CITIZENSHIP

Citizenship is the specifically modern form of political association. It is a juridically codified reality whose exercise reconstitutes individuals into citizens. It typically involves a connection between individuals and the nation-state in purely secular terms. Second, citizens are social selves whose conduct is motivated by norms and interests. They are the bearers of rights, whose origins, scope and consequences are the object of political contestation. Depending on concrete historical and geographical conditions, individuals qua citizens have specific sets of rights and duties. This involves a process of self-rule in which, as Quentin Skinner observes, “the sole power of making laws remains with the people or their accredited representatives, and in which all individual members of the body politic – rulers and citizens alike – remain equally subject to whatever laws they choose to impose on themselves” (Skinner, 1998: 74). Third, besides this juridical-political dimension, citizenship involves a sense of belonging to a political community: political identities are formed as citizens, through diverse forms of political socialization, come to see themselves as members of a common political body, with a shared past and future (Gutmann, 2003). These individual senses of belonging coalesce into collective understandings of what citizenship ideally entails, which are designated as “norms of citizenship” (Dalton 2008). Fourth, there are several such norms of citizenship, the origins of which can be partially traced back to the founding, constituent moments of each polity. At least, two normative axes can be distinguished. The first has a socioeconomic basis: consider the rise of post-materialist values, with a strong individualist emphasis, during the ascent of the “neo-liberal model” of state. The other normative axis refers to the distinction between ethnic-based (“thick”) versus bureaucratic-legal (“thin”) norms of citizenship. Fifth, there are several different models of citizenship as norms and interests are historically articulated in different ways in distinct contexts. These aspects of modern citizenship shape current debates over citizenship. Citizenship, however, has been a topic of concern for social scientists ever since the inception of professional social sciences.
Classical sociological theory treated citizenship as part and parcel of the societal process of political modernization. In *The City* (1921), Max Weber famously traced back the origins of modern citizenship to the late medieval cities of Northern and Central Europe: subjects were replaced by citizens as modernity unfolded, bringing about a secular urban culture along with Christian notions of political obligation (which replaced local or tribal membership ties) (Weber 1958). Another German classical sociologist, Georg Simmel, did not ignore the close relation between cities and citizenship: in the seminal 1903 essay “The Metropolis and Mental Life”, Simmel began a line of critical re-examination of the relation between urban lifestyles and the exercise of citizenship rights that proved immensely influential over the years (Simmel 1950). For Émile Durkheim, the religious underpinnings of collective ties in traditional societies were to be replaced by the secular solidarity associated with citizenship. G.H. Mead, in turn, offered a conception of citizenship as the universalistic, impartial and egalitarian viewpoint associated with modern science and selfhood. A generation later, Talcott Parsons drew on Weber, Durkheim and Ferdinand Toennies to develop a sociological account for the emergence of the modern system of societies. In Parsons's account, citizenship is the epitome of political modernization: as societies differentiate into autonomous sectors and values become more universalistic and based upon achievement criteria, a societal transition from “status” to “contract” occurs. In the political domain, this transition concerns the replacement of traditional particularistic forms of social membership for the universalistic set of practices, values and institutions associated with citizenship. Parsons’s account, however, remained too vague and abstract to provide a satisfactory analytical framework for those interested in studying citizenship.

An alternative is found in the work of the British sociologist, T.H. Marshall, whose 1949 Alfred Marshall Lecture at the University of Cambridge, published in the following year as “Citizenship and Social Class”, soon become the standard sociological approach to this topic (Marshall 1992). Marshall’s analysis reveals
the three components or elements of modern citizenship: civil, political and social. Each of these components is analytically and historically different from the other, corresponding to different sets of rights and institutions that can be found in the course of development of British society in the last three centuries. Civil rights, such as the freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property, and the right to justice, are the rights necessary to ensure individual freedom. They were developed in the seventeenth century as a response to absolutism and were institutionalized through courts of justice. In the eighteenth century, a new set of rights emerged, this time associated with the political element of modern citizenship. The right to participate in the exercise of political power, both as an elector of the organs of government (parliament, councils of local government) and as a member of such organs, is a crucial extension of the earlier civil liberties and was the focus of intense political strife throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. But it is only in the course of the twentieth century that the third element of citizenship comes about: social rights, which refer to social entitlements in the realms of health care, social security and education, are introduced to guarantee a modicum of economic welfare. "Social citizenship", at least as developed in postwar welfare parliamentary democracies, is aimed at counteracting the inequalities produced by the capitalist economic system. Central to the conception of “social citizenship” that marks out the “social welfare” model of state are socioeconomic rights. If civil and political rights were important elements of the modern political problematic during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, socioeconomic rights were presented in the second half of the twentieth century as the epitome of the latest, more advanced stage in democratic life. All three generations of rights, however, were conceived in strictly secularist terms. Each national sub-culture, including religious ones, was supposed to free their individual members from their embrace so that they could be reconstituted as citizens. The modern syndrome of state, social knowledge, and social policy provided the material basis for this secularist project.

