comparable periods – started in the years following the fall of the non-democratic regimes (1974-77 in Portugal and 1989-94 in Poland), the aspirations to join the process of the European integration and EEC/EU-candidacy period (1977-86 and 1994-2004) and finished in the first years of full membership until their first Presidencies in the Council (1986-91 and 2004-11). Despite such a different background one could observe the same patterns of the process of Europeanization in both countries which shows that it occurs independently from the country’s background. It also opens up a discussion as to whether this process is a universal process that appears in all the countries involved in European integration, which would however need a much broader study than this thesis.

The process of foreign policy reorientation in both Portugal and Poland started during the democratic transformation. After first years of uncertainty among the variety of options for the
new direction to be taken in their foreign policy, the elites conscientiously chose the pro-European approach. Integration to the European structures became a primary objective of the governments. The Europeanization of foreign policy after democratization did not start by chance or as a certain consequence, but as a planned strategy. During the ongoing integration process the Europeanization of foreign policy in the both candidate states was notable in the sphere of elite socialization, bureaucratic reorganization, constitutional change and the increase of public support for European cooperation in the field of foreign policy. Closer ties and cooperation with the EEC/EU helped Portuguese and Polish officials to socialize and become a part of the European decision-making process. Administration restructuring improved information flows and the decision-making process on the level of European cooperation. Adjustments to the legal systems of both countries aimed to adapt to the new multilateral Community-based working framework. With cooperation advancing also in the civil societies of Portugal and Poland, the environment became more trustful and favorable towards European cooperation in the field of foreign policy.

Immediately after their accession, both Portugal and Poland started to influence actively the cooperation on foreign policy at the European level. The years of “one-way Europeanization” were used to prepare well the membership period when finally also policy projection became possible. Being part of a recognized global actor like the EEC/EU allowed these countries to complete their political agendas and develop interests in all continents and become more credible to the third parties. At the same time, Portugal and Poland started to shape European foreign policy by projecting national priorities to the European level, giving them a new dimension and higher visibility.

4. Further analysis

The outcomes of this study show unambiguously that Europeanization is a process that also applies in intergovernmental policies that are still the exclusive domain covered by the Member States. The features of Europeanization of foreign policy are undoubtedly different from the phenomenon of this process in other policies. The methodology of this thesis could serve as useful in further studies on Europeanization of foreign policy. Such a study could cover all the countries involved in the European integration process, as mentioned above. The question that arises is, would this apply to the founding members of the ECSC that were involved in European
integration ever since? How would the process of Europeanization of their foreign policies look like? Since there is no candidacy period, would it only consist of the second part that is uploading and downloading at the same time?

5. **Methodological aspects of the research**

During the whole period of research I intended to merge two methodological approaches: the literature of the subject (academic approach) was completed by the information collected on the interviews with policy-practitioners during the field study visits (policy-makers approach). The outcomes of the review of the literature on Europeanization were not always satisfactory and often confusing. *Primo*, there is no general agreement on the definition of the term. *Secundo*, the Europeanization of foreign policy raises many controversies, since numerous researchers claim that as a “high policy” it cannot be a subject of the Europeanization process. *Tertio*, the literature on Europeanization is still scarce, and this refers particularly to the studies on the topic with respect to the new democracies that joined the European Union. The literature concerning Europeanization of foreign policy in Portugal and Poland is not voluminous and in the first case it generally takes into account the period of the first Portuguese Presidency in the EU (1992) and the process of uploading of national priorities to the European level during this time. Nonetheless, the theoretical models proposed by Smith, and Miskimmon and Paterson turned to be a good matrix for analysis of downloading and uploading between national foreign policies and the European level. Moreover, these two models ensured an objective form of comparison between the two countries of such a different background. As a complementary tool I used the interviews with officials in the three decision-making hubs (Lisbon, Warsaw, Brussels). These interviews with policy-practitioners were invaluable as they provided me with the information on specific trends and schemes in the decision-making process. Although I spent quite a lot of time on the interviews and their analysis, had I had to start over the research once again I would definitely commit more time to this part.

