Table of contents

INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 13
Paulo Granjo, Sofia Aboim and Alice Ramos

PART I
Alterity experiences in displacement

1.
Ambiguous boundaries between exclusion and inclusion.
Experiences from the Meheba Refugee Camp (Zambia) ........................................... 29
Pedro Figueiredo Neto

2.
Long-distance nationalism, boundaries and the experience of racism among Santomean migrants in Portugal ................................................. 49
José Manuel Sobral

3.
Portuguese in the cane: the racialization of labour in Hawaiian plantations ...... 65
Cristiana Bastos
PART II
Citizenship and discrimination

4. On marginal inclusion: refugees at the fringes of citizenship in Portugal .......... 99
Francesco Vacchiano

5. Opposition towards immigration: the view of natives and immigrants .......... 113
Alice Ramos

6. Socially critical decisions towards low status groups: the role of meritocracy ... 137
Rui Costa-Lopes, Ana Filipa Madeira, Mariana Pires de Miranda and Wilson Moreira

PART III
Mobility and migrations

7. Nodes of inclusion and exclusion: media, context and the shaping of contemporary movements across the Atlantic ................................................................. 161
Marta Vilar Rosales

8. Tactics in movement: pursuing social inclusion in transnational migration .... 175
Simone Frangella

9. Mirroring the dialectic of inclusion and exclusion in ethnoheterogenesis processes ............................................................................................. 195
Nina Clara Tiesler

PART IV
Past to present

10. The “Brasileiro”: a 19th century transnational social category ......................... 221
Isabel Corrêa da Silva
11. Reducing difference in the Portuguese empire?  
A case-study from early-modern Goa  
Ángela Barreto Xavier  

12. In and out of history: how a Goan scholar in Bombay imagined a colonial Indian past and a future independent India (1870-1900)  
Filipa Lowndes Vicente  

PART V  
Gender and family  

13. Why are caring masculinities so difficult to achieve?  
Reflections on men and gender equality in Portugal  
Vanessa Cunha, Leonor Bettencourt Rodrigues, Rita Correia, Susana Atalaia and Karin Wall  

14. Trans masculinities: embodiments, performances and the materiality of gender in times of change  
Sofia Aboim, Pedro Vasconcelos and Sara Merlini  

15. Family and kinship in contemporary mobile world  
Marzia Grassi  

PART VI  
Learning and working  

16. Including and excluding. Schools’ reputations: students, families and choices  
Maria Manuel Vieira, Ana Nunes de Almeida and Ana Sofia Ribeiro
17. Inclusions and exclusions in the production and circulation of scientific knowledge: the case of the Royal Anthropological Institute (RAI) and of the Portuguese Society of Anthropology and Ethnology (SPAE) .......................... 407
Patrícia Ferraz de Matos

18. Inclusion processes in work cultures and their impacts: a comparison of Portuguese and Mozambican cases ...................................................... 431
Paulo Granjo and João Feijó

PART VII
Spaces and boundaries

19. With or without you: models of urban requalification under neoliberalism in Portugal .............................................................................................. 457
Sónia Alves and Rosa Branco

20. Inclusive communities, exclusionary city, planning n/a? Mapping condomínios fechados semi-quantitatively in Lisbon, Cascais (and Barreiro) ................................................................................................................... 481
Simone Tulumello and Alessandro Colombo

21. Physical, geographical and social access: the neglected dimensions of food security ........................................................................................................ 509
Mónica Truninger, Sónia Goulart Cardoso, Fábio Rafael Augusto and Vasco Ramos
List of figures

1.1 Regional map ............................................................................................................................... 33
1.2 Meheba refugee settlement map
(As of 2015, adapted from Agier 2011, UNHCR 2017 and Google Maps) ........................................ 35

3.1 “Ancestry, Portuguese”, included in Romanzo Adam’s Interracial Marriage in Hawaii ......................... 71
3.2 “Portuguese women, children and bread at a plantation” ........................................................................ 74
3.3 Portuguese church in Kula, Maui ....................................................................................................... 88
3.4 Portuguese oven, Kepaniwai Park’s Heritage Gardens, Iao Valley, Maui. ............................................... 88
3.5 Traces of Portuguese societies in Oahu ............................................................................................... 88

5.1 Theoretical model of relations among motivational types of values, higher order value
types and bipolar value dimensions ....................................................................................................... 118
5.2 Opposition to immigration (means) 1 (allow many) to 4 (allow none) ................................................ 126

12.1 José Gerson da Cunha (1844-1900). Photographic portrait in carte-de-visite format pasted in the endleaves of his posthumously published book ............................................................................... 266

13.1 Early leavers from education and training (18 to 24 years), by sex (%)
– Portugal, 2005-2015 ......................................................................................................................... 312
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>Population distribution by level of educational attainment (total and age group 25-34 (%)) – Portugal, 2014</td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>Employed population in Education and Human Health and Social Services, proportion by sex (%) – Portugal, 2011</td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>Proportion of male teachers, by teaching level (%) – Portugal, 2004/05 – 2014/15</td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>Individuals who disagree that men’s take-up of parental leaves has positive effects in helping the father to keep his job, by sex and age group (%) – Portugal, 2014</td>
<td>318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>Individuals who agree that the child suffers when the father does not take part in childcare and that the father is as capable as the mother, by sex and age group (%) – Portugal, 2014</td>
<td>319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>Sex ratio in causes of death mainly affecting men (sex ratio &gt; 200) – Portugal, 2014</td>
<td>321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>Sex ratio at death, by age group (%) – Portugal, 2015</td>
<td>322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>Raí Archive, London, 2016</td>
<td>412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>SPAE Archive, Porto, 2015</td>
<td>412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>Integrative liminality, through centripetal participation</td>
<td>435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>Expelling liminality, desired by workers</td>
<td>442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>Structural liminality, by change refusal</td>
<td>451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>The Cardosas quarter in the historic centre</td>
<td>472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>Metropolitan Lisbon and the municipalities of Lisbon, Cascais and Barreiro</td>
<td>491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>Condomínios Fechados in Lisbon (left) and Cascais (right)</td>
<td>495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>cf Typologies (multi-villas, apartment building and mixed developments) in Lisbon (left) and Cascais (right)</td>
<td>495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>Number of housing units in cfs in Lisbon (left) and Cascais (right)</td>
<td>496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>Temporal stages of production of cfs in Lisbon (left) and Cascais (right)</td>
<td>496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>CFS and professional-managerial employee rate, 1991, 2001 and 2011 in Lisbon (above) and Cascais (below)</td>
<td>497</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of tables

5.1 Respondents’ profile ................................................................. 125
5.2 Predictors of opposition to immigration in European countries (Standardised coefficients) ......................................................... 128

7.1 Migration in Portuguese and Brazilian Media ................................................................. 169

19.1 List of interviews ........................................................................ 468
19.2 The main strategies and operations drafted and implemented by Porto Vivo srU
over the last 10 years ........................................................................ 471

20.1 Main socio-economic and territorial indicators ......................................................... 492
20.2 Condomínios fechados in Lisbon and Cascais, main findings ......................................... 494

21.1 The main dimensions of the food security concept ......................................................... 512
List of appendices

5.1 Indicators of basic values and underlying motivations ......................................................... 131
5.2 Structure and salience of Schwartz’s values – nationals, immigrants from European countries and immigrants from non-European countries ........................................................................................................ 132
5.2.2 Values structure – Immigrants from European countries (Multidimensional Scaling – Proxcal; Tucker coefficient of congruence = .981) ........................................................................................................ 132
5.2.3 Values structure – Immigrants from non-European countries (Multidimensional Scaling – Proxcal; Tucker coefficient of congruence = .978) ........................................................................................................ 133
5.2.4 Importance attributed to the ten basic values by group (centred means) ........................................... 133

20.1 Available works about cfs in the Lisbon metro, with the total number of cfs found per municipality ........................................................................................................................................... 503
In 2016, the Scientific Board of the Institute of Social Sciences (University of Lisbon) decided to prepare a three volume publication in English based on its 2015/2020 Strategic Programme: Changing Societies: Legacies and Challenges. Each volume focuses on one of the programme’s main research areas: Inclusion, Citizenship and Sustainability (I-C-S). The aim was to foreground the science carried out at ICS, make its researchers’ innovative contributions to the advancement of knowledge in social sciences more widely known, and leave a significant mark on the national and international scientific agenda. A further aim was to encourage and foster interdisciplinary collaboration between researchers belonging to different Research Groups - as strongly encouraged a few months earlier by the External Advisory Committee during its visit to the Institute.

Once the rules of the game had been thought out, two calls were made to the Institute’s scientific community. The first, for the selection of interdisciplinary editorial teams for each volume, was based on the presentation of an editorial project. Candidates explained how their project would explore the theme (Inclusion, Citizenship or Sustainability), as well as their conceptual and possible empirical approaches. The second invited proposals for texts for each of the volumes. Their provisional versions would be presented, discussed and commented on publicly at the ICS Conference, in November 2017, in addition to being subject to the usual peer review processes organised by the volume editors.

The response to this challenge went far beyond our expectations. The numbers do not speak for themselves, but they do give some indication of the ICS community’s remarkable
collaborative vitality. They also show the amount of work involved in the initiative: three editorial teams, benefiting from the support of three editorial boards; 21 chapters, 39 authors in the Inclusion Book (vol. 1); 13 chapters, 30 authors in the Citizenship Book (vol. II); 14 chapters, 37 authors in the Sustainability Book (vol. III).

However, I would particularly like to emphasise the quality of the editorial lines defined, as well as the texts that have been collected and are now accessible to the reading and scrutiny of a vast international audience. As well as highlighting the virtues of interdisciplinarity in science practice, one of the structuring marks of ics-ulisboa is that its work is illustrated through different prisms.

On behalf of the ics-ulisboa Scientific Board, I would like to thank all the authors for their contributions, which invite us into areas of scientific thought and innovation, from issues and concepts to the empirical contexts, through the strategies and methodological instruments used. I also wish to express my gratitude to the editors of the three volumes, for having decided to advance with the original, inspiring proposals for their volumes, as well as for their perseverance and determination over many months of work: Sofia Aboim, Paulo Granjo and Alice Ramos; Marina Costa Lobo, Filipe Carreira da Silva and José Pedro Zúquete; Ana Delicado, Nuno Domingos and Luís de Sousa. My sincere thanks also go to the editorial boards that worked so closely with them: Rui Costa-Lopes, Pedro Magalhães and Ângela Barreto Xavier; José Luís Cardoso, António Costa Pinto and Jorge Vala; João Ferrão, Dulce Freire and Susana Matos Viegas. The Director of the Imprensa de Ciências Sociais (the Social Sciences Press), José Machado Pais, who from the first moment enthusiastically welcomed this publication, disseminated in open access, also deserves our warmest thanks. My final expressions of gratitude are to Carla Araújo, who served as secretary and Marta Castelo Branco, editorial assistant to the project.

Ana Nunes de Almeida
President of the Scientific Board
ics, University of Lisbon
INTRODUCTION

Paulo Granjo
Sofia Aboim
Alice Ramos
EDITORS
INCLUSION: A SUI GENERIS WORD AND A FALSELY CLEAR IDEA

The word “inclusion” has become increasingly conspicuous over the last few decades, both in well-intentioned, though vague, political speech, and as a guiding element for obtaining scientific funding in the social sciences.

It is a pleasant word to hear, especially if we do not give it too much thought: *inclusion* immediately sounds positive, desirable and moral. We tend to assume those favourable characteristics because we are also used to interpreting “inclusion” and “exclusion” as an opposite pair or concepts, which are clearly delimited and supposed to have positive or negative contents, according to the prefix. However, such opposition is not that simplistic.

On the one hand, the value we may attach to the word “inclusion” is neither abstract nor permanent, but rather depends on the place or situation for such *inclusion*. If we used *inclusion* to describe being well adjusted to incarceration in prison, life in the World War I trenches or being a member of the Ku Klux Klan, it is a fairly safe guess that almost no reader would see *inclusion* as positive, desirable or moral.

On the other hand, the opposition between *inclusion* and *exclusion* is not absolute or clearly evident at all but, in each particular case, an elaborate social construct. It is true that, as Levi-Strauss (1962) has shown us, the functioning of human thought is based on the manipulation of oppositions and similitudes. However, contrary to the use of several opposite notions that become clear once we define a criterion for their objective differentiation, every time we establish an opposition between a specific field of *inclusion* and *exclusion*, we are not taking notice of empirical evidence.

What we are doing is to arbitrarily select and emphasise a set of criteria or characteristics, amongst many alternatives, in order to highlight the similarity and/or possession between those who are “included”. Simultaneously, we emphasise another set of characteristics or criteria of differentiation and/or dispossession, which allow us to contrast such a group with that of the “excluded” (Granjo 2014). It is only in the light of this arbitrary negotiation, usually set-up according to the socially dominant valuation criteria, that the border between “in” and “out” (and between the “included” and the “excluded”) is proclaimed and seems evident.

This means that the selection and valuation of a specific *inclusion* field, as desirable or relevant, is not at all an evidence. We valued that field, instead of many other possible ones, as a result of an ethical and political choice – and the
reasons and processes underpinning that choice should also be the object of a demanding and self-reflexive analysis. This urge for epistemological criticism is reinforced by other characteristics of the relationship between inclusion and exclusion.

Firstly, it might be almost redundant to recall that every inclusion process implies and presupposes a previous exclusion. For a social scientist, however, it is also necessary to understand precisely “what” those people were excluded from; on which terms, and what meaning they ascribe to the exclusion we attribute them.

Secondly, every inclusion process into something is simultaneously an exclusion process from something else, at least in conjunctural terms. Since people and groups are not blank sheets of paper who live in some abstract social nonexistence, the inclusion in a group, a status, an identity, a system of practices, values or ways of feeling, implies their exclusion from previous opposite, or just different, groups or forms of inclusion. Again, this has individual and social costs, which should be taken into account.\(^1\)

Symmetrically, exclusion processes cannot project their results into a void. Therefore, an exclusion from something implies further inclusions – in new groups or systems of practices, representations and/or identities – to which the now “excluded” are pushed by the effects of the exclusion they suffered, or pulled in either by their new peers, or through their own attempts to be integrated and accepted.

Inclusion and exclusion are thus not really opposite sides of the same coin; they are processual and can, in fact, be the very same thing, looked at from different perspectives. This conundrum calls for a heightened awareness from social scientists and, ideally, requires the understanding of the diverse perspectives involved, beyond the dominant social, political and/or epistemological ones.

### INCLUSION AND LIMINALITY

The dynamics of inclusion and exclusion are not, however, reducible to oppositional simplification and to one-dimensional criteria separating the included and the excluded along the lines of a single and clear frontier.

---

\(^1\) For instance, in several cultural contexts inclusion in market-oriented agriculture may induce exclusion from the local mechanisms of social solidarity, eventually leading to vulnerability and ostracism (Negrão 2001).
On the contrary, the grounded observation of empirical realities often shows us a “no-man’s-land”, that is, an area of ambiguity where some are no longer “others” but not yet “us”. This common process creates a grey zone for those who are no longer purely excluded, but are not yet plainly included. In other words, when we focus on the inclusion and exclusion processes, we are systematically confronted with situations and statuses of liminality (van Gennep 1909; Turner 1969).

In the classic definition, liminality corresponds to a transitory phase (delimited and projected to a time and space perceived as exterior to those of daily existence) in a path leading to integration in a new group of practices, values, knowledges, attitudes and/or status. In order to differentiate it from other liminal processes, we will call it “integrative liminality” here.

However, instead of a transitory path for full inclusion, liminality can also become a perennial intermediate situation that reproduces and institutionalises an ambiguous status, from which, under exceptional conditions, only a few may escape. This is what we can call a “structural liminalisation”.

Finally, it may often happen that liminality does not drive to inclusion at all but, instead, has exclusion as an outcome, after a variable and often long period of ambiguity. When such a period of “excluding liminality” lasts for long, it can easily be confused, in the perceptions of both social actors and external observers, with structural liminality. This happens because the difference between them is only apparent when considering the time and the specific characteristics of the systemic framework which sets up and reproduces that liminal situation – and both these factors are difficult to perceive, unless we already expect them to be possibly relevant.

Most importantly, structural and excluding liminalities correspond to systemic liminality situations. Furthermore, they can be relatively marginal and complementary or actually crucial for the existence and reproduction of the system, which would not function and endure without liminality, or without deep alterations that would change it into something else.

---

2 This model of liminality corresponds, for instance, to an apprentice-like status (Lave and Wenger 1991), or to processes like the rites of passage originally studied by van Gennep (1909).

3 The historical cases of goeses (Xavier 2011), literate Cape-Verdeans (Batalha 2004) and assimilados (Moreira 1997) in the Portuguese colonial period are good examples of this kind of liminality.

4 This is, for instance, expectable and predominant with systemic labour precariousness.

5 See Piketty (2013) on the intrinsic role of precariousness in neoliberal capitalism, or the current structural precarity of the Portuguese scientific system.
Moreover, since they are both systemic and long-lasting, such kinds of liminality can induce inclusion into stable status groups, different from those that defined the inclusion/exclusion dynamic in relation to which the liminal situation was created. Therefore, we may observe diverse inclusion/exclusion processes, interacting mutually and affecting each other throughout such interaction.

CHAPTER OUTLINE

The theoretical reflexion on the ambiguity, complexity and plurality of meanings that we usually merge under the word “inclusion” was the benchmark to the call for the chapters in this volume. Inside Out, Outside In brings together 21 contributions authored or co-authored by researchers from the Institute of Social Sciences (ICS), each of which explores, either from a disciplinary or transdisciplinary approach, one or more aspects highlighted above. The volume is a collective effort covering a wide range of subjects, which represent the research being carried out at the ICS and contribute to the reflection on inclusion and exclusion.

The book is divided into seven parts, each of which includes three chapters that tackle various forms of liminality, the key conceptual lens with which we seek to overcome the inclusion/exclusion divide.

**PART 1** is dedicated to alterity experiences in displacement situations, and to the manipulation of inclusion/exclusion dynamics.

In **Chapter 1**, Pedro Figueiredo Neto presents the Meheba Refugee Camp (Zambia) as a case depicting how ambiguous the boundaries between exclusion and inclusion can be. The camp’s purpose is to enclose, better manage and control displaced populations, whose rights are indefinitely suspended as long as they remain under humanitarian rule. However, refugee camps also provide protection, food provisions, access to basic health care and education, economic opportunities and training programmes that are commonly absent in the refugees’ place of origin, as well as in the hosting region where a given camp is deployed. They are illustrative of the paradox between the inclusion of the excluded (the refugees) and the exclusion of the supposedly included – the national citizens whose plight and needs have been neglected by their own state.

Exploring the potential of the “long-distance nationalism” concept, in **Chapter 2** José Manuel Sobral addresses the processes of community-building
and inclusion among the Santomean migrants and their descendants in Portugal. The author shows how those immigrants’ transnational identification as Santomean is mainly a product of their own agency, by formal and informal ways that bind the members of the community and keep them connected to their “homeland”. On the other hand, full understanding of this identification process also requires the analysis of the processes that tend to exclude such immigrants from the full exercise of citizenship in the settlement society, racism in particular.

In Chapter 3, Cristiana Bastos discusses the significant migration flux of Portuguese islanders to Hawai’ian plantations, during 19th and 20th centuries, and their ambiguous and liminal inclusion in the multi-layered local society, facing stereotypes and ethnicization (if not racialization) processes. The author finishes her article by raising a pertinent broader issue: the exclusion from national narratives of the Portuguese who reached the plantations and towns of British Guiana and Hawai’i escaping from oppression and destitution, when they were far more numerous than those following the path of imperial aspirations in the Portuguese African and Asian colonies.

PART II analyses precarious liminal citizenship processes resulting from social discrimination.

In Chapter 4, Francesco Vacchiano addresses the social insertion process of a group of refugees who arrived in Portugal in 2017, presenting the public policy initiatives undertaken and discussing problems still to be addressed. One main finding is that reception works frequently as a process of marginal inclusion into the most fragile strata of society, due to a process in which scarcity is paradoxically justified by the idea of having to do with people in extreme needs. The author concludes that it is urgent to reformulate the notion of reception. It should be changed from a benevolent concession into an opportunity for rethinking the structural mechanisms of social stratification operating in the receiving society, investing in a common future in which citizenship is not a corollary of nationality but a project of radical inclusion.

Chapter 5, authored by Alice Ramos, explores the opposition towards migration from a multi-layered angle that offers novel insights beyond the common opposition between migrants and nationals as two homogeneous groups. Starting from the perspective that immigrants are heterogeneous, the author deconstructs this simplistic dualism and discusses how immigrants from within and outside Europe see the entrance of other immigrants, as well as the extent to which their attitudes differ from those of nationals. By
exploring the role of values in the formation of a common cultural heritage, she concludes that the main divide opposes Europeans and non-Europeans, with the first being protective of “Europeanness” in contrast to the attitudes of non-European migrants.

Focusing on a social psychological approach to socially critical decisions, in Chapter 6 Rui Costa-Lopes, Ana Filipa Madeira, Mariana Pires de Miranda and Wilson Moreira present empirical research testing how the contextual salience of a meritocratic norm impacts on these decisions towards low status group members. They also test the hypothesis that the social norm of descriptive meritocracy may legitimise the maintenance of inequality and limit actions towards inclusion. Findings indicate that when people are made to believe that society is structured along meritocratic principles, they will make inferences about whether people deserve to be in the situation they are in. Moreover, results show that people from low status groups are consistently treated in a more negative and exclusionary way.

In Part III, present day mobility and migration processes are addressed.

Marta Vilar Rosales examines in Chapter 7 how and to what extent migrants interact with and make use of media content to feed imaginaries and expectations, design positioning strategies, manage belonging and handle exclusion and inclusion in the different spatial, cultural and political contexts that comprise their migration experiences. The chapter examines the print content published by the Portuguese media during 2011-15, focusing on three topics: Portugal as a hospitable and inclusive location for foreign middle classes; the attractiveness of diverse migration destinations for the Portuguese population; and the particular social, economic and political context, which promoted the simultaneous exploration of pulling and pushing aspects in Portugal and Brazil, by the Portuguese media.

Focused on the experience of immigrants from Goiás (Brazil) to Portugal, in Chapter 8 Simone Frangella discusses the implications of informal and irregular networks in the construction of migrant routes and routines in transnational mobility. The author argues that the webs of vicinity projected to and re-appropriated from the regions of origin, as well as those uncertain and negotiated ones built up in the settlement locations, reconfiguring family and friendship interactions, are crucial to the feasibility of the migratory process and to highlight the complex ways migrants struggle to gain a sense of place. She argues that the strength of the concept of vicinity is in its use of social inclusion to address the structural inequality that permeates transnational mobility.
In **Chapter 9**, Nina Clara Tiesler analyses the dialectic of *inclusion* and *exclusion*, as empirically observed in several diasporic settings of Portuguese emigrants and Portuguese Muslims of Indo-Mozambican origin. She demonstrates how current analytical concepts and frameworks are too limited to grasp the complex and multi-dimensional formative processes which produce ethnicities. The outcome of her debate is the proposal of an innovative concept, “ethnoheterogenesis”, which is able to surpass such limitations and address the dialectic of homogenization and heterogenization inherent in ethnogenesis and ethnic change.

In a move from present to past, the three chapters in **PART IV** revisit the construction of categories, institutions and social relations, as well as imagination in the colonial contexts of Portuguese empire.

Isabel Corrêa da Silva reflects, in **Chapter 10**, on the multiple and often contradictory dynamics of *inclusion* and *exclusion* faced, in both 19th century Portugal and Brazil, by those belonging to an enduring but ambivalently regarded social category: the “Brasileiros”, those Portuguese emigrants who were successful in Brazil. Back in Portugal, the author argues, they were *excluded* from the elites in which they sought to be accepted, because although the modern world democratised elites with more widespread and inclusive integration criteria, the trend towards standardisation created new *exclusion* criteria by drastically reducing the acceptance of diversity.

In **Chapter 11**, Ângela Barreto Xavier revisits the first centuries of the Portuguese presence in Goa and the strategies followed by the Portuguese crown in order to conserve those territories and people under Portuguese rule. She analyses the physical and cultural miscegenation policies practised in 16th century Goa and contends that the *inclusive* and assimilationist policies led both to the reduction of difference and the multiplication of distinctions and hierarchies between the colonisers and the colonised, as well as within the latter. The author explores the tensions and dilemmas between *inclusion* and *exclusion* in the early-modern Portuguese empire, while establishing a critical dialogue between the contrasting interpretations of Gilberto Freyre and Orlando Ribeiro that brings the luso-tropicalist views of the 20th century to the fore.

**Chapter 12** focuses on the *inclusion* and *exclusion* of Indian scholars within 19th and 20th century Portuguese historiography. Filipa Lowndes Vicente explores the life of Gerson da Cunha (1844-1900), a historian, doctor and collector born in Goa. Gerson da Cunha studied medicine in Bombay,
Edinburgh and London before returning to Bombay, and published numerous articles and books on themes related to the Portuguese in India. Despite his inspiring comparisons and connections between different histories and historiographies, Cunha was always on the fringe of both empires, which contributed to his invisibility as a historian and as a producer of knowledge about India.

The three chapters on gender and family dynamics in Part V bring to light different, though intertwined, processes of social change.

Vanessa Cunha, Leonor Rodrigues, Rita Correia, Susana Atalaia and Karin Wall, the authors of In Chapter 13, analyse the challenges posed to men by the emergence of caring masculinities as a dominant norm leading them to reshape their practices and identities. The ideal of caring masculinities has gained momentum as a key ally against hegemonic masculinity, gender inequality and the harmful traits of traditional masculinity itself. Nonetheless, the shift is not free of obstacles hindering men from full equity as partners and fathers, and their inclusion in the realm of care work. The examination of men and care in Portuguese society reflects the growing international concern about men's inclusion and harmful exclusion from care, relocating gender equality as a problem for men and not only for women.

With the new challenges brought about by the increasing visibility of the transgender category, Sofia Aboim, Pedro Vasconcelos and Sara Merlini, focus on the construction of masculinity by trans individuals in Chapter 14. They address both the internal plurality of trans masculinities and the ways in which apparent subaltern forms of ‘doing masculinity’ might, even if unwillingly, benefit from the privilege historically associated with manhood. Drawing on fieldwork with trans men in Portugal and the United Kingdom, the authors conclude that, after all, gender matters. The dividends of being perceived by others as men are acknowledged, even if they are unwanted or viewed with criticism, which is not the case of trans women, regardless of their greater visibility in public spaces and the media.

In Chapter 15, Marzia Grassi focuses on family mobility between Africa and Europe, while offering an overview of three empirical studies carried out in the national/transnational mobile spaces between Angola, Cape Verde, and Portugal. By examining the changes occurring in conjugality, parenthood and care, the author explores the processes of marginalisation that target some individuals over others by analysing the role of culture, the unequal access to resources and the impact of geographic distance. Transnational flows of
people are changing families and creating renewed forms of exclusion and inclusion that reshape political views, forms of gender power and policy making, let alone the performances and semiotics of transnational families as a multifaceted category.

In PART VI, the three chapters on learning and working processes address, in different but complementary manners, the ways in which resources are unevenly distributed.

Maria Manuel Vieira, Ana Nunes de Almeida and Ana Sofia Ribeiro, the authors of Chapter 16, explore the concept of reputation, emerging from the sociology of art, to untangle the criteria guiding educational options for parents and children. Drawing upon six case studies of state and private schools, the authors provide an account of objective and subjective motivations leading to a given school preference. They demonstrate that choice is constrained on the basis of a systemic exclusion, counteracting the ideal of equality in schooling, and revealing how reputation influences parent and children’s preferences when searching for the symbolic gains awarded by the most reputable schools, even if they are state run. The state system also constructs its own reputation and selection mechanisms, thereby also reproducing inequality at the heart of a supposedly inclusive system.

In Chapter 17, Patrícia Ferraz de Matos explores the knowledge construction processes in two scientific societies. She examines the relationships between the Royal Anthropological Institute, created in 1871 and still internationally renowned today, and the Portuguese Society of Anthropology and Ethnology (spae), founded in 1918 and whose activity is nowadays considered peripheral. The author addresses the legitimacy of knowledge in different geographies across time, showing how the reputation of knowledge is key for understanding why claims from the centre are deemed more relevant. In the context of unequal globalisation processes, where the Anglophone world is still central, this chapter locates Portugal and Lusophone scientific production as a semi-peripheral space in present day scientific dynamics of power.

Paulo Granjo and João Feijó explore, in Chapter 18, the normative work ethics in three labour contexts (inside the largest industrial companies in Portugal and Mozambique, galp and mozal, and amongst the workers of several smaller Mozambican companies with Portuguese, Chinese or Mozambican owners). Through these case studies, the authors compare how newcomers are integrated into their jobs and into the workers’ group; the different visions of labour and duties/rights relationships; and, thirdly,
the impact of the previous aspects on the development and reproduction of labour cultures, workers’ identities, safety and production. As the authors demonstrate, the capitalist model implies specific cultural settings, work cultures, and stereotypes about workers. By identifying multiple and different modes of exclusion/inclusion, they prove that even if there is a hegemony of capitalism, it is an adaptive one which implies fostering work cultures better understood from a transnational angle.

Finally, in PART VII, inclusion and exclusion are viewed from the angle of spaces and geographical boundaries.

In Chapter 19, Sónia Alves and Rosa Branco discuss the impact of urban requalification on resident families. They explore the role of globalisation and financialisation, via the recently created Urban Requalification Societies (sru), in replacing programmes that aimed at maintaining and assisting poor families by transforming affordable privately rented housing into spaces for tourism and consumption. The authors also give a picture of the urban requalification models implemented in Portugal from 1974 to the present day. Focusing on the Porto Vivo sru campaign in the Cardosas quarter, located in the heart of Porto city centre, they discuss how public policies professing to be inclusive may in fact create social exclusion and, instead of mitigating poverty dynamics, actually aggravate them by reinforcing social and spatial inequality.

Simone Tulumello and Alessandro Colombo explore, in Chapter 20, the spatial dimensions of urban inclusion/exclusion by addressing the topic of “condomínios fechados”, the Portuguese version of the gated community. The chapter presents the mapping – the first in Portugal, and among the very few available worldwide – of condomínios fechados in the cities of Lisbon and Cascais (besides Barreiro, were none were found). By reflecting comparatively on these cases, the authors suggest that the phenomenon of residential fortification needs to be considered in terms of the dimensions of production (real estate and planning) and consumption (social demand). Considering the characteristics of the Portuguese case, they argue that, with relatively low segregation (like most Southern European metropolitan areas), the concept of polarisation and fragmentation is useful to understand the patterns of urban inclusion and exclusion.

In the final chapter, 21, Mónica Truninger, Sónia Goulart Cardoso, Fábio Rafael Augusto and Vasco Ramos explore the consequences of income inequality and its links with food poverty in food-insecure households. The analysis combines the material lack of resources with other forms of exclusion
that go beyond simple economic access. The authors start by defining food security from a perspective that emphasises the multi-layered nature of these concepts and reconstitutes the social, economic and political dynamics currently shaping accepted definitions. This serves as a backdrop to propose the importance of access in grasping the concept of food (in)security, leading them to engage both with food deserts and social exclusion. While food represents a strong element of social inclusion and identity, the focus on the physical and social aspects of access permits a conceptual refinement.

BEYOND THIS VOLUME

We believe this set of texts demonstrates that the criticism of simplistic and irreflexive uses of the idea of “inclusion” does not suppress its relevance as a trans-thematic and transdisciplinary research line. On the contrary, to conceive and approach inclusion and exclusion as ambiguous and socially situated notions, and to study their dynamics and processes according to their complexity and the key-role played by liminality, provides an innovative conceptualisation contributing to the advance of research and enhances the heuristic potential of those notions. We can even reasonably hope that such an approach by the social sciences might eventually influence the political and public speech about inclusion and exclusion, turning it into something less pedestrian and ideological.

However, this set of texts also highlights another crucial issue: the current structural precariousness of the Portuguese scientific system. Ironically, in a volume on “Inclusion”, only 19% of the first authors (and 15.8% of all authors) are included in the Research Career. All others are in a precarious and liminal situation, many of them have been for more than a decade, by holding temporary contracts or post-doctoral grants.6

Those numbers are not a random distortion. About ¾ of the ICS researchers are precarious, and this tendency is generalised throughout Portuguese research centres. Besides issues of social and labour fairness, this brings up serious problems for autonomous research institutions. It introduces instability into the medium and long-term planning and dissuades ground-breaking research

6 Besides the clearer cases, one of the 38 authors is a previously precarious researcher who had to immigrate in order to secure a permanent position.
programmes that may transcend ‘normal science’. It makes it harder to keep the researchers with more competitive specific competences, and is an obstacle to generational renewal and institutional culture reproduction.

Therefore, it seems that a new and urgent research challenge has been presented to ICS and its peers on the subject of “Inclusion”: the in-depth analysis of the structural precariousness of the Portuguese scientific system, its impact and how to overcome it, from the perspective of turning science into a lever for a healthier economy and society.

---

PAULO GRANJO
Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa
Av. Prof. Aníbal Bettencourt 9 — 1600-036 Lisboa, Portugal
paulo.granjo@ics.ulisboa.pt
orcid.org/0000-0003-1567-5839

SOFIA ABOIM
Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa
sofia.aboim@ics.ulisboa.pt
orcid.org/0000-0002-6605-8614

ALICE RAMOS
Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa
alice.ramos@ics.ulisboa.pt
orcid.org/0000-0001-9512-0571

---

REFERENCES

GRANJO, P. 2014. “Raça e racismo são coisas que se aprendem”. In O que é Racismo?. Maputo: Escolar, 93-127.


CITE THIS CHAPTER AS:
https://doi.org/10.31447/ics9789726715030.00
PART I

Alterity experiences in displacement
Ambiguous boundaries between exclusion and inclusion. Experiences from the Meheba Refugee Camp (Zambia)

Pedro Figueiredo Neto
INTRODUCTION

Refugee camps are often created and portrayed as places of exclusion where “supernumerary” (Bauman 2004), “undesired populations” (Agier 2011) are concentrated. And yet, experiences from the Meheba Refugee Settlement show that the reality is rather more complex, providing evidence of the ambiguous line between inclusion and exclusion involving refugees and the neighbouring population.

In order to better “care, cure and control” – in United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) terms – internationally displaced individuals and communities, the humanitarian aid regime often enacts a set of international legal frameworks and provides basic services and infrastructures which find their sum in the “refugee camp”. Albeit in different ways and to different degrees, humanitarian settings usually provide protection, food provisions, access to basic health care and education, economic opportunities as well as training programmes. In the context of rural Sub-Saharan Africa, these are elements often absent in the refugees’ places of origin but also sometimes virtually non-existent among the marginal populations in villages and towns near refugee camps. In contrast, once in a refugee camp, displaced individuals see the suspension of key fundamental rights such as the right of movement, the right of assembly, the right to work, among other limitations, as we shall see below. Indeed, refugees do not enjoy the same rights and freedoms – nor have the same duties – national citizens, or even regular immigrants, do. But to what extent do national states provide their citizens with similar resources and entitlements outside a refugee camp?

At the crossroads between humanitarian and state rationales, within the “liminality” (Malkki 1995a) embodied by the camp, emerges the paradox between the inclusion of the excluded – the refugees who live a “suspended life” (Agier 2011) in a sort of “campzenship”1 (Sigona 2015) –, and the exclusion of the supposedly included – that is, the citizens belonging to a socially and politically defined community and that supposedly fulfil the “national order of things” (Malkki 1995b).

1 Campzenship: an attempt “to capture the specific and situated form of membership produced in and by the camp, the complex and ambivalent relationship of its inhabitants with the camp and the ways the camp shapes the relationship of its inhabitants with the state and their capacity and modes of being political (Sigona 2015, 1)”.
Although sociopolitical divisions and hierarchies among refugees in camps – sometimes taking form as dynamics of inclusion and exclusion – have been highlighted by different authors in different contexts (Powles 2000; Veroff 2009; Turner 2010; 2014; Agier 2011). The fact is that similar dynamics between refugees and the local population in their relationship with the camp has been overlooked (Malkki 1995a; Jansen 2014). In this regard, the experiences of refugees and local citizens in the Meheba Refugee Settlement is an interesting case study, which brings about insights into the ambiguous boundary between inclusion and exclusion among these two rather heterogeneous groups. Thus, in order to understand the dialectical inclusion/exclusion complementarity the humanitarian logistics entails, and before introducing a set of ethnographic accounts from the Meheba Refugee Settlement that illustrate the phenomenon, it is necessary to theoretically frame the nature of the camp.

Designed by the UNHCR alongside (inter)national governments and organisations – the “international community” –, refugee camps are “extraterritorial spaces” (hors-lieu) by their very nature (Agier 2002; 2011; 2014; Bauman 2004). Challenging any Euclidian continuity, camps are often managed by the UNHCR offices in Geneva, in conjunction with the so-called implementing partners2 whose headquarters are located, say, in The Hague or New York. If, on the one hand, the plight of the camps and their inhabitants is usually determined in important decision centres across the world; on the other, camps are often set in inhospitable, unpopulated and hard-to-access areas, on the periphery of the periphery.

Equally noteworthy is the common absence of their representation in the official national cartographies, therefore suggesting the non-existence of refugee camps. By taking cartography as ontology, illustrated in a common institutional quest for “invisibility” (Harrel-Bond and Voutira 2007), the non-representation of camps is a form of denying the existence of such places and their respective inhabitants (Anderson 2006 [1983], 173; Neto 2016). Nevertheless, this does not mean that camps do not play a key role at the sociocultural and economic level – thereby creating new centres – or that camps cannot be integrated in the national cartography at a certain point in time (Agier 2011), closing the circle of a protracted state of “liminality” (Malkki 1995a).

2 Implementing partners are the associate governments or non-government agencies that carry out institutional arrangements in line with the larger organisation’s goals and objectives.
In addition, refugee camps are usually enclosed places – fenced, geographically and/or socially demarcated –, and therefore physically and symbolically separated from the national territory. A clear line between the refugee camp and the “outside world” is evident at different levels: a dividing line that not only configures a boundary in an anthropological sense: a double recognition between refugees and the “others”, or between citizens and the “others”. It is a more or less visible physical border – a defined and demarcated space –, but also a legal one – knowing how international legal frameworks\(^3\) and specific local refugee acts rarely coincide with national laws applied to citizens. Notwithstanding the existence of specific rights and duties in camps, legal measures might be changed, reframed, suspended – or simply not enforced (Veroff 2009) – in a more or less arbitrary fashion. In this sense, the camp illustrates the physical manifestation of a continuous “state of exception” (Agamben 1995; 2005), which alongside its extraterritorial character, configures a “space of exception” (Bauman 2004; Agier 2011). At the same time, the camp enacts a set of boundaries at the social, economic, cultural, political and legal level. These nevertheless configure sites of contact, of potentially fruitful conflict, of mediation and interaction between the inside and the outside (Barth 1969; Mezzadra and Neilson 2012). And yet, although similar in its operational principles, each refugee camp is one of a kind (see the many cases in Agier 2014). In spite of their exceptionality, camps are not exclusively composed by ever evolving “walls and fences” but also of flickering “doors and windows” (Diken and Laustsen 2005).

In order to examine how different boundaries between inclusion and exclusion are continuously – and ambiguously – forged in the Meheba Refugee Settlement, I will start by providing a brief background to the camp and outline past and present divisions among the refugee community. I will then present a set of experiences portraying the struggles and interactions between Zambians and refugees, which have the humanitarian infrastructure at their core.

Last but not least, given the size and heterogeneity of Meheba, any effort to grasp its complexity as a whole would be easily defeated. Thus, by using the term “experiences”, I intend to focus on specific cases and situations I came across and that inform of period in which fieldwork was conducted between

---

\(^3\) Namely the Refugee International Law, to a large extent based on the 1951 UNHCR Geneva Convention and the 1967 New York Protocol, among other regional treaties and protocols, and overlapping national bills/acts concerning refugees. For the case of Zambia, see the 1970 Refugee Control Act, which was repealed and replaced by the Refugees’ Bill in 2017.
experiences from the meheba refugee camp (zambia)

2012 and 2014. Indeed, as the more recent news, reports and statistics from the terrain indicate, the situation in Meheba and in the region has probably changed.

MEHEBA REFUGEE CAMP, A BRIEF CONTEXT

The Meheba Refugee Camp is an immense agricultural settlement located some 70 kilometres away from the town of Solwezi, the capital of North-Western Province, Zambia (see Figure 1.1). As a result of the growing influx of Angolan refugees and increasing insecurity along Zambian eastern borderlands, the Government of the Republic of Zambia (GRZ) passed the Refugee Control Act in 1970 (RCA 1970), which was at the origin of the creation of Meheba in 1971. The camp was deployed in an unpopulated area belonging to the Kaonde chiefs, which was ceded to the GRZ, and, in turn, to the UNHCR administration.

The escalation of the war in Angola, alongside new and re-emerging conflicts in the region, meant that Meheba would come to host populations from
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Rwanda, Burundi and, more recently, Somalia. As a consequence, the camp would experience five expansions defined in three specific areas: Old Meheba (1971-85), New Meheba (1985-1995) and New Extensions (1995-2002) (see Figure 1.2).

The main road of the camp starts from the road connecting Solwezi and Mwinilunga. It is in the form of a fishbone and articulates the different blocks. The eight blocks or zones of the camp, from A to H, subsequently split into perpendicular roads (67 from Block A to E, of roughly 1 km distance from each other); and from Rd 68 to 125, Blocks F, G and H, the settlement is organised in villages. Meheba does not have a clear demarcated perimeter, apart from an entrance gate whose control is erratic. Instead, its limits are marked by natural elements – the rivers that flank the eastern and western slope of the camp – and by social boundaries – demarcated by the edges of the inhabited areas and/or agriculture fields.

The agricultural character and continuous flow of refugees largely explain the Meheba dimensions, now covering an area of approximately 720 square km (roughly 35 km long by 15-25 km wide).

In 2001-2002, the camp registered its population peak of more than 50,000 refugees – of which 90% were Angolans (WCRWC 2001). Between 2011 and 2013, the official number was roughly 18,000 refugees (UNHCR/GRZ 2014), and – though expected to decrease – almost 20,000 as of October 2017 (UNHCR 2017). The end of the conflict in Angola, in 2002, and the subsequent repatriation process; the transference of Congolese refugees coming from the Northern Province camps (Mwange and Kala) closed in 2010; as well as the end of refugee status for Angola and Rwanda nationals, in 2012, certainly had an impact on Meheba’s demographics. Recent UNHCR data indicates that Congolese now constitute the most representative group.

4 UNHCR 2013 census informed about the presence of other less representative nationalities such as the Republic of the Congo, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, South Sudan and Namibia (UNHCR 2013).

5 According to the UNHCR, Meheba is not a camp but a settlement. In a settlement, each household is allocated a plot of land with the aim of facilitating self-reliance (UNHCR 2013). I will refer to Meheba either as a camp or settlement in the same way refugees and UNCHR staff did.

6 As of October 2017, the total number of Congolese refugees stayed at 8,286 (UNHCR 2017). The displaced Congolese, however, are not a homogeneous community. In spite of sharing the same country of origin, Congolese refugees come from different parts of the DRC. The oldest Congolese communities arrived from the Kasai and Katanga during 1990s, whereas the most recent come mainly from the Kivu, Eastern Congo.
Still, access to the number of Zambians living in the camp continues to be limited to those officially married to refugees – 196 to be statistically accurate (UNHCR 2017). Not included in the official figures are those who work for the camp’s administration and civil servants (whose offices are located in Rd 36), the police (whose barracks and offices are located in Rd 6), individuals occasionally involved in the UNHCR programmes (some living in nearby towns and staying occasionally in the UNHCR Lodge in Rd 36, others actually living in the camp), as well as all those who live in Meheba but are not directly linked to the bureaucratic-humanitarian activities. In fact, since the early 2000s, that economic opportunities arising from the neighbouring – and ever-growing – Lumwana Mine have attracted people, some of whom have settled in Meheba.
In 2014, the camp was undergoing profound changes, much as the result of a recently approved urban masterplan – promoted by the Lumwana mine – and due to refugee resettlement. The new masterplan was devised to host many of the Lumwana staff, the required services and facilities, and was planned to take over a considerable area from Blocks A, B and C (Neto 2014). The on-going resettlement programme, essentially involving former Angolan and Rwandan refugees who refused repatriation and qualified for local integration, was taking place in the more peripheral areas of the camp, in Blocks E, F, G and H, and has been conceived to also host some 4,000 Zambian families (UNHCR 2017).

Over time, the organisation of the camp would not only reflect the outbursts of violence, the presages of peace but also the more recent local integration and development processes, which led to the opening, peopling, emptying, abandonment or re-organisation of each block.

INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION WITHIN THE REFUGEE COMMUNITY

While not the main purpose of this paper, it is nevertheless important to summarise a set of situations that involve economic, political, social and spatial aspects illustrating different dynamics of exclusion and inclusion within Meheba’s diverse refugee community.

In 2002, Michel Agier observed how the social stratification within the camp was linked to the chronology of the place. The several generations of refugees were “sociologically” organised according to the moment of arrival and split into settled, recent and new arrivals. The level of autonomy, the housing and social hierarchy were intimately linked to the length of stay and location in the camp (2011, 121). By then, Agier also perceived a “logic of inclusion in domination”, where social relations were almost “normal”. In other words, they were unequal but inclusive, as one would find in a village or community, where the longstanding inhabitants preserved a set of privileges and status, having a protective and dominant role regarding the recent refugees (Agier 2011, 126-127). Since then, however, the population numbers, characteristics and distribution have undergone profound changes, leading to different social dynamics and a rather more complex spatial panorama. Even though a “logic

---

7 According to recent information from Meheba, the masterplan implementation is currently at a standstill.
of inclusion in domination” was still evident in the period from 2012 to 2014, some of the actors had shifted.

First of all, there were striking differences between those who lived in or close to the more urbanised areas (near the entrance gate, along the main road, in Road 6, Road 18 and Road 36) and those located in the camp’s more peripheral, rural areas. Though differences in material conditions – most visible at the housing level – were sometimes evident between settled and new arrivals, the fact is, given the size of the camp, to live in a more urbanised area meant better infrastructures and access to markets, to different agricultural produce, to clinics and schools. Some of the populations living in the more peripheral pockets, however, actually preferred to stay away from the central areas. The voluntary exclusion from the wider social dynamics in the camp was deliberate and essentially supported by a set of sociocultural arguments. In Block B, G and H, there were groups from Angola who preferred to stay apart, these being still visibly traumatised by their experiences of war violence. From the contact I had, this was not only a way to keep the cultural system and family structure in place but, in their view, was also a self-protection strategy. Refugees from Burundi and Rwanda (mainly Hutu) presented another noteworthy feature. Living chiefly in Zone G and on the periphery of Zone D, these kept contact with the other groups to a minimum – essentially regarding trade and the exchange of agricultural surplus (Neto 2016, 99; for possible reasons why, see Malkki 1995a).

Ancient tensions between Angolan refugees – supporters or sympathisers of MPLA or UNITA, and whose location in the camp reflected those regional, political and sometimes ethnic divisions –, became largely diluted over time (Agier 2011, 123; Powles 2000, 15; 2002, 100; Veroff 2009, 62, 64). In reality, these no longer involved clear forms of inclusion/exclusion, quite the contrary. In 2012, most of the several Angolan refugee communities were united and – though unsuccessfully – demanded the right to vote in the then upcoming Angolan elections.9

8 MPLA (People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola) and UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) were the main opposing parties during the conflict that ravaged the country. The armed conflict between them worsened considerably after independence in 1975, lasting until the end of the war in 2002.

9 Although refugees are not entitled to vote in their countries’ national elections nor in those of the hosting country, Meheba refugees can elect road and block leaders. Since 2010, after the protests by a Congolese group against corruption (see below), those new elections have been suspended.
If most of the ancient Congolese groups (mainly those coming from the Kasai region in the DRC) had economic ties with the Angolan communities (with most Angolans being involved in farming and the Congolese in trade) and inter-marriage was common, the same was not true among the several Congolese communities. Indeed, tensions between the DRC nationals were recurrent, as mutual suspicion and avoidance between groups coming from the Kasai, Katanga and Kivu regions was evident, resulting in divisions and conflicts along regional and ethnic lines (see note 6).

Moreover, religion was an issue at times. Whereas most of the communities in Meheba attended Christian churches (Baptist, Methodist, Adventist, Catholic, The Church of the Pastor Brahnam, etc.), Somali refugees professed Islam and were therefore looked on with some suspicion. The existence of pig farms, namely in Zone H, unwittingly excluded Somalis, who alluded to these as “dangerous” areas.

Furthermore, the local integration process, involving former Angolan and Rwandan refugees, suggests that these will be set apart from the remaining displaced community and probably will not be able to benefit from the same humanitarian resources. The inclusive local integration process will therefore largely mean a renewed form of exclusion.

These and other aspects were and are at the core of dynamics of (in)voluntary inclusion and exclusion among the several refugee groups – aspects reflected in, or arising from, socioeconomic, political and cultural expressions, and fairly evident in the space. Still, the situation between refugees and Zambians and between the camp and the outside is the point that undoubtedly warrants more attention.

LEGAL ASPECTS

During my fieldwork, several refugees overtly contested the presence of Zambians in the camp. Most complaints were not necessarily directed at the bureaucratic-humanitarian staff, but towards those who worked in the Lumwana mine and lived in Meheba, and, most of all, towards those who, though being Zambians, pretended to be refugees. Some refugees argued that there were several “impostors” in Meheba, and that they, the true refugees, were the ones really suffering and, therefore, exclusively deserving of humanitarian support. The entitlement to the camp – and by extension to humanitarian aid
– as a result of a recognised suffering was a strong exclusionary argument in relation to non-refugees. According to an elder Angolan refugee, from Block B, and whose words could resonate elsewhere: “We suffer and the camp is all we have left… and then we see these individuals trying to take advantage and seize the few existent opportunities… these are spongers (aproveitadores)… Once life was easier here, there was room for all, but lately things have become more and more difficult, everything is scarce now.”

Curiously enough, Zambian citizens gave similar accounts about refugees who, unwilling to enter a refugee camp – which would confirm them as de facto refugees – pretended to be local citizens and sought integration in border villages (Hansen 1979a, 1979b; Bakewell 2000, 2007; Silva 2011; Neto 2017a, 2017b).

It was widely known that there were “illegal refugees” living in the camp. Even if that included the cases of new refugee arrivals who did not go through the normal registration procedures – mainly concerning those coming from the DRC and being de facto refugees nonetheless. There were also cases of Zambian nationals who declared themselves refugees and/or had purchased refugee ID cards. Corruption in the camp was perceived as endemic and a group of Congolese refugees who had protested against it – and against the living conditions and the absence of some fundamental rights – had faced deportation. Political freedoms are dramatically limited within camps and refugees are not supposed to meet and discuss, let alone to demonstrate (for the laws then applied to refugees in Zambia, see RCA 1970).

In early 2010, the camp’s management was handed to the GRZ, while remaining under the supervision of the UNHCR. Since then GRZ members, the Refugee Officer (RO) and the Commissioner for Refugees (COR) staff have been under investigation. Beyond the selling of gate passes to refugees (required to leave the camp for a maximum period of 30 days) and of refugee ID cards, there was also the suspicion that names had been added for ineligible food distribution, and that records that could enhance better resettlement opportunities for specific individuals were deliberately changed. Perhaps, this was not a recent phenomenon, as official data and statistics seem to have

---


11 Idem.
disappeared and/or been manipulated since the camp’s early days (Hansen 1990; Bakewell 2012, 12).

According to one Zambian, a member of the GRZ administration staff and who lived and worked in the camp, the major concern was not necessarily related to corruption as a whole – even if that was seen as an issue –, but rather to specific individuals who, having purchased ID cards, had been residing in the camp ever since. Such accounts uncovered the existence of individuals suspected to be criminals, thieves and rapists – many of them Zambian citizens –, who in order to avoid being caught and brought to justice sought refuge in the camp. The camp was a hideout and protection came from insertion into a different legal framework, which was not actually enforced (Veroff 2009). This served both refugees and humanitarian aliens residing in the camp alike, and illustrates the materialisation of what Turner (2010) has called the politics of innocence. The moment the humanitarian regime constructs the figure of the refugee as “bare life” (Agamben 1995), it holds that all refugees are “apolitical”, “innocent” and “pure victims”, without “agency”, “roots” and a “past” (Turner 2010, 160). Arguably, such a framework encompasses virtually all inhabitants of camps, whether refugees or not. Although the vast majority of refugees had indeed gone through many hardships and either witnessed or had been victims of violence in all its forms, it is also true that some refugees were the perpetrators themselves. Inasmuch as refugee camps neutralise the lives of its inhabitants, former soldiers and guerrilla fighters – who have most likely committed crimes and atrocities – live side by side with their victims. For better or worse, the exceptional nature of the camp enacts a selective exclusion from national jurisdiction(s). Likewise, other non-refugees grabbed this opportunity offered by the camp. Indeed, it seems important to acknowledge how supposed criminals and troublemakers also bypass the law by seeking refuge and settling in humanitarian spaces.

EDUCATION

During the 1970s and 1980s, Hansen observed how the existent services and facilities, as well as the overall material conditions of those living in Meheba, were significantly better than those in the surrounding villages or towns (Hansen 1990). At that time, international stakeholders provided financial and logistical humanitarian support, which kept Meheba running and in shape.
However, after the end of the conflict in Angola, in 2002, the humanitarian funding and respective activities steadily diminished. As a result, most of UNHCR’s implementing partners gradually left Meheba, meaning that infrastructure maintenance and a set of training and food programmes and other services almost came to a halt (UNHCR 2013), leaving the roads to deteriorate, and the schools and clinics in disrepair. Other facilities, like the library or the Women’s Centre, were no longer available. Such circumstances certainly had an impact on the overall quality of life in the camp. And yet, what Hansen had observed a few decades earlier was, to a large extent, still true. Meheba still had several schools (from Primary to High School), and the continuance of education was probably the most obvious aspect in this regard.

Thus, apart from current and former “refugee children”– mainly Angolans who, after being repatriated, returned from time to time to enrol their children and/or younger siblings in the Meheba schools –, the presence of Zambian youngsters too was hardly surprising. In the same way refugees are attracted to better camps and/or try to keep some link with humanitarian settings in the hope of further opportunities, the local population were drawn to the camp (Horst 2006; Jansen 2014; for Zambia specifically, see Ferguson 1999).

During the camp’s golden period – that is, until the emergency was considered over in the early 2000s – Western teachers and skilled volunteers were a common presence in Meheba. In 2012-2014, the situation was rather different and most of the teachers were Zambians or refugees trained while in the camp. In spite of the infrastructural decline and the lack of notebooks and schoolbooks, schools had many Zambian students coming from as far as Livingstone, Lusaka, Kitwe and Solwezi, whose parents preferred that their sons and daughters studied at Meheba. Despite their noticeable presence, systematic data with regard to the number and origin of Zambian students at Meheba’s different schools was virtually non-existent.

According to the Head of School in Rd 36 (the largest school, and which included primary and secondary), to study in Meheba was relatively inexpensive, even if that did not mean it was accessible to all. Still, for

---

12 In 2014, the Norwegian based NGO, Refugee Alliance, was the sole organisation active in Meheba, with four volunteers whose role was to carry out school activities and assist at the Block D clinic.

13 According to the Head of School, in 2014, the Basic School (the seven first years) was free; in the Secondary School (8th and 9th grades) fees were 65,000 kwacha (roughly 11€) per year; and the High School (10th and 12th grades), only in Zone A, had a fee of 85,000 kw (approximately 14€) for each of the three terms.
Zambians, it was not the comparatively low fees that mattered most when choosing to enrol their children in Meheba’s schools. As the Head of School remarked, children in the camp lived in peace and in harmony with nature, they could play and run freely, and were not separated by sex or nationality. There was less danger compared to urban environments, and teaching standards were above the national average. The Head of School at the time shared the dream of a Rwandese refugee and teacher: that one day Meheba could have its own university (from camp to campus?).

As far as the ambiguity between inclusion and exclusion is concerned, education was certainly among the most illustrative cases. In spite of being located at the “end of the world”, or in the “middle of nowhere” – as some Zambians and refugees living outside the camp used to say –, Meheba was, in fact, an educational centre providing schooling for refugees and Zambians alike. However, the interaction between refugee and non-refugee students was not always easy going.

The plight of Cabazo, 15, from Chingola (Copperbelt Province, Zambia) is illustrative of the dynamics between inclusion and exclusion among refugees and Zambians. His mother was a nurse in the Block B clinic and Cabazo, after attending school, also performed different paid tasks helping other members of the Zambian administration. Yet, Cabazo resented his condition in the camp. Despite being in Zambia, he “was not from there”. His words were insightful: “I don’t know how to play football, and my schoolmates don’t want me to play with them… I don’t speak English well and I am not a good student… And they [the refugees] believe I have more things than they do… They don’t like me because I’m not a refugee, because I’m not from here, because I don’t belong here…”

The extraterritorial dimension of the camp – which under the aegis of the humanitarian government turns the refugee into the autochthonous of the enclave – confirms Cabazo as an outsider, a foreigner in what would be his national territory in “normal” circumstances. Mirrored dynamics of exclusion and inclusion unfold at every opportunity. The local animosity

\[14\] UNHCR has established several rules aimed at protecting the natural environment. Garbage collection is mandatory and UNHCR authorisation is required to fell trees. However, this does not mean that such rules are necessarily followed by refugees or enforced by the authorities.

\[15\] Football constitutes an important event and activity in the camp. Usually during the weekends matches take place opposing different communities (e.g. the Angolans vs the Congolese) or multinational teams opposing different blocks or roads.
towards presumed allochthonous, that is, to non-refugee inhabitants, external to the humanitarian realm, is fed by the transformation of power structures. This is most evident in the access to education, but also to property and jobs and which amounts to a set of inclusionary and exclusionary practices and behaviour.

SOCIOECONOMIC ASPECTS

In contrast to Zambian nationals, refugees cannot own property – whether the houses or shops they themselves have built or the farming land assigned to them, sometimes decades ago. It does not mean, however, that refugees do not (il)legally sell “their” houses – this being a common practice upon repatriation. In addition, refugees are not officially entitled to work, a legal interdiction that, as some refugees pointed out, promoted labour exploitation. For the refugees who collaborated in Meheba’s humanitarian activities, conducted by a given NGO or the UNHCR, the maximum earnings were not more than 50$US. Instead, Zambians could earn at least four times as much for the same task, inevitably causing a profound malaise. Not to mention that there were refugees working in the nearby Lumwana mine, while others worked in the plots of Zambians – mainly belonging to miners or to those involved in the administration staff, who had bought or rented land in Meheba –, and whose labour situation was not substantially different.

The impact of changing demographics and new economic dynamics in and around Meheba was perceptible. This resulted in real estate speculation, increased food prices and directly affected the livelihoods of refugees: circumstances that could not but create social unrest.

Furthermore, until 2014, refugees used to sell their harvest surplus in order to obtain certain products, but the camp’s overall economy remained exchange-based. Likewise, the vulnerables\(^{16}\), who were provided with food packs by the humanitarian agencies, also exchanged part of them in order to have a more varied diet and/or to obtain other essential products. However,

\(^{16}\) In humanitarian terms, the vulnerables group consists of single mothers, families with many children, orphans, the elderly and/or refugees with some form of handicap. In the case of Meheba, they are also those who arrived recently or had not attained self-sufficiency were included. As of 2011, UNHCR data indicated that roughly one third of the camp’s population was still receiving food provisions (UNHCR 2011).
not only did repatriation lead to the decline in food production, but the presence of miners contributed to skyrocketing prices. This meant that refugees were no longer capable of buying some of the agricultural produce that they themselves were growing. Moreover, instead of continuing to provide goods and food provisions to the *vulnerable*, UNHCR was planning to introduce a cash/voucher system in the settlement, so that targeted beneficiaries would be in “the position to purchase food of their own choice” (UNHCR 2013, 5).

The paradox is nevertheless interesting, as inclusion in the money economy, leaving aside an economy predominantly of exchange, of barter-trade, represented exclusion from the economy in itself (Bauman 2004).

**CONCLUSION**

Throughout this paper, I have tried to portray a constellation of different situations that illustrate the ambiguous boundaries between inclusion and exclusion among refugees and the local population in their relation to the refugee camp. At their core, one can find sociocultural, economic, legal and political aspects enhanced by the extraterritorial nature of the camp.

As a dialectical process, the dynamics of exclusion and inclusion go hand-in-hand, meaning that – humanitarian or state – subjects are neither fully included nor fully excluded. They are never fully insiders nor fully outsiders, and continuously oscillate in “zones of indistinction” (Agamben 1995), with the camp being emblematic of this.

The paradox between the inclusion of the excluded, and the exclusion of the supposed included is an ever evolving process of transformation that cannot but bring about change – even if through conflict. By including the excluded – in this case, refugees and/or aliens –, humanitarian policies unwittingly create new forms of exclusion. Paradoxically then, the excluded are a sort of humanitarian aliens. Yet, such circumstances do not go uncontested or remain static, as “the outsider is not only the subject to exclusion but also becomes a key actor in reshaping, contesting and redefining the border of citizenship” (Mezzadra and Neilson 2012, 71) – and/or “campzenship” (Sigona 2015). The expected closure of the camp in the foreseeable future (UNHCR 2017) will mark the moment of its opening, that is, its integration in the territorial continuity (Agier 2011; UNHCR 2017). To observe and
understand how new dynamics between inclusion and exclusion will evolve in Meheba, as the local integration process moves forward, will certainly be a necessary and significant endeavour.

PEDRO FIGUEIREDO NETO
Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa
Av. Prof. Aníbal Bettencourt 9 — 1600-036 Lisboa, Portugal
pedrofneto@ics.ulisboa.pt
orcid.org/0000-0001-7687-7202

§ REFERENCES


CITE THIS CHAPTER AS:
https://doi.org/10.31447/ics9789726715030.01
Long-distance nationalism, boundaries and the experience of racism among Santomean migrants in Portugal

José Manuel Sobral
INTRODUCTION

Benedict Anderson (1998, 58-74) first coined the concept of “long-distance nationalism” for dealing with the important role of exiles and migrants in nationalism. Long-distance nationalism “resembles conventional localised nationalism as an ideology that links people to territory” (Glick-Schiller and Fouron 2001, 20). It includes a territorial homeland governed by a state that claims to be acting in the name of the nation and ideas of common descent and history. The main specific point of differentiation in relation to conventional nationalism is that this type of nationalism is a product of transnationalism, that is, of the keeping of a transnational field of social relations between those who migrated and those who stayed. As two of the more influential scholars in the field have emphasised, “Long-distance nationalism binds together immigrants, their descendants, and those who have remained in their homeland into a single transborder citizenry. Citizens residing in the territorial homeland view emigrants and their descendants as part of the nation, whatever legal citizenship the émigrés may have” (Glick-Schiller and Fouron 2001, 20). Immigrants remain attached to those who stayed, sharing a sense of “peoplehood”, based not only on culture and history, but also on a continued commitment to the nation-state. They also remain highly interested in national politics and try to intervene in local affairs, and there is political activism among them. Indeed, not only is long-distance nationalism – or “diaspora nationalism” (Landau 2001) – closely related to homeland nationalism in its ideology and purposes, but, as has been emphasised in several cases, diasporas have played a historical role in nationalist projects of state-nation building, such as in Ireland, Israel, Armenia, Slovenia and Croatia (Dieckhoff 2017; Skrbis 2017). One of first scholars that, following the steps of Benedict Anderson, analysed long-distance nationalism pointed to the relations between this type of nationalism and globalisation: “Long-distance nationalism is still a nationalism but one that is profoundly adapted to the conditions of a modern global system” (Skrbis 2017 [1999], 79).

1 Although many Santomean migrants are interested in their “homeland politics” (Vertovec 2009, 93-94), only a political elite is militantly involved in objectives like “the constitution of a transnational nation-sate” (Glick-Schiller and Fouron 2004, 21). In our view, we should not only consider the members of this minority as long-distance nationalists, but all those who claim an unrivalled attachment to the nation and express this in several ways, including those pertaining to banal nationalism.
In fact, “ethno-nationalism [his expression] and globalization thus need to be seen as complementary rather than contradictory processes” (Idem, 2). It is closely embedded in one of the building blocks of globalisation: migration. Indeed, a short definition of long-distance nationalism sees it as binding together “immigrants, their descendants, and those who have remained in their homeland into a single transborder citizenry” (Dieckhoff 2017, 273).

This study will pay attention to modalities of the expression and reproduction of long-distance nationalism among immigrants from S. Tomé and Príncipe in Lisbon – commemorations and conversations and narratives – that are also dimensions of social memory.

Building on the examination of these expressions, and complementing them with data gathered from interviews, we aim to show that immigrants – including the second generation, at least – remain attached to their Santomean national identity and offer some explanations for this. Like others before – Glick-Schiller and Fouron (2001) – we don’t see long-distance nationalism as a phenomenon related solely to the migrants. On the contrary, we will argue that this attachment to homeland is the by-product of two types of processes: ones that bind them together as a collective with shared cultural expressions and memories; others that pull them apart as the Other of the so-called “host nation” (Triandafyllidou 2006). If the boundaries that demarcate them from the majority also exclude and stigmatise, this must be taken into consideration when explaining the strength of national feeling. As more than one stated in conversation with us, “I live here, but my heart lies in S. Tomé”.

S. TOMÉ AND PRÍNCIPE: A BRIEF LOOK AT ITS HISTORY

The archipelago of S. Tomé and Príncipe (STP) consists of two islands and some islets located near the coast of West Africa, in the Gulf of Guinea, with a total area of 964 km². According to the last census (2012), its population is around 180,000 people.

2 A word of caution about our data must be given. It was gathered through ethnographic research and in-depth interviews. The people with whom the researcher has been interacting are mainly adult men and women. So, although the chapter also relies on information obtained through interviews with people under 25, the older ones are still over-represented in the data.

The archipelago was, for centuries, an agricultural colony controlled by the Portuguese. The islands were uninhabited when the Portuguese arrived at the end of the 15th century. The first colonisers were a few white settlers, but mostly of the population were Africans imported as slaves. The first wave of colonisation in the 16th century was linked to the production of sugar in plantations that collapsed in the following century. The islands were then reduced to small farming and to the involvement in the slave trade. Then, after some centuries, a new plantation economy was established in the 19th century based on coffee and mainly on cocoa, supported at first by slave labour (Tenreiro 1961).

Cocoa production would reach its peak in 1920, when the output of its production was around 50,000 tonnes (Tenreiro 1956, 30), STP being the third biggest producer after the Gold Coast and Brazil. The plantations could be huge – one of the biggest had over 20,000 acres, 50 Kilometres of railways, 50 European employees and 2,500 contract workers (Seibert 2006, 40).

By the end of the 19th century, former local planters and smallholders retained less than 10% of the land (Seibert 2006, 41). The highest positions in the plantation system were occupied by white settlers and employees who, by the 1950s, accounted for around 2% of the total population (Tenreiro 1956). The colonists also controlled the most important businesses. Although people from S. Tomé were considered formally as Portuguese citizens (Tenreiro 1956, 25), in practice racism denied them higher positions and opportunities.

After the abolition of slavery in 1876, as the local inhabitants refused to do agricultural work they identified with their former bondage, they were replaced in the plantations by a workforce of indentured labourers mainly imported from other Portuguese African colonies. These formed a segregated group. The local population was heterogeneous and stratified. The former slaves, now freedmen – forros – remained the broadest stratum of native-born Santomeans. This group owned land that was only of marginal value for the plantation economy, but which afforded them relative autonomy in poverty. The vast majority were either unemployed or had humble occupations. At the top were those who had occupied the lower and even some middle-ranking positions in the colonial administration; some of them owned small businesses or shops, particularly outside the capital (Tenreiro 1956, 25). Some would work on the plantations, but as carpenters or mechanics, for example, not as rural workers. At the bottom of the local population, there was a group
of small-scale fishermen and farmers, the *Angolares*, descended from former slaves who had escaped from the plantations into the jungle, and who were discriminated against by the dominant *forro* (Tenreiro 1961, 80).

S. Tomé and Príncipe became an independent state in 1975. The plantations, previously owned by the Portuguese, were nationalised. Lacking the training and the technical expertise that were the monopoly of the colonisers, who then left the country, the plantations were ruined and with them the main source of revenue of this new nation-state. Privatisation in the 80s followed a neoliberal agenda dictated by international funding agencies. Linked to cronyism and corruption, not only did it not prevent the decay, but it actually seems to have accelerated it. At the same time, the population experienced an exponential growth. From that time on, Santomean immigration increased massively, mainly to Angola, Portugal and from here to other countries of the European Union. According to the Portuguese authorities, the current number of legal immigrants in Portugal is around 9,000 (SEF 2016), but other sources who take into account both Santomeans with dual citizenship and illegal immigrants estimate that up to 25,000 could be in Portugal (Nascimento 2012, 123-124).

We must take into consideration the history and the social configuration of the islands in order to get a full understanding of the practices and discourses that are major dimensions of their memories and national identification.

**LONG-DISTANCE NATIONALISM, MEMORY AND REMEMBERING: FORMAL AND INFORMAL WAYS**

The S. Tomé and Príncipe community in Portugal is concentrated in the poorer suburbs of the Lisbon Metropolitan Area. Male adults are mostly public works and construction workers, and many women are cleaners or care workers. There is also a small number who have mid-level occupations – such as nursing and primary school teaching – and a few higher ones: high school teachers, doctors, lawyers, civil servants, etc. Nearly all the members of this small elite will have Portuguese citizenship. A certain number of high school and university students whose parents remain in the country are also members of the community.

There is an immigrants’ association for those born in S. Tomé and Príncipe

---

4 Official data gathered from SEF (2016).
(ACOSP). Another, smaller one, only for the natives of the Island of Príncipe, and a more recent and active Organisation of the Women of São Tomé and Príncipe (MEN-NON, “Our Mother” in S. Tomé Creole). The ACOSP – to which I will be mainly referring, as many of the conversations took place there – has been playing a central role in immigrant life. In its modest headquarters, immigrants can get help in legal matters, such as the acquisition of legal residence or of Portuguese citizenship, support in health care issues, or even in searching for educational and employment opportunities. Besides, people can go there and listen to music from the archipelago, eat and drink, exchange information, discuss politics, and engage in conversation, keeping communal bonds alive. Mostly adult men go there. Officials from S. Tomé and Príncipe also regularly visit it when they come to Portugal. There is also another organisation, based in S. Tomé, that aims to connect people in the Diaspora with the homeland, the FDSTP, Fórum da Diáspora de São Tomé e Príncipe (Forum of the Santomean Diaspora).

