The project of creating an artificial brain which can emulate the intelligent behaviour of human beings occupies the investigations of mathematicians like Alan Turing, Norbert Wiener and John von Neumann, pioneers in the development of the discipline of Artificial Intelligence.

Included in the genealogy of the production of mediators between humans and the natural world - in which António Cadima Mendonça states, artistic production is amongst⁴ - the possibility of creating an artificial brain questions Man's relation with its technical production, in the dimensions it takes on as an instrument, a prosthesis, or, in the ultimate hypothesis, as an artificial creature.

The progressive involvement and absorption of technology in the human biological support, and its various consequent extensions, physical, sensory and mental, propitiate the emergence of a post-human status, of which the cyborg serves as paradigm.

The previous univocity of the man-technique relationship, based on the definition of man as the "god of the artifacts"⁵, and supported by modernity's game of basic dualities, is thus wounded, threatening the originality of the human model.

The human body, created in the divine image and as the most celebrated motif of Western art, is now threatened by a new and improved version, a post-human Adam 2.0, of amplified capabilities, which fluidly blends the organic and inorganic, human and the technical in mixed entities of a nomadic or never definite taxonomy.
In the work *L'image de l'homme*, Philippe Breton asserts that the development of intelligent computers in the twentieth century is in accordance with the goal simulating, through the machine, a human brain outside the biological support. The project of the artificial intelligence is based primarily on a two way comparison between the human brain and the computer: if it is possible for a computer to be intelligent, it is because the brain is as well a "(...) machine to perform the functions of thought." "Therefore the pioneers of the Artificial Intelligence discipline have dedicated themselves to, above all, understand the workings of the human brain. This project is, thus, part of a wider narrative of the creation of an artificial being in the image of Man.

As a condition of the possibility of replication it is presented the notion of a human essence linked not to the morphological structure, but to the level its relations. This new feature, which neglects the material support, requires a reassessment of the human status rendering a kinship with the computer at an essential level, proposing the integration of both as two variants of a common class of species, the informational being.

Philippe Breton identifies the three main agents in the project of Artificial Intelligence in the Twentieth Century: Norbert Wiener (1894-1964), an American mathematician, inventor of cybernetics, "(...) the matrix of computer artificial intelligence (...)"; Alan Turing (1912-1954), English mathematician, whose project aims to the simulation of intelligent behaviour on the computer; and John von Neumann (1903-1957), Hungarian-American mathematician, who in 1945 describes the architecture of a new machine, with the purpose to "(...) simulate the functioning of intelligence of the human brain outside the human brain." This machine is called EDVAC and will be the basis for the modern computer. Their goal is, firstly, to understand the mechanism of the human brain so that at a later moment they can proceed to simulate its operation and capabilities on an artificial support.

According to Philippe Breton, is Norbert Wiener who inaugurates "(...) the new informational paradigm (...)" comprising a new understanding of the human being, defined as integrating a global based web of information exchange and its related communication processes.
The comparison platform between living and artificial beings proposed by Wiener is not bound to the material nature of the phenomena but rather to the relationships they maintain among themselves. Referred to as the Behavioural Method, it emerges as opposed to the functional method of classical science, based on observation of isolated phenomena, its structure and properties. Wiener establishes that the behaviour of objects is the founding element for their difference. All phenomena, natural or otherwise, must, within this context, be translated under general designations such as objects, environment and behaviour, a strategy that will enable the mathematician to interweave with few resistance human and machine under common categories.

The behavioural paradigm focuses thus, not on the objects, but rather on the relationships between objects, by shifting the differences to the behaviour of the phenomena, opening a taxonomic zona franca wihch will allow the equivalence between man, machine and other worldly things. The behaviour of a given subject is confronted to a particular behavioural model that characterizes and defines a specific way of being, regardless of its composition. In this sense, the informational being can be classified and ordered according to the degree of complexity of its behaviour, determined by specific testing.

In the behavioural method types performance are of two kinds: input, environment's action over the object, and output, the reverse. This binomial input/output serves to verify the existence of intention in the actions of the object through retroaction, also referred to as feedback. As condition for the occurrence of intent, which determines the complexity degree of the object's behaviour, feedback occurs whenever the information obtained from an output is re-introduced into the process as a new input to serve a certain goal. This ability to adapt behaviour through self-regulation of the inputs and outputs process, defines the complex nature of humans as informational beings, and one that the machine should emulate.