The further lines of research after this thesis seem to be quite naturally linked to the Presidency of the Council. There are some studies concerning the three Portuguese Presidencies (1992, 2000 and 2007) and very few of the recent Polish Presidency in 2011⁹⁶. The continuation

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⁹⁶ This research was conducted in 2007-2011 and the summaries concerning the Polish Presidency in the EU were yet to be written.
of this thesis could be a comparison of the first Presidencies of the two countries in question. Curiously, the methodological approach in this further research could be the same as in this very thesis; although the presidency is only a 6-month “leadership” or “guidance” of the whole Community, it is at the same time a very intensive time in which the tempo of some political processes in the Presidency-country is raised significantly\(^9\). In this particular time the process of uploading and downloading in the field of foreign policy is extraordinarily intensive and therefore the research focusing particularly on this period would be extremely interesting.

6. Final comments

This project came into being with the curiosity to analyze the process of Europeanization which has been a subject of great interest among the scholars of various fields, in particular political scientists, sociologists and historians. The idea behind this was to investigate this process in the periphery of the European Union and in the field of a high national sensitivity, such as, foreign policy. Comparing two cases from different extremes of European Union gave the clarity of objectivity of the research that would not fall into a “trap of regionalism” (similar results of the thesis analyzing two Iberian countries or two Central-Eastern European countries could be undermined by the argument of similar interests for geographic and historical reasons). Adding to this a comparable, but not exactly the same time frame (1974-91 vs. 1989-2011) and the subsequent change of common foreign policy at the European level, silenced potential arguments on the “obvious reasons for similarity”.

Along the different findings of the research one could identify some that are of fundamental importance. Firstly, both Portugal and Poland, after the fall of non-democratic regimes, underwent a short period of instability when it was unclear which direction in foreign policy they would take. Both of them quickly abandoned the hitherto policy of isolation from Western Europe and in both of them the decision to take the pro-European course was taken by the democratic elites. After the democratic fundamentals of the new regime were established, Western-European countries supported the newly-born democracies with both financial assistance and political promises of future admission to the European Community. After the euphoria while setting new foreign policy priorities/orientation/strategies to pro-European in Lisbon and Warsaw,

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\(^9\) The author worked for the Portuguese Presidency in the EU in 2007 and observed first months of Polish Presidency in Warsaw and Brussels.
the disappointment arose a few years later when it turned out that the way to Europe is neither so straight nor so short as it initially seemed to be. With the opening of the accession negotiations the first part of Europeanization process started: the “one-way” Europeanization. The four components of this process were elite socialization, bureaucratic reorganization, constitutional change and the increase in public support for European political cooperation. All of them were crucial in the structural and qualitative change of administration and procedures in the decision-making process. Capacity building and strong civil service in Portugal and Poland allowed the elites to establish themselves in the new political environment of European integration and facilitated the decision-making process in new circumstances. The second element, bureaucratic reorganization occurred as a national institutional and procedural adaptation to the requirements of cooperation at the European level. Constitutional change was a high political cost that was necessary to restructure national law systems in order to reach some progress on closer political cooperation. The last element of Smith’s model was the public support for European political cooperation – an important factor due to the importance of public opinion in modern European democracies. All these costly reforms at the national level were required before Portugal and Poland were admitted to join the EEC/EU. It took more time for the governments in Lisbon and Warsaw to get ready for membership, but eventually after just under 10 years since handing out the application, negotiations terminated and the Community gave the green light for enlargement.