Marshall’s analysis of citizenship has been the object of intense debate and criticism over the last few decades (see, e.g., Turner, 1993: 7-12). First, there is
the evolutionary character of Marshall’s account. The Marshallian gradual transition from civil to political to social rights is historically misleading (for instance, fascist and communist regimes were generous in providing social rights but granted no significant political or even civil rights), and analytically poor as no causal mechanism for the development of human rights is put forth. Second, Marshall’s historical description shows insufficient sensitivity to gender inequalities: despite the formal promises of universal inclusion, women were systematically denied civil and political rights until very recently (Walby 1994). Third, the relation between the principle of citizenship and political institutions and behavior suggested by Marshall is oversimplified. Political organs and actors may act under the influence of that principle, but they are influenced by a host of other, competing ideas, and may have different understandings of what it means. Fourth, Marshall seemed to take for granted the secularist nature of modern citizenship. In the last few decades, however, the Western European secularist model of “social citizenship” became the target of fierce political contestation. The first attack came from the neo-liberal model of state. The so-called crisis of the welfare state, the attempts at its reform or dismantlement, can all be traced back to this alternative model of relations between the state and the economy. The latest challenge to the secular model of “welfare state” has been posed by post-secular politics. The secularist belief in the inevitable and foreseeable disappearance of religion as modernity progressed has been replaced by the consciousness that religion is here to stay. As a consequence, what was once considered the model of social progress is increasingly seen as an anomaly, an episode in the societal development of one of the “multiple modernities”, which has yet to come to terms with its post-secular condition.

In sum, Marshall’s theory of citizenship gradually lost its appeal as the world it took for granted fade away. The prevalent norm of citizenship in the mid-twentieth century Western societies was duty-based: citizens’ duties included electoral participation, payment of taxes, and availability to serve in the military. In turn, citizens expected to have their civil, political, and certain economic and social rights protected. Almond and Verba’s 1963 classic *The Civic Culture* is perhaps the best description of the political culture in which this conception of
citizenship originated and developed. They suggest a “threelfold classification of participant, subject, and parochial” political cultures, where the highest degree possible of civicness corresponds to someone who devotedly performs his citizenship duties. Such a classification is itself exemplary of the mode of thinking associated with this duty-based idea of citizenship (Almond and Verba, 1965: 19). The inculcation of citizenship duties functional to the political system was an elemental aspect of the political socialization experience in this period. In addition, the style of politics in mid-twentieth century Europe and North America still had strong elements of “class politics” and clientelism: left and right were clearly opposed to one another as hierarchical relations between the citizenry and their representatives predominated.

All this began to change in the 1960s, with the public questioning of racism, sexism, and homophobia, as well as the assertion of individual rights of self-expression. As industrial societies gave way to post-industrial societies (the percentage of manual laborers has fallen by half in most industrial countries since the 1950s), the traditional postwar party system was transformed with the decline of unions and left-wing parties seeking new social bases. The model of the welfare state, as well as the relationship between citizenship and capitalism it presupposes, came under increasing criticism in the 1970s, and new collective understandings of citizenship began to emerge.

The Rise of the Consumer Citizen

The most important new norm of citizenship is the “new political culture”, or “post-materialism”. This original blend of social liberalism and fiscal conservatism was first identified in the 1970s urban America. Terry Nichols Clark and Ronald Inglehart suggest seven general elements that help understand the emergence of this new civic norm: 1) the classic left–right dimension has been transformed; immigration, women, and many new issues no longer map onto one single dimension; 2) social and fiscal/economic issues are explicitly distinguished, work no longer drives all; 3) social and cultural issues like identity, gender, morality, and lifestyle have risen in salience relative to
fiscal/economic issues; 4) market individualism and social individualism grow: people seek to mark themselves as distinct from their surroundings; 5) the postwar national welfare state loses ground to federalist and regionalist solutions; parties, unions, and established churches are often replaced by new, smaller organizations that may join into social movements 6) instead of rich vs. poor, or capitalisms vs. socialism, there is a rise of issue politics—of the arts, the environment, or gender equality—which may spark active citizen participation on one such issue, but each issue may be unrelated to the others; 7) these postmaterialist views are more pervasive among younger, more educated and affluent individuals, and societies (Clark and Inglehart, 1998: 10-13). This new political culture has been rising in most developed societies bringing about significant changes as to the way citizenship is conceived.

The shift in citizenship norms from a class politics paradigm to the “new political culture” is revealed as soon as one considers that the older debates about capitalism vs. socialism, and left vs. right, have gradually been complemented, if not replaced entirely, by new, issue-specific concerns, like feminism and environmental protection, among others. In contrast to the hierarchy and tradition of the past, individualism and egalitarianism exists more pervasively today. A new focus on the citizen, on neighborhoods, on individual participation and self-generated bottom-up rather than top-down politics has also become apparent. French politics provide a good illustration of this shift. If the General Charles de Gaulle was illustrative of the older class-politics style, Nicholas Sarkozy and his celebrity wife Carla Bruni are the consummate personification of NPC values. The shift from class politics and clientelism to the “new political culture” is also illustrated by individualizing lifestyles, exemplified in dress, entertainment, spontaneity, and volatility of choice. This same individualism – which can be expressed politically – is also expressed daily in people’s lives, in how they choose clothes, or where to spend their free time. This tendency extends the individualism to many new domains: in contrast to tourists travelling in a large group to a classic, fixed destination, or travelling to the same vacation home with your family. Instead young persons increasingly find, or search for, more personalized lifestyles.
Underlying this normative shift is the assumption that there are multiple components to citizenship. Traditional components include norms of law-abidingness, solidarity, criticism, and deliberation. The “new political culture” citizenship norm adds others that are more self-expressive and individualistic: political consumerism is one good illustration of this. If class politics was associated with a duty-based norm of citizenship, the “new political culture” comes associated with a more egalitarian, individualistic and expressive conception of what it means to be a citizen.

The rise of cultural issues is a critical, specific aspect of the “new political culture”. As this new norm of citizenship develops, classic concerns of work and job decline, ceding their importance to a new creativity, a playfulness, an entrepreneurship that has come to define the ideal workplace. “Ideal” organizations like Microsoft or Google are detailed as having “campus-like creative settings”. They are the new models in business magazines like Fortune and Business Week. Work and leisure are no longer so isolated; leisure concerns penetrate the workplace. This recent yet widespread tendency of dedifferentiation directly questions the classic modernization theory’s thesis that functional differentiation is the dominant principle of societal organization. Driven by more income, education, and the “new political culture”, culture and tourism are key parts of this transformation. Art is on the walls of many banks; major corporations sponsor theatre, music, and public art. Political leaders sense the importance of rising arts and culture concerns among citizens and look for ways to capture these concerns: via public art, music festivals, historic preservation of neighborhoods, museums, and more.

Charisma and individualistic self-expression are alternative mechanisms that may successfully engage citizens with their political systems – in addition to voting and civic participation, as stressed by the Tocqueville-Putnam tradition. The individual fruition of amenities or mega-cultural events is a powerful and significant civic engagement, as an alternative to participation in the local neighbors association. Along with post-secular politics, this is perhaps the single
most important social change currently taking place – the shift from a class-based style of politics to an issue-based, individualistic and consumption-oriented mode of citizenship.

Approximately at the same time as the post-industrial transformation in the West, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent wave of democratization in Eastern Europe made the study of citizenship emphatically postdisciplinary and more global in scope (Baert and Silva, 2010: 285-306). These recent developments have set the tone of today’s debates over citizenship. The territorial nation-state is no longer considered the “natural” home of citizenship: with the economic globalization of the 1990s, sub-national units such as cities and regions, and supra-national entities (consider the European Union) are gradually becoming alternative arenas for citizenship acts – global demonstrations, such as against the invasion of Iraq in February 2003, are taking place in cities around the world, making use of electronic media, and bringing together millions of citizens of dozens of different countries. New models of citizenship (e.g. “cosmopolitan citizenship”, “transnational citizenship”) thus seem to be emerging, and are the focus of heated debates. Participants in these debates now include sociologists, historians, political scientists, anthropologists, feminists and jurists, which constitutes a radical departure from academic debates in the 1950s and 1960s on citizenship. Likewise, the journals in which these discussions are taking place, such as Citizenship Studies, are largely interdisciplinary. As a result, a wide set of discourses enters the contemporary debates over citizenship: from Marxist approaches emphasizing democratic participation to liberal models that focus on the relation between citizenship and political modernization and individualism, and from feminist perspectives which question the gender blind character of conventional accounts of citizenship to postcolonial viewpoints that explore the hybrid nature of such accounts, there is a plethora of intellectual resources one can draw from in studying citizenship today.

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See also Materialism and Post-materialism, postindustrial society, urban culture, social movements.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