The Association (ACOSP) can be conceived as a “mnemonic community” (Zerubavel 2003a), because it is a place where “mnemonic socialization” – the transmission of narratives and representations of the past – takes place. It is a place where “communities of memory” – such as those of the nation and the family – are inextricably interwoven (Misztal 2003), as people meet there and recall, at the same time, their kin and their homeland. At this point, we must stress that our approach to collective memory is the one adopted by scholars like Misztal, who states that “Although memory is a faculty of individual minds, remembering is social in origin and influenced by dominant discourses. In other words, while it is the individual who remembers, remembering is more than a personal act as even the most personal memories are embedded in social context and shaped by social factors that make social remembering possible, such as language, rituals and celebration practices” (Misztal 2010, 27). Social memory is an ensemble of practices – oral, visual, ritual, bodily – through which a community’s collective remembrance of the past is produced and sustained (Linke 2001; Connerton 1988; Olick and Robbins 1998). All these practices can be observed at the Association, which plays a most important role in Santomean long-distance nationalism.

Remembering the homeland is crucial in long-distance nationalism. For the sake of simplification, we can divide recalling in formal and informal
ways, the first involving intentional actions and the latter non-intentional ones. By formal ways, I mean the rituals or commemorative ceremonies (Connerton 1988; Gillis 1994) related to the official national Santomean calendar (Zerubavel 2003b), hence bonding the homeland and the Diaspora in the same celebration, as is the case of the commemoration of Independence Day, July 12th, promoted by the Association. In these commemorations, iconic food such as calulu (callaloo, a stew similar to others found in the West Indies and Brazil), molho no fogo (literally “sauce in the fire”, also a stew with smoked and salted fish) and boiled banana are usually served. There are performances of traditional dances and concerts by bands and singers from the islands or the community. Flags of S. Tomé and Príncipe – and, at least sometimes, also those of Portugal – are used in the decoration. The national anthems of both countries are usually also sung. However, even in this more formal context, informality tends to prevail. Most of the time is spent with people rejoicing, talking, dancing, eating, drinking, enjoying the conversation and the togetherness, recreating the type of commensality and interactions they would be having in their homeland.

In a nutshell, we can say that, in these commemorations, memory operates not only through discourse and the display of symbols that are reminders of the homeland, but also in an embodied way, such as through dancing and eating – both of them manifestations of a *habitus*, in Bourdieu’s terms, acquired in the homeland.⁶

Although in these special moments the nation is formally invoked, we can say that by informal ways it is constantly recalled. For some years, during summer, when people could use a small backyard which provided more space, these gatherings were even formally organised on a weekly basis: they were the so-called “conversas no quintal” (conversations in the backyard). On Saturdays, people would bring food deemed typical of the Islands, hear the music and dance, joke and talk about private and public matters. S. Tomé and its tragic economic and social situation, old times, the prospects for the future, the recent past, were the main topics of conversation. But the Association is

---

⁶ Another formal commemoration is S. Tomé Women’s Day (19th September). In this commemoration, the role of women is even more pronounced, because they are really the mainstay of the activities, in planning, arranging the spaces, preparing the food, cleaning, etc. But what makes this commemoration special is the fact that there has always been a debate concerning their educational role – for instance in matters preventing the spread of HIV – or the abuse and violence they are victims of. It is a specific vindication of women’s role and value.
also open during weekdays, after work, to deal with occasional matters and to offer a place for the Santomeans who pass by after work or who are unemployed to talk and for informal conviviality on Saturdays.

In a very simplified summary of the recurrent topics of the ongoing conversation there, we can say that geography and history are always present and intertwined in the re-imagination of the islands. People remember roads, beaches, rivers, trees, flora and fauna, the settlements and the plantations: all function as mnemonic devices that trigger recollections. As plantations were the mainstay of the local economy, being at the same time the symbols of modernity, it is not surprising that they are central reference points when recalling in conversation. And this is certainly inflected by the fact that most of the individuals involved in these conversations are adults in their mid-fifties or above, whose youth was spent in the last years of the colonial regime.

So, informal conversation revolves around the dichotomy between the present and the past, with a tendency to turn into a kind of critical history of the years following independence. If the conversation draws on the forest, for example, there are complaints that nowadays, with the explosive growth of the population that relies on wood for fuel and building material, deforestation is gaining ground with negative implications for the environment, because it will be responsible for less rainfall and the increasing erosion of the soils. But, most importantly, conversation will deal with the present situation of the old plantations, which, according to their own representation of them, were bright examples of economic modernity. These acknowledged hallmarks of the colonial economy are now abandoned, their buildings in ruins, a sad shadow of their glory days.

They view their recent history since Independence with pessimism. And, although they hold the political elite as most responsible for the present situation, denouncing the effects of patronage politics and corruption, they are not afraid of producing an essentialist representation of what we could call their “national character”: the blame is also put on local people who don’t want to work (o forro não trabalha; the freeman doesn’t work). This is a discourse that is heard from people who classify themselves as of freemen (forro) ascendancy.

This contraposition between the present and the past makes clear how present circumstances shape social memory. As one of the founding figures of the study of social memory, Maurice Halbwachs, made clear, memory is not a simple registration of the past waiting to be awakened. It is “a reconstruction
of the past” constantly made and remade in the present (Halbwachs 1994 [1925], 83-113; 1997 [1950]). In the words of a more recent scholar, “Social memory is concerned with both constancy and change, referring at the same time to continuity with the past, while reinterpreting that past to provide the justification for both political beliefs and needs of the present”. The past is not something fixed but is continually reinterpreted “in relation to factors related to the present” (McAuley 2015, 130, 129). It is the angst provoked by the current situation of their country that explains this focus of the conversation.

This appraisal of the present doesn’t involve in any way the condoning of the colonial regime, but rather, as is also the case in memories of the colonial past in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Mwembu 2008, 97-120; Rubbers 2008, 121-129), a critical view of the situation since the independence that forced many of them to immigrate. The contrast between the past and the present tends to favour a selected past, a past that, as in the case of the Congo (Mwembu 2008, 117), concerns the last decades of the Portuguese domination, when agricultural production was well managed; the estates where not derelict as they are nowadays; the capital city, the sanitation system, the airport, the roads were well kept and clean and there was better healthcare on the islands. This is clearly the Golden Age of the national narrative(s) that are reproduced constantly.

I’ve recalled in some detail this perspective on recent history because it really haunts conversations and recollections among immigrants. But remembering the homeland is neither reduced to commentaries on their history nor to discourse in general. They dance, listen to music, eat, touch each other and experience the togetherness of a (imagined) community. In sum, they perform nationality.

Being part of a collective is something enjoyable (Skey 2013, 87). As Peter Bratsis states there is “libidinal value” in national identity (quoted in Skey 2013, 87). They enjoy shared practices and understandings rooted in the homeland and reproduced in the Diaspora. As Hage put it, in his study on Lebanese immigrants in Australia, “it is the positive encounter with a person, a sound, a smell, or a situation that offers an intimation of an imagined homely experience in the past, an experience of “back home”. These intimations operate like “imagined metonymies” in that they are fragments that are imagined to be traces of an equally imagined homely whole, the imagined past “home” of another time and another space” (Hage 2010, 412-422).
Homeland means intimacy and familiarity (Grosby 2001). Their attachment to homeland is, first, a product of their upbringing in the archipelago that constituted their experiences – their feelings – of place, home and homeland. This is very different from learned knowledge. As the humanist geographer Tuan stressed, “Abstract knowledge about a place can be acquired in short order if one is diligent. The visual quality of an environment is quickly tallied if one has the artist’s eye. But the “feel” of a place takes longer to acquire. It is made up of experiences, mostly fleeting and undramatic, repeated day after day and over the span of years. It is a unique blend of sights, sounds, a unique harmony of natural and artificial rhythms, such as times of sunrise and sunset, of work and play. The feel of a place is registered in one’s muscles and bones” (Tuan 2005, 183-184). The nation is incorporated in the body forming a national habitus, as emphasised by Bourdieu (1997). In our view, these experiences are constitutive dimensions of long-distance nationalism.

LONG-DISTANCE NATIONALISM, BOUNDARIES AND THE EXPERIENCE OF RACISM

The discursive and non-discursive practices that evoke S. Tomé and Príncipe, such as those observed at the Association, are components of what Michael Billig calls “banal nationalism” (Billig 1995). He claims they play a crucial role in reproducing national identity. This kind of identity is not a “thing” but a “way of life”. It implies discourse – reiterating the distinction between “us” and “the others” – and practices through which attachment to nation-states and nations came to be seen as something taken for granted, natural. National identity is embedded in the most mundane aspects of everyday life and it is not “shaped necessarily, or even mainly, by a conscious and reflective identification” (Edensor 2002, 28). National identity affords them “ontological security” (Giddens 1990), a place of their own in an insecure world.

Immigrants from S. Tomé in Portugal – regardless of class, gender and generation – assume without questioning that they form a specific community endowed with its own ancestors, history, culture, territory, memories and nation-state. Like the Haitians studied by Glick-Schiller and Fouron (2001, 2002) they are tied by “long-distance nationalism” to the Santomeans in the Archipelago, as well as to those who targeted other places in the Diaspora.
Even members of the second generation, born in Portugal, or people with Portuguese citizenship – dual citizenship – express a strong identification with their ancestral homeland (Nascimento 2012, 124). The ties that bind them are in no way reduced to the commemorations and other performances, narratives or conversations mentioned. They are embedded in the practical dealings that involve family and friendship networks, which are of vital importance in providing mutual assistance in migration and in sending remittances to family and kin who stayed. It is through processes like these, and through intense communication by phone or the Internet, that national identification is also maintained and reproduced. As has been pointed out, there is no contradiction between globalisation and national identification. Several authors have pointed to the role of the “communications revolution” (Television, the Internet, social media) in maintaining the “emotional attachment of the diasporans towards the homeland” (Dieckhoff 2017, 273). Cyberspace is crucial (Bernal 2014). And we can see this in action every day among the Santomeans that stay in touch with the country and family through, mainly, mobile phones, and, when the Internet is available, through e-mail messages and images that constantly remind them of S. Tomé.

But in order to more fully understand their attachment to the Santomean identity, we must take into consideration their situation in Portugal. Being poor, or relatively poor, in their majority, besides the social barriers of poverty they also have to confront the boundaries (Barth 1969; Jenkins 2011) – that is to say, “specific patterns of relations and representation between groups located on one or the other side” (Faist and Ulbricht 2015, 190) – represented by nativism and racism. As Skey emphasised, “the rights and entitlements that come from being a citizen are still generally tied to (and expressed in terms of) nation-state boundaries” (Skey 2015, 107). Also, boundaries make possible the distinction between in and out groups, and offer a privileged social position to dominant groups. Even if nationals and migrants are heterogeneous collectives, the distinction between the natives and non-natives applies. Belonging to the nation confers security, familiarity and power to the dominant group (Idem, 108-109). This land is unquestionably “theirs”.

Santomeans, like other immigrants, are not seen as part of a community conceived as autochthonous inhabitants of the country, i.e., as Portuguese. In spite of their special legal status, which derives from a shared history and official language, hence offering them a more favourable treatment in terms
of the acquisition of citizenship compared to other migrants coming from outside the European Union; and, in spite of being mostly Catholics, like the majority of Portuguese people, they are still perceived as different from the natives, “the keepers of the nation’s traditions” (Foner and Patrick 2015, 4). Their music, narratives and food, even, in many cases, their polygamy, marks them as foreigners. They have a different “national habitus” (Bourdieu 1997; Edensor 2002) from the native one, which is the norm, the fruit of dissimilar processes of socialisation. National identity depends on defining who belongs or not, and the immigrants are the Other (Castles 2000, 187). This is still true when the Santomeans have acquired Portuguese citizenship by birth or naturalisation – they have dual citizenship – something that entitles them to a range of civil and political rights almost identical to the majority, allowing them to be civil servants or to fully participate in political life in Portugal.\footnote{Those who acquired citizenship by naturalisation cannot be elected presidents of the Republic.}

And to that we should add the experience of racism, colour-coded racism – a major boundary – that they share with other migrants. As in other cases, citizenship is not enough to guarantee integration, due to discrimination based on race or culture (Triandafyllidou 2006, 288). And their experience of racism in Portugal, widely shared, is deeply resented. There are very, very rare claims that the Portuguese are not racist or, in a relativising tone, not as racist as other people. Their experience of racism is expressed in complaints involving, for example, relationships with neighbours, feeling that their proximity is avoided in public places and transport. Besides this, they complain they are subject to malevolent stereotyping, discrimination in the workplace, or that they are submitted to unfair treatment by the authorities because they are black. A young man experienced an open and extreme form of racism expressed by a neighbour, who would call him a “nigger”, threaten to kill him, and would tell him to go home. He also complained that people in the underground hold onto their bags when a black person approaches, because of their preconceived idea of African people. A woman claimed that she was only accepted in her job after the agreement of her colleagues, being subjected to the same discriminatory treatment that a disabled (white) woman had also endured. And we could go on quoting testimonies. The intervention – respectful – of the police during a ball on a Saturday afternoon at the Association premises led to an enormous tension and to the suspicion that (white) neighbours – motivated by racism – had unfairly complained
about the noise. Racism is the most powerful of the exclusionary practices they have to endure in the so-called “host country”. It is a most powerful boundary that, segregating them from the majority, contributes to the strengthening of their Santomean national identity.

CONCLUSION

Much has been written on the fact that globalisation, with wide migrations, has substantially weakened the appeal of more localised collectives, like the nation. For Stuart Hall, writing some time ago, there was “considerable evidence that late modern globalization (...) it is further undermining and putting into crisis those centred and united formations of cultural identity, including that most powerful of modern identities, the nation” (Hall 2017, 111). And although he resisted the idea that “cultural homogenization would follow”, pointing to the “unexpected revival and unexpected return of new kinds of national identifications” (Idem, 115), these couldn’t be mapped “within the terms of nations and national identities” (Idem, 117). But this diagnostic didn’t take into account either the strength of contemporary nationalism in established states or among nations without states, or the importance of “long-distance nationalism”, precisely a form of nationalism born in the Diaspora. We have delved into it on researching the Santomean community in Lisbon, pointing to the importance of boundaries and the processes of inclusion and exclusion that, in our view, are its core.

8 Although only published in 2017, this is from Stuart Hall’s W.E.B. Dubois Lectures delivered at Harvard University in 1994.
José Manuel Sobral
Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa
Av. Prof. Aníbal Bettencourt 9 — 1600-036 Lisboa, Portugal
jose.sobral@ics.ulisboa.pt
orcid.org/0000-0003-3098-3434

§ REFERENCES


CITE THIS CHAPTER AS:


https://doi.org/10.31447/ics9789726715030.02
Portuguese in the cane: the racialization of labour in Hawaiian plantations

Cristiana Bastos
SAILING BEYOND EMPIRE: THE PORTUGUESE AS A LABOUR FORCE

The identification of the Portuguese as intrepid sailors crossing oceans and bridging the world, as praised in Camões’ epic poem Os Lusiadas (The Lusiads), has been central to a historical narrative that merges sea travel, trade, conquest, knowledge, empire and nation. Yet sailing, I shall argue in this article, was also about a variety of endeavours other than opening the way to empire. Sailing could also be embarking as a stowaway, travelling immense distances on improbable fishing boats, joining the crews of passing whalers, being kidnapped ashore, enslaved, enduring the galleys or being sent off to faraway plantations as labour. More often than not, sailing overseas was a way to escape poverty, abuse, oppression, misery and distress. And that – sailing away from their homes, looking for a better life, running from destitution – was what many Portuguese men and women did over extended periods of time. Their routes hardly corresponded to an imperial strategy for Portugal. They often contradicted it.

Circa 1900, at the peak of the “age of empire,” there were more Portuguese-born men and women living in the foreign plantations and cities of British Guiana and Hawai‘i than there were in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea - let alone Timor, Macau or Goa. Their lives and experiences have hardly been acknowledged by mainstream historiography. Their sailing was not about conquest, conversion, discovery, sea-trade, plantation owning or slave trading. They were the ones being racialized, traded and contracted.

Occasionally, Portuguese politicians tried to counter that movement. At a higher level, they dreamed of a new empire, a new Brazil in Africa in the aftermath

---

1 In 1851, the Consul Henry Horatio Haynes mentioned that there were 18,000 Portuguese in Guiana – 14,000 of them working in the sugarcane fields – and that the industry would not survive without them (Arquivo Diplomático, Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, Lisboa, Consulado Guiana Ingleza, caixa 700, ff. 74). Many of them lived in extreme situations. In 1854, their condition was described in official documents as “misery” (Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino, Conselho Ultramarino, India, Cx. 14, Doc. 453, “Sobre o estado de miséria em que se acham os colonos portugueses em Demerara”. See also Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino, Conselho Ultramarino, Reino, Cx. 2, Doc. 32, “Emigração de madeirenses e açoreanos para a Guiana britânica (Demerara),” 1852). The estimated number of Portuguese-born residents in the African and Asian colonies is much lower than that all through the 19th century. Just as a sample, in 1844, the estimated number of white inhabitants in Angola was 1,832 in a total of 386,163 inhabitants (Lima 1846, 4A). For the entire area of Mozambique, in 1900, there were 953 Portuguese out of a total of 107,677 inhabitants (Sousa 1902, 453) (See Counting Colonial Populations at www.cham.fcsh.unl.pt).
of Brazilian independence. But the actual Portuguese who moved would rather migrate to independent Brazil or other nations and empires than to embark for the ill-reputed, feverish and unprotected African destinations. Officers like the consuls, who were closely acquainted with the flows and communities of migrants, suggested that the Portuguese government should take the initiative of rerouting those migrants into the Portuguese administered territories.

By the 1850s, the Portuguese consul in Georgetown, British Guiana, recommended that the Portuguese working in the local sugar plantations should be sent to Southern Angola or Mozambique.2 What happened instead was that a group of Guiana-settled Madeirans chartered a ship to go to Australia at the time of the gold rush (Newitt 2015, 106). In 1897, the Portuguese consul in Honolulu corresponded with the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the matter of sending some of the Portuguese residing in Hawai‘i into Timor, which was under Portuguese jurisdiction but hardly settled by Europeans.3 That never happened either.

The Portuguese government had little means to support the patriotic biopolitics foreseen by consuls and politicians. Madeirans and Azoreans kept being recruited for the sugar plantations of the Guianas, Caribbean and Hawai‘i and the textile mills of New England, or trying their fortune at sea, or following the promise of gold in California or elsewhere. The closest there was to a policy of re-routing migrants into the colonies was the sponsored settlement of the Huila plateau in Angola with Madeiran islanders, from 1884-5 onwards (Medeiros 1976; Bastos 2008, 2009). As I have previously argued (Bastos 2008), this episode is better understood in the context of inter-imperial competition for workers than in that of an organised colonisation of Angola: Madeirans were being drained into foreign nations, and the sponsored settlement of Huila worked as a two-in-one; not letting them “out” and bringing them “in.”

Historians of the Portuguese empire have paid little attention to those massive flows and the communities thus created within other empires and nations, except for a few recent attempts to frame migration within empire

---

2 Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino, Conselho Ultramarino, India, Cx. 14, Doc. 453, “Sobre o estado de miséria em que se acham os colonos portugueses em Demerara” (9/5/1854-15/4/1856).

(Morier-Genout and Cahen 2012; Newitt 2015). Nor were those flows addressed in the revised narrative of empire known as Lusotropicalism, a doctrine adopted in the 1960s to support a regime increasingly fought against from within and questioned by international organisations.\(^4\)

The imperial geography of reference remained practically untouched by the post-empire literature. Whether critical or nostalgic, approaches to “Lusofonia” take it as an imagined transnational Portuguese-speaking community replicating the locations of empire: Angola, Mozambique, Guinea, Cape Verde and S Tome in Africa; Brazil in South America; plus enclaves of Portuguese heritage, such as Goa in India, Macau in China and Timor in South East Asia. Excluded from that cartography are the large pockets of Portuguese descendants in Canada, the US, Australia, northern Europe, the Caribbean, or other nations unrelated to the Portuguese empire.\(^5\)

In the project *The Colour of Labour – the racialized lives of migrants*, I go beyond the analytical limitations of using primarily nation-based imperial geopolitical units, and address, instead, the flows of people who moved across them - mostly as labour. I follow their displacements and settlements, study their communities and racialized lives in the plantations, industries and shores where they worked. I engage with a few of those situations, including the sugarcane fields of colonial British Guiana and Hawai‘i (both as kingdom and US territory) and the cotton mills of Southern New England. In this article, I present the case of the Portuguese in Hawai‘i.

**Hawai‘i’s Multi-Ethnic Society and Its Early Sociologists**

The Portuguese in Hawai‘i were one among a variety of ethnic groups brought to the islands by the plantation economy – along with the Chinese, Japanese

\(^4\) It should be noted that the regime explicitly obfuscated the fact that in the 1960s thousands of workers were leaving Portugal to settle in northern European economies; “emigration” was not to be officially acknowledged – and that has had consequences in the understanding of the past, too.

\(^5\) Although hardly visible in mainstream historiography and narratives of nation, Portuguese diasporic communities are acknowledged as a central part of the “Portugal and the Portuguese Communities Day” celebrations on June 10th. In 2018, for the first time, the official celebration with Portuguese authorities was held in New England (and extended to California) following a new trend inaugurated the year before (when they were celebrated among luso-descendants in France), and no longer in Portugal – as a step meant to replace the discursive nature of the acknowledgment by a public action.
(including Okinawans, who identified themselves separately but did not figure as such in the census), Southern Pacific Islanders and, later, Koreans, Filipinos and Puerto Ricans. That multi-ethnic society has long been considered a prime case for the study of racialization dynamics. Its potential as a laboratory for social studies was explored early on by pioneering sociologists Romanzo Adams and Andrew Lind. In the 1920s, they both left the University of Chicago to join the newly founded University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa and lead its sociology department. They promoted hands-on empirical research with their students and brought in their mentor Robert Park as a visiting scholar in 1931. They collected a large amount of data on the accommodation of different groups/races, using the concepts of amalgamation and assimilation, and avoiding the biological sciences’ use of race; insisting, instead, on the social character of collective identities. The concept of “ancestry” was meant to sanitise the categories of belonging from their racist tones.

Race and racism were historically enacted in different ways in Hawai‘i and on the mainland United States. Hawai‘i and Hawaiians existed outside the scope of Asian and European empires until the accidental visit of Captain Cook, on his way to the northern passage in 1778. The islands had been settled for about a thousand years by Polynesian navigators – sailors, sea explorers, discoverers – who came mainly from the Marquesas and Tahiti. For an unknown amount of time, they sailed back and forth between those distant islands and Hawai‘i, but their routes had been suspended much before the British arrival. Renamed by Cook as the “Sandwich Islands,” the archipelago then entered an era of dramatic change: population decline, arrival and establishment of foreign sailors, traders, missionaries, adventurers and eventually large masses of indentured labourers, as well as new plant and animal species, new commodities and lifestyles. There were also major changes in internal politics: the troops of Kamehameha the Great, from the easternmost Island of Hawai‘i (the Big Island), had conquered most of the other islands by 1795, unifying the archipelago – except for the westernmost island of Kaua‘i, which submitted in 1810. The ruling Kamehameha dynasty was interrupted in 1874 by the death of King Lunalilo and the dispute – solved with elections – between their Dowager Queen Emma and opponent David Kalākaua. Kalākaua won and became the cosmopolitan ruler that many referred to as the “merry monarch.” He had previously worked with the board of emigration and was a supporter of the massive importation of labourers. After his death in 1891, his sister Lili‘uokalani held the throne, but
she was forced to give up power to a mostly US coalition of planters in 1893 – an episode painfully inscribed in the memory of Hawaiians and subject to yearly evocations and commemorations (Wisniewski 1979). The “Republic of Hawai‘i” then founded was annexed to the US in 1898 (Daws 1968; Coffman, 2016; among others). From then on, Hawai‘i followed United States’ rules and regulations as a territory and, in 1959, it became the 50th State of the Union.

Throughout most of the 19th century, Hawai‘i was not, therefore, a formal colony but a kingdom with its own aristocratic lineages (ali‘i). Hawaiian ali‘i frequently promoted alliances and intermarried white newcomers, or haoles, generating a class of descendants with high political influence, who were ranked above the incoming migrants from Europe and Asia in the social hierarchy.

As a consequence of this historical process, Hawai‘i entered the 20th century with a multi-ethnic society with its own racial arrangements along an idiosyncratic social stratification. The black-and-white vocabulary of the mainland was inadequate for the local complexity, which had evolved in its own way. Adams, Lind and students used the available emic categories, shaped by social use and endorsed by the censuses adopted since the mid-19th century. The censuses sanitised the slur or mere vulgarity attached to the popular categories: instead of “Kanakas”, “half-castes”, “haoles”, “Pakes”, “Portagee”, etc., they used “Hawaiians,” “Part-Hawaiians,” “Whites,” “Chinese,” “Portuguese,” etc. While the sociologists used the census categories, society held to the common, sometimes pejorative names.

It is thus unsurprising that someone scribbled the word “pocho” underneath the figure representing a woman of Portuguese ancestry in one of the library copies of Adams’ *Interracial Marriage* at the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa. There were further pencil annotations next to other photographs, like “pake” underneath the picture of a Chinese youth, probably from the same reader - a statement of idleness, a playful didacticism, an experiment in translation not exempt from racial slur. Asked about the meaning and intensity of that term, my contemporary interlocutors in Hawai‘i suggested that “Pocho” was less offensive than the ubiquitous “Portugee.” Although we can only speculate about the intention of the person who held that pencil,

6 In 2017, the legacy of the defeated Princess/Queen was subject to multiple commemorations, including a public festival for her birthday, a series of enactments of the coup performed by professional actors at the Royal Palace and Gardens, and the exhibit “Lili‘uokalani: Her Life, Her Legacy, Her Words”, at the Hawai‘i State Archives.
we can argue that the act was consistent with the book’s reification of “types.” Adams contested the use of “race” to refer to social groups and argued that there was nothing biological, but solely social, in their distinctiveness, proposing the more accommodating concept of “ancestry” as a mode of overcoming the tension between biological and social criteria for collective identities. Yet he presented the groups in ways that so resounded with the physical anthropologists’ approaches to races, particularly when he used photographs of “types” to illustrate the book, that he ended up reinforcing the very thing he wanted to dismiss: stereotyping groups based on their physical appearance.

**Figure 3.1**

“Ancestry, Portuguese”, included in Romanzo Adam’s Interracial Marriage in Hawaii. A reader added “Pocho” to this caption, presumably the same person who added “Pake” to the caption under a youth of Chinese ancestry, and others.
THE PORTUGUESE, AN UNDERSTUDIED GROUP

The Portuguese entered Hawaiian society in large numbers between 1878 and 1913, predominantly, although not exclusively, to join the sugar plantation workforce. From 1878 to 1888, about 11,000 Portuguese men, women and children left their homes and family networks in Madeira and the Azores and moved to Hawai‘i with contracts signed with the Hawaiian government’s Board of Immigration. In 1887-8, the sponsored migration of Portuguese labourers was suspended, to be resumed in 1895, already in the period of the Republic. Between 1895 and 1913, another 13,000 Portuguese arrived - mostly islanders, some mainlanders (Caldeira 2010).

That large number of people left an indelible mark on the islands’ social landscape, especially the islands of O‘ahu, Maui, Hawai‘i (Big Island), and, to a lesser degree, Kaua‘i. Those women and men came with their language, their Catholicism (although Protestant communities came to Hawai‘i via mainland us; see Dabagh and Case 1988; Fernandes 2004; Ferreira 2006; and Newitt 2015), their saints, their Holy Ghost, their festivals, their costumes, their stone and clay ovens, their bread, their fried dough, their seasonings, their cooking (Portuguese Pioneer 2007; Maui Portuguese Cultural Club 2011) and their musical instruments (Tranquada and King 2012).

“Portuguese” became a common word in Hawai‘i, whether referring to ancestry or food; the trio malasada/Portuguese bean soup/Portuguese sausage supplanted that of bread/wine/olive oil, which might elsewhere be associated with the Portuguese. Malasadas (fried dough with optional filling) are, to this day, Hawai‘i’s favourite sweet treat. Portuguese sausage is a daily staple; there is even a variety of spam with the flavour “Portuguese sausage”, and an option of Portuguese sausage for the Hawaiian MacDonald’s breakfast. But while Portuguese food is still a strong presence, the existence of actual Portuguese groups is somewhat elusive. There are societies and heritage groups, there are festivals, there are churches, but the community has not remained bound together – or at least not in the ways that can be observed in New England today. On the contrary, a large majority will refer to their multiple heritages and intermarriages.

In spite of its local relevance, the Portuguese-Hawaiian connection is poorly known outside of Hawai‘i and the ancestral islands of Madeira and the Azores. From a social science perspective, the Portuguese in Hawai‘i remain an understudied group, with a limited number of academic works on
them. In the 1930s, Andrew Lind’s students at the University of Hawai‘i at Manoa produced a variety of research papers on all ethnicities, some of them on the Portuguese. Those papers, however, had a limited or no circulation, but many were kept at the university. Also at that period, one MA student from the University of California engaged on a comparative study of the Portuguese in Hawai‘i and California, referring to the concepts of amalgamation and assimilation (Estep 1941); but the circulation of that work was equally limited. After World War 2, Edgar Knowlton, a professor of European languages at the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa, who had been born in Fall River and had previous acquaintance with the Portuguese of New England, promoted and authored a number of academic studies on the language, history, genealogy and printed press of the Portuguese in Hawai‘i (Knowlton 1960a, 1960b; Correa and Knowlton 1982). The modest body of literary works produced by, or about, the Portuguese in Hawai‘i (Roll 1964; Coito, in press), generated a specific line of commentary by literary scholars (Rogers 1978; Dias 1981, 1989; Fagundes 2005; Silva 2013; and Coito, in press), plus one unpublished Harvard PhD thesis by Hawaiian-born, Portuguese-descent religious studies scholar, Timothy Paul Freitas. Based on literary and historical sources, Freitas used Paulo Freire’s liberation theology to depict the experience of Portuguese islanders in Hawai‘i as a movement of emancipation (Freitas 1979). A celebratory volume organised by John Henry Felix and Peter Senecal compiled some landmark texts on the Portuguese in Hawai‘i – poetry, short stories, transcripts of personal documents and historical narratives (Felix and Senecal 1978). Maria Ioannis Baganha’s thesis on the Portuguese migration to the United States compared the communities of the East Coast, California and Hawai‘i (Baganha 1990). More recently, and available only in Portuguese, there are Palminha da Silva’s (Silva 1996) and Susana Caldeira’s (Caldeira 2010) comprehensive view and exhaustive compilation of documents about

7 I thank historian John Rosa, from the University of Hawai‘i at Manoa, for sharing this and other observations. Indeed the number of research based academic works is limited, there are some non-academic or partially academic works – sometimes sponsored by community associations - that represent valuable sources on the Portuguese in Hawai‘i (Freitas 1930; Gouveia 1975; Felix and Senecal 1978; Coryel 1986; Knowlton 1991, 1993; Santos 1996; Pasquini 1999). There are also a few different community associations promoting the study of Portuguese heritage, like the Portuguese Genealogical and Historical Society in O‘ahu and the Portuguese Association of Maui.

8 Student papers addressing the Portuguese in Hawai‘i are stored in the Romanzo Adams Social Research Archives at the University of Hawai‘i at Manoa.
Portuguese islanders in Hawai‘i. But so far, only one mainstream sociological article in English has addressed the Portuguese in Hawai‘i, using the group for an argument on ethnogenesis: the authors argue that the clear distinction between “Portuguese” and “haole” in Hawai‘i is due to the fact that they are rooted in different parts of the productive system. Although both of them are considered Caucasian, or Eurodescendants, the haole were landowners, whereas the Portuguese had come as labourers. It was that factor, rather than any other, which had created an ethnic distinction between the two groups (Geschwender, Carroll-Seguin and Brill 1988).9

While rarely targeted as the main subject of study, the Portuguese in Hawai‘i are nonetheless present in any broad-scope study of Hawai‘i’s ethnic diversity (Adams 1937; Lind 1938), plantation society (Takaki 1983; Beechert 1985; Jung 2006), cultural (Tranquada and King 2012) or general history (Daws 1968; Kuykendall and Day 1948). They appear as a category defined by national origin but also by a racialized existence, one that adopted names with variable derogatory potential like Poregee, Portugee, Pocho, etc.

9 The argument does not address the thousands of Germans and Scandinavians that also came as contract labourers in the 19th century, followed by large numbers of Spaniards, Central Europeans, Galicians and Russians in the 20th. One way or another, none of those groups persisted as a distinct quasi-race as the Portuguese did.
A MAJOR ENDEAVOUR: HOW MANY, WHEN, HOW, WHY?

The arrival of over 20,000 Portuguese had an important demographic impact on Hawai‘i, whose indigenous population was going through rapid decline. By the mid-19th century, many in the islands feared complete disappearance—something that had indeed happened to other indigenous populations after first contact with incoming foreigners. From an estimated number of at least 300,000 Hawaiians in 1778 (Takaki 1983, 22), or up to nearly 700,000 according to new research (Swanson 2016), the population had gone down to 130,000 in 1834, mostly due to introduced illnesses (Daws 1968). There were a few foreigners there at that time: Anglo-American missionaries and their families; some French Catholic missions; the traders who settled there for business; the whalers and sailors of diverse backgrounds, who jumped ship and established themselves in the islands. But they were not many. In 1853, the population had plunged to 71,000 (Takaki 1983, 22) and, in 1872, it was down to 57,000. The arrival of many thousands of labour migrants in the following decades reversed the demographic decline. In 1900, the population of Hawai‘i had nearly tripled to 154,000 (Forstall 1996, 3). Among the newcomers and their offspring, there were 18,272 Portuguese individuals, almost 12% of the total population. Other groups included the Chinese (17%), Japanese (40%), Hawaiians proper (19%), and Part-Hawaiians, whether European-Hawaiian (5%) or Asian-Hawaiian (2%), and a varied group of non-Portuguese Europeans and North Americans (6% in total) (Forstall 1996, 3).

The Portuguese were thus a core group in Hawai‘i at the turn of the century. From a social science perspective, they provide a key case not only for the analysis of inclusion, exclusion, ethnogenesis, and racialization processes, but also for the study of gender, reproduction, family and sexuality. The Portuguese migrated to Hawai‘i in families and married mostly within the community, differently than the Chinese and Japanese who, at that time, migrated as single men (Williams 2007), and contrary to the stereotypical adventurous single Portuguese man in the tropics, imagined by Gilberto Freyre as the root of Lusotropicalism (Bastos 2018). In 1900, the Portuguese were the only

---

12 That role was perhaps enacted by the sailors and whalers that came previously and married locally. The contrast between the two patterns helps demystify the lusotropicalist essentialisms, so as to pay
migrant group in Hawai‘i with a nearly equal number of men and women. While the male/female ratio among the Chinese migrants was 7/1, and among the Japanese it was 4.5/1, among the Portuguese it was 1.2/1, with a total of 9,785 men and 8,487 women (Forstall 1996).

I will not elaborate much further on numbers, aiming instead to go beyond the disembodied statistical charts and approach the experiences of moving and settling, the projects and aspirations of those who moved, their choices, and the constraints they faced. The experience of those men and women, often accompanied by their children, started with the anticipation and planning of the trip, signing the indenture and boarding the vessel for a six month voyage (shortened when travelling by steamer) all the way across the Atlantic, round Cape Horn and then all the way across the Pacific to Hawai‘i. There they found a place that so resembled their home islands – the mountains, the volcanic soils, the vegetation and climate – that some would think they had gone in a circle and were back in Madeira. The society was different, however, and so was the social setting in which they could move. There were Hawaiians, whom the Portuguese referred to as Canecas, from the original Kanaka (d’Oliveira, d’Ornellas and Canario 1970, 48); there were part-Hawaiians, offspring of unions between Hawaiians and Asians or Europeans; there were haoles (whites, mostly Anglo-Saxons); there were Asians (Chinese and Japanese); there were southern islanders. And there was an expanding sugar economy, one that demanded an increasing amount of human labour.

The islands’ economy had gone through a radical change: from the low-impact (though labour intensive) traditional agriculture centred on taro, the main food staple, into a cash-oriented plantation system. For a while, the sandalwood trade was central for the new Hawaiian economy, followed by a period of whaling and agricultural exports to Mexican and then American California. It did not take long, however, for Hawai‘i to surrender to the so called white gold, or sugar – a product that had transformed the entire Caribbean and Brazil into plantation societies based on enslaved African labour (Mintz 1985; Palmié and Scarano 2011; MacLennan 2014). Although neither a European colony nor a society of enslaved labour, Hawai‘i, too, became a land of sugar plantations and, with it, slowly transformed itself from an indigenous kingdom into a semi colony – not of an old European nation, but of the new player in the world economy, the United States of America (Coffman 2016; Miller 2017).
Two measures had enabled the establishment of the sugar economy in the kingdom of Hawai’i. First, the possibility of privately owning land, facilitated by the land division that started in 1839 and was completed in 1848: the “great mahele” (Beechert 1985, 29-33). It was meant to grant rights to native Hawaiians but was soon turned on its head, for the 1850 amendment allowed foreigners to own local land. The process of allowing land partition and land owning would benefit, above all, the class that emerged from the connections between the haoles and the ali’i, or Hawaiian aristocracy. Second, there was the 1875 reciprocity treaty with the US, which granted a viable market for the commodity. Indentured labour completed the equation that turned Hawai’i into a sugar field.

Such was the physical, social and moral ecology into which the Portuguese arrived: it was there that they interacted with other groups, as contract workers in the sugar plantations, like the Chinese before and after them, and the Japanese, in larger numbers, as well as the Filipinos, Koreans, Puerto Ricans and others that came later. There were also the Native Hawaiians, who had always supplied a smaller but steady workforce on the plantations as both workers and lunas (overseers).

The Portuguese who went to the Hawaiian plantations came from a variety of backgrounds. Many were familiar with agriculture, and some came from complete disenfranchisement. But many others did not: some were urbanites who longed to work in a city street shop; others had been small-scale farmers who dreamt of acquiring land; there were also those who were business oriented and used the time of indenture/contract to amass funds and used some land-acquiring opportunities to pursue their projects. At the end of their three-year contract, some renewed it; some moved up in the plantation hierarchies as lunas; others bought land and farmed it; others moved into the city, others, particularly after annexation, went to the US mainland; but only a few went back home.

WHY HAWAI’I – AND WHY MADEIRANS AND AZOREANS?

A question that often occurs to those who are involved with, or want to know about, the Portuguese migration to Hawai’i is: why go through such a long and painful journey to such a faraway place? Weren’t there closer viable destinations? The short answer is that the contracts offered by the Hawaiian
Board of Immigration were the most attractive for the many who wanted to leave the island in search of a better life, whether escaping destitution or improving what they already had. But why did the Hawaiian government sponsor Portuguese islanders from so far away rather than people from the nearer Pacific islands, South America or Asia? The Portuguese were expensive in many ways: the travel was longer, their pay was high, and they came as families, while Asians came mainly as single men with no “unproductive” family members attached.

Oral tradition has it that the good match of the Portuguese islanders and Hawaiian plantations was due to Madeirans’ familiarity with sugarcane production and Azoreans’ familiarity with pineapples. This is a picturesque motive, yet of not much relevance – or even chronological accuracy - against the hard structural facts of land scarcity, dramatic social inequalities, limited upward mobility and extreme vulnerability at the bottom. In the idiom of conventional migration studies, there were strong “push” factors for Madeiran and Azoreans (Baganha 1990). Leaving was a repeated gesture and, for many, a desired path. Islanders were recruited as crew in the vessels that stopped for water and supplies; some entered as stowaways for unknown destinations; large contingents had been mobilised by the Portuguese government to settle in the southern border of Brazil in the 18th century; and above all, many had ventured into the harsh life of Demerara plantations in British Guiana (Menezes 1992). In other words, moving off the island was common. Living transnationally, across empires, was an accepted existence. The contracts offered by the Hawaiian Board of Immigration were more attractive than any of the previous options. Many fought to embark. The police had to check for stowaways – and still there were many. When the British steamer Kumeric anchored in Funchal in 1907 to load passengers for Honolulu, the captain set up a tight control in order to prevent the entrance of those who did not have contracts; besides the officers, local policemen were hired for the purpose. In the end, the more ingenious got on board, among them some of the guards who had been assigned to keep intruders away.13

The reasons why the Hawaiian Board of Immigration and the local planters sponsored Portuguese islanders over other populations from closer places – with less expensive travel costs – deserves further analysis (Miller 2017).

A set of structural elements and conjuncture shaped the choice of this group as labour supply for the Hawaiian plantations. The Hawaiian government was keen about the need of countering the Hawaiian demographic decline by bringing migrants, and there were endless discussions on what peoples would make the best migrants, and according to what criteria. Surrounding those discussions there was also a growing fear of being engulfed by neighbouring Asian nations that had furnished contract labourers in large numbers, a fear laced by the “yellow peril” ideology (Miller 2017). King David Kalākaua, who ruled between 1874 and 1891 as a cosmopolitan monarch who engaged with western modernity while keeping the traditional Hawaiian ways, was an active promoter of bringing in other groups as a counterweight to the Chinese. The Portuguese served as such to the Japanese labourers. As much as planters cherished this group, there was a subliminal fear that Hawai‘i would become an extension of Japan via an overpopulation of Japanese on the islands.14

For a few years, the Portuguese were presented to the planters as worth being paid for on the basis of a number of traits: laborious, family oriented, and, through a variety of euphemisms, of an appropriate race – not really white, like the haoles, but still of European descent, a variation of the white-but-not-quite concept that pervades in Anglo-Saxon environments (Almeida 1997; Azevedo 2010; Harney 1990; Lassalle 2016). Portuguese disputable whiteness was manipulated by the authorities and ideologues according to the occasion – to bring them closer to white planters in disputes regarding annexation (Daws 1968) or to keep them at a social distance for purposes of managing labour.15 The Portuguese, arguably white, at least “Caucasian”, “speakers of a European language” (categories used to bring them closer to white), but not really “white”, were conveniently used as an alternative both to Pacific islanders, who were in small numbers, and to East Asians, who might

14 The discussion around the ideal balance between the two groups – Portuguese and Japanese – involved planters and the government for decades. In the end, after having been discontinued in 1885, the sponsored migration of Portuguese islanders to Hawaiian plantations was resumed in the 1890s. In the 1907-1908 Consular Report, the Portuguese Consul in Honolulu, Antonio de Souza Canavarro, examined the matter at length, together with his comments on the better conditions now found by the migrants in the plantations, when compared to the past, and on the fact that many chose to move to California given the high salaries provided there (Arquivo Diplomático, Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, Lisboa, Consulado de Portugal em Honolulu, Cx. 624, 1896/1913, Relatório Consular para 1907-1908).

15 For a parallel process in colonial Guiana, where Portuguese islanders served as indentured labourers from 1835 and moved upwards to commerce after the term of their contracts, see Williams (1989).
be too many. Bringing in Africans was then out of the question – nor was it acceptable, neither for the Hawaiian rulers nor for the New England haoles, to restore the concentrationist racial regime of the Caribbean and Southern US plantations. Diversifying the labour force was a better prospect for all parts involved. Bringing in European labourers was considered a plus. In smaller contingents than the Portuguese, workers from Spain, Germany, Norway and others made it to the Hawaiian plantations.

One key person in enabling the Madeira-Hawai‘i connection was William Hillebrand, a doctor and natural scientist, and long-term resident in Hawai‘i, who had connections with Madeira (Meier 2005). Azores would soon join in with large numbers of people. Later, smaller contingents of mainlanders equally sailed to Hawai‘i.

The Portuguese Atlantic islanders and Hawai‘i were also linked by the routes of whaling ships that harvested the rich waters of the north Pacific in the early 19th century. The whalers brought sailors from the islands of Cape Verde, Madeira and Azores to Hawai‘i, recruited on stopovers in the Atlantic or from among the settlers of New Bedford, the world capital of whaling and an old destination for Portuguese islanders. Those men often jumped ship and sometimes married and settled locally. In the 1870s, there were about 400 Portuguese in Hawai‘i, most of them whalers and sailors (Felix and Senecal 1978). One of those early settlers was the businessman Jason Perry (or Jacintho Pereira), who claimed the credit for influencing King David Kalākaua into sponsoring Portuguese islanders. Perry would later become the first Portuguese consul in Hawai‘i, but he would soon be replaced by a career diplomat – Antonio de Souza Canavarro – due to the importance and responsibility of the position. Canavarro was appointed in 1882 and stayed in office until 1914.  

16 The long term residence was partly due to personal reasons; Canavarro refers to his son’s health as a reason to remain in Honolulu beyond what was expected. He resided in the Nu‘uanu valley near Honolulu, on the island of O‘ahu, where most Portuguese also lived, and occasionally visited the other islands to check some situations of his countrymen, as many of them worked in the plantations of Kaua‘i, Maui and the Big Island. The consulate was a link between the Portuguese government and its subjects in Hawai‘i and, while fantasising about rerouting them into the Portuguese possessions in Africa and Asia – to no success –, Canavarro kept quite close to the community. He thoroughly investigated abusive situations of Portuguese labourers in some plantations; pleading for them in what they considered unfair court decisions; making arrangements for the property of deceased men or women with no relatives and representing the country in the pomp and circumstance of royal events – the Kalākaua’s birthday parties, coronation anniversaries and other festivities occurring at the palace (Hawai‘i State Archives, Foreign Office and Executive Collection, N. 403-19, especially folder 289, 1884; See also Interior Department, Immigration - Portuguese, 1865-1899; and Foreign Officials in Hawaii – Portugal, 1893-1900).
The previous existence of a few hundred Portuguese in Hawai‘i may have had a minor role – if any – in making them a group of choice for the planters and government. It was not irrelevant, however, that there was some vague notion of a “Terra Nova” very far away, a place where some Portuguese islanders had gone to for good and gave notice of (Jardin 1971).

THE VOYAGE: A MIDDLE PASSAGE ON A MAYFLOWER

The first sponsored contingent of Portuguese islanders arrived in Honolulu in 1878, on board the German ship *Priscilla*. For its 100th anniversary, in 1978, a group of Portuguese-descendants in Hawai‘i organised a big celebration, which included refashioning a downtown square with a Portuguese-style cobblestone pavement and a *Padrão* honouring the Portuguese and their history. There were festivals, dances, music, food and an enactment of the *Priscilla’s* arrival. The fact that such celebrations treated the *Priscilla* like the Portuguese *Mayflower* also brought the criticism that this presentation whitewashed the history of hard labour endured by their ancestors. There was a tension between two ways of regarding those voyages: as close to the pilgrims’ experience in search of a new homeland, on the one hand; or, on the other, as echoing the horrific experience of the Atlantic “middle passage” that brought millions of enslaved Africans to the New World plantations. Being neither of those extremes, the Portuguese passage to Hawai‘i was experienced differently by different people and it is referred to in different ways by the descendants of those who sailed. Much of the tone in such depictions relates to current positions in contemporary Hawaiian society.

Sources reporting the actual experience of migrant sailing are rare and indirect. It is quite easy, however, to discover the numbers, names, and even family ties of those who travelled. The State Archives in Honolulu have a separate collection of card files for the Portuguese migrants. Whoever is interested in knowing about the arrival of their ancestors from Portugal can find the name of the vessel in which they sailed and the year of arrival. It is, however, far more difficult to grasp the experience, perceptions and reflections of those who travelled. The few who could write were not in the habit of

17 Recent works have addressed in quite inspiring ways the experience of ocean-crossing by emigrants (Brown 2013), indentured labourers (Bahadur 2013) and enslaved men and women (Mustakeem 2016).
keeping personal diaries: they mostly favoured sharing their experiences by telling stories to one another. They wrote occasional letters, meagre in content and context. Mandatory logbooks, like those that should have been kept by the captain and physician or surgeon on board the British commercial liners transporting the Portuguese migrants, are yet to be found, in spite of our efforts in the appropriate archives. So far we could only find logs for the voyages of the Surveric (1906), Kumeric (1907) and Willesden (1911).

For that reason, the document “Destination Sandwich Islands,” written by João Baptista d’Oliveira and Vicente d’Ornelas, young Madeirans travelling on the British vessel the Thomas Bell, between Funchal and Honolulu in 1887-88, is a most precious source (d’Oliveira, d’Ornellas and Canario 1970).

João Baptista d’Oliveira had been a clerk for the British consul in Madeira and could speak enough of both languages to act as translator between the Portuguese-speaking immigrant passengers and the English-speaking officers and crew. It is not clear whether he travelled on a contract or as a paying passenger. He often referred to the immigrants as “them,” putting himself at a distance. That distance, however, could have been due to the fact that as a single young man he travelled with the other bachelors, whether regular paying passengers or contract migrants, while the bulk of migrants travelled as families. He was

---

18 The local expression “talk story” fits well on this tradition. Recently, efforts to compile scrapbooks with family histories and memories have fixed the oral tradition in a material support. California-based Luis Proença, S. J., compiled and published online the Portuguese Hawaiian in Hawaii Oral Histories series. He also produce the documentary Pukiki – The Portuguese Americans of Hawai‘i (Proença 2003)

19 Exhaustive research at the British National Archives in Kew, the National Maritime Museum in Greenwich, the State Archives in Honolulu and other major collections, including the companies that owned the vessels, has disappointingly shown that the captains’ and surgeons’ logs of merchant vessels have not been archived in ways that minimally resemble those of the Royal Navy – a fact confirmed by Naval Historian Kevin Brown (personal communication). The rarity of sources related to travelling generated an inflexion in the overall project. Still, the few sources found allow for a glimpse of the sailing experience. For the Willesden and Kumeric there are interesting complementary sources provided from the Portuguese Consulate in Honolulu (Arquivo Diplomático, Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, Lisboa, Consulado de Portugal em Honolulu, Cx. 624, 1896-1913, memos from April 14, 1908, and from January 26, 1912).

20 Thomas Bell’s was the last sailing of the first wave of Portuguese migration to Hawai‘i, all to the kingdom of Kalakaua. Portuguese migration was then interrupted, to be restored during the planters’ republic, in 1895, after much debate on the comparative advantages and disadvantages of the Japanese and the Portuguese labourers’ performance in the plantations (Arquivo Diplomático, Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, Lisboa, Consulado de Portugal em Honolulu, Cx. 624, 1896/1913, Relatório Consular, 1907-1908).
friends with the First Mate Kinnon, who encouraged him and his companion Vicente d’Ornelas to keep a journal, which they did. Unfortunately, their diary is the only one we know of from the dozens of journeys with Portuguese on board. Fortunately, their record is rich enough in detail to give us a close-up view of their long haul sailing experience.

Aboard the Thomas Bell, there was life’s drama in all its aspects: babies were born, babies died, adults got sick and died, many got seasick, some got lice, most got bitten by bed-bugs, some were treated by the physician and Isabel, the Portuguese nurse, and most often they were prescribed more nourishment as medicine (farinha de sustancia). There was music, dancing, card playing, jokes and trickery. There was romance; there was sex, within and outside the marriages, including that of young boys with older women. There was jealousy, there were triangles, there were marriages on board. There were fights, an increasing amount of them after months of people being crammed together on the boat. There were rows between couples in which one had persuaded the reluctant other into embarking on such an adventure. There was domestic violence, rightly punished by the Captain. There were constant disputes for food, as the cooking crew took bribes or sexual favours in exchange for edible and drinkable goodies, leaving some passengers with nothing other than sea biscuits and coffee. There was sadness on board, longing for home, longing for those left behind, for a life of no return. But there was also joy. There were feasts and festivals; celebrations of saints and Christmas with the making of a lapinha (elaborate Nativity scene) with whatever could be found in the vessel. There was a dramatic passage around Cape Horne, an aborted landing in Valparaiso, where a cholera epidemic induced quarantine, and a happy landing in Iquique, still in Chile (also the place where a man who had brought both his wife and children and his younger lover – whom he had met in Demerara – jumped ship, leaving behind both the family and the mistress, who right after married one of the ship’s cooks). There was the awe and joy of seeing whales, sharks, albatrosses; of fishing and hunting big animals, on anticipating the edible feast they provided. There was, above everything else, the celebration of arrival. Oliveira and Ornellas wrote a few final details on the quarantine and depot in Honolulu, described the encounter with the consul Antonio Canavarro, and mentioned that “the trip had been recorded by J. B. d’Oliveira and Vicente d’Ornellas, and that in our possession was a document signed by the passengers in regard to the knavery that had occurred on this trip” (d’Oliveira, d’Ornellas and Canario 1970, 47).
João Baptista d’Oliveira, who in the meantime became Oliver, kept the journal safely and, after his death, his widow handed it to the Reverend Ernest G. da Silva, of Hilo, who had been on that trip as a young boy. Silva stored it away, and it remained forgotten until found by his daughter Lucille Silva Canario. She translated it into English and, in 1970, had it published by the prestigious *Hawaiian Journal of History*, becoming afterwards a most quoted source. Although Timothy Freitas (1979) notes some minor discrepancies in the translation and suggests further reading of the Portuguese original, its published version in English provides a wealth of detail in the passengers’ experience.

**ARRIVAL: DESTINATION PLANTATION**

Historian of Hawaiian plantations Ronald Takaki argued that it was in the interests of plantation owners to keep the work force segregated, even when that involved different housing, different wages, different functions. Indeed, plantation payroll records are most often organised by racialized groups – Chinese, Hawaiians, Japanese and Portuguese.\(^\text{21}\)

A rare literary source provides another sort of account of plantation life: *Hawaii’s Kohala Breezes*, presented as “a novel about the early Portuguese settlers in Hawai‘i.” Published in 1964 in New York, this was the first novel by Elvira Osorio Roll (1886-1969), who was born in Hawai‘i of Portuguese parents and who lived through some of the situations and atmospheres depicted in the novel. *Hawaii’s Kohala Breezes* (henceforth *Breezes*) is not only one of a kind but also a powerful entrance into the lives of the Portuguese in Hawaiian plantation society (Rogers 1978; Silva 2005). Francis Rogers, a Harvard Literature professor who pioneered the study of writers of Portuguese descent in the United States, was such an enthusiast of Elvira Osório Roll that he placed her as second only to John dos Passos among that group, although acknowledging that *Breezes* was no *Manhattan Transfer* – not even close (Rogers 1978). But *Breezes* remained, for Rogers, an eloquent illustration of how novels can sometimes provide more insight than the social sciences. Rogers’ student, Timothy Freitas, himself born in Hawai‘i of Portuguese ancestry, also emphasises the documentary value of the setting of *Breezes*

---

(Freitas 1979). Its dense and multilayered account of the life of the Portuguese in Hawai‘i further enables us to pursue an analysis of the interactions of class, race and gender in that society.

Elvira Roll, nee Osorio, was born in Hilo, on the Island of Hawai‘i, her father from mainland Portugal and her mother from Madeira, presumably from comfortable family backgrounds. They were meant to reach Tahiti but remained in Hawai‘i, moving thereafter solely between O‘ahu and the Big Island. Their experience was different from that of contract labourers, as they did not work in the fields, had an education, were ranked higher in the social system, and held higher expectations of upward mobility. However, just like the labourers, they were classified as Portuguese, or, in the derogatory form, “Portygee”, “Portagee”, or simply “Poregee.” Elvira would eventually marry a man from Indiana and move to mainland US. There is little record of her in the islands and most of the Portuguese-Americans of Hawai‘i – by no means a homogeneous group – whom I met in 2017 had never heard of her or Breezes.

The tensions of class, gender and ethnicity/race run through the entire novel: being Portuguese, being “poregee”, being American, not being a labourer, being a girl, being a woman, being a haole’s wife. The plot consists of a romance between the Portuguese Infelice and the haole Jack (much like the 1980s Mystic Pizza, Julia Roberts’ Hollywood debut as a working class Portuguese girl dating an upper class Yankee). The author makes the “Portugueseness” of her character clear to the reader, while emphasising her distance from the labourers, the “Poregee” at the bottom of the scale. Although literate and claiming aristocratic descent, Infelice will always be called “Poregee” by the haoles she comes across – including the pair of siblings she meets as a child, described as angels with blond air, with the little boy being her future sweetheart, Jack. Her parents tried in vain to match her with a rich Portuguese suiter of noble origin, but her heart belonged to the haole Jack, who also had to fight against his father and was disinherited as a consequence of marrying a Portuguese woman. After marriage, in spite of being the supervisor’s wife, she is still subject to further expressions of racism by the haole women of the plantation and vicinities. One of them, from the US Midwest, mocks her Portugueseness and reduces it to themes of food and wine. Infelice responds by bringing in references to imperial glory and civility that build up to an ancestry of civilised Romans for the Portuguese versus the haoles’ uncivilised Barbarian descent. She even stresses that the habit of drinking tea was handed to the English by the Portuguese Queen Catherine,
married to Charles VI (wrong monarch, but point made). Like others before and after her, Roll responds to ethnic deprecation with themes of national pride rooted in themes of empire.

Following previous analysts, I find Elvira Osorio Roll’s novel of remarkable value, not so much for its literary qualities - which are neither outstanding nor substandard - but for its sociological and anthropological notes on the lives of the Portuguese who settled in Hawai‘i in the late 19th century and onwards. The author knew first-hand what she wrote about. Although the book is not strictly autobiographical, it is based on her personal experience, her accurate witnessing and her engaging reflections upon the social tensions that shape the lives of the many subjects involved in the plantation. While the fictional plot is a standard one of love and fear, honour and shame, order and disruption, past and future, social constraint and individual choices, the actual characters live through the identifications of that precise plantation culture, involving labour, racialization, gender, age, nationalities, hierarchies, stereotypes and class. Regardless of the literary value of Roll’s Breezes, it stands up as a powerful way of approaching the history of the Portuguese in Hawai‘i, itself a variety of a larger story of labour and race.

LIFE BEYOND THE PLANTATION

For most of the Portuguese who came to Hawai‘i, their new life started at the plantation, but it did not end there – or, at least, not at the bottom of the plantation hierarchy where they began. They moved up into other positions: the prevailing racialized hierarchies brought the Portuguese to positions of operational management like lunas (overseers), while keeping them away from full leadership and supervision. Moon-Kie Jung notes that there is a tradition of associating the Portuguese with the role of luna, but the evidence is that although there were many Portuguese lunas, they were not a majority; and that by no means the majority of Portuguese were lunas (Jung 2006). Paniolo (cattle-handler, rancher, cowboy) is another role much associated with the Portuguese, especially in Maui. Many Portuguese did work as ranchers, but the term is not Portuguese. It probably evolved from espanholes, as there were a number of early ranchers from Mexico in Hawai‘i. Landlord is another role often associated with the post-plantation Portuguese. Many of them planned to own their piece of land or urban property after
their time at the plantation. In the second wave of migration, housing and surrounding land was part of the contract deal and many of the workers made that a starting point for accumulating more property. Masonry is yet another craft and skill that is immediately associated with the Portuguese: even today, the oral tradition has it that the main public buildings in Honolulu were built by the Portuguese, who knew how to handle the lava stone from back home. Carpentry, cabinet making, guitar making – the ukulele being its most famous outcome –, printing, and a variety of other arts and crafts were also activities carried out by many of the Portuguese after finishing their plantation contract. Indeed, many had come with those skills and tried to shorten their time at the plantation in order to go back to their arts and crafts. At moments, the consul acknowledged that it would be useful to have the migrant ships unloading their passengers directly in the rural islands rather than in Honolulu, because there some migrants escaped their route to the plantations and went directly to the exercise of their urban-oriented skills and arts.  

As a group, the Portuguese in Hawaiʻi embodied the multiple experiences of leaving, moving, settling, labouring the land, hoeing, cutting, threshing, carrying cane, burning straw, feeding engines, navigating racial classifications, enacting identities, playing, praying, carving their place, doing business, owning property, moving into the mainstream, or away from it, leaving their mark on Hawaiian society, taking credit for creating icons as Hawaiian as the ubiquitous *ukulele* and the beloved *malasadas*, celebrating their heritage, promoting festivals abundant in food, music and dance, and also exploring their genealogy and culture beyond their playful elements.  

They founded important cultural associations, religious groups and mutualities: the oldest being St Anthony, or *Sociedade de Santo António Beneficente de Hawaii*, founded in 1877, before the first wave of contract labourers even arrived; the most famous being Lusitana, immortalised in a street name in Honolulu’s Punchbowl neighbourhood – although two Lusitanas existed, the *Sociedade Lusitana Beneficente de Hawaii*, and the *União Lusitana Hawaiiana*, founded in 1882 and 1892 respectively. The important devotion to the Holy Ghost in the Azores and among the Azorean Diaspora (Leal, 2011) also structured societies and churches throughout Hawaii: in Oʻahu, the Holy Ghost Fraternity of Punchbowl has existed since 1891 (*Punchbowl Holy Ghost 1991*); in Maui, the spectacular Kula Church was funded by the

---

22 Hawaiʻi State Archives, Foreign Officials – Portuguese.
Figure 3.3  Portuguese church in Kula, Maui

Figure 3.4  Portuguese oven, Kepaniwai Park's Heritage Gardens, Iao Valley, Maui.

Figure 3.5  Traces of Portuguese societies in O'ahu

All photographies © Cristiana Bastos.
Portuguese community. Other Portuguese late-19th century charities included the Portuguese Ladies Charitable Society, the *Corte Camões*, and the *Sociedade Concórdia* (Caldeira 2010, 222-23). At the beginning of the 20th century, the number of Portuguese cultural societies expanded in number and functions, adding recreational activities to their charitable goals: the *Associação de Socorros Mútuos A Pátria*, founded in 1905, followed by the *Club Literário D Carlos*, the *Club Recreativo Português de Hawaii*, the *Club Dramático Português de Honolulu*, the *Portuguese Charitable Society*, the *Pioneer Civic Association* and the *Hilo Chamarrita Club* (Caldeira 2010, 223-24).

Another sign of the vitality of the community was the variety of the Portuguese press: in Honolulu, O‘ahu, where most of the Portuguese resided, there was the *Luso Hawaiian*, founded in 1885, which in 1892 merged with *A Aurora Hawaiian* (founded in 1889) to form *A União Lusitana Hawaiian*, which lasted until 1896. In parallel, there was *A Sentinela*, also running from 1892 to 1896 and, from then on, *O Luso*, which lasted until 1924. There were also the short lived *O Directo* (1896-1898), *As Boas Novas* (1896-1898), *A Liberdade* (1900-1910) and *O Popular* (1911-1913) (Caldeira 2010, 237). In Hilo, Hawaii, there were *A Voz Pública* (1899-1904), *A Setta* (1903-1921) and *O Facho* (1906-1927).

In spite of the importance of the Portuguese language in the plantations and urban settings, efforts to promote its teaching were not met with success. There were attempts to support a Portuguese school: there were plans and subscriptions. By and large, however, the education of choice – even for the Portuguese children - was in English; and through English the Portuguese of Hawai‘i were mainstreamed.

Becoming mainstream was neither an easy nor fast process for the Portuguese in Hawai‘i. Until 1930 (incl.), they figured in a separate census category, outside the “white” category covering most other Europeans and North Americans, as well as their descendants. Things were to change in the following decades, a time in which Hawai‘i was deeply and directly affected by the international war, followed by a time in which the territory became a state – the 50th of the United States. That was the definitive element of mainstreaming: the Portuguese became Americans in the first place; Americans of Portuguese descent on a second level of identification; and Portuguese-Americans in the light of more recent trends. Or, as many would tell me, just “Portuguese.”

23 Some people would say how much better it is to be Portuguese than haole, with all the colonial connotations and resentment that goes with it.
Or: “Portuguese – not Portugee!” Portuguese names are widespread and Portuguese as a label is commonly identified by anyone in Hawai‘i - although not always related to the history of migration and plantation labour that brought so many Portuguese to the islands.

Many people of Portuguese descent search for their genealogy, seek records, try to know in which boat their ancestors came, from which district and village on which island. Genealogy is often complemented by genetic ancestry tests that in theory show the exact proportion of Portuguese, Hawaiian, Scottish and other ancestries there are. As anthropologist J. Kehaulani Kauanui (2008) argues, the legal/colonial imposition of “blood” arguments for claims of indigeneity shaped and influenced the perceptions and practices of belonging – or of being eligible for qualified programmes. Many of those perceptions and practices, I argue, have been extended to other groups, including the Portuguese. Much like proof of at least 1/8 of Hawaiian blood is required for admission to the Kamehameha schools – aimed at providing excellent education to people of indigenous Hawaiian ancestry – so proof of Portuguese ancestry is required to qualify for a high school scholarship under the Dolores Furtado Martin fund, meant to support the education of students of Portuguese descent in the prestigious Punahou school. More than once, the Portuguese genealogical society has been called to assess ancestry among candidates.

Nowadays, the Festa (a yearly festival in Honolulu), the cultural associations on the different islands, the Holy Ghost fraternities, also on different islands, the Genealogical Society in Oahu, the Heritage Society in Maui, are some of the venues where people of Portuguese descent can celebrate their heritage. No longer needed as a primary support, as in the early days of migration, those societies keep a flame of tradition while providing space for enjoyment – through music, dance, food and festivity. Some participants in the Festa get to learn the phonetics of old Portuguese songs to sing them more authentically, dance to the music, wear traditional festive clothes from Madeira and the Azores, cook, eat, sell and buy Vinhdalhos (garlic-seasoned pork), Pão (bread), sweetbread, malasadas, get to know their ancestry, and strengthen their community ties.
CONCLUSION:
PARTIAL VISIBILITIES AND IMAGINED COMMUNITIES

To finalise, I suggest a reflection on the inclusion and exclusion processes of some groups and themes in the national narratives they are part of. I have shown the importance and visibility that the Portuguese in Hawai‘i achieved locally and referred to the absence of a counterpart in Portuguese national narratives. I have associated such an absence with the programmatic tradition in mainstream Portuguese historiography of emphasising empire as the core of nation, and thus equating national history with conquest and crusade - first in Iberia, then in the four corners of the world, whether as an expansion of the Christian Crusades, or resulting from discoveries, or as the establishment of trade and business, or any combination of those aspects. I have also added that the contemporary imagined community of Portuguese speakers – *Lusofonia* – follows the map of empire, highlighting the former colonies, now officially Portuguese-speaking countries like Angola, Mozambique, Guinea, Cape Verde and S Tome in Africa, Brazil in South America, or enclaves of Portuguese heritage, such as Goa in India, Macau in China and Timor in South East Asia, while leaving aside the geographies of exile and labour migration.24

Throughout the article, I addressed up close one of those geographies – that of the Portuguese who laboured and made their lives in distant Hawai‘i. Their saga was not inscribed in the geography of the nation, just as that of Madeirans in Demerara was not, even though more expressive in numbers. And yet, as I have discussed, more Portuguese-born lived in the plantations and towns of British Guiana and Hawai‘i than in Portuguese colonies in Africa and Asia. The geographies of escape from oppression and destitution attracted more Portuguese men and women than the aspiration to empire in Africa. They built their communities, carved their space and social niche, lived through the stereotypes and categories that society assigned them, and went on with their lives in and out of the plantations. They built their churches and associations with their own funds and energies; they played and danced their music; they baked their bread, cooked their cuisine, ate their food; they printed their newspapers in Portuguese, compiled their knowledge, and celebrated their heritage. The language may be nearly lost in contemporary Hawai‘i, but there are many other marks of their heritage, and much of its memory is kept alive.

24 Brazil, however, has also been a destination for migrants in different periods.
by volunteers and cultural activists that recreate it in a variety of imaginative ways. Less important than finding traces of an essentialised “Portugueseness”, the knowledge of the Portuguese experience in Hawai‘i allows us to account for multiple ways of enacting a collective identification through reference to an existing nation with a history, geography and culture. In turn, their experience expands that collective history in ways that challenge the traditional national narratives around empire.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This article is a result of the project The Colour of Labour: The Racialized Lives of Migrants, generously funded by the European Research Council with an Advanced Grant (erc-2015-adg 695573). The author wishes to thank the team members who discussed the preliminary version of this paper and the institutions who supported her research in Hawai‘i in 2017: the East-West Center Research Department; the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa, particularly at the Hawai‘ian-Pacific Collection at Hamilton Library; the Hawai‘i State Archives; the Hawai‘i Historical Society; the Bishop Museum; the Portuguese Genealogical and Historical Society at O‘ahu; the Plantation Village and the Portuguese Association of Maui, and an extensive number of people who kindly helped by sharing their memories and commentaries – among others, many thanks to Bernard Carvalho, Robert Castro, Wiletta Centeio, Paul Chandler, Josephine Carreira, Larry Cravalho, John Henry Felix, Marta Macedo, Rachel Mamyia, Jodie Mattos, Nic Miller, Dan Nelson, John Rosa, Audrey Rocha Reed, Evelyn Starkey, Beatrice Wong Souza, Russel Sousa Bordel Borges and Wilma Souza Boucheau.

CRISTIANA BASTOS
Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa
Av. Prof. Aníbal Bettencourt 9 — 1600-036 Lisboa, Portugal
cristiana.bastos@ics.ulisboa.pt
orcid.org/0000-0001-5387-4770
REFERENCES


CALDEIRA, S. 2010. *Da Madeira para o Hawai‘i: a Emigração e o Contributo Cultural Madeirense*. Funchal: CEHA.


---

**CITE THIS CHAPTER AS:**


https://doi.org/10.31447/ics9789726715030.03
PART II

Citizenship and discrimination
On marginal inclusion: refugees at the fringes of citizenship in Portugal

Francesco Vacchiano
INTRODUCTION: ON BORDERS AND CRISES

According to data provided by the EASO (European Asylum Support Office), almost 2,700,000 asylum applications were lodged in the EU+ in 2015 and 2016.¹ Although the debate on whether this figure portrays an unprecedented, and unexpected, “humanitarian crisis” is still open, it is certainly a number of people in motion that Europe has not witnessed since the Second World War. However, assuming that the European countries have been simply surprised by a phenomenon of unexpected magnitude would seriously downsize the role of the EU in contributing to this outcome, particularly through its border policy and its general attitude towards asylum seekers. Although the effects in terms of human displacement produced by war and instability in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Nigeria, Eritrea – to name just the most representative cases – were highly predictable, the EU countries relentlessly refused to establish a common policy of reception, one which would allow regular travel to Europe in search of temporary or permanent protection. As a result, hundreds of thousands of people moved en masse through makeshift means, spending all their savings and putting their lives at risk in order to reach countries where, paradoxically enough, the majority of them were entitled to receive asylum. The most dramatic effect of this choice consists of thousands of deaths in the Mediterranean Sea (almost 15,000 in the last four years)² and unprecedented pressure from illegalised people at the Eastern EU border. A terrible series of tragedies unfolded in the Mediterranean Sea between 2013 and 2016. Each one, culminating in the disappearance of probably 900 people in a shipwreck in the Sicilian Channel on 18th April 2015, set a new record of casualties and was invariably labelled as “the worst tragedy of the Mediterranean” (Vacchiano 2015). The manufactured massification of migrants’ despair, as various authors have claimed,³ serves the aim of conveying images of emergency and invasion that end up justifying more surveillance and, ultimately, more borders.

An emblematic case here is that of the European Agenda on Migration, a set of measures showcased as the EU solution to the ongoing “refugee crisis”. Presented as a way of warding off further casualties, the Agenda is largely aimed at preventing new arrivals of asylum seekers and other migrants, mainly

¹ EU Member States plus Norway, Switzerland, Iceland and Lichtenstein.
² https://missingmigrants.iom.int/region/mediterranean.
³ See the notion of “border spectacle” in De Genova (2013). See also Casas-Cortes et al. (2015).
through cooperation with transit countries (Carrera, Gros and Guild 2015; Vacchiano 2015). Beyond these deterrents, the Agenda includes an initiative of “burden sharing” based on a scheme to relocate 40,000 people hosted in Italy and Greece into other Member States (a number later increased to 98,000) and, as the only concrete measure to facilitate reception, a programme to resettle up to 22,000 refugees recognised by UNHCR from outside the EU.\(^4\)

Not differently from previous EU initiatives, the Agenda is conceived in conformity with the rationale that human flows must (and can) be channelled into directions that are “useful” and “productive” for the destination countries (van Houtum and Pijpers 2008; Ambrosini 2008; Mezzadra and Neilson 2013). This way of engineering human mobility is based on the assumption that people are willing to accept the primacy of governmental priorities over their perceived needs and expectations. As we will see, this is one of the most significant factors explaining the failure of many reception and social inclusion programmes.

In fact, the strongest opposition to the Agenda, and particularly to the relocation plan contained in it, came from a number of EU countries (the UK, Ireland, France, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland) that resolutely refused to comply with it. Owing to pressures exerted by the EU Commission, the initial resistance was mainly overcome, except for the UK, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Whereas the inception of the Brexit process suspended de facto any UK commitment to the Agenda, the other three countries became the target of an infringement procedure launched by the EU Commission in June 2017. In a completely different move, the Portuguese government strongly supported the initiative and expressed the intention to host 4,775 people. In a later meeting in Brussels, held in February 2016, the Portuguese Prime Minister António Costa expanded this offer further by opening up to 10,400 people through a scheme of bilateral agreements. According to his declarations, they would be employed in areas affected by shortage of manpower, like agriculture and forestation and, if the situation arose, allowed to study at Portuguese universities (Gomes Ferreira 2016). Eventually, the final number agreed in Brussels was 2,951 people, to be relocated from Italy and Greece across two years.

As a consequence, an issue that had gone almost unnoticed in the country (Portugal registered only 477 asylum requests in 2014), took centre stage and turned into a matter of intense public debate. Seminars and other public initiatives that previously would have hardly attracted more than a handful of onlookers, cropped up everywhere and went sold out. Detractors and defenders went repeatedly on air in heated debates, while old and new experts gleaned their appropriate share of attention. Opponents remarked that country-nationals, severely impoverished by the economic crisis, should be prioritised, while a number of local organisations and NGOs responded with an extraordinary mobilisation, creating networks of solidarity and setting up resources for the expected newcomers. Although some groups envisaged the possibility of gaining visibility and State commissions, the majority were moved by ideals of solidarity that cannot simply be reduced to self-interest and profit. Collective involvement and a generally benign attitude owed largely to the images of death and despair coming from Syria, Turkey, Greece and Eastern Europe. And yet, the wish to alleviate human suffering was a motive for ethical engagement according to which a minoritarian, although not negligible, portion of society felt compelled to do its part. As a result, under the initiative of members linked to the Jesuit Refugee Service, a wide platform of volunteers was established, including public and private bodies, banks, companies and universities. Through a large use of voluntary work, this network was meant to support the forthcoming reception process.

On the side of the government, a “Working Group for the European Agenda on Migration” was constituted. The unit is coordinated by the “Immigration and Border Service” of the State Police (SEF) and works with representatives of the Ministries of the Interior, of Education, of Health, the National Institute for Employment and Vocational Training (IFPPT), the National Institute for Social Security, and the High Commissioner on Migration (ACM). Its role is to coordinate reception on a national level by setting up a system of local programmes based on public-private partnership. Among the requirements defined for such programmes, there are the principles of “giving value to the reception potential of territories of middle and low density, preventing the concentration of people” and “ensuring the gradual acquisition of autonomy by refugees”.5 Reception programmes are to provide housing, language tuition,

---

vocational training, legal counselling, and accompaniment for medical needs and psychological support. They last 18 months, during which beneficiaries are supported by a monthly allowance of 150 euros and are required to make the necessary steps to live independently in Portugal. As we will see below, reality is much more complex: services are often unavailable, 18 months is barely enough to find one’s bearings in a new society and the monthly stipend is little more than pocket money.

By late 2015, the Working Group was in place, the platform of volunteers was ready to work, and a number of other institutions were willing to do their part. Everything seemed impeccably set up for Portugal to be like the other EU countries. Except for one detail: refugees were not coming… Indeed, as time went on, it became clear that refugees, and particularly the awaited Syrians, were not keen on arriving at all. Greek and Italian authorities were occasionally blamed for their supposed organisational faults, while some dared insinuate that people might not want to come to Portugal. Some Portuguese NGOs had even carried out missions to Greece so as to meet asylum seekers and convince them of the many advantages of choosing Portugal, although with poor results. In December 2015, a group of people who were supposedly ready to leave Greece escaped from the reception centre and disappeared rather than heading to Portugal. Something similar happened again in February 2016 (Cruz 2016). And yet, starting from March, asylum seekers finally began to flow in and, according to the last available official data, the country received 1,507 “relocated” and 122 “resettled” people until November 2017.6 Eritreans, Syrians and Iraqis constitute a significant part of the share. They have been hosted in facilities provided by municipalities, NGOs and other local organisations, with a very diverse set of outcomes.

While I write, almost half of the people who arrived through the EU relocation programme have already left the country (Dias Cordeiro 2017). They have preferred to turn down their right to protection and the provisions made available in Portugal to live as irregularized migrants elsewhere. In compliance with the rules established to implement the European Agenda on Migration,7

---


some of them have been intercepted and identified in other European countries and a growing number of them are being deported back to Portugal. For them, the specific category of *retomado* (“retaken”) was coined. And yet, a systematic analysis of the reception process and its results has not been undertaken in Portugal so far and, in general, relatively few contributions are available on the topic of asylum in the country.\(^8\)

Based on my ethnographic research in the field of migration and asylum in Portugal, this chapter will analyse the experience of some asylum claimants within the reception programmes already established in order to show how their expectations and possibilities are thwarted by a number of obstacles which, well beyond intentions and declarations, foster frustration and sense of failure. I argue that asylum seekers and refugees, not too differently from other immigrants, are the object of procedures of hierarchical inclusion operating through a specific bureaucracy of citizenship. While bureaucracy, as an effect of modernity, is the form in which the State manages the organisation of social relations, for asylum seekers it turns into a tool generating specific forms of experience, some in which people’s priorities and time are appropriated by the receiving institutions in order to produce social assignment and geographical immobilisation. The meaning of “re-localisation” seems here to take on the value of a concept-metaphor (Moore 2004): a telling representation of an impossible move from the assigned position in time and space.

**ON RE-LOCALISATION**

I met Redwan in late 2016, in the small provincial town where he was hosted.\(^9\) He was sharing a house, made available by a local NGO, with his father Samir, aged almost 90, and three other people, two Syrians and a Portuguese ex-detainee, a beneficiary of another programme run by the same organisation. On his way to a safer place, Redwan had left his pregnant wife and three children in Istanbul with the intention of providing his father with better treatment in Europe and paving the way for the arrival of the rest of the household.

---

\(^8\) See Malheiros (1995); Barra da Costa (1996); Gomes de Sousa (1999); Santinho (2010); Santinho (2013); Santinho (2015); Costa and Sousa (2016). Vacchiano and Santinho (forthcoming) have recently proposed the first comprehensive analysis of the Portuguese reception system.

\(^9\) Names and details have been changed to preserve anonymity.
Understandably, he was anxiously waiting for an answer to his asylum claim, which would allow him to give course to the process of family reunification and see again his wife, children and, for the first time, his new-born daughter. He recalls how, in Greece, they were requested to fill in a paper with eight preferences for relocation. Needless to say, nobody chose Portugal. Still, EASO officers insisted that Portugal was a welcoming country, people were friendly and a job, they guaranteed, was easily available.

They had been waiting in the small town for eight months and no improvement was in sight. In that rural area, no work was available except for petty jobs in agriculture and his prospects were further narrowed by his poor proficiency in Portuguese. In fact, the receiving organisation was unable to provide a teacher on a steady basis and Redwan had only attended a handful of language classes. During my visit, I found myself acting as interpreter in a long-awaited meeting between him and the social staff, in which I was asked to help dealing with a number of issues. In particular, Redwan was upset by learning he was supposed to use his scarce monthly allowance, which he largely employed to maintain his family in Istanbul, to pay the costly translation required to have his Syrian driving licence recognised. Although this need corresponds to an important step on the way to finding a job in Portugal, the NGO staff admitted they had no provisions to address it. Similarly, they had no additional funds to pay for transport, the only way to meet compatriots, and for the maintenance of the house, the conditions of which were seriously questionable according to any standard.

When I met them again, one year later, their situation had even worsened. Eighteen months after their arrival, when the reception programme was about to come to an end, they had their asylum claim accepted. Unable to find a decent job, Redwan had insisted on being relocated with his father to Lisbon, where they were hosted in some shared rooms at the NGO headquarters. Redwan was alone in taking care of his father, as no support was offered to improve his language skills or in looking for a job. He was also alone in dealing with the complex administrative procedure to reunite his family, who were still living in Istanbul. In December 2017, almost two years after their arrival and when their future was still uncertain, Samir passed away due to a heart attack. For Redwan, “he died of sadness” in a grey periphery of the Europe of unfulfilled promises. Redwan concedes that he must wait and let time pass for lack of alternatives. Differently from many of his compatriots who have fled Portugal, he is determined to stay, knowing that elsewhere he should start
from scratch and this would slow down the reunification of his family further. For him, the idea of being together again one day – finally meeting his newborn daughter – enables him to face adversities and administrative obstacles.

Like Redwan, many other “relocated” people face daily hardships in finding a way through dull bureaucracy and lack of resources. Yasir is a young Iraqi man who was relocated from Greece to Portugal in spring 2017. I was introduced to him by a mutual acquaintance, who was helping him find a solution to his longstanding toothache. Yasir had turned to emergency units several times, receiving analgesic remedies but no permanent solutions. As was explained to him, he had to approach the local health service in order to make a formal appointment for specialised treatment, a step requiring a good deal of skills, both in terms of language and familiarity with procedures. Yasir was hosted in a shared apartment made available by the reception programme. However, his contact with the hosting institution was sporadic and he was mainly left alone in dealing with everyday tasks. Several months after his arrival, his communication skills were still poor and he had still not been registered in a language class. After several attempts to arrange an appointment at the health centre, he turned to the university dental health unit, a low-cost service usually provided by students in dentistry. As Yasir claims, something went wrong during the operation and his tooth suffered further damage. No other solution was available but seeking help from a private dentist, who demanded 500 euros to fix the tooth, a sum greatly exceeding his monthly allowance. The toothache was steady and acute, but even more unbearable was the sense of humiliation for his condition of poverty and solitude. In the waiting room of my dentist, he recalls his happiness when his request for relocation was accepted by the Portuguese authorities, a feeling that, as he observes, is at odds with the certainty he has been somehow swindled by a false promise of help and solidarity.

Solidarity was at the core of the idea leading to the foundation of the Plataforma de Apoio aos Refugiados (Platform for Supporting Refugees) in summer 2015. The initiative, promoted by the Portuguese section of the Jesuit Refugee Service, brings together volunteers and institutions in order to receive “relocated” people within their network. Volunteers who adhere to the Platform share generally – although not exclusively – a Catholic background and take an active role in asylum seeker reception as a form of ethical commitment. The Al-Akbari family escaped from Iraq and was
relocated from Greece into Portugal in April 2017, being received by a group of volunteers pertaining to the Platform. The situation of the household, a couple with a son aged six, was considered potentially critical due to the state of pregnancy of the mother and an extended burn on the child’s skin resulting from an accident occurred in Greece. Volunteers collected resources to rent an apartment at market price and mobilised an active network of people to face the needs of the newcomers, with health being a paramount concern. Particular care was given to accompany them to State offices, hospitals and health units, so as to provide help with translation and procedures. The birth of the new child, after some months, was welcomed by a supportive group of people, one that was able to convey a sense of community and conviviality to the household. And yet, the family had recurrently to face numerous obstacles disseminated on its way, often constituting inextricable chains of interwoven hurdles. A delay in the renewal of the residency permit triggered a chain-reaction in which the Iraqi driving licence expired, preventing in turn the possibility to have it converted into a Portuguese one and apply for a job as a driver. Simultaneously, it caused the suspension of the right to exemption from hospital fees and the following debt with the administration for childbirth and successive consultations. Throughout these occurrences, volunteers softened the impact of the difficulties, providing comfort and alternative solutions. This was possible since their motivation allowed them to establish a bond which largely exceeded the common relationship between service providers and users. And nonetheless, the sense of loneliness commonly reported by refugees ended up being transferred to volunteers, who frequently complained about the lack of support from institutions and the many hindrances they had to help their interlocutors to establish a normal life as citizens.

ON AMBIGUOUS PROTECTION AND A “DECENT LIFE”

The discrepancy between the representations conveyed by the institutions (a generous society, a supportive welfare, a set of good practices) and the experiential narratives of beneficiaries, in which penury and deception predominate, is often due to a misconception of the notion of protection and to a way of imagining the person in need. As I have shown elsewhere (Vacchiano and Santinho, forthcoming), the Portuguese system of refugee “integration” is mainly based on four main mechanisms: (1) a process of
subordinate inclusion, based on mechanisms of social and geographical assignment; (2) a “revolving door” dynamic, in which re-emigration is a common outcome; (3) a strong reliance on volunteers and charities to obviate the shortage of public provisions; (4) a persistent rhetoric of “good practices”, built on a one-way narrative of painless integration, high legal standards and goodwill. Additionally, not differently from what happens in other countries, refugees are considered as individual entities, with no relevant affiliations and no plausible responsibilities towards the kin: the latter, once left behind, are only marginally included by the idea of protection. This attitude uncovers one of the most problematic features of asylum, represented by the powerful performativity of the individual over the group. Redwan’s grief has much to do with this.

Furthermore, in Portugal as in other countries, the “national order of things” (Malkki 1995) draws heavily on the humanitarian discourse on protection as an act of compassionate generosity and philanthropic benevolence, one to which the beneficiary is expected to respond with gratitude and acceptance. This attitude is underpinned by a powerful set of ideologies and practices revolving around the notion of “trauma” as the primary explanatory event for refugees’ distress, with the effect of “relocating” pain and suffering from the receiving society to the country of origin and from the social to the individual body (Summerfield 1999; Vacchiano 2005; Fassin and Rechtman 2009). According to the resulting mindset, people are thought of as vulnerable and desperate enough to accept the left-overs (and the worst) of what remains of devastated welfare, chronically eroded by the succession of structural adjustments disguised under the concept of “crisis”: a roof, flaked walls, a bed with a cover, and the minimal (and liminal) provisions for the poor. The paradox lies in the fact that the idea of a specific vulnus, contained in the very definition of asylum, concurs in producing the experience of vulnerability to which people are exposed. It is not by chance, therefore, that asylum seekers frequently complain more about what they encounter in Europe than what they have concretely suffered at home.

The engineering of asylum seekers’ emplacement in space and time works in harmony with a wider project of re-localisation, one in which people are denied the access to one of the most relevant forms of self and social reproduction on a global scale today: mobility. By hindering people’s autonomy, and particularly the autonomy to move, current European reception systems clash frontally against the expectations that motivate people to head
to Europe to look for a “decent” and “respectable” life. I draw such definitions from my fieldwork in North Africa, since they are used by many people, refugees included, to qualify their orientation towards the future and their migration projects as a possibility of self-realisation and collective fulfilment.¹⁰

A specific geography of power orient these aspirations, one in which Europe is not represented as a coherent whole (as it is not), but as a land of different opportunities: Europe is not Sicily, is not Andalusia, is not the Alentejo, is not agriculture and is not getting stuck serving as low-level manpower in a forgotten province. For Redwan, Europe is not there, but a place in which the future becomes thinkable, for him and his family.

As the cases I have mentioned testify, “asylum seeker” and “refugee” are administrative categories which reflect, and enforce, the rules of immigrants’ conditional inclusion in our societies, shaping the niche they are expected to occupy in our national landscape of opportunities and citizenship. However, people are far from exempt from the set of expectations and aspirations which motivate mobility today: their experience simply reveals how “decency” and “respectability” are hindered not only by war and political violence (as the common notion of asylum prescribes), but by the impossibility of hoping for a better future, both in their country of origin and in that of arrival.

In an article of 2013, Katy Long argued that “in creating a special route for admission deliberately set apart from migration, the humanitarian discourse that protects refugees from harm actually prevents refugees from finding durable solutions, which depend upon securing an economic livelihood and not just receiving humanitarian assistance” (Long 2013). From an opposite stance, I contend that the assimilation of asylum to other means of controlling mobility and immigration transforms protection into a specific device for social assignment and hierarchical inclusion.

Mobility is a specific feature of power configuration on a global scale, one which reproduces class in the sharp divide between frequent fliers and boat people (Vacchiano 2016). The forms of “radical mobility” enacted by migrants in different ways today (and I include playing by the administrative rules as one of these forms) pose a challenge to the common notions of asylum and require new ways of thinking reception.¹¹ Strategies of national incorporation

¹⁰ For a discussion, see Vacchiano (2014, 2015) and the contributions contained in Graw and Schielke (2013).

¹¹ For a proposal along these lines, see Bhabha (2018).
based on immobilisation and localisation are bound to re-produce “bare life” at the fringes of our societies, with Portugal being no exception. Asylum seekers and refugees claim instead their right to a “decent life”. Tackling this need seriously means establishing reception mechanisms that allow the newcomers to imagine a future in the new society, eliminating administrative barriers to family reunification, facilitating the recognition of competences and qualifications, promoting quality teaching of language and skills directed both at asylum seekers and professionals, providing accompaniment for daily tasks and adequate subsistence for the necessary time. It means empowering and training social and health professionals to work with new and different languages and needs, extending their capacity to deal with specific situations of fragility or vulnerability, lowering the threshold of access to public services, for the benefit of all, “foreigners” and “autochtonous”.

All these measures entail a reformulation of the very notion of reception, turning it from a benevolent concession into an opportunity for rethinking the structural mechanisms of social stratification operating in the receiving society, investing in a common future in which citizenship is not a corollary of nationality but a project of radical inclusion.

**ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

This contribution is the result of research carried out as an “Investigador FCT”, funded by the Portuguese Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (IF/01002/2014/CP1239/CT0003).

---

**FRANCESCO VACCHIANO**  
Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa  
Av. Prof. Aníbal Bettencourt 9 — 1600-036 Lisboa, Portugal  
francesco.vacchiano@ics.ulisboa.pt  
orcid.org/0000-0002-2445-7422
REFERENCES


BHABHA, J. 2018. *Can We Solve the Migration Crisis?* Cambridge, UK; Medford, MA: Global Futures.


CITE THIS CHAPTER AS:


https://doi.org/10.31447/ics9789726715030.04
Opposition towards immigration: the view of natives and immigrants

Alice Ramos
A EUROPE UNDER PRESSURE

Contemporary European societies are becoming more and more diverse, and there is nothing to suggest that this tendency will be reversed. This diversity stems largely from the migratory dynamics characterising the world today. According to the International Migration Report (United Nations 2017, the number of international migrants worldwide has continued to grow rapidly over the past fifteen years, reaching 244 million in 2015. During recent decades, these fluxes of people have been particularly intense in Europe, which has witnessed new contexts and causes, one of which being conflict. According to the International Organization for Migration, 1,003,124 people were reported to have arrived in the European Union via the Mediterranean in 2015 alone; on the way, 3,771 lost their lives or were given as disappeared. From Greece, a mass of men, women and children started a journey crossing Serbia, Slovenia, Hungary and Austria, to arrive into Germany, the preferred destination. This movement became the visible side of the drama experienced by millions of people living under infrahuman conditions caused by conflict and socio-economic inequalities in countries like Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan.

Alongside this movement, the human capital flight caused by the economic crisis that affected some European countries, together with the pre-crisis arrival of many economic migrants and their departure during the crisis, introduced considerable changes in the social landscape, influencing peoples’ lives, in a way or another, with greater or lesser intensity. Before the refugee movements, some European countries were already experiencing a new wave of migratory flows that have sustained economic growth and simultaneously contributed to changes in the patterns of customs, life styles, values and religions. This new European scenery has triggered ambivalent positions in the attitude domain. On the one hand, inclusiveness, motivated by egalitarian values, has become more salient, nurturing awareness of the need for equality and fairness whether in the domain of public policies (e.g. equal salaries for equal jobs; equal civil rights for everyone) or in that of interpersonal relationships (e.g. criminalisation of domestic violence and sexual harassment). The normative discourse of anti-racism and tolerance, the fight for human rights, and the demand for solidarity and collective action in defence of the neediest has become increasingly important, reaching all sectors of society and public policies.
On the other hand, these disorganised masses of people crossing Europe have generated different kinds of fear and resistance. In 2012, the Greek authorities constructed a 12.5 km fence along its border with Turkey. In the summer of 2015, Hungary built a fence on its borders with Serbia and Croatia to stop migrants entering Europe from Greece. The traditional hosting countries, like Germany or France, intensified border checks to control migrant and refugee flows. These official initiatives, together with the intensification of massive deadly terrorist attacks since 2015 (e.g. Paris-Bataclan; Brussels-Airport; Nice-Bastille Day; Manchester Arena; Barcelona-Ramblas) and other episodes like the allegedly mass sexual assaults in Cologne perpetrated by Arab men during the 2015/2016 New Year’s Eve celebrations, contributed to the creation of a social triad linking immigration, terrorism and Islamism in peoples’ minds, boosting Islamophobia and feelings of threat associated with immigrants and refugees. Appealing to conservative values, that promote the virtues of the past and the purity of national culture, in sum, the maintenance of the status quo, the extreme right wing discourse claims the need of implementing tight restrictive measures in order to protect national borders and culture from the damaging influence of immigrants.

Besides the institutional scenarios created by policy makers around the issues raised by the presence of immigrants and refugees, there is the other side of the coin – everyday life. Settlers are often distinct from the populations of receiving countries: they have a different skin colour, they speak different languages and profess different religions. Because of this, they are categorised as a specific “ethnic” or “racial” group, different from the majority. Independently of the laws regulating their integration in the hosting countries, inequalities and injustices are still part of their daily social life; and the idea that immigrants bring more trouble than benefits is shared by a significant number of the native population. The attitudes and beliefs of the hosting populations have been deeply studied from different perspectives based on data collected in representative samples: the predictors and consequences of openness/opposition to immigration (Heath et al. 2018; Ramos, Pereira and Vala 2018); the preferences in terms of integration modalities and immigrant characteristics (Bourhis et al. 1997; Guimond, Sablonnière and Nugier 2014; Heath et al. 2013; Pehrson and Green 2010); the frequency and quality of contact with immigrants (Pettigrew et al. 2011; Hewstone et al. 2014); the feelings of threat associated with their presence (Ramos, Pereira and Vala 2016; Green 2009; Schneider 2008).
However, as far as we know, no survey based studies have made migrants the main subject of analysis and aimed at exploring their feelings, opinions and attitudes regarding the hosting countries and their migration public policies. For that reason, this study constitutes a completely new approach using survey data, namely the European Social Survey Round 7, collected in 2014/15.

We will start by discussing the role that values play in the formation of attitudes in general and attitudes towards immigration particularly. We will then present the theoretical model under analysis, which is looking at the “e” side of immigrants and explore their attitudes towards new immigrants. Taking into account the diversity of immigrants’ profiles living in European countries, three groups are considered – nationals, immigrants from European countries, and immigrants from non-European countries. Based on the literature on the determinants of opposition to immigration, four hypotheses are contrasted: (1) former immigrants are more open to newcomers than the other two groups (the solidarity hypothesis); (2) people living under more fragile socio-economic conditions are more opposed to immigration (the self-interest hypothesis); (3) long standing immigrants develop a sense of primo-occupancy that makes them reject newcomers (the autochthony hypothesis); (4) values, as moral guiding principles, contribute over and above the other three dimensions to explain opposition/openness to immigration (the morality hypothesis).

THE ROLE OF VALUES

Values are important elements of people’s lives and, for that reason, they have been at the origin of multiple reflexions, in a wide set of disciplines and from diverse perspectives. Values are meaningful objects of study for different areas of social research: whether studying the organisation of a local community, the relations between groups or the functioning of social structures, values can be considered as an important element in their understanding. The conceptualisation of values as orientations that guide, justify or clarify attitudes, norms and opinions, and consequently human action, has achieved a considerable consensus among social scientists. This perspective has oriented multiple studies on the relationship between values, attitudes and individual behaviour, and is at the origin of some value taxonomies. In this chapter, we will analyse the influence of values in opposition towards immigration using the Human Values Model of Shalom Schwartz (1992).
From a theoretical point of view, Schwartz’s model (Schwartz and Bilsky 1987 and 1990; Schwartz 1992; Schwartz et al. 2012) is framed by Rokeach’s work (1973) and can also be linked to that of Inglehart (1997) and the principle of belief congruence developed by Rokeach and colleagues (1960).

The conception of the model began with Schwartz and Bilsky studies (1987 and 1990) and was based on the assumption that values represent, as conscious aims, three universal needs of human existence to which all individuals and societies have to respond: the needs of individuals as biological organisms; the requisites of coordinated social interaction; and the survival and welfare needs of groups.

These three needs can be expressed in 10 types of motivational values shared by individuals, regardless of their cultural context. They are power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, self-direction, universalism, benevolence, tradition, conformity and security. The actions involved in achieving each one of these values have psychological and social consequences, which might be compatible or incompatible with the continuing of other types of values. For example, actions indicating obedience (conformity) will tend to conflict with those expressing autonomy (achievement), but will be compatible with actions concerning social order (security). One of the innovative aspects of Schwartz’s model consists of representing values as elements of a matrix of conflicting or compatible relations. The greater the distance between two values, the greater the degree of incompatibility between their underlying motivations (Figure 5.1).

The analysis of the incompatibilities between values led the author to set them in a bi-dimensional structure made up of four types of high-order values forming two basic and bipolar conceptual dimensions: one placing self-transcendence values against those of self-enhancement; and a second, placing openness to change values against those of conservation. The first dimension reflects the conflict between acceptance of others as equals and the concern with their well-being versus the pursuit of individual success and dominion over others. The second dimension reflects the conflict between the desire for intellectual autonomy, freedom of action and orientation towards change versus obedience, the preservation of traditional practices and the protection of stability.

More recently, a refinement of the Schwartz model has partitioned the same continuum into 19 more narrowly defined values, with discernible effects
(Schwartz et al. 2012). However, for comparative reasons, the European Social Survey still uses the instrument measuring the 10 values model, the one we will be using in our analyses.

Previous studies have already shown that those endorsing the values of humanitarianism and egalitarianism share a greater concern about the most disadvantaged groups of society. They are more sensitive to the difficulties that people belonging to those groups experience, more receptive to diversity (Leong and Ward 2006) and less prejudiced towards minorities (Biernat et al. 1996). This acceptance and concern about the “Other” is specifically mirrored in the Schwartz value of universalism.

In contrast, those who hold conservative values are more likely to reject all that may jeopardise stability and control over life and over the social environment (Rockeac 1960). Coherently, these individuals are motivated by the maintenance and preservation of the status quo and by the superiority of
their own culture, which in turn may support the relative elevation of whites, heterosexuals, males and so on, compared to other groups (Lambert and Chasteen 1997). This conservative view of society is reflected in the Schwartz conservation values.

In the context of immigration studies, Schwartz’s model has been broadly tested (Davidov and Meuleman 2012; Ramos, Pereira and Vala 2016). Nonetheless, they only address the opinions of nationals (or of the total samples without distinction). The main conclusions of these studies show a general tendency for the values of self-transcendence (and specifically universalism) to generate more open attitudes towards immigrants and immigration policies, with the values of conservation acting in the opposite way, promoting higher levels of opposition to the reception of immigrants and more restrictive policies regarding immigrants’ civil rights. In this regard, we cannot expect a specific association between conservation values and opposition to immigration in the case of immigrants and, for that reason, we do not put forward any correspondent hypothesis. Other studies have also shown that values are more relevant to explain attitudes towards immigration than other dimensions that are often presented as the main triggers, such as nationals’ social and economic vulnerability (Ramos and Vala 2009).

Based on these empirical findings, we propose the following hypotheses:\footnote{For theoretical reasons, the variables measuring the impact of values on opposition towards immigration will be introduced in the model after the variables measuring the solidarity and autochthony hypotheses and, for that reason, they are numbered H4, H5 and H6.}

\begin{itemize}
\item[H4] The higher the endorsement of universalism, the lower the opposition towards immigrants expressed by nationals and immigrants;
\item[H5] The higher the expression of conservation values, the higher the opposition towards immigration expressed by nationals.
\end{itemize}

Most immigrants leaving their country in search of a better life are predisposed to remain in the new country for a long period (or permanently) and motivated to improve their economic situation. From this combination of characteristics, we may assume that immigrants arrive in a new country with a set of expectations that they wish to fulfil. According to Boneva and Frieze (2001), those who emigrate tend to have a stronger achievement motivation than individuals that prefer to remain in their own country. However, we
have no empirical or theoretical arguments to preview an association between motivation for achievement and opposition to immigration in the case of immigrants.

Finally, we expect values to have an explanatory power over and above situational variables (age, education, political orientation and religiosity), self-interest indicators (subjective income, employment status and length of sojourn) (H6-morality hypothesis).

THE IMMIGRANTS’ PERSPECTIVE

As mentioned above, the main objective of this chapter is to lift a corner of the veil and understand how immigrants see the entrance of other immigrants, as well as the extent to which their attitudes differ from those of nationals. Immigrants are not a homogeneous group – deriving from countries with different immigration policies and different societal contexts, they are motivated by different ambitions. Distinctive motivations can underlie their expectations: a job, a better income, career improvement, joining the family, or running from conflict and inequalities. These are undoubtedly important criteria to take into account in a sociological approach and in future studies. However, the nature of this first study is exploratory and, for that reason, comparisons between countries or between different categories of immigrants will not be addressed. Immigrants will be analysed from the point of view of what they all have in common: individuals living in a country where they were not born nor brought up and that, with the exceptions stemming from the brain drain phenomenon, often come from lower socio-economic classes, tending to occupy a low rank in the status hierarchy of the hosting society.

In theory, immigrants may share multiple identities: they are immigrants from the point of view of nationals, emigrants from their own point of view, and they can also take the place of nationals when it comes to evaluating the benefits/disadvantages of receiving new immigrants. In this chapter, we will look at immigrants through the lens of their “e” side; i.e. as emigrants, and compare their attitudes towards immigration with those of nationals. Independently of the public immigration policies, basically integrative, and regardless of the degree of identification with the majority, emigrants transform their current spaces of residence by “placing” their identities; i.e. by inserting their belonging into neighbourhoods and creating local ties (Ehrkamp 2010). By doing this,
immigrants engage with the hosting society on their own terms and may eventually become members of the host or receiving society with respect to new settlers. The boundaries between majority and minority groups become blurred and, according to Hutnik’s model (1986), immigrants may promote acculturative strategies (high identification with the ingroup and the outgroup). Moreover, belonging is not only defined by group boundaries; it can also be expressed through “claims of primo-occupancy of a territory” (Martinovic and Verkuyten 2013). The concept of autochthony is well known in anthropology, but its application to prejudice explanatory models is new. Arriving somewhere first can generate self-evident notions of ownership that may in turn be used to exclude newcomers from access to rights and power (Geschiere 2009). A similar effect was confirmed by Martinovic and Verkuyten (2013), who identified autochthony as a unique and relevant predictor of prejudice, mainly among those who fear that their entitlements are being challenged by newcomers.

These reflections lead us to propose the emergence of a double identification with different impacts on the attitudes immigrants develop towards newcomers: as emigrants, and due to their own experience, the identification with newcomers may result in more open and inclusive attitudes; as members of the community that have gained their own "place," they may share some of the nationals’ concerns and manifest less open attitudes. For instance, immigrant opposition to newcomers may be driven by self-interest motivations due to a perceived unfavourable economic position or by feelings of primo-occupancy entitlements.

The data we will analyse was collected using questionnaires designed to measure the attitudes of the majority towards immigration and, therefore, we do not have attitudinal indicators specifically designed for immigrants. We know that they were not born in the country of residence and how long they have lived there. Based on the assumption that those who have been in the country for longer periods may see newcomers as a challenge, we will use sojourn as an indicator of autochthony.

Three hypotheses are drawn from these considerations: H1 – Immigrants are more open to immigration than nationals (solidarity hypothesis); H2 – Those living under more fragile social and economic circumstances are less open to immigration (self-interest hypothesis); H3 – The longer the immigrants’ presence in the hosting country, the less open they are to immigration (autochthony hypothesis). These three hypotheses will be contrasted with the morality hypothesis, previously presented.
METHODOLOGY

DATA

To analyse the impact of individual characteristics and contextual circumstances on opposition towards immigration, data from Round 7 of the ESS was used (2014/15). The methodological standards followed in all participating countries guarantee a strong level of confidence in the data produced to perform comparative analysis; namely the strict probability sampling of the 15 year old or older resident population, and the rigorous translation process of the questionnaire into the several languages of the participating countries. The countries used in the analysis were the following: Austria (1,785), Belgium (1,767); Switzerland (1,527); the Czech Republic (2,084), Germany (3,034); Denmark (1,492); Estonia (2,029), Spain (1,861); Finland (2,068); France (1,903); the United Kingdom (2,247); Hungary (1,689); Ireland (2,379); Lithuania (2,204), the Netherlands (1,900); Norway (1,434); Poland (1,596); Portugal (1,253); Sweden (1,786) and Slovenia (1,222), making a total of 37,049 respondents, 3,517 of whom being immigrants; i.e. they were not born in the country where they live (representing 9.5% of the total sample). Due to the contrast between the diversity of origins, covering the five continents, and the destination of those immigrants, which is limited to 20 European countries; two groups of immigrants were created: one from European countries and another from non-European countries. Data was weighted using the “design weight” available in the ESS data set. (For further information on the ESS methodological specifications, see www.europeansocialsurvey.org).

VARIABLES

Dependent variable – Opposition towards immigration

Four questions were used to operationalise the dependent variable: (1) “To what extent do you think [country] should allow people of the same race or ethnic group as most [country] people to come and live here?” (2) “How about people of a different race or ethnic group from most [country] people?” (3) “And how about people from the poorer countries in Europe?” (4) “How about people from the poorer countries outside Europe?”

The answers were given in a four-point scale: 1 – allow many to come and live here; 2 – allow some; 3 – allow a few; 4 – allow none.
Independent variables

1) Situational variables
   • age, gender, number of years of education, left-right orientation
     (“In politics, people sometimes talk of “left” and “right”. Using
     this card, where would you place yourself on this scale, where 0
     means the left and 10 means the right?”); religiosity (“Regardless
     of whether you belong to a particular religion, how religious would
     you say you are?” 0-Not at all religious to 10-very religious)

2) Self-interest indicators
   • Subjective income: “Which of the descriptions on this card comes
     closest to how you feel about your household’s income nowadays?”
     (1-Living comfortably on present income; 2-Coping on present
     income; 3-Finding it difficult on present income; 4-Finding it very
     difficult on present income). This variable was recoded so that higher
     values represent a higher sense of comfort with the present income.
   • Work situation in the last seven days: unemployed, actively looking
     for a job (yes/no)

3) Autochthony indicator
   • Length of sojourn: “What year did you first come to live in
     [country]?” The indicator was transformed in order to measure the
     number of years living in the country.

4) Human values

   The measurement of individual values was done using the Schwartz Portrait
   Value Questionnaire included in the eSS questionnaire. Past research showed
   that values we are using are equivalently measured throughout eSS countries
   (Davidov 2010) allowing us to use them without further tests of equivalence.
   Respondents were asked to answer 21 questions describing different people.
   In each answer, they should say how much that person resembles them (scale:
   1– very much like me to 6 – not like me at all). This procedure is current
   practice, but raises some problems, which must be controlled. One of these
   comes from the fact that individuals differ in the way they use the different
   points of a scale; in other words, the anchorage points. For some, everything is
   highly important; others, cautiously, use the medium point of the scale; others
   are reluctant to use extreme positions; and others even find it difficult to place
   themselves in the intermediate points between yes and no. It is therefore
   necessary to find a way of controlling this effect when we want to compare
value priorities between countries or correlate values with other variables. The strategy that Schwartz (1992) highly advises consists in centring individual answers on the respective means, subtracting the individual mean of the 21 items from the scores given to each item. This procedure has the advantage of being usable without problems in regression analysis, namely those introduced by multicolinearity effects. In the analyses presented here, the indicators were submitted to this procedure.

The basic values of Universalism, Achievement, Tradition, Conservation and Security were used in the analyses. According to the Schwartz model, Universalism is a combination of three indicators (equality of opportunities, listening to different opinions and concern for the environment). However, we did not use the last one, since we do not have theoretical reasons to establish a link between this motivation and attitudes towards immigration. Appendix 1 summarises the operationalisation of the 10 values.

RESULTS

WHO ARE THE IMMIGRANTS CAPTURED BY THE ESS?

To better understand the findings, it is important to know the characteristics of the respondents. As explained above, two groups of immigrants were created regarding their origin: within European and outside Europe. Table 5.1 summarises the profile of each group concerning the independent variables used in the regression model.

Women are slightly more represented than men, with the exception of immigrants from outside Europe that have an almost even composition. Non-European immigrants are younger, more religious, express more financial difficulties and place themselves in a more left political orientation than the two other groups. Non-Europeans have completed more years of schooling than nationals and register a higher rate of unemployment, though, on average, their sojourn is shorter. Regarding this last aspect, European immigrants have been in the hosting country for longer periods than non-European immigrants.

OPPOSITION TO IMMIGRATION IN EUROPE

According to the “solidarity hypothesis” (H1), people experiencing emigration should express a more open attitude towards immigration. As represented in
Figure 5.2, this is in fact the case. The differences between groups are statistically significant \((F(2, 36447) = 102.5, p < .001)\). The value of the \(\eta^2\), however, reveals that the magnitude of the effect is very small \((\eta^2 = .005)\), suggesting that the migration experience does not have as meaningful an impact as we would expect. Both immigrant groups’ mean values of opposition to immigration are significantly different from the scale midpoint \((2.5)\) \((t_{\text{European countries}} = -7.2, p < .001; t_{\text{Non-European countries}} = -14.4, p < .001)\), meaning that both groups express an attitude tendentiously more open than nationals, who remain at the midpoint \((t_{\text{Nationals}} = 1.5, \text{ns})\).

Up to now, we have confirmed that nationals and immigrants have different attitudes regarding the entrance of newcomers, with nationals being less open. The next step of this study is to identify the factors associated with these different attitudes. To pursue this aim, hierarchical regression models were run for the three subsamples. Findings are presented in Table 5.1.

Looking at the first block of variables introduced in the model, three different patterns emerge. Among nationals, only gender has no impact on opposition to immigration: older people and those more identified with the right wing oppose immigration more, while the more educated and more religious tend to be more open to it. Regarding immigrants from European countries, age
and ideological orientation have a similar impact to those observed in the nationals’ sample. However, the impact of education and religiosity is not significant. This picture is even more restricted in the case of immigrants from non-European countries, among which only age has a significant impact on opposition to immigration, similar to the other two groups.

The self-interest hypothesis was built under the assumption that those experiencing social and economic constraints are more opposed to immigration. Results show that this is not completely true: being unemployed has no effect on willingness to receive newcomers (even for immigrants outside Europe with double the unemployment percentage rate of the other two groups), and income difficulties are related to more opposition to immigration only in the subsamples of nationals and immigrants from European countries.

According to Ceuppens and Geschire (2005), autochthony implicitly calls for the exclusion of strangers, whoever they may be, and can also be used to exclude newcomers and immigrants in particular. The ESS questionnaire does not have any autochthony indicator and, for that reason, we created a variable measuring the number of years each immigrant had been living in the hosting country at the time of the questionnaire administration, using it as an indicator of autochthony. For nationals, the variable would have the same meaning as age, since they have all been in the country since they were born. Consequently, we did not include it in the nationals’ model. According to our results, the autochthony hypothesis (H3) is confirmed regarding immigrants from outside Europe. For these, the length of the sojourn may trigger a feeling of primo-occupancy that motivates a less positive attitude towards newcomers. A possible explanation for why the two groups of immigrants react differently is the fact that immigrants from outside Europe live in more adverse socio-economic conditions, probably similar to those of newcomers and, consequently, they feel they have more to lose with their presence than immigrants from inside Europe.

**Figure 5.2**  
*Opposition to immigration (means) 1 (allow many) to 4 (allow none)*

![Graph showing opposition to immigration by natives, immigrants from Europe, and immigrants from outside Europe](image)
Regarding the impact of values, the findings reveal remarkable differences between the three groups². The results obtained with the group of nationals reproduce the findings of previous studies about the impact of values on attitudes towards immigration (Ramos, Pereira and Vala 2016) – and allow us to confirm $H_4$ and $H_5$ –, with universalism and security being the values that contribute most to the explanation of openness and opposition to immigration, respectively. Adhesion to the other two higher order conservation values – tradition and conformity –, as well as achievement, is also associated with higher levels of opposition, but with a less expressive contribution.

Adhesion to universalism is also the value that strongly predicts openness to immigration among immigrants. But this is the only aspect common to both groups: while the importance attributed to Conformity and Security has a significant impact on opposition to immigration in the case of immigrants from European countries; for those coming outside Europe, only Achievement is also, although modestly, associated with opposition to the entrance of newcomers. On the whole, the morality hypothesis ($H_6$) was confirmed for the three groups, since values predict openness/opposition to immigration over and above the other two selected explanatory models, namely, self-interest and autochthony.

A final word on the validity of the tested model to explain opposition to immigration is due. For the group of nationals, the set of variables chosen contributes to explain 22% of the variance, meaning that a lot of variance in opposition to immigration remains to be explained. Regarding the two groups of immigrants, the explained variance is even lower (18% for European migrants and 10% for non-European migrants). This means that other models must be tested, and this is particularly the case for the non-European immigrants.

CONCLUSIONS

In order to understand the differences regarding openness/opposition to immigration expressed by nationals, immigrants from European countries and immigrants from non-European countries, four hypotheses were tested:

² For reasons that have to do with the organisation of the chapter, the statistical tests made regarding the equivalence of value structure and salience in the three groups under analysis are presented in Annex II.
**Predictors of opposition to immigration in European countries**  
*(Standardised coefficients)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th><strong>NATIONALS</strong> (N = 33522)</th>
<th><strong>IMMIGRANTS</strong> European countries (N = 2259)</th>
<th><strong>IMMIGRANTS</strong> Non-European countries (N = 1258)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.010</td>
<td>.013</td>
<td>-.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.092***</td>
<td>.098**</td>
<td>.126**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.123***</td>
<td>-.052</td>
<td>-.035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>-.073***</td>
<td>-.031</td>
<td>-.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-right</td>
<td>.100***</td>
<td>.122***</td>
<td>.035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R²</td>
<td>.091</td>
<td>.081</td>
<td>.055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjective income</td>
<td>-.157***</td>
<td>-.159***</td>
<td>-.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>-.010</td>
<td>-.030</td>
<td>.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R² change</td>
<td>.035***</td>
<td>.035***</td>
<td>.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj R²</td>
<td>.125</td>
<td>.118</td>
<td>.055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sejourn</td>
<td>.052</td>
<td>.111**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R² change</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.003*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj R²</td>
<td>.118</td>
<td>.058</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universalism</td>
<td>-.245***</td>
<td>-.157***</td>
<td>-.156***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achievement</td>
<td>.023***</td>
<td>-.023</td>
<td>.093**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>.143***</td>
<td>.120***</td>
<td>.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservation</td>
<td>.049***</td>
<td>.134***</td>
<td>.073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tradition</td>
<td>.039***</td>
<td>-.001</td>
<td>.057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R² change</td>
<td>.093***</td>
<td>.061***</td>
<td>.043***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj R²</td>
<td>.217</td>
<td>.177</td>
<td>.097</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**p < .01; *** p < .001.**  
Left-Right (0 left to 10 right); Gender (Woman=1); Education (0 to 30 years of schooling); Unemployment (Unemployed=1); Subjective Income (1 lower to 4 higher); Age (15 to 90).
the solidarity hypothesis (former immigrants are more open to newcomers for empathic reasons); the self-interest hypothesis (people in more fragile socio-economic situations oppose immigration more); the autochthony hypothesis (long standing immigrants develop a sense of primo-occupancy that makes them reject newcomers); and the morality hypothesis (as life guiding principles, values contribute over and above the other three hypotheses to explain opposition/openness to immigration).

The first important conclusion that can be drawn from this study is that immigrants are not a homogeneous group and the socio-cultural specificities that divide them need distinctive models to interpret their attitudes towards immigration. The differences found between immigrants from European and from non-European countries is an example. The impact of sojourn, for instance, is an irrelevant aspect for the former, but one of the main predictors of opposition to immigration from the latter.

Another important aspect is related to how fundamental common variables are in understanding such attitudes. For instance education has been seen as a key factor to explain attitudes and fight prejudice. However, education only appears as a significant predictor of openness for the group of nationals (and immigrants are not less educated that nationals; on the contrary). Is education, by itself, really important? Or is it the learning of normativity and correctness (social, political, moral…) that education brings that is different among the origins of the three groups? In other words, is this an effect of education, or one of social desirability? We have no data to disentangle these relationships, but this is certainly one important issue to clarify in the future.

Blaming immigrants for taking jobs from nationals is also a frequently heard claim. However, our findings show that being unemployed is not related to more restrictive preferences in any of the groups. This is particularly relevant considering that the unemployment rate of immigrants from non-European countries is twice as high as that of the other two groups.

Finally, the study confirms the role played by values in forming attitudes towards immigration. Several studies on the impact of values have reported a positive effect of universalism and a negative effect of conservation values (security, tradition and conformism) on opposition towards immigration. Universalism is the value that strongly motivates people to accept immigrants and to develop preferences for more inclusive immigration policies, and this finding was reproduced for the three groups considered in our study. Conservation values, in contrast, aim both at individual and
social protection, as well as maintaining the *status quo*: goals that may be threatened by the presence of culturally diversified groups, having norms and customs that conflict with those of the native population. Our findings draw attention to the importance that these values play in the forming of nationals’ and European-immigrants’ attitudes to newcomers, but not for non-European immigrants. One can argue that nationals and immigrants from European countries share a cultural heritage: at an upper level they both have origins and live in Europe. Non-European immigrants may have no reason to feel the need of protecting the culture of the European country where they are living and so, although they praise tradition and conformity as much as everyone else, these values are not mobilised in forming opinions about the entrance of newcomers.

As stated at the opening of this chapter, our intention is to start filling a void in the literature on attitudes towards immigration, and look at immigrants as subjects instead of objects. Many questions have been raised, a few answered, but the floor is open for what we believe is a fertile line of research.

**ALICE RAMOS**
Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa
Av. Prof. Aníbal Bettencourt 9 — 1600-036 Lisboa, Portugal
alice.ramos@ics.ulisboa.pt
orcid.org/0000-0001-9512-0571
## Appendix 5.1

**Indicators of basic values and underlying motivations (Schwartz 1992)**

| Types of Motivational Values | Objectives and Specific Values That They Represent | Indicators (A Man.../A Woman...)
|------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|
| **Universalism**             | Understanding, recognition, tolerance and protection of the well-being of others and of nature. | 1 - ... who thinks it's important for everyone to be treated equally. Believing that everyone should have the same opportunities in life.  
2 - ... for whom it's important to listen to people who are different from oneself. Even when disagreeing with someone, there's still the desire to understand that person. |
| **Benevolence**              | Preservation and valuing of the well-being of people whom you often meet. | 1 - ... for whom it's important to help those around us. He/She enjoys looking after their well-being.  
2 - ... for whom it's important to be loyal to friends. He/She is very committed to those they are close to. |
| **Security**                 | Security, harmony and stability in society, relationships and within oneself. | 1 - ... who gives importance to living in a place where people feel safe. Anything that can put his/her security at risk is avoided.  
2 - ... for whom it's important that the Government guarantees his/her security, against all threats. A strong State is needed, so it can defend its citizens. |
| **Tradition**                | Respect, involvement and acceptance of the customs and ideas that traditional culture and religion have provided. | 1 - ... for whom it's important to be humble and modest. He/She tries not to attract attention.  
2 - ... who gives importance to tradition. Everything is done in accordance with religion and family. |
| **Conformity**               | Restriction of actions, inclinations and impulses likely to harm others and violate expectations or social norms. | 1 - ... who thinks that people should do as they're told. People should always follow the rules even when no one is watching.  
2 - ... for whom it's important always to behave properly. Doing things others would say were wrong must be avoided. |
| **Power**                    | Social status and prestige, control and dominion over other people and resources. | 1 - ... for whom it's important to be rich. He/She wants to have a lot of money and expensive things.  
2 - ... for whom it's important to have other people's respect. He/She wants people to do what he/she says. |
| **Achievement**              | Personal success through the demonstration of competence, according to social patterns. | 1 - ... who gives a lot of importance to being able to show his/her abilities. He/She wants people to admire what he/she does.  
2 - ... for whom it's important to be successful. He/She likes other people's recognition. |
| **Stimulation**              | Excitation, novelty and challenge in life. | 1 - ... who likes surprises and is always looking to do new things. He/She thinks it's important to do lots of different things in life.  
2 - who's looking for adventure and likes taking risks. He/She wants to have a life full of emotions. |
| **Hedonism**                 | Pleasure and sensorial gratification for oneself. | 1 - ... for whom it's important to have a good time. He/She likes to look after him/herself.  
2 - ... who's looking to take every opportunity to have fun. It's important to do things that give him/her pleasure. |
| **Self-direction**           | Independent thinking and action, choice, creativity and exploration. | 1 - ... who gives importance to having new ideas and being creative. He/She likes doing things in his/her own way.  
2 - ... for whom it's important to make his/her own decisions about what to do. He/She likes to be free and independent of others. |
Appendix 5.2 — Structure and salience of Schwartz's values – nationals, immigrants from European countries and immigrants from non-European countries

Appendix 5.2.1 — Values structure – Nationals (Multidimensional Scaling – Proxcal; Tucker coefficient of congruence = .980)

Appendix 5.2.2 — Values structure – Immigrants from European countries (Multidimensional Scaling – Proxcal; Tucker coefficient of congruence = .981)
Appendix 5.2.3 — Values structure – Immigrants from non-European countries (Multidimensional Scaling – Proxcal; Tucker coefficient of congruence = .978)

Appendix 5.2.4 — Importance attributed to the ten basic values by group (centred means)
REFERENCES


CITE THIS CHAPTER AS:

Socially critical decisions towards low status groups: the role of meritocracy

Rui Costa-Lopes
Ana Filipa Madeira
Mariana Pires de Miranda
Wilson Moreira
We make trivial decisions everyday but, every once in a while, we face decisions that have a deep impact on others, as they may imply serious harm or the unequal distribution of relevant material or symbolic resources. These socially critical decisions (scd) constitute the core of this chapter. Its main goal is to describe the literature on these scd and present empirical research testing how the contextual salience of a meritocratic norm impacts on these decisions towards low status group members.

The first part of this chapter will describe the existing research on scd within asymmetric social relations that has mostly focused on different examples, such as “shoot vs. not-shoot” police decisions as a function of different ethnic target groups, medical decisions, moral dilemmas and legal decisions. A consistent result across these different decisional contexts (though with some caveats) indicates that low status group members (e.g. blacks, gypsies, the homeless) are targeted with more unfavorable decisions, therefore suggesting an inequality in treatment that may be undermining the full scale inclusion of these group members.

We describe how this research has been more focused on showing this group-based discrimination in scd than in explaining it. Importantly, a significant factor that has been consistently shown to impact on group-based distinctions has been neglected by scd research: the salience of a meritocratic norm. Although seen as an important social norm that regulates society, descriptive meritocracy – i.e. the belief that people are rewarded based on their efforts – is nonetheless associated with intolerance and dislike of low status group members and may therefore be logically associated with more unfavourable decisions towards low status groups. This lay explanation of discrimination may legitimise the maintenance of inequality and limit actions towards inclusion. In the second part of this chapter, we will present the rationale for such hypothesis and present our own research developed around this idea. We end the chapter with a succinct discussion on how this bias in scd hinders a full integration of low status group members in society.

**SHOOT VS. NOT SHOOT DECISIONS TOWARDS LOW STATUS GROUP MEMBERS**

Police shootings are a paradigmatic example of a situation where individuals are forced to make socially critical decisions that may carry very serious
consequences. Police officers face a challenging situation when arriving at a dangerous scene: there may be several individuals, with some of them being armed and others not. In a fraction of a second, the police officer needs to make a shoot vs. not shoot decision. Not to shoot an armed individual may result in the police officer getting shot, shooting an unarmed individual may lead to a tragic loss of innocent lives. Moreover, these wrong decisions may lead to major social unrest.

In New York, 1999, Amadou Diallo, a 22 year old African immigrant was shot and killed by the police when he tried to reach for his pocket to show some ID and the police mistakenly assumed he was reaching for a gun. Several similar incidents with African Americans have occurred since, namely the shooting of Sean Bell in 2006 and the shooting of Trayvon Martin in 2012. In all these incidents, public opinion was focused on one question in particular: would the police officers have made the same decision if the suspect had been white, or even just non-black?

This was the question that led Joshua Correll and his colleagues at the University of Colorado at Boulder to set up a research programme that would help provide some answers by recreating in a controlled environment, as realistically as possible, the experience that police officers go through when they are expected to make these decisions. Accordingly, Correll developed a video game simulation in which White or Black targets appeared in different poses and against different backgrounds during several trials of the task, either holding a gun or a neutral object (e.g. mobile phone). Correll and colleagues first used this computer game in a study with university students as participant colleagues (Correll et al. 2002). Results yield a pattern of shooter bias, where participants decide to shoot Black more quickly and more frequently than White targets. Additionally, participants, on average, required more time to make the decision not to shoot an unarmed suspect when the suspect was black than white.

After some years, the same researchers decided to assess the presence of such shooter bias within the police officer population of a major US city in the same state as the first study. Using the community population of the same geographical area as a comparison sample, police officers went through the same computer simulation and results showed that both police officers and community samples exhibited robust racial bias in terms of speed, i.e. participants were quicker to make the decision to shoot black suspects than white suspects. Notably, however, police officers did not show the same shooter
bias effect in terms of the final decision. That is, although community members set the shooting decision criterion lower for Black targets (compared to White suspects), police officers outperformed them by expressing no such bias in the decision (Correll et al. 2007). According to the authors, results seem to indicate that the training that police officers go through may not affect the speed with which stereotype-incongruent targets are processed, but that it does affect the ultimate decision. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that the shooter bias effect is partially explained by the stereotypical associations that the participants have of the targets. In other words, people take less time in making a decision that is consistent with Black and White stereotyping and more time in making a decision that is inconsistent. Implicit prejudice (i.e. negative stereotypes) leads to more unfavourable decisions towards Blacks.

The research line developed by Correll and colleagues is consistent with (and indirectly supported by) research from other US-based social psychology colleagues. For example, Payne (2001) developed a paradigm in which he was able to demonstrate that, when guessing the real content hidden in blurred images, participants are quicker to distinguish weapons from tools when they have been previously primed with pictures of Black faces, compared to White faces. Another (more indirect) example comes from research by Eberhardt and colleagues (Eberhardt et al. 2004), showing that people have a stronger tendency to turn their attention to Black faces, than to White faces, when they have been primed with the concept of crime.

SOCIALLY CRITICAL DECISIONS TOWARDS LOW STATUS GROUP MEMBERS IN MORAL DILEMMAS

The classic example of socially critical decisions comes from the study of moral dilemmas, although in this case, these are often based on artificial situations created to illustrate fundamental ideas. Nonetheless, these fundamental ideas often resonate with real examples from everyday life. When we decide, for example, if we support a war that will most likely kill hundreds of soldiers and civilians for the sake of a more just society; or when a fireman has to decide, during a fire, whether he goes left, to save two elderly people, or right, to save a baby.

But how do we decide in these situations? Do we maximise the number of people we save? In theory, moral rules are rigid and absolute. The Bible’s Ten
Commandments include unequivocal exclusions such as “Thou shalt not kill.” In real life, however, people are often puzzled about what is the right thing to do. Though it is not yet completely clear what drives people’s decisions within these moral dilemmas, some consistent results have already been identified. A most relevant example for this chapter concerns decisions within moral dilemmas involving people from low status groups.

The classic example of a moral dilemma is the “trolley dilemma.” This dilemma has several versions but the most common one is a version with a lever: “There is a runaway trolley barrelling down the railway tracks. Ahead, on the tracks, there are five people tied up and unable to move. The trolley is headed straight for them. You are standing some distance off in the train yard, next to a lever. If you pull this lever, the trolley will switch to a different set of tracks. However, you notice that there is one person tied up on the side track.” Thus, you have two options, you either do nothing, which means the trolley will kill the five people on the main track, or you decide to pull the lever, which diverts the trolley to the side track, saving five people but killing one.

While there is no consensus on what the right decision is here, the two fundamental principles that are evoked by those making one decision or the other have been identified. A deontological principle states that the morality of an action lies in its intrinsic nature (Kant 1785 [1959]), which means that causing harm is always wrong, regardless of any positive consequences that may derive from that action. This principle is evoked by people who choose not to do anything. The utilitarian principle states that the morality of an action depends indeed on its consequences and that we should make the decision that maximises the well-being of the majority of people involved (Mill 1861 [1998]). This is the principle evoked by people who choose to kill one in order to save five, as the number of lives saved by that decision is larger than the number of sacrificed victims. Hundreds of thousands of people have responded to the trolley dilemma and its lever version. And even though there is no consensus, the majority of individuals favour the utilitarian principle that you should kill one to save many (Cushman, Young and Hauser 2006; Greene et al. 2001).

Recently, Cikara and colleagues (Cikara et al. 2010) brought the status dimension to trolley dilemmas involving victims and other individuals differing in terms of social status. Cikara and colleagues presented several trolley dilemma scenarios to participants, manipulating the social status...
of the five people on the main track and the victim on the side track by presenting pictures in different scenarios. Results showed that participants see the utilitarian decision – i.e. the decision to sacrifice the victim on the side track to save the five people on the main track – as more favourable when the victim belongs to a low-competence group and that the scenario in which the sacrifice of the victim was seen as more acceptable was the one involving a victim belonging to a group seen as having both low-competence and low warmth (e.g. the homeless or drug addicts). To our knowledge, no other study has manipulated the victims’ status within moral dilemmas, instead, the research has been more focused on distinguishing how participants from upper- and lower-classes respond to the dilemmas (Côté, Piff and Willer 2013).

SOCIALLY CRITICAL DECISIONS TOWARDS LOW STATUS GROUP MEMBERS IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT

Research on medical decisions is considerably more developed than the previous two research areas. Consistent with other decision making domains, health care providers demonstrate implicit biases suggesting the existence of discriminatory attitudes and decisions towards low status groups, such as Blacks (Blair et al. 2013; Cooper et al. 2012; Green et al. 2007; Haider et al. 2011, 2015a, 2015b; Hausmann et al. 2015; Sabin et al. 2009; Schaa et al. 2015; Stepanikova 2012) and Latinos (Blair et al. 2013; Stepanikova 2012).

So why should the level of bias of a particular health provider be of concern during medical decision making? Evidence from four systematic reviews suggests a significant positive relationship between level of implicit bias and lower quality of care (Hall et al. 2015; Paradies, Truong, and Priest 2014; Fitzgerald and Hurst 2017; Dehon et al. 2017). This lower quality of care manifests itself in more negative patient-provider interactions but also in clinical decisions. Indeed, a large body of research found empirical evidence of implicit bias influencing clinical decision making towards low status...
groups (Bogart et al. 2001; Burgess et al. 2008; Di Caccavo, Fazal-Short and Moss 2000; Drwecki 2011; Ponterotto, Potere and Johansen 2002; Green et al. 2007; Hirsh, Jensen and Robinson 2010; Stepanikova 2012; Sabin, Rivara and Greenwald 2008; Schulman et al. 1999; Thamer et al. 2001). For example, Schulman and colleagues (1999) found that physicians were less likely to refer Black women for cardiac catheterisation, even after controlling for symptoms, i.e. the physicians’ estimates of the probability of coronary disease and clinical characteristics. Also two studies on treatment recommendations found that providers with greater implicit racial bias are less likely to recommend thrombolysis treatment when presented with clinical vignettes presenting patients with chest pain symptoms, and are less likely to prescribe postsurgical pain medication for a low status patient (Black) than a high status patient (White) (Green et al. 2007).

Several studies have shown how the salience of target status group indirectly activates racial stereotypes during clinical decision making. For example, studies using racial primes found physicians’ medical decisions being influenced when subliminally exposed to Black and Hispanic stimuli (Stepanikova 2012), specifically, when primed with stereotypes related to African Americans, participants tended to rate a hypothetical patient more negatively. Another study found that physicians rated Black patients as less likely than Whites to comply with medical advice or participate in cardiac rehabilitation if prescribed, although these differences were of only borderline statistical significance (Van Ryn et al. 2006). Moskowitz and colleagues (2012) found that physicians had lower trust in non-White, compared with White, patients.

Furthermore, the salience of target status group seems to indirectly affect individual’s evaluations and judgements during socially critical decision making. For example, in a study intended to examine medical students’ willingness to prescribe antiretroviral pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP) to a White vs Black patient, participants judged the Black patient to be more likely to increase his rate of unprotected sex if prescribed PrEP, which, in turn, was associated with reduced willingness to prescribe PrEP to the Black patient (Calabrese et al. 2014). A similar indirect effect was not found for the white patient. This result is consistent with research on stereotype activation in clinical judgement and decision making (Hirsh, Jensen and Robinson 2010; Van Ryn et al. 2006), suggesting that physicians often associate a racial category with racial stereotypes and use them as decision making heuristics.
leading to corresponding behaviour. Moreover, it has been shown how implicit stereotyping may affect diagnosis and treatment without conscious knowledge of its influence, or may even unduly influence diagnosis and treatment (Bean et al. 2014; Dovidio and Fiske 2012; Moskowitz, Stone, and Childs 2012).

More recently, studies have shown how cognitive stressors (e.g. time pressure, cognitive load) may promote reliance on stereotypes and racial bias during decision making (Burgess et al. 2014; Stepanikova 2012). For example, it was found that male physicians were using controlled processes to “correct” for racial stereotypes when they had the opportunity to do so (e.g. sufficient cognitive resources), but were influenced by racial stereotypes in their decision making when under cognitive busyness (Burgess et al. 2014).

**SOCIALLY CRITICAL DECISIONS TOWARDS LOW STATUS GROUP MEMBERS IN THE LEGAL CONTEXT**

Research on decision making in the legal context is fairly developed too and it also yields results showing that low status group members are targeted with more unfavourable decisions. However, the dimension this research most focuses on is the one referring to racial categories, i.e. the research on legal decisions that informs about possible bias against low status group members is almost exclusively about more negative decisions towards different-race targets.

A recent Portuguese investigative journalism story (Henriques, 2017-08-19) has described that one in every 73 citizens of Lusophone Africa over 16 years old and living in Portugal is in prison, whereas for Portuguese citizens in the same age group the proportion is one to 736. The same kind of results have come up throughout the years in different national investigations (Oliveira and Gomes 2014; Roldão 2016; Seabra and Santos 2006). However, this is clearly not an exclusive problem for Portugal. In the USA, for instance, 38% of the people in prison are Black, 21% are Hispanic, whereas they represent 13% and 17% of the total population, respectively (Nellis 2016). As striking as these proportions are, they should be interpreted cautiously. Seabra and Santos (2006) have modulated scenarios within the Portuguese context in which the ratios of incarcerated population in function of the total group population account for confounding variables (such as the social structure of the groups), and even for distortions in the data (such as the non-inclusion
of people with irregular status; the inclusion of foreigners who do not reside in the country, etc.). When taking into consideration the bigger picture, the difference between the likelihood of a migrant being in prison compared to a Portuguese citizen decreases but is, nonetheless, greater for the migrant group than for the Portuguese group in every scenario.

These differences were described and analysed in Faigman and colleagues’ review in terms of the different stages of the criminal path, from (1) the Police encounter, moving to (2) the Charge and plea bargain, and (3) the Trial, and ending with (4) the sentencing (Faigman et al. 2012). The Police encounter phase is sufficiently discussed in the section on shoot vs. not shoot decisions.

To our knowledge, there are few studies that describe what happens in the phase in which prosecutors decide to charge or not to charge someone for a given crime. Furthermore, from the results of these studies, it is not possible to describe a consistent pattern, with analysis of justice data sets suggesting either some (Radelet and Pierce 1985) or no disparate decisions by prosecutors (Caravelis, Chiricos and Bales 2013). As such, studies that can isolate the effect of race or status in the charge and plea bargain phase are in need.

More attention has been given to the trial and sentencing phases, in regard to which we highlight three meta-analyses conducted in the context of mock trials. Mazzella and Feingold (1994) conducted a meta-analysis including 29 studies which revealed a non-significant effect of racial bias on either trial judgments or sentences, but with the defendant’s race having an effect on sentences qualified by the type of crime.

On the other hand, a meta-analysis conducted by Sweeney and Haney (1992), including 14 studies, reported a small but significant racial bias in the sentencing phase, with White participants giving Black defendants longer sentences than White ones. To integrate these inconsistent findings, Mitchell and colleagues (Mitchell et al. 2005) conducted another meta-analysis exploring possible moderators of this racial bias effect. The authors defined racial bias specifically as “a juror’s disparate treatment of a defendant from a racial out-group, when compared with a defendant of the juror’s own-race, in verdict and sentencing decisions”. As such, the authors aimed at extending this effect to an other-race context. Results unequivocally demonstrated the existence of a small but significant other-race racial bias in studies addressing juror decision making, which nonetheless, and in line with our argument, became more pronounced when White jurors evaluated Black defendants.
Data coming from studies conducted in natural contexts is consistent with the prior evidence. At a national level, we highlight the analysis done by Oliveira and Gomes (2014), which demonstrates that foreigners are sentenced for longer periods of time than national citizens convicted of the same crimes. Graham and Lowery (2004) tried to experimentally isolate the effect of race in sentencing by natural groups in the legal system (police and probation officers). The authors demonstrated that when primed with content related to the Black group, the proposed sentence was harsher.

Another line of research still within the description of racial bias in SCD (within the legal area) has moved away from the analysis of racial category to focus specifically on the physical traits associated with Black characteristics (i.e. Afrocentric Features, such as darker skin or a wider nose). On a series of five studies using different laboratorial paradigms, Eberhardt et al. (2004) have shown that both lay participants and police officers associate stereotypicality with criminality.

Eberhardt and colleagues (2004) moved beyond the laboratory in their analysis and went through a large legal US database (Baldus et al. 1998) to select actual black murder defendants advancing to penalty. The aim was to test their hypothesis that the display of Afrocentric features would predict the likelihood of their conviction turning into a death sentence. In two studies with naïve participants, the authors proved that, even when controlling for a large set of covariates, the stereotypicality of Black defendants did predict the death sentence when the victim was White, but not when the victim was Black (Eberhardt et al. 2006).

Blair, Judd and Chapleau (2004) directly tested the effect of group race against Afrocentric features, and found evidence that the effect of Afrocentric features does prevail over the effects driven by group race. These results are still in line with the explanation of the differential treatment in terms of prejudice and, in particular, in terms of implicit prejudice (Faigman et al. 2012). Some evidence suggests that stereotypical information (e.g. Afrocentric features) is linked to perception (e.g. of criminality), regardless of individual explicit bias (Eberhardt et al. 2004). Similarly, but more directly linked to socially critical decisions in the legal context, Sommers and Ellesworth (2000, 2001) showed that, when the race dimension was made salient in the courtroom, discrimination did not occur; whereas when it was explicitly ignored, the bias in sentencing for Blacks and Whites emerged. Thus, overall, research does suggest the existence of more unfavourable decisions towards low status group members.
THE ROLE OF MERITOCRACY ON SOCIALLY CRITICAL DECISIONS TOWARDS LOW STATUS GROUPS

The previous sections went through a large body of studies describing the existence of more unfavourable socially critical decisions towards low status group members in shoot vs. not shoot decisions, in moral dilemmas, in medical decisions, and in legal decisions. Research has been more focused on showing this group-based discrimination in SCD than in explaining it. Indeed, though a significant part of these studies explored the pivotal role played by implicit prejudice in the existence of this bias in decision making, no other variable that is usually predictive of biased attitudes and behaviours in intergroup asymmetrical contexts has been considered. Importantly, a significant factor that has been consistently shown to impact on group-based distinctions has been neglected by SCD research: the salience of a meritocratic norm.

Meritocracy is a social norm according to which social status and rewards depend, or should depend, on individual effort and hard work (Kluegel and Smith 1986). This distinction between “depend” and “should depend” is a fundamental one that applies to all social norms, namely the meritocratic norm: the distinction between prescriptive vs. descriptive norms.

Descriptive norms describe what typically happens in a society and derive from the way people normally act in certain situations. On the other hand, prescriptive norms characterise groups’ moral norms and the perception about what most people approve or disapprove of, while not describing necessarily what happens in reality (Cialdini 1993; Deutsch and Gerard 1955). Basically, descriptive and prescriptive norms refer to the distinction between what is more often observed and what people would like to be more often observed (Costa-Lopes and Pereira 2012).

While meritocracy is seen as a social norm more typical of an Anglo Saxon society like the US, it is nonetheless something that is, to some extent, also conveyed in more collectivist societies like Portugal (Green, Deschamps and Páez 2005). Indeed, in Portugal, despite the belief in the importance of factors that are not related with merit, success is at least partially attributed to the personal merit of each individual. The sports’ area is definitely the best source of examples acknowledging the importance of effort and hard work in obtaining success. Cristiano Ronaldo, for example, is often portrayed as someone who worked his way up the top of the football world. José Mourinho, one of the most famous and successful football coaches in the world, took
part in an advertising campaign for a Portuguese bank in 2011. He would appear on large posters saying things like “I don’t believe in luck, I believe in a job well done” or “Our work, our passion”. This is just an example of the ever more prevalent norm of meritocracy that characterises most modern Western societies.

The rising presence of meritocracy in our society implies the need to study its effects. And, while meritocracy may be seen as an important and useful norm, – one that defines a fair criterion for the distribution of resources, – the fact is that this norm has been associated with higher justifications and stronger acceptance of inequality (Furnham 1982; McCoy and Major 2007) and also to more negative attitudes towards low status groups, both at the explicit (Vala, Lima and Lopes 2004) and the implicit level (Costa-Lopes, Wigboldus and Vala 2017). Despite these results, the study of socially critical decisions has, so far, neglected the role that a meritocratic norm may play in this area.

When people assume or believe that social status is a reflection of one’s own merit or individual effort (i. e. when people endorse a descriptive meritocracy), one can make the individual “accountable” for the status that individual has, and therefore, meritocracy legitimises the status differences between individuals and between groups and helps to justify the status quo (McCoy and Major 2007; see also Jost and Hunyady 2005). Thus, if hierarchical status is based on merit, a possible logical inference indicates that individuals with a higher social status are more talented, hard-working and valuable. Using the same logic, low status individuals will be seen as lacking in worth and as possessing several negative features. If indeed a descriptive meritocratic norm is salient, these low status individuals are no longer seen as victims of a discriminatory system but instead as individually responsible for the negative situation they are in. This argument is nonetheless fallacious, as it does not account for the structural discrimination present in our societies and may in turn lead to the discrimination of people with a low social status, given that people’s “worth” is often a criterion that people use to make distinctions that form the basis of decision making processes. A more indirect path, but consistent with this former idea and with the results described previously, clarifies that this legitimised perception of one’s status may increase levels of implicit prejudice towards these people, and an increased implicit prejudice should lead to more unfavourable scd (as shown above).

As previously explained, we aim to introduce the impact of meritocracy in scd research. Thus, several issues remain unsolved: does the salience of a
To address these lacunae, our team initiated a research programme directly addressing the role of meritocracy in socially critical decisions towards low status groups in the several decisional contexts mentioned above.

RESEARCH FROM OUR TEAM\textsuperscript{2}: ON MORAL DILEMMAS

The first line of work we initiated was within the moral dilemmas area. So far, we have conducted two experimental studies that, taken together, provide initial support for the idea that when a meritocratic norm is made salient, people find negative decisions towards low status group members more acceptable.

The first study was collected online through social networks and involved 206 voluntary participants (75% female and with ages from 18 to 57 years old). Participants were asked to take part in two, supposedly unrelated, studies. Those “two unrelated studies” were in fact two parts of this same first study. The first “study” served to manipulate the salience of meritocracy, through a \textit{Scrambled Sentence Task} (adapt. from Srull and Wyer 1979). Participants were asked to transform 18 sets of 5 words into 18 logical 4-word sentences. In the meritocracy condition, 10 sentences conveyed messages related to meritocracy (e.g. “Lazy people are unsuccessful.”; “No pain, no gain.”) and 8 presented neutral content (e.g. “A calculator saves time”). In the neutral condition, all 18 sentences presented neutral content (8 of the sentences were the same neutral ones as used in the Meritocracy condition). This task is a classic social psychological research tool for priming concepts and ideas.

In the supposed second study (in reality, the second part of the study), people would express their opinions on the trolley dilemma, providing their views on accepting the socially critical decision. As detailed above, in the trolley dilemma, people are faced with the challenging situation of deciding whether to sacrifice one victim to save five lives or do nothing. In our version of the trolley dilemma, we add pictorial information about the potential victim to be sacrificed. Specifically, after describing the dilemma, we tell participants

\textsuperscript{2} The team is made up of the authors of the present chapter.
that they can see a picture of the person on the side track further down. We then ask participants how acceptable they would consider the decision to pull the lever and kill that victim to save the other five on the main track. Half of the participants would respond to this after seeing a picture of a well-off man, while the other half would respond to the same question after seeing a picture of a homeless man (included here to represent a member of a low status group). Results from this first study were not as hypothesised. In fact, a main result indicated that the sacrifice of the high-status victim was seen as more acceptable. Moreover, making meritocracy salient did not make the sacrifice of the low status victim more acceptable. We elaborated a post-hoc explanation for these unexpected results. Drawing from previous research on the content of stereotypes conducted in the US (Fiske et al. 2012), we assumed that homeless people were truly seen as a low status group, i.e. a group seen as having low competence and low warmth. According to Fiske and colleagues (2012), when that is the case, the group elicits disgust. However, we considered the hypothesis that, for Portuguese, this group of homeless people was, in fact, seen as low competence, but high on warmth, and thus eliciting pity. And this pity was probably “in the way” of accepting their sacrifice.

In a second study, we included a different low status group. A group that pre-tests showed as being seen as definitely a low-competence and low-warmth group: drug addicts. Participants were 141 university students (75% female, and ages from 18 to 63 years old), enrolled in the laboratory in exchange for 5€ gift cards. Results from this second study were more encouraging. Despite still showing a very strong acceptance of the sacrifice of high status victims, results also showed that participants who were in an experimental condition, where a meritocratic norm was made salient, were also the participants who considered the sacrifice of drug addicts as more acceptable.

RESEARCH FROM OUR TEAM: ON MEDICAL DECISIONS

The second line of research we initiated was devoted to the study of medical decisions. In this research, we examined whether the salience of meritocracy influences decision making in medical scenarios. We examined the relationship between priming meritocracy and assigning transplant priority for both low and high status targets. Additionally, we explored whether varying the degree of perceived responsibility over the disease would influence decision making
(Study 1), and whether under time pressure participants are more likely to make discriminatory decisions towards low status groups (Study 2).

Study 1 and Study 2 were conducted online, with respectively 78 (78% female, with 24 years old on average) and 93 (71% female, 23 years old on average) participants.

For both studies, we hypothesised that, on average, individuals primed with a meritocratic norm would assign a lower priority level (in a transplant scenario) to a low status individual (compared to a high status one). In study 1, we hypothesised that priming meritocracy along with a high responsibility disease would be the condition where the decision would be more unfavourable towards the low status individual.

The study again employed a two-study ruse. Participants were told they were taking part in two separate studies, one on “Cognitive Performance” (where they would go through the Scrambled Sentence Task) and one on “Decision Making Processes”. In the “second study”, participants were told to imagine themselves as being invited to be part of an evaluation panel, with the mission of assigning priority to patients, who are already on the waiting list for a heart transplant. They were then told to evaluate the clinical cases of six patients on the waiting list, and asked for their opinion regarding the level of priority to be assigned to each patient. In reality, we were only interested in the third and six clinical cases. These were identical medical cases that varied only in the status of the person depicted (low vs. high status, i.e. Black vs. White patient).

Again, results from the first study were not in line with our hypotheses. Even though results showed that participants who had previously been primed with meritocratic beliefs, evaluated the target differently only when the responsibility for the disease was high, the assignment of priority went in the opposite direction. We expected that priming individuals with concepts relevant to meritocracy would influence decision making when assigning priority to low status, in that the low status target would be more likely to receive a lower priority level, than the high status. Our results showed that when the fictitious patient had the high responsibility disease, participants in the meritocracy condition, were significantly more likely to assign a higher priority to the low status target, than to the high status target; and participants in the control condition were more likely to assign a higher priority to the high status than the low status one. We attributed these results to a potential overcorrection for low status targets showing a positive bias towards low
status during the decision making process. According to the literature on implicit attitudes (Fazio 1990; Wilson et al. 2000; Dovidio et al. 1997), when participants become aware of study intent (e.g. racial issue), if they have the opportunity and motivation to think beforehand about the consequences of their decisions (e.g. discrimination), their responses will be primarily based on explicit attitudes. In this study, participants had sufficient time (e.g. opportunity) and might have been motivated to control for prejudice, which may have led them to overcorrect their responses towards the low status target.

Nevertheless, when the opportunity is not permitted (e.g. due to time pressure) implicit attitudes are more influential (Fazio 1990; Wilson et al. 2000; Dovidio et al. 1997). Following up on this idea, in Study 2 we focused on the perceived high responsibility disease, and added a time pressure condition sought to examine the salience effect of meritocracy on the participants’ decision towards low status groups with a perceived high responsibility disease. Replicating the previous paradigm, we hypothesised that under the salience of meritocracy, participants in the high pressure condition would be more likely to assign a lower priority level to a low status patient (compared to a high status target). Results indicate that participants in the high pressure condition were marginally more likely to assign a lower priority to a low status patient than a high status patient. In contrast, participants in the low pressure condition were more likely to assign a higher priority to a low status patient, although this difference did not reach statistical significance. More importantly, results also showed that these effects were qualified by the condition of meritocracy salience. Specifically, under high pressure, participants were significantly more likely to assign a lower priority to the low status patient than the high status one, and this bias was significantly stronger in the condition where meritocracy was made salient.

SOME PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS
AND UNFAVOURABLE SCD AS A BARRIER TO INCLUSION

While providing initial support to the main hypothesis that meritocracy is associated with more unfavourable decisions towards low status group members, this research programme is still at a very incipient stage. Not only do we need to start addressing the other two types of decisions (in the legal context and the shoot vs. not shoot decisions), but we must also consolidate
our knowledge on the obtained effects, namely through the analysis of the underlying mechanisms.

Nevertheless, the results obtained so far allow us to ponder the potentially dangerous consequences of promoting a meritocratic norm. What these results already seem to indicate is that when people are made to believe that society is structured along meritocratic principles, they will make inferences about what people deserve according to their situation. They will tend to think that people who are in unfavourable conditions (i.e. low status groups) are in those circumstances of their own accord, as if they are solely responsible for their situation. This kind of inference takes the place of any alternative thinking that considers other determining (societal) factors for people's situations. Additionally, this line of thinking legitimises discriminatory decisions about issues involving low status group members.

A significant part of the meaning of inclusion is about equal treatment and equal opportunities. What the results of our own work and the results of the other studies described in this chapter show is that people from low status groups are treated differently, and this difference consistently means a more negative treatment. They are more likely to be shot in police encounters; they are more likely to be sacrificed if the situation calls for such an act; they are more likely to be prescribed the wrong treatment in a medical context and they are more likely to be targeted with harsher sentences. Moreover, these results also indicate that if discussions emerge about the existence of this discriminatory behaviour, the narratives that ensue are characterised by discrimination-legitimising discourses that place the responsibility of the situation on the targets of discrimination. Thus, this research aims to contribute to a more nuanced reflection about the situation of low status groups and how attitudes and behaviours may be contributing to a vicious cycle, where the discussion about causality and responsibility may be tainted from the start by discriminatory or fallacious assumptions.
REFERENCES


cite this chapter as:
PART III
Mobility and migrations
Nodes of inclusion and exclusion: media, context and the shaping of contemporary movements across the Atlantic

Marta Vilar Rosales
INTRODUCTION

This chapter is based on a comparative ethnographic research project addressing the migration movements across the Atlantic between four cities (Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Lisbon and Porto), from 2011 to 2015, and their intersections with the movements of things (Appadurai 1988) across the same routes. The project examined all four cities as both sites of departure and destination. This theoretical and methodological option aspired to challenge the dominant assumptions concerning power relationships and their impact on migration trends between South American and European countries, in general; and simultaneously tackle present day post-colonial relationships between Portugal and Brazil, in particular. The movements of people and things were explored at three levels of analysis. The first (macro) aimed at identifying and contextualising the major lines that define and delimit these movements between the four cities, exploring how and to what extent they feed, compete and/or complement each other. The second (mezzo) investigated the specificities of each city as point of arrival and departure. Thirdly (micro), the impact of movement on identity and belonging was looked into through the analysis of domestic material culture and consumption practices.

This chapter will only focus on a very specific dimension of the Atlantic transits explored in the research project. It will examine the role of the media in general, and of social media in particular, in generating and disseminating information and knowledge produced by Portuguese and Brazilian media corporations (major newspapers and news agencies). How this information and knowledge has contributed to shape and promote these four cities as attractive settling locations for significant contingents of the Portuguese and Brazilian middle classes will then be analysed.

MIGRATION IN THE AGE OF GLOBAL CIRCULATION

The circulation of things, images, money, knowledge, media, information and, in particular, people is one of the most visible areas of inquiry in the social sciences. From examinations of transnationalism and cosmopolitanism to
recent theories of mobility, social sciences continue to devote special attention
to the impact of human movement both in present day subjective experience
and social institutions, as well as on how subjects and institutions develop
strategies to frame, control and make sense of it. The emphasis on migration,
and on its causes and impact, is partially the result of the fact that present
day human mobility, both in international and national scales is, according
to the United Nations\textsuperscript{2}, at its highest levels in recorded human history. This
situation has prompted the public debate of the theme, as well as political,
economic and social responses, which try to capture, categorise and order the
increasing diversity of routes, scales, temporalities and intensities of human
motion. Hence, and even if stasis is by far the most regular experience in the
life of the great majority of the world population, scholars have responded to
this new picture and are working to identify alternative approaches to address
motion and its (extra) ordinary effects on contemporary collective life.

Social theory presents us today with an extensive collection of concepts to
capture and describe “those on the move”, which stand as possible alternatives
to the classical concept of “the migrant”.\textsuperscript{3} However, and despite the term in use,
all migrants (and travellers, expatriates or cosmopolitans) and their aspirations,
beliefs and practices integrate various spatial networks and temporal linkages.
This fact underlines the complexity of contemporary migrations’ multiple layers
and dimensions, and draws attention to the importance of the specificities
(Morley 2002) entailed in each particular experience. In reality, all migrations
are grounded on details with reference to: who travels and who stays; when,
how and in what circumstances does the first journey occur, as well as the
others who follow and or stay; what historic, economic, political and cultural
conditions mark the spaces crossed and the trajectories travelled; what is the
impact of the journey overtime on personal biographies; and how are new and
old relationships and networks characterised, along with the managing and
displaying of belonging and affection.

The “transnational turn” (Vertovec 2007) introduced significant changes
in the debate about the articulation of these several dimensions of migration.


\textsuperscript{3} The United Nations Migration Agency, the International Organisation for Migration, defines a
migrant as any person who is moving or has moved across an international border or within a State
away from their habitual place of residence, regardless of (1) the person’s legal status; (2) whether the
movement is voluntary or involuntary; (3) what the causes for the movement are; or (4) what the length
of the stay is.
It drew attention to the fact that most migrants maintain and manage their lives in spaces that go beyond national borders (Glick Schiller 1995), and to the importance of including within the analytical framework how institutions and states incorporate these movements and relations in order to control and manage them. Family and family ties emerged as especially significant in the structuring of transnational networks and relations. Transnationalism drew research away from approaches portraying those who migrated as passive reactors to the contexts and events that framed their journeys, promoting an alternative research agenda focused on migration experiences (Rosales 2017). Nowadays, in fact, various authors frequently focus on central aspects of these experiences and, particularly, on the importance of exploring the disconnections between the idealised, and often shared, plans and expectations every migration experience involves from the very beginning, and the subjective and objective conditions that those who move and those who stay actually experience. Tackling and comparing the migrant’s imagined states and expectations with the narratives and observations of their daily routines, perceptions and positioning strategies (Rosales 2012) became, therefore, a crucial topic of analysis. It generated productive lenses to explore present day multiple forms of movement as cultural and social processes. Hence, migration is increasingly addressed through religion, material culture, media, food and many other subject matters, whose intersections with human movements are decisive in its understanding, besides promoting dialogue between circulation and stillness in contemporary societies.

The relationship between motion and stasis continues to challenge this field of study. Movement, and especially transnational movement, is far from being unproblematic in contemporary societies. In fact, and in spite of the current intensification and globalisation of human circulation, most of the world’s population lives all their life in a relatively fixed and recognisable territory (Morley 2002). For many people, moreover, the possibility of moving continues to be impossible; while for others, it has become less necessary due to developments in ICT technologies and infrastructures. Circulation, therefore, needs to be seen within a frame that is broad enough to include, not only transience and motion, but also all the more stable and static dimensions of communal life.

A significant number of theoretical contributions have been consistently highlighting the centrality of community, kinship, residence and all other more or less stable forms of affiliation and belonging (Povrzanović Fryman...
contemporary movements across the Atlantic

2015; Fortier 2000 and Gardner 2002) in migration contexts. This trend has proved to be productive in integrating human mobility in a picture that transcends movement itself and is big enough to refocus the discussion on the main structures shaping social life and how they react, adjust and incorporate the increasingly complex reality of present day circulation.

CONTEMPORARY ATLANTIC CROSSINGS BETWEEN PORTUGAL AND BRAZIL

The first stage of Atlantic Crossings’ fieldwork was to interview 100 people who had migrated to and from one of the four cities the research was based on; while the second stage carried out participant observation with 5 families in each setting. The groups of respondents from the two Brazilian cities were mainly composed of skilled young Portuguese professionals, half of them married and with young children. Most of these individuals had been to Brazil before migration, as students and/or tourists, and claimed to know the country in general, and the city they choose to settle in relatively well. For all of them, migration was a new experience, in the sense that unlike many of their co-citizens who had migrated to Brazil in previous migration waves, their families did not have any prior migration experience.

The Portuguese families depict their migration to the two Brazilian cities as a decision resulting from choice rather than from need. In fact, most subjects resist being defined as migrants and prefer to use terms such as expat, foreigner or traveller to define their status in Brazil. Leaving one’s country of origin is, in their view, an enriching life experience and/or a significant stage in their transition from youth to adulthood. In fact, all subjects consider movement, i.e. the ability of being mobile, an important, almost imperative, life dimension of today’s global reality. Migration, and especially economic migration, however, is not evaluated the same way. This is why all subjects draw a clear dividing line between them and their social position in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo society today, and the other Portuguese migrants who arrived in Brazil many years ago to, according to them, escape poverty. A similar stance is expressed concerning all other migrants originating both from other non-European and non-North American locations. This dominant perception is further reinforced by a second, which pictures their mobility experience as a highly invested and planned adventure, therefore resulting only from their agency.
However, if movement is strategically organised and prepared, and its outcomes carefully calculated and controlled, it can also be described as a preventive mechanism to escape downward mobility, precariousness and material loss. The economic crisis the country has been facing since 2008 was a major topic of concern to all families, even if none of them was, in their words, experiencing real difficulties at the time they decided to migrate. This aspect introduces a conservative note in how migration is pictured and experienced by most subjects in the group, which is often conveyed in the sentence: *I decided to leave Portugal before something bad happened to me or my family*.

The second group of subjects, within the first stage of research, crossed the Atlantic in the opposite direction from the first group and settled in Lisbon and Porto. Like the first, this group is mostly made up of young skilled workers and post-graduate students who choose a Portuguese university to continue their studies. However, and in clear contrast with the first group, the subjects coming from Brazil openly claim to be *migrants* in Portugal, even if their migrant condition is, in some cases, nuanced by diverse explanations. In fact, some of the subjects explicitly stressed that, in their own words, *being a migrant in Portugal is a temporary condition since they were planning to apply for citizenship*, and others argued that they lived in constant transit between Brazil and Portugal, which made them somewhat different from regular Brazilian migrants. Like the first group, these subjects also carefully planned their migration, with high investment in their trajectories. This is especially evident in the cases of those who came to work in Lisbon and Porto, but also with those who have migrated to continue their studies. All subjects said they had carefully gathered a large amount of information about Portugal and the Portuguese legal system, as well as about Lisbon and Porto as places to live. All of them claimed to have a good knowledge of the country and its institutions, even if this was their first experience in Portugal for most.

The fact that both groups said they had carefully planned their journey to the Brazilian and Portuguese cities highlighted the potential significance of the media in contemporary migration experiences, as both a research field to gather information about key aspects of everyday life abroad and as an instrument for evaluating the possibility of particular places meeting personal aspirations and allowing present and future goals to be accomplished. Media analysis also proved important in exploring a second dimension directly related to the first: feeding prospective migrant imagination by promoting
idealised representations of some destinations and adverse representations of others.

The results of the first stage of the research showed that all subjects have used a significant variety of media to gather information and do research on prospective destinations concerning their personal migration. The media was used both before and after a final decision was made concerning the country and the city to emigrate to. Even if these results are significant per se, it is important to note that the questionnaire also revealed that subjects continued to use other very classical sources of information in migration contexts: family and friends. The importance of social networks (e.g. family, friends, colleagues, friends of friends) is especially visible when it comes to evaluating the reliability of the information gathered. Even if media content was never considered non-reliable, most subjects explained that it was often compared with material gathered through other (also reliable) sources of information.

MIGRATION IN THE MEDIA: THE PORTUGUESE AND BRAZILIAN PRESS

The first stage of the research produced extensive information regarding media uses. According to the data gathered, most subjects said they had made use of extensive sources of information, such as TV, printed media, radio and the Internet (e.g. webpages, blogs, social media, etc.) to investigate their prospective destinations. According to the results, the most significant source of information for both groups was the Internet, followed by printed media. However, when asked which sites were consulted, the online versions of the most prominent Brazilian and Portuguese newspapers and magazines stood out. This result illustrates the significance of the media for both groups and confirms the tendency towards a conservative position concerning the reliability of data, which was already evidenced by the importance attributed to family and friends as information sources.

The subjects in both groups said they were interested in a wide range of topics, when looking for information in the media directly related to their destination country and city. These topics ranged from structural aspects, such as the Brazilian and Portuguese health systems and services, job markets, security policies, housing, schools and school systems; to more subjective matters, such as the arts and culture scenes, leisure activities or cost of living, amongst others.
The fact that the information had been produced and displayed by traditional and reputable newspapers or magazines lent it, according to the subjects, if not the same value in terms of credibility as the data directly obtained from friends and family, at least a sign of quality and consistency that most of the other sources, in their words, *maybe did not offer*. This was the main reason to analyse the online versions of printed newspapers and magazines, which was not at first included in the research plan. However, its recurrent presence in the subjects’ discourse about the four cities and what they had to offer as migration destinations, i.e. working and living conditions, receptivity towards foreign citizens and migrants, education and health opportunities and constraints, histories of success and misfortune, as well as international migration in general, led to it.

The sample included the online edition of a large collection of Portuguese and Brazilian newspapers. All the journalism dealing with international migration with a special focus on migratory trends in Portugal and Brazil, in general, and on the movements between the four cities, in particular, were retained. The time frame analysis was, for the Portuguese press, from July 2013 to September 2014; and for the Brazilian press, from April 2013 to September 2014. The research gathered a total of 307 pieces that were subjected to content analysis and classified according to their relevance to the project. From these, 213 were from Portuguese newspapers and 94 from Brazilian. The sample included both free and restricted access press and was representative of the most renowned newspapers and magazines in both countries.

The media content analysis was based on 14 pre-defined general topics, which emerged both from preliminary interviews with the subjects and from literature research.

**THE MATTER OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION: THE BRAZILIAN PRESS**

The most visible topic emerging from the news sample of Brazilian press is not the *Atlantic Crossings* of Portuguese people seeking a better life in Brazil, but the Haitian migration. The flow between Portugal and Brazil was, however, the second most significant theme (15) in all the Brazilian press articles dealing directly with immigration. These articles are significantly diverse and deal with a wide variety of topics, such as: the maintenance of Portuguese cultural
### Table 7.1

**Migration in Portuguese and Brazilian Media**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOPICS</th>
<th>PORTUGUESE MEDIA 213 (N)</th>
<th>BRAZILIAN MEDIA 94 (N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Migration total</td>
<td>Port./Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flows</td>
<td>52 (24.4%)</td>
<td>9 (17.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegality</td>
<td>22 (10.3%)</td>
<td>7 (13.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical relationships</td>
<td>6 (2.8%)</td>
<td>2 (3.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment (general)</td>
<td>8 (3.8%)</td>
<td>———</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>precariouesity</td>
<td>8 (3.8%)</td>
<td>3 (5.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>entrepreneurship</td>
<td>8 (3.8%)</td>
<td>3 (5.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unskilled labour</td>
<td>9 (4.2%)</td>
<td>1 (1.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>skilled labour</td>
<td>42 (19.7%)</td>
<td>9 (17.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>remuneration</td>
<td>4 (1.9%)</td>
<td>2 (3.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime</td>
<td>36 (16.9%)</td>
<td>13 (24.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration</td>
<td>17 (8.0%)</td>
<td>1 (1.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return migration</td>
<td>7 (3.3%)</td>
<td>1 (1.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy (general)</td>
<td>7 (3.3%)</td>
<td>3 (5.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>crisis</td>
<td>24 (11.3%)</td>
<td>4 (7.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>social mobility</td>
<td>1 (0.5%)</td>
<td>1 (1.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>remittances</td>
<td>8 (3.8%)</td>
<td>4 (7.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sectors/exports</td>
<td>1 (0.5%)</td>
<td>1 (1.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>public/private agreements</td>
<td>7 (3.3%)</td>
<td>3 (5.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural costs</td>
<td>1 (0.5%)</td>
<td>1 (1.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural references</td>
<td>7 (3.3%)</td>
<td>3 (5.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration policies</td>
<td>15 (7.0%)</td>
<td>3 (5.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>attraction</td>
<td>26 (12.2%)</td>
<td>8 (15.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>containment</td>
<td>13 (6.1%)</td>
<td>———</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>support</td>
<td>———</td>
<td>———</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demography</td>
<td>24 (11.3%)</td>
<td>2 (3.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xenophobia/discrimination</td>
<td>———</td>
<td>———</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
traditions by the migrant communities of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro; the positive integration of Portuguese workers in the Brazilian skilled labour market and their entrepreneurship competences; the Portuguese economic crisis and the immigration attraction policies developed by the Portuguese government, such as the *Golden Visa Programme*; and the opening of places specifically for Brazilian students at Portuguese Universities.

There were, in fact, 5 articles exclusively devoted to the Portuguese economic crisis and its impact on Portuguese emigration rates. The Brazilian immigration policies were also a significant topic. The articles devoted to this topic particularly emphasised the new Brazilian legislation on the topics of temporary and work visa programmes, the national policies for attracting foreign health professionals (especially doctors), and the excessive bureaucracy of the Brazilian legal system concerning migration. The flow out of Brazil did not have the same attention from the press as immigration. Some articles addressed the “pros and cons of life abroad”, from a Brazilian point of view, while other pieces drew attention to the visibility and impact of the return migration going on in the Brazilian population residing in Portugal, as a consequence of the economic crisis. The existence of a dominant international representation of Brazil as an “exotic and exciting destination” and place to live also attracted the attention of the Brazilian press during the period of analysis.

**The Matter of International Migration: The Portuguese Press**

Unlike the Brazilian press, the Portuguese main newspapers and magazines devoted a great deal of attention to migration during the whole analysis time frame. Hence, there is a significant number of articles in the research sample addressing the high emigration rates Portugal was facing at the time per se, as well as several opinion texts that explore the theme of emigration and identify it as a direct consequence of the economic crisis; or as a possible way of balancing the economic insecurity, risk of unemployment and lack of opportunities resulting from the financial crisis. These two topics – emigration and emigration and crisis - are often explored in association with others, such as the demographic implications of migration; the impact of migration on the national skilled labour force; or the national immigration policies in times of strong emigration flows.

There are also a significant number of pieces exploring the young age of present day Portuguese emigrants. These articles in particular tend to stress
the economic and demographic risks this new emigration trend inflicts on the future of a country such as Portugal, which already had a high rate of aged population before the crisis. There are also 5 articles directly addressing the Brazilian policies to attract foreign doctors and engineers (with a special focus on the Portuguese who decided to join these programmes). The great majority of the articles are, however, dedicated to the emigration of skilled Portuguese men and women and reporting their lives abroad. These last articles portray the migration of this particular group as positive, not only from a professional and economic angle, but also in terms of the quality of life they have achieved abroad.

Regarding the movements across the Atlantic from Brazil to Portugal, there is a significant and prevailing presence of articles in the Portuguese press that continue to explore the classic journalistic topics devoted to migration issues. The most frequent of these topics are: illegal labour, crime, drugs, trafficking and prostitution. The *Golden Visa Programme* implemented in Portugal also got the attention of the Portuguese press. Most of the articles criticised this particular policy for the pressure it put on the housing market, considered an additional stress factor with negative economic impact on the already fragile Portuguese population suffering from generalised financial cutbacks at the time.

The analysis took into account the data concerning the number of times these articles were assessed, viewed and/or shared. This exercise was limited by the fact that some of the webpages did not allow access to this specific data, while others provided a large amount of information regarding the number of viewings, forwards, prints, comments and shares in the social media their articles had. A substantial number of the articles included in the sample (both in the Portuguese and Brazilian press) presented a significant number of viewings, were shared on Facebook and Twitter and were intensively debated for more than a week in the newspapers’ webpages.

**CRITICAL ANALYSIS AND SOME TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS**

The content in the online versions of the Portuguese and Brazilian media are representative of the different economic, politic and social positions the two countries were experiencing at the time on the international scene. The Brazilian economy was being boosted and the country was in the spotlight,
not only due to its economic growth, but also by being the host country for the World Cup (in 2014) and the Olympics (2016). Portugal, in contrast, was experiencing great instability. Strongly affected by the financial crisis, the country was dealing with the consequences of a rigid austerity policy and facing very high rates of unemployment and emigration. And even if the major contingent of people exiting the country was composed of unskilled workers heading towards European countries, such as the UK and Germany, the Portuguese media was particularly focused on exploring the departure of a minority group: the highly skilled young professionals. This focus created a perception that Portuguese emigration was mostly highly skilled, young and heading to Europe; but also to post-colonial destinations such as Brazil and Angola. This had a great impact on the public debate of the matter and blurred the true impact of exits from the country at that particular time. It also prevented the discussion of Portuguese emigration by the media in a longer term, structural way. By presenting this emigration flow as distinctive in terms of age and socio-economic composition, when compared with all the others that make up the long history of Portuguese emigration, the media indirectly helped to establish both a reductionist picture of the topic and dividing lines between migrants.

A good example of the prominence of this main representation is The Portuguese at the Heart of the Euro, published by Público, which tells the personal stories of young Portuguese who work at the European Central Bank and live trendy lives in central Europe. Another instance is the multimedia series, Indubitably Portuguese, also produced by Público, which presents the lives and migration experiences of young artists and highly skilled workers in online videos. Migration experiences are depicted as successful and those involved as educated and qualified people who directly engage in community and political activities in order to defend their best interests.

As for the Brazilian press, migration is addressed in two contrasting ways. When focusing on Brazilian emigrants, the content tends to stress both the advantages (e.g. security and higher wages) and disadvantages (e.g. distance from family and lack of integration or precarious jobs) of migration. In both cases, immigrants or prospective emigrants give their testimonies and are photographed. Brazil is almost always portrayed as a welcoming country, which accepts and fully integrates migrants, in general; and Portuguese migrants, in particular, due to the existing historical and cultural bonds between the two countries. The press in both countries, in fact, tends to make use of colonial
and post-colonial arguments to explore and justify the positive representation of Portuguese migrants in Brazil in a similar way.

To conclude, the media had a significant impact on both groups’ migration experiences. This impact was particularly clear in terms of migration planning. The media is a powerful information tool and was used intensely to gather data on a diversity of topics concerning prospective migration destinations, which all subjects considered a key aspect to their successful professional and social integration. Its importance was only surpassed by information and knowledge provided by friends and family with previous migration experiences. The information gathered in the Portuguese and Brazilian media played another significant role for the Portuguese group: it provided the subjects with an overall portrait of how to present and evaluate their own ongoing migration experiences, based on the stories of other migrants with similar backgrounds and experiences. It also gave them important material to establish a dividing line between them and other migrants, in general; and Portuguese migrants in Brazil, in particular.

Every migrant residing in the four cities was highly proactive in gathering data in order to inform and justify the crucial options all migration entails. Nonetheless, the sources explored were rather conservative, since the majority showed a clear preference for mainstream newspapers and magazines. This choice is justified by arguments stressing the objectivity and reliability of the information displayed which, in their view, highly compensated for some lack of diversity and representativeness on how the contemporary international circulation of people was being portrayed and their experiences examined during the period of analysis.

> ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The research leading to these results has received funding from FCT Research Project (PTDC/CS-ANT/119803/2010) Atlantic Crossings: materiality, contemporary movements and policies of belonging.

MARTA VILAR ROSALES
Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa
Av. Prof. Aníbal Bettencourt 9 — 1600-036 Lisboa, Portugal
marta.rosales@ics.ulisboa.pt
orcid.org/0000-0001-6576-2039
REFERENCES


cite this chapter as:
https://doi.org/10.31447/ics9789726715030.07
Tactics in movement: pursuing social inclusion in transnational migration

Simone Frangella
INTRODUCTION

Within the social webs comprising migratory movement, mutual-help and forms of cohabitation prove to be fundamental for their creation and maintenance. Both in the sphere of national and international migration, overlapping or running in parallel with forms of State agency or even the illegal networks that emerge in this area, these support relations are a crucial axis of the circulation composing the dynamics of migration, as a collective fact and an individual itinerary (Menezes and Godoi 2011; Martes 1999). Whether in search of new forms of family-based economic reproduction, or due to “going out into the world” seeking social experience of a diverse order, migrants create trajectories that are contingent upon exchanges, favours and interactions between relatives, friends from the place of origin and new ones met along the travelled route. This process involves an intense movement of people, assets and information. It continuously redefines and creates the social relations and significance of place that characterise the daily experiences of these individuals (Olwig 2007).

In the debate on transnational migratory mobility, this phenomenon is reflected in the movement of non-institutional actors crossing one or more national, geographic, cultural and political frontiers (Schiller Basch and Blanc 1995; Portes 2006), and creating heterogeneous personal and collective experiences in view of the political and economic asymmetries generated by these frontiers, in complex and non-linear transits (Lee 2008; Sheringham 2010). On this extensive spatial scale, in which circulation is accelerated by the development of transport and communication technologies, a whole procedural mechanism of interpersonal relations is formed, articulating space, time, precariousness or clandestinity, delineating and diversifying social networks in terms of dimension, location and social form (Hannerz 1996; Harney and Baldassar 2007). Crossing the transatlantic distance and that of national frontiers, the networks implicated in this journey between the place of origin and the various destinations involve a daily negotiation of social and translocal interactions in terms of obligations, opportunities and constraints (Olwig 2007, 9). It is in this broad scenario of movements, interests and practices between point of origin, trajectory and place of destination that the migrants construct places and feelings of belonging.

Regarding Brazilian emigration, given the absence of government initiatives for this movement and the significant existence of barriers into the
countries of destination, it is the reciprocity between relatives and friends or acquaintances in the town of origin that, on most occasions, guide the flows of transnational movement. Acts of mutuality foster everything, from the provision of invitations, information and practical measures for migration, to logistical and emotional support upon arrival and in adapting to the intended destination, including the maintenance of ties with the place of origin. Although institutional networks, such as tourist agencies and illegal contacts for recruitment of undocumented migrants, may play a significant role in some of these flows (Pereira 2011; Assis 1999), they lack the intense dynamics of the webs of interpersonal relationships.

The world of mutual help has a substantial, albeit not total, component of social interaction alluding to feelings of familiarity/similarity. This means that people involved in these support networks are, in principle, relatives and friends or acquaintances who, in some manner, embody a lingering proximity with the family and place of origin. With time and circulation, these networks also include people related to the daily life of the migrant, who contribute by adding other meanings of place. Thus, the construction of the transnational itinerary can be viewed from a procedural configuration of kinship, family and friendship, from the intersubjective participations that formed them (Carsten 2004; Sahlins 2011) and from the identity of places (Olwig 2007).

Transnational mobility moves and is moved along these axes, making the migratory experience a piece of personal and collective history, and creating a new way of being in the world. However, precisely due to its procedural and negotiated nature, this sphere characterised by connectivity stands on a fine balance of interactions, subject to the political, social, economic and personal imponderables of this movement. It is essential to understand the rough lines and sharp edges involved along the route, and the spatial and time dimensions directing them, searching for the forms of intersubjectivity, the fragile relationship among individuals and their environments.

---

1 Up to the 1970s, the migratory movement was sporadic. Brazilian emigration began to be more systematic from the 1980s onwards, with significant numbers emigrating particularly to the United States and Japan. The flow increased from the second half of this decade, as did news about Brazilians barred abroad. A large number of these migrants were illegal, except for the dekassegus in Japan, who were legalised. During the 1990s, the destinations of Brazilian emigration diversified further. Adding to the movement to the United States and Japan, by this time gaining density, Italy and Portugal became other destinations (Assis and Sasaki 2001). In the 21st century, most West European countries were included in this route, such as the United Kingdom, Ireland, Germany, Holland, Spain and France. For the majority of the flows, these emigrants are illegal, although there is also a significant number of people with double citizenship.
between time, employment networks and the investment expectation identifying this connectivity. I therefore decided to frame them under the concept of vicinality. Reflected in mutual-help practices and forms of cohabitation between transnational migrants, vicinality is understood herein as the dynamics of territory and circulation of people, creating webs of proximity, initially formed by family members, but later or simultaneously by kin and friends.

The concept refers, in different anthropological studies, to neighbourhood groups, including relatives (that generally come in first place), similar and non-family members recruited for specific mutual-help purposes, with non-rigid inter-group relationships and spatial definitions (Webster 2009; Pina-Cabral 1991). Although the formation of this vicinality emerges, in the cases in which it has been identified, from the gathering together of relatives, there is a common and necessary inclusion of people with more tenuous ties. In other words, cohabitation and neighbour relations extend beyond the primary social unit (Pina-Cabral 1991). In both contexts, the condition of belonging to the group is given by an expected reciprocity, by the maintenance of loyalties, negotiated and transformed over time (Webster 2009, 90).

In theorising my research context – the migration of the inhabitants of the state of Goiás (Goianos) to Portugal – two aspects of this concept are particularly interesting. The first refers to the way that neighbourhood experiences are spatially flexible, often giving rise to the establishment of mutual-help practices among people who are not necessarily close neighbours. Although there is a certain spatial coherence, the belonging to the group is not defined according to the proximity of the homes, but rather to the strength of the ties that are maintained (Webster 2009). Thus, for the most part, mutuality relations condition the dynamics of the particular vicinality and its inherent mobility. Pina-Cabral addresses this condition in an interesting manner: vicinality is not a spatially determined area, but rather a spatial relationship. The residential proximity occurs around ties that are structured, and which modify or have modified the actual spatiality of the relations according to the geographical or social distances that are created therein (Pina-Cabral 1991, 186). This feature confers relative expansion dynamics in spatial terms, as well as relationship networks comprising the vicinality; a potential enlargement and inclusion, which maintains a certain spatial and genealogical coherence.

I propose theorising this potential enlargement and inclusion in the case of transnational migratory transits. This would enable, on the one hand, understanding how mutuality relations enlarge and modify, both in the cities
the migrants left behind or those they went to, and in the actual migratory trajectory. To what extent are the mutual-help practices maintained along this transnational distance? What are the elements that make it work and what are the limiting aspects? How do people reiterate or remake their solidarity with relatives and friends? How are new relationships created in the destination? Through the description of the trajectory of these migrants, I wish to show that vicinality is a form of organisation in which mutuality relations play a central dynamic role, not fixed or predetermined but, as Webster describes, plastic. I would venture to say that it is this very plasticity that conditions the construction of migratory mobility.

The second aspect refers to the tenacity of this set of exchanges and the feelings involved in it. From Webster’s perspective, the balancing of two dimensions is attempted. On the one hand, feelings such as solidarity, cronyism, hospitality, “friendship”, affinity and kinship underlie the constitution of groups and the set of actions of relatives and non-family members. Steeped in the same inspiration, and based on Porto families, Pina-Cabral suggests commensality as “the most important form of representing familiarity and, consequently, one of the principal pillars of the language of emotion” (Pina-Cabral 1991, 200). On the other hand, and particularly in Chope’s case, internal competitiveness and falling expectations of mutual help can lead to the breakup of these connections (Webster 2009, 131). Vicinality is, therefore, defined as a negotiated feature: the close relationship between the language of emotions and the pragmatic actions that involve the group. The maintenance of these aspects requires constant negotiation and care, and the emotional components are reasons to change vicinality.

In the trajectories of the people I followed, what really caught my attention was not so much the formation of webs, but rather the apparently volatile parameters sustaining them. In these essential mutual-help group relations making up cohabitation, there is a series of imprecisions, emotional turbulence, practical failings, negotiations that, in general, appear less in studies on migration than the cohesion of these webs (Martes 1999). There is a fragile balance in these interactions, maintained based on feeble relations of trust which, nevertheless, fuel the circularity moving these paths. Crucial feelings in the sustainment of these webs of solidarity, commensality and mutual-help, such as trust and consideration, are constantly being challenged by the characteristic difficulties of migratory circulation. In this case, the initial consequence of vicinality is a drive to reproduce the interactions between
the relatives who once were and those who remained behind, the friends of back home and friends due to affinity. Migrants move to places that are references for them via their contacts in their place of origin, and likewise live in the same houses or houses close to Goianos in the destination society. However, while the network initially serves to strengthen the reproduction of these relations, over time and due to the changes of migratory dynamics, the network broadens, opening up to other social interactions.

Based on the experience of Goianos who moved to Portugal, in this article I propose to examine how people construct the space of mutuality in transnational mobility. In order to better understand the social and individual hardships of migrants in this broadly encompassing context – in more extended spatial dynamics and challenging temporality – I will list, through several trajectories, the vicinality practices involved in constructing the path of this mobility, and following this, how it is revealed in initial cohabitation experiences. In the construction of this path, vicinality pervades through temporalities and barriers of a diverse nature, constantly repositioning generational, affective and labour-related relations, expectations of world and the notion of belonging. The emerging fragility of these dynamics paradoxically coexists with the tenacity of the webs that underpin the migratory circuit, and the search for inclusion practices in the destination society.

VICINALITY IN ROUTE

Goiânia and its surroundings can be considered one of the major centres of most visible Brazilian emigration, together with the region of Governador Valadares, a well-established centre in this transnational process (Assis 1999; Machado 2010), and North of Paraná. This is not a precise statistical finding because, although there are numbers on Brazilian immigrants abroad, there is no accurate information on the amount of people and the proportion per region in these flows. However, the massive presence of migrants from these three regions is empirically noted in various European countries, notably Portugal, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Belgium and Spain. Goiás is a region

2 The study on which this article is based addresses the dynamics of the migratory networks between Goiás and Portugal. This research ran from 2009 until 2015, as part of my post-doctorate, and included fieldwork in Lisbon, Goiânia and Anápolis.
in which migration grew exponentially in the first decade of the 21st century.\(^3\) According to the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística – IBGE – at this time, Goiás became the state with the largest number of international emigrants\(^4\), although the visible effects of the international migration are still rather diluted in Goianan cities.

Goianan emigrants constitute a dense network, motivated by the opportunity to fast-track their entry into a consumer circuit, by the desire to venture into a world already known to their contemporaries and by a commitment to investments in order to create their place (which, in the majority of cases, is back in the region they left, although there are many exceptions). Most of these people come under the profile of the migrant worker and, at least in the beginning, move without documentation. As constantly happens where lack of documentation is the most common condition, the social webs around this movement are responsible for helping the migrant in taking the first steps, in adapting to the destination, and in maintaining ties with Goiás.

During the trajectory involving the migratory movement, mutual-help practices stand out in some particular moments: in obtaining information about the destination society and the ways to get there; in obtaining the airline ticket and other travel arrangements; in reception upon arrival; and in employment indications and the continuous return journeys or visits to Goiás. Although other gradually and timidly emerging social networks in this circuit are present, such as commercial interest (the case of tourism agencies), prostitution and religious entities, it is the connection with relatives and family members, friends and acquaintances of the town of origin that actually enable the circulation of people, information and resources. These links are informal and not necessarily inter-articulated.

\(^3\) It should be said that there was already a flow of Goianos to the United States in the 1980s (Ribeiro 1999).

\(^4\) The IBGE (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics) 2010 demographic census records 35,572 Goianos living abroad. The Centre-West region corresponds to 12% of the emigrants, in particular Goiás, which contributes with 7.2% of this contingent. Although the largest flow is from the Southeast (49%), these three other regions – Minas Gerais, Paraná and Goiás – are increasingly visible. This is due to the fact that they have very systematic flows containing a more homogenous profile of the undocumented labour migrant. See “Goianos lideram emigração”, *O Hoje*, Thursday, 17th November 2011. From them on, even with the economic crisis in Portugal that has prompted Brazilian migrants to return to home in recent years, there is still a significant flow coming from Goiás, less numerous, but steady.
Relatives or friends from the same neighbourhood are essential in stimulating the drive to migrate, even when the information is not necessarily real or positive. The people that I contacted or interviewed went to Portugal as a result of encouragement by their mother, aunt or uncle, children, a cousin, a brother or else a friend who was already in Portugal. “Friends” generally means friends of parents, neighbours in Goiânia, friends of cousins. This encouragement is done by the Internet (migrants are avid users of social networks or chat rooms such as Msn/Skype and Orkut/Facebook in order to communicate) or telephone. On some occasions, the stimulus is given in a less intentional way. Communication with the relative or friend nourishes the imagination of those remaining behind concerning the desired world of possibilities, even if the severe plight of the migrant’s situation is frequently highlighted, along with disappointments concerning work and the difficulty of returning. At other times, it is the parents or friends that instigate the movement, and ensure a good initial experience, as is the case, for example, of mothers who encourage their daughters to emigrate in order to have access to good education, or get over a “broken heart”, or even to be close to them.

This is the case of Soraia, who I met and followed up in Lisbon. Currently 30 years old, she moved to Portugal eleven years ago due to separating from her former husband. Her mother, who was already in Lisbon, together with Soraia’s aunt, persuaded her to leave Goiânia. Both mother and aunt had arrived through the intervention of a cousin. Her airline ticket was purchased. When questioned why she decided to move, Soraia said that she was kind of “drifting” as a result of the breakup. She knew nothing about Portugal or the employment possibilities, which were vaguely listed by her mother. This “drifting” is common in the discourse of the young migrants in my research. But these are not necessarily feelings of passiveness or indifference; they appear, above all, to be possible answers to personal misfortunes, to the need for adventure, or the desire to rapidly access consumer products, one of the aspects of information most conveyed in this migratory transit.

Nonetheless, the objectives are somewhat obscure, inasmuch as the information is uncertain. The decision to migrate is encouraged by those who return as migrants, or by friends who are abroad, with whom they communicate...
by the Internet. In other words, the ideas and references substantiating this decision and the strategies that enable the movement are fostered from various points (spatial and temporal) of the migratory circuit. Those who have already left or who are in transit supply a constant source of “expectations of change”. The fact that this information might be far from being reliable, or that there may be discouraging discourses on the migratory experience (expressing the harshness of “life abroad”, for example) is of little significance in comparison to the ambitions projected by images and consumer products circulating on the Internet. At this initial stage, and at subsequent moments of these trajectories, information is the great mobiliser of the mutual-help networks. Their potential failings can lead to cracks in this network, without, however, compromising the projection of the migrants’ expectations.

Once the desire to travel has been expressed, the arrangements must be made for the journey. Arnaldo, another interviewee, paid for his airline ticket out of his own pocket, while Soraia obtained hers through her mother. In most cases, the airline ticket is funded by the closest relatives, who can be in the homeland or already outside the country, establishing a debt that is payable according to negotiated deadlines, depending on proximity and affection, or the relative’s need. In many cases, due to this form of indebtedness, the migratory project initially becomes a family project (Nogueira 2011; Pereira 2011; Assis and Sasaki 2001). However, this condition is not always maintained. The debt might not be paid, or, once paid, the person who migrated begins to establish other social ties and other priorities, weakening this connection.6

This first material exchange is one of the clearest connections between the place of departure and arrival. Other important preparations for the journey, such as the letter of recommendation written by a person in the destination society, are also part of this strategy. Together with the letter, there will be an address that becomes the reference accommodation for the immigration agents. This address may or may not correspond to place the person will actually be. The preparatory steps for the relocation have progressively changed in accordance with the gradual increase of the flow of Brazilian emigrants to Portugal and their experiences of entering the country. There is a difference between the period when Arnaldo travelled, and the time when

6 Another group of these migrants require an agent to fund the journey. This generally implies a pawning of assets, which ends up involving the migrant’s family, placing the family’s assets and belongings at risk (Pereira 2011, 227). Although these cases are not the majority, they indicate the complex relationship between other members of the migratory network and personal mutual help relations.
Soraia moved. Regarding Arnaldo, the demand for civil construction workers in the early 21st century facilitated the entrance of Brazilian migrants, who bought their flights and travelled with tourist visas. Many were received by potential employers right at the airport. Five years later, when Soraia travelled, it was more difficult to enter the country, especially for Brazilian women, who were constantly suspected of belonging to prostitution rings. The changes of strategy are set out, above all, by friends and family members who are abroad, and constitute a part of this empirical experience, not always very clear, of “being abroad”.

**MUTUAL-HELP GROUPS IN THE DESTINATION**

Having arrived in Portugal, and having successfully passed through the immigration service, the migrant begins the next stage. Arnaldo telephoned his cousin’s husband, who explained to him how to get to the house by taxi. Soraia was received by her mother, like many migrants who are received at the airport by their relatives or friends and then go to their homes, or to rented rooms in the same house. Even if they do not have a contact person to receive them, in general, they have details about a boarding house or private house linked to their place of origin. After the first few days at his cousin’s house, having already contacted a contractor recommended by a friend in Goiânia, Arnaldo moved to a house lived in by people of various nationalities and began working in civil construction. Soraia, who went to her mother’s house, started working in a restaurant the following week.

The arrival in Portugal is, in most cases, delineated by this mutual-help system. Through the network of their contacts, by this time more enlarged, they might able to find work right in the first week, at this time also making a commitment to pay the rent and other charges. For the initial period, until they adapt to the new place, the recently arrived migrants remain in these residential schemes, which may or not be extended, depending on the balance between interaction with relatives and other more pragmatic issues. Thus, work, house and initial contacts essentially involve these relationships. The gradual insertion in other social and economic scenarios in the destination countries slowly but steadily expands their mesh of social connections, covering Brazilians from other regions, migrants of other nationalities, non-migrants, religious or political entities. However, the initial networks prior
to this later stage suggest that proximity to the family, the connection with Goiânia and daily life among Brazilians are stronger reference points than the alterity relations experienced in the new country. There is, in the beginning, an impression of territorial continuity, which is especially evident in the presence of the known, of close kinship or friendship as if with a relative, through these mutual help and protection networks. While this may minimise the yearning for the homeland or homesickness, it does not prevent the transformation of feelings of belonging.

Another important aspect of this circuit is the maintenance of ties with the homeland, whether temporary or permanent. The relationship with the place they left is constantly maintained either through cash remittances or through contact via the Internet, telephone or letters, as was done in the previous decade (Assis 1999; Frangella 2013). Here, information is once again a fundamental element in the maintenance of mutuality relations. The exchange of news between those who left to embrace the world and those who stayed behind is an essential thermometer of continuity or rupture of relations (Nogueira 2011), underlying both the socio-economic schemes that structure these interactions, and also keeping alive the narratives on the updated “experience”, thus strengthening the relatives’ incentive to circulate. There is a need for news affirming the success of a migratory project, which then legitimises the risk of the experience to the family, neighbours and friends. As a consequence, there is a complex fictional side to these narratives, which contributes intensely to the specific maintenance of this network.

Finally, the temporary visit for leisure purposes or definitive return also involves arrangements made by close and extended family members, as in the case of Arnaldo and his brothers, recently returned to Goiânia. They were received at the airport with great joy. Some of the brothers, still without a home, were hosted in the homes of family members and friends as guests or new residents. In some cases, depending on the degree of success or failure of the person returning, money is also loaned. When the return is temporary, the visitors must meet two requirements. The first is to visit the people who were part of their daily life when they lived there, in addition to visiting other more distant relatives to tell the news and share their experience. The second is related to the concept of a gift (Nogueira 2011). Apart from the assistance that the migrants continue to assure even during their temporary return, there are products and presents to be distributed. Not bringing presents can be interpreted as “mean spirited”, or lacking in consideration, thus recalling
the reciprocity established implicitly between the migrants and those who remained behind.

The very brief and systematic incursion into this trajectory serves as an analytical map of highly dynamic relations involving a re-dimensioned spatiality. People who experience the mutuality practices referred to above come, in principle, from a localised aggregation in the country of origin. As they move along the migratory path, however, they seek to temporally and spatially extend these relations. A vicinality thus occurs surpassing the core of kinship and spatial geographical proximity, creating a type of *continuum* between the place of departure, the place of arrival and the actual path. The dynamics of information embody an empirical field conditioning and altering relations and feelings, constituting another fundamental place in this *continuum* (Oosterbaan 2010). In this regard, the connection between relatives, friends and neighbours is plastic and inclusive, without necessarily losing its reference to the initial core.

All these mutual-help practices are marked by feelings. They rely, in the first place, on the feeling of trust. Trust is the credit given to people in relation to whom consideration is nurtured; i.e. an emotive investment fostering the upkeep of material relations and of sharing between people (Pina-Cabral and Vanda Silva 2013, 26).\(^7\) Affection is connected to trust due to the person “belonging to the family” or being a “friend of the family”, or “a friend of mine from my home town”. Accompanying this classification is the implicit expectation, on some occasions, that this consideration will activate the wheels of inter-help group practices. This expectation is the affective projection based on the hope that the mutuality relations derived from relations of trust will be materialised and made public\(^8\) in their shared environment. Although this was not a systematic part of the discourse of my

---

7 In their study on the Bahia Southern Lowlands, Pina-Cabral and Vanda Silva explored the notion of consideration that came up in their interviewees’ discourse. This concept was what gave meaning to the relationship between people, albeit being a vague and large implicit attitude (Pina-Cabral and Silva 2013, 25). The study by Pina-Cabral and Silva brings out this significant element which I believe can be seen in other contexts of relations of reciprocity, such as is the case of the Goianos in question. Although the empirical mapping of this concept in their study is particularly directed at relations of affiliation and kinship in Bahia, it involves the issues of vicinality present in this context.

8 Being made public means, according to Pina-Cabral and Silva, that consideration must be expressed and constructed in a joint action between the subjects that foster it (2013, 27). Moreover, consideration is always embodied in interpersonal relations.
interviewees, their narratives pointed to the importance of this feeling as the engine driving such reciprocity. Consideration appears to be essential for the construction of this vicinality.

The counterbalancing feeling permeating these relations, particularly when they do not work out well, or when they become more vulnerable, is envy, deception. The weak nodes holding together this circulation are justified by competition between relatives, neighbours and friends. This competitiveness goes far beyond a banal conflict between Brazilian compatriots; it is part of the daily immigrant narrative. It becomes more serious when these supportive relationships, supposedly the mainstay of the trajectory, are broken. Family and friend networks involving Goiano migrants are marked by numerous fissures and fault lines, or setbacks. From the very beginning, the information exchanged on laws, places to stay and employment guarantees, on which the decision to migrate is based, are often inaccurate.

Likewise, not all the practical preparations are rock solid. Letters of invitation that are badly written or contain information that heightens the suspicion of the immigration official are part of the lack of success narratives in entering the country. Sometimes, the recently arrived migrants are faced with the absence of the people who were supposed to receive them. Cases were reported to me of cousins, or friends of uncles and aunts, who had promised accommodation and work, and then did not turn up, leaving the migrants in very difficult situation. Very often, the employment networks do not function, forcing the recently arrived migrant to search for other resources or contacts. And, finally, gossip and moral accusations feed the network via means of communication, or even personal conversations, as described by Machado. These can become threats to the connections established up to this point, such as marital affairs (Machado 2010). All these issues alert us to the notion of the immigrant's risk and social fragility (Pereira 2011), creating a constant tension within these links of affection and mutual exchange, and of survival practices.

The feeling of cooperation appears to be the keynote that justifies the grouping of relatives and non-family members. In the case of the Chope society, studied by Webster (2009), the nature of the relationship between the leader who forms the vicinality and the follower is transactional. It is based on a reciprocity that can be broken, and the probabilities of fission are significant. On the one hand, feelings such as solidarity, cronyism, hospitality, “friendship”, kinship and affinity lay the foundations for group constitution and the actions of relatives and non-family members. On the other hand,
internal competitiveness and lowered expectations of mutual help can lead to the breakup of these emotional connections.

These two aspects of vicinality delineate the negotiated character of these relationships, in addition to the close link between the language of emotions and the pragmatic actions involving the group. A relative spatial flexibility in the constitution of the neighbourhood (including relatives and non-family members) reinforces the path (time and space tension in this mobility) and, in itself, a production of place. These networks are, for a long period of the migrants’ stay, the basis of the movement that allows them to remain in the destination country, and maybe the only main support until the migrant eventually manages to access more diverse social and economic opportunities, through the State or through the labour and housing market.

It is almost consensual that in many international migratory situations, recently arrived migrants share houses or rooms. The forms of accommodation vary according to what is achieved in that initial period, in general with people who share their closest points of reference (Dias 2010; Assis 1999). This means that people who lived close to one another or were neighbours in Goiânia, or with whom mutual help relations were already maintained, tend to live together. When this is not the case, people helping the migrants in their initial arrangements normally provide a room in a collective house, with other migrants. Some neighbourhoods are concentrations of pensions or rented houses, which are offered for modest prices upon arrival in the country through the information networks circulating in the cities, as in the case of Arroios, in Lisbon, in the last decade (Frangella 2014). Very often, the houses are shared by people of the same town; when this is not the case, the dwellers are practically all Brazilian. Here, the house serves as a place of preservation of “Brazilian” socio-cultural rules and the promotion of a “national” sociability, in addition to transmitting cultural capital about the destination (Dias 2010).

If entry into the desired country is difficult, living with strangers makes this even more complicated. When he and his brother moved into the house offered by his employers, Arnaldo experienced considerable hardship, living in a house with other foreigners, who allegedly robbed him. Cases like this are regularly narrated and constitute the primary complaint of recently arrived immigrants. After their construction work finished, and their move to another city in Portugal, Arnaldo and his brother started to rent an apartment, which was gradually filled up with other brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces and households also part of this migratory movement. However, neighbourhood
relations are added to the family core, with various friends from Goiás and new Brazilian and foreign friends visiting the house.

This first address represents an important experience, as it marks the beginning of the adaptation and is also a test of proximity and trust. Following common rules, learning to live “all on top of one another” (as is the case of couples with children who share a room), paying for the accommodation, all the while getting used to the new location, is always recounted as an enormous challenge. Here, the social interaction, the exchanges of loans and the expectations of mutuality are exacerbated. Trust and envy merge dynamically. At this address, many friendships and affective relationships revolving around kinship start to founder and the search for new living spaces begins. Thus, vicinality becomes a slow congregation of this network that begins with Brazilian relatives and subsequently incorporates, in a fragmented manner, other friends, provided that they adopt Brazilian attitudes.

Understanding vicinality and its permeability is therefore essential in theorising a rationality where exchange relations gradually expand beyond what was the initial network (relatives, friends or acquaintances in some way linked to the town of origin). Slowly and steadily, other Brazilians, some Portuguese, some immigrants of African origin are included. Above all, a network of mutual-help and sharing is formed, linked to the dynamics of the house and dispersed in the urban space where the daily lifestyles are staged. Cohabitation relations, while continuing to be guided by similar mutual help, change according to the possibilities of daily life. In Portugal, the houses become an extension, not analogous, but rather reconfigured, “of the homes” – or family configurations – of origin, and also create another sense of place.

The same occurs with another spatial dimension, the neighbourhood in which they live. In general, the choice of the neighbourhood is linked either to accommodation references obtained from informal networks, or is explained by the ease of circulation offered by the district and the different social and economic possibilities implied by the location. Arroios, for example, as already mentioned, has become a reference point for material resources, possibilities of socialising and mutual help among Brazilians, but also of conflict during social events among Brazilians and between Brazilians and people of other nationalities (Frangella 2014). The neighbourhood has contributed even more to showing how the plastic, dynamic nature of negotiation and care in vicinality intersect with temporalities and spatial connections. In other words, the stay in the country of destination can be circumscribed by the initial mutuality
networks and remain like that, creating a strong sensation of proximity with the country of origin (territorial continuity). However, other types of mutual help and interaction in the neighbourhood can be added to this experience that defy these territorial boundaries throughout the migration project.

**Final Notes**

It is recognised in this debate that the transnational migratory experience is endowed with differentiated meanings and formats according to empirical differences – motivation, class, gender, religion, forms of entry and the density of the constructed networks, among others. The degree of linkage between the connected countries, creating stronger or weaker ties with the homeland (Lee 2008), is also diverse in migratory contexts. In this regard, the tenacity of a migrant’s transnational connections emerges as a relevant issue. The intensity of the movements and the variety of possibilities of being situated in multiple locations, or assuring ties between one place and another are linked to the time of the people in the migratory circuit, to the gradual change of objectives brought about by the daily experience of life, and to their actual constitution as a person.

In this article, I have sought to understand how the transnational migratory path and the initial forms of cohabitation are constituted and imbued with meaning based on their underlying conviviality, mutual help and mobility relations. In order to theorise beyond a multi-situated vision, my research aimed to understand how the trajectory is progressively created, whether of departure or return, and, as such, produces inter-subjectivity and complex feelings of belonging. Although the discussion about the transnational world affirms the dynamic relationship between the place of departure and that of arrival, these are still viewed as dichotomous.

The real effect of the *temporal flow* moving this migration is frequently overlooked. Time, which constitutes these extended spatial flows, should be interpreted herein in its chronological dimension, but also by means of the social and political barriers permeating it, and the dynamics of continuity of the relations enveloping the person who migrates. With the progression of time, there can be, on the one hand, a densification of the migratory circuit’s social webs, contributing to the idea that the migratory project is a project of return. However, on the other hand, the migrants’ way of positioning themselves and
living in the world may change completely. Vicinality constitutes one of the principal mainstays to be investigated in order to understand the effect of migratory movement.

In the midst of the extensive debate on migratory social networks, interpersonal networks – relations that involve family and friends – tend to be interpreted as sources of personal trajectories which, as such, embody merely one among other networks comprising the migratory experience. Many authors endeavour to show personal ties as drivers of this trajectory (Boyd 1989, 639; Martes 1999) and state that the actual interpersonal networks offer greater flexibility in the circulation of information about employment opportunities and the strongest possibilities of social reinvention (Granovetter 1973; *apud* Fazito 2002). Despite this, some sociological literature on migration tends to view them as having little explanatory value due to their focus on the individual.

Now, in spite of the importance that migration has for the construction of the individual itinerary of these migrants, their interpersonal experience should be seen from the perspective of the mutuality relations that constituted it. This means that, from the decision to migrate up to the arrival and permanence in the place of destination, all these choices are made through a system of relationships that is above all collective, continuously articulated with the socio-structural constraints and dynamics conditioning migratory mobility. In a migratory cycle, the structural conditions and the world of feelings and exchanges that involve the migrant are in continuous interlocution. In this regard, although the potential explanatory power of interpersonal networks may not be as exhaustive, they are the main thread enabling this mobility.

Vicinality opens doors to more encompassing dynamics of interpersonal relations in the new accommodation situation, without ever detaching from the initial reference network. However, despite an effort to constitute a place that corresponds to the migrant’s position in Brazil, the forms of socialising gradually assimilate other lifestyles, which challenge this person’s expectations and ways of interpreting the world. Therefore, new forms of inhabiting the world are engendered, even if they will rarely be detached from previously constituted mutuality relations. A whole world is composed within this path, a material and symbolic outcome of this very mobility, maintaining a web that is gradually and constantly composed in search of a place. Vicinality is produced along the way, always negotiated and continuously relying on an attitude which paradoxically weakens it: consideration for others.
If we view vicinality as a dynamics assuming the maintenance of an underlying mesh of solidarity and mutual help, marked by the interaction of relatives and non-family members recruited for this purpose (Webster 2009), I believe that we can find certain affinities with the transnational migratory circuit. In these dynamics of labour migration, mobility to another country and between two or more countries, essentially depend on the establishment of networks providing information, support, financial and logistical arrangements and emotional support. The construction of the webs is based, above all, on relatives, friends of the family and, to a lesser extent, acquaintances from the same town.

These webs maintain the operationality of the circuit, but are also fraught with very weak, imprecise and faulty organisation. The mutuality relations implicated in these webs are subject to constant breakdowns, and feelings of trust and envy are part of the recurrent narratives linked to their success or failure. The transformation of these relations affects the modes of living together, the migratory project plans and previously established alliances. I am left to imagine if there is actually a specificity of vicinality in this context. I believe that the differential is that the spatial and temporal relationship moulding these relations appears to be of another intensity.

The tenacity of these networks and their chaotic redesigning can be seen as a powerful resource in responding to continuous social exclusion mechanisms that mark migration mobility politically, economically and logistically. The transnational distance implies physical distance, but also the national-based social and political constraints and negotiations. There are continuous exclusion practices, from blockages of movement at border controls, to denial of documents, and good daily living conditions, to low-paying jobs and social discrimination. Such processes affect the migratory project, holding back or altering expectations on this set of mutual arrangements. At the same time, nonetheless, there is a constant movement guaranteeing the emergence of other reciprocity networks, driving a continuous circulation, allowing the maintenance of transnational movements, strategies of social inclusion and creating new ways of being in the world.

**ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

This article was produced during my post-doc fellowship at ICS (Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa), with a FCT grant Reference SFRH/BPD/111800/2015.
SIMONE FRANGELLA
Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa
Av. Prof. Aníbal Bettencourt 9 — 1600-036 Lisboa, Portugal
simone.frangella@ics.ulisboa.pt
orcid.org/0000-0003-3021-4096

REFERENCES


CITE THIS CHAPTER AS:
https://doi.org/10.31447/ics9789726715030.08
Mirroring the dialectic of inclusion and exclusion in ethnoheterogenesis processes

Nina Clara Tiesler
INTRODUCTION

Regarding inclusion and exclusion processes, the study of ethnic relations has been a common pursuit in Sociology and Anthropology, both in the past and in the present, especially — though not exclusively — in historical contexts marked by heightened migration. While the work of many sociologists and social-cultural anthropologists can be applied directly to social policy and welfare, this contribution is an attempt at refining the theoretical understanding of social and cultural processes through merging perspectives from both disciplines. It does so by choosing a subject matter which ranges from the micro level of individual agency and interaction to the macro level of systems and the social structure: the coming-into-being of ethnicities in the light of societal and cultural change, and as a social form of symbolic collectivity that may enhance as much as restrict individuality.

Studying the genesis and continuously shifting social forms of ethnicities is heuristically important in that it can help clarify processes of socio, cultural and political change in society at large. The specific contribution of this paper is to the research context of migrants and migrant descendants; wherein conceptual debates on self-perception, modes of belonging, group formation and collective subjectivities continue to be at the core of theoretical considerations. In conducting research among Portuguese emigrants in diverse diasporic settings on the one hand, and Portuguese Muslims of Indo-Mozambican origin on the other, we have followed different generations of people with migration experience in their family histories who share “memories of colonization and migration” (Weber). The two groupings were selected in order to be able to compare differing histories and experiences of migration and settlement, relations with other societal minorities and majorities, references to the Portuguese nation, societal positioning, and “lived” everyday cultures. Over time, different generations and migration trajectories, ethnic self-perceptions and membership roles have changed among both groupings. This paper takes the essence of the research output for exploratory analysis.¹

¹ While it was possible to meet periodically with the same Muslim families from winter 1991/92, with a respective first case study carried out in 1998 (Tiesler 2000, 2005), the research collected and chosen for this work took place between 2004 and 2014 as part of diverse research projects. It included a number of case studies drawing upon a variety of qualitative and quantitative (Tiesler and Lavado 2018; Tiesler and Bergano 2012; Tiesler and Cairns 2010, 2007) and exclusively qualitative techniques (Tiesler 2008, 2009, 2012). We have conducted research on statistics and secondary data analysis, original
The main argument is that current analytical concepts and frameworks are too limited to grasp the complex and multi-dimensional formative processes producing ethnicities.

The complex settings illustrated in the form of field notes move this preparatory work towards a new analytical concept, which I call Ethnoheterogenesis (EHG). Emphasis lies on the genesis and changes of ethnic framing and multiplicity of ethnic memberships. A common concept to describe and analyse the coming-into-being of ethnicities and ethnic change is ethnogenesis. The conceptual history of the term ethnogenesis from the late 19th century up to the present day shows manifold perspectives on – and definitions of – ethnicity and leads to insights into diverse scholarly traditions and ways of employing the concept – the latter always depending on the very specific historic (and political) research context (Tiesler 2017a, 18-31). While the linear and one-dimensional nature of most models of ethnogenesis is one source of motivation to conceptualise EHG as an alternative, another source is the analytical shortcomings and reification of subjective experience when group formations and affiliations are tautologically explained by the use of the cover-all and obliterating “identity”-category. It is essential that this preparatory work towards a new analytical framework and that EHG should open up ways to resist what Eric Hobsbawm (1996) and others have called “identity-jargon”. In close harmony with the narratives of the inquired families, analysis points out that ethnicity can neither be seen as a form of collective subjectivity nor as an unchangeable part of one’s Self – but rather as one of many membership roles that individuals take on and are ascribed within specific constellations. By conceptualising ethnic affiliation as one of many membership roles, EHG aims to add to the development of a Sociology of Membership.

Above all, the established concepts with regard to the formative processes of ethnicities do not explicitly address the dialectic of homogenisation and heterogenisation inherent in ethnogenesis and ethnic change. Therefore, I propose the concept of Ethnoheterogenesis (EHG) as an alternative model with which to analyse ethnic framing and affiliations of individuals, groupings and macro groups. The conceptual history of ethnogenesis, identity and groupism-critique and Sociology of Membership define the theoretical basis of our work.
which suggests that EHG has the potential to become a useful framework for future investigations.

CONCEPTS AND METHODOLOGICAL CONCERNS

A short sociological introduction to the term “ethnicity”, which can connect with current anthropological perspectives, reads: “To talk about human groups who define membership based on their belief in common ancestry, one can use the term ethnicity” (Bös 2010, 2). Eric R. Wolf underlines that “ideas about race, culture and peoplehood or ethnicity have long served to orient anthropology’s inquiries” (Wolf 1994, 1). As for an early conceptualisation of the term “ethnic group”, it is not only sociologists who can refer to Max Weber’s *Economy and Society* [1920]. As Weber uses categories and concepts fundamental to anthropological research, such as kinship, his definition can serve as a starting point for this contribution, which aims to merge sociological and socio-cultural anthropological perspectives:

We shall call “ethnic groups” those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of external habitus or of customs or both, or because of memories of colonization and migration; this belief must be important for the propagation of group formation; conversely, it does not matter whether or not an objective blood relation exists. Ethnic membership (Gemeinsamkeit) differs from the kinship group precisely by being a (believed-in) membership, not a group defined by actual social action. In our sense, ethnic membership does not constitute a group; it only facilitates group formation of any kind, particularly in the political sphere. (Weber 2007 [1920], 301)

Weber also refers to “customs” and “external habitus” as pointing to what can be understood as cultural habits and daily life culture. Some anthropologists indeed emphasise the cultural nature of ethnicity.² As a commitment common in both Sociology and Socio-Cultural Anthropology, one can name the study of cultural processes and practices through which human action is individually and collectively mediated. In other words, a commitment to

---

² Following Cohen (1974), one of the earliest and most influential schools of thought in this respect has been that of the former Rhodes Livingstone Institute anthropologists, notably Mitchell (1956), Epstein (1958), and Gluckman (1961), whose views were greatly affected by the special conditions existing in the industrial towns of Northern Rhodesia, now Zambia, during the 1950s.
the study of people doing things, of action and practices in specific settings of power relations, rather than the study of culture as an object. In the first edited volume on “urban ethnicity”, Cohen (1974, ix) notes that ethnicity is a ubiquitous phenomenon. This is debatable as “ethnic communities do not represent a ubiquitous form of social organisation but rather the result of a historical process related to a specific technique of social distinction”, Gabbert argues, with reference to shifting boundaries and emerging ethnic communities on Nicaragua’s Atlantic Coast (Gabbert 2011, 77). They are not a “natural” form of organisation.

Connecting with Glazer and Moynihan, inter alia, and conceptualising ethnicity as a modern ideology based on renewed categories of the Frankfurt Institute of Social Research, Werz highlights that ethnicity is an enigmatic notion that can be conducive to illustrating a transformation that, during the 20th century, affected the states of consciousness of various people. Ethnic ideology or “identity-thinking” (Horkheimer’s and Adorno’s critique on “ticket-mentality”, 1969) are products of a dialectic of enlightenment and secularisation; mirroring a historical process once described by Max Horkheimer as the onward comprehension of a life world that is identical in its disenchantment (Werz 2002, 13). Indeed, ethnic ideologies (just as national ones, cp. Anderson 1991; Gellner 1993) create history. Following Gabbert, who bases his theorising on the Miskitu in Eastern Nicaragua, ethnic ideologies “take fragments from the past, string them together, construe them, and change their meaning or, if necessary, reinvent them” (Gabbert 2014, 197). In accordance with Bös, and what Cohen understands as “ubiquitous”, probably in the sense of being pervasive or omnipresent, and due to the fact that ethnicity takes a “variety of form, scope, and intensity, and of its involvement in psychic, social, and historical variables”, one can conclude that ethnicity has been defined in a variety of ways, “depending on the discipline, field experience, and interests of the investigators” (Cohen 1974, ix).

As a starting point towards a consensus, one can take the entry on “ethnicity” in the recently published second edition of the *International Encyclopaedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*. The author draws upon historical aspects

---

3 “We are suggesting that a new word reflects a new reality and a new usage reflects a change in that reality. The new word is ‘ethnicity’, and the new usage is the steady expansion of the term ‘ethnic group’ from minority and marginal subgroups at the edges of society – groups expected to assimilate, to disappear, to continue as survivals, exotic or troublesome – to major elements of a society… [T]here is something new afoot in the world, and we may label it ‘ethnicity’” (Glazer and Moynihan 1975, 5).
regarding ethnicity and ethnic groups, and argues that the concepts have been applied to a broad spectrum of groups in history. While ethnic community building is used to foster solidarity in macro-group structures, ethnicity also legitimises social inequalities by descent. Furthermore, ethnic membership serves to fulfil individuals’ need for collective belonging:

In the social sciences there is a growing consensus that ethnicity is socially constructed and historically contingent, but that many people perceive it as an important, unchangeable part of their identity. (Bös 2015, 136)

Yet, the analysis of emerging and shifting ethnic mobilisations, ascriptions and identifications uncovers societal transformations. Reflecting on the historical aspects of ethnic thinking, Randall Collins argues that:

Ethnicity is an intrinsically messy topic because the historical processes that produce it are intrinsically messy. Our analytical problems stem from the fact that ethnicity is always a distorted concept, an attempt to impose a pure category on a social reality that is not at all pure. (Collins 1999, 78; cited by Bös)

As said, the specific contribution of this paper relates to the research context of migrants and migrant descendants. Migratory contexts constitute a strategic lens for understanding “under what circumstances, among whom and in order to satisfy which needs or interests, do migrant selective identifications and dis-identifications occur” (Banton 2008, 1276). Now, as ethnicities are produced by historical processes, how can one study the emergence of ethnicities when these processes are so “messy”? One possible way is taking a historical perspective during analysis, while using abstraction from the very specific historical context in follow-up theorisation. This can be done by constant comparison – in this case, between the two groupings under analysis but also between each of them and comparable social entities of differing ethnic or non-ethnic reference and identification. Secondly, ethnicity appears as a distorted concept, as an attempt to impose a pure category on a social reality which is not at all pure. As a methodological manoeuvre to avoid this, we suggest acknowledging that the coming-into-being of ethnicities is an ongoing process that typically involves de-ethnisation as much as ethnisation, forces of both hetero- and homogenisation as well as a diversity of ethnic membership roles and multiple “ethnic options” (Waters 1990).
The third methodological challenge is due to the circumstances that suggest ethnicities are socially constructed and historical contingent, but conversely, that most people believe ethnic ascriptions and membership is unchangeable. The experiences of the two groupings under analysis underline the historical contingency in the genesis of ethnicities. More precisely, in taking both the diasporic context and that of origin into account, it highlights the fact that ethnic framing and self-articulation develop as “relational” to other minority and majority groups, as well as “situative” in specific power relations. In these processes, both societal contexts shape and undergo social and cultural change and can be described as ethnoheterogeneous (Claussen 2013). Above all, in close harmony with the narratives of the inquired families, analysis points out that ethnicity can neither be seen as a form of collective subjectivity, nor as an unchangeable part of one’s Self – but rather as one of many membership roles that individuals take up and are ascribed within specific constellations.

SHIFTING ETHNIC BOUNDARIES – NOTES FROM THE BIOGRAPHICAL NARRATIVES OF MIGRATION-EXPERIENCED FAMILIES

Néria grew up in Germany, born to Portuguese emigrant parents.4 Her parents left Portugal in the era of dictatorship (1926-1974). Her father had been among the first workers from Portugal registered in Stuttgart in the 1950s. During the first years abroad, Néria’s family lived in economic hardship in a working class neighbourhood, in rather ad hoc housing conditions. Portuguese had been the lingua franca at home, the meals were Portuguese, and during her childhood, Néria and her siblings clearly perceived themselves as Portuguese. In their social surroundings, they were seen as foreigners, guest-workers’ children, from Portugal – as far as “their country” was known by name. Originally hailing from the Alentejo, a rural southern region in Portugal, living in Germany had changed her parents’ self-perception from predominantly “alentejano” to “Portuguese”. This was different whenever the family had the opportunity to travel to Portugal for holidays and family visits. While remaining Portuguese nationals up to the present day, as well as being connected to their former neighbourhood in the Alentejo, here the local population naturally considered them as emigrants, more particularly, as Luso-Germans

4 Interviewees’ names have been changed.
This concept quickly started corresponding to the family’s self-perception, at least when positioning themselves as being Portuguese.

Néria concluded her education at a technical college in Essen (Germany) and gained professional experience in the import-export business, using her language skills in German, English and Portuguese. Independently of her family, she moved to Portugal in the early 1990s, where she lives near Lisbon and continues to be successful in her professional realm. Whether in real life or on social media platforms, being in contact with people with similar socialisation experiences makes her feel most comfortable: “Communication is much easier, we always know what the other person is talking about, it doesn’t need much explanation”. This includes Portuguese emigrants and Luso-descendants in Germany in general, and Portuguese and Luso-descendant return migrants, in particular – especially those who grew up in Germany, but also returnees from other countries. She considers herself “Luso-German”, according to her conception of belongingness, her daily life cultural preferences, and her ideas of her “origins”. On Facebook, she participates in “Portuguese in Germany” and “Germans in Portugal” networks. Furthermore, she forms part of a network of Luso-descendants in Portugal and once participated in an international meeting of Luso-descendants from all over the world. In the midst of Luso-French, Luso-Canadians, Luso-Swiss, Luso-Americans, and so forth, it had been her “German-ness” in the first place, alongside a kind of “broken, kaleidoscopic Portuguese-ness”, of which she became more conscious at this event.

Aadil holds a bachelor degree in Economics from a Lisbon university, and another in Economic History from University College in London. Together with his wife and children, he moved from Lisbon to London a few years ago, where he works as a freelance journalist and activist for deprived British-Asian children and youths. He continues writing his Portuguese Blog, which is followed by Portuguese Muslim and non-Muslim visitors who are interested in leftist politics, emancipatory struggles of ethnic and religious minorities in Portugal and social/humanitarian aid projects, many of the latter being organised by the Islamic Community of Lisbon. Aadil and his wife Samira are Sunni Muslims and both their families have Indian roots. His grandmother grew up in British India; later on, she lived in Daman under Portuguese rule, where Samira’s father and his siblings were born before the family left West India to settle in Lourenço Marques (today Maputo), the capital of Mozambique.

“Luso” means Portuguese.
a Portuguese colony until 1974. Here, her father worked in administration and later served the Portuguese army during the colonial war, as was the case with other Muslims of Indian origin. Both Aadil and Samira, their siblings and most of their cousins were born in Mozambique, living in relatively privileged conditions, comparable to wealthy and educated Portuguese non-Muslims in higher positions. Both their parents were active in Islamic community matters and held Portuguese citizenship, as did other community members.

During a conversation with Samira’s family, her grandmother once explained her definitive societal experience and respective self-perception with the words “I am British Indian”, while her father prioritised “being a Portuguese Muslim”. In fact, while living in India (Daman) under Portuguese rule, being a (Sunni) Muslim had been more important. But Samira’s father also highlighted that his Indian origin had been a major reference, both in Mozambique and, up to the present day, in Portugal – with the exception of the early years in Lisbon during and shortly after decolonisation, when several hundred thousand people (retornados) returned from the colonies, in their midst, Hindus, Ismailis and Sunni Muslims of Indian origin. “Our solidarity group had been the retornados”, he explains. “We are often called immigrants today, this despite the fact that we had been Portuguese nationals already in Mozambique. From our perspective, in fact, we were retornados”. Samira confirms the existence of this “solidarity group”, remembering her early Lisbon experiences as a child in the schoolyard. “The other Portuguese kids were picking on us. There I found myself in a corner, together with the white, Catholic retorno kids”. Samira also considers “being a Portuguese Muslim” her strongest reference, and that this matches the self-perception of her cousins, some of whom live in Mozambique, others in Leicester (UK). Aadil explains that for those in Mozambique it also serves to set them apart from Mozambican Muslims and from non-Muslim Portuguese and Mozambicans. Those in Leicester actually meet with other Daman Sunni Muslim families who lived in Kenya under British colonial rule before settling in Leicester. For Aadil’s Leicester cousins, who “became quite British”, he adds chuckling to himself, the self-ascription as Portuguese Muslims was important not

---

6 As for the position of Sunni Muslims of mainly African origin in Mozambique under Portuguese colonial rule, see Bonate (2007). Regarding Ismaeli Muslim of Indian origin in the same context, see Khouri and Pereira Leite (2012). As for the attempts of the Portuguese colonisers to monitor and activate Mozambique's Muslim minority population shortly before and during the colonial war, see Vakil Monteiro and Machaqueiro (2011).
only in a family context stretching across at least three countries but also in their conversation with the “British Muslims” from Daman, who frequently express something like “superiority out of the simple fact that they were part of the British Empire”. For many reasons, among them being Muslim [and not Catholic or secular] but also due to his visible Indian roots, being Portuguese had always been very important to him. It is only since the couple moved to London that they have also felt affiliated to the huge South Asian population there. “One of the beautiful aspects of going to Mecca is that we simply feel like Muslims, nothing more, nothing less”, Samira says, adding with a smile: “and if anything else, there I suddenly feel quite European.” But this was stronger when she once went to the USA. Among other activities, mainly of purely touristic nature, she attended a meeting of Young Muslims there, with the organisers grouping them into the section “European Muslims”.

SITUATIVITY AND HISTORICAL CONTINGENCY OF INCLUSION, EXCLUSION AND ETHNIC FRAMINGS

As illustrated by the field notes, different generations and migration trajectories, ethnic self-perceptions and membership roles have, over time, changed among both groupings. The first generation of Portuguese emigrants arriving in Germany, France, the USA, etc., changed a self-perception based on regional bonds to a national one; only through emigration did they “become” Portuguese. At the same time, adaptation to the new surrounding and the strong connection to Portugal which they preserved meant that in relation to (and in interaction with) the people they had left behind, they became “others”: not only “the emigrants” but more specifically the “Germans, French, Americans”. It was in the conflict between the pressure of assimilation in the host societies7 and the weight of the “emigrant script”8 that Portuguese emigrants and their offspring developed hyphenated self-perceptions of ethnic membership, such as Luso-German, Luso-American and Luso-French.

7 For Germany see Tiesler and Bergano (2012); for France see Pereira (2012); for the USA see Almeida (2010).

8 The moral obligations which constitute the emigrant script are rooted in the period from post-World War II until the 1990s, when remittances played an extremely important role in the local Portuguese rural economies; see Lubkemann (2002).
Elite Sunni Muslims of Indian origin that had been living in Mozambique before coming to Portugal in the course of decolonisation are today often framed as “Indo-Mozambican”, a concept also applied to Ismaelis and Hindus who live in Portugal (Tiesler 2008). Naturally, that was different at each stage of their migration trajectory (British India, Portuguese India, Mozambique under Portuguese rule, Portugal, and for some, the UK) and also for the different generations of the same family in each context. Members of this group represent the migration intelligence (Tiesler and Lavado 2018) and integration figures of the ethnically diverse (Sunni) Islamic communities in Portugal. Their self-perception of being Portuguese Muslims and the respective promotion of the pan-ethnic concept is of utmost importance in Islamic community life and public discourse. The concept had already emerged during colonial times in response to the colonisers’ ideology of the Portuguese Nation during the Third Empire. The first Sunni Muslim Portuguese students of Indo-Mozambican origin founded the Islamic Community of Lisbon, CIL, in 1968, and used the concept to be able to speak for all Muslims under Portuguese rule, including those in Guinea Bissau. Nowadays, the concept encompasses different ethnic groups of Muslims in Portugal and plays a key role for CIL in Islamic education. It underlines their loyalty to the Portuguese nation and the fact that they are Portuguese citizens allows them to speak for and integrate as a socially and ethnically diverse Muslim community (the most numerous group hailing from Guinea Bissau), and in Islamic education, leads to the educative formula: being a good Muslim means being a good Portuguese (Mapril 2004).

When we asked other individuals and families who belong to the grouping of Sunni Portuguese Muslims of Indo-Mozambican origin about their self-perceptions and the ways they were perceived by others in different historical and geographical contexts, we found a long row of multiple options and diverse framings (in India: Muslims; in Portuguese India: Diu-, Daman-Muslims; in Mozambique: Indian, Sunnis, Portuguese Muslims; in Portugal: Retornados, Indian, Portuguese Muslims; in Britain: Indian-Portuguese, Portuguese Muslims, British-Asians, and so forth). And yet, the concept of Portuguese Muslims prevails. This is interesting in at least two aspects: class and culture. The concept stresses national and religious belonging and dissolves class and cultural differences. The migration intelligence and integration figures conceptualising this are the educated middle classes who speak for a community which is diverse in terms of socio-economic backgrounds (including many
deprived families who find significant support here) and Muslim cultures to be found in the contexts of origin. African Muslims in Lisbon partly share more cultural preferences in daily life with other Afro-Portuguese (a pan-ethnic self-perception currently in fashion among younger generations), meaning those with family roots in diverse Lusophone African countries, than with Lisbon Muslims of Indian origin. The latter often socialise with other young middle class Ismaeli (Shiite) Muslims of Indo-Mozambican origin – while all of them usually socialise in broader social environments and take part in peer groups that are not ethnically marked (Tiesler and Cairns 2007). The concept dissolves class and culture inside the community and in reference to the Portuguese “white” non-Muslim majorities. It is due to the successful work of the integration figures that the Islamic Community of Lisbon is, in general, positively recognised by the Portuguese public and well regarded among the classe politique. A further study which compared young middle class Muslims with young middle class non-Muslims in fact revealed very little difference regarding their daily life cultural preferences (Tiesler and Cairns 2010).

It is generally acknowledged that homogenising forces shape the formative processes of ethnogenesis and ethnic change, as former socially and/or culturally diverse entities are becoming framed or start perceiving themselves as an allegedly homogeneous collective. The essence and exploratory analysis of the field notes suggest that this view is one-dimensional and too linear. The strength of the ethnogenesis concept, as developed to date (see Tiesler 2017a for an overview of the conceptual history), is its constructivist (and partly instrumentalist) approach, which highlights the fact that ethnicities are socially constructed and historically contingent. Its weakness lies in the fact that it cannot grasp the entanglement, the interdependency and simultaneousness, of hetero and homogenising forces. Migrants from different regions in Portugal only started perceiving themselves as Portuguese by migrating, for example, to Germany. The homogenising process of “becoming” Portuguese was part of – and only possible through – the heterogeneising process of becoming Luso-German. As for the concept of Portuguese Muslims, the same dialectic of hetero and homogenisation is in play. The latter case makes it particularly clear that ethnogenesis and ethnic change are not at all linear developments but rather multi-dimensional.
FORMATIVE PROCESSES OF (ONLY ONE KIND OF) MEMBERSHIP: A BRIEF CONCEPTUAL HISTORY OF ETHNOGENESIS

The first references to the term ethnogenesis are to be found in Literature Studies. A descriptive use of the concept, on the other hand, was first implemented in Latin American Studies, circa 1930s, followed by its use in Anthropology and Archaeology in different regions and scholarly traditions in the 1940s. While the term “ethnic group” had been established long before, the novelty of the notion of ethnogenesis was, in its explicit emphasis on the genesis, in a formative process of ethnic groups and entities, thus acknowledging, implicitly at least, that ethnic groups are not natural, given entities, but are instead the result of historical processes.

Conceptualisation and theoretical considerations appear from the mid-1940s onwards in Latin American Studies (works by ethnologists and anthropologists) and in Soviet (Archeological) History and Ethnology. In both strands, it was used to differentiate between – and often with the intention to classify and categorise – social entities and populations along constructs of common history and cultural markers. Although the structural forces of power relations and “ethnic change” are today recognised as intrinsic to processes of ethnogenesis, ethnic strategising “from above” might have caused the concept itself to go out of fashion in Latin American Studies for a prolonged time period, this before getting discharged altogether by constructivist scholarly tradition (Gabbert 2011, 2014).

From the 1940s to the 1960s, most academic references to ethnogenesis at international level were to the Soviet theory of the subject. The decisive context here had been the National Question, with eminent Marxist historians and ethnographers partly taking on the role of motivating actors of “ethnic strategising”. While ethnogenesis was seen as the result of historical processes, the weakness of the Soviet concept of ethnogenesis lay in the assumption (or political programme) that ethnic groups were seen as rather stable, social entities that would continuously transmit their social structures from one generation to the next. It did not consider what is today commonly referred to as “ethnic change”.

“Ethnic change” was probably most visibly introduced by the “instrumentalist analyses”, as pioneered by the Manchester School Anthropologists, a perspective based on the observation of migrant workers that placed ethnic markers on highly circumstantial performances within new urban political configurations
(as opposed to positions deriving from cultural complexities of rural origin) (see Epstein 1958; Mitchell 1956). While successfully challenging the earlier fixed ideas about “tribalism,” these models had relatively little to say about the specific content of ethnic models, in particular, the affective elements that could become powerful political motivators. The instrumentalist perspective has offered quite complete explanations of the process, whereby an individual, family, or community reassigns itself from one ethnic category to another without fundamentally transforming the system at hand. Fredrik Barth (1969, 21) coined this phenomenon “ethnic osmosis”. In current use, ethnogenesis, the creation of an ethnic category, can be seen as the constructivist’s logical counterpart to the idea of “ethnic osmosis”.

In Sociology, the term only gained momentum in the 1960s, during the phase of the so-called “ethnic revival” in American Sociology, with the first paper by Lester C. Singer, entitled “Ethnogenesis and Negro-Americans Today”, published in Social Research (Singer 1962). Typical of sociological foci, the analysis of the relationship between the individual and social structure in formative processes of social entities is key for Singer:

> The “members” of a social category are not necessarily involved in any relationship among themselves. Thus the terms “men”, “women”, “immigrants”, and “divorcees” stand for social categories. The term “social entity”, on the other hand, refers to a number of people manifesting such qualities as patterned relationships, shared values, and self-recognition. Thus a team, a gang, a community, an ethnic group, and a society all constitute recognizable social entities. (Singer 1962, 420)

For Singer, and importantly for our understanding of “ethnic groups”, the central point of the contrast between the two terms is the “presence or absence of internal structure and the accompanying cultural, or ideological, element”. He further suggests calling the formative process of ethnically defined social entities “ethnogenesis, meaning by this term the process whereby a people, that is an ethnic group, comes into existence” (Singer 1962, 423). He also reminds us that this process is only one of several kinds of group-forming processes, of which socio-genesis is the generic term.

While there are a multiplicity of causal factors at work in processes of ethnogenesis, Singer suggests specifically looking at the context of power relations, that is, “the specific character of the relationship with the other segment(s) of the population” (Singer 1962, 423-428). This relates to a
common social scientific sense, namely that internal group development and external (inter-group) relationships influence one another. In short: the characteristics of an emergent ethnic group are the consequences of factors outside themselves, as well as their response to these factors. There is a parallel to Weber’s argument that highlights the difference between a kinship group and ethnic membership (as a “believed-in membership”), precisely where Singer underlines that the ancestors of the people in question do not necessarily show any kind of “ethnic group characteristics”. Rather, it might only been possible to conceptualise former generations as a social category, not as a social entity. Singer connects this with the kind of process which E. K. Francis (1947) referred to:

What we have here called ethnogenesis is related to Francis’ sequence at two points. It is, on the one hand, temporally prior in that ethnic groups must have formed before they could expand. On the other hand, the last stage of the sequence is ethnogenesis. Consequently, the expanded sequence should be: ethnogenesis – expansion – fission – new combination (that is, ethnogenesis). (Singer 1962, 429-430)

Although the term genesis carries the connotation of “birth” or “creation”, ethnogenesis tended to be used to describe what was later called “ethnic change” or “ethnic osmosis” (Barth 1969). In introducing the ethnogenesis of African-Americans as starting ab initio (unlike all other inquiries up until that date in which ethnogenesis was used to conceptualise the transformation of some ethnic groups into other ethnic groups), Singer’s contribution added decisively to the works of his time because traditional perspectives had nearly exclusively focused on the survival and transformation of European-derived “ethnic cultures” in the USA. It was later argued – e.g. by Fredrik Barth (1969) and Andrew Greeley (1974) – that the process whereby ethnic groups come into being had been largely ignored. Similarly, as criticised by Pierre van den Berghe (1967) as well as William Yancey, Ericksen and Juliani (1976), the emphasis on culture as an explanatory variable had tended to obscure the contribution of structural conditions to the emergence and persistence of ethnicity. During the same period, several scholars (Cohen 1969; Doornbos 1972; Hechter 1974; and slightly later Taylor 1979) suggested that while ethnicity may involve cultural referents, its development and persistence would depend on certain structural conditions. This is to say, the expectation that class or functional cleavages should become predominant over ascriptive solidarities in modern
society seemed to be unjustified in view of the persistence of these structural factors (Mayhew 1968; Bell 1975).

This is a very important point and matches with the exploratory analysis of the concept of Portuguese Muslims which dissolves class and cultural differences. Furthermore, the awareness and need to differentiate between social category and social entity, as stressed by Singer. In contrast, our ideal-typical field notes made clear that Singer’s expanded sequence is too linear to grasp the formative process of either hyphenated or pan-ethnic conceptions of ethnic membership. This supports the argument that differing processes described as ethnogenesis can more tellingly be conceptualised as Ethnoheterogenesis (EHG) as this concept highlights the dialectic of hetero and homogenisation at work. However, the selected relevant sociological works introduced here underline, again, that in order to elucidate the formative process of ethnically defined social entities one needs to consider the interplay between sociocultural characteristics and social structure, as well as intergroup relations in specific settings of power.

Furthermore, there are a few relevant alternative concepts applicable to or enhancing ethnogenesis and ethnic change, namely ethnic osmosis (Barth 1969), ethno (re)genesis, ethnocultural drift and ethnic strategising (Thomson 2011). The question is whether or not EHG might serve as an umbrella category for these concepts.

ETHNOHETEROGENESIS: APPROACHING THE DIALECTICS OF INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION WITHIN A SOCIOLOGY OF MEMBERSHIP

The conceptual history of the term ethnogenesis provides an essential part of the theoretical framework for this endeavour. The second important aspect for such a framework derives from a key problem dealt with in researching migrants and sociocultural change in society at large – this less so in the field and more in relation to academic discourse: the (ab-)use of the identity category, and loose talk of “identities” and consequent lack of analytical insight. As mentioned above, it is no coincidence that our conceptual considerations and theorising are oriented by “traditional”, critical, sociological and anthropological craft. “Traditional” in this context means before the identity-jargon became established.
There is indeed a complement to the instrumentalist, constructivist and other perspectives on ethnicity. Matching our purpose, a significant parallel line of argument addresses the nature of ethnic situations rather than the nature of “ethnic identity”. Essential to all of these perspectives is the insight that ethnicity, as a phenomenon, is fundamentally an attribute of pluralistic situations, especially “the asymmetric incorporation of structurally dissimilar groupings into a single political economy” (Comaroff 1987, 307; cp. also Thomson 2011). As the subtitle of Barth’s 1969 landmark volume states, we are considering “the social organization of cultural differences.” The research at the basis of this theoretical endeavour took an actors’ perspective and employed anthropological as well as sociological methods in the field. While acknowledging the importance of the emancipatory struggle of ethnically defined minorities, the analysis, however, does not perpetuate the political language of identity politics.

The problem of the commonly loose talk of identities is that it neither explains the socio-cultural heterogeneous premises for the homogenising genesis of ethnicities nor its heterogeneous outcomes. In doing so it enhances the structuring of allegedly homogenous macro groups along ethnic boundaries – in terms of “cultural”, “national”, “hybrid”, “multiple”, “pan-”, “hyphenated” and so forth “identities”. Instead, and as with a growing number of recent theoretical works (Banton 2011) in the “post-identity era” (Hank, Enrique and Laraña 1994), it refers back to sociological and anthropological craft and concepts that were in use before the 1960s; a time when the words “identity” and “ethnicity” took off together for a vast career of semantic broadening in academic discourse.

An analytical framework called Ethnoheterogenesis resists tautological explanations such as “ethnic identities emerge from cultural identities and challenge or are being pressured by national identities as such causing collective minority identities and hybrid and multiple personal identities”. It suggests rediscovering and recuperating self-perception, membership, affiliations, ascriptions, ethnic framing, representations, mobilisation, social entities, 9 Ethnoheterogenesis, as proposed here, shares many grounds with the theories of ethnic boundaries (Barth 1969) and ethnic boundary making (Wimmer 2008), especially regarding the dynamic nature and situativity. It goes beyond these theories by employing a transnational perspective and in highlighting not only the diversity inside such boundaries, but also the heterogenising power impacting in inter and intragroup dynamics during formative processes that are often interpreted as homogeneous in their results (Tiesler 2017a).
reflexive ethnonisation and de-ethnisation, collective subjectivity, collective identification, identity-thinking and politics, from the unrecognisable condition into which they melt within the “verbal container” (Claussen) of “identities”. Here, they melt from subjective belief and needs for collective action, with the objective consequence of structuring macro groups in society and re-enforcing social inequalities along ethnically defined boundaries. By conceptualising ethnic affiliation as one of many membership roles, this contribution adds to the development of a Sociology of Membership.

The alternative concept I am proposing is called Ethnoheterogenesis (EHG) in order to highlight the hetero and homogenising forces and their inherent entanglement in these formative social entity processes. This insight is based on several case studies among two groupings: Portuguese emigrants and their offspring in diverse diasporic settings and Portuguese Muslim families with triple migration trajectories. But the dialectic of hetero and homogenisation in of ethnic framing and membership processes does not seem to be specific to these two particular cases. Numerous examples of empirical material derived from research on race and ethnic relations, on hyphenated and pan-ethnic self-perceptions, point to this logic. This is why I believe that EHG has the potential to become an analytical framework of heuristic value for future investigations in this field. As an alternative to the reifying identity-jargon, the EHG concept suggests perceiving individuals and their subjective experiences, preferences and unique webs of group affiliations (Simmel 1992 [1908]) as non-identical with others despite possible common ethnic affiliation and ascriptions to macro groups. Above all, as an analytical framework, EHG considers ethnic membership as one among many membership roles.

Who belongs here, and who does not? A Sociology of Membership observes and analyses the developmental contexts, impact and consequences of this question. The answer to the question targets different aspects, frames, modes and conditions of membership and is constantly negotiated by diverse social formations, such as national states, political parties, firms, sport clubs, families, or ethnic groupings. Such negotiations are defined by – and are shaping – power relations. While ethnic claims and identity politics are found among both societal majorities and minorities, the term ethnic group (as well as national group) is commonly used to describe a societal minority. It is not exclusive but indeed essential that a Sociology of Membership acknowledges that minorities in any society, however defined, are not homogenous units. Individuals and group(-ings) within a minority may differ in their reaction to
subordination, type of leadership, ideology, degree of allegiance to their group, to other members or to the larger society, the ultimate goals of the group, etc. Consequently a minority (and by inference the contextual majority/ies as well) will generally not be a wholly united group – groups and individuals will favour various modes of action in response to majority constraints.

In his *Theory of Social Categories*, Michael Banton (2011) is on a par with Steve Fenton (2003) and Rogers Brubaker (2006) in his critique of “groupism”. As a starting point, Banton confirms that it has been conventional to conceive of ethnogenesis as a process by which a set of individuals come to conceive of themselves as a people. For the development of ethnoacclivity and ethnodeclivity as processes by which the significance attributed to ethnic identification rises and declines. From a sociological standpoint it is as important to account for the absence of ethnic identification as for its presence” (Banton 2011, 193).

Every person can acknowledge one or more ethnic or national origins. As Steve Fenton (2003, 68) has observed, “the problem … is not the word ‘ethnic’ but the word ‘group’”. Brubaker (2006, 8) has similarly criticised “groupism”, by which he means “the tendency to take discrete, bounded groups as basic constituents of social life, chief protagonists of social conflicts and fundamental units of social analysis”. Banton concludes:

> The conceptual problem is even greater when the recognition of ethnic origin is generalized by reference to ethnicity as if this were an independent factor that influences the behaviour of humans in many regions of the world. Some of these difficulties may be eased if the focus is moved from the concept of a group to that of a category (Banton 2011, 194).

This confirms what we have already learnt from Singer’s work, the first sociological paper on ethnogenesis (Singer 1962), namely to speak of ethnically defined groupings as social entities. Additional to these insights, there is a different line of sociological inquiry regarding ethnogenesis which can add to the development of our framework.

A model that grasps the simultaneousness and interdependency of ethnocultural changes among both migrant populations and the society they are part of was presented by Andrew Greeley (1974), an American sociologist and Roman Catholic priest, with empirical reference to the USA context: a two-dimensional
model of ethnogenesis. By conceptualising socio-cultural change in society at large as ethnogenesis, Greeley’s model went beyond the analysis of group affiliations but remained under-theorised despite its heuristic potential. As with other models of socio-cultural change, and concepts regarding ethnicities, Greeley’s model does not explicitly address the dialectic of homogenisation and heterogenisation in the process of ethnogenesis. It is for future research to verify if Ethnoheterogenesis can also be employed as a framework to analyse socio-cultural change in society at large. The notion of “ethnoheterogeneous societies” as coined by Detlev Claussen (2013) points to this potential.

In this paper, I have proposed the concept of Ethnoheterogenesis (EHG) as an alternative model to analyse the ethnic framing and affiliations of individuals, groupings and macro groups. Potentially, EHG can further develop a) as an umbrella category for ongoing formative processes of ethnogenesis and ethnic change, including ethnocultural drifts and ethnic strategising, and b) to grasp the process of socio-cultural change in societies marked by migration which we describe as ethnoheterogeneous.

NINA CLARA TIESLER
Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa
and Institute of Sociology, Leibniz University of Hannover, Germany
Av. Prof. Aníbal Bettencourt 9 — 1600-036 Lisboa, Portugal
ninaclara.tiesler@ics.ulisboa.pt
orcid.org/0000-0002-3712-5929

REFERENCES


cite this chapter as:
PART IV

Past to present
The “Brasileiro”: a 19th century transnational social category

Isabel Corrêa da Silva
INTRODUCTION

This article is the result of the intersection between the two main historical fields I have been studying in recent years: 19th century Portuguese and Brazilian political culture. It synthesises, reviews and juxtaposes conclusions and data that I have gathered during my research on 19th century Luso-Brazilian relations, Portuguese emigration to Brazil, liberal elites and the political culture of the Portuguese constitutional monarchy. It compiles and digests information aiming to make a contribution to the understanding of a social stereotype that, for more than a century, has concerned Portuguese fictional and non-fictional literature: the “Brasileiro” (Silva 2013; Ramos, Carvalho and Silva 2018).

The Portuguese emigrants who returned from Brazil in the 19th century with enough wealth to ascend socially and often politically in their homeland were nicknamed by their contemporaries and have come down to us as “Brasileiros” (Brazilians). Throughout their lives these emigrants, who in their own country were called the “Brasileiros” and in Brazil were stigmatised as the “Português” (the Portuguese), have been subject to the pressure of overlapping exclusion and inclusion. This situation not only conditioned their integration both in the host country and homeland, but also had a great impact on their perception of their own national identity.

The purpose of this article is to reflect on the social construction of that category by analysing the Portuguese liberal culture’s criteria for social inclusion and exclusion in the 19th century. The operative use of the concept “transnational” allows the perspective to be widened beyond the social, economic, or even regional (centre versus interior) and even acknowledge the phenomenon within a historical reflection concerning issues of nationality. The article also raises several questions and shows the many uncertainties in our knowledge about the social context that produced the categorisation.

THE PORTUGUESE IN 19TH CENTURY BRAZIL, FROM COLONISER TO IMMIGRANT: THE “PORTUGUÊS”

After the independence of Brazil, in 1822, and long before seriously considering the economic exploration and exploitation of its African territories, Portugal realised the absolute and urgent need of restructuring its economy, or in the
words of a contemporary: of “finding in work the means to live that it had in the colonies” (Ramos 1990, 153-223). Nonetheless, the yearning for privileged economic relations with Brazil concerned Portuguese diplomacy right from the years immediately after its independence. Successive failed attempts to sign a commercial treaty marked the panorama of Portuguese-Brazilian relations throughout the 19th century. Agreements were on the verge of being signed in 1826, 1836, 1840, 1889, 1892 and 1908. But none was. Yet this obsession wasn’t merely imperial nostalgia. It was actually propelled by a very empirical phenomenon that rather spontaneously assured the continuity of a special link between Portugal and Brazil: emigration.

In fact, during the 19th century, the Portuguese in Brazil went from colonisers to immigrants. The relatively short period of time in which this transformation happened enabled the continuity of many things, among which the continuity of a refashioned resentment. The depreciative feelings behind the caricatured images of the “Português” (the Portuguese man) survived the century with just some adjustments. Recurrent waves of Lusophobia flared up in the first decades after independence and characterised the nation-building process of the Brazilian Empire, while most commonly limited to urban contexts and mostly motivated by economic rivalry concerning the continuity of the Portuguese slave trade monopoly (Lessa 2008, 237-256; Alencastro 1988, 30-57; Ribeiro, 2002). Being the most Portuguese of Brazilian cities, Rio de Janeiro was also the most propitious stage for the rising of these anti-Lusitanian feelings. In fact, from the 18th to the 20th century, the flow of Portuguese emigration was never interrupted in this city. Portuguese emigrants invested largely in urban real estate and small commercial properties, having the monopoly of retail trade and therefore controlling an important share of the job market (Ribeiro 1990). Later, this setting would be central to the mobilisation, reception, and integration of the men and women who embodied the mass migration phenomenon begun in the 1870s and reached its apogee at the turn of the century, when Rio de Janeiro became, after Lisbon, the city with the largest Portuguese population in the world (Oliveira 1919, 15).

In this new scenario, the traditional type of migrant from the colonial times – the single boy travelling alone at the age of 12 or 13 with minimal literacy, often with the voyage paid for by his family, with the purpose of raising some money and then to return – was no longer to be found. This was replaced by a distinct pattern of migration, characterised by the arrival of entire families,
very poor, illiterate, and with no prospect of returning. The stereotype, which flourished in the Brazilian society around that time, of the ignorant, greedy, and rude Portuguese is a combination of feelings towards those two types of migrants: resentment against the former, disdain towards the latter. In any case, the result was a sort of unintentional character assassination of a particular social and ethnic group due to fierce competition for jobs and increasing nationalism.

Of course, this hostility was not exclusively directed at the Portuguese: as in any melting pot society, there was probably no foreigner safe from some prejudice. However, the Portuguese immigrant community had specific characteristics that distinguished it from other groups of migrants, starting with the fact that its members shared a historical, social, and cultural background with their hosts. A circumstance that, if on the one hand, entailed much awkwardness; on the other, enabled a kind of familiarity that was crucial for the colony’s internal organisation and for migrant integration in Brazilian society.

Unfortunately, there are no reliable official statistics on 19th century Portuguese emigration.\(^1\) Approximate numbers for the exodus of Portuguese emigrants are available for some periods, but it is not possible to evaluate the size of the Portuguese immigrant community in Brazil solely based on such data. Contemporary estimates of its size at the beginning of the 20th century varied between 700,000 and one million. But it is possible to draw some conclusions if we narrow our inquiry to the city of Rio de Janeiro: according to the 1906 Brazilian census, there were 132,529 Portuguese individuals living in Rio, amounting to about 70 percent of all foreigners and to one fifth of the city’s total population.\(^2\)

Although the statistics do not give us accurate figures of the size of the Portuguese community in Rio, they can inform us about its civic organisation. Data from 1913 about welfare institutions in Rio de Janeiro reveal the existence of 24 Portuguese associations with approximately 63,000 members, meaning that around 40 percent of these immigrants were

---

\(^1\) For the next two pages, I’ll follow the introduction of my article (Silva 2017).

\(^2\) José Barbosa, *As Relações Luso-Brasileiras, A Imigração e a Desnacionalização do Brasil* (Lisbon: s.n., 1909), 45 and “Letter from King Carlos to the Duchess of Uzès,” 12th December 1907 in Rodrigues Cavalheiro, *D. Carlos I e o Brasil* (Lisbon: Off print from the *Diário da Manhã*, 1957, 20).
integrated in networks of cultural or social assistance. These associations provided health support, financed immigrants who wished to return home, helped newcomers to settle, assisted in contacts with the homeland (regarding correspondence, remittances etc.), promoted patriotic cultural activities such as lectures, evening classes on Portuguese history, culture and language, as well as book lending and activities celebrating national holidays. So far, the study of these associations has been regarded with suspicion in Migration Studies, seen as the “foam of migration waves” and therefore unrepresentative of the whole Nuñez Seixas (2016, 141). However, my research has led me to believe that associative sources are of great significance not only because they allow us to keep track of the collective organisation, but also contribute to the sociological description of groups which, more or less voluntarily, held some kind of moral and informal leadership in the community (Peyrou 2015).

This institutions-oriented perspective allows us to identify and characterise an elite group that would include people possessing social capital and capable of political intervention such as entrepreneurs, wealthy shopkeepers, merchants, journalists, publishers, writers, titled individuals, diplomats and consular authorities. An elite that, regardless of its lack of an official accountability, played the role of informal representative of the migrant community. Keeping in mind that we are only dealing with a “social sample”, which is far from giving us the whole picture, these are the men that by their geographical mobility, emotional and political engagement and by their economic behaviour gave shape to a transnational social category from more than a century ago (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003, 775).

Excluding diplomats and consular officials, most of these elite individuals shared a common experience in life (arriving in Brazil in the mid-19th century, aged from 13 to 20, coming from modest backgrounds to engage in commercial activities), as well as ethics founded on principles of meritocracy, philanthropy, and honesty. This set of values not only provided them with a distinct individuality but also offered them a specific sense of belonging, not just to a class or socio-professional category, but to a more subjective group of an “imagined community” simultaneously related to Brazilian and Portuguese nationalities but, at the same time, external to both.

---

Patterns of cultural and social reproduction in the Portuguese community in Brazil have reflected this feeling of an incomplete belonging in such subtle forms as: valuing meritocracy; encouraging an ethic of sacrifice and work; fostering a patriotic consciousness deeply bound to the homeland but simultaneously independent from national politics. In fact, it was the very historical nature of this consciousness that drove the Portuguese immigrants to regard themselves as an important part of the development of Brazilian nationality – as heirs and continuers of the Portuguese colonising mission.

Portuguese emigrants also expressed their sense of dual loyalty when choosing the destination of the proceeds of their work. For obvious reasons, the primary beneficiary was the Brazilian economy, but the “mirage of return” always played an important role in the strategy of asset management, and in this sense migrants promoted a significant movement of capital in opposite directions between the sending and receiving countries. In fact, at the turn of the century, Portugal’s finances were considerably dependent upon money transfers from immigrants in Brazil, and Portuguese governments did nothing to disparage that source of revenue, which played a crucial role in ensuring a surplus in its credit balance in London. Moreover, Portuguese migrants living in Brazil also continued to consume products from the homeland, and in the first decade of the 20th century, this consumption represented around 18 percent of all Portuguese exports (Lains 2003; Pereira, 1983; Alves, 1994). The wills left by these men illustrate this transnational mindset: a great part of them instructed that their money and property was divided between their heirs in both Brazil and Portugal. And in the very common cases in which there were no direct heirs, the fortune was normally assigned to charitable institutions, the building of schools and hospitals, and other similar kinds of initiatives on both sides of the Atlantic (Piloto 2014).

Remittances, nostalgic patterns of consumption and investments were only the economic facet of an existence that was already socially and emotionally spread between the “here” and the “there”. Unsurprisingly, this transnational life course also favoured the rise of transnational political practices, a phenomenon that would be of great consequence for Portuguese domestic politics at the end of the Monarchy and first years of the Republican regime (Silva 2017).

---

4 This scenario had some similarities with the contemporary British Empire (Magee and Thompson 2006).
THE PORTUGUESE EMIGRANT RETURNED FROM BRAZIL:
THE “BRASILEIRO”

Long before reaching a national impact, which only happened at the beginning of the 20th century, the political engagement of these Portuguese emigrants in Brazil was already very valuable at local and regional levels. In 1881, an *Industrial National Survey* concluded that in the region of Oporto “the valuable capitals acquired in Brazil and the close relations that the constant emigration of this district maintains with the American empire are more or less present in all these industries, which animates agricultural activity and explains the high price of property.”\(^5\) Another survey specifically about emigration, published some years before, concluded that around 50% of the emigrants that came back from Brazil between 1863 and 1873 managed to save enough to be considered of little to averagely wealthy, although of these only one third showed a fortune above the 10 “contos”.\(^6\) As optimistic as this scenario may seem, we must not forget that we are dealing with data that, by default, excludes the cases of failure. According to the testimony of the Portuguese consul in Rio de Janeiro to the same *Emigration Survey* of 1873: “of 1000 emigrants, around 10 manage to be rich, around 100 to save enough to live on medium standards, the rest vegetate only if they do not die.”\(^7\) Understandably, only the two first groups had the means to return home. Hence, the label “Brasileiro” by default implied someone with some means.

Because they had always maintained a transnational allegiance, when settling back home these emigrants had a very positive impact on the development of their community of origin. Actually, they were engines of modernity in many different aspects, such as finance, industrialisation, architectural innovation, or philanthropy. In fact, the houses of the “Brasileiro” stood out from the rural scenery of the time, and are still, even today, a hallmark of the rural landscape in northern Portugal. They break with the regional pattern in terms

---

5 *Inquérito Industrial* de 1881 quoted in Maria Filomena Mónica (1987, 829).

6 For a correlative notion of these values, it is useful to know that an artisan would have around a 400 “reis” daily wage, and apeon 200 “reis”. So 1 “conto” of “reis” would represent around 6 to 12 years of work at home, assuming there was full-time employment, see Alves (1994, 261-270).

of style; building materials; volumetric and are recognisable at a glance. Not surprisingly, most probably because of their deviation from the national standard, they were considered bad taste by the Portuguese social elites of the time (Monteiro 2000, 2007).

Philanthropy was probably where the “Brasileiros” made a major difference, as far as local development was concerned. Charity was a common practice among liberal elites, but these emigrants had a particular predisposition that was obviously related with their lifetime experience within the immigrant community in Brazil. They were probably the more important philanthropists of their time regarding education. Building a school in their hometown became almost a rule. Not to mention some extraordinary cases like that of the Count of Ferreira, whose will stipulated the building of 120 schools throughout the country (Araújo 2013).

It is also important to notice that both sides of the story stressed the transnational nature of the “Brasileiro”. It was predominantly evoked symbolically, but was often also used in operative ways concerning many different aspects of daily life, such as escaping from military service or other civil obligations. The commercial almanacs of Oporto, where the name of the “Brasileiros” businessmen appeared followed by the abbreviation Braz., are a vivid example of this voluntary distinction, since we know these almanacs only published the information provided by each individual (Alves 1994). By choosing to deliberately appear identified as “Brasileiros”, these men were using the exclusion device for their own benefit: they weren’t foreigners, because these almanacs had specific lists for foreigners, but they didn’t want to be seen as any other Portuguese businessman. They performed their own transnational identity.

Throughout the 19th century, the Portuguese crown was well aware of the significant contribution of these wealthy “Brasileiros” to the development of their homeland, as well as their dedication to the network of solidarity within the migrant community in Brazil. As a sign of recognition, kings granted titles either of nobility, chivalry, or honorific orders to practically all those Portuguese emigrants who managed to reach a place of some significance in the heart of the colony, or who returned home wealthy enough to generously serve their birth community.

Historiography has not yet sufficiently noticed the attention that governments of the Portuguese constitutional monarchy devoted to the many dimensions of the transnational dynamic developed by the “Brasileiros”. That is why it may be surprising to realise that from 1850 onwards, and until the end of the monarchy (1910), there were about 160 titles of nobility granted
to emigrants either living in Brazil or who had already returned from Brazil. The majority of these new title-holders were of very modest origins, mainly from the north or central interior of Portugal (Minho, Trás-os-Montes and Beiras), with a lifetime of hard work engaged in commercial activities. Just considering the amount of new titles after 1850 (a total of approximately 950), the amount granted to Portuguese emigrants in Brazil (156) or to Brazilian nationals (47) corresponds to about 21% of the total.8 There are at least three comments we can make on these numbers regarding the relationship between political power and the “Brasileiros”.

First, the consistent commitment of the state to granting official recognition to a certain group of people who only had in common the commendable characteristic that they had put their wealth at the service of their fellow countrymen. We should note that, for the most part, these men were merchants and financiers with little or no connection to national politics, and therefore the title of nobility could hardly work as a recompense for political favours. However, neither did it work as recognition for civil entrepreneurship; as it was, for instance, in the case of the Order of Industrial Merit, created by King Carlos in 1893 for that specific purpose. Certainly, the titled “Brasileiros” fit into a paradigm of merit reward, but they also apply to a new way of understanding the service to the monarchy, considering it beyond the traditional frame of the Crown and State administration. These “Brasileiros” were rewarded because they had served the Portuguese monarchy, perceiving it as the Portuguese nation, a rather modern and yet imprecise concept that comprised all Portuguese men and women, including those that lived outside the national territory.

Second, we should note that the numbers above corroborate what we have already written about the strong desire of Portuguese governments to maintain good relations with Brazil. In fact, with 34%, Brazil ranks first on the list of all Portuguese titles granted to foreigners throughout the whole 19th century. It is followed by Britain (24%), France (14%), Spain (9%), and Germany (5%). It is easy to find coincidences between this ranking and the table of national exports. It is also easy to understand how one way to curry favour with the Brazilian government was by the influence of the Portuguese colony elite, who were a significant lobby in some Brazilian state affairs, for instance by controlling an important part of the Rio de Janeiro press.

8 An estimate based on the data compiled by Vasconcelos (2003).
Third, acknowledging the fact that the Portuguese state treasury used titles and other honours as a source of revenue, we see how this was another way for the “Brasileiros” to contribute to state finances. Since every title or honour granted by the crown was subject to taxation. Committed, in theory, to abolishing privilege and favouring merit, the liberal state taxed the use of aristocratic titles and other forms of traditional privilege heavily. This may seem a contradiction when we know that, in the 19th century, the number of titles of nobility and of many other honorific orders increased as never before (Monteiro and Silva 2018). However, the old aristocracy was largely bankrupt to the point that it often had to appeal to the king’s favour for lower entitlement taxes on their titles. Nevertheless, a second rank of nobility (gentry) and an ascendant bourgeoisie were growing wealthier and more politically weighty and, therefore, avidly in search of signs of distinction. The liberal monarchy was, in fact, opening access to noble ranks which, besides being a democratic endeavour, also represented a significant income to the state treasury.

The Portuguese liberal state had many reasons to please the “Brasileiros” and to nourish their transnational nature: economic domestic benefits and political influence in the host country were probably the most obvious but not the only ones. In the effort of nationalising the monarchies, common to many western nation-states during the 19th century, emigrant communities started playing a rather important role in the building of a certain idea of national identity that included different perceptions of many antagonistic concepts, such as race, ethnicity, language, culture, and tradition. Keeping the national allegiance of the “Brasileiros” close to the crown was, therefore, a significant matter. This was also because, around the beginning of the 20th century, republicans started seriously directing their propaganda towards the Portuguese emigrants in Brazil.

However, the official fons honorum did not have a social correspondence. After all, even honoured by the Portuguese crown, these wealthy Portuguese returning from Brazil never ceased to be the “Brasileiros”. Contrary to what would be expected, it seems that the signs of status given by the State did not really serve as a vehicle for social rising and integration in the Portuguese social elite.9 Only very exceptionally, did any of these “Brasileiros” obtain

---

9 I refer to the return-phenomenon of the second half of the 19th century. This was completely different from the migration circumstances in the early decades of the century, when “Brasileiros” were men who had left for Brazil during the Luso-Brazilian Empire, and their integration in the new liberal elite was, therefore, completely natural.
higher political or administration positions at a national level after returning to their mother country. Though some of them became local political leaders or even mayors of small towns, very few got to sit in the lower or higher house of Parliament, or serve in other prestigious public offices.

The most common fixation of these ex-emigrants was in their birth village or, at most, in the nearest city, where they could have made some commercial or industrial investment. Besides local confinement, another potential constraint for the social reproduction of these “Brasileiros” was the difficulty of physiological reproduction, since these men emigrated during their youth and often married already at an advanced age, which naturally reduced the odds of a large offspring. They often married heirs of landowners of local nobility, thereby saving many traditional noble families and their estates from ruin. But examples such as those of the Viscount of Morais or of the Counts of Alto Mearim, whose direct descendants (children or grandchildren) married into families of the high nobility, are exceptions. Similarly, cases of second holders of the “Brasileiros” titles of nobility are also exceptions. Thus, although a sociological prosopography of these “Brasileiros” is yet to be done, the existing monographic literature points out their very weak capacity of being assimilated by the upper stratum of society where, by the ennoblement, they theoretically belonged.

However, we should not look at this picture and simply see a clash between two opposite worlds: one of privilege, and one of merit; nor necessarily, between an old and a new society. By the second half of 19th century, the high ranks of Portuguese society were already very heterogeneous, and social status or even nobility could be acquired by a multiplicity of ways: academic curriculum, finance, marriage, politics, commerce and industry, etc. Nobility titles in use represented mainly civil aristocracy. In any case, titles of nobility were less than 5% of the total number of distinctions granted by the crown.11

Most likely because of all the conceptualisation problems that come with the historical effort (Elite or elites? Political elites? Social elites? Cultural elites?

---

10 One characteristic that differentiates the 19th century nobility from that of the ancien régime was the fact that it was mostly non-hereditary. This, however, did not stop many sons requesting the renewal of their parents’ title after their death. This rarely happened with the “Brasileiros”.

11 Of the approximately 7000 distinctions granted in the period between 1900 and 1910, only 233 were titles of nobility. The counting of distinctions and of individuals is an estimate made from the survey by Jorge Forjaz (2012).
Local elites?), there is still no strong scholarly work about Portuguese 19th century elites. Although it would be in many respects very useful. Starting with the possibility of situating the Portuguese case within the old, and yet not closed, international debate about the social consequences of the liberal revolutions from the first half of the century and the persistence of the ancien régime in societies with negligible or late-industrialisation in 19th century Europe (Mayer 1981). The vision of an unaccomplished bourgeois society in liberal Portugal was dominant in 1970s and 80s Portuguese historiography, at a time when studies about the bourgeoisie, nobility, and elites started to proliferate all around Europe (Serrão 1970, 1984; Godinho 1971).

Recent scholarship tends to clearly disagree with the view that features from a pre-modern world persisted in 19th century Portuguese society (Monteiro 1993, 2007). In fact, considering property as the main indicator and comparing with other nations, the ancien régime suffered a brusque fall in the Portuguese case, with a fast decline of the established wealthy aristocracy and the traditional noble lineages. Historiography has already argued how the liberal revolution of 1820 had a rather extraordinary impact on Portuguese society, irretrievably demolishing its traditional foundations. Moreover, and once again in comparison for instance with Spain, it has also proved that the liberal legislation of the first constitutional governments had catastrophic consequences for the patrimony of the old traditional Houses, including the royal House of Braganza (Fontana 1975; Ruiz Torres 1993). The thesis of the absolute decline of ancien régime has furthermore been supported by evidence about the weak presence of old aristocracy in the high political ranks of the liberal monarchy, such as government and parliament (Almeida 1995).

All this is true but may be insufficient to shape a solid image of a modern society, completely imbued in a bourgeois and meritocratic mindset with no remains from the former political culture and values. Although very important, the economic and political spheres are not the only indicators to consider when trying to gauge the “modernity” of a society. It is essential to consider also social and cultural dimensions. Saying this is suggesting that some other questions could be added to the inquiry, such as: did the old aristocracy still have any social influence? How did it relate to the new bourgeois elite that rose during the 19th century? And did this new liberal elite have an ethos of its own, completely distinct from the elites of the ancien régime?

An exception to the already mentioned work by Vasconcelos (2003).
The enchantment of the bourgeoisie with the ethos of nobility is a common characteristic of many European national cultures in the 19th century and widely acknowledged by literature. To go beyond this assertion, we should try to discover if the reproduction of this traditional ethos meant the rejection of the liberal mindset that led to enrichment and social ascension (Fonseca 1993, 465). This seems to be a key question because it invites us to better define what we are dealing with when talking about “liberal mindset” outside of an ideological framework. Does it concern strategies of property and wealth management? Is it about levels of independence or connections with political power? Is it just about social behaviour: matrimonial strategies, for instance? Is it to do with stylistic and aesthetic choices? Does it involve types of cultural and educational investment? Finally, how, and to what extent, did this liberal mindset actually contribute to social climbing? The better we answer this questionnaire, the closer we are to picturing liberal Portuguese elites and understanding how autonomous they were from the ethos and mentality of the old ruling classes.

Biographical research on some important and very wealthy figures of the 19th century Portuguese society, such as José Maria Eugénio de Almeida, Manuel José Gomes da Costa São Romão and José Maria dos Santos contradict the image of an economically conservative bourgeoisie unconcerned with national progress (Martins 1992, 116-117; Reis 1987, 865-904). However, only more monographic works of this kind might prove or deny whether these cases stand for the common pattern or the exception.13

A study that analyses Portuguese 19th century etiquette guide books and many social drama texts from the same period advocates that throughout the century there was, in fact, an effort to codify the manners and draw a specific bourgeois ethos, characterised by a trilogy of work ethic, merit and discretion. Nevertheless, that study also argues that from a certain moment (later in the century), ostentation and idleness became distinctive of this same bourgeoisie, in a progressive appropriation of the symbolic capital of the nobility. In those social dramas, tension between good and evil is normally displayed by a conflict between two leading characters: frequently, the rude magnate (often the “Brasileiro”) plays the role of the villain, while the old aristocrats are often pictured as heroic characters, combining a certain nostalgic ideal of tradition

13 The study by Maria Antonieta Cruz (1999, 289-340) about the 19th century elites in Porto mitigates this perspective.
with their independence from political power due to inherited wealth (Santos 1983, 54).

Even assenting that a particular reverence to tradition and a certain propensity for nostalgia are characteristic of 19th century Portuguese society, the scenario we’ve described cannot be disconnected from the trend for historicism at the time and the phenomenon of the “invention of tradition” that was common to many European societies during the same period. Nevertheless, it is difficult to imagine someone in Portugal reproducing what in Germany Alfred Krupp declared about preferring to be the first of the industrialists than the last of the knights (Gay 2005). The 7000 decorations granted by the crown between 1900 and 1910 reinforce this idea.

If social status was no longer dependent on noble birth, the same way it was no longer restricted to fortune, it was undoubtedly conditioned by some kind of social performance. That is to say, by complying with a particular code of manners and civility – a system of practices –, and by the display of certain signs of dignity. From this perspective, it is easier to understand the difficulties and constraints involving the social assimilation of the “Brasileiros” upon return. Even exhibiting titles of nobility, after a lifetime abroad, they were not only perceived as social meteors but also as foreigners. Literature of the time mirrors well the contradictory feelings that the “Brasileiros” motivated. Eça de Queirós, the most famous and sharpest writer in the second half of the 19th century, frequently denounced the snobbish and cynical attitude of the Portuguese elites towards the “Brasileiros”: “You – that in conversations, among friends, in the café, are inexhaustible in mocking the “Brasileiro” – in the newspapers, in public speeches or in the sermon you are inexhaustible in glorifying the “Brasileiro”. In your chats, he is the monkey; in the press, he is our brother from overseas.”

If on the one hand, the “Brasileiros” were vivid examples of entrepreneurship and ascent by merit; on the other, their manners from the new world were unsuitable for the social norms of Portuguese elites. Hence, they were pushed into a category of their own, which stigmatised them not only in terms of social status but also in terms of their national identity.

---

THE RISE OF A NATIONALISTIC POLITICAL CULTURE
AND THE LUSO-BRAZILIAN RHETORIC

The scenario described above started to show signs of change in the twilight of the 19th century when, pressed by the international context of the new-imperialism, Portuguese political forces realised the political potential of the Portuguese overseas community to face the new international challenges. In fact, since the Berlin Conference (1884-85) Portugal had sought to find a strategy to overcome the gap between its imperial ambitions and its resources. The invocation of historic rights, the inconsistent occupation of the African hinterland, the efforts to reorganise colonial administration, and the fragile alliances had showed erratic and weak results. In contrast, imperial discourse seemed to be a successful expedient. The rhetoric about the Luso-Brazilian fraternity became an important feature of this emergent imperial discourse.

In 1908, the Portuguese king, Carlos 1st, was planning a state visit to Brazil, programmed for June of the same year. It did not take place due to his assassination in that February. It would have been the first time a European head of State had made such a visit. More than honouring a former colonial territory, King Carlos would have been honouring the Portuguese men and women living there. Clearly, the implicit purpose of the royal visit was to put Brazil on the symbolic map of Portuguese imperial discourse (Silva 2009). The conviction of a “Greater Portugal” was being set up; paving the way to thinking of Portugal’s “greatness” both in terms of space and time. In space, because of its vast colonial empire; in time, because it “generated” other major nations, like Brazil. Within this rhetoric, Portuguese emigrants living in Brazil were considered part of the Portuguese “brave and immortal nation”, as can be seen from the lyrics of the martial hymn, A Portuguesa, written in 1890 and made the national anthem in 1910.

The same way that Italian and Irish emigrants were part of Italy’s nation-building project and Irish nationalistic ideology of a “larger Ireland” (Jacobson 1995; Foner 1997), symbolically, Portuguese emigrants in Brazil also sustained the idea of a “diffuse Lusitanity” that, along with an emergent imperial consciousness, started to germinate within the Portuguese imagination at the turn of the century. Republicans internalised this idea and chose the “Brasileiros” as one of the main targets for their propaganda. Therefore, after the republican revolution of 1910, Portuguese governments sponsored many official initiatives that gave concrete shape to this Luso-Brazilian facet.
of cultural nationalism. This was the period of the Luso-Brazilian journals such as *Orpheu* (1915), *Águia* (1920-21), *Atlântida* (1915-1920); of ambitious editorial projects, such as the *History of Portuguese Colonization in Brazil* (1921-1923), of the Portuguese aerial crossing of the south Atlantic (1922). It was also the time of President António José de Almeida’s official visit to Brazil (1922), who referred to the Atlantic Ocean as “the great Lusitanian Sea, enclosed between the shores of Africa and Brazil, having Lisbon as safe haven.” (Derouet 1923).

It is easy to understand how Portuguese emigrants in Brazil were interested in encouraging this ideology. Not by coincidence, the *History of Portuguese Colonization of Brazil* was published thanks to the financial support of the “Brasileiros”, with the purpose of being distributed in instalments in Portugal and Brazil (Dias 1921). It is also easily comprehensible how this new nationalistic trend helped to rehabilitate the image of the “Brasileiros”, who started to be acknowledged as mediators for the Luso-Brazilian fraternity that become a key feature of the imperial and colonial Portuguese discourse during the first Republic and, later on, during the authoritarian regime of the *Estado Novo*.

CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

The purpose of this overview and questioning on 19th century Portuguese elites was mainly to reveal the idiosyncrasies and complexity of the world that was intercepted by the “Brasileiro”. By identifying the conditions of inclusion that the “Brasileiros” lacked, we hope to have contributed to a deeper understanding of Portuguese 19th century society, which produced that classification, and to a more accurate knowledge of the criteria that worked as gatekeepers to the higher ranks of that society.

Viewed as social category, the “Brasileiros” are indeed a very fertile case to think about dynamics of inclusion and exclusion in 19th century Portugal. Not only because it obliges us to go beyond the economic or even political notion of inclusion, but also because it calls for a sharper lens when looking for the grounds of social exclusion. These men had the means and the official recognition sustaining their stance as members of an elite, but apparently they did not have the capabilities nor the experience required to be assimilated and recognised by the elites. Moreover, the “Brasileiros” seem to confirm the
link that literature identifies between “the birth of the modern world” and the gradual uniformisation of the system of practices in which elites were fostered. More than genealogy or wealth, the modern status regimes were grounded on manners, and required the performance of a certain code (of dressing, of behaving etc.) (Bayly 2007). Therefore, if on the one hand, the modern world effectively leads to a democratisation of elites with more widespread and inclusive criteria of integration; on the other, its trend towards a standardisation created new exclusion criteria, by drastically reducing the acceptance of diversity.

The “Brasileiros” also allow us to look at inclusion in terms of national and cultural identity, since they thought of themselves and acted as transnational players. In fact, 19th century novelists and journalists already acknowledged what anthropologists and sociologists identify today as a “correlative imaginary” or a dual ethnic sensibility of transnational migrants (Westwood and Phizacklea 2000), picturing the “Brasileiro” as a character doomed never to have a complete sense of his own nationality: in Brazil he will never cease to be the Portuguese, in Portugal he is hopelessly the “Brasileiro.”

Yet, in the transition to the 20th century, in the historical context of the emergence of new imperialism that characterised the period, the “Brasileiros”, particularly those who were still living in Brazil, were redeemed, to some extent, by an emergent political culture that saw then as important assets to deal with international pressure regarding its colonial Empire. Symbolically featuring the inheritors of former colonisers and playing agents of propaganda for Portuguese imperial ambitions, Portuguese emigrants in Brazil played a key role in the strategy of showing the successes of the ex-colony to prove Portugal’s capacity to undertake a “civilising mission.”

The time when a new type of nationalism impregnated with imperial aspiration and nostalgia arose was simultaneously that when 19th century civic liberal culture fell. This new trend towards a nationalist political culture rehabilitated the “Brasileiros”, to some degree, by making political profit from their transnational curriculum. Their transnational feature was finally seen as the interest of a new ideological discourse exulting the Luso-Brazilian fraternity and foreseeing a common civilising destiny for Portugal and Brazil. Yet, if on the one hand, this context promoted the political criteria of inclusion for the “Brasileiros”; on the other, it was never able to overcome the social criteria of exclusion.
REFERENCES

the “brasileiro”: a 19th century transnational social category


CITE THIS CHAPTER AS:


https://doi.org/10.31447/ics9789726715030.10
Reducing difference in the Portuguese empire? A case study from early-modern Goa

Ângela Barreto Xavier
In 1951, the Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freyre made a short visit to Goa. This was part of a trip during which Freyre travelled through the Portuguese colonies in Africa and Asia to observe the results of the miscegenation process that, in his view, characterised Portuguese colonialism (Castelo 1998; Souza 2008; Bastos 2003; Cardão and Castelo 2015; Bastos 2015). During that visit, Freyre considered that Goan society was one of the best expressions of Lusotropicalism, of that benign Portuguese colonialism that adapted physically and culturally to tropical contexts, creating mixed societies (Freyre 1953).

Ironically, five years later, the Portuguese geographer Orlando Ribeiro, who, among other Portuguese intellectuals, espoused Lusotropicalist theories, had a different impression of the same territories and society, warning Salazar about the near absence of Lusophile feelings, and that the Portuguese presence in Goa was in danger (Ribeiro 1999).

How can these different narratives be explained? Was Freyre mistaken? Or was Ribeiro too apocalyptic (which he was not, since in 1961, Goa was annexed by the Indian government)?

To understand the diverse perceptions that Freyre and Ribeiro had, in the same decade, of the same territories and society, it is necessary to go back in history. Freyre and Ribeiro were seeing parts of the end of a process that had started four centuries before. Probably each of them was struck by different outcomes of that process, which led to their contradictory perceptions. In his short visit, Freyre was apparently unaware of the resistance to the Portuguese presence felt by many Goans (Catholic or Hindu, but usually of Indian descent) in those very same years. He was, in fact, “guided” by well-off Goans of Portuguese (perhaps mixed) origin and by Catholic elites of Indian origin completely adapted to the Portuguese imperial idiom, and sometimes the first to trumpet the virtues of the Portuguese empire. Ribeiro, in contrast, had a longer stay in Goa. In his 1956 report, requested by Salazar, his perplexity is clear when faced with the intricacies of Goa. He obviously did not expect to hear the narratives of the many representatives of the demographic majority that had been excluded, from the 16th century onwards, from the benefits that imperial domination brought to a few. In fact, these narratives were in deep contradiction with the Lusotropicalist fantasies.

In revisiting the first centuries of the Portuguese presence in Goa and the strategies followed by the Portuguese crown in order to keep those territories and people under Portuguese rule, I shall discuss why Freyre and Ribeiro’s perceptions were simultaneously correct, mistaken, and complimentary.
The first two sections will scrutinise the Portuguese physical and cultural miscegenation policies in early modern Goa, and their long-term consequences. How successful were these policies? To what extent the “Lusitanisation” of Indians was complete? Were they full members of the imperial political body, or stigmatised subjects with a liminal status? And what happened to the children of mixed couples (Van Gennep 1909; Goffman 1963; Turner 1969)? In the third section, I argue that the inclusive and assimilationist policies of the 16th century led simultaneously to the reduction of difference and the multiplication of distinctions and hierarchies not only between “colonisers” and “colonised”, but also between “colonised” and “colonised”, in what could be called a colonial expression of the community problems of “the established and the outsiders” (Elias and Scotson 1994). If in the 16th century Estado da Índia, the Portuguese colonists ironically played the role of “the established”, in the following centuries, this equation gained a different complexion, calling into question the expected balance of power, and the necessary hierarchy between “colonisers” and “colonised” (to compare with other imperial experiences, see Stoler, 1995; Belmessous, 2013). Finally, in my fourth section, I shall revisit the initial paradox and draw some conclusions on the tensions and dilemmas between inclusion and exclusion in the early modern Portuguese empire.

MIXED MARRIAGES

Controlling the forms of social reproduction was central to the durability of colonial societies, as pointed out by Ann Laura Stoler and others (Stoler 1995; Stoler 1997; Young 2005). Social reproduction in the imperial territories laid the foundations for the political identity of these places, the rights of belonging to the political community, the terms of this belonging, as well as the location of the various actors in the social scenario. It was the awareness of its significance that led Afonso de Albuquerque (1453-1515), the 2nd viceroy of India, to propose a policy to Manuel I (1469-1521) that, in his view, would constitute the basis of maintaining the new Indian Ocean territories and of further territorial advances in India.

The military and administrative needs of the newly created Estado da Índia (1505) demanded more and more people. However, until the second decade of the 16th century, the majority of Portuguese imperial agents returned to Portugal at the end of their commission, normally staying three or a few more
years. In contrast with the Atlantic islands (the Azores and Madeira) and, from the 16th century onwards, with Brazil, where Portuguese settlement became the rule, the Portuguese presence in Asia was characterised by mobility (Russell-Wood 1992; Russell-Wood 1998).

To overcome these difficulties – few colonists to hold vast and distant territories – Albuquerque proposed to the king of Portugal that his soldiers be allowed to marry Indian women, transforming the newly conquered cities of Goa, Kochi, Malacca and Hormuz, into settlers’ societies of a sort. The perception of India as a place of alterity, as worth less than the kingdom, legitimised these marriages of the Portuguese men with (lower caste) Indian women. In addition, the Aristotelian generation theory still prevailing at this period, which stressed the dominant position of the male semen in the moment of generating a child, supported the belief that the blood of the children of these couples was mainly Portuguese (Needham 1959; Darmon 1977; Hespanha 1993; Felici and Siracusa 2000).

The legal terms of the agreement between the Portuguese crown and its subjects who accepted these marriages were exacting, both regarding the more enticing parts of the proposal – the granting of lands and other rewards as compensation for the unions – and the qualities required of the spouses.

The brides should have the fairest skin possible and had necessarily to convert to Christianity (Barros 1988, 1, 198; Boxer 1961). Birth (natio) and baptism (regeneratio) were equivalent identification criteria in Portuguese law, which meant that these women theoretically became Portuguese after their baptism.

The land grants were given under a regime of emphyteusis, by which transmission could only occur through inheritance. This helped to attach the couples and their progeny to the Indian land. The renewal of the idea of pater familias with corresponding economic implications, underpinned the legal rules that sustained this policy, where the topoi “house”, “land”, “farm” were directly associated with “marriage”.

The immediate results of Albuquerque’s strategy were not negligible: in the second decade of the 16th century there were hundreds of mixed couples – from that moment onwards known as the casados – and mixed children who were subjects of the Portuguese crown. The majority of them were from Goa, where these initiatives were more successful (over 500 mixed couples), besides unsanctified unions between single men and slave women or concubines. A letter from Diogo Mariz, a clerk of the Goa Council, is very suggestive. According to Mariz, the city of Goa had 1,000 children of Portuguese fathers,
considering them as future loyal soldiers to defend the empire. The other towns under Portuguese rule had fewer *casados*, but there were still a number of children conceived from these unions bearing typically Portuguese names: Afonso, Jacome, Ines, Joana, Brisida, Francisco, Pero, Ana (GTT, 10, n.º 23; ian/TT, CC, p 2, MÇ 3, n.º 154; MÇ 17, n.º 27 e 30).

Like their parents, these children had full rights and obligations in matters of public and private Portuguese law. Since Portuguese law did not predict interference in the private affairs of the communities that were under Portuguese dominion but were not Portuguese (or Christian), this legal aspect was not irrelevant (Hespanha 1995; Suárez 1971, 6, § 18-22). At the time, in fact, the Portuguese king exercised direct rule only over a minority (the Portuguese people and the few Indians converted to Christianity) of the thousands of people living in those territories, which meant that nearly all the empire's inhabitants were not, strictly speaking, subjects of the king of Portugal (Thomaz 1994a; Hespanha 1995).

Besides increasing, in demographic terms, the crown’s power in those territories, physical miscegenation changed, in the long term, the relation between “colonisers” and “colonised”. From the second decade of the 16th century onwards, the community of “colonisers” became more heterogeneous, including a social group of Indian descent, which was, to some extent, the historical proof of what was argued by Freyre. However, in contrast with the positive assessment of Freyre, the malaise towards the *casados* and their children was high, eventually leading to the suspension of Albuquerque’s policy of physical miscegenation (which Freyre was apparently unaware of).

Resistance to physical miscegenation started from its beginnings, in India and in the kingdom. First, the parents of the Indian women refused to give their daughters to Portuguese men. Only later, when they saw them “honoured with land and richness that they did not have before”, the poorer ones agreed to this kind of union. However, the daughters of upper-caste Indians did not integrate this marriage market, probably because their parents didn’t need to have honours and richness, and preferred to keep their own way of life (Barros 1998, 1, 198). Secondly, from the outset, there had also been Portuguese nobles who were against such unions, arguing that similar arrangements would neither be welcome nor honoured. Since there were concurrent theories of generation (originated by Hippocrates and Galen), and some of them questioned the male dominance, the fear of blood contamination was also present. In addition, there was the question of colour – the colour barrier –,
which did not have any legal standing, but to which most Portuguese were hardly indifferent (Boxer 1961, 1963). João de Barros, who praised Albuquerque’s decisions, complained against these critics, arguing that the Romans had married the Sabine, and nobody evoked those beginnings of Rome as being impure; and in the Portuguese colonisation of the Atlantic islands there had been mixed couples, too. Again, there were no complaints against it (Barros 1998, I, 178, 470-73, 550).

Another important variable to take into account at the moment of analysing the changing perceptions towards the mixed marriages happening in India is the emergence of the ideology of purity of blood. This ideology evoked the alternative generation theories, in which the role of the female substance in the moment of generation is active, too. Purity of blood became hegemonic during the 16th and 17th centuries Portugal, arguing that until the fourth generation the “impure” Jewish male or female blood did not vanish. The outcome of this was that most people of Jewish descent were not eligible for the offices, benefits, privileges and distinctions of the Portuguese crown. The significant presence of Jews and New Christians in the imperial Portuguese territories, as well as the fact that some of the casados were married to daughters of New Christians, helped the transfer of this ideology to India, and its impact on the perception of the casados and their children (and later, of the Indian converts, too) (Tavim 2003; Rego 2011; Xavier 2011).

Along with this, in Europe there were debates on “the perfect marriage”, the proper behaviour of couples, the role of the Christian pater familias, and the education of children. These debates that later would have a normative expression in the Tridentine decree entitled De Reformatione Matrimonii of 1563, adopted as law in Portugal in 1564 (Fernandes 1995; Caetano 1965; Xavier 2010), fuelled questions such as: How could marriages between unequal parties be considered “perfect unions”? How could an Indian woman recently converted to Christianity raise a child as a true Christian? Or, how could an “Indianised” Portuguese man behave like a pater familias (Xavier 2014)?

The perception that the casados were gradually becoming less and less interested in the crown’s military campaigns, and more involved in their own private projects also contributed to their negative image in the kingdom. Already in 1524, the captain of Goa, D. Henrique de Meneses, had written to João III stating that he could not trust the Portuguese settled in Goa to defend that city, because “they had no honour, instead, they were all married to niggers” (Subrahmanyanam 1995).
If increasingly detached from the Portuguese political body, how could these people guarantee the maintenance of the Portuguese imperial presence in Asia?

One of the measures taken by the Portuguese crown to cope with this problem was to suspend the policy of physical miscegenation, while sending Portuguese orphan girls to India intended to marry the sons of the *casados*. Frequently daughters of royal officers who had died in military campaigns in Africa and the Indies, these girls brought with them a dowry of land and the right to collect rents. The sons of the *casados* who would marry them would receive an office in the local imperial administration (Boxer 1961, 1975; Coates 2002). The King’s circle of advisers believed that this would help to reconstruct the dependence of the *casados* and their families on the king and the kingdom, recover the “Portuguese identity” of the Portuguese families settled in India, and, simultaneously, to *whiten* their offspring.

Started in the decade of 1540, the new marriage policy continued to be adopted during the Habsburg period (1580-1640), when Portugal was under Spanish dominion. Politically undesirable, the practice of marrying local women did not stop completely. In order to prevent it, in 1596, Filipe II of Spain (and I of Portugal) forbade those that married Indian women to receive any office in the imperial administration. Later, marriages between the Portuguese orphans with people of “lower quality”, namely those of Jewish and Indian origins (in general, the descendants of the first *casados*) were also discouraged. In contrast, the crown stimulated the marriages between Portuguese girls and bachelors of “quality” (the children of the second *casados*, considered purer than the first) (APO 1992, f. 3, 620-628; CCLP 1603-1612, 1854, 105; IAN/TT, Livro das Monções, nr. 2, 314; nr. 21, 55v; DRI, 1880, 1, 191-203).

Unexpectedly, upper-caste Catholic Indians began to request royal protection for their own marriages, too. Initially these marriages occurred strictly within the Indian community, following caste rules. But from the second half of the 17th century, a new sort of mixed marriage was taking place, namely between poor Portuguese noble men and the daughters of well-off Catholic Brahmans and Charodos, those castes that had adopted the imperial vocabulary and presented themselves as pure blood Indian nobles. The systematic conversion of the local population to Christianity and its structural effects on the local social order played a key role in this new scenario of physical miscegenation.
RELI GIOUS AND CULTURAL CONVERSION

If controlling the forms of social reproduction was central to the durability of colonial societies, governing the forms of cultural reproduction became even more important in some territories of the Portuguese empire. Complementing the whitening and westernisation of the children of the casados, the Portuguese crown realised that the conversion to Christianity of the demographic majority (the Indians) was the most efficient tool for maintaining and expanding the Estado da Índia territories. Although this had theoretically been a mission of the Portuguese crown from its initial presence in the Indian Ocean (Thomaz 1994b), it was only in the reign of João III that the material conditions for Christian conversion were established, namely the bishopric of Goa in 1534 (which soon became the biggest Archbishopric of the Portuguese monarchy).

In the third decade of the 16th century, João de Barros reproduced the well-known humanist topos “a word lasts more than a stone” to defend the linguistic colonisation of India and other territories under Portuguese dominion. Together with other humanists influenced by Erasmus circulating in the king and queen’s circle, Barros also believed that the spread of Christianity would bring universal dominion and everlasting peace. Romanitas and Cristianitas intersected, defining the political fabric that nurtured the government of João III, converting the exercise of political power into something quite different from his father’s rule. In that period, the Roman emperors Augustus, Marco Aurelius, Constantine and Theodosius became role models for the construction of the imperial society, which was shared by the inner circles of the crown and by many imperial agents, too (Buescu 1996, 2005; Deswarte 1992; Moreira 1991, Xavier 2008b). In addition to that, the conflicts and wars caused by the religious divisions in Europe reinforced the idea that a prince’s subject should share his faith: the principle of cuius regio eius religio. The ideal political community was, therefore, one where all subjects shared the same religion as their prince, the only way to guarantee their political loyalty. In Portugal, as in Spain, Italy, Germany, or England, this principle led to an alliance between political and religious agents and to the use of Christianity as a way to build a certain type of society (Prodi 1994; Prosperi 1996; Hsia 1989; Palomo 2004; Paiva 2006, 2011; Xavier 2008b).

This means that religious conversion became an instrument of politically including Indians, with the goal of, over time, attaining political and cultural
conformity. The arrival of increasing numbers of missionaries in Goa, many bearing papal dispensations that allowed them to engage in judicial and secular activities – i.e. to actively behave as agents of the king – played an important part in this structural change in the exercise of the imperium (Xavier 2008b, ch. 2).

First under the orientation of the vicar-general of the Estado da Índia, Miguel Vaz, of the Franciscan bishop Juan de Albuquerque and the Franciscans, and later with the help of the Jesuits, local Goan Hindu temples and objects of worship were destroyed during the 1540s, the local priests expelled and public worship of Indian religions prohibited, in a process of material and symbolic decapitation of the local religious culture (Xavier 2010; Robinson 1998).

Legal violence was also pursued systematically, aiming to promote the full Christianisation of Goan social order. Provisions in 1541 channelled the assets of local temples into Christian ones. These actions were accompanied by others with equally profound impact, covering aspects such as the family, inheritance, land, residence, labour, and political rights. A law signed by Queen Catarina of Austria in 1559 – following in the footsteps of previous legislation – called again for the destruction of all temples, namely those that were hidden in private houses, prohibiting the celebration of any local rite, in public or at home. These and other normative tools intended to “persuade” Indians (and, in particular, Indian elites) to convert to Christianity by reducing their local power if they did not. Significantly, the preambles of many of these orders explicitly stated that “by depriving them of this honour, they shall be more easily converted to our Catholic faith” (Apo F. 5, p. II, 543-545, 612, 903-903). Other decrees favoured Catholics in the distribution of the most productive lands within villages with Catholic and non-Catholic populations, and subverted the traditional distribution of power, prohibiting the access of non-Catholics to decision-making positions. Ecclesiastical laws, like decree 27 of the First Provincial Council of Goa (1567) reinforced this, when stating that “no office, dignity, honour, pre-eminence or domain shall be given to a non-believer over a believer”, a decree that evoked the Summa contra Gentiles of Thomas of Aquinas, and that would have a legal expression in the law of the crown (Apo F. 5, p. II, 543-545).

In fact, from the moment of their baptism, the Indians of Goa enjoyed, at least theoretically, the same legal rights and obligations as the Portuguese (Dri vol. II, 66-67). For some it meant social mobility, or an unexpected
legal autonomy, as was the case of women converts. If converted, women could access their own parents’ inheritance, and take precedence over their non-converted male brothers; and widows were allowed to marry a second time, and to receive part of their husband’s inheritance (APO F. 5, 1, 171-173; 175-178). Again, as had happened with the *casados*, but with undesirable consequences, to interfere in women’s local status was to intervene directly in the process of social and cultural reproduction in Goa.

If with the physical miscegenation policy, the number of the king of Portugal’s subjects had risen, the increase was drastic after the systematic conversion of Indians: in Goa, from only a few thousand in the mid-16th century, their number increased to over 100,000 by the start of the next century. This meant that in the medium and long run, the people of Goa would be submitted to the same legal and fiscal system, share the same military obligations and owe the same type of loyalty to the king. They would also be educated both as Christians and “Portuguese”.

The monarch’s inner circle of advisers did not foresee the social consequences of the reordering of colonial society resulting from these policies, namely at the micro-level. In fact, if conversion expanded exponentially the power of the king in these territories, it also reduced the legal and political distance between “colonisers” and “colonised”, challenging the position of the first.

The *casados* of mixed origins heavily resented the conversion of the Indians and the legal consequences it entailed. They were already stigmatised because of their physical and cultural Indianisation (Xavier 2014). Because of that, the crown distrusted the level of their loyalty, quality, and “Portugueseness” to perform the best offices of Estado da Índia, choosing, instead, reinóis, the Portuguese born in the kingdom (APO F. 5, P II, 543-545). Like the civil institutions, the religious orders also hindered the entrance of mixed blood Portuguese born in India, or did not allow them to occupy higher offices (DRI vol. 1, 155-161). If in the beginning, these *casados* were, in the view of the Portuguese crown, “the established”, now they too were becoming “outsiders” of a kind.

By the end of 1630s, the anxieties of this group were expressed in a short treatise written by Friar Miguel da Purificação, a Franciscan born in India of Portuguese descent (Machado 1752, vol. 3, 481). His *Relacion defensiva dos filhos da Índia Oriental* (A Report in Defence of East Indian Children) protested the “quality” of the Portuguese born in India, stating, first, that
Portuguese blood did not change under different climatic conditions; and secondly, that the Portuguese born from Portuguese settled in India were neither “mixed” nor “niggers”. Purificação argued that these “Children of the East” were able to govern, and should not be excluded from all honours and dignities, in contrast with the true “niggers” – the Indians –, who should not be allowed to occupy those positions (Purificação 1640, fls. 13, 31, 57v).

Purificação’s arguments denote the criticisms coming from the kingdom, as well as from the ambitious Catholic Indians. Among these, there were those that openly claimed ancient noble origins and purity of blood, knowledge and written skills, arguing that they were, in fact, the best intermediaries of the Portuguese power locally. From the mid-17th century onwards, many of them, like the Brahmans, accused the casados of being “sons of niggers and fishermen”, therefore unfit for governing them. Writing his *Espelho dos Bragmanes* (The Mirror of the Brahmans), in Latin and Portuguese, the Brahman Matheus de Castro (1504-1677), the first bishop of Indian origin, started a Brahman literature in European language where their authors legitimised their position within the old social order and inscribed their aspirations in the new one (ASCPE, SOCPE 1, “Epistola Domini Mathæi à Castro Episcopi Chrysopolitani, ad Brachmanes, ad rebellionem exhortatoria dicta speculum Brachmanum” fls. 154r-163rv; “Espelho dos Bragmanes”, Portuguese version, ff. 180r-195v).

That some of these aspirations were successful can be interpreted from the words of António José de Noronha, the bishop of Halicarnassus, another Portuguese born in India, who, a century later and with a certain disdain, summed up the position of the local elites. In his *Systema Marcial Asiático* (The Military System of Asia), Noronha explained that “the majority of the natives on the island of Piedade and Chorão bequest to their sons the Books of Law, and in the same place you can see a lot of rich houses: they are lawyers (*Solicitadores das Causas*), chieftains (*Naïques*), baillifs (*Meirinhos*), scribes (*Escrivães*), mayors (*Alcaides*), and all related” (Noronha 1994, 24-25; Garcia 1872; Pereira 1964-5).

This late 18th century perception of the social position of the “colonised” upper-caste, and the jealousy over their “many rich houses” is ironic. In this period, the Catholic Indian elites rejected the sons of casados and agreed, instead, to marry “meritorious Portuguese born in the Kingdom.” This inversion of positions had been witnessed by Giovanni Careri, an Italian traveller who visited Goa in the 17th century and left some interesting observations on its
social organisation (Guglieminetti 1976, 700). It was also supported by the complaints of the *casados* of Goa in this period, as well as by viceroys’ decrees on the issue (Frias 1702; Paes 1713; Xavier 2008b, ch. 7, 2012; Županov 2009; Xavier and Županov 2015).

Does this mean that these Indian elites were recovering their pre-Portuguese centrality?

Not completely. If the power of Indian elites increased after conversion, it is also true that their aspirations to equality could not be completely satisfied. Social opposition and reaction to their transformation into a kind of Portuguese was frequent and harsh. Parallel to the raising of upper-caste Catholic Indians – the structural trend that singularises Goan experience when compared with any other within the early modern Portuguese empire –, were the systematic attempts to reinstate difference between “colonisers” and “colonised”.

**THE DILEMMAS OF REINSTATING DIFFERENCE**

In fact, the Portuguese crown was not completely insensitive to the anxieties of the *casados*, thinking up new ways to prevent the complete integration of Catholic Indians that conversion to Christianity theoretically implied. Further norms – many of them inspired by those in the kingdom to prevent New Christians from having the same rights as old ones – restricted access of the “Christians of the land” to the high local imperial offices, namely the access to military orders, forbidden to people of non-Christian ancestry (former Jews, Muslims and “Gentiles”) (APO F. 2, 115-116; F. 5, 1, 390-392; F. 6, 1, 739 et seq.; 776 et seq). At the same time, a crown officer called the *Pai dos Cristãos* (Father of the Christians), whose initial mission was to protect the converts from discrimination, was given power to decide who among them could have access to offices (and which offices) in the imperial order. Generally, he channelled the converts to subaltern positions, such as doorman, helper, cleaner, and so forth. Rules such as those forbidding Portuguese from being domestic servants or from working for non-Portuguese, or from being treated by local doctors, also aimed to prop up the imperial hierarchy (*HAG, Assentos da Relação de Goa*, n.º 8779, fl. 109; *HAG, Livro Vermelho*, 1, 6). Through this route, as had happened in the kingdom with the New Christians, Indian converts were given a transitory status, a kind of liminality: they were neither inside nor outside; they were “equal”, but not completely (Fabre 1999).
The local Indian elites did not forget the promises that had been made to them at the outset of Portuguese colonisation. The archives are full of petitions addressed to the king of Portugal that reflect their dissatisfaction, resorting to the dominant political rhetoric in the kingdom, recalling the contract they had made with the monarch, a contract whose violation would free them of their obligations to cooperate (IAN/PT, CC, Parte I, Maço 58, nr. 7; DRI Vol. II, 263-264, 412-413).

Since the cooperation of Indians, the demographic majority, was central to the maintenance of Estado da Índia, the crown could not but be sensitive towards the arguments pressed in these petitions. In 1572, King Sebastião wrote to the viceroy Luís de Ataíde, telling him to provide offices to converted Indians who were worthy of them. The same order was repeated ten years later, with Portugal now under Spanish domination (DHMPPO, vol. 12, 252; APO, F. 5, II, 748-749, p. 989). In other cases, the king granted some of the demands from Catholic Indians to be appointed to positions already occupied by casados. During the 17th century, against the backdrop of the growing fragility of the Portuguese position in the Indian Ocean (Subrahmanyam 1995; Ames 2000), the aspirations of these local elites were heeded even more. In 1617, Filipe III of Spain (II of Portugal) told the viceroy pointedly that it was impossible to maintain the empire without having local populations content, which required granting them more offices in the imperial order. Seven years later, another royal decree determined that “the Christians of the land shall be vested in the offices of which they deserve”, while at the same time prohibiting the elites of Portuguese origin from enjoying the inverse privilege of acceding to posts occupied by these elites in the pre-existing local order. This means to say that the crown simultaneously guaranteed the old privileges of these elites and granted access to new privileges in order to maintain the rule over the Indian populations (DRI, vol. IV, 109-117; vol. V, 139-140; 374-375. HAG, Relação de Goa, Cartas, Provisões, Alvarás Régios, Regimentos e Leis, Livro I, fl. 137v; Índice dos Assentos e Registos da Relação de Goa, n.º 8780, fl. 56, 187, 225).

However, these decisions were not easily implemented, as is demonstrated by Matheus de Castro. Castro had studied humanities in the Franciscan college of the Reis Magos, and wished to continue his education in the college of São Boa­ventura, where he would have earned higher degrees in order to pursue an ecclesiastical career. However, the Franciscans’ head in India, and the archbishop of Goa, dissuaded him. The archbishop, in particular, was
not keen on the ordination of the Brahmans, considering them intellectually incapable of performing higher positions in the Catholic hierarchy.

With his career possibilities thwarted in the Estado da India, Matheus de Castro left for Rome between 1621 and 1622, travelling by land. He crossed the Persian Gulf, stopped in Jerusalem, and arrived at the Papal capital in 1625. In Rome, Castro studied with the Oratorians and was protected by the Barberini family and by the powerful Secretary of the recently established Congregazione della Propaganda Fide. Intended to recover the power of Rome over the religious missions around the world, Portuguese included, the Propaganda Fide took on Castro as its agent, sending him with offices granted by the Pope that challenged the Portuguese ecclesiastic hierarchy and rights. Not accepted by the Goan hierarchy, and after several adventures, Castro wrote his treatise *Espelho de Bragmanes*, exhorting the Brahmans of Goa to fight against discrimination and for a better position in the local imperial order (Sorge 1986; Faria 2007; ASCPF, SOCP 1, fols. 180r-195v).

Matheus de Castro’s treatise, like that of Friar Miguel da Purificação and other examples, shows that the choice for reducing the difference between “colonisers” and “colonised” was complex, entailing long-lasting paradoxes and tensions. Legal laws and decrees, explicit social reactions and implicit social norms, as well as institutional procedures, just like the statutes on purity of blood (Olival 2004; Rego 2011), built a complex architecture of distinctions that would allow a complicated combination between inclusion and exclusion, equality and hierarchy.

These tensions were reiterated in a decree of 2nd April, 1761, which basically repeated, now in a more modern language, and excluding the religious variable from it, what had already been defined in the 16th century norms. In the new decree, José 1 explained that there were many conflicts between the local elites and those from the metropole, and ordered that all Christians born in India, in dominions of the Portuguese crown, be granted the same honours, distinctions, rights and privileges as those born in the kingdom. Beyond this, the king established that the Indian Catholics were to be protected from insults, so that anyone who called them “mistiços” (mixed) or “negros” (niggers) was to be strongly punished (Lopes 1996, 39 and following). This decree demonstrates that the several attempts to reduce difference – the inclusive attitude expressed, to some degree, in the choice of mixed marriages and conversion policies – pulled up discriminatory practices. Instead of transforming them into equals to the Portuguese, the
children of the *casados* and the Indians converted to Christianity were “almost the same, but not quite” (Bhabha 1997, 153). And the constant use of the words “nigger” and “mixed” as an insult demonstrates how physical miscegenation became undesirable. Since the early days, it had existed for pragmatic reasons, and was suspended when the crown thought that it was not needed anymore.

Ironically, these processes also fuelled conflicts within the upper-caste Catholic Indians, namely the Brahmans and Charodos. Both competed intensively to be recognised by the Portuguese crown as the true Indian pure blood nobles, of a long Christian ancestry, therefore combining civil and Christian nobility. Besides also being part of the Catholic Indians’ long process of emergence identified by Antonio José Noronha in his *Systema Marcial Asiatico*, the treatises *Aureola dos Indios* (The Indians’ Halo) by the Brahman, António João Frias, published in Lisbon in 1702, and *Promptuario de Diffinicoes Indicas* (*Enchiridion of Indian Definitions*) by the Charodo, Leonardo Paes, of 1713, express well the internal competition, within and beyond the empire, between the Indian local elites.

This internal competition continued, with different nuances, in the two following centuries. In fact, the social history of Goa changed significantly, again, from the second half of the 18th century onwards. In this period, the territories of Goa more than doubled. New territories were conquered or annexed (known as “New Conquests”), bringing another relevant demographic change. From that period until the mid-20th century, a great part of the population of Goa was not Catholic anymore (theoretically, at least 90% of Goa was Catholic in the first decades of the 18th century). In fact, conversion to Christianity stopped being a political tool, and the efforts to convert the population of the new territories were scarce. Compared to those previously discussed, these other Indians were of a different sort, indeed more “Indian like”.

This prompted the Catholic Indians of the territories belonging to the Portuguese empire since the 16th century to act openly as “internal colonisers”, now the most fitting intermediaries between the Portuguese crown and the new subjects. At least in this internal scenario, Catholic Indians could play the role of “the established”, relegating the inhabitants of the “New Conquests”, non-Christian, non-Westernised, “uncivilised”, to the place of the subaltern and “outsiders”.
REVISITING FREYRE AND RIBEIRO

The descendants of one or the other of these groups were certainly among those people that Freyre and Ribeiro met in mid-20th century Goa, giving them different versions of the past and of their present condition. That is why neither the sociologist nor the geographer were completely mistaken, or completely correct, but complementary. Their opinions were definitely shaped by their historical knowledge, contexts of interpretation, and direct experience of local Goan society. Goans from the “Old Conquests” and the “New Conquests”, Goans with Portuguese origins or not, Catholics and non-Catholics, from upper and lower castes: the divisions in the local society were immense, but impenetrable at first sight.

Some Goans were more of the Luso-tropicalist type and proclaimed the Portuguese empire as a different type of colonialism, where “colonisers” and “colonised” co-existed peacefully. Since some of the converts increased their local power and riches through the Portuguese presence – and who could rightly be called “collaborationists” –, and that the Goan elites had a special status among all the “indigenous elites” of the Portuguese empire, as many authors have already demonstrated (Silva 2009; Lobo 2013; Oliveira 2015), this interpretation can be considered accurate (Thomaz 1994b).

Others, in contrast, stressed the idea that the Portuguese were racist, and did not want to mix with the locals, especially when they were of a dark colour – which was completely true, too, particularly when we consider the official rejection of physical miscegenation from 1540 onwards, and the constant demand for purity of blood.

And others, namely those coming from the “New Conquests”, had weaker ties with Portugal, the Portuguese people, and the Portuguese culture and empire, remaining almost completely “Indian”. If they were the ultimate “others”, for them the Portuguese represented alterity, too.

Again depending on who they had met, it is not surprising that Freyre and Ribeiro’s views were so different. They only shared with us different stories of an irregular puzzle that still asks to be resolved, a puzzle that was not so singular – if we consider recent literature on Dutch, British and French experiences, for example (Stoler 1997; Belmessous 2013) –, and which reminds us of some of the tensions and dilemmas of contemporary societies, and the side effects of more or less inclusive and assimilationist policies.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This essay is based on the chapter “Dissolver a Diferença. Conversão e Mestiçagem no Império Português” (Xavier 2008a).

ÂNGELA BARRETO XAVIER
Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa
Av. Prof. Aníbal Bettencourt 9 — 1600-036 Lisboa, Portugal
angela.xavier@ulisboa.pt
orcid.org/0000-0002-4367-6647

REFERENCES


subrahmanyan, s. 1995. o império asiático português. 1500-1700. lisbon: difel.
tavim, j. a. r. da s. 2003. judeus e cristãos-novos de cochim, história e memória (1500-1662).

braga: appacdm distrital de braga.
thomaz, l. f., 1994b. “a estrutura política e administrativa do estado da índia no século xvi”.
in de ceuta a timor, ed. l. f. thomaz, lisbon: difel.
van gennep, a. 1909. les rites de passage. paris: émile nourry.
xavier, a. b. 2008a. “dissolver a diferença. conversão e mestização no império português”.
in itinerários. 25 anos de investigação no instituto de ciências sociais, orgs. m. villaverde cabral, k. wall and f. c. da silva. lisbon: imprensa de ciências sociais.
xavier, a. b. 2008b. a invenção de goa. poder imperial e conversões culturais nos séculos xvi e xvii. lisbon: imprensa de ciências sociais.
xavier, a. b. 2010. “matrimônio e império na goiânia quintentista”. in sacramental disciplines and praxis in non-european contexts, 16th-18th centuries, coord. maria teresa fattori, special issue of cristianesimo nella storia, 30.
xavier, a. b. 2012. “race and caste. identity narratives in Goan elites”. in race and blood in Spain and Colonial Hispano-America, ed. m. e. martinez, m. s. h. torres and D. nirenberg, berlin and london: lit verlag.
xavier, a. b., i. županov. 2015. “internal orientalism”. in catholic orientalism. portuguese empire, indian knowledge (16th-18th centuries), eds. a. b. xavier and i. županov. delhi: oxford university press,

ABBREVIATIONS

cc – corpo cronológico.


HAG – Historical Archives of Goa.

IAN/ TT – Instituto dos Arquivos Nacionais/Torre do Tombo.

CITE THIS CHAPTER AS:
https://doi.org/10.31447/ics9789726715030.11
In and out of history: how a Goan scholar in Bombay imagined a colonial Indian past and a future independent India (1870-1900)

Filipa Lowndes Vicente
INTRODUCTION

In his book on Portuguese men that achieved some prominence abroad, published in 1879, Bernardes Branco confessed that he had not been sure if Gerson da Cunha was Portuguese or English, and that he had had to contact Cunha Rivara, the Portuguese secretary of the Governor in Goa and a scholar, to resolve his doubts: “Mr. Gerson da Cunha is a Portuguese subject, born in Goa, of indigenous race and of the Brahman caste. He is established in Bombay as a doctor” was Cunha Rivara’s answer. In fact, Gerson da Cunha studied medicine in Bombay, Edinburgh and London, before returning to Bombay in the 1870s and making medicine his profession. However, his historical, archaeological and numismatic interests, mainly in themes related to the Portuguese in India, increasingly occupied a large part of his time and resulted in numerous articles and books published in the last three decades of the 19th century.

José Gerson da Cunha’s biography and bibliography, his personal itinerary as well as his scholarly written production, will enable me to explore the idea of inclusion, and of exclusion, in three different yet interconnected ways. The first is through his actual biographical itinerary. Living across different borders and spaces meant that foreignness and displacement were central words in the narrative of his life. I shall explore how da Cunha strove to be included in certain scholarly national spheres, such as the Italian; while apparently consciously excluding himself from Portugal, where his status would always be that of a Portuguese “other” and, therefore, subaltern in relation to mainstream scholarly local elites. He also profited, I shall argue, from being a foreigner in Bombay, and thus an Indian that was not a colonised subject since, being Goa-born, he was of Portuguese nationality. Caste and religion, and the fact that the historian and doctor combined the most privileged aspects of both identities – Brahmanism and Catholicism – were also central in his self-definition and frequently addressed in his writings.

Secondly, I shall analyse how exclusion and inclusion are central questions in his vast historiographical work. His main aim was to include the Portuguese experience in India within the mainstream historical narrative of Indian history produced in English, in British India and Great Britain. British

---

historiography tended to exclude the other main European presence in Asia, that of the Portuguese (as well as the Dutch and French), in the past and in the present. In this article, I will focus on the specific ways in which Gerson da Cunha introduced the Portuguese or Goan perspective in a wider narrative. In some cases, this was done as part of a clear strategy to value what was “Portuguese” or “Goan”, as when he argues for the pioneering character of Portuguese Orientalism, a few centuries before British Orientalism.² He also makes a defence of the teaching of the Portuguese language at the University of Bombay, while, in another publication, he writes a vindication for the valuing of Konkani, the Indian language that had at times been repressed by the Portuguese rule in Goa. In other moments, however, his critical approach turns to the Portuguese past colonial policies – mainly in relation to their religious violence perpetrated against the Hindus. In this apparent reversal of culprits, his goal is to denounce how some historical events and experiences were omitted from Portuguese mainstream historical narratives precisely because they did not favour those who practised them. His reflections on contemporary British India will also be addressed. Writing for an Italian periodical in French, or in a private letter to an Italian Indianist, Gerson da Cunha could be freer in his opinions on delicate political subjects. What was already latent in some of his historical writings became evident in his journalistic impressions: India, an independent and united India, was already in his imagination (Anderson 1991). After colonial India – Portuguese or British – there was another India, the future nation that was becoming tired of her “foreign invaders”.

And thirdly, I will explore the ways in which Gerson da Cunha’s work was excluded from both Portuguese and British historiography. Only in 1955 was one of his works on numismatics translated into Portuguese and published by Luis Pinto Garcia. In his preface, the Portuguese scholar notes how da Cunha’s “Contributions [are] very well known and always quoted in the numismatic centres in the Orient and in Great Britain”, but remain “unknown to the great majority of our numismatists and collectors” (Garcia 1955). Before Pinto Garcia, only the eminent Portuguese ethnologist Leite de Vasconcelos had made a

reference to Cunha: in his *magna opera* on Portuguese Numismatics in 1923.\(^3\) My argument is that, paradoxically, the cosmopolitanism and hybridity of his life itinerary and historiographical work kept him out of sight of subsequent scholars. As Gerson da Cunha’s life and work straddled borders, they failed to be grasped by either of the two main geographies of knowledge in which he moved. British and Indian historiography failed to value an author who was a Goan

\(^3\) Vasconcelos (1923, 279-280) wrote on Gerson da Cunha in a section on Numismatic Writings from 1867 until his present on pages 163-165, and even included an offprint of his photographic portrait published in the *Rivista ital. di Numismat.* (1888): 383. The Portuguese author also adds an appendix with a biographical note, in English, on Gerson da Cunha, which had been published in the *Royal Asiatic Society’s Journal* after his death: “Biografia Inglesa do Dr. Gerson da Cunha”.

---

### Figure 12.1

José Gerson da Cunha (1844-1900). Photographic portrait in carte-de-visite format pasted in the endleaves of his posthumously published book. Date and photographer unknown. (Cunha, 1900).

Note: This portrait must have been done in Rome, in 1878, at the photographic studio Lorenzo Suscipj, as it is very similar to another one Gerson da Cunha did there. See Vicente (2012b, 5).
of Portuguese nationality and highlighted everything that was Portuguese in India. Gerson da Cunha was excluded from the Goan and, particularly, the Portuguese historical canon for an array of reasons I will outline further on: one of the major ones certainly being that he only wrote in English. Ironically, the factors that enabled him to combine, compare, confront and cross different Indias, different Europes and different historiographical traditions ended up excluding him from those very traditions.

THE POLITICS OF LANGUAGE: KONKANI BETWEEN SUPPRESSION AND RESISTANCE

I will start by analysing two of Gerson da Cunha’s publications. The first was published in 1881 and was titled Konkani Language and Literature. It is the only one of his texts where I could find criticism of contemporary Portuguese colonialism rather than the usual discussion of events placed in a remote historical past (Cunha 1881). The second text I will address, also on the politics of language and how they are embedded in national projects, was centred on the history of the Portuguese language in the East and was published more than a decade later (Cunha 1893, 168-191). Both were published in English and in Bombay, one for the Bombay Gazetteer and the other for the Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society.

How local languages and their usages were affected by the Portuguese presence in the region from the 16th century on was the central subject of his essay on Konkani. Gerson da Cunha condemned the destruction perpetrated by the first missionaries who, in their “mistaken zeal to propagate Christianity,” did not understand how the preservation of ancient Indian manuscripts could have been useful for the conversion of “natives”. That which the Spanish had done in Granada with Arabic manuscripts, he added, the Portuguese did in

4 When Gerson da Cunha’s name appears in recent historical books, it does so for his work on Bombay. Gyan Prakash (2011) mentions him once in his Mumbai Fables. A History of an Enchanted City, while a recent book on Bombay includes him in the bibliography but not as a subject (Chopra 2011).

5 We do not know what kind of relationship Gerson da Cunha had with Angelo Maffei, an Italian Jesuit missionary who, precisely in 1878, some months after the international congress of orientalists in Florence, travelled from Naples to India. During the twenty years he lived in the Karnataka region, he dedicated himself to missionary work and producing studies on Konkani (Maffei 1882, 1883). See also all the works of Mons. Sebastião Rodolfo Dalgado.
Goa with Indian ones. They destroyed them. The fanaticism that “blinded these missionaries” (only justified, Gerson da Cunha argued, by the historical moment) prevented the transmission of Christianity through vernacular languages. According to him, a global vision of history helped to understand the violence, but also the banality of this kind of behaviour during that period: “The history of mankind is already full of examples of how sectarian differences, bigotry, and superstition have deprived the world of literary treasures of considerable worth” (Cunha 1881, 25).

This Portuguese policy of eliminating the local language did not restrict itself to the past because, as Gerson da Cunha notes, by the end of the 18th century there were still priests advising the Portuguese government to abolish Konkani and other Indian languages, “as if a language were a mere custom to be easily dealt with by a legislative enactment”. Only with the Marquis of Pombal was this policy modified. Perhaps as a way of better legitimising his criticism of Portuguese policies regarding local language, Gerson da Cunha quoted Cunha Rivara, a Portuguese resident in Goa who, apart from his scholarly work, was a respectable government secretary (Cunha 1881, 26).

Gerson da Cunha also reflected on the transformations of Konkani and the attempts to resist them:

Such is, indeed, the transformation a language – in the comparatively short period of two centuries – undergoes even in autonomous states, which strive, with a view to their national dignity, to preserve the purity of their language by means of literature, arresting all changes, and stereotyping the forms inherited from a former age, that it is no wonder that Konkani, an idiom of a small country, ruled by a foreign race, and without, at present at least, any aspiration to national independence [my italics], should within only a couple of centuries have assumed a form so entirely different from the old one. (Cunha 1881, 34)

Gerson da Cunha finished his history of Konkani and analysis of its uses with a pessimistic evaluation of the present, in which language and literature were considered inseparable from colonial rule, and where there was a reference to foreign governments that clearly distinguishes Goa – pre-existent – from its colonisers: “Goa has for centuries been swayed by foreign rulers, who have insisted on making their own language the official language, or the language of the court, withdrawing at the same time all encouragement for the cultivation of the native tongue” (Cunha 1881, 41). Facing a contemporary context in which there was a growing pressure from other Indian languages not subject
to the same kind of colonial linguistic policy, Gerson da Cunha predicted the disappearance of Konkani within one or two centuries. That was, after all, the destiny of those weaker languages, as well as those weaker peoples, he added.

In order to strengthen his argument, he also discussed Konkani literature, mainly poetry, indirectly criticising the contemporary state of affairs in Goa quite harshly. The decline of literary production corresponded to a social and political decline: “this is invariably the case where a country is in its decadence, or humiliated, depressed and degraded by despotism, or is swayed by a foreign rule”, which most probably will do nothing to “encourage the study of native poetry” (Cunha 1881, 41). In spite of the many material benefits that may be brought about by the colonial presence, he continues, “it is amidst the elements of national freedom and independence, and the pledges and evidence of the former greatness of their country that poets grow up.” As he often did, in order to reinforce his criticism of a specific subject, character or institution, Gerson da Cunha quoted another author, an Archbishop writing on the literature of Spain who wrote on the direct effects a foreign government had on the creativity of a people: great poetry could not emerge from a place with “little or no national life or feeling” (Cunha 1881, 42). By quoting others with whom he agreed, instead of making the same statement in his name, he was somewhat legitimising his critical position, while making it less direct. And also, by quoting a book on the Spanish golden age that had been published in the previous year, Gerson da Cunha is reinforcing his position as a cosmopolitan and erudite scholar completely in tune with the European scholarly production.

In his book on Konkani, therefore, Gerson da Cunha combined his linguistic interests, associated with a philological and orientalist discourse concentrated on the past, with a discussion of the present uses of Konkani. He is clearly establishing a correlation between a defined space-territory and a language. Mainly, however, he is “imagining” Goa as a nation – a “small country” – that has been, and still is, governed by foreign rulers who have striven to impose their language. However, and as we shall also realise when analysing his text on the Portuguese language in the East, it is not possible to think of Gerson da Cunha’s position on language politics as a straight dichotomy between the language of the colonisers on the one hand, and that of the colonised on the other. In his manifesto promoting Konkani and Portuguese, he claimed the languages had more in common than appeared at first sight. They both

---

6 Gerson da Cunha is quoting Richard Chenevix Trench (1880).
occupied subaltern spaces; both were an inextricable part of Goan identity and both needed to be actively defended and promoted, in different geographical spaces, in order to thrive.

THE TEACHING OF PORTUGUESE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF BOMBAY: A EUROPEAN LANGUAGE OR AN INDIAN VERNACULAR?

Ten years later, in *A Brief Sketch of the Portuguese and their Language in the East*, published in 1892, Gerson da Cunha focuses similarly on the Portuguese language, analysing its history in India and anchoring this genealogy in the present. What led him to publicly champion the Portuguese language was a contemporary debate on the changes taking place in the language department at the University of Bombay (Cunha 1893, 190-191). In this historical justification of the importance of Portuguese, Gerson da Cunha clearly acknowledges the political meaning of languages, their uses in forging identities, and their intersections with notions of nationalism and colonialism.

When consulting the organisation of the language courses at the University of Bombay, Gerson da Cunha noticed how Portuguese was placed alongside Maratha, Gujarati and Canarese, while French was grouped with Sanskrit, Latin, Greek and Hebrew. If the University of Bombay did not consider Portuguese the equal of other European or classical languages and placed it within the section of “Indian vernacular”, it would be better to simply abolish it, he argued. By relegating the Portuguese language to second-class status, the University of Bombay was not only marginalising a language but also the history of the Portuguese in India (Cunha 1893, 172). In order to reinforce his argument on the importance of Portuguese, he mentioned the work of Hugo Schuchardt, published in the 1880s, on the quantity of Portuguese dialects that were spoken in Africa and Asia – work on which he had collaborated.7

Portuguese being the official language in the regions under the rule of the Portuguese government was a fact that could be compared with the use of French in Pondicherry or that of English in Bombay. Just as religious conversions did not reflect the effort put into the Christianisation policies – the actual

---

7 “I have had the pleasure of contributing to this interesting study, namely to that part relating to the dialect of Ceylon. The New Testament was published in this dialect in 1852 by the Wesleyan Mission, and a Grammar of the dialect was printed at Colombo in 1811”. He must be referring to the *Kreolische Studien*, published by Hugo Schuchardt between 1882 and 1889.
converted being very few when having in mind the high degree of investment – the state of the Portuguese language in Goa at the time did not reflect the effort put into its imposition. Even in the Indo-Portuguese communities of Bombay, Portuguese was largely being surpassed by English: “Peasants” did not understand it, and the “bourgeoisie” did not speak it frequently; only the higher classes used it. In this social categorisation, Gerson da Cunha is also showing his familiarity with the European contemporary language of social sciences, which stratified classes according to work, wealth and genealogy.

Language could not be isolated from many other factors, which were used to characterise the Indo-Portuguese community. Gerson da Cunha argued for the learning of Portuguese amongst a minority elite through a historical digression on the uses of Portuguese in India since the 16th century in commerce, diplomacy and missions, as well as in educational establishments of a religious nature. In this incursion into the past, he wrote how Brahmins (“born missionaries”, in his words), when joining Catholic religious orders, had helped disseminate the Portuguese language in the world; an idea he had explored in previous publications (Cunha 1893, 168-191). In his study of Konkani, he had reinforced how “Brahmans were not mere copyists but authors of “several works in Konkani on Christianity”; as well as works in Tamil or Sinhalese (Cunha 1881, 36). Moreover, in his long essay on “Oriental Studies amongst the Portuguese”, he had made a list of all publications by these Indian Brahmin men missionaries and scholars. In contrast to the Portuguese, many of whom did not know how to read or write, Brahmins were literate already in childhood.8 Gerson da Cunha concluded by saying that despite the fact that only a few spoke and wrote it correctly, Portuguese was simply “beautiful” (Cunha 1893, 188).

More than ten years after writing on Konkani, in a text that constitutes one of his harshest criticisms of the Portuguese colonial government and its strategy of linguistic annihilation, Gerson da Cunha also declares himself strongly in favour of the preservation of Portuguese as one of the languages of India. What could seem a contradiction – how was it possible to defend the language of the colonised and, simultaneously, that of the colonisers – can also be read as a valorisation of what was Goan in the general context of late 19th century India; and that meant valuing Portuguese as much as Konkani. It, mainly, meant valuing Portuguese in India, but outside Goa; and valuing Konkani in Goa.

---

8 Gerson da Cunha (1893, 186) considered music the great benefit of Portuguese elementary education because “Indian fellow subjects” hardly learnt any music at all.
“OLD PREJUDICES WITH NEW PRIVILEGES”: THE IDIOSYNCRASIES OF GOA’S COMBINATION OF CASTE AND CATHOLICISM

Gerson da Cunha uses his text on Konkani to explain to his readers “a subject of no little confusion to foreigners, especially Englishmen” (Cunha 1881, 36-37). By living in Bombay, the Goan historian, himself a Catholic of Brahmin caste, was conscious how “many Englishmen on this side of India appear to believe that everyone with a Portuguese name is a descendant, pure or mixed, of a Portuguese”. He goes on to explain how this was a mistake that only knowledge of the history of the Portuguese presence in India since the 16th century could help explaining. To “trace historically the influence” that the Portuguese conquest of Goa “has exercised on the natives of the country” was, according to him, the only way to understand the complexity of Goa’s case, unlike any other in the Indian subcontinent. Conversion to Catholicism meant adopting a Portuguese surname and, in most cases, “the habits and customs of Western civilisation”, or even enrolment into Portuguese nobility awarded by merit. It did not necessarily mean, however, mixing with the Portuguese. And the result was the profusion of “pure Indians” with Portuguese names, Catholic religion and Western habits. When speaking of the past history of Goa, Gerson da Cunha is also speaking about himself.

Addressing what he considered to be a common misperception, Gerson da Cunha denied that the Brahmins were mere copyists, and explained to the British readership something that he considered to be difficult for a foreigner to understand and that was also related to him – the existence of Christian Brahmins (Cunha 1881, 36-37). Christianity, he explained, had not eliminated caste hierarchies: “it simply reconciled old prejudices with new privileges” (Cunha 1881, 37). There was not in Goa, unfortunately, a “blend of races, as in Europe” favourable to a future of homogeneity; on the contrary, there were as many tribes and castes amongst the Christians as amongst the Hindus.

Gerson da Cunha’s relationship with caste may seem confusing at times, or even contradictory. He hesitates between a legitimisation of the caste system in a way that contributed to his own self-identification, and the affirmation that the future unification and independence of India depended on the dissolution of the caste hierarchies.9 He sometimes showed pride in the ancestry of his

9 The somewhat problematic relationship Gerson da Cunha had with his origins, which revealed itself in the need to affirm his belonging to a high caste in different ways, even by invoking
name, and he never denied his “Portuguese” and “Catholic” identity which, far from contradicting his Brahmin identity, elevated his status and brought him numerous advantages within a social context that valued Christianity and Brahmanism as the best of both worlds (Siqueira 2006).

The only difference of note between Christian and Hindu modes of living, according to the prescriptions of caste was that, according to Gerson da Cunha, among the Christians of Goa caste was not determinant in social relations. With the exception of marriages, all castes lived together, at the same level, “not unlike any of the advanced peoples of Europe”. In this Goan distinctiveness, Cunha found proximity with the existing social European models he valued. He also took the occasion to emphasise those Goan men who had significant positions in the Portuguese metropolis: in Parliament, at universities, and in military and civil institutions (Cunha 1881, 39).

An essay on Konkani thus becomes the trigger for a much wider valorisation of what was “Goan”, a strategy that reveals a local “nationalism” inseparable from larger strategies of valorisation: areas ranging from language to history. The Aryanism proposed by some prestigious European orientalists, mainly by Max Müller, was appropriated by some groups of Indians who saw it as a way of assuming a superiority that colonial rule seemed to deny. By identifying the superiority of a specific Indian group to which he himself belonged, Gerson da Cunha seems to use a similar strategy: a specific current of western thought was used as an instrument of affirmation by subjugated peoples. On the one hand, Cunha often used strategies to reinforce and legitimate a Brahmin distinctiveness and, in his case and that of many Goans, a Catholic distinctiveness, a kind of aristocratic combination that deserved to be privileged. On other occasions, as we have seen, he wrote on the need to

pre-colonial Goa, has already been analysed by George Moraes. Moraes also showed how Gerson da Cunha had a tendency to favour those authors who belonged to a high caste and ignore those who belonged to other social groups. Moraes suggests, furthermore, that in his historicisation of Goa, Gerson da Cunha undertook a strategy of valourising his family origins to the detriment of historical truth. He also wrote that the Goan doctor’s weakness was precisely his caste complex, in George Mark Moraes (1967, 38).

10 See Raychaudhuri (2002, 34-25); Di Constanzo (2004). Di Constanzo gives special relevance to Müller’s diffusion and influence within British Orientalism. Müller’s ideas of India’s contemporary decadence, in contrast to its sophisticated past, were used to legitimise the regenerative presence of the British colonial government. However, in order to prevent the mistakes which had led to the Indian revolts of 1857, Müller advocated that British administration had to modernise itself and undertake profound reforms. See Ballantyne (2002); Marchand (2010); Cluet (2004); Murti (2001).
blur the caste distinction and ameliorate the living and educational conditions of the “indigenous” population; and on the fact that the path to future Indian independence required a social cohesion that a very hierarchical caste system could not provide.\textsuperscript{11} Can this sometimes ambiguous way of defining the idiosyncrasies of Catholic Brahmins – combining the religion brought by the “foreign rulers” with the privileges of the higher position within the Hindu caste system – be also seen as a strategy of resistance to subalternity? Wasn’t this combination of privileges, ancient and newer, Indian and European, also a way of subverting colonial rule?

GOANS AS PIONEERS: INDIAN NATIONAL REVOLTS, ORIENTALISM AND THE PRINTING PRESS

Gerson da Cunha goes further, suggesting that an “Indian Risorgimento” – that is, the unification of India as an independent nation, which had the recent Italian example – would only be possible when there was a “blending of castes” (Cunha 1881, 37). Only when caste no longer separated Indians would it be possible to shout “India for the Indians”, as had happened in Goa in 1787 (Kamat 1999; Rivara 1875). Much earlier than the revolt or “mutiny”, as it was called by the British, of 1857, which so frightened the British in India and had so many repercussions in Indian-British relations; and before other later signs of Indian nationalism within the British empire, the natives of Goa had raised their voices against the Portuguese colonisers. Gerson da Cunha was referring, of course, to the “Conjuração dos Pintos” in 1787, a revolt imbued with French ideas, in which some of his ancestors had been involved (even if he did not mention this in the article) (Moraes 1967, 11-12). When referring to this episode of Goan history, he is attributing a kind of pioneering nationalist consciousness to Goa, anticipating what happened in British

\textsuperscript{11} José Gerson da Cunha (1884a, 830). Not by chance, one of Subaltern Studies’ main criticisms of post-colonial historical approaches was that it was centred on Indian elites. By doing so, post-colonial approaches were reproducing that which was established by colonialism itself – a hierarchy in which these elites occupied the place left empty by the colonisers, and the voices of women and men of low caste still remained unheard. Subalterns, therefore, appear as the victims of both the colonisers and the Indian elites, men of high caste. This same idea had already been proposed in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, for example, by Bankim, who in his criticism of the discrimination against Indians by the British compares this situation to that which existed between Brahmans and Sudras in ancient India. See Guha (2000); Sarkar (2000); Raychaudhuri (2002, 183).
India exactly 70 years afterwards. The mastery Gerson da Cunha had of both colonial histories and contemporary historiographies – the British and the Portuguese – enabled him to make other less usual comparisons: for instance, he compared the union between the kings of Bijapur and Ahmednagar against the Portuguese, in the 16th century with the Indian resistance endured by the British during the 1857 Indian Revolt (Cunha 1876b, 95).

He considered a kind of national consciousness to be one more example of Goan precociousness that tended to be ignored historiographically by the British. Two other examples were to be found as early as in the 16th century: Portuguese orientalism and the Imprensa de Goa, the Goan Press, two subjects which Gerson da Cunha had approached together in his Conference given at the Florentine International Congress of Orientalists in 1878. Here, as in other places, Cunha shows a clear willingness to contradict the ignorance of this “other India” within the kind of Orientalist knowledge being produced in British India.12

The main aim of his article was to contest the 18th and 19th century British narrative that they were the first to consistently study the languages, culture and history of India. The British had consolidated a genealogy of orientalist studies where the chronology of the British presence in India coincided with the chronology of a scholarly field, a truly power-knowledge narrative where the previous history – namely the Portuguese – had no place. However, Cunha blamed the Portuguese themselves, and their general attitude towards the past, for this wrongly attributed pioneerism of the British: “the neglect which had so long prevailed in Portugal and her Colonies of their valuable archives, consigning to utter oblivion valuable writings, which have but of late been brought to the light of publicity.”

Therefore, only in the historically conscious 19th century were there prints, or re-prints of many of the texts on the presence of the Portuguese in India written 300 years before: from Gaspar Correia’s Lendas da Índia, to the Roteiro da Viagem by Vasco da Gama, or the Roteiros of D. João de Castro (Jackson 2005). By turning the argument upside down, in a kind of self-blame, Gerson da Cunha is doing what many of his contemporaries in Portugal where doing to explain Portugal’s peripheral and subaltern place within Europe.

12 I have addressed this subject in my book, Other Orientalisms, especially in the chapters dedicated to Gerson da Cunha’s participation at the Florentine International Congress of Orientalists in 1878 (Vicente 2012b). See also Xavier and Zupanov (2014).
Looking inside for the causes and blaming the country itself and its elites for their underdevelopment was a self-conscious exercise that naturally placed those who spoke publicly in the distinguished place of “knowing better”.

CONFRONTING THE PAST OF PORTUGUESE INDIA: HISTORICAL EXCLUSIONS, INCLUSIONS AND REVISIONS

Apart from the criticism in his article on Konkani, Gerson da Cunha’s references to contemporary Goa or to the Portuguese Government of India are scarce. His Goan identity was more safely expressed through his study of the past: through the archaeological, numismatic and historical interest he demonstrated in the Portuguese presence in different Indian regions in previous centuries. It was, in fact, through the distance provided by a historical approach that he proffered his criticism of the Portuguese Government and its religious institutions. Present day “India”, on the other hand, tended to signify “British India”, and it was not by chance that Gerson da Cunha’s texts were rich in comparisons between the Portuguese colonialism of the past and the British colonialism of the present.

Gerson da Cunha gave many lectures at the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society that were then printed in its journal. When finishing his presentation on the 1661 marriage treaty between the Portuguese Catherine of Braganza and Charles II, a pivotal moment in the history of the “greatest Empire a European nation ever acquired in the East”, he reflected on both empires and, in so doing, on his own identity between these two spaces.

Although not a British subject, and perhaps from this circumstance the more disinterested, I avail myself of the opportunity afforded by the occasion of commemorating, at least academically for the first time in Bombay, the Marriage of the Infanta, to express my wish that the liberal principles, which guide the policy of this Empire, may grant it a long life and happier results than those achieved by the ephemeral career of the Old Portuguese Empire, which, though comparatively narrower in its sphere, was nevertheless replete with instructive teachings, and full of most stirring incidents, heroic deeds, noble actions and romantic episodes, a complete history of which remains yet to be written. (Cunha 1887, 145-146)

In praising the city where he lived and the British Empire, in an article published at the most prestigious scholarly Bombay institution, Cunha reveals
the apparently contradictory nature of his position. His “Old Portuguese
Empire”, the one he wanted to write about – as its “complete history” had “yet
to be written” – was a historical entity, safely remote, inoffensive, populated by
heroic and noble characters of a “romantic nature”, but also characterised by
fatal mistakes and instructive lessons that could be of great utility to the present
British Empire. This idea that the British in 19th century India could learn from
the mistakes made by the Portuguese of the previous centuries constituted a
trope within contemporary British and Protestant historiographical context.
Some favourite culprits were Catholic attitudes towards local Hindu culture,
language and religion, in general; or the Inquisition and the Jesuits in particular.

When referring to the causes of the decadence of the Portuguese Empire
of Asia, a central theme for him and for anyone writing on Portuguese India,
Gerson da Cunha criticises those most recent “Portuguese writers” he does
not name who lay “all the faults of their impolitic rule at the door of the
Spanish yoke”. He is referring to the argument, already common in the 19th
century and later, in the 20th century Estado Novo historiography, that the
decline of Asia Portuguesa was due to the Spanish dominion of the Felipes, a
position that, according to the Goan historian, was the best way of avoiding
the recriminations that would arise from a critical Portuguese reflection on
the past (Cunha 1876a, 302; Hunter 1882, 269).

With this position, he was making a double criticism: of some past
Portuguese colonising policies, which were responsible for the nation’s decline;
and of a contemporary historiographical position which, instead of reflecting
on the mistakes of the past, found the culprits in external causes. A few years
afterwards, however, in his history of Indo-Portuguese numismatics, Gerson
da Cunha’s position seem closer to what he had previously condemned: “The
Portuguese had long borne with inimitable patience the weight of the Spanish
yoke, which had, by depriving them of their former glorious conquests, atoned
in part at least for their past guilty career in the Eastern land and sea” (Cunha
1883a, 194). While writing on the classic themes of the history of Portuguese
India, and making use of classic texts, Gerson da Cunha necessarily had to
confront many of the ideas of contemporary Portuguese history. In some
cases, his historical positions fit into the traditional canon of Portuguese
historiography. On many other occasions he questions, criticises, or contests a
more canonical history, making it difficult to place or classify him ideologically.

The Lusiads are always present as a historical source, and Gerson da Cunha
continuously praises the poem’s literary merit; but he also calls attention to its
silences in relation to those episodes that “do not add to the glory of the nation (Cunha 1896, 254-255)”. As happened with the poet-soldier, Camões, by then already considered the greatest figure of Portuguese literary history, there were, in the present, many who only remembered the virtues of the nation and preferred to forget its crimes. Exclusions and inclusions in history are thus denounced by the scholar as ways of manipulating the narratives of the past, in a kind of criticism of fellow historians that inevitably values a critical voice (his own), one capable of confronting instead of excluding, even those parts of history that are not so flattering to the nation’s self-representation.

Gerson da Cunha did not hide his great admiration for the historical character of Afonso de Albuquerque, who was the “great founder of the Portuguese empire in the East”, and “like Wellington”\(^\text{13}\), was very attentive to details (Cunha 1893, 177).\(^\text{14}\) But in relation to another much-cited reflection on the empire’s decadence – the marriage policy of Afonso de Albuquerque – Cunha’s position was clearly critical and was, in fact, very close to that voiced by Richard Burton, in his *Goa and the Blue Mountains*, and by other writers of contemporary British texts (Cunha 1876a, 302; Burton, 1991 [1851]; Kennedy 2005, 49-50). This episode belonging to the past – Albuquerque’s policy to encourage the marriage of Portuguese men with local Indian women – was usually referred to as a historical lesson pertinent to the debate that was taking place in the context of 19\(^{\text{th}}\) century British India on the advantages and perils of policies enabling “mixture” as opposed to “separation”. Within this debate, this marriage policy was generally held as an example of what not to do. The present decadence of the Portuguese empire as the ultimate consequence of that and other policies.

Gerson da Cunha recontextualised Albuquerque’s gesture in the tradition of the Roman Empire, only to classify it as an “experiment that has been found, now that it is too late to repair the evil, to be the source of grave evils to both parties.” This approach, which would fit in a British historiographical tradition, with which he clearly identifies himself, contrasts with later

---

13 Gerson da Cunha is referring to Arthur Wellesley (1\(^{\text{st}}\) May 1769 – 14\(^{\text{th}}\) September 1852), Duke of Wellington, prominent 19\(^{\text{th}}\) century political and military figure, who was commander of the British troops in Portugal and Spain against the Napoleonic Invasions of the Iberian Peninsula in the early 19\(^{\text{th}}\) century (1808-1813).

14 Albuquerque also appeared as a positive historical character amongst British authors, being considered fair and magnanimous and someone who had in mind native interests. See Hunter (1882, 268).
interpretations of the same historical event, as happened with Gilberto Freyre’s “luso-tropicalismo”. Luso-Tropicalism was the concept that the Brazilian anthropologist developed to identify the practice and policy of “miscegenation” between white Portuguese men and women belonging to those Asian, American and African geographies under Portuguese rule.

Religion was, of course, the most controversial issue of Portuguese colonialism in India. The violence of the conversion methods was frequently condemned by someone who, despite considering himself a Catholic, did not reveal the nature of his religiosity or the centrality of faith in his life. And even if Gerson da Cunha’s position cannot be reduced to a single viewpoint, he clearly tends to be critical of the Portuguese methods of imposing Christianity and eliminating Hinduism.

Unlike the policy of the present rulers of Hindustan, which we hope will also be that of future eras, the spirit which guided the true missionary, in his noble task of imparting to the heathen the news of peace and good-will, was not of tolerance but of aggression. (Cunha 1880, 184)

As an example of the Portuguese policy under which the natives were forced to change their faith, Gerson da Cunha mentioned the destructive urge against Hinduism shown by the Bishop of Goa, Fr. João Albuquerque (Spain, circa 1479 – Goa, 1553), by quoting a document that was kept at the Lisbon Torre do Tombo (Cunha 1880, 184-185). When the Inquisition was set up, the Bishop of Goa had ordered, according to Gerson da Cunha, the destruction of Hindu images and manuscripts, but did not forbid his subordinates to use the local languages as a means of conversion, something which enabled the writing of a series of grammars and vocabularies that were later published by the Goan official Press.

In this plea for a politics of respect and tolerance towards other religions, Gerson da Cunha compared the contrasting attitudes of two different colonisers of India – the Portuguese of the past, and the British of the present, – and clearly revealed which side he was on. By doing so he, again, stood closer to British-Protestant historical and policy approaches, in which Portuguese strategies regarding local religions were frequently contrasted, negatively, with those practised a few centuries later by the British. Cruelty, in fact, especially when

15 We do not know how Gerson da Cunha had access to this document.
associated with religion, often appeared in descriptions of Portuguese India written by British or by Indians of British India (Hunter 1882, 268). Bhudev Mukhopadhyay (1827-1894), for example, considered Britain – as opposed to Spain, France or Portugal – the least cruel of the European nations. By writing “which we hope will also be that of future eras”, however, Cunha also clearly stated his position towards the present main colonial government of India, the British.

One of the subjects of his book, *Notes on the History and Antiquities of Chaul and Bassein* was the contrast between the past glory and the present decadence of the empire, a persistent topic when treating Portuguese India's history that was inseparable from religious factors. The Inquisition and the religious orders – that “imperium in imperio”, which Gerson da Cunha attributed to the Jesuits – were amongst the main causes of decadence (Cunha 1876c, viii). When, in 1878, he was invited by the Vatican to receive a decoration by the Pope, he confessed his surprise to his Italian friend, Angelo De Gubernatis. Yes, he was a Catholic Indian, a scholar and a doctor, but did they know what he had written against the Jesuits?

Gerson da Cunha presented his criticism of the Jesuits, and his subsequent praise of the Marquis of Pombal's policies towards them on various occasions (Cunha 1880, 193). Again, in his praise of the historical character of the Marquis and his criticism of the *Companhia de Jesus*, he is reproducing a common vision of contemporary British historiography, in which the Marquis represented modernity and the Enlightenment; and the Jesuits, the proof of Catholic excesses. Pombal, with his “great genius”, conceived the “admirable policy” of expelling the Jesuits and closing convents, “nests of idlers” more interested in selfish concerns than in establishing peace and good-will. Gerson da Cunha also made another harsh criticism, but in an indirect way: by quoting a text of another author stating that everything that the Jesuits built was destined for ruin and destruction.

17 See Cunha (1876c, v-ix). I have written on this past glory, present decadence dichotomy in a text where I concentrate on his work on ruined cities (Vicente 2013, 227-278).
19 See Cunha (1880, 187). He quoted Dr. Döllinger, in an article published in the *Dublin University Magazine*, in 1877: "the proverb about the Turks – saying that no grass grew under their steps – would apply to the Jesuits."

In another article in English, also destined for the readership of British India or Great Britain, he appealed for a historical recontextualisation of the Inquisition that “made the Portuguese rule odious to the mild inhabitants of the Konkan”. However, he argued, one could not read the feudal character of that time with contemporary ways of thinking codes, nor could one contrast the despotic militarism and the clerical supremacy of that period with the present, during which “the spirit of democracy pervades every political creed, and the French Revolution has taught nations their rights, as well as their duties” (Cunha 1887, 142; 1887-1889). In the same period, and in the same journal, he published an article on Dellon, the French doctor and traveller who went to Goa in the 17th century and wrote about his personal experience as a victim of the Goa Inquisition (Cunha 1887-1889). Gerson da Cunha explains why he considered Dellon’s memoir a “fabrication”, a “forgery” and a “fraud” but, at the same time, he is careful to add that his own “denial of the authenticity of the work certainly does not imply a defence of the Inquisition, which I have elsewhere condemned, as should every liberal-minded man, whether a Catholic or Protestant” (Cunha 1887-1889).

HOW FREELY COULD HE SPEAK?
WRITING ON THE CONTEMPORARY BRITISH EMPIRE OUTSIDE INDIA

In his article on the Buddha’s tooth and its cult in Ceylon – Mémoire sur l’histoire de la dent-relique de Ceylan précéde d’un essai sur la vie et la religion de Gautama Buddha –, Gerson da Cunha finished with a long quotation from Rodier that had no direct relation to the article’s subject and historical context, and which reflected on the relations between Europe and Asia, between European colonisers and colonised Indians.

Les réglements orgueilleusement immuables, pour le corps et pour l’âme, que les théocrates de l’Inde ont eu la témérité d’imposer à la société, ont fini par y détruire tous les éléments du progrès. Le génie hindou, autrefois si brillant, si fécond, si vivace, meurt étouffé dans

could be applied to the Jesuits, whose buildings always became the victims of a tempest or a flood. By presenting this quotation, Cunha could criticise the Jesuits without exposing himself to criticism. He was criticising the Jesuits but he was doing so indirectly, by quoting someone with whom he agreed. At the same time, by quoting from a Dublin scholarly journal, he was displaying the cosmopolitan nature of his erudition” (Cunha 1880, 192).
une camisole de force! Le dur contact de notre civilisation le réveillera peut-être! Espérons que les descendants des Arias trouveront, tôt ou tard, une compensation aux douleurs et aux humiliations qui leur inflige la prépondérance des Européens. (Cunha 1884b, 431-432)

Gerson da Cunha was not the author of these words. However, by reproducing them as the epilogue of his text, wasn’t he criticising, to some degree, the successive governments that had oppressed India and Ceylon? Wasn’t this a kind of strategy destined to reveal his opinions, not only about historical events but also about present day India? Could the fact that Gerson da Cunha was publishing in a French journal, and not one of the scholarly journals of British India where he usually published, have given him more freedom of expression? Wasn’t this a way of defending an ancestral “Indianness” of the Aryans, a racial and cultural category being widely discussed at the time, and which was repressed through the successive European presences? And wasn’t this a stratagem to say what he could not say, with the advantage of doing so by using the legitimising words of a European?

The same could be said about his private correspondence with his friend, the Italian Indianist Angelo De Gubernatis, and his collaboration with the *Revue Internationale*, one of many journals created by De Gubernatis in Italy. In this private correspondence, Gerson da Cunha could express himself more freely knowing his words would remain in a private sphere. While, his two articles for the *Revue Internationale*, as the India correspondent, Gerson da Cunha clearly felt free to voice his opinions on contemporary India. Published in Florence – a European country that had no colonial relations with India – but written in French, the *Revue Internationale*, as its name suggests, concentrated on contemporary events and literature from different nations. However, his manuscript articles do not exactly match his published articles. Having had access to the manuscript versions of the articles he sent to Gubernatis, as the journal editor, and being able to compare them to the published versions, I could verify how some of the more critical positions towards the British Government in India were erased from the final published article. Gubernatis clearly used his role as editor to exclude what he considered controversial or problematic. Therefore, Gerson da Cunha’s Indian voice as the India correspondent on current affairs, a voice that seemed freer in that remote Renaissance city of Florence, was somewhat contained and suppressed.

In the two articles he sent to the journal, there is also a clear consciousness of the changing nature of colonial relationships, and of the fairly evident
signs that announced the end of British India. The period in which Gerson da Cunha contributed to the *Revue Internationale*, 1884-85, was precisely that in which the Anglo-Russian conflict was simmering, due to the recent Russian occupation of some of the borders of the British Empire. Lord Curzon also considered Russia’s expansionist policy a threat to the British presence in India (Curzon 1892). Gerson da Cunha sometimes referred, albeit somewhat indirectly, to the possibility of Russia being the next coloniser of India. And he did so in a positive way, assuming that Russian colonisation would be a necessary transitional phase before Indian independence. Benedict Anderson’s ideas are pertinent when considering Cunha’s ways of imagining the future Indian nation, as well as when thinking of his multiple identities. Both in *Imagined Communities* and in *Under Three Flags*, Anderson’s work was especially pioneering in grasping the relevance of 19th century colonial scholarly elites in imagining a post-colonial future (Anderson 1991, 2005).

In the intimacy of a letter sent to Angelo De Gubernatis, in Florence, the Goan Historian wrote what he most probably could not write elsewhere: “The Russian domination, which *sooner or later* [my italics] will follow the British, will be an important phase of our political evolution or, to use a somewhat impressive Italian expression, in our *Risorgimento* [underlined in the manuscript].”20 By establishing this comparison between the Indian case and the recent process of Italian unification that led to the birth of the Italian nation, in 1861, united under the same king, the Goan stated his belief in the future – “sooner or later” – independence of India. Colonised yesterday by the Portuguese, and today by the British, India would be colonised tomorrow by the Russians and, the day after tomorrow, which was not too remote, there would be only “India”: a non-colonised India. In this teleological reflection, Gerson da Cunha imagined a nation without the presence of foreign colonisers and, even if he gives no dates, there is a certain sense of imminence, of inevitability in the words “sooner or later” that he uses in his letter. Here, as well as in other of his writings, we can, as mentioned before, trace many of Benedict Anderson’s ideas of how communities were imagined before being (Anderson 1991). In another letter to his Italian friend based in Florence, he sent his compliments to the Russian princesses living in Florence and whom

---

20 Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale di Firenze – Manoscritti – Carteggio Angelo De Gubernatis – Corresp. José Gerson da Cunha para Angelo De Gubernatis, n.º 6 (Roma, Hotel Minerva, 20th October 1878). This reflection on Russia and India was prompted by a photograph Angelo De Gubernatis had sent him of Princess Galitzine, a Russian princess whom the Goan had met in Florence.
he referred to as the “future rulers of my country, rulers that, we hope, will be the last foreign domination that will precede our emancipation”.\textsuperscript{21} In another letter, he wished the Russian princesses a long life, so that one day they could arrive in India and cause “the British to panic”.\textsuperscript{22}

In the article published in the \textit{Revue Internationale}, destined for a European public, Cunha also felt free enough to muse about the advantages of a hypothetical Russian dominion of India, mainly when compared to the British colonialism of the present.\textsuperscript{23} While the British would “leave India impoverished and underdeveloped” because they had conquered India as adventurers and had colonised it like Greeks, by not mixing with the local populations and by being avaricious; the Russians would colonise India like ancient Romans, mixing with the Indians. At the same time, they would contribute to the unification of India, resolving its religious differences and the conflicts caused by the caste system. The Russian example, Gerson da Cunha goes on, with its honesty, would also inspire the Indian people with a spirit of nationality, “which will inevitably place the elder brother of the Aryan family on the pedestal he is entitled to and which is sanctioned by history”.\textsuperscript{24}

Despite being married to a Russian and having a special interest in Russian culture, his Italian friend Gubernatis did not seem to agree: in his Indian travel diary, he states that a hypothetical Russian invasion of India would be

\textsuperscript{21} And when Prince Galitzine, brother of the “beautiful Russian princesses” went on a trip to Bombay, Gerson da Cunha offered him his hospitality. Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale di Firenze – Manoscritti – Carteggio Angelo De Gubernatis – Corresp. José Gerson da Cunha para Angelo De Gubernatis, n.º 16 (Bombay, 37 Hornby Road, 17\textsuperscript{th} March 1879); Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale di Firenze – Manoscritti – Carteggio Angelo De Gubernatis – Corresp. José Gerson da Cunha para Angelo De Gubernatis, n.º 22 (Bombay, 39 Hornby Road, 14\textsuperscript{th} June 1881); Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale di Firenze – Manoscritti – Carteggio Angelo De Gubernatis – Corresp. José Gerson da Cunha para Angelo De Gubernatis, n.º 23 (Bombay, 39 Hornby Road, 26\textsuperscript{th} July 1881).

\textsuperscript{22} He also wrote that this British aversion towards the Russians was “the same aversion that Mahomet had towards bacon”, a common derogatory Portuguese expression.

\textsuperscript{23} Gerson da Cunha’s interest in Russia was also latent in the article he published in the English language journal \textit{Bombay Gazette} in 1879, on the education of women in Russia. Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale di Firenze – Manoscritti – Carteggio Angelo De Gubernatis – Corresp. José Gerson da Cunha para Angelo De Gubernatis, n.º 17 (Bombay, 37 Hornby Road, 1\textsuperscript{st} August 1879).

\textsuperscript{24} “[que deve acabar por colocar o irmão mais velho da família ariana no pedestal que lhe cabe de direito, e que a história sanciona]”.
of no benefit because Russia was not more civilised than India. Therefore, Indians wouldn’t benefit at all by changing “landlords” (De Gubernatis 1887, 321-322).

In his role as the Indian correspondent, Gerson da Cunha sent his “Lettre des Indes Orientales” to the first issue of the magazine at the end of 1883. In it, he identified the state of contemporary India as one of crisis and transition (Cunha 1883b, 202-204; 1884a, 829-831). He started to refer to the widely repeated dichotomy between oriental apathy, on the one hand; and, on the other, the active nature of western peoples said to be affecting the apathy in the Orient. The contemplative and even servile nature of the Indians was changing, thanks to European colonialism, into a transitional process favouring a closer and friendlier relationship between the two worlds. The “Indian of the 19th century”, Cunha declared, “thinks, moves, communes in mind and sympathy with his Aryan brother of the West, recalls the past greatness of his native country, feels keenly his present partial bondage and aspires to a future full of more promises of success and prosperity.” Arianism, here, serving to unite Easte and West, and somehow subverting the inequalities institutionalized by colonial rule.

THE REAWAKENING OF A NATION: INDIA AFTER THE FOREIGN INVASERS

In the second manuscript article Gerson da Cunha sent to be published in the Florentine journal, he highlighted the recent passage of power from Lord Ripon to Lord Dufferin and the grandeur of the acclamation ceremonies with which Lord Ripon was bid farewell. However, the Indians had been very unhappy: “ten centuries of tyranny and oppression by foreign invaders have made them nearly forget that theirs was one of the seats of an ancient and advanced civilisation”. When a Viceroy gave the Indians the political right of “municipal self-government” – a right that

25 See Cunha (1883b, 202). Ronald Inden (1986; 2000 [1990]) analyses the persistence of these essentialist images of India in contrast with European values and ideas.

26 Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale di Firenze – Manoscritti – Carteggio Angelo De Gubernatis – Corresp. José Gerson da Cunha para Angelo De Gubernatis, n.º 32 (Bombay 23rd November 1883). The article, written in English, is sent along with this letter; Cunha (1883b, 203).
had been present in the Indian village communities from time immemorial, – their gratitude was enormous. This happened, according to Gerson da Cunha because in the last ten centuries “of darkness”, the Indian people had received more “blows than kisses, more kicks than pence!” , and had forgotten the privileges they once possessed. Now the process was unstoppable. When a people were taught about their rights, this people started questioning itself about the evolution of these rights. If they encountered resistance, on the other hand, this progressive evolution would transform itself into revolution. However, as Gerson da Cunha pointed out, rights also meant duties, and these were the last thing on which the masses reflected.

“The inauguration of a spirit of nationality among the natives of this country” had been, in his opinion, the greatest revelation of the transition of power. Gerson da Cunha’s argument would be oft-repeated in the future but, in 1884, was still latent. India had much to gain by maintaining its relationship with the most progressive, enlightened, intelligent and energetic nation of Europe, but Britain would have to gradually adjust to India’s demands. The coloniser had to please the colonised and win its good-will, mainly when facing the threat of a potential rival such as Russia. Just as the Portuguese had done when they became more benevolent with the natives at the beginning of the 17th century, when the British had arrived in Surat, argued Gerson da Cunha, so the British had to please the Indians when the Russians arrived in Kabul. The published article did not print this sentence or idea, nor did it print the section of the article in which he reflected on the meaning of the 1857 Mutiny, while comparing it with the excesses displayed by the masses present when Lord Ripon ceded power.27 Clearly Gubernatis must have thought that Cunha’s openness was too bold.

In regard to the public’s apparent loyalty to the British Crown, the Indian correspondent noted that there was always an element of precariousness in any foreign government. In India, many had read the manifestations of joy towards the ex-viceroy – Lord Ripon – as a sign of the success and permanence of Britain’s relationship with India.28 Gerson da Cunha, however, had doubts. And to demonstrate them, he gave an example of historical parallelism

27 Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale di Firenze – Manoscritti – Carteggio Angelo De Gubernatis – Corresp. José Gerson da Cunha para Angelo De Gubernatis, n.º 37 (Bombay, Hornby Road, 25th December 1883).

28 Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale di Firenze – Manoscritti – Carteggio Angelo De Gubernatis – Corresp. José Gerson da Cunha para Angelo De Gubernatis, n.º 37 (Bombay, Hornby Road, 25th December 1883).
taken from “Portuguese India’s” past: those manifestations of joy had been analogous to what took place in the “flourishing Portuguese Empire in the East”. When D. João de Castro returned to Goa after the conquest of Diu, the natives offered him golden flowers and the merchants of Cambaia spread out their richest and most beautiful cotton and silk cloths, so that he could walk between the galleon and the cathedral. And what was the result of all of these native acclamations of the “last hero”, and the congratulations of all the Hindu and Muslim princes of India? Nowadays, argued Cunha, not even the most cultivated native of India remembers the name of D. João de Castro. This forgotten name stood in clear contrast to the names of contemporary natives, whose memory was still alive, and was preserved in popular ballads: “Such is the destiny of all foreign rulers, most benevolent though they be.”

Gerson da Cunha ended this reflection with praise of D. João de Castro’s character, followed by the reference to an event that again enabled him to establish a comparison between the two colonial empires: the Portuguese empire of the past and the British empire of the present. D. João de Castro died poor, assisted by St. Francis Xavier, whose Tomb-Relic in Velha Goa Lord Ripon had visited recently. The epilogue of the Portuguese empire was already known, while the epilogue of the British was yet to be written. It would, however, be similar, Gerson da Cunha suggested.

Gubernatis, however, did not seem to think the reflections on contemporary British India should be included in the published version, and omitted many of the pages Gerson da Cunha had written.²⁹ Was the Italian troubled by his friend’s comments, which seemed to announce the end of the British colonial government in India? Were these reflections too problematic to be published in the journal edited by someone who was considered the major Italian figure in Indian studies, and who was about to depart on a major journey to India where he needed the support of the British Government of India? The exclusions Gubernatis decided to make reveal that even away from India, not everything could be said. Gerson da Cunha’s free speech – words written in Portuguese and sent to an Italian city to be translated into French – were still subject to a censorship that we can only explain by asking questions rather than by rehearsing any clear answer.

²⁹ Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale di Firenze – Manoscritti – Carteggio Angelo De Gubernatis – Corresp. José Gerson da Cunha para Angelo De Gubernatis, n.º 37 (Bombay, 25th December 1884); This second article as correspondent was published two months after, on 25th February 1884: Cunha (1884a, 829-831).
The conversation about Indian immutability – being transformed by the British presence – was present in much of the writing about India during this period, a fact of which Gerson da Cunha was clearly aware (Temple 1881, 1-2). In the paradigms of progress that the British claimed to have taken to India were the seeds of nationalism that, ultimately, would lead to India’s independence. Therefore, the interpretation presented by Gerson da Cunha should be seen in the context of the debates amongst British and Indian elites of the second half of the 19th century. An example of how nationalistic values inspired by the West were used by the Bengali elites has already been analysed by many, Raychaudhuri amongst them (Raychaudhuri 2002). Bhudev Mukhopadhyay, for example, recognised how the British, by thinking mainly about their own interests, had also contributed to the unification of India (Raychaudhuri 2002, 62, 65). Bankin Chandra Chattopadhyay, a Bengali writer of the same period, who was especially critical of the British government, recognised that Western education, transmitted in English, was the major benefit of British colonialism, and could even become a link of a pan-Indian union, in a way that Sanskrit could never assure.30

While Raychauduri focused on the ways in which the local elites of a specific geographical region embraced Western values in order to sometimes use them against the colonial presence, Chatterjee concluded that an Indian national discourse was able to incorporate a critique of the colonial government, while simultaneously accepting the values of modernity that were inseparable from colonialism (Chatterjee 1993). Similarly, Gyan Prakash argued that the nationalists transformed India from a passive element into an active one: from an “object of knowledge” essentialised by Europe to self-identification as a nation (Prakash 2000, 168). Raychauduri and Chatterjee give specific examples of intellectuals, historians and Indian writers who, like Gerson da Cunha, have ambivalent positions, which contradict one another and can be also explained through the rich multiplicity of sources from which their thoughts and cultural references derive.31 All of these historical figures reveal what could also be said in relation to Gerson da Cunha: it is difficult to

30 See Raychaudhuri (2002, 184) and Isaka (2006, 151-176). But Chattopadhyay could also foresee another consequence of the spread of the Western educational system in India – the profound gap between the Indian elites and the illiterate masses, the majority of the population (Raychaudhuri 2002, 195-196. For a biography of Chattopadhyay, see Amiya P. Sen (2008).

assert that these complex positions are in simple opposition to one another. It cannot simply be stated that there was one force on the European or colonial side, which stood against another supporting the colonisers.

THE UNEXPECTED ADVANTAGES OF BEING ELSEWHERE: MOVING BETWEEN HISTORIES AND IDENTITIES

When referring to Salman Rushdie’s novel, *Midnight’s Children*, Edward Said used the expression to take a “voyage in” to designate the “effort” made by those writers, historians and intellectuals from the peripheries of the world “to enter into the discourse of Europe and the West, to mix with it, transform it, to make it acknowledge marginalised or suppressed or forgotten histories” (Said 1993, 260-261). However, for the Goan historian, or, in fact, a great part of Goan writers, historians and scholars from the Catholic elites, this distinction between periphery and centre, India and Europe, or non-European and European did not apply. Gerson da Cunha was not appropriating the instruments of a European culture, because they were part of his education and his Goan culture.

Since Said, a pioneering thinker in so many ways, wrote on the subject, a new field has emerged – global intellectual history –, where an effort has been made to go beyond the Eurocentric traditional focus of intellectual history and examine a rich knowledge production where many authors were colonised subjects (Moyn and Sartori 2013; Bose and Manjapra 2010; Ganger and Lewis 2013). Gerson da Cunha could certainly be included in the approaches of global intellectual history centred on India, which also have a strong biographical line of research as a way of bringing to the fore authors that were unknown and seldom referred to. Other works have centred not on specific authors, but on how political and social justice ideas were used and transformed by Indian intellectuals, as happens in C. A. Bayly’s book, where the Goan Bernardo Peres

---

32 Two published collections are examples of such an effort: one is by Oxford University Press, in New Delhi, centred on “short biographies of men and women from the late nineteenth century to the present day, who have contributed in discrete ways towards building modern India”, from Mahatma Gandhi to Sri Aurobindo, Raja Ram Mohan Roy or Madan Mohan Malaviya; the other is the *Pathfinders Series*, published in New Delhi by Routledge (Muhammad Iqbal, Veena Dhanammal or Shyamji Krishna Varma, among others).
da Silva is one of the thinkers analysed. In Kris Manjapra’s and my own book (Vicente 2012b), another thread of research has privileged the ways in which intellectual relations through correspondence, conferences and journals have been established between Indian and European scholars. Manjapra’s Age of Entanglement focuses on German and Indian intellectuals from the 19th to the mid-20th century; while my work, Other Orientalisms, is centred on the relationship between Italian and Indian scholars between 1860 and 1900 (Manjapra 2014; Vicente 2012b). Specifically on Goa’s 19th century intellectual and printing history there are two fundamental works: Rochelle Pinto’s book on Print and Politics in Goa and Sandra Lobo’s PhD’s thesis, Culture and Politics in Goa from Liberalism to the Colonial Act (Pinto 2007; Lobo 2013).

Gerson da Cunha’s double gaze – his control of the “here and there”, of both sides of a border, within the Indian subcontinent and also outside it – enabled him to write a comparative and transnational history that went beyond an interest in “Portuguese India”, even if that was almost always his point of departure. His, however, was a history that also took into account other communities, other religions, and other colonial configurations. His was a history of some regions of India whose history, in a certain period, intersected with that of Portugal; regions which had other histories before, during, and after the Portuguese presence; histories that were sometimes also colonial histories. Gerson da Cunha’s was a kaleidoscopic vision that was distinct from that of those Portuguese historians who wrote on India from the metropolis. It was also different from the vision of those who, being Goan or Portuguese, wrote from Goa.

Gerson da Cunha knew all the bibliographical references of those Portuguese historians, yet his vision was as Eurocentric as Indo-centric, and that differentiated his work from the historicisation of India done in 19th or even 20th century Portugal. In addition to knowing those Portuguese sources, found not only in Goan archives but also in Lisbon, and while keeping abreast of what was being published in Lisbon, Porto, Coimbra and Goa, Gerson da Cunha also knew what was being published in London, Bombay, Paris and Calcutta. In addition to Portuguese, he read English, and a number of Indian languages. This historiographical and linguistic cosmopolitanism gave him a knowledge of different national traditions that did not usually cross each other.

It was Gerson da Cunha’s geographical identity and his ability to preserve his foreignness in relation to the dominant contexts in which he moved in multiple countries, which enabled him to produce different kinds of knowledge about India. He had access to different kinds of publishing contexts and, I would argue, was conscious of what he could write and what he could not write in different geographical contexts. Even in an increasingly cosmopolitan world, in which journals, writings and ideas were interchanged between places, when writing in French and publishing in Italy, Gerson da Cunha knew he could say things that he would not say if publishing in Bombay.

In the two main scholarly journals of Bombay – the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society and the Indian Antiquary – he located the history of the Portuguese within a wider history of India, oscillating between a legitimisation of the pioneerism of the Portuguese in many areas and criticism of Portuguese marriage policies, Catholic methods of conversion, and the politics of eradicating local languages – Konkani – and religions – Hinduism. His approach typified the British historiographical tradition: the “mistakes” of the Portuguese past in India were often quoted to exemplify what should not be done in the present. However, when Gerson da Cunha is corresponding with Gubernatis, or writing for a French language journal published in Italy, the British India that emerges is a very different one, as we have seen. Although Gerson da Cunha occasionally digresses to comment on the past, when discussing British India in these writings he dwells principally on the present state of affairs and also on the future – always with an independent India on the horizon. The same cannot be said of his reflections on Portuguese India, where his criticism safely addresses only the past, avoiding any contemporary reflections.

Gerson da Cunha’s specificities further complicate the places from which he writes on colonial experiences and configurations, past and present. He was never in the place of the colonised. By being Goan but not resident in Goa, he did not have to live under the Portuguese colonial government. He lived in Bombay, but he was not an Indian subject of British India, and therefore was always something of a foreigner. His permanent condition of “foreignness”, in this limbo between exclusion and inclusion that is an underlying condition of all experiences of displacement, gave him the freedom to never be in a subaltern position.

And how can we think of him as an “oriental orientalist”? Gerson da Cunha’s case, or that of Bhandarkar, another Bombay scholar who travelled to
Europe to attend an international congress, come to subvert the identity of the orientalist as a white European coloniser (Bhandarkar 1887, 72). There were many Indians producing scholarly work, which was identified as “orientalist” and legitimised in the spheres where knowledge was shared between peers: international congresses or scholarly journals. Knowledge and people travelled, and so did the idea of what was an “orientalist”. However, if the growing role and visibility of Indian “orientalists” along the 19th century could serve to question Said’s theories of orientalist knowledge as an instrument of European colonising power, we could also argue that these “orientalist orientals” needed European legitimisation to be accepted and considered. Their work had to fit the norms, traditions and formats of what was considered “orientalist knowledge”, as defined by a European mode. Therefore, in order to be “included”, they had to fit a knowledge configuration that was defined in Europe. Gerson da Cunha was cherished within a certain European orientalist sphere both because he produced knowledge within the same codes and traditions and spoke the same intellectual language.

He went to Europe a few times, but apparently he never went to Portugal, although he exchanged letters with some Portuguese scholars, and was a correspondent member of the main Portuguese institutions of knowledge, such as the Sociedade de Geografia and the Academia das Ciências, both in Lisbon. France and Great Britain were places to where he returned, but it was with Italy that Gerson da Cunha established more intellectual relationships. These were his locations of choice, where he was never a colonial subject in the colonial metropolis, but an “Indian” who shared the culture – because he was a Goan –, and religion – because he was a Catholic – of his European interlocutors. In the places where he lived and in which he wrote, Cunha was never completely subject to a colonial context, to those everyday discourses and practices of hierarchies, differences and inequalities.

Always being a foreigner granted him this unusual freedom, and the possibility of voicing at least some of his opinions on the various colonialisms of India, of both the past and the present. It also meant, paradoxically, that his

34 With Conde de Ficalho, for example, who wrote on Garcia da Orta and therefore shared many scholarly interests with Gerson da Cunha. See Garcia da Orta (1891, 1895).

35 Gerson da Cunha’s relationship with Angelo De Gubernatis, his 50 letters are kept at the Gubernatis’ Archive of the National Library of Florence, were the point of departure for my book Other Orientalisms... (Vicente 2012b). On Gerson da Cunha’s trips to Paris, see Vicente (2012b, 133-151).
intellectual production was never acknowledged by those historians of India working within the two dominant historiographical traditions, the Portuguese and the British. His in-betweenness and the uncertainty and even contradictory nature of his identities contributed to his invisibility and his exclusion from the canonical layers of historical authorship. This was, however, the other side of the same coin, perhaps the price to pay for the kaleidoscopic nature of his position. He could see many different things, but was missed at the vantage point of those who look at history and historiography from a single place.

CONCLUSION

Gerson da Cunha’s intellectual and social world was concentrated in the diverse world of Bombay, a heterogeneous and fluid world, made of people of different ethnicities, religions and origins (Vicente 2012b). Through an analysis of a number of his writings, I have explored different ideas of inclusion and exclusion. The central one is the effort made by the historian in mapping, studying and valuing what was Portuguese in India, both in the past and in the present. In this process of knowing and making known, he could concentrate on the past, as when he wrote an article on Portuguese Orientalism before the British 18th century Orientalist genealogy. Or he could concentrate on the present, as when he criticised the University of Bombay, his city, for not sufficiently valuing the Portuguese language. Another way of thinking of the idea of exclusion is through those specific historical subjects central to the historiography of “Portuguese India”. Exclusion of Hinduism within the making of the Portuguese empire of India – through discriminatory laws, destruction of Hindu material culture and manuscripts, eradication of Konkani and other Indian languages or punishment of religious practices – was a strategy he criticised, for example. However, Cunha was also against the

36 In my book, Other Orientalisms... (Vicente 2012b) I analyse Angelo De Gubernatis’s numerous references to Gerson da Cunha’s social and intellectual circle, which, very often, met at his house, in Angelo De Gubernatis, Peregrinazioni Indiane, vols. 1-111 (Firenze: Tip. Editrice di L. Niccolai, 1886-1887). In this chapter, I will not be able to explore Cunha’s relationships with the various Goan communities settled in Bombay – something that, for example, Paulo Varela Gomes (2007) has written about, – nor his relationship with other Goan scholars based in Bombay and linked to British institutions of learning, such as José Camilo Lisboa (Bardez, 1823 – Bombay, 1897), a distinguished doctor and botanist from Bardez. On José Camilo Lisboa, see Aleixo Manuel da Costa (s.d., 192-194) and Filipa Lowndes Vicente (2017, 323-327).
exclusion of Portuguese from the range of European languages taught at the University of Bombay in the late 19th century. He does not, therefore, enable us to draw simple conclusions, and even less to establish linear dichotomies between those who sided with the foreign colonisers and those with the colonised Indian.

His criticism of Portuguese colonial practices focused mainly on the past and was expressed in his scholarly publications, and was therefore historical in nature. With British India, however, his critical eye tended to address contemporary events and was mainly conveyed through journalistic writing and private correspondence. This division was also an object of my reflection. Policies and practices of exclusion and inclusion – and the dialogues and conflicts over what should be included or “excluded” – were embedded in all colonial spaces and Gerson da Cunha participated in this debate through his historical and journalistic writings. However, I tried to analyse, his audience – the people who were going to read him and the places where he was going to be read – determined what he wrote on India’s present or past. He was conscious of their specificity and adapted his discourse, politics and criticism accordingly and this was not by chance. His position and identity determined what he could say and to whom he could say it.

The fact that Gerson da Cunha was Goan and could read Portuguese, along with other European and Indian languages, was determinant in the choice of historical subjects he chose to research and write about. It was also important for the cosmopolitan community with which he interacted, socially as well as in his role as doctor with a medical practice. By belonging to different worlds, and constantly crossing, literally and historically, the borders between Portuguese and British India, Cunha was able to make comparisons and connections between different histories and historiographies. This contrasted with the majority of written scholarly production, which tended to remain separate and unaware of each other: on one side, the work written in English, published in British India or in London, and concentrating on the geographies and experiences of the British presence in India; and on the other, the bibliography published in Portuguese, in Goa or in Lisbon, and focused on the Portuguese presence in certain Indian regions, mainly in Goa, since the 16th century. This, as we have seen, had two main results: it enabled him to establish unusual comparisons and crossings between both dominant colonising experiences in India, while also meaning that he was not incorporated in either of the historiographies dealing with Portuguese and British India.
Situated between these two traditions – the Portuguese and the British – Gerson da Cunha was never fully acknowledged by either of them. In a historical period – the second half of the 19th century – in which different European colonial governments ruled India with the obvious predominance of the British, there were different national historiographical traditions depending on the place where the writing was taking place and on who was writing. These tended to concentrate on different periods and different subjects, and were written in different languages, by scholars who worked in different archives and quoted different historians. Paradoxically, as I have suggested, it was this belonging to many places while not belonging to a single one – the fact that Gerson da Cunha was always on the borders of different worlds – that contributed to his invisibility as a historian and his exclusion from the canon, as a producer of knowledge on the history of India.

Acknowledgements

I thank my friend Naomi Parker, from the Department of Portuguese and Brazilian Studies at Brown University, for the thorough revision of this text, and I thank my dear Gerson da Cunha, an Indian stage and film actor, social worker, activist, journalist, author and advertising executive, descendant of José Gerson da Cunha, who from the beginning of my research on his family has been a friend and a supporter.

FILIPA LOWNDES VICENTE
Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa
Av. Prof. Aníbal Bettencourt 9 — 1600-036 Lisboa, Portugal
filipa.vicente@ics.ulisboa.pt
orcid.org/0000-0002-3334-3064
§ REFERENCES


**SOURCES**


**BIBLIOTECA NAZIONALE CENTRALE DI FIRENZE – MANOSCRIPTS** – Carteggio Angelo De Gubernatis – Corresp. José Gerson da Cunha para Angelo De Gubernatis, n.º 16 (Bombay, 37 Hornby Road, 17th March 1879).

**BIBLIOTECA NAZIONALE CENTRALE DI FIRENZE – MANOSCRIPTS** – Carteggio Angelo De Gubernatis – Corresp. José Gerson da Cunha para Angelo De Gubernatis, n.º 17 (Bombay, 37 Hornby Road, 1st August 1879).

**BIBLIOTECA NAZIONALE CENTRALE DI FIRENZE – MANOSCRIPTS** – Carteggio Angelo De Gubernatis – Corresp. José Gerson da Cunha para Angelo De Gubernatis, n.º 20 (Bombay, 39, Hornby Road, 1st January 1880).

**BIBLIOTECA NAZIONALE CENTRALE DI FIRENZE – MANOSCRIPTS** – Carteggio Angelo De Gubernatis – Corresp. José Gerson da Cunha para Angelo De Gubernatis, n.º 22 (Bombay, 39 Hornby Road, 14th June 1881).

**BIBLIOTECA NAZIONALE CENTRALE DI FIRENZE – MANOSCRIPTS** – Carteggio Angelo De Gubernatis – Corresp. José Gerson da Cunha para Angelo De Gubernatis, n.º 23 (Bombay, 39 Hornby Road, 26th July 1881).

BIBLIOTECA NAZIONALE CENTRALE DI FIRENZE – Manoscritti – Carteggio Angelo De Gubernatis – Corresp. José Gerson da Cunha para Angelo De Gubernatis, n.º 37 (Bombay, Hornby Road, 25th December 1883).


CITE THIS CHAPTER AS:
https://doi.org/10.31447/ics9789726715030.12
PART V

Gender and family
Why are caring masculinities so difficult to achieve? Reflections on men and gender equality in Portugal

Vanessa Cunha
Leonor Bettencourt Rodrigues
Rita Correia
Susana Atalaia
Karin Wall
INTRODUCTION

The emergence of caring masculinities in many parts of the world has been assessed in several reports since the early 2000s, all of them highlighting the virtuous impact of this reshape in male identities and practices for gender equality improvements in societies (Connell 2003; Norwegian Ministry for Children and Equality 2009; Scambor et al. 2013; Levto et al. 2015; Heilman et al. 2017; Santos et al. 2016; Wall et al. 2017). Indeed, after decades of women demanding equal rights and opportunities and for the end of male domination and its harmful costs in their lives, caring masculinities arise as a strong ally against hegemonic masculinity.¹

What are caring masculinities? According to a recent attempt to promote the concept, by combining contributions from critical studies on men/masculinities and feminist care theory, caring masculinities “can be seen as masculine identities that exclude domination and embrace the affective, relational, emotional, and interdependent qualities of care (…); a critical form of men’s engagement in gender equality because doing care work requires men to resist hegemonic masculinity and to adopt values and characteristics of care that are antithetical to hegemonic masculinity” (Elliot 2016, 252, 254). So, besides the commitment to care work and gender equality, caring masculinities entail a mindful refusal of hegemonic masculinity and inherent prerogatives (privileges, domination, power), as well as of the plural manifestations of “complicit masculinity” that it assumes (Aboim 2010).

Moreover, an all-inclusive perspective enlightens the manifold dimensions of the transformative process involved in caring masculinities, from care work in family life to care work in professional life, from taking care of others to taking care of oneself. Therefore, caring masculinities come up “in the everyday lives of men, when they take over caregiving practices, especially within families or when they work in ‘feminine’ professions of care (…),

¹ The powerful concept of hegemonic masculinity is at the core of Connell’s work on masculinities and patriarchal gender order, and it was recently reappraised by the author (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005). Even if this concept has been criticised in relation to its scope for understanding phenomena from local to global scale, as well as the plurality of masculinities that are lodged under the archway of hegemony (Aboim 2010; Beasley 2008), it’s nevertheless indispensable for comprehending inter/intra-gender power relations and inequalities. For a thorough insight into Connell’s work, see Aboim (2010).
why are caring masculinities so difficult to achieve?

[which it is crucial to widen] the concept of ‘care’ towards ‘self-care’ (awareness of health or emotional issues, deeper friendships, less risk-taking behaviour, etc.)” (Scambor et al. 2013, 2).

Lastly, this theoretical backdrop has pinpointed the narrow scope of perceiving hegemonic or complicit masculinities exclusively as a place of privilege and power encompassing well-acknowledged costs for women and non-hegemonic men (Aboim and Vasconcelos 2013; Norwegian Ministry for Children and Equality 2009). Indeed, “violence (against others and self), high-risk behaviour, lack of self-care, poor health, and impoverished relationships” (Elliot 2016, 246) are the costs that dominant men have to pay. But even if caring masculinities underpin improvements in men’s physical, mental and interpersonal domains of life (Elliot 2016; Scambor et al. 2013, Levtov et al. 2015), emerging “as a central path forward, and one that is increasingly taken up in practice” (Scambor et al. 2014, 552), this civilizational transformation is far from being fully achieved (as confirmed by persistent gender inequalities). The driving forces of the trade-off in masculinities are far from being fully seized.

Drawing on the above conceptual framework and the assumption that patriarchal gender orders have been challenged in Portugal, both in the public and private spheres, at least since the 1974 Revolution (Almeida 2011), this chapter offers a reflection upon the white paper Men and Gender Equality in Portugal (Wall et al. 2017). The focus here is on the costs of masculinity in men’s lives and the obstacles – interplaying at institutional, relational and individual levels – to the consolidation of caring masculinities.

The white paper is the main product of the project “Men’s Roles from a Gender Equality Perspective”2, which intended to raise awareness on the need to include men in the discussion of gender equality in Portugal. This was done by tracking recent changes in male roles and assessing their contribution to developments in this realm; promoting a major debate with the relevant social agents; and setting out a set of recommendations for decision-makers in order to enhance a gender equality agenda. In line with international reports and findings, the white paper concludes that “abolishing inequalities between

---

2 This project was undertaken in 2014-2016 within a partnership between the Commission for Equality in Labour and Employment, as the promoter, and the Institute of Social Sciences of the University of Lisbon, as the scientific partner. It was funded by the Financial Mechanism of the European Economic Area, EEA Grants, Programme Area PT07 – Mainstreaming of Gender Equality and Work-Life Balance, with the Commission for Citizenship and Gender Equality as the programme operator.
men and women involves profound changes not only in the condition of women but also of men, in particular in terms of identity and the ways of being a man in private life (…), by breaking up the traditional patriarchal model of masculinity and putting forward a new model of masculinity which is more caring and egalitarian” (Wall et al. 2017, 15).

Caring masculinities linked to parenting and partnership are in motion in Portuguese society. This is largely a result of public policy that, from the mid-1980s onwards, has been enrolling men in early childcare, with the aim of improving work-family reconciliation in dual-earner couples with young children and, more recently, explicitly upholding gender equality as a goal written down in leave regulation since 2009. Men have been responding to the challenge by increasingly assimilating and displaying a nurturing role in children’s lives (Aboim and Marinho 2006; Wall, Cunha and Marinho forthcoming; Marinho 2011; Santos et al. 2016; Wall 2014, 2015; Wall, Aboim and Cunha 2010; Wall, Aboim and Marinho 2007). The rise in the take-up of parental leave, the trade-off in the time allocated to paid and unpaid work, and the greater share of household tasks are clear evidence of the consolidation of caring and more egalitarian masculinities in Portugal.

This ongoing cultural change, transformative of male identities, parenting practices and family dynamics, is also supported by favourable gender-role attitudes, especially among individuals in family-formation ages with secondary and tertiary education, according to ISSP2012 (Ramos, Atalaia and Cunha 2016; Wall et al. 2017). In fact, both the ideas of equal sharing of household tasks and of the father’s important role in childcare have been substantially supported. There is also considerable approval of key policy measures that strengthen the father’s caring role. There is extensive recognition of the plentiful benefits of the father’s take-up of parental leave, not only for men’s, women’s and children’s individual and relational well-being, but also as a booster of gender equality and domestic balance among couples. Briefly, major changes are happening in the attitudes towards men as caregivers and partners, as well as in the way fathers display a nurturing role and make sense of it. These

3 The Decree-law 91/2009 of April 9th defines and regulates the protection in parenthood.

4 The Portuguese ISSP2012 “Family and Changing Gender Roles” was only administered in 2014 and counted on the co-funding of the project “Men’s Roles in a Gender Equality Perspective” Under this protocol, an additional module was produced on the attitudes of the resident population concerning the national legislation in force, or under discussion, that endorses gender equality in the public and private spheres, including in the field of leave policy.
developments are in tune with “the objectives outlined in the law governing the protection of parenthood, i.e. reconciling family and work on the basis of gender equality, the child’s well-being and the ‘harmonization of career and family responsibilities’ between men and women” (Wall et al. 2017, 40).

However, even if this means that leave policy moved by those principles is essential for promoting men’s involvement in early childcare and upgrading gender equality in family life, the caring masculinities’ revolution is far from achieved. As mentioned above, caring masculinities are not confined to parenting identities and practices, they comprise a much more comprehensive value of care (including self-care) defiant of dominant models of masculinities in different realms of life and frameworks of interpersonal relationships over the life course. From childhood to old age, and in many arenas of men’s identity and daily existence – from school to labour market, from family life to health and violence – men and boys have to cope with the costs of being excluded from socialisation for care work and of being recognised as (competent) caregivers. Caring masculinities remain, therefore, an enterprise full of obstacles.

UNDERSTANDING THE OBSTACLES TO CARING MASCULINITIES

Like other reports that appraised men’s contribution to gender equality in different domains of social existence (Norwegian Ministry for Children and Equality 2009; Scambor et al. 2013), the white paper portrayed four main arenas – family and work-family reconciliation, labour market, education, and health/violence. It also unveiled key obstacles that hinder the thriving of caring masculinities: the refusal to giving up hegemonic privileges, like those resulting from male leading position in the labour market; the harmful costs for themselves of dominant forms of masculinity “defined by physical strength, power, domination and aggression” (Scambor et al. 2014, 562); and the institutional and interactional ambivalences or setbacks regarding men’s role in family and professional caregiving. Common to all these obstacles, we may grasp the surreptitious but powerful role of gender stereotypes, which motivates prejudice and discrimination, by excluding men from (self-)care.

Gender stereotypes are defined as a set of structured and shared beliefs based on the specificities of being a man in contrast with being a woman.
They are imputed to sexual differences (Connell 2002) and refer to characteristics, attributes, behaviour, preferences and roles associated with and believed to be appropriate to the masculine and feminine identities (Deaux and LaFrance, 1998, cited in Laranjeira et al. 2002). Therefore, gender stereotypes take on a descriptive function, whereby male and female characteristics place limits on the roles and responsibilities regarded as suitable for men and women, boys and girls. Additionally, they have a prescriptive function for gender roles as, even implicitly, they convey ways of acting. The internalisation of commonly-shared gender representations – both in interpersonal relationships and at an institutional level – shapes expectations, values, behaviour, decision-making, experiences and opportunities (Cavaco et al. 2015). Therefore, caring masculinities can be seen as a transgressive social demand that challenges deep-rooted gender stereotypes.

**BOYS AND SOCIALISATION FOR CARE**

**WHITE PAPER recommendation:**

To socialize and educate early in life for gender equality and for the value of male care (Wall et al. 2017, 6).

Primary socialisation usually takes place in the family and has a particularly important role in inculcating stereotypical models of behaviour and identity during early childhood (Fontaine 1990, quoted in Cavaco et al. 2015). Secondary socialisation, in turn, takes place in school, where the child encounters other sets of references and social learning which, through stereotyped messages, lead to the construction of masculinity and femininity (Carrito and Araújo 2013). This section of the chapter highlights the most significant features of family and school contexts that make them key-territories for the reproduction of gender stereotypes and, therefore, for keeping boys away from caregiving skills and caring masculinities.

The central role of parents in socialisation justifies seeing them as powerful players in the gender game, in the sense that they tend to reproduce gender-stereotyped expectations (Lynch and Feeley 2009). From toys to kinds of play, from types of interaction to expected behaviour, skills and choices, the primary socialisation at home shapes boys and girls and determines what being a man or being a woman means (or is expected to mean), and what kind of skills men and women are expected to have. A recent BBC experiment has demonstrated
that when faced with an unknown child, just taking into account the clothes they have on, people make use of a set of gender stereotypes that guide the interaction with the child, the kind of toys chosen and the kind of play used, clearly showing that both men and women, when interacting with a child with gendered-male clothes, choose more spatial awareness or games and toys requiring physical confidence (robots, cars or puzzle games), while when interacting with a gendered-female clothes child, they often choose a doll or soft toys.

Scientific studies have been producing similar results, supporting the idea that parents and other significant adults reproduce a traditionally gendered childhood (choice of toys, clothes, activities and styles of play), in which they seek to ensure that boys will be boys (Kane 2012), pushing them away from caring-related toys or activities. The impact of this gendered parental influence becomes evident when children show stereotypical toy preferences, which have been proven to occur early in development, at least from 9 months onwards (Alexander, Wilcox and Woods 2009; Todd, Barry and Thommessen 2016). Studies based on infants’ visual preferences (Alexander et al. 2009) and on observations of infants and toddlers “playing alone” (Todd et al. 2016) reveal that boys have more interest and spend more time playing with a car, a truck or a digger toy than with a doll or a cooking pot.

It is interesting to notice that for boys, but not for girls, this preference increases with age (Todd et al. 2016). This sex difference can be explained as a result of the observation of others’ behaviour and expectations in the socialisation process, through which boys, not only increase their knowledge of gender-typed behaviour, but also realise the social criticism that exists around it and which is, across racial and social backgrounds, greater for boys than for girls (Kane 2006). This pressure towards a dominant model of masculinity is highlighted in a National Reading Plan book for the 8th grade on the uneasiness of school-aged children with regard to society’s gender stereotypical expectations.


6 In this story, an eight-year-old boy tells his six-year-old sister (who is always complaining about women’s gender discrimination): “Have you ever thought that dad is the one who has to work all day long in the store to make money for us? Have you ever thought that he is the one who always arrives home at night, tired and sick of putting up with customers? You’re lucky you are a girl (…). You think being a boy is cool? Do you think I wouldn’t want people to stop annoying me with what is being a man and not being a man?” (Gomes 2017).
Additionally, the literature reveals that even parents who have a progressive attitude to gender equality tend to be “gender trap[ped]” and, thus, influence their children towards gendered identities and skills (Kane 2012) and encourage their school trajectories and vocational choices in a stereotypical way, which, in turn, later on impacts on labour market horizontal segregation (Lynch and Feeley 2009).

As regards school context, there are different environment features that make it a key-territory for reproducing gender stereotypes. To describe its features, one has to refer to the multiple ways through which, both explicitly and implicitly, school environment sends stereotypical messages conveyed by educational practices, namely text books and informal/non-verbal interaction and behaviour. These, along with expectations, activate gender stereotypes by associating masculinity with skills and characteristics such as logical reasoning, assertiveness, pro-activity, competitiveness and aggressiveness that can be more associated with virility and the public sphere; distancing the male role from the private sphere, not promoting more empathic, relational, altruistic, caregiving skills. In contrast, school confines male and female pupils with distinct personalities, attributes, interests and motivations to a single educational strategy and evaluation criteria based on a feminised image of a good student: the one who concentrates on studying, is attentive in class, completes assigned tasks, performs well and whose behaviour reflects calm acceptance of the rules. This representation is close to the stereotypical characteristics of the female: dependence, imitation, passivity and conformity (Cavaco et al. 2015).

Beyond the formal curriculum, which is written down and is objective, schools also have an informal or hidden curriculum, which may reinforce gender stereotypes through personal interaction and the way in which time, space and resources are organised and managed. School practices and routines reveal beliefs and attitudes which incorporate gender discrimination and are evident in: different performance and behavioural expectations; defined learning strategies; the selection and organisation of curricular and extra-curricular activities; and, “the identification of vocational tendencies and orientations characterised by ‘natural’ aptitudes” (Silva and Saavedra 2009; Cavaco et al. 2015). The social pressure towards a hegemonic model of masculinity is also undertaken by peers. For example, 3 or 4-year-old children reveal the influence of peers on gendered-typed behaviour (Serbin et al. 1979; Wilansky-Traynor and Lobel 2008). Under the influence of the hegemonic model, boys in school, both in low and upper classes neighbourhoods, adopt
aggressive behaviour to demonstrate their virility (Amâncio 2004). Indeed, being involved in fights is considered one of the requirements that boys have to meet to demonstrate their masculinity (another one is playing football) (Pereira 2012). The violence in schools is recurrent and occurs on a daily basis, mostly between male pupils (small thefts, aggression, intimidation, persecution and threats), generally by older against younger and stronger against weaker – “Pushing and shoving”, “kicking”, “sandwiching” and “petty theft” (Sebastião, Alves and Campo 2003).

The influence of gender stereotypes on primary and secondary socialisation that occurs in family and school contexts has immediate short-term effects on children's lives and long-term effects in adulthood. Immediate short-term effects become evident while still at school in, at least, two ways. First, gender stereotypes are salient in boys’ specialisation and vocational choices for more practical, objective disciplines. And second, as a result of the clash between gendered acquired and informally expected attributes and those formally demanded from pupils in the school context, boys’ school trajectories in Portugal are marked by high retention and low performance, which in a gradual, cumulative way leads them to drift away from school. Despite the positive trend of time-series, in 2015 still more than 16% of young male adults aged 18-24 had dropped out of school before completing secondary education and the learning opportunities that it provides (Figure 13.1) (Cavaco et al. 2015; Wall et al. 2017).

Long-term effects become evident in men's lower educational levels, as compared to women's, even at young ages (Rodrigues, Cunha and Wall 2017). In 2014, while most women aged 25-34 had completed higher education, most men had completed basic schooling (Figure 13.2). Literature on this topic has shown that, despite all the education policy-related measures adopted in recent decades – e.g. extension of compulsory schooling up to the age of 18 – and an overall increase in educational levels, those sex differences enlarge when socioeconomic background is considered (Almeida and Vieira 2006; Almeida, André and Cunha 2005). Notwithstanding, men's lower educational attainment level is not a barrier to their insertion in the labour market, even if in disqualified jobs (Almeida and Vieira 2006; Almeida, André and Cunha 2005; Wall et al. 2017). This phenomenon has several implications: it extends and reinforces sex differences in education and male devaluation of schooling as an empowering tool towards knowledge; it promotes dominant models of masculinity linked to a professional and economic identity rather than to a
school and intellectual one; it perpetuates conservative attitudes and values on gender roles and relations, with the persistence of gender inequalities in all spheres of life, as discussed in the sections below.

**Figure 13.1** Early leavers from education and training (18 to 24 years), by sex (%) – Portugal, 2005-2015

[Bar chart showing early leavers from education and training by sex for Portugal from 2005 to 2015.]

Source: Wall *et al.* 2017 (Calculation based on data from Eurostat [edat_ifse_14]).

**Figure 13.2** Population distribution by level of educational attainment (total and age group 25-34 (%) – Portugal, 2014

[Bar chart showing population distribution by level of educational attainment for Portugal in 2014, categorized by age group 25-34 and gender.]

MEN AND PROFESSIONAL CARE

WHITE PAPER recommendation:
To develop initiatives to support careers for men in traditionally feminized sectors. (Wall et al. 2017, 9)

The crystallised notion that there are feminine and masculine occupations and roles in the workplace collides with the right of both sexes to freely define their career choices. It also affects the management of time allocated to paid work, unpaid work, family life and leisure, and even financial independence. Hereupon, horizontal segregation of occupations – the segmentation of occupational activities into strongly male and female sectors – is a particularly good example of how traditional gender roles corroborate male and female stereotypes in day-to-day practices, and restrain boys’ and girls’ access to certain areas of specialisation and even affect their vocational choices. Those are limited at the outset, based on a differentiation that derives from stereotypes of male and female roles, and not from choices in the true meaning of the term, based on equal rights and opportunities (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005).

Indeed, stereotypical conceptions about manhood – aggressiveness, ambition, domination, strength, endurance, independence and drive to competition, but also being unafraid, having integrity and being prone to conflict – are highly correlated with the career paths society finds suitable for men and which are embodied in men’s professional choices. Also, research shows that men tend to be portrayed as more technically gifted and task and result-orientated, while women are typically seen as caring, emotional and relationship-orientated, which constitutes a pervasive societal bias with important implications in men’s low demand for professions related to care work, namely in Health, Social Work and Education areas. Indeed, the Portuguese labour market reflects this trend and has similar patterns to other European countries, in terms of the horizontal segregation of occupation. According to the Census 2011, the industry, construction and retail trade sectors accounted for most of the employed men in Portugal, together with

public administration, agriculture, fisheries and transport/storage, and a wide disparity between men and women was shown in sectors like health and social services, education and construction. In 2011, 6% of male workers, as against 27% of female workers were working in health and social services and education (Figure 13.3). Likewise, only 1.3% of women worked in construction, as against 17.3% of men (Wall et al. 2017).

An analysis of this indicator over time in traditionally more segregated sectors shows that between 2008 and 2015, men failed to gain ground in traditionally female occupations (education, human health and social services), the change being minimal (Wall et al. 2017).

Concerning the education sector, in 2014/15, in all levels of education up to secondary, men accounted for less than 30% of the teaching staff, recording 13.8% in the first cycle of basic schooling and less than 1% in pre-school teaching (Figure 13.4). It is important to recall that specific teacher training for kindergarten emerged in Portugal only in the 1950s and, at the time, men weren’t allowed to attend it. Even if this situation changed after the 1974 Revolution, the social readiness of men in regard to this profession has been almost motionless, as the statistics clearly prove. Indeed, the existence of widespread bias against female-dominated occupations has visible consequences on their low social status and on lower wages, which tend to increase men’s resistance to them. Likewise, there is also a low proportion of men in non-teaching staff in pre-school, basic and secondary education, with a percentage of around 14.

The effects of male/female disparity in the school teaching body on pupil performance remain unclear, but special attention has been drawn to the impact of a lack of adult male figures as role models in schools, and its effect in terms of boys’ lack of motivation and involvement (Thornton and Bricheno 2006).

As stated in the white paper, this “horizontal occupational segregation suggests that a gender-based definition of work persists, attributing to (less skilled) men those types of work which demand physical strength, technological mastery and leadership functions (for those best qualified), and to women the types of work related to caregiving, reflecting the essentialist stereotype of the role of the woman as a ‘natural’ carer” (Wall et al. 2017).

When men embrace female-dominated professions, including most care work occupations, there’s a “glass escalator” effect where they tend to have higher wages and faster wage growth compared to their female counterparts (Dill, Price-Glynn and Rakovski 2016; Baughman and Smith 2011).
**Figure 13.3**

*Employed population in Education and Human Health and Social Services, proportion by sex (%) – Portugal, 2011*


**Figure 13.4**

*Proportion of male teachers, by teaching level (%) – Portugal, 2004/05 – 2014/15*


Men tend to ride the “glass escalator” in “pink-collar” occupations with a higher likelihood of being promoted, a more strategic choice of career paths by selecting those that have higher wages or higher social recognition, and even being pressured by female colleagues to assume managerial positions\(^8\) (Snyder

\(^8\) In an article from the daily newspaper, *Diário de Notícias* (12/11/2016) on male pre-school teachers, this issue was addressed by the interviewees when talking about their experiences.)
and Green 2008; Williams and Villemez 1993). Thus, the “glass escalator” reflects again the stereotypical beliefs of men as more suited for managing, well-paid positions, making a good use of their “innate” leadership traits and fulfilling their role as providers. It’s nevertheless important to point out that horizontal segregation has basically focused on women’s disadvantages and on their efforts to break through existing gender patterns, norms and barriers. This has made it more difficult for men to gain ground in “traditionally female” jobs, given that male discrimination has generally been absent from the public agenda (Aboim and Vasconcelos 2013). Adding to these socio-normative constraints, male teachers are confronted with the stigma related to sexual abuse of children that are frequently raised in unsubstantiated ways, or based on extremely rare occurrences (Cameron 2001). Overall, this socially perceived inadequacy of male participation in educational settings tends to be higher for younger children than for older children.

MEN AND FAMILY CARE

WHITE PAPER recommendation:
To enshrine in the Portuguese Constitution the right to care, associated with the duty of care. (Wall et al. 2017, 6)

Successive studies at national level have been highlighting the ongoing reshaping of fatherhood practices and identities, embedded in expectations and assumptions of a hands-on, emotionally involved and co-responsible role in childcare (Aboim and Marinho 2006; Wall, Aboim and Cunha 2010; Marinho 2011; Wall 2014). But even if this sphere of life is, beyond question, where caring masculinities are making their way, Portuguese men still have to face massive ambivalence, if not resistance, regarding their role as family caregivers and their (constitutional) right to work-family reconciliation at institutional, interactional and individual levels (Wall et al. 2017). Apart from the family and the school, the labour market and the legal order are,

The coordinator of the course of pre-school teaching from the Santarém Higher School of Education, Maria João Cardona, talked of the great impact of gender stereotypes, sometimes from families, in the marginal choice of this course by young men: “Male students that I had, had to fight against families, because there is a lot of prejudice” (Available at: https://www.dn.pt/sociedade/interior/o-diploma-de-pedro-diz-educadora-5493800.html).
most probably, the major institutional settings that mark out and shape daily existence, interaction, opportunities and constraints. Contradictory messages and guidelines on men’s roles in the private and public spheres emerge precisely from these crucial settings of human existence, which sustain the conflict between progressive perspectives on caring masculinities and more conservative ones on traditional or complicit masculinities (Aboim 2010). A conflict with which men have to cope as fathers, partners, and workers.

Indeed, despite the objective developments, since the 1974 Revolution, in women’s full-time employment and in labour legislation promoting gender equality, most indicators on paid work extensively attest to a highly gender-biased labour market, and to the persistently uneven distribution of privileges and rewards of paid work in prejudice of women (Ferreira 2012; Wall et al. 2017). However, the costs of men’s advantageous position in the labour market are less known, namely the persistent expectations stemming from a traditional organisational culture of workplaces that fosters the “androcentric career model” (Lewis 2010). Many men have to comply with this “ideal” of the male employee, fully committed to a demanding and time-consuming professional life and released from family responsibilities (Casaca 2013). As highlighted by several in-depth national studies, most men identify this “androcentric model” as inescapable and as a cost that is hindering their willingness and chance for greater involvement in family life and childcare, therefore experiencing conflicting appeals in the performance of these roles (Aboim and Marinho 2006; Wall, Aboim and Cunha 2010; Wall 2014; Wall et al. 2017).

The long-standing and quite stable two-hour/week gap in the average time men and women allocate to full-time employment is the most evident indicator of the higher onus on men in paid work (with well-known costs for women in unpaid work) (Wall et al. 2017). There are, however, other indicators that clearly assess the current conflict surrounding the construction of male identities and roles, such as ISSP 2012 Family and Changing Gender Roles findings suggest: on the one hand, men recognise that they should do more household tasks and more childcare than they actually do (Ramos, Atalaia and Cunha 2016). On the other hand, many men, especially those in family formation years, are aware of the negative effects associated with the obstacles in workplaces to their caring role as fathers, expressing their disagreement with the idea that “men’s take-up of parental leaves has positive effects in helping the father to keep his job” (Figure 13.5).
Other obstacles to a more far-reaching development of caring masculinities stem from the national legal order, as already mentioned. The leave policy advances towards the endorsement of the father’s right and duty to care for young children, culminated in the 2009 legislation that established the “initial parental leave”, ideally to be shared by both parents, as a further step towards gender equality and shared work-family reconciliation. Despite these progressive principles and guidelines in the law, the mother remained the main recipient of leave policy, not only due to the amount of time available for her, but also due to the fact that the father’s eligibility is dependent on the mother’s eligibility for the initial parental allowance (Cunha, Atalaia and Wall 2017; Rêgo 2012; Wall et al. 2017).

This constitutes a major setback for a broader understanding of men as primary caregivers, with equal entitlements and responsibilities in care work, and a handicap for men to negotiate in the workplace the legitimate right (and duty) to care for their children (or other dependent or sick family members).

Even if recent national research has been focused on male caregiving experiences in regard to dependent ascendants (Silva 2017), this domain of family care remains highly feminised (Wall et al. 2017).
Moreover, this legal bias echoes a powerful, persistent and long-ranging gender stereotype that is deep-rooted in society: the superior value of women’s care that blossoms out of female “nature” (Gaunt 2006). Indeed, if fathers have definitely made their way in childcare, and are acknowledging it, there is still a non-negligible proportion of men and women that see fathers as less competent or skilled caregivers of small children. Younger generations, though (as well as the most qualified individuals), are challenging the gender stereotype (Figure 13.6), most probably due to the experience of gender deconstruction processes that some couples have been through by sharing initial parental leave (Wall 2014; Wall, Cunha and Marinho forthcoming).

But the foremost objective obstacle that the legal order has set to caring masculinities development in Portuguese society, in the private sphere, concerns the massive retrenchment of the father’s role in children’s lives after divorce or separation. The post-divorce parenthood regulation (Law 61/2008, 31 October), which hosts the legal presumption of shared parental responsibility with maternal residence and paternal alimony and visitation, is sustained by the assumption that there are prescriptive gender roles for men

**Figure 13.6** Individuals who agree that the child suffers when the father does not take part in childcare and that the father is as capable as the mother, by sex and age group (%) – Portugal, 2014

![Bar chart showing the percentage of respondents agreeing with statements about the father's role in childcare and his capability compared to the mother, by sex and age group.](source: Wall et al. 2017 (Calculations based on data from issp 2012).)

and women in society: the men’s breadwinning role and the women’s caring role. This re-traditionalisation and re-genderisation of post-divorce families, undoubtedly in counter-cycle with most trends of family life, has heavy costs for men, women, and children (Marinho 2017; Marinho and Correia 2017; Marinho 2018). In line with Marinho’s statements, the white paper identified the costs of parenting after divorce for mothers and fathers: “An added ‘exclusive’ responsibility falls on women in day-to-day life, with a strong impact on their position in the labour market, in work-family reconciliation, in managing timetables and the economic well-being of their household. Men find that access to their children is severely constrained, through a system of visits which makes it impossible to share their day-to-day lives and to maintain the relational proximity (...) [and] responsibility ‘for the acts of day-to-day living’ of their children” (Wall et al. 2017, 52-53).

In the absence of better statistical information, the Censuses of 2001 and 2011 portrayed the evolution of lone-parent families with children below age 18. These families increased 48% in this period, largely as a result of the rise in divorce. In both years, lone-father families represented 11% of the total (Marinho 2014). So, the persistence of gender stereotypes in the realm of parenthood brings a drawback in men’s lives, as an increasing number of fathers are being disengaged and excluded from their children’s daily existence after divorce or separation in Portuguese society.

MEN AND SELF-CARE

WHITE PAPER recommendation:
To develop more in-depth studies on the impact of social inequalities on men’s health and undertake awareness campaigns based on the social determinants of men’s health. (Wall et al. 2017, 12)

In contrast to the privileges gathered in other spheres of life, men’s health problems and lack of well-being are regarded as costs of masculinity (Scambor et al. 2014). Although masculinity is not a fixed entity (Connell 1995), boys and men’s physical and emotional well-being have been affected by the social construction of gender (Prazeres et al. 2008; EC 2011). Men are socialised to be strong, independent and self-reliant, which implies physical toughness, risk-taking and heavy drinking. This hegemonic masculinity influences the way
boys and men relate to themselves, including to their body and sense of self-care. Following this line of reasoning, being sick is the opposite of what a man should be. Men shouldn’t be weak or, worse, reveal to others their weakness, whether physical or psychological. For that reason, men report less suffering from health problems during their lives than women (INE/INSA 2016), in particular chronic illnesses; but have more severe injuries and spend longer periods out of work due to health problems (Wall et al. 2017). In fact, men assess their health status more positively than women do: for every 100 women there were 112 men who stated they were in good or very good health (Wall et al. 2017). At the same time, men resort less to health services in a preventive way, in particular to medical appointments (both general or family practitioner and specialist), diagnosis, and screenings, but have a higher exposure to risk, including occupational risks. Men are major victims of mortal or disabling accidents in the workplace (Scambor et al. 2014) and are most frequently victims of violent deaths, such as suicide and road traffic accidents. This can be seen as a consequence, in men’s life course, of the adoption of risk behaviour and specific lifestyles profoundly related to the social construction of masculinity, such as higher alcohol and tobacco consumption, drug abuse, road accidents, deaths from suicide, deaths from HIV-AIDS or calorie food intake (Figure 13.7).

**Figure 13.7**

*Sex ratio in causes of death mainly affecting men (sex ratio > 200)*

– Portugal, 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cause of Death</th>
<th>Sex Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mental disturbances and behaviours due to alcohol use</td>
<td>1680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malignant tumour of the oesophagus</td>
<td>581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malignant tumour of the lip, mouth cavity and pharynx</td>
<td>531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport accidents</td>
<td>403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chronic illnesses of the liver</td>
<td>396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malignant tumour of the larynx, trachea, bronchus and lungs</td>
<td>392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human HIV-related illnesses</td>
<td>311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suicides and self-inflicted injuries</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malignant tumour of the bladder</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accidental poisoning by drugs, medications and biological substances</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malignant tumour of the liver and intra-hepatic biliary tract</td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuberculosis</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Wall et al. 2017 (Calculations based on data from INE/INSA, National Health Survey).
Indeed, some of the most alarming data in this domain refers to men’s premature mortality. Accordingly, although the average life expectancy at birth in Portugal has increased over the last decades for both sexes, statistics from 2014 show that men have on average a six-year lower life expectancy than women (INE/INSA 2016); and in 2015, male deaths exceeded female deaths in almost all age groups (Figure 13.8). This fact is particularly visible in the working ages (15-64 years), when the number of male deaths at least doubles female’s (sex ratio >= 200).

Men’s premature mortality deprives society from fathers, partners, sons, brothers, workers, work-colleagues and friends, affecting not only male economic sectors such as industry or construction, but also the social and financial positions of families, namely those in which men are the primary earners of family support (EC 2011).

Nevertheless, in Portugal, as elsewhere in Europe (EC 2011), men haven’t been targeted as a distinct population group in health care strategic planning, and men’s health remains relatively overlooked by public policy. In contrast,
why are caring masculinities so difficult to achieve?

women have been the target of specific programmes and measures since the 1974 Revolution, notably with regard to sexual and reproductive health. The massive use of hormonal contraception by Portuguese women has dismissed men from contraceptive surveillance, particularly in stable heterosexual partnerships. Accordingly, there is the perception, including among health professionals, that sexual and reproductive health doesn’t concern men. In fact, in the National Health Survey 2014 (INE/INSA 2016) questions on sexual and reproductive health were addressed to women only.

Improvements in men’s health conditions are mainly a result of EU directives on general health topics such as the end of tobacco consumption and the reduction of traffic accidents, largely associated with drugs and alcohol consumption. Nevertheless, men’s specific health status remains a serious concern in terms of public health that needs urgent attention. As stated in the EC Report, The State of Men’s Health in Europe: “In order to achieve the highest standard of health, health policies must recognise that women and men, owing to their biological differences and their gender behaviour, have different needs, obstacles and opportunities” (EC 2011, 25).

Differences in men’s and women’s health are partly explained by differences in the way men and women live their lives and attend to health and illness. At the same time, however, they are also the result of the conditions in which people grow up and work (EC 2011). In this sense, men’s health is due to: (i) biological sex differences between male and female; (ii) gender differences associated with the social construction of masculinity and femininity (which vary in time and across cultures); and (iii) social determinant impact, such as educational attainment, career, income level, conjugal status and place of residence (Antunes 2010, 2012; Carvalho, Mateus and Xavier 2016; Fernandes et al. 2012; Perelman, Fernandes and Mateus 2012; Santana et al. 2015). These factors seem to affect men’s access to health care, with direct implications on their health status and well-being. That’s probably why the above mentioned causes of male death are more frequent in men from disadvantaged social backgrounds, in which access to adequate medical care and the use of health services are more limited (Antunes 2010, 2012). From this point of view, men’s health “is not just an issue of gender equality but also a more fundamental equity issue, which is the right of all men to be able to live a long and fulfilling life” (EC 2011, 24).
CARING MASCULINITIES, AN INCIPIENT ENTERPRISE FULL OF OBSTACLES: CONCLUDING REMARKS ON THE NEED TO INCLUDE MEN IN THE REALM OF CARE WORK

[T]here is good reason to use the term ‘the extreme gender’ when referring to men. Men make up both the upper echelons and the lower strata of society. They are over-represented in the power forum, and yet they also top the statistics for violence, criminality and suicide. Eight out of ten pupils with serious behavioural problems in schools are boys. (Norwegian Ministry for Children and Equality 2009, 8)

The main aim of this chapter was to discuss and reflect on the obstacles to the consolidation of caring masculinities in Portuguese society. The theoretical approach framed the concept as a wide-ranging commitment of male identities and practices to care work and gender equality in public and private realms, along with non-conformity or compliance with dominant forms of masculinity and the intrinsic privileges of hegemonic masculinity (Elliot 2016; Scambor et al. 2013, 2014). Drawing on findings and recommendations of the white paper Men and Gender Equality in Portugal (Wall et al. 2017), on different dimensions of male care – socialisation for care, professional care, family care and self-care –, this all-inclusive perspective on caregiving and care work helps us to understand the uneasy path that men, and society as a whole, are slowly taking towards caring masculinities.

Indeed, there have been more assertive steps in parenting practices, identities and values, largely in response to challenging public policies that have been pushing men into early childcare. But in other domains of men’s lives, in their practices and identities as pupils, workers and in self-care, embodying caring masculinities remains an extremely incipient enterprise full of obstacles, lacking social and public visibility and awareness. The rationale for this state of affairs is threefold. Firstly, the “invisibility bespeaks its privilege” (Beasley 2008, 86), i.e. men’s likelihood to accept the benefits of their advantaged position in the labour market, as well as their likelihood to come and go in the realm of unpaid work: this is still “a choice for men but a moral and social imperative for women” (Elliot 2016, 254). Secondly, the invisibility results from the absence of reflexivity concerning the ubiquitous narrative on vocational choice in the educational system and in the labour market, notably men’s lack of calling for “pink-collar” professions. And thirdly, the invisibility is linked to the severe costs of masculinity for men.
and boys themselves in fields such as education and health. As if it was the inescapable price they have to pay just because they were born male; a destiny that they have to accept, just like women have to accept their biological calling (Almeida 2003).

Hereupon, gender stereotypes and their scripts for proper boyhood and manhood (Amâncio 1994, 2004), still in line with ground-rules of hegemonic masculinity (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005), remain deeply ingrained in all social strata. From families to schools, from labour market to health and policies, stereotypes are reproducing and legitimating prejudice and discrimination in different spheres of men’s and boys’ lives, by excluding them from the rewards of care work. The social and public neglect of the costs of masculinity for boys and men is even more detrimental as they are doubly cumulative in their lives, underpinning the “extreme gender” (Norwegian Ministry for Children and Equality 2009): costs are cumulative in an intersectional way. They are unevenly distributed among men according to a set of socio-demographic variables, with social contexts infusing different scripts for the display of masculinity. Costs are also cumulative over the life course, from boyhood to older ages, since the growing engagement in complicit masculinities narrows the opportunities of challenging hegemonic masculinity and embracing caring identities and practices (Wall et al. 2017).

By making the costs of masculinity for men visible, as well as the obstacles that hinder their greater commitment to the virtuous circle of gender equality and caring masculinities, it becomes clear that society as a whole is given the potential to change: “A reduction in the harmful costs of hegemonic masculinity can lead to benefits for men, including increased physical and psychological health, longer life expectancy, increased quality of social life, better family relationships, and reduced violence between men” (Elliot 2016, 247). Moreover, the reduction of these costs has obvious benefits for women and for children, but also for societies, as they have to pay heavy prices for the “sub-optimal outcomes” (Esping-Anderson 2009), i.e. the underdeveloped human potential and fulfilment, and, when extreme, the loss of human lives that gender inequalities encompass. Therefore, if it’s already acknowledged that gender equality cannot be accomplished without men’s commitment, women do not benefit from it alone. Men also do. As Scambor and colleagues (2014, 569) wisely claim, “Men need gender equality and gender equality needs men”.


However, achieving this societal desideratum entails overcoming ambivalence towards the rights and duties of men to care for others and for themselves. And this implies a full inclusion of men in the realm of care work: socialising boys and young men to caregiving practices and identities; improving the social value of care work, whether in the family or in the occupational field; and, ultimately, striking at “the heart of the stereotype.”\(^\text{10}\)

In other words, the powerful “conception that caring is a female attribute (…), [which] has kept women captive to their role as caregivers (to small children, but also, by virtue of the role itself, to other sick or dependent family members) and has kept men removed from these tasks” (Wall et al. 2017, 53), and, therefore, from the responsibilities and rewards of hands-on care. As this reflection has underlined, even if caring masculinities are making their way in the realm of parenting, men still have to cope with major obstacles to achieve “optimal outcomes” (Esping-Anderson 2009) in this sphere: the individual stereotypical dispositions resulting from socialisation; and the institutional settings, which frame daily existence (workplace, legal order), and resist embracing caring masculinities.

---

\(^{10}\) Maria do Céu da Cunha Rêgo, expert consultant on gender equality, Focus Experts (Wall et al. 2017, 51).
VANESSA CUNHA
Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa
vanessa.cunha@ics.ulisboa.pt
orcid.org/0000-0003-2576-3111

LEONOR BETTENCOURT RODRIGUES
Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa
leonor.rodrigues@ics.ulisboa.pt
orcid.org/0000-0002-3166-7655

RITA CORREIA
Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa
ritacorreia@ics.ulisboa.pt
orcid.org/0000-0002-2127-0355

SUSANA ATALAIA
Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa
susana.atalaia@ics.ulisboa.pt
orcid.org/0000-0002-7271-6062

KARIN WALL
Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa
karin.wall@ics.ulisboa.pt
orcid.org/0000-0002-6452-8352

REFERENCES


why are caring masculinities so difficult to achieve?


KANE, E. W. 2006. “’No way my boys are going to be like that!’ Parents’ responses to children’s gender non conformity”. Gender & Society, 20 (2): 149-176.


Why are caring masculinities so difficult to achieve? Reflections on men and gender equality in Portugal.

Trans masculinities: embodiments, performances and the materiality of gender in times of change

Sofia Aboim
Pedro Vasconcelos
Sara Merlini
INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the increased visibility of the category, transgender – or simply trans\(^1\) – has brought new challenges to light and, most importantly, led to the formation of a new lexicon for the naming of privilege and oppression (Boellstorf et al. 2014; Marciano 2014). While women and femininity remain subaltern in contemporary societies, the affirmation of the rights of gender minorities and the expansion of plural gender identities beyond normative definitions of hegemonic masculinity and femininity (Plummer 1996) can be seen as one of the most challenging forms of resistance to the limits imposed by binary systems of gender that oppose men and women.

At present, according to hegemonic principles of correspondence between “sex” and “gender”, those whose gendered bodies and minds are “in conformity” (cis-people)\(^2\) contrast with the unprivileged minority whose gender identity “contradicts” the sexed body each person is assigned at birth. If, in 1949, Simone de Beauvoir broke new ground when arguing that one is not born a woman, but rather becomes one, (de Beauvoir 1949) today embodying a gender seems a more complex process as new possibilities for naming oneself widen and gain increased recognition in the social and political realm. As Joe Biden, former USA vice-president, recently said, “transgender equality is the civil rights issue of our time” (The Independent 2017).

Against this backdrop, we argue that the categories for naming gender – whether femininity, masculinity or other forms of definition that reject or bend these binary terms – must be analysed and addressed from a critical standpoint. Stemming from the “transgender moment” of the early 1990s (Stryker 2014; Namaste 2005), the “gender revolution” of the present-day implies not only a characterisation of the forms of inclusion of an already large and varied gender minority – gathered under the prefix trans – but also

---

1 Trans people is a provisional umbrella term to name those who, in a variety of ways, challenge the naturalness of gender as emanating from the sexed codification of bodies, whether they are transsexual (both male to female, and female to male), transgender, transvestites and cross-dressers, “travestis” or other forms of gender variance, such as genderqueer, non-binary, gender fluid, androgynous, among other designations. In a nutshell, Trans is a wide-ranging designation that includes all individuals who do not identify with the gender they were assigned at birth. For an overview, see Stryker (2008).

2 The terms cisgender and cissexual are used to refer to individuals who identify with the sex/gender they were assigned at birth. Cisgender replaced the nowadays pejorative notion of “gender normals”, commonly used in the social sciences since Garfinkel (1967).
a reflection on how new names for affirming gender generate new oppositions and processes of exclusion.

However, working with growing axes of oppression and subalternity challenges us to dismantle hierarchies of privilege (being non-trans, white, western) that might obfuscate the prevalent inequality between the masculine and the feminine in favour of other differences that create new designations for redressing the traditional order of gender. Yet, while the current politics of trans-naming is vital (Aboim 2018), the materiality of gendered inequality cannot be ignored and reduced to one-dimensional oppositions. If the tangled web of gender diversity brings new challenges for interpreting privileges and oppressions (Connell 1987; Bourdieu 2001), we argue that inequalities between feminine and masculine also mark the internal divisions within the trans collective. For that reason, in this chapter we focus on the construction of masculinity enacted by trans individuals, seeking to address both the internal plurality of trans masculinities and the ways in which such apparent subaltern forms of “doing masculinity” (Cromwell 1999) might, even if unwillingly, benefit from the privilege historically associated with manhood when compared to the more evident exclusion and discrimination of trans femininities (Connell 2012).

Drawing on fieldwork with trans men in Portugal and the United Kingdom, two lines of argument will be developed. Firstly, from a theoretical standpoint, the importance of building bridges between different areas of critical gender studies, namely Critical Studies on Men and Masculinities (henceforth CSMM)

---

3 The sub-sample analysed in this chapter was drawn from a much larger empirical data-set created over the course of the past three years, aiming to compare five European countries from South to North: Portugal, France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Sweden. Until the mid of August 2018, nearly 160 in-depth interviews have been carried out with both trans people and healthcare practitioners alongside ethnographic work (ranging from political, medical and activist venues to street trans sex work), which is representative of yet another 40 cases. In addition, an extensive historical and document analysis has been done (including all major legal and social developments across the globe, including both the centres in the global north, such as the USA, and the global south) and media analysis is ongoing at a rapid pace, with the construction of a database containing more than 8,000 items published between 2014 and 2017. These data-sets enable us to reflect upon gender and citizenship by focusing on trans people (namely, transsexuals, transgender, crossdressers and other forms of gender identifications) as subjects whose recognition constitutes one of the most challenging boundaries for framing contemporary debates about human and gender rights. It also enables us to characterise the institutional apparatuses (whether legal, medical, political or even social-scientific) that frame trans lives. We interpret our empirical data as a privileged locus from which to investigate, at large, the doings of gender and gender politics.
and Trans Studies is advocated. Following Connell’s proposal (Connell 1987, 1995), it is suggested that redressing the conceptual premises of masculinity is a fundamental step to understand the plurality of trans embodiments, bodily materiality and the possibilities of doing masculinity without men (Prosser 1998).

