Racisms: Social Representations, Racial Prejudice and Normative Pressures

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This paper argues in favour of an analysis of racism as a social representation, and in favour of the differences and complementarities between the analysis of racism as a social representation and the concept of racial prejudice. This paper also intends to discuss how the pressures of the anti-racist norm that have developed since the Second World War introduced transformations and mutations on racist beliefs.

I propose that the analysis of racism as a social representation allows us to establish a theoretically coherent distinction between racial prejudice and racism (Vala & Pereira, 2012; Vala, Pereira, & Costa-Lopes, 2009); it provides the theoretical elements necessary for grasping racism as a social theory; it stimulates the diagnosis of different forms of the anchoring and institutionalisation of racism and makes it possible to examine the objectification of the concepts that sustain racial beliefs. Finally, the theory of social representations offers an analytical framework conducive to a psychosocial analysis of racism from a historical perspective (Alexandre, 1999; Bethencourt & Pearce, 2012; Castelo, 1998; Fredrickson, 2004; Jahoda, 1998; Matos, 2006; Sobral, 2004; Xavier, 2012; Pollares-Burke, 2012; Henriques, 2011) and within the context of collective memory (Cabecinhas & Feijó, 2010; Licata & Klein, 2010; Licata, Klein, & Gély, 2007; Licata & Volpato, 2010; Valentim, 2008).
My theoretical position with respect to the transformations and mutations of racist beliefs is based on socio-normative principles (Beauvois & Dubois, 1988; Cialdini, Kallgren, & Reno, 1991; Pereira & Costa-Lopes, 2012), on inter-group relations (Doise, 1976; Tajfel, 1982) and on social identity theory (Tajfel, 1982; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2005). In previous analyses of racist beliefs, I have highlighted their connection with intergroup conflicts (Vala, Brito & Lopes, 1999; Pereira, Vala, & Costa-Lopes, 2010; Pereira, Vala, & Leyens, 2009; Vala & Pereira, 2012; Vala, Pereira, Lima, & Leyens, 2012), sometimes considering racism as a simple modality of intergroup relations. In this paper, I look at racism in terms of social representations theory (Moscovici, 1962), which I articulate with the study of racial prejudice. Thus the discussion I will develop follows on from the studies I have presented in various publications since 1999, but stems above all from the one proposed by Moscovici and Pérez (1997). The conceptual and methodological approaches adopted here are contextualized from the distinction between racism as social representation and racial prejudice, which I have only recently begun to develop (Vala & Pereira, 2012), along the lines as part of a theoretical debate that we consider important to renovate. This debate was initiated by Jones (1972) and more recently was promoted by several authors specifically in the context of the social representations theory (e.g., Augoustinos, 2009; Howarth & Hook, 2005; Sanchez-Mazas, 2004) and in the context of social identity theory (e.g., Augoustinos & Reynolds, 2001).

The argument is presented in three stages which will gradually be linked. First, racism is presented as a social representation of the differences between human groups and their hierarchisation, which is distinct from racial prejudice, a concept that refers to blatant or subtle negative attitudes and feelings towards groups defined on the basis of racial categories. Next, some examples of the social, sociohistorical and institutional anchoring of racism will be presented. The third section of the paper will focus on the transformations and adaptive evolution of racial beliefs resulting from the pressures of the anti-racism norm.

1. SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS, RACISM AND RACIAL PREJUDICE

Within social psychology literature, the terms racism and racial prejudice are used almost interchangeably. With few exceptions, the majority of studies have analysed racism as a set of
negative attitudes towards specific social groups such as Black people, Jewish people or Gypsy people. For instance Leyens and his co-authors (Leyens et al., 2000; Leyens, 2012) establish a deep-seated continuity or a near equivalence between the processes of intergroup discrimination and racism. In this sense, we can state that research has established a significant homology between racism and racial prejudice or, more generally, between racism and explicit or implicit negative intergroup attitudes, as exemplified by the classic definition of prejudice proposed by Allport (1954) and the research it inspired (for a revision, see Fiske, 1998). A classic example of this line of thought is the research programme developed by Pettigrew and Meertens (1995) about subtle and blatant prejudices.

In contrast to this view, a distinction between racism and racial prejudice is proposed, specifying that racism is not simply a negative evaluation of a specific social group, though it may include negative attitudes towards racialised groups, that is, groups defined in terms of racial categories. However, based on feelings of pity, individuals may express a racism bereft of negative attitudes towards racialised and inferiorised groups. For instance Voltaire was strongly opposed to slavery, through pity, but he still regarded black people as belonging to an inferior group, albeit one who deserved our compassion (see Cohen, 2003).