The accession started a new chapter in the history of Portugal and Poland. It started also a new stage of Europeanization – as full members both countries were ready not only to adapt to the European common lines of foreign policy, but now also to shape these lines by uploading national priorities, creating coalitions and lobbying for their particular interests in the Community. Although initially some concerns were raised, saying that participating in the European Political Cooperation/Common Foreign and Security Policy would result in losing national sovereignty and be obliged to adapt to the directions incompatible with the raison d’Etat, they were dispelled in the first months of cooperation. Moreover, the “two-way” Europeanization turned to be a process that enriched Portuguese and Polish foreign policies, opening them to new areas and including them in their agenda (downloading). Simultaneously, Portugal and Poland specialized in their traditional zones of interests and started to be perceived as experts within the EEC/EU on certain issues; additionally, some of these topics were brought to the European level for the very first time (uploading). Through the mechanism of downloading Portugal added closer
contacts with the Central and Eastern European countries to their foreign policy agenda and put more attention on relations with the countries of the Middle East, which had been scarce before 1986. On the other hand Lisbon promoted at the European level relations with the countries that had been Portuguese territories in the past (Brazil, Angola, Mozambique, East Timor in particular) and remained in close cooperation with Portugal after their independence. The accession of Poland to the EU brought to the Polish foreign policy closer relations with African and Asian countries which had been very selective and in many cases limited before 2004. At the same time, Warsaw uploaded to the CFSP closer cooperation with the countries from the Eastern borders of the EU (Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova) as well as the ones from the Caucasus region (Georgia).

To sum up, the process of democratization in Portugal and Poland went hand in hand with the foreign policy change. It resulted in the abandoning of hitherto alliances and warming up the thus far cold relations with Western Europe. The decision on the reorientation of foreign policy priorities/strategy was taken by new, democratic elites that chose European integration as their priority.

The processes of democratization and Europeanization are closely related to each other. The process of Europeanization in the field of foreign policy in the countries under study was complex in phases and dimensions. It started with the democratization of the political regime and application of the Western-European model of democracy. It was also possible thanks to the engagement and active support of the EEC/EU Member States in the construction of the Portuguese and Polish democracies after the fall of the non-democratic regimes in both countries. Furthermore, the decision to reorient foreign policy priorities to European integration taken by the political elites in Lisbon and Warsaw launched the programme of legal and administrative adaptation of the structural and mental level. Subsequently, the process of downloading and uploading of foreign policy started. The governments in Lisbon and Warsaw were committed to “import” the directions agreed in the European level. In the first part of the downloading process they had no influence on the lines to be taken. After their accession, both Portugal and Poland started exporting their foreign policy priorities and creating coalitions with partners to upload them on to the European level. This proves their governments and administrations learned their lesson and did not remain passive recipients of decisions at the European level, but became active players taking part in the process of shaping European foreign policy.
Literature:


Annex 1. List of interviews

1. Bochenek, I., Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland; First Secretary, Parliamentary Section, Permanent Representation of Poland to the EU.
2. Buzek, J., President of the European Parliament; former Prime-Minister of Poland.
4. Czerniuk, H., Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland; First Secretary, Head of Parliamentary Section, Permanent Representation of Poland to the EU.
5. Gąciarz, J., Ministry of Interior and Administration of Poland; General Counsellor, Department for the European Union and International Cooperation.
6. Grela, M., Council of the European Union; Director in General Secretariat, DGE IV: Transatlantic Relations, Latin America, United Nations and Counter-Terrorism; former Polish Permanent Representative to the EU and former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland.
7. Husak, T., Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland; Second Secretary – Antici, the Office of the Head of Mission, Permanent Representation of Poland to the EU.
9. Jasiński, F., Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland; Counsellor, JHA Section, Permanent Representation of Poland to the EU.
10. Martela, M., European Parliament; Administrator in the Secretariat of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs.
12. Piesiak, A., Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland; Second Secretary, Institutional and Legal Section, Permanent Representation of Poland to the EU.
14. Pijanowska, M., Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland; specialist in the Department of Coordination of Polish Presidency; formerly in the Office of the European Integration Committee.

15. Szostak, R., General Secretariat of the EU Council; Administrator in the Council Legal Service.

16. Świeżaczyński, A., Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland; Head of Department of Subsaharian Africa and Near East.

17. Utnicka, A., Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland; Political Advisor, Third Secretary in the Embassy of Poland in Spain.
Annex 2. List of publications and communications at scientific conferences

1. Published (and submitted) articles:


2. Communications at scientific conferences:


