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Crisis and Breakdown of Non-Democratic Regimes: Lessons from the Third Wave

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Washington DC
To Pietro Grilli di Cortona
Esteemed colleague, teacher, and friend
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There is international consensus among scholars that democratic transitions are multicausal processes in which both internal and international variables are involved (Pridham 1991, 1995; Whitehead 1996; Schmitter 1996; Linz and Stepan 1996; Carothers 1999; Morlino and Magen 2008; Grilli di Cortona 2009). This chapter is limited, on the one hand, to the dependent variable consisting solely of the crisis/breakdown/transformation of non-democratic regimes in the Third Wave of democratization, and, on the other hand, to an independent variable identified solely with the international dimension of democratic transition. This factor, which can be termed the Proactive International Dimension (PID), specifically concerns that combination of actions or processes, produced by one or more international actors, that, intentionally or not, cause or contribute to the crisis/breakdown/transformation of a non-democratic regime.

This is not exclusively tied to the concept of intentionality. Actions that do not aim at destabilizing a regime, but in any case contribute directly to that result, are included in the analysis. The definition, however, excludes democratic “emulation” (Huntington 1995), as well as anything belonging to the international dimension that is not linked to an actor’s explicit action, e.g. the effects of globalization or international economic crises.

Which international actors work to promote/cause the fall of non-democratic regimes? What are the motivations that drive them to act? What instruments or kinds of actions are employed? How effective have these instruments been in the cases under consideration? The answer to these questions will help us to understand the role of the PID in the breakdown of non-democratic regimes in the Third Wave of democratization (Huntington 1995).
The Proactive International Dimension:
Actors, Types of Actions, Capacity for Influence

It would be misleading to interpret the PID as a unitary actor or a collection of actors who work in unison. The only common characteristic is that they originate and are located outside the borders of the target state (Pridham 2000, 195). The range of possible actors includes: individual states (e.g. US), coalitions of states (e.g. the Allies during World War II), international and supranational organizations (e.g. UN, EU, IMF), political parties, unions, churches, and NGOs, among others. The underlying motivations for actions that promote/cause the fall of an autocracy include: interests linked to the security of the international actors; the need to preserve peace and the stability of the international system; the actual intention to encourage the spread of democracy (Castaldo 2014, 33-34). It is important to underline that the first two are fundamental, while the third often appears more like a public justification of actions that are, in fact, motivated by international security and stability objectives, rather than being a real motivation in itself.

It is important to make distinctions among the various actions of the PID, separating those that can temporarily undermine/suspend the formal sovereignty of the target state from those that do not threaten formal sovereignty, even though they have actual influence on it. Although there is no deterministic connection, it is likely that the kinds of actions that undermine the formal sovereignty of a state have a greater chance of playing a prominent role in an autocracy’s breakdown. Actions that can limit/suspend the formal sovereignty of a target state can include: a) military intervention and b) inter-state conflict and its internal effects.

Intervention is a coercive action that officially makes recourse to military force. According to Tillema, interventions can be considered “military operations undertaken openly by a state’s regular military forces within a specific foreign land in such a manner as to risk immediate combat” (1994, 251). In this optic, intervention constitutes a distinct category of “militarized international behavior” that: a) requires the use of force; b) often foresees a limited number of soldiers falling in battle; c) is described by the target state as a hostile act (Kegley and Hermann 1996, 311). A broad interpretation
of this concept envisions the intervention resulting in a full-fledged military conflict, either brief or of medium-long duration, between the target state and the international actor, including consideration of a military occupation. What distinguishes it from a generic interstate conflict is the intention, even if not overriding, to influence the internal order of the target state, promoting/causing the autocracy’s fall. Interesting examples are Grenada (1983), Panama (1989), Afghanistan (2001), and Iraq (2003).

Inter-state conflict and its internal effects represent a coercive action with official recourse to military force that does not include the breakdown of the non-democratic regime among its stated goals. The target state is involved in an inter-state war from which it will emerge defeated or extremely weakened. This is a classic reference to the scapegoat theory: an autocracy, delegitimized internally, attempts to stimulate a rally-around-the-flag effect by embarking on an external military adventure (Panebianco 1997, 76ff.). The failure of this strategy, whether by military defeat or the conflict’s profound political and socio-economic consequences, exhausts the regime’s residual legitimacy and causes its fall (Schmitter 1996, 35). In these cases, there is not a clear intention to influence the type of regime in the target state. Although the war’s consequences are partly responsible for the regime’s breakdown, these are unintended consequences of intentional actions (Grilli di Cortona 2014, 32). The classic examples are Portugal (1960s and ’70s), Greece (1974), Argentina (1982), Uganda (1979) and the USSR (1979-89).
The second group of actions, which do not formally undermine the target state’s sovereignty, include: a) covert operations; b) negative conditionality (sanctions); c) positive conditionality; d) diplomatic pressure; e) democratic assistance. Covert operations are a type of coercive action, including possible use of military force, intentional in nature, but unofficial. These are often clandestine military actions, conducted by the special forces of the international actor or via the recruitment/training/support of guerillas affiliated with opposition groups. It is important to make a distinction between this type of action, characterized by military goals, and peaceful assistance given to internal opposition groups. The classic case is Nicaragua (1980s).

Sanctions are political, economic and diplomatic measures of a coercive nature that do not envisage the use of military force, and aim to provoke a change in one or more policies of a given country (Smith 1995). These can consist of financial restrictions, arms embargoes, cuts in assistance, commercial sanctions, non-issuance of visas, etc. Sanctions can run from “comprehensive” to “targeted” or “smart” (Drezner 2011). The first type is based on the “punishment theory” (Lektzian and Souva 2007, 850), which assumes that socioeconomic problems inflicted on the population will translate into a loss of legitimacy for the regime and political pressure to conform to international demands (Kerr and Gaisford 1994). Smart sanctions are more recent, and aim to resolve some potential problems with comprehensive sanctions, such as the emergence of a rally-around-the-flag effect³ (Allen 2005; Galtung 1967). Smart sanctions directly strike the regime’s leaders, oligarchs, and socioeconomic elites (Giumelli 2011; Lektzian and Souva 2007; Major and McGann 2005). According to Brooks (2002) comprehensive sanctions should be more effective against democracies while smart sanctions should work better against non-democratic regimes. In any case, if the objective is regime change, then Dashti-Gibson, Davis, and Radcliff (1997) and Elliott (2002, 171) maintain that comprehensive sanctions have a major chance for success. Some cases include: South Africa (1970s and 1980s), Cambodia (1997), Haiti (1991, 1994), and Peru (1992).

If sanctions represent the stick in the process of promoting democracy, positive conditionality (Schmitter 1986; Pridham 1991),
devoid of coercive elements and deriving its ability to influence from the concession of advantages in exchange for internal political decisions, plays the role of the carrot. A regime can secure advantages, including diplomatic recognition, the promise to be included in a supranational community, economic aid, development programs, or commercial contracts (Horng 2003; Piccone 2004). On the other hand, they are obliged to make progress in the development of democratic institutions (Murphy 1999), e.g. respect for political and civil rights, protection of internal minorities, and respect for the principles of liberal democracy. There are numerous examples of positive conditionality from Africa and Latin America.

Diplomatic pressure is often the first kind of action employed to promote the crisis/breakdown/transformation of an autocracy. This can take many different forms and often can overlap with the types of actions already discussed (Diamond 2011) but certain aspects merit highlighting. First of all is so-called “quiet diplomacy”: confidential diplomatic contacts, conducted by ambassadors or emissaries of international organizations, with the objective of convincing regimes to liberalize and democratize. Various examples of the positive application of quiet diplomacy can be found in Africa, as well as in Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s, especially on the part of the US, thanks to the ambassadors (“freedom pushers”) appointed with a mandate to push regimes to democratize (Huntington 1995, 116). Particularly important is an international actor’s withdrawal of political approval or support for an autocracy, even if not necessarily reflecting the desire to promote its fall. The more crucial the support of an external actor for a regime’s economic/military survival, and from the ideological point of view, the more the withdrawal of that support can play an essential role in the regime’s fall. Good examples are the change in Soviet foreign policy towards Eastern Europe, as well as Africa, in the 1980s, and the US withdrawal of support for South American regimes in the 1970s (Dix 1982, 567; Sikkink 1996).