Racism is also distinct from racial prejudice since, by definition, it is a social theory inscribed in social institutions and in social thought and not a personal trait, or merely a phenomenon that reflects individual or intergroup attitudes. Racism is a phenomenon which organises relations between social groups, it is more than an individual position. Prejudice, meanwhile, in social psychology literature, is the expression of an individual position with respect to a group, even though that individual position may be relatively widespread, as proposed by the concept of the cultural stereotype of ‘races’ or ‘ethnicities’ developed by Devine (1989) and Devine and Monteith (1993).

Three further issues which may contribute to the theoretical debate being discussed should be highlighted. Firstly, the literature on racism and racial prejudice has emphasised, above all, the role of individual factors in their genesis. In accordance with Duckitt’s classic literature review (1992), which doesn’t, however, cover cognitive and identity factors, research on racial prejudice can be classified into four major groups: (1) genetic and evolitional predispositions; (2) individual differences in the acceptance of prejudiced attitudes and behaviour; (3) social and
institutional factors which organise patterns of intergroup relations (laws, norms of segregation, etc.); (4) mechanisms of social influence which operate within interactions between groups and people (e.g., parental influences, mass media, educational system, the structure and functioning of work organisation). From our point of view, only the last two levels of analysis are relevant to the study of racism as a common sense social theory or as a social representation. It is in this context that the difference between a categorisation based on intra-individual processes, a categorisation based on social interactions and a categorisation based on relations of domination becomes meaningful.

Thus, according to the theoretical and empirical logic adopted, racial prejudice is often a result of racism, but doesn’t necessarily result from it. How many of us feel discomfort or even fear around black people yet do not consciously or subconsciously believe in hierarchies based on race? Conversely, we may – in theory, at least – express racism without resorting to negative attitudes, as was illustrated above using Voltaire as an example, and as could be demonstrated by referring to accounts from history and literature in which strong positive emotional relationships between blacks and whites are described within contexts of strong racial domination.

Finally, to establish a link with the conceptualisation proposed by Doise (2005) about ethnocentrism and radical alterity, I would state that prejudice is closely related to ethnocentrism, while racism expresses, to use a term coined by Jodelet (2005), a feeling of radical alterity, in that differences between groups, based on biological or cultural criteria, are perceived as deep-seated and the cause of natural hierarchies that are hard to overcome, or can only be overcome in the historical long term.

It was in the context of this framework that I recently proposed (Vala & Pereira, 2012) the conceptualisation of racism as a social representation of the nature of humanity based on the following fundamental psychological and social processes: categorisation (belief that humanity is organised according to racial or ethnic groups); differentiation (there are profound differences between human groups); hierarchy (certain groups have a permanent superiority to others); essentialisation (differences are immutable due to biological as well as cultural essences) (e.g. Rothbart & Taylor, 1992); radical alterity (not all groups have all the essences which common sense considers to be specific to humans).
The research of Vala, Pereira and Costa-Lopes (2009) is a contribution to this debate. In this research the authors examined the relationship between basic biological and cultural racial beliefs (e.g., “The human species is divided into racial groups that are very different from each other”; “The human species is divided into very similar cultural ethnic groups” (reversed); “The mixture of different human groups may weaken the biological evolution of the human species”; “Some human groups are culturally more civilized than others”) and dimensions of racial prejudice (Pereira, 2013). The analysed dimensions of racial prejudice applied to Black people were ontologisation, based on the common sense nature-culture opposition, as defined by Moscovici and Pérez (1997); infra-humanisation, opposition between non-uniquely human primary emotions (nature) and uniquely human secondary emotions (culture), as studied by Leyens et al. (2000); and also hetero-ethnicisation, or accentuation of cultural differences between the in-group and inferiorised out-groups. To these three dimensions, the most common dimension of racial prejudice, the evaluative dimension (opposition good/bad, agreeable/disagreeable, etc.), was added. Two hypotheses were tested. The first one predicts that hetero-ethnicisation, ontologisation, infra-humanisation, and negative general evaluation of Black people are dimensions of a second order latent factor that can be called racial prejudice. The second hypothesis states that racism is a predictor of that second-order latent factor. In order to test these hypotheses, a set of Structural Equation Models was set up.
Accordingly with the model summarily described in Figure 1, the results show that a) hetero-ethnisation (perception of cultural differences between Black people and, in this case, the Portuguese), ontologisation (greater attribution of natural features to black people than to Portuguese and greater allocation of cultural traits to Portuguese than to Black people), infra-humanisation (greater attribution to Portuguese than to Black people of capacity to express secondary emotions), and negative attitude are dimensions of a latent factor that we called racial prejudice; and that b) racial prejudice is predicted by racist beliefs or social representations about the nature of the differences between human groups. These racist beliefs concern not only the biological hierarchisation of human groups (biological racism), but also the hierarchisation of cultures (cultural racism). The alternative model against which this model was tested (structural equations) was a model that considered a single latent variable that integrates racial beliefs and dimensions of prejudice. The results showed that our model (Figure 1) was better than the one that did not distinguish between racial beliefs and racial prejudice.
2. SOCIAL ANCHORING OF RACISM

As stated above, considering racism within social representations theory makes it possible not only to question its reduction to racial prejudice, but also to analyse it within the framework of the concepts of objectification and anchoring in a socio-historic and contextual perspective. In this section some examples of the process of anchoring and its heuristic power for the study of racism will be presented.

As Jahoda (1998) reminds us, the principle of anchoring or familiarity was set out by Vico, in the eighteenth century: “when man is not capable of forming an idea about something that is remote or unknown, he judges it by what is familiar to him”. In a more precise way, Moscovici (1984) defined anchoring as the process by which something that is foreign or disturbing is incorporated into our particular system of categories and compared to the prototype of the category that we deem appropriate, rendering it familiar. This process is important in understanding how racism consists of not recognising a given being as entirely human and making it intelligible by placing it in a less than human category, whose boundaries and meanings have changed throughout history.

Following the distinction established by Moscovici (2002) between stigmatic and symbolic thinking, Kalampalikis and Hass (2008) proposed two modalities of anchoring with a distinction that can help to understand how anchoring intervenes in the constitution of racism: “the first form of anchoring is compatible with symbolic thinking introducing familiarity, and the second form of anchoring is compatible with stigmatic thinking introducing strangeness. Thus, in the perspective of social transmission we can conceive of a new form of familiarisation, that is, familiarisation with the uncommon, the non familiar, the strange, the not me, that guarantees, orchestrates or institutes a difference” (p.456).

Edward Said: The Anchoring of Racism in the Negative Prototype of Humanity

An exemplary analysis of what we understand by anchoring in the context of racism as a social representation was carried out by Edward Said (1978/1994) in his work on the construction of the Orient through Orientalism, an intellectual, political and colonial movement which from the early
nineteenth century generated doctrines and imagery of the Orient. Said’s analysis of this extensive production on the Orient fits in with the concept of anchoring: the *other* becomes familiar through being represented as radically different to the prototype of the westerner, yet also as very similar to everything that is regarded as inferior by the west, such as delinquents, mentally ill people and the poor. According to Said, writers from Renan to Marx, Lane to Sacy, and Flaubert to Nerval, share the common trait of describing the Orient as different, unequal and inferior, as ‘*a locale requiring Western attention, reconstruction, even redemption*’ (p.206), a place which is, ultimately the inverse negative of the positive west.

**Gustav Jahoda: Racism and the Myths of the Sociogenesis of the Human**

In a book which has become a classic text on images of the *other*, Jahoda (1998) describes the representation of the savage and its connection with the emergence of racism. There is, in fact, a set of images which forms part of the representation of the human, and which sustain the representation of the savage and the inferiorising of the *other*. Of these images, we highlight some of those that Jahoda describes at length: the image of the child as a proto-human, the image of arrested development, and the image of the lunatic or degenerate. Similarly, Jahoda’s work shows how the oppositions civilised/primitive and natural/cultural may account for the profound differentiation between us and the other. This difference can be represented within the framework of evolution and thus the other is seen as possessing the potential to rejoin the path towards the human through, specifically, the Christian faith or through education. However, when the difference is associated with a genetic error or degeneration, evolution becomes impossible. For instance, Oliveira Martins, a nineteenth-century Portuguese intellectual and humanist considered, well in accordance with the mainstream thinking of his time, that Black people were inherently immune to the process of civilisation through education (see Alexandre, 1999).

**George Fredrickson: The Anchoring of Racism in Different Historical Contexts**

We will describe now a third type of anchoring. Taking as a point of reference the historical analysis of western racism developed by the American historian George Fredrickson (2004), we
describe the anchoring of racism in three historical contexts fundamental to understanding racism and its transformations.

First, however, I should make a preliminary remark. We are discussing the sociohistorical context of racism in the western world. It is clear, nonetheless, that we consider that the sociopsychological processes triggered by the radical inferiorisation of another relative to an us will be, fundamentally, the same in any sociohistorical context, since the issue is always one of understanding social relations between humans, as constructed by humans themselves. Yet these psychosocial processes will not be triggered in the same way, nor will they interact with each other in a similar way in all social and historical contexts, whose differences will give rise to equally diverse issues. Prudently, Fredrickson provides a history of western racism and not a history of global racism. A few days ago I was reading a remarkable book by Alberto Moravia (Un’idea dell’India [An Idea of India]) in which he describes his trip to India with Pier Paolo Pasolini. Moravia analyses the fundamental connection of racism with ‘impurity’. This is one of the structural bases of racism and the hierarchisation of castes in India, but it also exists in western racism when laws or social norms prevent, for example, marriage between people regarded as belonging to different races. The sense of ‘impurity’ may take different forms in different social contexts, however as Lévi-Strauss (1998) stated: ‘when the traveller realises that customs that are totally opposite to theirs and which he would be tempted to negatively evaluate and reject, are identical to theirs when seen in a reverse way, he gives himself the possibility to control the strange and turn it into something familiar’. In a similar way, the opposition Black/White is the same in India as in the west, though in India it is defined by a different code, the Laws of Manu that establish a hierarchy of various groups from the brahmin to the pariah. Situating ourselves, therefore, in the ‘western world’, we will explore the anchoring of racism in middle age cultural-religious context, in the scientific context of modernity and in politico-institutional context of the first part of the twenty century.

Anti-Semitic and Anti- Black Protoracism

As we know, throughout the Middle Ages relations between Christians and Jewish people were marked by permanent hostility, accompanied by periods of great violence between the eleventh
and thirteenth century and, in the Iberian Peninsula, between the end of the fifteenth and beginning of the sixteenth centuries. This hostility, which accompanied expulsions and all manner of discrimination, was supported by anti-Semitic beliefs probably derived from interpretations of the Bible: as described in the Gospel of Saint John (8:44 and 8:48), Jesus said of the Jews ‘you are of your father the Devil’, to which they responded ‘you are a Samaritan and possessed by the Devil’. Jews are seen by Christians as being on the fringes of humanity, due to cultural-religious rather than biological inferiorisation.

Another fundamental belief in the relation between Christians and Jewish people is that it is possible to convert a Jew to Christianity, but this conversion will not be genuine since ‘religious essence’ is immutable. For instance, in the Iberian Peninsula converted Jewish people will always be ‘new Christians’, never simply Christians. It is these beliefs that justify separation, exclusion and genocide as dominant forms of social relations between Christianity and the Jews, only recently attenuated. The idea of religion as an essence persisted for many centuries. In this context, Connelly (2013) quotes Karl Adam, a German Catholic intellectual of the 1930s. According to Adam, Jesus was not a Jew since Mary’s Immaculate Conception spared Jesus from “those characteristics that are passed by blood from Jew to Jew”.

With respect to relations between Europeans and Black people, more intense contact occurred from the fifteenth century, contact which at first was somewhat ambivalent. The legend of the Black Christian King of Ethiopia, with the potential to help Christians in the struggle against the Muslims, meant that Black people were seen as allies. On the other hand, however, Black/White relations were from the outset accompanied by a sense of cultural strangeness, generating a self-protective feeling reflected in the attribution of cultural inferiority to the other. The association between Black people and descendants of Noah’s son who had been condemned to slavery may have conferred legitimacy on the relations of separation and domination, specifically in the form of slavery, which gradually evolved. There are many images in medieval and renaissance Christian iconography in which Black people are shown in subordinate positions. To describe just one of them: Fra Angelico’s celebrated painting in which Saint Cosmas and Saint Damian amputate the leg of a Black man in order to transplant it to a White man. This anti-Black protoracism, like anti-Semitic protoracism, is anchored in the cultural sphere with the backing of religion, and not in the biological sphere with the backing of science, as it will occur
later. Note, however, that the religious legitimization of slavery was object of some controversy as shown by Las Casas (1552/1989) writings about Indians and Blacks.

**Modernity and Scientific Racism**

It was the scientific context of the eighteenth century that introduced biology—as opposed to culture and religion—into racism. In the intellectual movement that led to ‘scientific racism’ a pivotal role was played by the work carried out by Linnaeus in his study of the taxonomy of living beings which, in 1758 (see Jahoda, 1998), established the order of primates, subdivided into *Homo, Simia*, etc... *Homo* was in turn divided into *sapiens* and *silvestris*. *Homo sapiens* was then subdivided in four categories: *Americans, Europeans, Asians* and *Africans*. In his ‘essay on inequality’ published in 1853 (Gobineau, 1967), Gobineau would complete this intellectual architecture, constructing a hierarchic categorisation of the races and a relation between phenotypes and culture. These approaches became particularly popular as a result of their dissemination in encyclopaedias, as can be seen in this extract from Larousse in 1866 on the ‘nègre’ cited by Jahoda (1998): ‘the colouring of the skin is not the most characteristic difference which exists between the black species and the white species. The anatomical structure offers an interest of quite another order of importance, since it approaches the Negro almost as closely to the orang-outan as to the white or Caucasian species...’. We move from the cultural-religious legitimation of racism in the Middle Ages to scientific-biological legitimation in Modernity. A new vision of humans has spread from the scientific thought to the common sense and the ground was prepared for racism to move into a new context: the politico-institutional sphere.

**Racism and the politico-institutional sphere**

During Modernity it was the backing of science that lent legitimacy to different forms of social relation such as segregation, exclusion and domination or genocide. But it was when racist theories made inroads into political institutions that it became possible to legislate and bureaucratise racism making racial categories so familiar and natural as well as any other bureaucratic category. The anchoring of racism in the law and in State bureaucracy increased its
legitimacy. It became possible, thus, in different institutional contexts, to define a Black person, or a Jew, and to define the rights of each group. It also became possible to legislate on the length of time it took for descendants of a race to be purified and be attributed a different racial nature. What was taking place was the incorporation of racist beliefs and racial essentialism into the logic of the political and administrative decisions that would ultimately have the task of attempting to resolve the ‘ambiguities’ of racial assignment and, thus, defining the nature of a race and its transmission.

This political and administrative logic reached its height under the German Nazi regime, however it also fuelled the so-called Jim Crow regime in the United States, which was only abolished twenty years after the end of the Second World War; and the apartheid regime in South Africa, established after the Second World War, after the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and UNESCO’s Declaration on the subject of race. In the three cases referred to, the groups that were the target of exclusion were subjected to extermination in Germany, and to legally sanctioned domination in the United States and South Africa, together with legislation that prohibited the mixing of the ‘superior race’ and the ‘inferior races’, organised racial segregation (of neighbourhoods, schools, health facilities, leisure, etc.), and withdrew the civil rights of ‘inferior’ groups just as it restricted their economic rights, and thus exacerbated their poverty.

In what concerns the study of the constitution of racism in the politico-institutional sphere, a particular attention should be paid in the future to the exhibitions of ‘strange races’. The exhibition entitled ‘Exhibitions: L’Invention du Sauvage’ at the Quai Branly Museum in 2011/2012 recalled the ‘inferiorisation of the other’ exhibitions that were held between 1890 and 1940. These events basically consisted of the public display of inhabitants of the colonies of the respective countries at fairs or national or international ‘colonial exhibitions’. For 50 years, exhibitions of colonised peoples were popular in the most important European cities such as in Paris (1855, 1867 and 1879), London (1862), Vienna (1873), Amsterdam (1833), Porto (1861, 1865 and 1894, 1934), Lisbon (1863, 1882, 1897, 1906, 1940) (see Matos, 2006). In these exhibitions, people brought from the colonies were exhibited in ‘realistic scenarios’ which celebrated their civilizational backwardness and the protective and redemptive role of the Europeans.
3. THE DYNAMICS OF RACIAL BELIEFS AND THE ANTI-RACIST NORM

The horror of the Second World War, the success of African liberation movements and of the struggle of Black Americans for civil rights, the progressive expansion of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 and other social movements are all important moments in the process of the delegitimisation of the idea of race and of social inequalities founded on race. Such social processes show the gradual dissemination of the anti-racist norm and erected obstacles to the triumph of the idea of race. Racism was no longer a hegemonic social representation but a polemical social representation, the subject of dispute and conflict regulated by anti-racist legislation and by the dissemination of the anti-racist social norm.

Hidden Racial Prejudice

These transformations have been more successfully studied within research on racial prejudice than within research on racism itself. It is within the context of the study of prejudice that a significant decline in the attribution of negative stereotypical traits to Black people in the United States between the 1930s and the 1990s has been identified (Dovidio et al., 1996). At the beginning of the 1990s, various European studies also showed a reduction in the attribution of negative traits to people from racialised groups. For example, Pérez (1996) showed that, in Spain, respondents attributed more negative traits to the Spanish than to Gypsies. In other words, respondents were clearly keen to show that they were not racist towards a group which, in Spain, is protected by the anti-racist norm.

On the other hand, in the study conducted by Pettigrew and Meertens (1995) in four European countries, on racial prejudice with respect to immigrants, the authors showed that racial prejudice manifested itself through the absence of positive feelings about immigrants (rather than the expression of negative feelings). In a study carried out in Portugal in the same decade (Vala et al., 1999) similar results were obtained and it was also shown that anti-Black prejudice was expressed by the attribution of more positive traits to the Portuguese than to Black people and not through the attribution of more negative traits to the latter. These, like other studies, showed that it is not normative to express openly negative opinions about members of groups who were the...
target of explicit racialisation (for example, in the studies cited, Gypsies in Spain, Black people in Portugal, Afro-Caribbeans and Asians in the United Kingdom, Surinamese and Turks in Holland, North Africans and people from Southeast Asia in France, and Turks in Germany). Hidden expressions of racial prejudice have equally been identified outside Europe and the United States, specifically in Brazil (e.g., Camino, Silva, Machado & Pereira, 2001) about Black people and Indians (e.g., Braga & Campos, 2012).

However, the line of research introduced by Gaertner and McLaughlin (1983) which measured automatic association between words (positive vs. negative) and targets of evaluation (e.g., Whites vs. Blacks) showed that racial prejudice remained very active albeit in a hidden way. This line of research became prominent through dissemination of the studies carried out by Greenwald and collaborators (e.g., Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998; Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002), using the well-known Implicit Association Test (IAT). This test and other measures of the same type, which use response latencies, and which are genuine unobstructive measures of attitudes (Fazio & Olson, 2003), made it possible to question whether racial prejudice really was decreasing. The nature of these measures makes it impossible to consciously control responses and thus align these responses with the anti-racist norm. In other words, what the measures of implicit prejudice showed is that racial prejudice was ‘hidden’, or was expressed in less explicit ways.

Diffuse critics of this type of measures defend that such analyses of prejudice reveal feelings that are very deep-seated, but which do not have an impact on behaviour. However, this does not appear to be the case. For example, in a particularly sensitive area such as the prescription of thrombolysis in a hospital environment, implicit prejudice, measured through the IAT, predicts that thrombolysis will be recommended more frequently for White people than for Black people presenting exactly the same symptoms (Green et al., 2007).

We also have used implicit measures (Vala et al., 2012) to evaluate the time invested by White people to form an impression of White people and Black people. The hypothesis was that participants would show an intergroup time bias (ITB), meaning that they would put more time into forming an impression of White people than Black people. In this context, time signifies the degree of interest, consideration that a target of evaluation deserves (in this sense ITB is another measure of hidden racial prejudice). To test our hypothesis, we carried out a series of studies
which showed, as predicted, that White participants invested more time in forming an impression of other White people than of Black people. We also showed that the ITB correlated with other unobstructive measures of prejudice and with the homogenisation of Black people. Our studies also showed that the ITB is predicted by explicit measures of racism and had no correlation with internal or external motivation to control prejudice (Plant & Devine, 1998).

Figure 2. Time invested in attributing traits to White people and Black people in an impression formation task. In Vala, Lima, Pereira & Leyens, 2012.
Figure 3. Valence of traits attributed to White people and Black people in an impression formation task. In Vala, Lima, Pereira & Leyens, 2012.

For the argument that we are proposing, it is significant that our studies demonstrated that participants invest more time in attributing traits, whether negative or positive, for White people than for Black people. However, they always attribute more positive traits to Black people than to White people, and more negative traits to White people than to Black people. In other words, during a process which they do not control (the implicit measure of the time invested), they show a bias towards White people, investing more time in them than in Black people, while in a procedure that they control (the explicit attribution of traits), they manifest bias towards Black people. In our interpretation, the first measure is not affected by the anti-racist norm, while the second is. More importantly, a complementary study performed with minimal groups (Klee vs. Kandinsky) showed ingroup favoritism in the investment of time (implicit measure) as well as in the valence of the attributed traits (indeed these groups are not protected by the anti-discrimination norm).
The studies referred to allow us to confirm that the anti-racist norm has an impact on the overt expression of racial prejudice, but not on its implicit expression. On the other hand, it is important to point out that the anti-racist norm does not have the same effect with respect to all racialised groups, or in all cultural contexts. While we showed above how in the Portuguese case the anti-racist norm protects Black people, this is not the case with Gypsies (Aguiar et al., 2008; Correia, Vala, & Aguiar, 2007; Correia et al., 2005). This doesn’t occur in Spain, however, a country in which the norm protects Gypsies (Pérez, 1996; Correia et al., 2005), but not Black people. In any case, we should underline that in the empirical studies referred to above the role of the anti-racist norm has been suggested, but not directly demonstrated. In fact this norm has been little studied in terms of observing its effects on the expression of racial prejudice, with the exception of the initial studies by Katz and Hass (1988) and more recent works by Lima, Machado, Ávila, Lima and Vala (2006), and Costa-Lopes, Wigboldus and Vala (2013) as well as in the research by Monteiro, França and Rodrigues (2009) or by Falomir, Gabarrot and Mugny (2009). In the two first cases, the impact that the norm of egalitarian anti-racism has on the reduction of implicit prejudice was demonstrated. In the third and fourth studies it was shown that the same norm impacts on overt prejudice.

Adaptive Transformations of Racism: An Evolving Virus

In the previous paragraphs we argued in favor of the idea that normative pressures and the strength of social movements led to a retraction of explicit racial prejudice. Despite being alive, racial prejudice manifests itself more in a hidden than in an explicit way. The new question that emerges concerns what happened with social representations that hierarchize social groups. We propose that when the idea of racial hierarchies was delegitimized by the anti-racist norm transformations it occurred in the representation of differences between human groups, and that the "essences" that differentiated them moved from the domain of biology to the domain of culture. This adaptive transformation allowed racism to survive in a way that it is not threatened by the anti-racist norm. This hypothesis comes mainly from the studies by Sears and McConahay (1973) in the United States about “modern racism” and the research by Pettigrew and Meertens (1995) about anti-immigrants prejudice in Europe in the nineties.

Papers on Social Representations, 22, 6.1-6.29 (2013) [http://www.psych.lse.ac.uk/psr/]
For our part, we have shown that the anti-racist norm also makes it difficult these days to openly express cultural racism, the hierarchisation of cultures and the cultural inferiorisation of people being perceived as belonging to other races, cultures and religions. Due to normative pressure, cultural inferiorisation today is above all practised in an indirect or hidden way, through the simple accentuation of cultural differences (Vala et al., 1999). In accordance with the studies conducted by Taguieff (1987), we have called this process hetero-ethnicisation, termed in the past hetero-racialisation. We also showed that ‘ethnicised’ groups, that is, those groups which are attributed a cultural difference with respect to the majority group, react negatively to the attribution of this difference. In addition, the more they believe that they are seen as culturally different, the greater is their feeling that they are being discriminated against (Vala, Lopes & Lima, 2008).

It is in this context that we propose that racism has undergone adaptive transformations which make it possible to maintain the fundamental aspects of traditional racial beliefs, without jeopardising democratic institutions and a non-racist, non-prejudiced self-representation. Metaphorically, as previously suggested by Dovidio and Gaertner (1998), we can think of racism as an ‘evolving virus’. What is new in the use of this metaphor in the present context is the fact that this virus is capable of adapting to the pressures of the external environment that is, the anti-racist norm. It is the mutation that racism as a social representation has undergone, the shift from the biological to the cultural sphere that allows its widespread and socially effective persistence.

![Figure 4. Expression of biological racism, cultural racism and antiblack racism in six European countries. In Vala & Pereira, 2012.](http://www.psych.lse.ac.uk/psr/)[http://www.psych.lse.ac.uk/psr/]
A study about the overt expression of anti-Black racism (target of strong pressure from the anti-racist norm), biological racism without referring to a target (also censored by the anti-racist norm) and the expression of cultural racism (target of this same norm, though to a lesser degree) in seven European countries (Vala & Pereira, 2012) can constitute an empirical illustration of our hypothesis regarding the effects of the anti-racist norm and, at the same time, the way this norm has provoked transformations in racist beliefs.

As the results presented in Figure 4 show, the same pattern of response can be verified in the seven countries: it is easier to show agreement with the beliefs that sustain cultural racism than with those that express biological racism, and it is more difficult to express anti-Black racism than cultural or biological racism (Vala & Pereira, 2012). Other results of the same study showed that not only biological racism, but also cultural racism, were predictors of anti-Black racism.\footnote{The data were collected in a European study about Group-Focused Enmity directed by Wilhelm Heitmeyer and Andreas Zick.}

The association of biologically based racial beliefs with the perception of cultural threat (in other words, a perceived threat to the identity and values of the majority) has already been demonstrated in a study using data from the European Social Survey, specifically, based on French, German, United Kingdom and Portuguese samples (Vala, Pereira, & Ramos, 2006). It is now important to analyse whether cultural racism is also a predictor for a threat to the identity and values of the majority. For instance if an association between cultural racism and perception of a cultural threat from immigrants perceived as different was verified, this would indicate that social movements aimed at defending national identity are, in many cases, expressions of cultural racism. This transition from cultural racism to the threat to culture and identity is implicit in the warning against immigration in the United States, launched by Huntington (2004) in his work on ‘the challenges to America’s national identity’. According to him: ‘a multicultural America will, in time, become a multicreediaal America, with groups with different cultures espousing distinctive political values and principles rooted in their particular cultures’ (p. 340). This warning from Huntington is followed, furthermore, by more general warnings against ‘horizontal equalisation of cultures’.

As referred to in the case of changes in racial prejudice, the association proposed above between transformations in social representations on race and social norms derives more from
inferential processes than from empirical studies. In fact, the relations between social norms and social representations were underlined by various authors from the Aix-en-Provence group, for example in a collective work organised by Abric (1994) as well by Doise, Spini and Clémence (1999) in a study about human rights as normative social representations, or in the research by Castro (2012) about environmental issues. However, there are not, as far as we know, empirical studies which deal directly with normative changes and changes in social representations of race.

CONCLUSIONS

So-called racial or ethnic diversity is one of the social characteristics of contemporary European societies. This is an irreversible diversity and one which will continue to increase and thus we can choose to experience it in a latent state of conflict alternating with open conflict, as has occurred in the past, or in a relatively peaceful way which would benefit every group concerned. This last possibility presumes the recognition of the rights of all types of minorities, particularly those who are the subject of racialisation and ethnicisation.

It is in the context of this challenge that it will be important to better understand the social representations that create and legitimise processes of social differentiation and hierarchisation that produce categories and groups as if they were natural entities.

The inevitability of the social construction of differences, of their categorisation, labelling and hierarchisation appears to be real. Equally real however are the effects of political and institutional constraints on the acceleration or alleviation of conflicts. Anti-racist laws and the anti-racist social norm genuinely produced results, as those described. Interestingly, anti-Semitic and anti-Black racism emerged with cultural and religious support, and ‘scientific racism’ offered a biological justification for racism itself, while today, for various reasons, but also as a result of socio-normative pressures, a concealment of biologically based racism and a return to the religious and cultural pattern can be observed.

In order to analyse these social processes and their psychological correlates, we proposed three changes in the analysis of racism. The first is the differentiation between the concept of racism and racial prejudice, which is not to say that they don’t have certain points in common, be it in terms of effects, origins or the social and psychological mechanisms that sustain them.
The second change proposes the conceptualisation of racism within the framework of social representations, and thus analysing it in terms of historical period, memory and collective mentalities, the processes of anchoring and objectification and, above all, a dynamic vision of social thought (Jesuíno, 2011). For our part, we consider that linking social thought and fundamental psychological processes such as categorisation and social comparison, negotiation and identity is essential. The linking of social representations and these processes is still at an early stage and more research is needed for us to understand the social and psychological foundations of social representations.

The third change refers to the need to introduce social norms into the analysis of racial prejudice and racism. We attempted to show how normative pressures provoked a shift in overt prejudice to latent or hidden prejudice and forced a reconfiguration of social representations of differences and organisation of human groups, removing them, at least in the explicit domain, from the biological to the cultural sphere.

Stimulated by the work of Duster (1990) *Backdoor to Eugenics*, the question that we ask is the following: is it possible that the advances that have taken place in biology and neuroscience research, and which have very successfully entered common sense, will lead once again to the representation of biology as the principal organiser of behaviours and as the principal source of the categorisation of social groups?

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank Jorge Correia Jesuíno for inviting me to participate in the Eleventh International Conference on Social Representations, for which I prepared the talk that led to this paper, as well as for his encouragement and comments with respect to the first draft. I would also like to thank Paula Castro for her discussion of my presentation at the Conference. I am grateful to Cícero Pereira and Rui Costa-Lopes for their invaluable help in revising a previous version of this text and to Alexandra Raimundo for her support in preparing the original version of the text. My deeper thanks to Nicha for her revision of the French version of this paper which I presented at the Conference. I recall with infinite gratitude our conversations on racism and the “banality of
evil” while I prepared my speech in Évora, and we reread Joseph Conrad (Heart of Darkness and The Nigger of the Narcissus). Nicha’s intellectual subtlety and creative reasoning were always inspiring and contributed decisively to improve this manuscript. Finally, I want to express my gratefulness for the comments and precious suggestions of Christian Staerklé and Inari Sakki reviewers of this version of the paper.

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