In this perspective, the human being is understood as a rational and transparent creature, because his behaviour is informational and subject to decoding, and therefore capable of being known and replicated. Transparency and rationality are, thus, the two main premises on which the possibility of simulating human thinking by a machine lie.

This sense of indifferentiation between Man and machine at a fundamental level is continued by Alan Turing, who perceives the informational being as essentially androgynous. His approach is not addressed to know whether machines can think,
but if they can behave as if, indeed, would think. Turing’s proposal will be based on the possibility of creating an artificial device, capable of simulating the functions of the human brain according to an imitation logic. In this sense, a set of criteria is presented, allowing to state that a machine can behave as if endowed with intelligence, in what is known as the Turing test, or as in the words of the English mathematician, the Imitation Game.23

The Imitation Game involves a man (A), a woman (B), and an interrogator (C), each located in separate rooms and communicating by means of a printer, thus excluding any influences that may arise from appearance.24 The interrogator has to figure out which of the participants is the man and which is the woman, while one tries to help him, and the other to deceive him. After a certain period of time, if C can not distinguish between A and B, it means that they are identical at an essential informational level, above any physical characteristics. This imitation game is then shifted to the hypothetical intelligent machine: after some time, if the interrogator has been induced to genuinely think that was in contact with another human being, then, according to Turing, it would be legitimate to attribute intelligence to the machine.25

What is anticipated by the English mathematician, along the path of Norbert Wiener26, is a possibility of an undifferentiated essentiality, ie the informational and communicational core, between man and machine27. Just as Wiener, Turing also privileges the intellectual functions in relation to the material existence, regarded as being not essential and disposable. This latter form can be, in a radical perspective, waived28. It is that first undifferentiated, transparent, rational and informational nucleus that should be replicated on the machine. The informational being is thus an androgynous being, which can take shape whether as man or as machine. This fundamental separation asserted by Turing, between physical support and informational capacity, alludes, according to Philippe Breton, to a genoclastic instance. Like the original Narratives, differentiation occurs after Creation29. In short, intelligent behaviour is not dependent nor is it defined by material composition - electronics, for example - of the support.

The innovation introduced by Turing in this context, guided by the ultimate objective of building a brain30, is that he believed that the solution would lie in the imitation of human thought as he believed to be its operation: step by step, or discrete, and not through abstract operations, or continuous operations.

In this sense, Alan Turing theorized31 the Turing Machine32, “(...) the ideal machine to play the imitation game (the man)”33: a reading and printing head, working within given programme,
is powered with a paper tape divided into squares. Depending on the information presented in each square and that of the programming of the machine, the tape is moved whether to the left or right, forward or backwards one square, and would possibly new printing information. This device aims, by carrying out its operations by finite steps, simulate human reasoning at functioning, performing operations step by step, that is, through change and succession of discrete states, not continuous. The fact that the operations of Turing machines are performed by steps, corresponds to the transparency and rationality qualities held by Wiener: as the paper tape from a Turing machine is infinitely long, one can deduce all possible states of machine by the description of one single state.

According to Luis M. Aires, the invention of the computer opens for Turing a paradox from Gödel's Theorem, which prescribes the possibility of running a complex logical system to the point of it being able to achieve such sophisticated formulations that can be neither proved nor disproved within the system itself, making it illogical. That is, affirms Philippe Breton, the "(...) proof of having succeeded in building a creature in the image of Man, is that it escapes, like him, all programming". It is therefore anticipated that the machine can do more than what is initially designed for, altering its programming from the observation of its own behaviour, so that is comparable to a child, with an initial state - birth, education, and finally, other experiences which do not rate as education. Hence Turing grants the machine the possibility of error, such as the human brain, stating that "(...) if a machine does not have the right to error, we can not expect it to be intelligent." Intelligent behaviour is thus precisely one that moves away from the ruled behaviour by the original programming, marking the moment when the machine / creature escapes the control of its creator. Adopting the behavioural lexicon of Norbert Wiener, from the moment in which the machine acquires retroaction, or feedback, operating beyond the programmed manner, it is then possible to assign it intelligent behaviour.

Turing's belief that the human brain works in that discreet "change of successive states" is shared by John von Neumann. The invention of the computer is directed by a priori analogy to the human brain, wherein the one's binary operation corresponds to the other's neuronal functioning model. Following the separation between material support and informational device launched by Wiener and Turing, von Neumann suggests that the "(...) informational device for calculating and processing of digital data (...) would run whatever the material in question."
alluding to the possible ellision of the biological body, in order to privilege the informational component\textsuperscript{42}. The information processing occurs at a level which is not limited in the material composition of the machine, causing the information to be capable of exiting the machine and being transmitted in a communication network according to a disseminative logic.

Artificial Intelligence becomes an autonomous discipline in 1957, claiming the computer as a potentially intelligent entity and therefore able to negotiate with man sophisticated interactions of various kinds, threatening him at his most essential functions. Donald Michie, Turing's former collaborator, prescribes these interactions according to a "conversational uses"\textsuperscript{43} logic, wherein the computer is seen as a helper, a companion, an assistant or a tutor, in a relationship that is neither submissive nor oppressive in relation to humans.\textsuperscript{44} Reference again to Norbert Wiener that, according to Philippe Breton, advocated the gradual incorporation into society of communication processes that would emerge from a symbiosis between humans and communication machines, as a way to combat entropy. It is, therefore, a new definition of man-machine relationship, triggered by the behavioural paradigm, in which none of the elements has primacy or privilege.

The new definition of humans as "(...) universal informational beings"\textsuperscript{45}, inserts them into the same network of taxonomic continuity as the computer, in accordance to a similar complex behavior, asserting potentially man and machine as "(...) two subsets of the same species, the data-processing devices"\textsuperscript{46}. According to Philippe Breton, the project of artificial intelligence, guided by the ambition to build a brain, is interwoven with the several narratives belonging to genealogy of the artificial creature.\textsuperscript{47} For the author, the modern computer is a mixed object, because besides being a concrete achievement, it also corresponds to a particular imagery, one of precise mythical and historical ramifications, in science, the visual arts and in literature. The artificial being is conceived as the embodiment of an image of man, understood as a particular representation of man, perceived in this particular as an informational being.\textsuperscript{48}

The proposals by Norbert Wiener, Alan Turing and John von Neumann, are based on the notion of an informational essentélé
that brings men and machines closer, apart from any material differences, anticipating an erosion of the boundaries between the natural and the artificial, between biology and technology. In order to approach this promise of elison of human's biological support in a future symbiosis with the artificial entity, two contexts, that appear to be interwined in this context, shall be summoned; the project to construct an artificial creature in the image of man, and then the prosthesis as an extension of the possibilities defined by the nature, also involving the machine, that mediates the relationship between Man and nature.

The theme of the artificial creature as a replica of man, particularly on the subject of the robot corresponds, according to John Cohen, to man's attempt to assert himself as a creator in the image of God, repeating the story of the creator and creature, through manufacturing an artificial creature shaped in the image of its creator. The genealogy of this imaginary follows two ways: one of the creature of clay, made in the image of man, and other of the industrial and mechanical robot. Among others, can be finds within it, the legend of the golem, a creature of clay; Pygmalion and the lively statue; Pinocchio - a case of exception given its contours; the automata of the Eighteenth century, corresponding to a mechanistic view of nature; Frankenstein's creature, inflated with life by means of electricity, the robot, and finally, the cyborg, a figure of dynamic identity between human and machine, between the organic and the inorganic.

Among these stories a continuum drawn up, defined by repeating elements which link the former into a kind of kinship. Antecedent projects are often cited, and diagnosed its inadequate resources as reason for failing, asserting in contemporary techniques the ultimate solution: the succession of "vital agents" utilized include, magic (Golem and Pinocchio); divine intervention (Pygmalion and the Prometheus myth); mechanical and automation (automata); biology and science (Frankenstein's creature), and finally the computer (robots and cyborgs). Sometimes, the relationship between the creator and his artificial creature is one of a sexual nature. Invariably, the creation eventually revolts against its subordinate status, an aspect that is reinforced by means of the Romantic tradition of the Nineteenth century, and will hold even through Science Fiction, in which often the artificial creature acquires the status of a monster, for the exception of the story of Pinocchio.