A final mention should be made of “democratic assistance” activities: advice and consultation on drafting constitutions and establishing democratic judicial systems, training for state employees, monitoring elections, financial assistance, support for political parties and training for party officials, professional training for
members of NGOs and interest groups and their socialization toward democratic norms, etc. Particularly in the crisis/breakdown/transformation phase, it is important to highlight the role of peaceful external support for internal opposition groups. Classic examples are the democratic development programs carried out by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) in Latin America, but also in Poland in the 1980s (Carothers 1996).

Which factors influence the efficacy of such external actions in promoting/causing the fall of an autocratic regime? Answering this question is complicated due to the wide variation in the cases and the number of variables that have to be considered. The following is an attempt to catalog these factors.

The first group of factors concerns the strength of the institutions and economy of the target state. One must consider the

- size of the economy;
- state’s coercive capability;
- strength of the regime’s dominant political party;
- state’s discretionary control of the economy;
- dependence on foreign assistance and raw materials;
- strategic importance, including geographic location and wealth in raw materials, especially petroleum.

The PID’s influence potentially will be most important in weak states with small economies that are heavily dependent on foreign assistance and raw materials, e.g. Sub-Saharan Africa (Levitsky and Way 2010, 41; Schmitter 1996, 48).

The second factor to consider are “black knights” (Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott 1990, 12) which, by providing economic, military and diplomatic support to target states, can condition and/or impair the PID’s ability to exert influence. Since the end of the Cold War, Russia, China, Japan, and France have played this role at times (Levitsky and Way 2010, 41).

A third element concerns linkage to the West (Levitsky and Way 2010, 43-4). This concept identifies the density of economic, political, diplomatic, social, and organizational ties, as well as the flow of capital, goods and services, people, and information between the target state and the major pro-democratic international actors (US, EU, IMF, World Bank, etc.). A high level of linkage will amplify the influence of external pressure.
The fourth and final factor refers to the congruity between the type of actions employed and the kind of legitimacy that the autocracy enjoys (e.g. theocratic or hereditary factors; political ideology; electoral autocracy; performance legitimacy; external legitimization) (Burnell 2006, 548-49). Understanding the predominant sources of legitimacy is important for determining which kind of action to employ: the congruity between these and the target state’s type of legitimacy will amplify the PID’s efficacy. For example, economic sanctions will be more effective than diplomatic pressure if applied to a regime based on performance legitimacy, while diplomatic pressure will be more effective in cases of external legitimization.

In relation to other variables, the PID can assume a principal, concurrent or marginal role. The PID constitutes the principal variable when it comes close to being the sufficient condition for the fall of an autocracy. Even if other variables are present, the international variable is crucial to producing the result; without the PID, the regime’s fall would not occur in a given limited time period. The concurrent role is something very close to being a necessary condition. In this case, the PID is not, by itself, sufficient to provoke the regime’s fall, even if in certain cases it represents the detonator. It still has considerable weigh, however. The explanation for the breakdown can be found in the interactions between the PID and the other variables involved. Lastly, a marginal role indicates that the international variable represents a condition that is neither necessary nor sufficient. The PID is present, but the effect it produces on the regime’s fall is residual, and subordinated to the role played by the other variables. The PID effect is often indirect, at most amplifying the role of the crucial variables. The objective in the following pages is to identify the principal actors, the kinds of actions, and in particular the role (principal, concurrent, marginal) of the PID in some of the most important national cases in each world region during the Third Wave of democratization, focusing our attention on the interaction between this variable and the others involved.
Southern Europe

The “Carnation Revolution” in Portugal on April 25, 1974 launched the Third Wave of democratization. In Portugal and Greece, unlike in Spain, the PID had a significant concurrent role, along with inter-state conflict and its internal effects. At the time of its fall, the Portuguese regime was in a state of obsolescence, Caetano having succeeded Salazar only a few years before. Although the state was fairly strong, thanks to its pervasive penetration of society, Portugal had a weak economy, was dependent on foreign energy sources, and was severely damaged by the weight of colonial wars. Beginning in the 1960s, the military was engaged in the repression of independence movements in Portugal’s African colonies. The economic unsustainability of these conflicts, which consumed large portions of the state budget, and the inability to secure a military victory had seriously undermined the regime’s legitimacy in sectors crucial for its stability. The middle ranks of the army, directly involved in the colonial wars, were especially receptive to the influence of anticolonial ideology (Morlino 1986). The oil crisis of 1973 exacerbated the economic crisis (Germano, Grilli di Cortona and Lanza 2014, 48). Interaction among all these factors led to the coup that ended the Portuguese regime. While the role of the colonial wars appeared to be central, it did not by itself produce the end result (Germano, Grilli di Cortona and Lanza 2014, 47-48; Huntington 1995, 75, 77; Pridham 2000, 289-90; Schmitter 1996, 35).

The Greek military regime had been in power only a few years (beginning in 1967) when the transition began. Its legitimacy based on anti-Communism, the Greek regime was born as a temporary solution and never succeeded in consolidating itself (Contogeorgis 2003, 17). With a weak economy dependent on foreign energy sources, the regime was poorly institutionalized and had a fragmented elite. The oil crisis of 1973 further damaged the country’s already exhausted economy and weakened the regime (Germano, Grilli di Cortona and Lanza 2014, 43). To try to stimulate a rally-around-the-flag effect by procuring an external enemy, the 1974 attempt to overthrow President Makarios III of Cyprus created the conditions for a military conflict. Turkey responded by invading Cyprus. The Greek army’s refusal to embark on a war they would
have lost put an end to the regime’s residual legitimacy, and ended with its replacement by a transition government (Huntington 1995, 78; Germano, Grilli di Cortona and Lanza 2014, 43-44). The Cyprus crisis was the detonator for the regime’s fall (Germano, Grilli di Cortona and Lanza 2014, 44; Schmitter 1996, 35), but it might not have produced this result without the regime’s already serious loss of legitimacy, and the disastrous state of the country’s economy (Pridham 2000, 289).

Latin America

In evaluating the PID’s importance in Latin America, we must principally highlight the role of the United States of America. US policy toward this continent changed radically from the 1960s to the 1980s (Grilli di Cortona 2014, 31). The “geopolitical dependency hypothesis” (Muller 1985, 451, 466) maintains that the bipolar confrontation and the need to contain Communist expansion in the 1960s led the US to undermine certain Latin American democratic experiences, facilitating the emergence of, or at least supporting, solidly anti-Communist military regimes (Sanchez 2003, 238). US economic, military (including covert operations), ideological (development of the “national security doctrine”) and diplomatic support was often fundamental for the stability of these regimes (Sanchez 2003, 238). The American attitude changed with the emergence of a new human rights policy developed by Congress beginning in 1973 (Smith 1994, 241; Huntington 1995, 114). This was further accelerated with the election of Carter, who made human rights one of the cornerstones of his foreign policy (Smith 1994, 245). Carter pulled support from a good number of South American military regimes, removing one of their principal sources of legitimacy (Sikkink 1996, 107). In addition, Carter promoted policies of pressure and conditional-ity to combat systematic violations of human rights. Even if not its explicit goal, this policy contributed to weakening these regimes (Smith 1994, 241). For a brief period in the 1980s, Reagan pushed back the hands of the clock, giving priority to fighting Communism. However, thanks in part to the diminished perception of the Soviet threat, in his second term Reagan also placed human rights and democracy promotion at the center of his foreign policy (Carothers 1991, 150, 255; Smith 1994, 286-87; Huntington 1995, 114).
Grenada was the most straightforward case of democratic transition in Latin America and the Caribbean. In power for only a few years, the New Jewel Movement (NJM) was facing a crisis due to the failure of its economic policy and a conflict within its authoritarian elite that led to the assassination of Maurice Bishop, charismatic leader of the NJM, by the most orthodox Marxist-Leninist faction of the movement, led by Bernard Coard (Connaughton 2008; Williams 1997). Still, absent the 1983 US military intervention (Operation Urgent Fury), the regime’s structure (Henfrey 1984) and the absence of a strong internal opposition probably would have permitted the NJM to survive. Therefore, the PID was the sufficient cause for the fall of the non-democratic regime.

In Panama, even conflict within the authoritarian elite did not prevent Noriega from firmly holding on to power for most of the 1980s, surviving attempts to remove or politically weaken him (Levitsky and Way 2010, 173). Proof of the regime’s strength was its ability to resist the internal and international pressure applied prior to the military intervention. Demonstrations by the internal opposition never succeeded in making a dent in Noriega’s hold on power, or the popular support he enjoyed (Levitsky and Way 2010, 171, 178). Diplomatic pressure, withdrawal of economic and military assistance, and economic and commercial sanctions did not have the desired effect, in part thanks to the assistance Noriega received from other states such as Libya, which acted as a sort of black knight (Levitsky and Way 2010, 173-75, 178; Carothers 1991, 255). The military operation Just Cause (1989) represented, by itself, the cause of the Panamanian regime’s fall.

Haiti’s case is more complex, since at least four regimes fell during the period under consideration. The PID had an important role in all of these, but had its greatest influence in the fall of the Cedras regime (1994). Only seven months after the Aristide government came to power in the first-ever democratic elections in Haiti’s history (1990), the army seized power, placing Cédras at the head of a military junta. Condemnation by the international community (UN, OAS, and the US in particular) was immediate (Diamond 2011, 139; Mobekk 2001, 174). In the following three years, many PID actions were employed (diplomatic pressure, economic and commercial sanctions, a naval blockade), not only to restore the legitimate,
democratically elected government, but also because of the brutal methods the regime used to suppress the opposition. Despite the state’s extreme weakness, its socioeconomic structure, and its dependence on international aid (Levitsky and Way 2010, 173), the inability of these PID instruments to bring about the regime’s fall (Giumelli 2011, 58; Von Hippel 2000, 98-99) almost led to a military intervention (Operation Uphold Democracy, 1994). The US military was already deployed and waiting for the order to move into action when, because of this pressure, Cédras relinquished power (Diamond 2011, 122, 140; Von Einsiedel and Malone 2006; Mobekk 2001, 174-75; Schmitter 1996, 45; Gros 1997). The military intervention was transformed into a peacekeeping mission conducted under UN aegis. This action was the sufficient cause for the Haitian regime’s fall (Levitsky and Way 2010, 171-74).

In the case of Guyana, the PID (with the US in the lead) adopted a package of actions aimed at destabilizing the regime of the People’s National Congress (PNC), a party of the country’s Black minority that came into power in the 1960s. Supported initially by the US and Britain, it was led by Forbes Burnham until his death in 1985, and then by Desmond Hoyte. With the Cold War winding down, the US under Carter withdrew support from the Guyanese regime. Reagan increased the pressure, USAID offices in Guyana were closed and international loans blocked. These measures produced a rapid decline in the Guyanese economy, already extremely fragile and dependent on foreign assistance, indicating that international conditionality had decisive influence. At the end of the 1980s, free elections became the prerequisite for aid. Thanks to this pressure, elections were called in 1992. The Carter Center largely ran the elections, which removed the regime’s ability to manipulate them (Levitsky and Way 2010, 148). Regime repression had undermined the opposition’s ability to exercise influence (Premdas 1993, 48), but the PID actions created the economic crisis that weakened the regime to the point of forcing it to give in to international conditionality, which constituted the principal variable in its fall.

The US ability to influence the Dominican Republic was so great that it was able to bring down the Balaguer regime in 1978 using only diplomatic pressure (Diamond 2011, 121; Levitsky and Way 2010, 134-35). This derived from: a tradition of direct US in-
interference (i.e. the 1916-1924 occupation and the 1965-1966 military intervention); the state’s weakness in the face of migratory waves from Haiti; severe poverty; a weak economy totally dependent on foreign energy sources and on commercial relations with the United States; enormous quantities of economic and military aid from the US (Levitsky and Way 2010, 133). The non-democratic Dominican regime established after the American military intervention that ended the 1965-1966 civil war enjoyed full US support (Prince 1996; Conaghan and Espinal 1990). This situation changed, however, during the 1970s, with Carter’s human rights policy (Sikkink 1996). After the effective repression of opposition groups, in particular the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD), which boycotted elections in 1970 and 1974, it was American pressure (Hartlyn 1991) that forced the regime to cease its repressive policies and allow opposition parties to participate in more open and fair elections in 1978 (Arthur 2011; Conaghan and Espinal 1990). The regime’s loss of popular consensus led to the PRD candidate’s landslide victory (Conaghan and Espinal 1990). After it became apparent that the PRD would win, the US role emerged even more clearly when it withheld support for a coup organized by soldiers loyal to Balaguer (Arthur 2011). In this context, the PID was sufficient to explain why the regime fell.

Nicaragua’s case is particularly interesting, as the interaction of various international actors brought about regime change. The fall of the Somoza regime in 1979 was principally due to ever more effective military actions by the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN). This is not to underestimate the consequences for the regime’s legitimacy and military capacity of the US withdrawal of support, sanctions, and cutoff of assistance (Smith 1994, 245, 247, 250-51). Because the Sandinista regime, established in 1979, effectively repressed internal opposition (Levitsky and Way 2010, 145), the process that led to the Sandinistas’ fall originated in the international dimension (Levitsky and Way 2010, 141, 145), with prominent roles for the US, USSR and President Arias of Costa Rica. There were several different PID actions: covert operations, sanctions, positive conditionality, diplomatic pressure, and democratic assistance. The principal US instrument of pressure was a covert operation, long an open secret, that included economic,
military, logistic, and diplomatic support for the Contras guerrillas ($19 million in 1981; $24 million in 1983; $1 million a month via Saudi Arabia beginning in mid-1984; $27 million in 1985; $100 million in 1986) (Carothers 1991, 83, 89). Added to this during the 1980s were: economic sanctions and the 1985 commercial embargo (Carothers 1991, 84-85, 90-91); diplomatic pressure, including frequent bilateral contacts aimed at promoting the peace process; joint US-Honduras military exercises on the Nicaraguan border (Carothers 1991, 84-87); non-lethal assistance to opposition groups in the 1990 elections ($12.7 million), as well as international monitoring of those elections (Levitsky and Way 2010, 142-44; Whitehead 1996, 80; Carothers 1991, 95; Lean 2007).

In this period, the USSR played the role of the black knight, furnishing the Sandinistas with 4.5 billion dollars between 1981 and 1989 (Orozco 2002, 54). The diplomatic efforts of Costa Rican president Arias generated two agreements (Esquipulas II, 1987; Tesoro Beach, 1989) that led to the 1990 elections, won by the opposition. The interaction of these factors was responsible for the Sandinista regime’s fall (Diamond 2011, 122). The enormous amount of money supplied by the USSR had countered the effects of the embargo and the Contras’ military operations, but the cutoff of these funds beginning in 1986 made the economic consequences of American pressure and guerilla operations unsustainable (Levitsky and Way 2010, 141; Roberts 1990). It forced the Sandinistas to participate in the peace process promoted by Arias, which they saw as a way to block increased assistance to the Contras by the American Congress (Carothers 1991, 105-107). To make this succeed, the Sandinistas had to ensure an impeccable electoral process, by definition out of their control, which led to their defeat in the 1990 elections (Levitsky and Way 2010, 141, 145; Whitehead 1996, 84-85). The PID, therefore, was the sufficient cause for the regime’s fall (Levitsky and Way 2010, 141).

In Argentina the PID played a concurrent role. The Argentine military regime was subject to sanctions and diplomatic pressure, as well as being involved in an inter-state conflict. Following the establishment of Carter’s human rights policy, in 1978 the US blocked military assistance to Argentina (Sikkink 1996, 97; Smith 1994, 245), voted down or abstained on 23 out of 25 Argentine requests for in-
ternational loans, and clearly expressed its concerns about respect for human rights to all three Argentine military juntas (Sikkink 1996, 97, 115). If in 1980 sanctions were loosened, with the aim of obtaining Argentine cooperation for the grain embargo against the USSR, sanctions on arms sales remained in force until 1983 (Sikkink 1996, 97). Although they did not have a decisive impact, these actions exacerbated the legitimacy crisis (Diamond 2011, 121) stemming from the following factors: the regime’s failed attempt to revive an economy seriously scarred by the 1973 oil crisis; the “dirty war” to suppress internal opposition; divisions within the military elite; loss of support from the Catholic Church and entrepreneurs; and the growing activism of internal opposition groups, despite repression. This, along with a lack of options, led Galtieri to bet on a rally-around-the-flag effect in 1982 by invading the Malvinas/Falkland Islands, which Great Britain controls but Argentina claims (Grilli di Cortona 2009, 47). The British intervention and Argentina’s consequent military defeat cancelled out any residual legitimacy the regime still possessed, bringing it to an end (Huntington 1995, 78; Whitehead 1996, 63; Schmitter 1996, 35). As this was the result of interaction between internal and international factors, the role of the PID was concurrent.

In most of the other cases in Latin America, the PID’s role appears marginal. This is not to suggest that it had no role or no effect, but only that it was not a necessary and/or sufficient condition. In most cases, the PID reinforced key variables explaining regime change, even without an important direct impact. For example, in Chile, withdrawal of support from the Pinochet regime, pressure not to annul the 1988 referendum on renewing its mandate, and economic and diplomatic support for internal opposition groups did not represent necessary and/or sufficient conditions for the regime’s fall. However, they contributed to reinforcing those internal variables that were directly responsible for the transition, especially the opposition (Carothers 1991, 162, 163; Diamond 2011, 122). In the same manner, in Uruguay the PID (American pressure during the Carter Administration) had a considerable indirect effect in strengthening the pro-democratic faction of the military and internal opposition (Sikkink 1996, 106, 107, 115), but did not contribute directly to the regime’s fall.
Asia

In the Asian Third Wave the PID’s role was rather limited. There is only one identifiable case where it had a principal role, i.e. Afghanistan. In other cases, the role was marginal. The fall of non-democratic regimes on this continent is principally the result of internal factors and international factors not linked to explicit actions by an external actor. For example, the transformation of the Mongolian regime stemmed in good part from the authoritarian elite’s perception of the breakdown of Soviet Communism and the necessity of a rapprochement with the West in order to obtain enough assistance to replace the economic relationship with the USSR (Fish 1998).

In Afghanistan, PID actions were primarily sanctions applied when the Taliban seized power in 1996, and then military intervention after Afghanistan-based Al Qaeda carried out the September 11, 2001 attacks. In resolution 1076 of 1996, the UN had asked all member states to cease arms shipments to both the Taliban government and internal opposition groups, followed on December 17, 1996 by EU common position 746 (Giumelli 2011, 70). These and other measures adopted in subsequent years had little effect either in moderating the Taliban’s policies on human rights or bringing about the regime’s fall. The most important armed opposition, the Northern Alliance, made up of Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazara and ethnic Pashtun minorities, financed by Iran, Russia and India, only represented a limited threat to the regime and succeeded in gaining control of only a small and poor part of territory (Dobbins et al. 2003, 129). In response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack, the US launched Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), with the goal of eradicating Al Qaeda and the Taliban from Afghanistan. The operation included strong military and economic support for the Northern Alliance, enabling them to obtain early and unexpected military successes, conquering Kabul in mid-November 2001 (Dobbins et al. 2003, 129-30). The successes of the Northern Alliance, so ineffectual in previous years despite funding from Iran, Russia and India, were attributable to the support from OEF. Consequently, the PID (OEF) was the variable sufficient to explain the fall of the Taliban regime (Suhrke 2008).

In most of the other Asian cases, the PID played a marginal role.
South Korea is one example. The PID actions, mostly by the US, were diplomatic pressure and democratic assistance. Because of intense protests by opposition forces, American support for President Chun Doo Hwan was replaced by cautious but ever more constant pressure by Reagan and the Department of State for an opening to the opposition, increased moderation in dealing with public protests, and for Chun to keep his promise to leave office peacefully at the end of his term in 1988, along with a stern warning to the military not to attempt a coup (Sixer 2002, 63; Smith 1994, 280-81; Huntington 1995, 118; Diamond 2011, 122). In addition, via the National Endowment for Democracy, the Americans provided economic and political support for the opposition. By and large, at the origin of the South Korean transition were the internal opposition’s intense pressure and the authoritarian leadership’s awareness that it could not prolong its permanence in power (Smith 1994, 280-81). The PID actions reinforced a trend already in motion that, predictably, would have arrived at the same result. In the Philippines, American diplomatic pressure contributed to convincing Marcos to leave power after the electoral defeat of 1986 (Diamond 2011, 121-22; Haynes 2001). In any case, this pressure was applied when the crisis was already underway, thanks to the opposition’s mobilization and the regime’s inability to combat the Communist guerillas, resulting in divisions in the army and a weakening of the regime, along with a serious economic crisis and the opposition of the Catholic Church (Pei 1998; Huntington 1995, 77).

Post-Communist Europe

Although marked by nationally specific courses of action and geographical differences, the PID’s role in this region has been important. The following analysis focuses not on the countries created with the break-up of the USSR, as the dissolution of a state is not considered a PID factor, but rather on East Central Europe and the Balkans.

Although there were cases of military intervention and sanctions (Serbia) and of inter-state war (USSR in Afghanistan), diplomatic pressure, in the form of withdrawal of support and stimuli to adopt a particular set of reforms, was the action that most influ-
enced the breakdown of non-democratic regimes in East Central Europe. The principal actor was the Soviet Union. In the context of bipolar confrontation, relations between Eastern European countries and the USSR were based on the Brezhnev Doctrine, making the countries of the Soviet Bloc penetrated political systems. Such control prevented any political evolution not approved by Moscow. The cases of Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968) and Poland (1956, 1970, 1980-81) demonstrate how prepared the USSR was to intervene to block unwanted reform (Batt 1997, 155; Niklasson 1994, 202).

A series of actions by the reformist leadership that came into power in the USSR in the second half of the 1980s made a substantial contribution to regime change in Eastern Europe. It is unlikely that the objective was to promote the fall of these regimes (Light 1997, 134). The “Gorbachëv Effect” can be summarized as the withdrawal of Soviet willingness to intervene, including militarily, in the internal affairs of satellite states to preserve the status quo and the application of pressure to implement reforms that Gorbachëv himself was carrying out in the USSR (Light 1997, 133; Niklasson 1994, 203). These were not, however, obligatory, as in the past, since in 1985 Gorbachëv had renounced the so-called principle of “Socialist Internationalism,” under which the USSR had supervised internal policies and approved changes in leadership in East European countries (Light 1997, 140, 142).

The Polish case featured a long tradition of strong internal opposition. There were important protests in 1956, 1968, 1970-71, and 1976, ending with the imposition of martial law after protests led by Solidarity in 1980-81. These demonstrations were repressed, sometimes violently, thanks to USSR support. The emergence of Gorbachëv’s leadership had several consequences. It reactivated internal pressure for reform both by the opposition and regime moderates. Also, it convinced the Communist leadership that change was inevitable (Niklasson 1994, 210-211, 212). The Polish regime received Gorbachëv’s pressure positively (Light 1997, 140), relaxing its repressive policies, allowing Solidarity to reconstitute, and conceding limited reforms in the system. The telephone call of August 22, 1989, in which Gorbachëv pressured Jaruzelski to enter a non-Communist government, is only one example of the role the
PID had in the Polish transition (Light 1997, 141; Niklasson 1994, 211). Gorbachëv’s withdrawal of support, including military support, took away the regime’s principal source of legitimacy, and the instruments it needed to deter or repress internal opposition, indicating the concurrent nature of the PID’s role.

In Hungary as well, Gorbachëv’s reforms met a positive reception (Light 1997, 140). The principal difference with Poland resided in the long-standing moderation of the Hungarian leadership, thanks to which it was able to take the initiative and control the transition. Since the 1960s, the Communist leadership had undertaken a gradual reform process aimed at reacquiring popular consensus lost after the 1956 Soviet intervention. The New Economic Mechanism (NEM) of the 1970s was intended to enlarge the private sector. In 1983, an electoral reform was adopted that, within a single-party system, allowed non-Communists to be elected to parliament. The economic and political crises of the 1980s, however, increased internal pressure for change, even within the Communist Party (Batt 1997, 161). It was also thanks to Gorbachëv’s reforms that in May 1988, János Kádár was replaced as party leader by a moderate directorate. In addition, Moscow’s non-intervention when the Hungarian leadership dismantled the Iron Curtain on the Austrian-Hungarian border (May 1989) and thus made it possible for East Germans to reach West Germany (September 1989), convinced the Hungarians that there would be no external opposition to a regime change (Light 1997, 140). In essence, as in Poland, Gorbachëv’s reforms had convinced the Communist leadership that change was inevitable (Niklasson 1994, 212). In this transition as well the PID played a concurrent role.

The leadership of the German Democratic Republic, on the other hand, stubbornly refused to accept the reforms promoted by the USSR (Light 1997, 140). Since 1986, Honecker had made it clear the German regime had no need for change (Niklasson 1994, 212). Mass protests, suppressed by the regime, began in summer 1987 at the same time the Soviets were pressuring East European regimes to reform. These were repeated in January 1988 on the anniversary of the death of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht. Added to Gorbachëv’s pressure was the decision by the Hungarian government in May 1989 to open the frontier with Austria and allow free
passage of East Germans to West Germany, further weakening the Honecker regime (Light 1997, 142; Niklasson 1994, 211; Pridham 2000, 285). Beginning in October 1989, there were enormous popular demonstrations in Leipzig and Berlin. In the same month, during a visit marking the anniversary of the birth of the German Democratic Republic, Gorbachëv pressured Honecker to make concessions and refused to supply troops to suppress the demonstrations (Light 1997, 142; Whitehead 1996, 371). Faced with public pressure, and absent Soviet support, the Communist leader had no choice but to resign, triggering the regime change that occurred only a few weeks after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Without the support and legitimacy provided by the USSR, a regime like that of East Germany, with no internal legitimacy, could not last. This withdrawal of support, along with the popular protest, was the principal factor in the regime’s fall. The PID’s role therefore was concurrent.

The Czechoslovak leadership also refused to accept the reforms promoted by Gorbachëv (Light 1997, 140). Miloš Jakeš, who replaced Gustáv Husák in 1987, was also profoundly conservative, and responded to the failure of his reform initiative with increased repression. The purges following the 1968 Soviet intervention had excluded reformers from the Czechoslovak leadership (Niklasson 1994, 213). In addition, repression had limited the emergence of a strong internal opposition (Batt 1997, 161). The Czechoslovak ruling class, therefore, was dominated by orthodox factions, completely dependent on Moscow for their legitimacy (Niklasson 1994, 213). In this country the Gorbachëv effect was clearly the origin of the regime’s fall (Batt 1997, 161), removing any legitimacy that remained to the regime and indirectly encouraging the emergence of an opposition that, beginning in March 1988, was capable of organizing protests much larger than those in Poland and Hungary. Therefore, the 1989 “Velvet Revolution” was an excellent example of the PID’s concurrent role.

A heavy dependency on Moscow, both for legitimacy and economically because of its chronic budget deficits, made Bulgaria one of the regimes most loyal to the USSR (Niklasson 1994, 213). Živkov, therefore, officially embraced perestroika, announcing reforms in 1987 that were, however, barely implemented (Light 1997, 140; Niklasson 1994, 213). The centralization of power in Živkov’s
hands, and the control guaranteed by the secret police, limited the socio-political importance of opposition to the regime. This situation changed in 1987 with the proliferation of protests both within and without the party. The serious economic crisis and pressure from Moscow were the reasons for this change. In 1987 Gorbachëv openly admonished the Bulgarian leader to speed up reforms (Light 1997, 142). Because of the opposition’s weakness, change originated within the single party. In November 1989, Mladenov, leader of the reformist faction, obtained Živkov’s resignation, thereby initiating the regime’s transformation under the control of the reformist Communist leadership (Kolarova and Dimitrov 1996). It is certain that Mladenov consulted with Gorbachëv: returning from a visit to China shortly before Živkov’s resignation, the reformist leader stopped in Moscow (Light 1997, 142). It is likely that he got Gorbachëv’s green light for his succession (Niklasson 1994, 213). In this case the PID played a particularly important concurrent role in the transition.

In conclusion, abandonment of the Brezhnev Doctrine and diplomatic pressure for reform, especially in 1987-1989 (Light 1997, 138), left East European leaders helpless before their populations, orphaned of the principal source of their legitimacy. It gave Communist party reformist factions and opposition groups a greater awareness of the possibilities for reforming or overthrowing their respective regimes (Bratton and van de Walle 1997, 29; Sanford 1997, 176-77; Whitehead 1996, 371). Although the Gorbachëv effect cannot be considered a sufficient condition for the fall of the Eastern European regimes, it did represent a necessary condition (Light 1997, 133; Batt 1997, 155; Schmitter 1996, 27; Niklasson 1994, 206; Pridham 2000, 285). Maintaining the Brezhnev Doctrine would have altered both the time and character (certainly more violent) of regime change in Eastern Europe (Light 1997, 149; Whitehead 1996, 372).

Serbia, on the other hand, is a case of a principal role for the PID. The PID worked against the Milošević regime by employing democratic assistance, diplomatic pressure, sanctions, and a military intervention. Beginning in 1992, the international community imposed sanctions with the goal of persuading Milošević to end support for Serbian aggression in Bosnia and Croatia. The most
important of these were exclusion from the World Bank and denial of access to IMF financing (Levitsky and Way 2010, 107). The necessity of having Milošević’s support for the peace process in Bosnia obliged international actors to moderate the sanctions’ actual effects (Levitsky and Way 2010, 104). In combination with the regime’s coercive capability, it permitted Milošević to survive this phase, but not without difficulty.

The Dayton Accords (1995), which ended the Yugoslav conflict, enabled the West to intensify diplomatic pressure and make the sanctions more effective. The US and EU froze the overseas assets of the regime’s elite, prohibited new foreign investment, blocked the Serbian airline from flying to western countries, and banned issuance of visas to the regime’s most important figures (Levitsky and Way 2010, 105, 109, 110). Ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, visible to the world’s media, obliged the PID to intervene militarily in 1999 (Levitsky and Way 2010, 109). Sanctions and 78 days of NATO bombing12 devastated the Serbian economy, forcing Milošević13 to withdraw from Kosovo and call early elections for October 2000 (Diamond 2011, 122-23; Levitsky and Way 2010, 109). The international community intervened heavily on the side of the opposition, furnishing financing of between $40 and $70 million, creating a united anti-Milošević front (Levitsky and Way 2010, 111). His electoral defeat led to the fall of the regime.

A fragmented opposition, although active during all of the 1990s, would never have been able to bring down a regime like that of Milošević, which had popular consensus and a considerable capacity for repression. In addition to international financing, the victory of the opposition in the 2000 election resulted, above all, from the devastating effects on the economy of the sanctions and the military intervention, and the consequent weakening of the regime’s coercive ability and consensus (Diamond 2011, 122; Levitsky and Way 2010, 104, 109-10). The loss of Kosovo was a severe blow to Milošević’s image (Levitsky and Way 2010, 109-110). All of these factors demonstrate that the PID was the sufficient condition for the regime’s fall.

It is worth noting the PID’s role also in the breakdown of the Communist regime in the USSR. The PID actions in this case were inter-state warfare and its internal effects, plus diplomatic pressure.
The arms race triggered by Reagan, which should be considered a form of diplomatic pressure, worsened the Soviet economy’s crisis (Pridham 2000, 290). The consequences of the war in Afghanistan were especially important (1979-89), in particular the Red Army’s inability to win the war (Huntington 1995, 77). There were various internal effects, linked, for example, to the Communist leadership’s perception of the Red Army and of its potential effectiveness for use internally to control the non-Russian republics and abroad to preserve the Soviet empire (Reuveny and Prakash 1999). It is difficult, however, to judge the weight of these factors against the others involved in the fall of the USSR, such as the failure of the planned economy and the consequent economic crisis (Kort 1992), the emergence of a reformist leadership, (Adomeit 1994), the breakdown of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, and the increasingly loud demands by many Soviet republics for more autonomy or total independence (Carrère d’Encausse 1993).

Africa

About a third of the countries involved in the Third Wave were located in Africa. With this large number of cases, all possible types of PID action were present, playing all possible roles (principal, concurrent, marginal), with the full range of international actors involved. For this area as well, the analysis here is limited to cases where the PID’s role was principal or concurrent.

Mozambique is among the cases where the PID played the principal role. Different international actors employed assistance, diplomatic pressure, conditionality, covert operations and military interventions (a peace-keeping operation). With independence, Mozambique became the theater of a civil war that to a large extent reflected the bipolar confrontation (Levitsky and Way 2010, 246; Gomes Cravinho 1998). Set against the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO), which had covert support from South Africa and Rhodesia (Moran and Pitcher 2004), was the Frente de Libertaçao de Moçambique (FRELIMO), a single party heading a Marxist-Leninist-inspired regime (Pitcher 2002), supported by the USSR with ideological cover, arms, and petroleum, $150 million a year in the 1980s (Alden 2001, 94). Withdrawal of external support by both
sides in the 1980s compromised the ability of the two parties to continue the conflict and, unintentionally, amplified the effectiveness of international conditionality, especially important because, at the beginning of the 1990s, international assistance constituted 75% of the country’s GDP (Levitsky and Way 2010, 247; Peiffer and Englebert 2012, 362-64). The indispensable nature of this aid drove FRELIMO to abandon its Marxist-Leninist orientation, concede some forms of political liberalization (Alden 2001), and enter into peace negotiations, sponsored by the international community, which led to the deployment of a multinational force of 7,500 men, the UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) (Levitsky and Way 2010, 248; Manning and Malbrough 2010; Alden 2001; Gomes Gravinho 1998). Finally, different types of assistance were provided for the 1994 elections. RENAMO received several million dollars to provide some balance to the electoral competition, as FRELIMO had control of the state’s resources. In addition, 2,500 international observers monitored the elections (Levitsky and Way 2010, 249). The timing was particularly important. During the 1970s and 1980s, internal factors such as the economic crisis and the presence of an armed opposition did not produce regime change. International conditionality, supported by ONUMOZ and amplified by Soviet and South African withdrawal of support (Peiffer and Englebert 2012, 362-64), therefore constituted, albeit in a weak form, the sufficient cause of the regime’s transformation (Bratton and van de Walle 1997, 182).

There are numerous other cases where the PID played a concurrent role. South Africa is an interesting, if complicated, example. The principal actions of the US, UN, and European Economic Community were sanctions and diplomatic pressure, although it is necessary to carefully consider the withdrawal of Soviet support from the African National Congress and actions set in motion by foreign private financial institutions. In 1973 the UN declared apartheid a “crime against humanity” and in 1977 encouraged the adoption of an embargo on arms sales to South Africa. Beginning in 1985, after the declaration of a state of emergency by the Botha government, the European Economic Community, the Commonwealth, US, and other states and international institutions adopted increasingly stringent financial and commercial sanctions (Omer-Cooper 1998;
Huntington 1995, 120; Smith 1994, 278). Although the estimates fix the direct impact of the sanctions on South Africa’s GDP at 0.5% (Levy 1999, 7) the psychological effect on the White political and socio-economic elite should not be underestimated (Diamond 2011, 123; Von Hippel 2000, 98). In addition, the sanctions also should be evaluated on the basis of their importance for the protagonists in the transition. At the beginning of negotiations, for example, Mandela and the ANC asked that the sanctions be maintained until the regime had been effectively dismantled (Levy 1999, 10). The psychological effect was amplified by diplomatic pressure and the unanimous international condemnation of apartheid. In 1989, informal meetings were held in Great Britain among representatives of the ANC, the National Party, various African states, the US and the USSR. In September the US stressed that, if Mandela was not released within six months, President Bush would approve an extension of the sanctions.

The economic dimension was crucial in launching the transition. In the mid-1980s the South African public debt was $24 billion, two-thirds of which was short-term. This situation made the South African economy vulnerable, dependent on the readiness of foreign investors to refinance the public debt (Levy 1999, 5). Before financial sanctions, which exacerbated the situation, it was foreign banks that suspended investment in South African debt. After the state of emergency was declared, Chase Manhattan Bank, followed by other banks, announced that it would not extend further credit to South Africa (Levy 1999, 5). The impact was extremely important, even though not generated by a desire to bring about regime change. Socio-political instability made investment in South African sovereign debt risky (Levy 1999, 6). Another crucial element that inadvertently favored the South African regime’s transformation was the withdrawal of Soviet support from the ANC (Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Smith 1994, 279). This had a dual effect. On one hand, it undercut the ANC’s ability to continue its armed resistance, making it more open to negotiations. On the other, it reassured the White political and socio-economic elite that regime change would not mean the adoption of a planned economy (Levy 1999, 11). The most important factors in the internal dimension were the crisis of the South African economic model and the robust
activism of the internal opposition and civil society, e.g. churches, unions, and business associations (Wood 2001). Underpinning regime change, therefore, were interactions between internal and international factors, most especially those linked to the PID, highlighting its concurrent role in the transition.

In Malawi the PID worked via conditionality and diplomatic pressure. In the context of the bipolar confrontation, the West had long supported the Hastings Banda regime. This support ended with the end of the Cold War, and when Western democratic conditionality took hold (Levitsky and Way 2010, 283). With the Vatican’s encouragement, on March 8, 1992 eight Catholic prelates published an open letter criticizing the regime (Levitsky and Way 2010, 284). The arrest on April 6 of Chihana, one of the principal internal opposition leaders, and the popular demonstrations of May 6-7, brutally repressed by the regime, convinced international donors (Paris Conference, May 11-13) to suspend all non-humanitarian assistance\(^\text{15}\) until democratic reforms had been implemented (Levitsky and Way 2010, 284; Venter 1995). The country’s extreme poverty, enormous public debt ($1.5 billion) and growing difficulty in making interest payments (Venter 1995), its chronic dependence on international assistance,\(^\text{16}\) the absence of black knights (Levitsky and Way 2010, 282), as well as Banda’s advanced age, which provoked an intense succession struggle with a lack of military support for the designated heir (Levitsky and Way 2010, 283), combined to make it impossible for the regime to resist international pressure for long. Only a few months after the interruption of assistance, Banda allowed a referendum on the introduction of a multi-party system (October 18, 1992), marking the beginning of the democratic transition (Diamond 2011, 124; Levitsky and Way 2010, 283; Bratton and van de Walle 1997, 182; Venter 1995). Although elements of regime crisis were already present due to internal factors, the PID, in particular conditionality expressed via freezing international aid, was a necessary condition for the regime’s fall.

Uganda’s path toward a multi-party democracy has been a tortured one, characterized by civil wars and coups. The major non-democratic regimes have been those of Milton Obote (1966-71), Idi Amin (1971-79), again Obote (1980-85), Okello (1985-86) and, beginning in 1986, Museveni. PID actions have influenced the fate of
these regimes to varying degrees. The democratic transition, interrupted many times, began with multi-party elections after the fall of the Amin regime in 1979. The principal PID actions in this case were diplomatic pressure, inter-state conflict, and its internal effects, which then evolved into a military intervention. The immediate recognition of Amin’s regime in 1971, and the Western support he briefly enjoyed, already had been withdrawn by 1972 because of the regime’s brutality and Amin’s rapprochement with the USSR and Libya (Rake 1998). The atrocities and the ethnic strife the regime incited, especially to the detriment of the Langi and Acholi ethnic groups, leaving 300,000 dead in 1971-79, compromised the regime’s internal legitimacy (Jennings 2010; Carbone 2003). In October 1978, Amin tried to divert the attention of the armed forces from their internal divisions, which had generated several coup attempts, by acquiring an external enemy, specifically by invading Tanzania. This backfired, leading the Tanzanian regime to encourage formation of a united political front among Ugandan dissidents and exiles to depose Amin. In January 1979, the Tanzanian army and the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF) invaded Uganda and met with little resistance, taking the capital by April 1979 (Rake 1998; Hansen and Twaddle 1995, 139). Although the detonator was military defeat, the speed with which this happened, along with repeated attempted coups (Rake 1998), demonstrate how little legitimacy the regime had because of internal factors. However, the lack of international support and military defeat represented the necessary conditions for the fall of the Amin regime. On the other hand, in Museveni’s slow transition to democracy, still in progress today, diplomatic pressure and conditionality are more subtle, the PID having a marginal role (Keating 2011; Hansen and Twaddle 1995, 150).

Liberia’s case is particularly complex. Since 1980 there have been a succession of coups, non-democratic regimes, and civil wars. Focusing strictly on the process that led to the fall of Liberian president Charles Taylor (2003), the principal international actors were the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), in which Nigeria played the key role, the US, UN, and neighboring countries like Guinea and the Ivory Coast. Practically all PID instruments were present, although only some of these effec-
tively influenced the regime’s fall. In 1999, a new armed opposition formed, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), which, thanks to support from Guinea (Outram 2004, 625), opened the door to another civil war. At the beginning of 2003, another armed opposition emerged, the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), supported by the Ivory Coast (Moran and Pitcher 2004, 506). As the civil war deepened, it attracted the attention of the international community. In September 2002, the International Contact Group on Liberia (ICGL) was created, consisting of the UN, African Union, ECOWAS, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, EU, France, Great Britain and the US (Outram 2004, 626). The objective was to bring the belligerent parties to the table to negotiate a cease-fire agreement. Only in April 2003 did the LURD agree to negotiate with the regime, and on June 4 peace negotiations began in Accra, Ghana (Outram 2004, 627).

It is possible that the renewal and extension of sanctions (including commercial) and the arms embargo (May 2003) contributed to this increased inclination toward negotiation. During the negotiations, the UN Special Court for Sierra Leone issued an arrest warrant for Taylor, charging him with war crimes, crimes against humanity and grave violations of international law (McGovern 2008). This was taken as a clear signal, and was followed by a coup attempt by Vice-President Blah, allegedly with US backing, foiled, however, by Taylor on June 5 (Outram 2004, 627). The LURD in the north and MODEL in the south had at this point taken control of most of the country (MacQueen 2006, 223; Moran and Pitcher 2004, 506). Also on June 5, the opposition launched an attack on the capital, Monrovia, the only area still under Taylor’s control. Despite the cease-fire agreement signed a few days before, they attacked the capital again at the end of the month. The humanitarian crisis increased international pressure on Taylor. US president Bush formally asked for his ouster at the end of June; the Nigerian president offered him asylum on the condition that he remain out of Liberian politics; the UN peacekeeping mission was preceded by 1,300 Nigerian soldiers sent as ECOWAS peacekeepers (Moran and Pitcher 2004, 506; Outram 2004, 627). In exchange for some concessions, on June 6 Taylor accepted the Nigerian offer and, after the deployment of the UN mission at the beginning of August, left power in the
hands of Vice President Blah (MacQueen 2006, 223; Outram 2004, 627; McGovern 2008). International pressure was without a doubt very strong, including the threat of a direct military intervention by units of the US Navy that were positioned off the coast, and deployment of the UN peacekeeping mission. However, these factors cannot be considered sufficient for Taylor’s fall. We must remember that the armed opposition at that point controlled most of the country and was laying siege to Taylor’s last stronghold, the capital Monrovia. In conclusion, the regime’s breakdown was due to the coordinated contributions of LURD and MODEL’s military victories and pressure by the international community (Moran and Pitcher 2004, 516), making the PID’s role concurrent.

The Central African Republic also has experienced a succession of non-democratic regimes, coups and a transition process never fully completed. As the principal former colonial power, France has on many occasions played a fundamental role in the country’s political life. Most PID instruments were employed at varying times, with varying levels of effectiveness. The regime established by Bokassa in 1966 broke down in 1979, thanks to a coup supported by the French army (MacQueen 2006, 207). The change in the French presidency in 1981 led to withdrawal of support for the Dacko regime, which was persuaded to cede power to the military, giving birth to the Kolingba regime (Englebert 1998, 288). The actions by France were very close to being the sufficient condition for the fall of these regimes, making the PID role almost the principal one. The fall of the Kolingba regime formally occurred with multi-party elections in 1993. The PID played a crucial role on more than one occasion (MacQueen 2006, 207). The legalization of political parties, for example, granted in 1991 was, even by Kolingba’s own admission, the result of pressure by international donors, together with the activism of the domestic opposition, which had a role in influencing the international community’s policy (Englebert 1998, 289). Elections, originally set for the end of 1992, were postponed several times. Thanks to French pressure, these finally took place in August 1993. In the same vein, it was the French threat to suspend bilateral cooperation that convinced Kolingba to withdraw the decrees by which he intended to subvert the elections that were not going his way (Englebert 1998, 290). The extreme weakness of institutions
and of the socio-economic dimension, combined with strong pressure from the internal opposition, prevented the regime from holding out against international conditionality, and were necessary for the fall of the regime, which indicates a concurrent role for the PID.

In Mali the PID involved diplomatic pressure, conditionality and democratic assistance. For historical reasons, France, the ex colonial power, played an important role in the political life of the country, and specifically in the fall of the Moussa Traoré regime in 1991, which launched the transition (Diamond 2011, 124). After months of opposition demonstrations and popular protests, violently repressed, the regime’s fall occurred via a coup carried out by Amadou Touré. The precarious economic conditions and negative social effects of World Bank and IMF restructuring in the 1980s had undermined the Traoré regime’s popular consensus. In particular, the necessity for drastic cuts in public administration had serious repercussions for employment and swelled the opposition’s ranks (Vengroff and Kone 1995, 46). International assistance took on a crucial role for the regime. At the beginning of the 1990s, it constituted 30% of GDP (Levitsky and Way 2010, 297; Vengroff and Kone 1995, 46). France provided significant funding for both the army and the salaries of civil servants (Peiffer and Englebert 2012, 363; Turrittin 1991, 99). Mitterrand’s change in policy towards Africa at the 1990 Franco-African Summit in La Baule made France’s aid distribution dependent on the implementation of democratic reforms, leaving the Traoré regime only the option of repression (Peiffer and Englebert 2012, 363). In addition, it seems that, in the weeks before the Traoré regime’s fall, Amadou Touré made a trip to France, leading to the belief that there may have been French involvement in the coup (Turrittin 1991, 102). Finally, various international actors had provided important financing to opposition groups, which quickly transformed into political parties between the 1980s and 1990s (Vengroff and Kone 1995, 47). Without a doubt, popular mobilization, the economic crisis and the winds of change generated by the fall of the Communist regimes also had a crucial role in the Traoré regime’s fall. Conditionality and pressure from donor nations, especially France, were equally vital in arriving at this result. The withdrawal of international aid at that particular historical moment denied the Traoré regime the resources it need-
ed to remain in power. The PID’s role nonetheless should be considered concurrent.

There are also many cases in which the PID played a marginal role in the fall of African regimes. Nigeria’s case is particularly interesting. After having annulled the results of the 1993 elections, judged by international observers to have been free and fair, and to the general condemnation of the international community, Abacha took power (Giumelli 2011, 69). The US, Great Britain, and the EU imposed sanctions and strengthened them several times, but excluded the regime’s fundamental resource, petroleum (Giumelli 2011, 70). In addition, many of the measures had no significant effect, because of defections by France, Germany, and Japan in the implementation phase (Diamond 2011, 125; King 1999; Osaghae 1998). The regime fell in 1998 when the dictator died. It is rumored that Abacha did not die of a heart attack but rather was poisoned by his military colleagues, tired of the country’s international isolation (Diamond 2011, 126). In fact, right after Abacha’s death, the military began the democratic transition. This unsubstantiated interpretation could upend negative opinions on the effectiveness of sanctions in the fall of the Abacha regime. In any case, there is no concrete proof, and the failure of some states to implement sanctions, sparing at least some key economic sectors, leads us to believe that the PID’s impact was marginal.

Conclusions

The general objective of this chapter is to evaluate the PID’s role in the crisis/breakdown/transformation of non-democratic regimes in the Third Wave. In analyzing some of the most important cases (about 30 out of more than 80) in all the geographic areas involved, considerable challenges derived from the extraordinary variation in terms of time period, geographical location, socio-economics, culture, etc. and the number of variables involved. Nonetheless, taking into account both the overall analytical framework and the idiosyncrasies of variables and cases, it is possible to suggest conclusions specific to each geographic area. These conclusions take into account the interactions between the PID and the other variables involved.
In both Southern European cases considered here, the PID played a concurrent role through the same type of action, i.e. interstate conflict and its internal effects. The similarities were determined in part by the same international context (effects of the Cold War on the European chessboard and the 1973 oil crisis) and in part by the economic and political weakness of the Portuguese and Greek regimes, both with legitimacy crises and deeply dependent on foreign energy sources. These weaknesses, in the absence of black knights, interacted with the actions taken by the PID, which was enough to undermine the already weak legitimacy of the two regimes and contributed to their fall.

In evaluating the weight of the PID in Latin America, two factors are especially important: 1) there was an international actor (the US) with the ability and will to act as the hegemonic power in the region; 2) changes in the international context had considerable influence on the international actors involved. In Latin America, one can see all PID instruments in action and the PID playing principal, concurrent, and marginal roles. Comparative analysis of the Latin American cases shows that the PID has a greater capacity for influence in countries where:

- dimensions are small;
- the economy is weak;
- dependency on international assistance is strong;
- geostrategic importance is accentuated, e.g. in terms of bipolar confrontation, but black knights are absent;
- there is a tradition of external interference.

Due also to these factors, the capacity of the principal external international actor, the United States, to exercise influence varies significantly. It is more pronounced, in fact, in Central America and the Caribbean, with a concentration of cases of the PID having the principal role and of more invasive actions. In South America, on the other hand, there is a preponderance of cases in which the PID plays a marginal role in the fall of non-democratic regimes (Carothers 1991, 249-53; Whitehead 1996, 63).

The PID’s role in Asia, on the other hand, has been extremely limited. The fall of non-democratic regimes in Asia is principally the result of internal factors and international factors not linked to explicit actions by an external actor. The only case of a principal
role was Afghanistan, in which a military intervention was effective, given the country’s severely compromised socio-economic and institutional situation, with an absence of black knights able to counterbalance PID pressures. Although in certain cases (South Korea, the Philippines) there was a certain linkage to the West, in particular to the US, the PID involved little more than diplomatic pressure, playing a marginal role in the fall of those regimes. Importantly, however, in both cases strong internal oppositions were present.

In evaluating the PID’s role in East Central Europe and the Balkans the two primary factors worth mentioning are: 1) the presence of a dominant international actor (USSR) whose actions, even unintentionally (Light 1997, 134) contributed heavily to regime change; 2) the extreme importance of change in the international context. Despite the presence of military interventions (Serbia) and interstate conflicts (USSR) the most frequent PID action was diplomatic pressure, specifically withdrawal of support and stimulus to adopt a particular set of reforms, the so-called “Gorbachëv effect” (Light 1997, 133; Niklasson 1994, 203). In most cases in this region, the PID played a concurrent role.

The factors that contributed to the ability of the PID to influence outcomes in East Central Europe were:

- economic weakness due to the failure of planned economies;
- dependence on the USSR’s economy, due to inclusion in the Soviet Bloc;
- dependence on the USSR for instruments of repression of last resort to contain internal opposition;
- the end of the antidemocratic black knight role played by the USSR until the end of the 1980s;
- extreme dependence on the USSR for legitimacy;
- the change in the Soviet attitude under Gorbachëv in the second half of the 1980s, which led to the explosion of the legitimacy crises that hit practically all the East European regimes.

The concurrent nature of the PID’s role originated in the interactions between the pressures it exercised, the action of internal opposition, and a potent emulation effect after the explosion of the first cases.
The non-democratic African regimes fell primarily in the decade between 1980 and 1990, which demonstrated the weight of a new Soviet foreign policy (Light 1997, 44; Herbst 1990) and the changed policy of Western conditionality (Bratton and van de Walle 1997, 135), as well as the role of ex-colonial powers, France in particular. Thanks to the large number of cases in this region, about a third of the total, they run the full gamut in terms of both actions and the role of the Proactive International Dimension. In general, the PID’s influence on the fall of African regimes was amplified by:

- the presence of problems of stateness;
- civil wars;
- weak economies, especially where valuable natural resources were absent;
- a strong dependence on international assistance;
- little geostrategic importance;
- the absence or withdrawal of black knights;
- maintenance of close ties to ex-colonial powers.

The interaction of the PID with the economic variable was decidedly strong, not only in crises that augmented dependence on international aid, but also in states possessing rare natural resources where international actors were less willing to intervene to bring about a regime’s fall (Nigeria). We should note the important role in many cases, e.g. South Africa, of internal oppositions (Bratton and van de Walle 1997) that were able to connect with and benefit from assistance from international actors.

Both the analysis of individual cases and the conclusions regarding each geographic region demonstrate the utility and the effectiveness of the framework adopted. Albeit in specific, case-by-case fashion, the strength of the state and the economy, the presence or absence of black knights, linkage to the West, and the types of sources of legitimacy in a given state can be used to explain the role (principal, concurrent, marginal) of the PID in the transition processes of the Third Wave.

Another generalization emerging from this analysis is that PID actions that do not undermine the formal sovereignty of the target state are more likely to be ineffective if, despite even extreme weakness, e.g. economic, the target state retains one or more of the following attributes:
• a strong coercive ability;
• a very weak opposition;
• the presence of black knights;
• geostrategic importance.

Under these conditions, it is probable that necessity and emergencies (genocide, threats to the international actor’s security, etc.) will lead to direct interventions. Actions that undermine the sovereignty of a target state are more likely to succeed in causing a regime to fall, implying a more important role for the PID. But does this effectiveness of the PID necessarily persist in the subsequent democratization process?

All things being equal, and regardless of the specific instruments it employs, it is likely that the PID’s influence will be greater if there is a hegemonic power in the region that has the means and the political will to act, whether or not it intends to promote the fall of a regime. This observation finds confirmation, for example, in the US role in Central America and the Caribbean, the USSR’s role in East Central Europe, and the generally small role of the PID in Asia.

One hesitates to identify a hegemonic international power in the case of the so-called Arab Spring, even though the countries of the region, and everyone else for that matter, has kept a constant watch for signs of Washington’s intentions. Without underestimating the domestic drivers, both economic and political, of attempted change in the Middle East and North Africa, it is clear that the international dimension has been vitally important. This perhaps goes back to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, which at least may have demonstrated to the Arab publics that even the most brutally efficient dictatorships need not last forever (Husain 2013; Makiya 2013).

But what about a Proactive International Dimension, defined above as “that combination of actions or processes, produced by one or more international actors, that, intentionally or not, cause or contribute to the crisis/breakdown/transformation of a non-democratic regime”? One may quibble that the US and Europe have not always been “proactive” with respect to the Arab Spring, if we exclude the Libyan case. It may have been precisely US and/or European decisions not to take certain actions that established a permissive environment for, or helped stimulate, regime crisis/break-
down (Hollis 2012). Kivimäki (2013), for example, argues that the US, notably under the Obama Administration, relaxed its support for repression by Middle Eastern autocracies, opening the way to regime change. Kissinger in 2012 noted that the US administration had been “successful in avoiding placing America as an obstacle to the revolutionary transformations” in the Arab world, terming this “not a minor achievement.” One can argue, in fact, that decisions not to act are very much a type of action, perhaps especially for the US in the Middle East (Hamid 2015).

The Arab Spring may be a good illustration, however, of why including “intentionally or not” when defining the PID is a good idea. Unintentional consequences of international action, both positive and negative, have abounded. The success of reform in Tunisia frankly seems to owe little to international efforts, and a great deal to the Tunisians themselves. An Islamist government came to power in Egypt via elections that the Western powers precipitously demanded, only then to welcome a return to military authoritarianism. The Libyan case illustrated once again the difficulty outside powers have in foreseeing the longer-term effects of military interventions in unfamiliar territory.

Concerns about further unintended consequences, notably in Syria, have been increasingly evident. The vigorous Syria debate in the US as 2015 was ending pointed out, among other things, the difficulty of reliably connecting the Proactive International Dimension to positive, long-term transformation of autocratic regimes, and the need for better insight into such connections.

Endnotes

1 More recent cases have been excluded (for example, Libya) as they occurred after the conventional time frame of the Third Wave of democratization (1974-2004).

2 Southern African Development Community

3 See Amuzergar (1997) on Iran and Schreiber (1973) on Cuba.

4 “Notably, international donors remained important players in African transitions, though they were more effective at inducing political liberalization through quiet diplomatic persuasion than through highly publicized suspensions of aid” (Bratton and van de Walle 1997, 186).
The *Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado* – PIDE (International Police and State Defense), the secret political police, had an extensive network of informers and was very efficient in repressing dissent. It is no surprise then that the revolution was the work of actors inside the dominant coalition (army), and not of the opposition (Morlino 1986).


30,000 dead and 9 billion dollars in destruction (Orozco 2002, 68).

The leaders of Communist parties were appointed and supervised by Moscow; the security forces were run by the Soviet secret services; military structures were merged in the Warsaw Pact Organization, economies were linked to and dependent on that of the USSR via the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Batt 1997, 155).

In his speech of November 2, 1987 in commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution, Gorbachëv emphasized the independence of all the Communist parties and their sovereignty in resolving their own internal problems. The same message was repeated in Prague (April 1987), Belgrade (March 1988) and Warsaw (July 1988) (Niklasson 1994, 202).

Note the Western economic sanctions in response to implementation of martial law (Sanford 1997).

Besides pressure for opening, in 1989 Gorbachëv made it understood that he did not support Jakeš (Light 1997, 141-42).

The NATO bombing inflicted between $30 and $40 billion in damage to the Serbian economy (Levitsky and Way 2010, 109).

With its decision not to play the black knight and to provide only meager support, Russia contributed to Milošević’s choice to give in to Western pressure (Levitsky and Way 2010, 105).

From 1980 to 1986 the GDP dropped 9% annually (Manning and Malbrough 2010).

For example, a loan for $74 million was frozen in May 1992 (Diamond 2011, 124).

The blocking of international loans denied the regime the resources needed to pay the salaries of public servants (Levitsky and Way 2010, 284).

In three out of six cases (Grenada, Panama and Haiti) the US directly intervened militarily.

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