One of the most fruitful moments in the tradition of the artificial creature was formed with the automaton of the Eighteenth century, "the golden age of automata", in accordance with an at-
mosphere of fascination for clockwork engines and Cartesian debates about the essence of the animal mechanics. 53

Following the observation of automata, René Descartes (1596-1650) states in *The Discourse on Method*, that animals are fundamentally machines devoid of soul. In this sense, a automaton with the form, function and organs of an animal would not be distinguishable from a biological animal. 54 The originality of the human machine is, in this context, guaranteed on the grounds of the divine origin of the soul. 55 This privilege is in a way attacked when Julien Offray de La Mettrie (1709-1751) extends the mechanistic view of the animals into humans, pointing out that the fact that even if humans are perceived as the most perfected machines, it does not prove them to possess any soul whatsoever. 56 This philosopher will later move even further suggesting the hypothesis that there is no immortal soul that would distinguish man from animal. 57 However, according to Martin Kemp, is the physician Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592) that offers a definitely opposed sense to Descartes’s: anthropocentrism results only from vanity and pride of the human species, because humans and animals are equal in several respects, alterely surpassing each other.

According to Martin Kemp, the fabrication of automata provides tangible evidence for these philosophical models, hence he designates the automaton, rather than entertainment devices, as “Philosophical machines”.

Based on an analogy between the human body and the clock, somewhat reminiscent of the mechanistic cosmology of ancient Greece, that “(...) saw the universe as a giant gear,” 58 and motivated by a desire to imitate the role of God 59, the production of automata is part of an ancestral tradition, echoing in Classical Antiquity, with Heron of Alexandria (10 AD - 70 AD), and in the Islamic Middle Ages, with Al-Jazari (1136-1206), an inventor of the thirteenth century. The most notable creator of automata is, however, Jacques Vaucanson (1709-1782), who is dedicated to the manufacture of “mobile anatomies” since the thirties of the Eighteenth century.

Animated by pneumatic devices to engage in certain functions or to represent behaviours of a given model, the automata are mechanisms oriented according to a logic of imitation of its biological counterpart, linked to an increasing knowledge about the anatomical and functional features of natural beings. Accordingly, standing out from these automata, one finds drum and flute players, or chess players automata, as well as mechanical duck designed by Vaucanson, which reproduced the digestive
process⁶⁰, being the most complete attempt to construct a physiological machine. According to Kemp, such devices are of a courtisan production, displayed in cabinets of curiosities, and also coinciding with the emergence of the circus as a spectacle that joined men and animals, exposing for the first time the vulnerability of borders between human, animal and machine.⁶¹

The automaton prefigures as a historical antecedent of the robot, itself an entity originally tied to an instrumental purpose. The word robot is first used by Karel Capek (1890-1938), work in Rossum's Universal Robots⁶², and according to John Cohen, is etymologically related to the sense of the word the old Gothic arbaitha: simultaneously meaning “work penalty, heartbreak and misery.”⁶³

Given this link between concrete and artificial entity instrumental nature, and due subordination, it seems pertinent to raise the machine and the nature of prosthetic technology, mediators between man and nature, and agents that extend the possibilities of the biological support.

The technique, conceived as a mediator, enacts two dimensions that should be addressed: as an artifact, providing external mediation between the human body for a relationship of univocal use of nature, and the prosthesis, while integrated in the human body, whether replacing an absent capacity or extending physical or sensory possibilities.

According to António Cadima Mendonça, the manufacture of machinery and other instruments to an end - the techné - responds to the need of human beings to shape nature, making it useful in order to amplify their living conditions. According to the “Organic Projection Theory” or Organprojektion, by Ernst Kapp, all technology has an organic body counterpart. Quoted by Marta Jales, Freud claims that, being the human body the source of all instruments, whose advent sets the birth of civilization, artifacts result as improved versions of the human being.⁶⁴ That is how, for example, the screen reproduces the design of the nervous system and eye, and the several container objects allude to the shape of the hand when cupped.⁶⁵ The symmetry with the functional human model, in what Herminio Martins⁶⁶ calls “prosthetic technology theory,”
makes the instrument a means for humans to know themselves.67

In the same way as the project and construction of the artificial brain is based on an approach to understand and imitate human brain function, also the origin of all technology may be found in the human body's functional model for the artefact, rather than being solely its interpreter.

As the agent of departure of Man from his biological functions, technique is a condition of a "(...) decrudescence (...)",68 which tends to the progressive distancing between human animal and inorganic. This point legitimates the opposition based games which characterize the Enlightenment way of dividing the World69, between "(...) culture and nature, human and non-human (animal or machine), nature and artifice, body and spirit, organic and inorganic, real and simulated (...)"70

The relation between Man and technique, until some moment one of a unequivocal meaning, is embodied, according Tucherman leda, the definition of man as ""god of artefacts"",71 or, for Freud, as the" God of the prosthesis."72 This conception responds to one of the mottos of modernity, *verum ipsum fatum* or *verum fatum*, which circumscribes the possibility of understanding of the human being to only that is produced by him, also designated as the knowledge of the creator.73 The technique serves not only the knowledge of the physical phenomena of the world74, but it is also a representational tool for ordering worldly things, thus establishing a creation parallel with that of the divine entity.

The technical development of modernity, claims leda Tucherman, is defined from the Sixteenth century to the Nineteenth century under three assumptions:

[1] The technical and scientific development, characterized by the technological advance;

[2] The autonomy of human subjectivity, based on the spatio-temporal experience of the present;

[3] Finally, the future as a space that holds the promise for change and the implementation of projects.

Guided by these assumptions, technology as an agent for knowledge potentiates the creation of new possibilities for subjective existence, extending the human experience in all possible directions of reality, from macro to microscopic, to the the creation virtual worlds.75 The machine, concludes leda Tucherman, is thus,
always understood in modern epistemology as an external instrument, whether oppressive or liberating, optimizing or deteriorating the conditions for men's achievement of their projection for the future. Still, the influences between technology and man are reciprocal, states Elizabeth Grots, so that the history of civilization can be built through a technological perspective. Hence António Cadima Mendonça asserting that the technical product is not only mediator between man and nature, but also an element of influence in the social layer. That is, more than one object, he concludes, the machine is a prosthesis.

Concentrated on the study of the prosthesis in an artistic context, Marta Jales directly relates the production of artifacts to the impetus of Man to overcome himself, allowing him to develop activities that he is by nature incapable of. Through objects not entirely external to the body, but attached, the incorporation of prosthetic technology on the physical support serves to suppress the absence of a given capacity or to amplify an existing one.

According to Marta Jales, the etymology of prosthesis comes from the Greek, resulting from the juxtaposition of the prefix pro, meaning “opposite”, or pros, “near or on” and the suffix thesis, the verb that means “to place, to add”. Prostheses have their origin in Medicine, linked to the replacement of lost physical capabilities for the purpose of normalizing the appearance by means of invisibility in order to integrate in society. In this sense, Prosthetics, the “(...) science that deals with extensions or substitutions of the natural functions of the body (...)” deals with the way technology directly affects the human body, changing it and amplifying the possibilities of the natural biological support.

For the author, the concern for the normalization of appearance has in the twentieth century been replaced by a progressive preference for function. No longer the prosthesis replaces or camouflages missing limbs, but improves the existing ones. This relevance displacement for function is accompanied by a growing trend to neural and sensory prosthetics, connecting with the nerve endings, contributing to the emergence of utopian transhumanist and post-humanist views centered in the figure of the cyborg. However, Vivian Sobchak cautions about the cleavages between those ideals of humanity and the daily use of the prosthesis, assigning the former to be unrealistic and improper, since they use the metaphor of disabled bodies to discourse on human evolution through technology.

The intelligent computer, heir in the succession of projects on the artificial creature, and being shaped to the image of man, as it is all the other technological production, is claimed to be ca-
pable of integrating the human paradigm, by establishing continuity of perception and of action by means of its prosthetic character. The progressive erasure of the boundary between the natural and the built machine embodied by the cyborg, and the consequent resuming of the narrative of a creator God, ultimately threatens the privileged status of the human being.

The cyborg, a both natural and artificial entity, prefigures at the threshold of the interaction experience between human and the technological artifact, beyond the externality of incorporation machinery and prosthetics. In its most radical meanings, the cyborg reconfigures and threatens the very notion of human identity.

The short term for “cybernetic organism” is originally linked to the “space race” in the sixties of the twentieth century, as an answer to the need for adaptation of the human body to hypothetical extraterrestrial environments. The designation cyborg, authored by Manfred E. Clynes (b. 1925) and Nathan S. Kline (1916-1983), conceives a possible intervention of the human being in his own biological evolution as a solution to survive on another planet. The result is a proposal of a man-machine merge, in which the artificial component is intended to extend the capability of human’s self-regulating homeostatic system, allowing efficient adaptation to other atmospheres.

True that logic of adaptability of its original definition, the cyborg takes on a malleability of meaning resulting from the different contexts in which it is used. Subsequent definition(s) cyborg reveal, in this sense, its contextual meaning. In his book about the permanence of the cyborg motif in the Dadaists’ production, Matthew Biro isolates three different valences of the concept:

[1] acritical, linked to its primary definition of 1960, as a self-regulated organic-machine hybrid, so as to adapt to non-terrestrial environment;

[2] critical, applied to the social sphere and of post-humanist or liberal humanism strands, formulated by Donna Haraway. This notion advocates new
experiences of subjectivity and social existence, beyond sex, gender, race or class.95 The cyborg contributes, in this sense, to the breaking of three key distinctions: between human and animal, between organic and inorganic, and finally, between physical and non-physical.96 In this respect, the cyborg is understood to be at a substantial level a creature of information processing, capable of being incorporated in various media, even non-material ones, a creature of information.97

[4] A third concept derives from the other two, understanding the cyborg as perceptive place or a site for experimentation, dealing with the way prosthetic technology affects the meaning and place of our sensations.98

As the extreme consequence of the progressive modification of natural conditions it is drawn the promise of an informational immortality, conceived as a form of existence not dependent on the validity of the biological support. An example that falls into this nomadic logic is the possibility, foreseen by Hans Moravec, to upload the human mind onto a computer.99 In a similar sense, the post-humanist perspective advocated by Katherine Hayles considers the material body as the original prosthesis for the spirit. Any materials alterations, extensions or replacements are not but contiguous to the first prosthesis.100 Note the proximity of both notions with that of the informational essence by Norbert Wiener, Alan Turing and John von Neumann: both deal with the autonomy of an intellectual state in relation to its material container, prescribing the solution to the symbiosis between man and computer and consequent taxonomic transit between the two.

Ieda Tucherman cites the taxonomy proposed by Gray, Mentor and Figueroa-Sarriera comprising four types of integration of the cyborgian technologies, which may be:

"[1] Restorative: allowing to restore any lost functions and to replace lost organs and limbs;

[2] Normalizing: returning the creatures to an indifferent normality;

[3] Reconfiguring: creating post-human creatures that are simultaneously equal to humans and different them;

Technology as a condition of reconfiguration and improvement results in another thing that no longer the norm: a post-human being, whose prefix denounces marginality to which human nature is remitted to. However, this new form of subjectivity continues a certain understanding of the modern autonomous subject, as defined by the physical characteristics that are particular to him.102 The non-defined and never definitive character that results of this merger is incompatible with modernity's polarities game, settled on stable categories of anthropocentric privilege. The cyborg presents itself therefore as a subversion of that statement that perceives the human being as "god of the machines".103 Averse to any sort of categorization, the cyborg escapes that kind of control through order that normalization conveys, even questioning the level of originality on which modernist humanism thinking places humans beings.104

According to Marta Jales, as an entity of mixed nature, the cyborg is related to the ancient composite being, hybrid or chimaera.105 Due to its extraordinary and anti-taxonomic features, these creatures, often monsters, were associated with chaos and fragmentation, symbolizing the forces that were out of human control and understanding.107 Science Fiction, for it is alien to any scientific constraints, functioned as a repository for these fantastic creatures, on which the overlapping between men and machine in hybrid life forms fall in.108 Invariably, the threat to and overcoming of those limits imposed by order, either through the use of prosthesis or by grotesque-looking creatures, implies a sense of admonition, warning of the danger of uncontrolled experiments.

The former opposition games of modern thought, that ordered worldly things by means of well defined borders, are thus at risk of implosion, in a process that Leda Tucherman designates as "(…) the limits' historicity (…)".109 The crumbling and reconfiguration of those boundaries has resulted in the crisis of difference, rather replaced by a logic of connectivity since, says Donna Haraway, one can no longer discern where people end and machines begin. The process of integration of technology onto the human paradigm is reciprocal, since it also promotes a negotiation of statuses between man and machine: while one is mechanized, the other is subjectified.

In this process, states Leda Tucherman, the technique takes on a dual valency condition of possibility for new types of subjective experience of the world as well as becoming the agent