Secondly, from an empirical angle, such a perspective will enable us to tackle masculinities by exploring trans men’s subjectivities and doings of gender. The stories of trans men might tell us more about what masculinity(ies) is(are). When not naturalised as emanating from the (pre-existing) body, what defines masculinity can become clearer. However, as will be put forward, masculinity cannot be understood without taking into account the materiality of bodies regardless of their diversity and transformations. In the end, when the meanings of masculinity and femininity are increasingly diffuse and changeable, the body resists, in spite of all changes, as an important focal point of gender performativity, whether self-recognised or, perhaps also very importantly, as perceived by others. If we live in a legal and political world where, despite regressive backlashes, the language of self-determination and degenderisation of the body is becoming unavoidable, the interactional and normative orders of gender resist when bodies and bodily performances are displayed under the public eye and interpreted in accordance with historically available categories. Hence, the relative privilege awarded to bodies and performances recognised as masculine.

In the section that follows, we argue in favour of a sociological analysis of trans masculinities that might bridge the gap between trans men and masculinity studies. In a second moment, we briefly explore trans men’s life stories and, while accounting for their empirical diversity, bodies and embodiment will be shown to be of paramount importance. Bodily capital (Wacquant 2004, 2005) emerged as a (if not the) central feature of masculinity. Finally, we contend

4 Regarding gender identity laws, we are, in fact, witnessing the emergence of principles of self-determination, autonomy and individual sovereignty in a number of national polities. Overall, these principles produce the individual’s right to legally define their legal gender identity/category in almost any circumstance, namely without prior medical control or interventions, and without the need for judicial authorisation. Such legal and political shifts can be found, for instance, in the gender identity laws of Argentina (2012), Denmark (2014), Ireland (2015), Malta (2015), Colombia (2015), Norway (2016), Bolivia (2016), Ecuador (2016) and Belgium (2017). In Portugal, the Assembly of the Republic put forward a new gender identity law along principles of self-determination. The law (Lei n.º 38/2018) has been in effect since August 7th 2018, after it was promulgated by the President of the Republic. For an analysis of these institutional changes, see Vasconcelos, 2018 (forthcoming).
that under the name Trans, processes of inclusion and exclusion are taking place, while offering a privileged lens to understand – from margins to centre – the workings of gender as a prevailing power mechanism of binarisation – or governance – of diversity, in which the gendered body is centre-stage (Foucault 1979).

TRANS MASCULINITIES AND MASCULINITY STUDIES: BRIDGING THE GAP

Critical Studies about Men and Masculinities (csmm) have often been perceived as mainly focusing on straight cisgender masculinities, leaving aside the masculinities of trans men (Green 2005). This is an excessive criticism insofar as heteronormativity has been harshly viewed as a discriminatory principle. Gay men have been under scrutiny, with many contributions exploring forms of masculinity other than the hegemonic (Connell 1995; Donaldson 1993; Whitehead 2002). However, it is true that transsexual and transgender men have been given less attention. On the one hand, trans men have been seen as located in a “no man’s land”: they seem neither relevant for transgressing the boundaries of male privilege, thus not contributing to changing the order of masculine domination, nor important to assess the trappings of that same male privilege.

On the other hand, trans men have also received less attention from trans-studies (Hausman 2001), when compared to their female counterparts. It is as if trans men have just been seen as wanting to “pass” and, for that reason, have been unnoticed. In addition, when the interest falls on the emancipatory potential of transgression as common in queer oriented studies, trans men can be easily put aside insofar as they bear the burden of reproducing male privilege and even hegemonic masculinity. For many feminist strands, they are betrayers of the cause. After all, they became men. For other key developments in LGBTQ+ scholarship, the tensions between the perceived subversive potential of lesbians – and particularly butch lesbians – and the alleged conformity of trans masculinities have contributed to maintaining trans men at the margins of the fields of gender and sexuality (Beasley 2005).

It is our contention that theoretical connections between different areas of gender critical studies should be fostered, not only as to avoid the ghettoisation and closure of perspectives but also because objects pertaining to particular
fields or sub-fields might inform developments in neighbouring areas of research. In this sense, though there are already a number of studies about trans men (Green 2005), not many have discussed the problem of masculinities as constructed by CSMM. We know that trans men’s masculinities may be seen as contingent (Blackwood 2009), defensive or constrained (Abelson 2014), hyper-masculine, women-hating and aspiring to the patriarchal hegemonic pattern (quite evident in trans exclusionary feminists; see Raymond 1979; and Jeffreys 2014) or, conversely, feminist (Hines 2002). However, regardless of all the plurality of masculinities enacted by trans men (and non-trans men), which has been portrayed in the studies of Devor (1997), Rubin (2003), Vidal-Ortiz (2002) or Green (2005), among others (Aboim 2016), there is still a gap to be bridged. The conceptual connections between CSMM and studies of trans men have yet to come of age. One example of such fruitful linkages has been the importance of Halberstam’s work on Female Masculinities (1998) for redressing debates around what men and masculinity really are. In particular, Connell’s (1995) theoretical edifice has suffered from criticisms that point out, following Halberstam, the problems of rigidly equating masculinity with men’s practices or even just men themselves.

It is possible to argue that by focusing on men rather than masculinities, we could perhaps more easily avoid the trap of reification, into which we can easily fall whenever we couple general principles of power with particular groupings of men. On the other hand, we could also be at risk of ignoring the plurality of men and masculinities, a plurality that makes it difficult to operate either with the notion of masculinities or the category of men. However, even if masculinities may be diverse and one single dominant form of masculinity is difficult to imagine (Jefferson, 2002), men remain at the centre of power. Brittan, who has approached masculinity from a poststructuralist standpoint, also makes an interesting point when considering this question (Brittan 1989, 2): “While it is apparent that styles of masculinity alter in relatively short time-spans, the substance of male power does not”, he states.

An additional difficulty therefore emerges whenever we aim to trace the main traits of masculinity, without really disposing of a conceptual apparatus that allows them to be identified in different contexts and historical settings. How should we look at the multiplicity of men and masculinities? Should we identify different groups a priori, only then to characterise their practices, which may in the end result in an array of subcategories of a major group,
or should we follow the reverse pathway? This is a difficult question, but its intricacy must not prevent us from asking it. In a way, Connell does not present us with a solution, and tends to juggle between a practice-based approach and certain a priori definitions of groupings, a problem that she recognises in the article co-authored with Messerschmidt in 2005 (see also Messerschmidt 2015).

In a way, masculinities may be more plural than men, but the inverse can also be true (Hearn 2004). The complex relationship between men and masculinities has served as the backdrop for a wide range of criticism of the notion of masculinity itself, based on the common acknowledgement that the lives of “real men” would have difficulty fitting into the model of a hegemonic masculinity. In accordance with the view of masculinity as practice, all forms of practice are constitutive of masculinity and it is through practice, from daily interaction to institutional frameworks, that masculinity comes to organise social life, upholding a patriarchal gender order. From this perspective, masculinity could certainly be defined as simultaneously practice, place and effect (Connell 1995). Individuals embody masculinity from a particular place, enact masculinity as it is embodied and live with the effects of the masculinity they contribute to reproducing and shaping at the interactional and structural levels of society. However, as proposed, the inverse connection can also be of analytical interest and perhaps more heuristic when it comes to avoiding falling into the trap of locations as the triggers of all practice. We can, provisionally, see location as the final destination – of a journey as in the case of trans men – and not necessarily as the beginning.

However, even if we argue in favour of making the connections between “place” and “practice” more flexible, or even inverting them, it is still theoretically useful to work with the distinction between masculinity and men. It is true that masculinity is what men do, in the sense West and Zimmerman (1987) gave to the notion of “doing gender” in and through interaction. Nevertheless, by holding to such a definition we may end up with the simple fact that masculinity and men (and femininity and women, for that matter) overlap, with two probable and opposite tautological outcomes: a situation of entrenchment into categorical (and potentially essentialist) definitions of men or, on the other hand, the dilution of the category of men.

The former assumption may generate reification and reductionism and lead us to see black men as performing black masculinity, gay men as enactors of gay masculinity, white men as bearers of the dominant white masculinity, and
so on. In this respect, the work of Judith/Jack Halberstam, *Female Masculinity* (1998), broke new ground and presented a challenging and compelling thesis that dissociates men from masculinity, while also fomenting the links between feminism and queer theory. Rather than assuming that white masculinity is foundational, Halberstam puts forward the significant proposition that it is possible to study masculinity without men. In fact, Halberstam concludes, masculinity is most complicated and transgressive when it is not tied to the male body, especially the straight, white male body. Bearing in mind the will “to make my own female masculinity plausible, credible, and real” (1998, xi), Halberstam argues that female masculinity – that she found among a variety of women from butch lesbians and tomboys to the drag kings she studied ethnographically – is not merely a perverse supplement to dominant configurations of gender. Rather, masculinity itself cannot be fully understood unless female masculinity is taken into account. Likewise, Connell and Messerschmidt (2005) also recognise that professional “bourgeois women” are nowadays appropriating masculinity.

In this line of reasoning, masculinity and men become different things, which is a compelling thesis. Masculinity is not, after all, what men do. Instead, norms and ideologies become more important, an idea which ultimately fits the Gramscian notion of hegemony (Gramsci 1979 [1947]) from which Connell drew her theorisation. Once again, however, we encounter the same problem. What ideologies are dominant in a given context and how are they related to and created by men’s practices?

An answer to this question can be found in poststructuralist approaches to masculinity, where discourses are power and the emphasis is placed upon the complexity and plasticity of masculinities, when defined as discursive practices (Wetherell and Edley 1999). Following Foucault, the embodying subject, as the centre of productive power, now becomes the key problem and object of theorisation. The main concern is placed on the plurality of meanings associated with the masculinity that men can manage, enact and assemble according to their interactional needs. Men cannot be conflated with masculinity insofar as there is no essential subject (Jefferson 2002; Wetherell and Edley 1999).

Debating such central problems and operating with such a perspective will enable us to tackle the definition of masculinity. By exploring trans men’s subjectivities and doings of gender, their transition stories, we might be able to bring a degree of clarity to Connell’s canonical definition of masculinity as
“simultaneously a place in gender relations, the practices through which men and women engage that place in gender, and the effects of these practices in bodily experience, personality and culture” (Connell 1995, 71).

DOING RESEARCH WITH TRANS PEOPLE

Our analysis builds upon the conceptual perplexities raised by the life stories and transitional journeys of trans men and individuals performing masculinity. In-depth interviews were carried out with a variety of trans men and masculine defined individuals along the spectrum of trans masculinities in Portugal and the United Kingdom. Some participants, especially in Portugal, self-defined as transsexual, while transgender is a more common term in the United Kingdom. Others, however, have also explicitly defined themselves as transgender, genderqueer, non-binary FtM, gender fluid or androgynous, among other designations. Only rarely was a single definition enough to account for gender identity across their life courses. For instance, categories such as cross-dresser or lesbian were often associated with former life stages.

In both countries, our samples can be seen as of convenience (Given 2008) as they were constructed with the aim of showcasing the diversity of trajectories and modes of self-definition gathered beneath the trans masculine umbrella. However, even if we cannot claim to know all processes of becoming trans masculine, we consider, notwithstanding, that we were able to achieve our initial purpose and, even, a considerable saturation of the most common processes. Our assumption is supported by the comparison with former studies in the field.

Participants were recruited by various means (personal contacts, participation in events, networks associated with trans rights organisations) and a snowball method was used. Ethical approval had been previously granted by the Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa and the European Research Council Executive Agency. Clearance was also given by the Portuguese National Commission for Data Protection. All participants were provided with detailed information about the aims and procedures of

5 For a comparative overview of legal frameworks and trans activism in Portugal and the United Kingdom, see Santos and Hines (2017).
the study and were cognisant that their participation was voluntary and could be withdrawn at any moment. All participants were aware of their right to skip any question they might feel uncomfortable with. The terms of confidentiality and use of the information gathered in the interview were outlined. It was made clear that results would be reported in such a way that no individual would be identifiable.

Privileging a narrative approach, in-depth interviews with 13 trans men and trans masculine individuals were then carried out in Portugal in 2015 and 2016. Participants’ ages ranged from 21 to 58 years old; 8 could be identified as FtM, 3 as FtM non-binary and 1 as non-binary FtX; 8 had legally changed their name and gender; 6 were actively involved in activism campaigns, support groups or movements – 4 of them affiliated to queer “radical” movements. Two of the interviewees were not Portuguese nationals and some lived/had lived in other countries raging from France, the UK or the Nordic countries.

In the United Kingdom, the same ethical protocols were followed. In total, 17 trans men and trans masculine individuals were interviewed in-depth in 2016. Participants’ ages ranged from 23 to 55 years old; 10 could be identified as FtM; 5 as FtM non-binary and 2 as non-binary FtX; 16 had legally changed their name and 10 of them also changed their gender in documents; 12 were actively involved in (LGBT) organisations, support groups and campaigns. One of the interviewees was not a British national.

In accordance with our ethical protocol, all individuals were given pseudonyms and, when relevant, potentially identifiable socio-demographic data or specific life events were omitted or slightly transformed without ever compromising the validity of participants’ stories and voices. For this reason, the stories here told, with full respect for each participant’s perspective and cooperation, and the pseudonyms chosen to name them in the first person cannot be associated with any individuals who by mere chance might have a similar name, characteristics and stories.

The depth of the information collected enabled us to draw a number of important conclusions, which are not empirically distant from those presented in studies such as Rubin’s (2003).
From our samples of trans men and trans masculine individuals in Portugal and the United Kingdom, we selected cases that portray three exemplary processes in the construction of masculinity. In our analysis, we emphasise more the cross-national similarities that were found when comparing Portugal and the United Kingdom, and opt, rather, to disentangle the diversity encountered within the spectrum of trans masculinities. From our perspective, under a common name, different stories and appropriations of a similar designation are accommodated, while translated into diverse definitions and constructions of a bodily masculinity.

The first process pertains to trans men who fit into and self-identify with the medical categorisation of transsexuality or, to be more exact, gender dysphoria (DSM-5 2013).6 Usually, these individuals are undergoing treatment aimed at a full bodily transition, including genital surgery, wishing to migrate from one gender (female at birth) to the other. The emphasis is clearly put on the desire to become a man who can be publicly recognised as a man, regardless of the years lived in a body perceived as female. Trans men refuse, in this case, any idea of “evil deceiving or make believing” (Bettcher 2007). Often declaring they were born in the wrong body, the emphasis is then placed on the transformation of the body, in a way that is akin to the definition of transsexuality put forward by Harry Benjamin in 1966.7 The wrong body

---

6 The DSM is a manual on mental disorders published by the American Psychiatric Association (APA). Despite the name change from earlier versions of transsexualism, Gender Dysphoria (GD) retains its classification as a mental disorder. In contrast, the ICD-International Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems (other relevant manual published by the World Health Organisation) is not limited to only mental disorders. In its eleventh revision dated from June 2018, ICD-11, the diagnosis of Gender Incongruence (GI) (corresponding to GD in DSM-5 terminology) was moved out of the section on mental disorders. Instead, it has been placed it in a separate section on Conditions Related to Sexual Health or Sexual and Gender Health. Placing GI in this section declassifies it as a mental disorder, while maintaining a diagnosis that will facilitate access to care through third party reimbursement, and could eventually lead to American Psychiatric Association (APA) also removing GD from the DSM.

7 In fact, the notion of transsexualism is older and deserves a brief note. In 1923, Hirschfeld introduced the (German) term “Transsexualismus” (after which David Oliver Cauldwell introduced...
narrative – which infers a desire for transition as normalisation according to the medicalisation process – has been used by a number of participants. The challenges are more related to medical practice and access to healthcare than to defying gender binaries as they were constructed. To some degree, there is still a genitalisation of gender, even if this is an over-simplification. Many cases show the entanglement of different discourses about the trans – but the medical construct has not disappeared.

This short definition is quite applicable to the case of Luis (33, Portuguese of African descent, 6th grade, construction worker, living in a Nordic country) and Daniel (26, Portuguese, white, bachelor’s degree, painter and decorator, living in the suburbs of Lisbon). Both define themselves as men and display the imageries and the hexis of the stereotypical straight working-class guy. Their processes of transition were quite different though. Daniel matches the canonical medical definition of transsexuality and had always felt trapped in the wrong body since he was a small child. His diagnosis was swift and unproblematic, as was hormonal treatment and mastectomy. Having now achieved a male bodily appearance and presenting a visible beard and masculine voice, his main problem is the lack of a penis, which he replaces using strap-ons. For him, full masculinity will be achieved when genital surgery is completed. He defines himself as a man, putting aside the term “transsexual”, which he feels as a temporary medical condition to be corrected. Luis shares the same desires and projects, even if he “discovered” his transsexuality much later in life, already in his late twenties. Having a past as a butch lesbian, he now wants to put aside that past and live fully as a man able to sexually penetrate his female partner.

When asked about masculinity, all that mattered for them was gaining a male body that could be seen as genuinely male and sexually functional. Masculinity is equated with bodily maleness in a very strong sense. What they feel is lacking cannot be solved by any performative strategy, but only by a reconstruction of the body itself. On the other hand, masculinity remains diffuse and permeated by a myriad of references. Certainly, the gains of masculinity are very welcomed: being perceived as a man allows them a

---

“transsexualism” and “transsexual” to English in 1949 and 1950). In 1969, Harry Benjamin claimed to have been the first to use the term “transsexual” in a public lecture, which he gave in December 1953. Benjamin went on to popularise the term in his 1966 book, *The Transsexual Phenomenon*, in which he described transsexual people on a scale (later called the “Benjamin scale”) of three levels of intensity: Transsexual (nonsurgical), Transsexual (moderate intensity), and Transsexual (high intensity).
share of what Connell terms the patriarchal dividend (Connell 1995). They feel empowered by masculinity and enjoy it, but without a complete bodily metamorphosis the transition is not complete and they are not men yet, so they say. Luis is quite clear about the problem. For now, he contends, he still sees himself as a transsexual, but in the future he will drop the word and will be just a man.

Although Barry (36, British, bachelor’s degree, artist and performer, living in the suburbs of London) does not use the term transsexual, he positions himself in a very similar way to the two Portuguese cases. Just like Luis, Barry wants to “fit in with other guys” and “be one of the guys”. Followed by medical doctors since age 18, he was 21 when he started the process of bodily transition. In the last 8/9 years, he has had about 20 operations and, despite the surgical complications, Barry persists in trying to reach the last phase of a phalloplasty – the surgical insertion of an erection device. Barry carries the bodily marks of his transition: a large scar on his arm and the often swollen hands as a consequence of the surgery. Nonetheless, for him physical pain and discomfort were and are worth it. For Barry, completing his body transition and being perceived as a “straight male” will finally get him “to the level of confidence and state of feeling comfortable”.

A NINE OUT OF TEN: ON THE AMBIVALENCE OF TRANS MASCULINITY

The second major process is of discursive ambivalence. Individuals tie the categories of the medical apparatus and those emanating from queer activism together (Corwin 2017), thus juggling with a degree of apparent incoherence between a few ideas about non-binary gender self-categorisation and canonical medical binary thinking. They use the word transsexual and transgender interchangeably (much more in the Portuguese case), but showing respect for trans medicine as their resort for comfort and guidance.

An exemplary case is that of António (26, Portuguese, bachelor’s degree, sales clerk). António has been struggling to get his transsexuality (“gender dysphoria”) diagnosis for the past five years. As he says, he is a “nine out of ten” in his own perception of what becoming a man means. He always felt uncomfortable as a girl, though he was not completely certain of his condition or desires. As a bisexual individual divided between medical knowledge and queer proposals for identity, he had found it difficult to make sense of himself. He now wants to be a man and has started hormonal treatment, a step that left
him extremely proud of his physical transformation. Each hair in his body is a victory and he says masculinity is growing on him. A penis is not mandatory as masculinity is not so dependent upon conventions of bodily maleness, but a masculine attire is key and a mastectomy is planned for the near future. António is not like the former trans men. He does not wish to forget or deny his previous self as a girl, but he feels closer to masculinity, and that, all in all, a quantum of bodily maleness is needed. Aside from the body, masculinity seems an obscure topic. He explicitly states that he will know what it means when his body is further transformed. António believes the body will play its part and teach him how to be a man. He feels like one, wants to be seen as one, but ultimately does not know what a man really is. Rejecting stereotypes, he waits for the revelation of an essence through the body.

Likewise, Sandy (49, British, bachelor’s degree, working part-time as a gender equality advisor) struggles with a stereotyped perception of himself. Subjectively embracing both what he sees as “traits” of masculinity and femininity as his own, he sees himself as re-defining “what masculinity actually means”. As he puts it:

All I can do now is do what I can as a guy, now, to break down the roots of those issues and that as well which I take to be toxic masculinity and that need for power and control which I will challenge and I’ll challenge other men about it and of course now they take that much more seriously.

Also divided between medical knowledge and activist terminology, Sandy feels more comfortable to be perceived as a man. He questions himself whether this has more to do with the improvement in his relationship with his body or the attainment of male privilege. As he states: “It’s hard to separate that stuff out. I have got no way of telling what that is and it’s probably a combination actually.” In relation to medical care and services, he does not see the need for psychiatrists to be the gatekeepers of gender recognition and voices his concern about medical power, considering the system to be “paternalistic”. Sandy considers that the use of psychiatric support should be a decision made by trans people, whose informed consent is sufficient. Yet, because he fitted the criteria, he has not experienced any sort of prejudice from clinicians. His biggest fear is, as he gets older, to become more vulnerable to maltreatment by medical and social care services if he chooses “not to have certain surgery” (namely, genital surgery).
A QUEER MIND AND THE TRANSGRESSIVE BODY: REDEFINING MANHOOD?

In contrast, the third process includes trans masculine individuals with a strong queer self-identification and rather critical of medical standards. At first glance, coherence seems achieved, though they also (not always but quite often) resort to medical treatment and ultimately desire a fair amount of bodily modification – an aspiration that might be seen as oscillating between the desire of transcending gender and the power of the prevailing gender binaries. Indeed, transgressing gender might not come as an easy task for some, even when they achieve a bodily hybridisation. However, even if in both Portugal and the United Kingdom a number of participants self-defined as non-binary, that is, neither man nor woman; a significant part embraced a journey of bodily masculinisation, which might create situations (even if experienced with discomfort) of “passing” in the eyes of others – an expression that we use only in replicating the voices of participants and not as our own.

Diniz (27, Portuguese, university student) defines himself as a non-binary genderqueer FtM individual, with a “pansexual” orientation. Affiliated to queer activism, he is a very active member of both an organic LGBTQ+ genderqueer organisation and also less structured discussion groups aimed at the critique of the binary gender order. Hence, he (the pronoun the participant prefers) rejects all he perceives as forms of gender conventionalism and binary categories. However, in spite of his critical position and political engagement, he sought for a medical diagnosis that enabled him to go ahead with legal procedures and some treatment. Unsurprisingly, the contradiction between his ideological positioning and the demands of the medical apparatus made it difficult for him to adjust to medical standards of transsexual/transgender diagnosis and healthcare. Such contradictions of the system mark all his discourse about his journey and present gender identity. Before starting medical procedures in Portugal, he spent some time in a Nordic country but, disappointed with the medical system, migrated to Belgium, where he got a diagnosis that enabled him to finally change his legal name in Portugal. In Portugal, he had access to hormonal treatment and a mastectomy, modifications that he is keen on sharing through social media.

In spite of his convictions, Diniz also acknowledges that he feels more like a man and wants to pursue further body modifications. If a penis is not mandatory, a male appearance is nonetheless fairly important. Juggling between his FtM identity and the queer canon, he finds it difficult to construct a non-binary
gender identity and tries to justify his choices as non-conventional in terms of gender. For him, masculinity is lived afar from any hegemonic connotation, as he emphasises.

Interestingly though, he seems quite aware of the recent privileges of masculinity and does not refuse them. Being seen as a man is better, he says. Diniz reflexively states the structural gains of being a man as deeply rooted in the mere fact of looking like one. Once again, and contrary to first impressions, the body gains ascendancy.

In the same vein, Ash (34, British, Master’s degree, self-employed) considers that his definition as “more towards the male end of the spectrum (...) largely stems from a physical thing for me more than anything else”. However, even if he clearly states that he does not “and never will identify as fully male”, the mere possibility of being perceived as female is very uncomfortable for him. Above all, rejecting femininity, Ash thinks of his body as a mix, which mirrors his self-defined gender identity as non-binary – a term he has come to use in the last five years.

The changes in Ash’s self-designation reflects the developments in terminology within the Trans community. An activist himself, Ash wants to raise awareness among the general population regarding trans’ claims and issues. Namely, the need to contest “traditional” medical narratives about trans people as well as the oppression that affects the trans population. He sees these public mediations as ways of countering the tendency to disregard some trans’ identities over others as normally endorsed by the media and even some trans people or groups. For him, the decreased visibility of non-binary people stems from a strong mediatised focus on physical transitions that omits the social, philosophical and psychological transitions, considered by Ash to be more difficult.

For Ash, his identity is not permanent. On the contrary, it fluctuated and fluctuates still within the “realm of the masculine”. He sees his future as open but, despite all doubts, does not vehemently reject the “route of surgery”. Ash thinks he will, most likely, not need genital surgery as hormones and chest surgery were just enough to make him happier. The feeling of bodily discrepancy was over after starting hormones, and now his body is “just functional for what I want it to be functional for, it does its job and it feels fine.” Ash believes he was confident enough to deal with doctors and use the system to his own benefit. Other than with the endocrinologist, Ash did not feel pressure to decide on genital surgery or perform his gender in a more masculine manner. Yet, he was initially denied chest surgery, got two appointments cancelled
and had to “fight” to be included in the system. Despite his struggles with the establishment, he narrates the whole process as relatively “simple” and sees the access to medical intervention as just a way “to change the physical side of things that I needed to change”.

Both Ash and Diniz are most often seen as masculine, as men. In spite of the refusal of the system, their transformed bodies, leaving aside all aspirations and ambivalences, generated a new gender location. And with the new location in the “land of masculinity” came a degree of privilege, even if unwanted. Recognition is, in fact (Fraser and Honneth 2003), a fundamental moment that cannot be dialectically separated from body materiality and the history of gender as a binary system of difference.

Nor can it be disassociated from certain forms of privilege that mould the present day dynamics of inclusion or exclusion. A key example that must be taken into consideration concerns violence. Transgender people experience multiple forms of violence (Valentine 2007). However, trans men’s and trans women’s experiences differ significantly. At the intersection of gender, race, ethnicity, nationality or class, the violence against transsexual, transgender and other gender non-conforming individuals is striking, with the acknowledged rates of homicide rising visibly. According to the Trans Murder Monitoring project conducted by Transgender Europe (tgeu), since 2008, nearly 2,000 trans people have been reported killed. These official numbers cover 64 countries and affect mainly trans women – 99 per cent of the reported victims – and sex workers – 65 per cent (tgeu 2015). This worldwide pattern is far from random and targets the most vulnerable segments of the trans population, coupling transphobia with the particular violence of femmephobia.

Moving from the macroscopic to the microscopic angle, the awareness of the privileges of masculinity, whether wanted or unwanted, are quite present in the discourse of trans men, even when they perform a non-binary form of masculinity at a distance from hegemonic gender normativity and even categories.

Diniz clearly states how being seen as a man generated a competitive advantage in the labour market:

Sometimes I apply for jobs, and I was looking for a job before changing my name. I have a LinkedIn profile, and the only thing I did was to change my name, my gender… I didn’t even change my picture, it’s very androgynous. And I noticed that if before I had only received one offer after a year and a half, from the moment I changed my name and my
gender, in a month I received two job offers. I was thinking: Wow, this is… It’s sad, very sad, because I’m the same person with the same qualifications. But now that I’ve changed my gender and name, employers come looking for me… [Laughs]

CONCLUSION

In spite of their significant differences, all these trans men/masculine individuals share one common feature, even if in different forms and degrees: the desire for a male bodily appearance. Even if a penis is not always necessary, a masculine appearance is key for most of them. Almost all participants were under hormonal treatment and the majority had also undergone mastectomies, which are narrated as a source of joy and accomplishment. If not all, most desire a degree of maleness, which often leads to being perceived as a man, even if there is no specific style or type of masculinity that overall prevails. Neither the macho nor the genderqueer imageries are dominant, though a quest for “recognition” is often mentioned, particularly when the topic is social interaction.

Interestingly though, the “recognition” of masculinity is not necessarily the same thing for any of them. In other words, while masculinity as ideology can have quite different meanings, being/becoming viewed as a man or as masculine ends up being defined through the materiality of the body, whether this was the plan or not. In sum, if masculinity encompasses a wide number of definitions, maleness (that is, bodily masculinity as “flesh”) seems quite monolithic. Styles and clothes vary, but what is beneath seems to need more stability as a key capital of masculinity. However, if masculinity can exist without stereotypical full bodily maleness, a certain degree of maleness seems to be a condition for masculinity to subsist and sediment over time. Therefore, perceptions of difference and of gender binaries appear much more tied to notions of bodily maleness than of masculinity. While that bodily maleness seems quite clear-cut, masculinity (as femininity) is quite fuzzy and hard to define.

Maybe the linkages between location, practice and effects as put forward by Connell are imprecise and overly conflated, at least for analytical purposes. In the case of trans men, we contend, there might be a conceptual inversion of this scheme, with bodies being more than an effect but rather a vital constituent of the location and, through embodiment, the core of all gender praxis, that is to say, practices can build up the location, including, in the case of trans men, the bodily location. Our perspective does not fall into a citational version of
masculinity inasmuch as materiality as phenomenology is ever-present. Doing masculinity cannot be reduced to a text, a recitation, or even to performative exaggeration as argued in some versions of queer contributions (Green 2007). It is rather that, and playing with Judith Butler’s (1993) famous title, *bodies matter*. Not only because they are canvas where stories are written and read, but also because they have a material reality, a shape defining self-perception and the perception of others.

Doing masculinity can take varied forms, but whatever its “doings”, it is through bodies that it gains a palpable form and becomes more than a mere disembodied discourse. Derridian citational iterability (Derrida 1988), which Butler (2004) takes as key for her performativity theory, cannot then be effective if we dismiss all the material dimensions of the body, without obviously falling into any form of essentialism or dismissing Connell’s contributions. After all, bodies are paramount and ultimate capitals of masculinity because they are interpreted through the historical and cultural lens of the gender order. Not because their value exists per se.

However, without bodily masculinities, the doings of masculinity fall short and tend to live theatrically, if ever, outside the apparent (but still potentially subversive) normality of everyday life. Also in line with Bourdieu’s views, there is no gender without locations, composing a field and market of struggles, or a gender order. Nonetheless, when a body – or even just a hexis – is transformed, there is a change in its location. It is this nuanced version of gender, and particularly of masculinity, that can be furthered by bringing trans men to the frontline of the analysis. In a way, we can argue that, conceptually, masculinity may precede men – being or becoming a man – but without men masculinity loses its bearings. It becomes no more than a masquerade; transgressive it may be (or not). Trans men then are men only to the extent that they are bodily perceived as men, navigating along their journeys between available categories and systems of categorisation. Nonetheless, as evident from the analysed cases, bodies do matter in a very material sense. In sum, neither Connell nor Halberstam are quite right. In the former’s case, we cannot say that men (the location) always precede masculinity. Masculinity makes the man. In the latter case, we can neither agree that female masculinities can be the equivalent of male masculinities.

Certainly, when not naturalised as emanating from the male body, what defines masculinity can become clearer. However, as put forward, masculinity cannot be understood without taking into account the materiality of bodies
regardless of their diversity and transformations. In the end, when the meanings of masculinity and femininity are increasingly diffuse and changeable, the body resists as the focal point of gender performativity, whether self-recognised or perceived by others.

Indeed, our research with trans men and trans masculine individuals in Portugal and the United Kingdom has shown that those performing masculinity (whether they self-define as men, FtM transsexuals, non-binary masculinised individuals or other) gained some advantages. The dividends that came with the fact of being perceived by others as men are acknowledged, even if they are unwanted or viewed with criticism (Schilt, 2010). That is not the case of trans women, regardless of their greater visibility in public spaces and the media. Gender matters, after all.

**ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

This chapter draws on data collected during the European Research Council funded project *TRANSRIGHTS: Gender citizenship and sexual rights in Europe: Transgender lives in transnational perspective* (transrightseurope.wordpress.com/). The project reflects only the views of the authors, and the European Union cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein. The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Research Council under the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013)/ERC grant agreement n.º 615594.

---

**SOFIA ABOIM**
Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa
Av. Prof. Aníbal Bettencourt 9 — 1600-036 Lisboa, Portugal
sofia.aboim@ics.ulisboa.pt
orcid.org/0000-0002-6605-8614

**PEDRO VASCONCELOS**
ISCTE-IUL, Instituto Universitário de Lisboa
Pedro.Vasconcelos@iscte-iul.pt
orcid.org/0000-0002-1806-1843

**SARA MERLINI**
Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa
merlini.sara@gmail.com
orcid.org/0000-0001-7729-1908
References


CITE THIS CHAPTER AS:
https://doi.org/10.31447/ics9789726715030.14
Family and kinship in the contemporary mobile world

Marzia Grassi
INTRODUCTION

The aim of this chapter is to reflect on mobility, family, and kinship between Africa and Europe. Mobility produces changes in institutions and in the life of individuals in different forms taking into account the social, historical, and cultural organisation, as well as the development level of the societies under analysis.

At the same time, if the family seems to remain a fundamental base for social organisation, we cannot find a universal definition of family accepted as a socio-anthropological concept. There are many reasons for this. First, the structural and functional organisation is different around the world; second, there is a big difference also in the forms of approaching and solving problems and conflicts inside the family; and finally, the different methods used by Sociologists, Anthropologists, and other researchers in studying this analytical unit make consensus difficult.

Despite the existence of increasingly restrictive migration policies, migratory flows from Africa to Europe continue to be significant. Individuals are often unable to move together with their family and live geographically separated from their family members. The migrant families arising from the migration of its members poses changing dynamics regarding conjugality and the care of children and older members of the family.

The economic and financial crisis that hit the so-called more developed countries has changed the reasons for people moving from one country to another and changed the direction of human mobility. In the younger generations, time outside the country of origin not only appears diversified but also no longer seems an exceptional period in which the luggage that an individual brings is binding or impedes new experiences. The period of migration is increasingly perceived as a period of “stand by”, intended to be experienced through other forms of living, working and socialising. Temporary mobility can lead to susceptibility to the rupture of common sense – this is to think and feel about human mobility as a social fact in Durkheim’s sense. People move for many reasons; the new mobility has sometimes little or nothing to do with the economic migrations studied by the sociology of classical migrations. There is also a kind of immobility some face through different kinds of crisis around the globe, depending on material means to move around.

Studying social change in family relationships and comparing cultural dynamics and geographical and political contexts with the mobility
approach contributes to understanding the dynamics of social insertion or marginalisation of family members defined by their gender, social category, and ethnicity in an intersectional way. Besides, this approach allows the mobile family to be understood as an organisational concept of contemporary multicultural society.

The empirical case studies referred to in this paper have to be seen as a contribution to the debate on the differences between migration and mobility as operative concepts when studying the changes in conjugality, parenting and care. Through these empirical cases, it is possible to question not only the role of the culture in the organisation of the family but, mostly, the effects of the family at distance on exclusion from or inclusion in the access to resources of the members of the family.

After summing up the state of the art and methodology of this research programme, I will summarise the discussion of a consistent and contextualised database on family, mobility, and kinship dynamics (conjugality, parenthood and care) in the national/transnational mobile spaces between Angola, Cape Verde, and Portugal.

All the research projects referred to in this paper have been conducted in collaboration with a team of junior researchers and are part of a wider research programme and research led training of the “Transnational Lives, Mobility and Gender” Research Group that has been active since 2010 in the scope of a network with the same name, under my coordination at ics-ulisboa (see: www.tlnetwork.ics.ul.pt). The research group is part of the Life course, Inequality & Solidarity: Practices and Policies Research Laboratory.

FAMILY, MIGRATION, AND MOBILITY

An important conceptual distinction exists between the migratory phenomenon, and mobility even if, according to some authors, mobility includes not only longstanding migration but also long-time territorial movement, with all of them having almost exclusively economic reasons (Peixoto 2001). Perhaps the insistence on circumscribing the phenomenon to this definition of migration does not help the understanding of contemporary transnational mobility. In my opinion this approach, as well as the sole postcolonial approach to the analysis of migration from PALOP in Portugal, is responsible for the almost absent debate in the Portuguese academy on the difference between migration
and mobility, in particular when the flows are between the former Portuguese colonies and Portugal.

According to some authors, the term “migration” seems to suffer from two critical problems. First, it has developed into a pejorative term with a range of negative connotations that tend to associate movement with criminal activity and sees most movers as risky, questionable people. Second, and more importantly, migration does not fully capture the dynamic nature of human mobility (Cohen and Sirkeci 2011; Grassi 2006). Many authors also agree that migration has to be studied as a “process” set in motion through journeys back and forth, and often with no clear end (Vertovec 2007).

Contemporary mobility captures this variability. People move for many reasons and cross international borders not only and always for strictly economic reasons but also for cultural, ecological, political and religious ones. Individuals and their families have the right to move to achieve their goals; but to be able to move, some individuals have restrictions and cannot support the costs that moving from one place to another implies at many levels. Furthermore, it is important to remember that the majority of people in the world never move. According to Jeffrey H. Cohen and Ibrahim Sirkeci, in the contemporary world “only a tiny fraction, that is 3% of people live in a country other than the one in which they were born. (…) Only those who are able, capable and resourceful move. Mobility is about ability despite the fact that many people face challenges at home and our debate should focus on how best we can enhance the strengths of movers, potential movers and non-movers rather than demagoguery and fear” (Cohen and Sirkeci 2001, 2).

In migration studies, as well as in media and politics discourse, the majority of authors define immigration as a problem. The performative potential of the discourse in the literature of migration studies and its influence on the policy proposals is the main reason why it is important to change the language and the way to study human mobility. Social and financial remittances are just a result of the mobility that has contributed to human development throughout the world (Ostaijen 2017).

Since the 90s, research has addressed the lives of migrants with regard to either their country of origin or their country of destination, and has focused mostly on changes to the individual and/or their family in the medium term. Other targets of research have been institutions (Lubkemann 2008), paths to development, and the redefinition of feelings of belonging to the multiple
“homes”, not only from the geographical point of view (Grassi 2010; Vivet 2010), but also the spiritual (Levy 2002) and cultural ones (Appadurai 2006).

Scholars agree that the transnational lives of migrants demand constant reformulation of the sense of belonging as a meaning for the places where they live, work, and organise their family life.

The research on changes in family studies, which has targeted gender issues as important to understand inclusion/exclusion of individuals from resources, mostly stresses the vulnerability of women in relation to men, even if there is emerging research on masculinity that often refers only to western world settings (Pina-Cabral 2010). Therefore, the position of the actors explains the normative challenge posed in restoring through this framework. As contemporary studies have shown, the restoration of ethnographic techniques to contemporary sociology is crucial in identifying the indicator of the ongoing social change and may be achieved through references to theories put forward by the Chicago School (Sassen 2001; Vianello 2006).

If we are minded to de-colonise the interpretation of data on race, gender, and generation, mostly still nodding to luso-tropical definitions, in understanding contemporary social change in the geographical contexts referred to in this paper, the results of my research point to the potential of intersectionality between the postcolonial theory framework, the transnational and global approach, and methodological contributions also not limited to normative disciplinary models, with the comparison being a crucial tool for the data analysis (Grassi 2017, 15-23).

PARENTHOOD AND THE MOBILE FAMILY

The term “parenthood” was not very common until the 1980s, when many researchers started to study the process of transition towards parenting – mainly with regard to women. The term arose in the 1950s in the USA (Erikson 1950) in studies on severe psychiatric pathologies, “puerperal psychosis”, in order to emphasise that the concept of parenting refers to a complex process involving conscious and unconscious levels of mental functioning.

It is only recently that there have been studies on fatherhood, in the juridical institutionalisation of parental responsibility in the case of separation or divorce of the parents, mostly in Western societies.
When one of the parents is geographically separated from their children because of migration to another country or another city, it seems even more necessary to reflect on the difference between the subjective experience of parenthood, the exercise of parental power, and on its practices.

According to Palkovitz et al. (2002, 2), “people who become parents and are involved in the raising of children are transformed and follow a different developmental trajectory from people who do not engage in parenting roles.”

Erikson (1950, 130) suggested that “positive adult development reflects care for the next generation, or “generativity,” and that parenthood is “the first, and for many, the prime generative encounter”. Parenthood has been described as a necessary but not sufficient condition for the achievement of generativity (Snarey, et al. 1987). More recently, sociologists and psychologists have considered forms of child-rearing and the ways that these forms profoundly affect the lives of parents at many levels.

Using ethnographic analysis, anthropologists reveal the subtle dynamics that shape children’s socialisation to advance understanding of how cultural ideologies guide mothers’ behaviour, reconsidering existing developmental theory on discipline (see Rae-Espinoza 2010, on mothering, children, socialisation, and practices in Ecuador). In migration studies, most authors have also focused on motherhood (see for example, Gervais et al. 2009). Transnational migration studies report research on the separation of children and parents (Parreñas 2005; Suárez-Orozco and Suárez-Orozco 2001), but research on parenthood is also mostly focused on motherhood, and most of the authors in this area (Hondagneu-Sotelo and Ernestine 1997; Schmalzbauer 2004; Yepez 2011; Zontini 2004; Tolstokorova 2010) assume the primacy of the ethnocentric representations of gender roles inside the family. On the other hand, more recent works on fathering at a distance (Nobles 2011; Parreñas 2005) also question the father’s role and involvement in the children’s education. These studies reveal a growing interest in the father-focused perspective.

The first of the three axes of the concept of parenting (exercise of parenthood; experience, and practice) (Erikson 1950) refers to the exercise of a right in its legal sense, a domain that transcends individual subjectivity and its behaviour. The rights and duties lie in each individual kinship tie.

The definition of kinship exists in all societies precisely to individualise the organised groups to which each member belongs and by which they are governed by rules of transmission (Erikson 1950, 48). The rules (membership, alliance, affiliation) imply rights and obligations and provide a social space in
which each person may develop, but at the price of some constraint. From the structuralist perspective of Levi Strauss, the elementary structures of kinship in traditional societies determine marriage choices. In modern societies, legal aspects of kinship and affiliation determine the exercise of parenthood. Are we witnessing a weakening of the evolution of symbolic legislation that can lose its central role in organising society?

The dynamics resulting from cultures facing each other change when the site of observation alters and when engaging in a comparison of different contexts. Wide variation in patterns of fathers’ involvement after migration suggests an absence of clear rules about fathers’ responsibilities. In previous works, we have sought to understand long-distance fatherhood and the father-child relationships in transnational families. For example, it is pertinent to discuss the division of parental duties based on established gender roles (mother as caregiver and father as bread-winner) and how they are reconstructed in the long-distance context. Relational reconfigurations induced by absence are not always expected or controlled, as roles change within the family (Grassi and Ferreira 2016; Grassi Vivet and Marinho 2016; Nobles 2011) and considering that parenthood is a gendered process that adopts specific contextualised characteristics in mobile families between Africa and Europe.

GENDER IN THE MOBILE FAMILY

Migrant experiences derive from differentiation revolving around the gender function and producing differing propensities to migration, as well as different results between men and women (Boyd 2004). The first studies appearing on migrant women as actors visibly autonomous of males (Morokvasic 1983) and on female migratory flows (Kofman et al. 2000) were particularly focused on case studies in which there was a majority of women and did not yet set out a conceptual framework on female migration (Carling 2005, 4). The first consistent analysis of gender (Chant and Radcliffe 1992) highlights that thus far studies on women and migration have restricted their scope to establishing the statistical differences between the sexes in migratory flows without ever substantively analysing differences in terms of gender (Grassi 2015). These authors’ research findings on gender and migration pointed to examples of a cross-disciplinary space in which it is possible to interchange the differing insights of each field on this theme. The majority of studies on migration and
development seem to reflect the conceptual point of view that attributes a subject status to women following male forms of conduct (Carling 2005).

Data collected thus far suggests that when men decide to emigrate alone, they rarely leave without the agreement of the partner that they leave behind. In their memories and wishes, such moods remain present, and are transformed by the cultural role into worries about the life strategies for the partner left behind. African countries are specific in terms of gender role organisation in the family and in society (Grassi 2003, 2007). In Portuguese African studies, patriarchal versions of African societies are the most current, and gender power relations are taken for granted even if hierarchies of age (seniority, relational) are often mentioned as more significant than hierarchies of gender (Oyeronke 2001, 48; Arnfred 2007).

Also in Portuguese African studies, gender approach has been frequently concentrated on women (Grassi 2003, 2006, 2007; Andall 1999) with some stimulating exceptions showing that men’s studies on African countries mostly reflect power questions focused on black men’s political control (Arnfred 2007).

In a “mobile family” approach, male studies lack research into constructions of masculinity. It is crucial to look at the changes inside the conjugal and parental relationship to understand how the construction process of masculinity is renegotiated between man and woman in transnational migration and how the social reproduction “in motion” works in the context under analysis. Critical studies of men (Kimmel 2005) stress that it is impossible to fully understand masculinity without considering its connection with family change and women’s change, as well as without men’s practices and discourses in their relationships with changing femininities.

Anyway, gender maintains its pertinence in understanding an individual’s culture in that it is tied to the position that women and men take in a family structure in a particular culture deriving from the greater or lesser degree of responsibility attributed to them for sustaining and reproducing the family. Hence, stating that migratory flows diversify according to the variable of migrant gender implies the existence of inequalities stretching over the entire migratory experience, right from departure from one’s own country through to arrival in the host community and the experiences encountered there. Asymmetries in power between men and women produce differences in the organisation of migrant lives and permeate through social institutions, the family, economy, and politics. Gender inequalities leading to gendered
disadvantages in the destination countries of migratory trajectories may be linked to exploitation and recruitment into illegal trafficking networks.

The origins of migration lie in a practice that, in many cases, emerges out of a family history of geographical relocation as a potential option, already tried by others, discussed and held up as a cause for celebration. Studies on migrant women carried out thus far in Portugal (Grassi 2003, 2007, 2015; Hellerman 2005; Peixoto 2006) report that women carry the responsibility for maintaining links with the country of origin, influencing the behaviour inside their social relationships in Portugal and questioning the bread-winner role of man in the family.

**METHODOLOGICAL REMARKS**

The methodology for studying a complex thematic has a strong comparative potential in all the case studies presented here. As I have already stressed, the goal is to capture the different ways in which individuals identify and negotiate across power relations, their conjugality and parenthood structuring the contemporary mobile context of the family. This can only be achieved through comparison between different contexts. Mobility and family relationships at distance can be compared, giving central importance to the collection of data based on different pathways: multiple locations; multiple types of mobility (national and transnational both past and present); multiple family cultures (European and African); multiple places (host, transit and destination countries); combination of qualitative and quantitative techniques.

Multi-sited methodology aims to contribute to an epistemological shift in migration, mobility and family studies. Earlier research on transnationalism and migrations from African regions (Grassi 2003, 2007, 2010; Vivet 2010) points to gender, and family differences affecting migration in the source societies. The collection of data in all the countries involved by the migratory flows considered in such research fills the gap in global migration studies of qualitative information in the countries of origin, and transit of migratory flows.

The relevance of the comparison of ethnographic collection of contextualised indicators has to be stressed and identified as a crucial methodological framework carrying epistemological consequences. This methodology allows for the marking of visible specificities of the construction and negotiation
of individuals sharing space, resources, and affectivities in the globalised contemporary world. The understanding of social change induced in the institutions that organise contemporary societies can only be done by giving voice to the people who lead it and propose other organisational and even affective categories that define the contemporary family.

Let's go through the data with some examples.

**PARENTHOOD AND CARE OF CHILDREN IN THE ANGOLA/PORTUGAL MOBILE SPACE**

The research project discussed in this paragraph is an Angola/Portugal case study which is part of a European Consortium and project including four case studies. Each combined case study is composed of a pair of countries: a European country, where a part of the family resides and the migrants’ African country of origin. These are: Angola/Portugal; Angola/the Netherlands; Nigeria/Ireland; Ghana/Netherlands. Particular emphasis was placed on the methodological challenges presented by the transnational approach. On the one hand, some relevant aspects that emerge from the different “family” cultures that determine the representation of care in child rearing in different ways are discussed. On the other hand, how the “children” belonging to transnational families are not covered by the Portuguese laws governing their reception is discussed: the regulation that exists only covers “children at risk”.

The case study focuses on one aspect of family relationships both in the European and in the African country and brings a transnational perspective to the study of contemporary transnational mobility. The analysis presented here has emphasised the characteristics and repercussions of the children and caregivers’ lives in the migrants’ country of origin, as well as the migrating parent’s impact on their destination.

The transnational Angola – Portugal context is replete with contacts between peoples and nations covering the pre-colonial, colonial, and the post-colonial period. Although in different ways, the domination relations between the two countries in the various periods have the contact between individuals

---

favoured by human mobility in common. This is expressed in different forms according to the historical period and has favoured the knowledge and a certain affinity between cultures and the forms of organisation of the societies influencing each other.

When migration flows from Africa to Europe began to be discussed and studied in the 1990s, migratory flows between Angola and Portugal already had a relevant expression in this European country, conferring peculiar characteristics that still distinguish them from other flows from Africa to the European continent. This specificity has clearly emerged in comparison with the other migratory flows referred to above pointing to historically very important migratory patterns.

The dismantling of Angolan families and their organisation at a distance implies a very difficult picture to study because of the multiple causes of the migratory movement between the two countries, among which the long period of war had a significant role.

The war affected most areas of Angolan society and was the engine of several social changes. The urbanisation of the capital city, Luanda, saw steep population growth, the adaptation of distinct economic survival strategies and family disintegration due to the deaths, flight, mismatch and forced migration of family members. Lack of economic resources and goods and services, however, did not dissipate solidarity (although in the city it appears less intense than in rural areas). The informal reception of children is a common parental practice in Angola, which is based on cultural traditions. As a goal, this practice has the reinforcement of family ties or the creation of other (and new) ties, and it is also often a measure to provide education and training for the child, compensating for the economic limitations of the country and the parents. During the period of armed conflict, this solidarity was quite commonly shown with orphans.

Despite the importance of informal reception in Angolan society due to transnational migration and cultural reasons, this is also a consequence of changes in the family structure (the high number of divorces and separations). Nowadays, in Luanda new loving relationships between parents and divorces are the most common reasons for children to be in informal care. However, the decision to “turn in” their children, hoping that they can “grow up” is influenced by the socioeconomic level of the families. It can then be concluded that the family plays a central role in the informal reception of children in Angola, with the other parent or grandparents taking care of them when the parents separate for the various reasons mentioned above.
On the other hand, it can be said that in Portugal the information collected in this project through interviews with Angolan migrant parents points to a very complex image of the mobile family of Angolan origin. Even when we can highlight similar dynamics of family organisation with the family in Portugal, if we look more closely, there are small differences that become evident and that resemble patchwork (Grassi and Vivet 2015b). For example, it is important to emphasise the importance of parents’ conjugal status to understand the dynamics of transnational parenting and the reformulation of gender roles in the exercise of parenting.

In our case study, transnational care has strong connotations and gender differences. The overwhelming majority of migrant parents with children in Angola are men and only 20% of all parents are women. Contrary to the traditional image of the transnational family, where the father assumes the role of a “breadwinner” (Barou 2001), in our sample there are very few couples in this situation. On the contrary, a high proportion of families with the migrant father in Portugal have children both in Angola and Portugal, with the father no longer having a marital relationship with the mother of his child. As we have seen, in most cases, care for children in Angola is carried out by biological mothers (73%). The transnational agreements in the families of our sample last more than 10 years and there are relatively few cases of family reunification, all of them initiated in the cases that migrate by the mother of the child. Most of the migrant parents in our sample do not intend to take their children to Portugal because they do not have sufficient resources, have low-paid jobs, are in a relationship with another person and also because their children have always lived with their own mother in Angola.

One of the project research questions aims to understand the effects of transnational parenting on the life chances of parents – (defined in our project as work performance, health conditions and emotional well-being). The results published in (Mazzucato et al 2015) show that in the Angola/Portugal case, there is a significant correlation between being a transnational parent and their life chances, related to performance at work, but especially to mental and emotional well-being.

Regarding performance at work, it is observed that on the one hand, respondents are more likely to have lower levels of monthly family income and to work more hours per week than those interviewed with their children in Portugal. On the other hand, the level of unemployment of migrants with children in Angola compared to the same level of migrants without children
in the country of origin does not show significant differences. In addition, there is no statistical difference between the educational level attained and the type of transnational family.

As for emotional well-being, one can usually argue that being a transnational parent could negatively affect one’s mental well-being and happiness. The literature usually refers to discomfort with and emotional distance from their father/child, and when they are the migrating mother, children complain more often about feelings of abandonment (Parreñas 2005, 69).

In general, it can be said that in our context raising children at a distance results in poor relationships between parents and children. The key informants interviewed also underline a certain degree of family disruption and state that communication is extolled as a way of accompanying the child.

Regarding the effects on children, the distance of the migrant parents is mainly felt as moments of sadness although they do not mention any negative effect of their parents’ absence on school performance or their health.

The reflection we present here in our case study is a starting point to understand the repercussion of mobility in the family and we can affirm that the analysis of the data that we have collected through the survey of parents, children and caregivers points to the existence of different types of Angolan transnational families in Portugal. We have found few cases in which the transnational family consisted of mothers whose children were in Angola – and when this happens, they are short-term migrants who maintain close contact with their children and claim to have good relations with the person looking after them. They also claim they want to return to Angola to regroup with their children.

Although we may highlight similar dynamics in family organisation, a closer look at the data collected in Portugal reveals small differences that become evident, for example, in highlighting the importance of the parents’ conjugal status in understanding the transnational paternity dynamics and the gender roles.

CONJUGALITY AT DISTANCE

The case study on conjugality at distance in the geographical area of Angola/Portugal gives an account of the conjugal relations of the migrant men who lead the reactivation of an old migratory flow that, in the same space, has
existed for many decades, compared to the inverse flow from Portugal to Angola that has recently seen many Portuguese migrating to this country to work. Although the data that supports this cannot be generalised, it does show some of the trends and dynamics of the two migratory flows.

As previously seen, the existence of transnational families between Angola and Portugal is not recent and has been changing according to the historical periods and the political and economic dynamics of both countries in a context in which the historical links between the two countries persist. The oldest migratory flow from Angola to Portugal has led to the existence of family, and friendship networks that overlap with the emerging networks of new flows from Portugal to Angola and follow the market dynamics. In this scenario, the North-South paradigm is challenged by the transnational division of labour that means rethinking the concept of development, while in the collective memory the perceptions and representations of the colonial memory between the two countries persist.

The results of the project “Places and belongings: conjugality between Angola and Portugal” show the necessity to avoid cultural essentialisms, and points out a difference in the representations of the two groups related to the representations of the conjugal institution, which still persists in both migratory flows, a reproduction of colonial memory gender role stereotypes of the couple and the family (Grassi and Ferreira 2016).

Transnational partnership creates changes in couples’ relationships, and gender norms, roles and responsibilities are (re) formulated and (re) negotiated. Both spouses work to manage their daily routines and adapt to new rules and priorities aimed at maintaining a transnational familiarity (Pribilsky 2004).

Both flows also highlighted the importance of ICT in maintaining family ties and how technologies allow social spaces of family life at distance and minimise the impact of distance in space and time. The family is reinvented and thus becomes a shared social space, highlighting, once again, its genesis of active process in continuous change, a product of human interaction.

Social and economic inequalities often determine the frequency and intensity of family relationships at a distance. In the case of the two flows between Angola and Portugal, the economic situation and working conditions of the Portuguese in Angola allow them to maintain transnational practices with their relatives in the country of origin with a greater frequency and intensity: almost regular virtual contacts daily through the use of the Internet; physical contact through frequent visits to Portugal; and regular shipment of remittances.
For the Portuguese migrants in Angola, love and marriage implied fidelity and absence of extra-partner (principal partner) sexual relations. Many of those interviewed also show an attachment to the stereotype of the black African woman of the colonial memory, as well as the associated gender roles. The same is not seen among the Angolans in Portugal, who reveal much greater pragmatism regarding sexual behaviour, while simultaneously confirming the cultural importance of marriage and family in society. Without doubt, it can be concluded that the stereotypes about the conjugal-pair and family gender roles going back to the colonial memory survive in both of the migration flows.

Still, in a broader sense, can be affirmed that transnational conjugality is a contributing factor in the transformation of relations in the conjugal couple, which at a distance are creating a new space for the empowerment of the women who do not migrate, regardless of the direction of the flow. The reversal of flows—from Portugal to Angola—is more recent, and provides us with only a hint of what is happening in the lives of individuals moving between the two countries—and of changes that invite our continued attention.

Globalisation and migration thus pose new challenges for the understanding of conjugal and family life from a holistic perspective, which makes us question the classic units of analysis used in research on living conditions and trans-border dynamics.

The family dynamics of couples living geographically separated cannot, therefore, be studied separately, only in the country of migration or in the country of origin. Only in this way is it possible to understand the processes occurring beyond the boundaries of the nation-state and recognise that family life can be presented in various social and geographical spaces (Faist, 2006): that the comparison between the flows is an effective method for the perception of the contemporary mobility.

THE FAMILY IN THE “CAPE VERDE-PORTUGAL” SPACE

The reflections in this paragraph are related to an exploratory study carried out over the last year regarding a new project that is still awaiting financial support to be completed. With various background projects in Cape Verde and its diaspora², this project’s lines are here summarised.

² See, in particular, Grassi (2003; 2006; 2009).
Looking to mobility and families, and given the geographical separation between parents and children in contemporary mobility between Cape Verde and Portugal, it has to be considered that kinship in this space is not synonymous with consanguinity. Kinship reflects a broader concept than in European contexts, and migrant parents have to negotiate their parental role, considering that parenthood does not have the same meaning in Cape Verde and in Portugal. This process of negotiation can be very hard to manage for immigrant parents in dealing with the specificity of family and mobility in this African archipelago and in Portugal.

Parenthood in Cape Verdean society has a very strong symbolic weight for both women and men. This remains true despite recognising that the father is not in a conjugal relationship with the child’s mother, and lives in another place. It does not imply a genuine fatherhood experience in terms of practices. The emotional distress related to parents living at a distance has, therefore, to be understood in this context. Scholars working on parenting and caring at a distance believe that maintaining intimate relationships in transnational families depends on various care practices involving the circulation of objects, values, and persons; and that care practices are structured by geographical distance where the distinction between overseas and overland separation is significant (Leifsen and Tymczuk 2012). In this case, the most important difference can be the type of care that the transnational migrant male parent uses to cultivate the relationship(s) with his children (care at a distance moves through formal and less formal market channels, such as international communication technologies, remittance companies, and transport facilitators, at least in the case of middle and upper class families).

Taking into account the actual situation of the child and the family partners, as well as the symbolic dimension of parenting and affiliation to which the child adheres whenever there is parental failure, we can affirm that families continue to be the child’s enrolment place in a genealogy and filiation. It is the place where identity is constructed, and where differences arising from otherness, gender and generation are confronted.

Mobile fathers and mothers are active subjects and both identify challenges regarding the exercise of their parental roles. The roles of both women and men are culturally expected and are also constructed in the society to which they migrate. In this sense, transnational fathers who have their children cared for by their mothers in the country of origin, “appear less focused on
challenges related to the care of their children and problems back home, and were more focused on work and wages” (Avila 2008, 169).

Furthermore, in the Cape Verdan context, long separations between biological mothers or fathers and young children are socially constructed as a normal aspect of transnational lives: “they are a painful necessity, but are not automatically assumed to be traumatic. In an ideal situation, when the mother is the migrant parent, the biological mother and the foster mother play complementary roles in what some authors describe as the transnational fostering triangle” (Akesson, Carling and Drotbohm 2012). Constructions of parenthood roles are fluid and changeable, and have to be renegotiated and redefined in long-distance conjugal relationships.

On the other hand, conjugal relationships at a distance – when the cause of separation is mobility – ask for a redefinition of the roles of the couple and of the family. The impact on these relationships largely depends on a number of specific circumstances, including social position, the existence (or not) of children, the reason(s) underlying the migration, and the adaptive abilities of the individuals involved. Many authors who see migration as a threat to the destination country also see marriage and migration as arrangements of convenience, forced marriage, or trafficking. Others are more inclusive (Williams 2010; Bryceson and Vuorela 2002; Levin and Trost 1999; Boyd and Grieco 2003; Pessar and Mahler 2003; Wilding 2006; Grassi 2006), and address the challenges and stereotypes of transnational marriage, describing the ways that couples (re)define their roles, relationships, and family life as they learn and live side-by-side (Pribilsky 2004). The aggregate family unit of analysis, which is most commonly used for obtaining information about individuals and those they live with, was replaced in a previous study by a broader concept: the aggregate of residents, which enables us to include not only family members, but also people close to them and who reside with them.

This project includes the collection of exploratory qualitative data on internal mobility in Cape Verdan islands that has characterised the archipelago in recent years, using a comparable draft for interviews in relation to data on transnational families collected in the destination countries. This is based on the observation of Cape Verdeans’ mobility, which is not limited to transnational migrations. People move between islands for different reasons. Internal migration is expected to be less financially beneficial than international migration for individual migrants and their families, as wages are typically lower in Cape Verde and there is a lack of work opportunities.
However, individuals may benefit from such migration significantly, contributing to diversification of livelihoods and development of the wider economy. Research on highly skilled migrants enables a better understanding of the different facets of mobile lives. Qualitative interviews will be compared with the aim of understanding their daily practices, connections to the local and global context, and representations of their multiple “homes”. It is important to understand how, in the midst of so many “homes”, this new space is constructed: how and in what ways migrants’ dwellings become true homes – a space imbued with symbolic value, and what repercussions there are in conjugal and parenthood relationships. We intend to explore the influence of national and cultural gender roles inside the family institution, in comparison with transnational mobility dynamics.

The organisation of the data analysis will focus on the perceptions and representations of the family at distance (the economic and emotional well-being of family migrant male member), on the transnational/national migrant men’s perspective, on Mobility/Immobility, and the citizenship framework on the access to resources in the origin country, as well as the place of culture and the generational meaning of “home” in the target group. This will include migrant men and women from Cape Verde internally and internationally (in Portugal). The analysis will consider gender in its intersectionality with generation, class, and ethnicity. We can therefore discuss how and if the condition of being migrants makes a difference in their life trajectories, discussing if, in the different spheres, there is a reproduction of their trajectories. Empirical examples resulting from our team’s previous work in recent years covered countries in Africa and Europe (Grassi 2007; 2010; Ferreira 2011) and different modes of mobility and migration can be compared with the results of this proposal, increasing the debate in the area. At the same time, it will stimulate discussion of the negotiation processes and different representations of adult status within the family, adopting a comparative methodology among young people of Cape Verdean descent from collecting data to exploring gendered family dynamics in the Cape-Verdean diaspora, across family members.

Considering conjugality and parenthood relationships, and starting from previous results (Grassi 2010) that show the importance of internal migration in Cape Verde, it is important to reflect on how its consequences in the reorganisation of family relationships are easily comparable to what happens in mobile family situations under study in other contexts (Grassi and Vivet 2015; Mazzucato et al. 2015; Grassi et al. 2016). The data that will be collected
should add to our understanding of the families in this mobile context, which, due to its history and geographical position, is considered by many authors as an excellent place to discuss the organisation of societies and institutions in the contemporary world.

FINAL REMARKS

Before a changing society, relations between individuals, and within the family, tend to organise themselves at a distance in different forms according to contexts. Through case studies in the geographical area of Angola/Cape Verde/Portugal, this chapter discusses how migrants organise their family relations.

The existence of transnational families between Africa and Portugal is not recent and has changed during the various historical periods and due to the political and economic dynamics in the different countries. The strong historical links between the former Portuguese colonies and Portugal persist in the production of family and friendship networks overlapping the networks being formed in the new flows following the fluctuation of the economy. In this panorama, the north-south paradigm is challenged by the contemporary transnational division of labour, and this concept of development must be rethought. At the same time, the perceptions and representations of the colonial memory between the two countries persist, and this is particularly evident in family and migration studies. The approach proposed here in the study of family and migration dynamics allows us to avoid cultural essentialisms, highlight some differences in the representations between the groups and recognise the persistence of stereotypes about the family roles of colonial memory in the couple and family in contemporary migratory flows. At the same time, it also shows that conjugality and parenting at distance – when analysed as a global concept – contributes to a transformation in couples’ at distance relationships that are reformulated; sometimes also creating space for the empowerment of women that do not migrate.

The examples here referred to can highlight some dynamics of individuals’ social inclusion and exclusion from mobility access and other resources in their changing familial contexts. Furthermore, they stress the importance of renewing the dialogue between agency and structure: are the case studies’ family members presented moving as free agents or in a manner dictated by the cultural concept of family as a social structure?
Finally, studying migration and contemporary human mobility raises relevant theoretical questions by their intrinsic “political epistemology” (Garelli and Tazzioli 2013, 1), which has become a conceptual field denaturalising the categories and regimes of academic knowledge. The aim of studying “migrations” is to challenge government policies by creating a project incorporating both academic and governmental policies. To use the mobility concept to study the changes in family relationships when one of its members is living in another country, the paper also points to the necessity of focusing on language as a performative and constitutive dimension of reality by attributing meanings, norms and power that discipline human agencies into thinking, speaking and acting in a certain way (Foucault 1994; Fisher 2003). Global family relationships are changing and the concepts “mobility” and “migration” applied in the study of this social change are not only two different words for the same empirical phenomenon but represent two different institutional perceptions, interests and authorities, having the constitutive power to be reflected in the political dimension.

MARZIA GRASSI  
Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa  
Av. Prof. Aníbal Bettencourt 9 — 1600-036 Lisboa, Portugal  
marzia.grassi@ics.ulisboa.pt  
ocrid.org/0000-0003-0808-7879

§ REFERENCES


CARLING, J. 2005 “Gender dimensions of international migration”. In Global Migration Perspectives, Geneva: Global Commission on International Migration.


YEPEZ, I. 2011. “‘Si tu veux que je reste ici, il faut que tu t’occupes de nos enfants!’ Migration et maternité transnationale entre Cochabamba (Bolivie) et Bergame (Italie)”. Autrepart, 1: 57-58, 199-213.

PART VI

Learning and working
Including and excluding. Schools’ reputations: students, families and choices

Maria Manuel Vieira
Ana Nunes de Almeida
Ana Sofia Ribeiro
INTRODUCTION

Schools are key institutions in shaping inclusion and exclusion processes impacting on individual identity and social mobility. If the promise of widening participation in education has brought educational opportunities for almost all, it is not true that those educational opportunities are the same. Increasingly, the quality of education matters more as a mark of distinction, and choosing a school that brings success has replaced the quest for access in the new educational markets. Attending a certain school can lead to good grades, instil appropriate values, allow entrance to or maintenance of desired social circles and foster life projects envisioned by many families. School choice (and, in particular, upper secondary school choice) is a decision based on several factors. Rational criteria, such as geographical proximity and affordability, are certainly weighty family concerns. Subjective aspects, however, such as school leadership, safety and tailored educational projects, also carry increasing value among families of all backgrounds. While choosing a school is currently a decision more in the hands of families, given the Portuguese demographic downturn and the excessive school supply, policies driven by territorialisation and evaluation have led schools to target specific audiences and to develop distinctive profiles that help parents recognise a school as a perfect match.

We therefore argue that reputation, a concept emerging from the sociology of art, can make a useful contribution in untangling the diverse criteria that guide educational options for parents and children. Based on six case studies of state and private schools, carried out in three contrasting settings, we provide an account of objective and subjective motivations leading to a given school preference in Portugal. The chapter begins with a contextualisation of educational policies in the global and national sphere; it then moves to a careful theoretical outline of the reputation construct, followed by an application of its features to the educational sector. After a brief methodological section, we illuminate the consensus and dissensus behind parents and children’s motives, highlighting inclusion and exclusion processes. Concluding remarks then focus on the value of reputation in identifying generational gaps among families.
RECENT TRENDS IN EDUCATION

In contemporary Western societies, the extension of compulsory schooling to higher levels of education over recent decades reflects a political consensus about the benefits of providing advanced training for all. More education would contribute to more inclusive and less unequal societies.

Universal schooling means eliminating barriers when entering the system. But the literature has shown that massive access goes hand in hand with more sophisticated divides, now placed inside that same system. Differences between schools and their communities introduce diversity in a heterogeneous landscape and hierarchies of prestige and reputation emerge. Not all students have access to all schools, state or private. Inclusion and exclusion processes are at play and challenge democratic ideals on equity and equal opportunities.

On the other hand, the long-term enrolment of a larger number of students with different needs and expectations brings new challenges to schools, now facing contrasting demands. With the increased diversity of students, managing at a distance complex social spaces, such as today’s schools, has become more difficult in centralised education systems (among which is the Portuguese). Territorialisation appears as a new paradigm in educational policies (van Zanten 2004; Barrère 2006). It means transferring higher levels of autonomy and management responsibility to the local scale, based on the assumption that stakeholders generate better solutions to problems directly affecting them. Thus, each school acquires an unprecedented relevance by becoming the core management pillar of the educational system.

The relevance of the local territory in educational policies is one of the factors that promotes the differentiation of the school world. If each school is supposed to deal with specific challenges, its educational project should be distinct from all the others.

This structural change puts schools under pressure. How to combine education for all with the need to meet the singularity of each one? In fact, the extension of compulsory education has widened the school world’s “principles of justification” (Derouet 2000). In addition to those associated with the “civic world” (equal opportunities, education for all), which inspired the development of state education systems, other principles based on values such as expressiveness, effectiveness, and market have emerged in recent decades (van Zanten 2004, 51-52).
Following a larger international trend, market-based values have also penetrated the Portuguese educational system, promoting competition between schools (Afonso 2010; Almeida et al., 2017; Antunes 2008; Quaresma and Villalobos 2016). Two sets of conditions favour competition, according to van Zanten (2005): the decrease in the demand for education (either due to demographic factors, or to a sudden lack of interest in a specific educational offer); and the efforts, made by schools, to attract “the best” students (both academically and socially) (van Zanten 2005, 569). These two sets of conditions are not only present but intertwined in Portuguese society.

The sharp drop in fertility rates have affected the dynamics of the demand (Almeida 2005). With the student population decreasing, some authors argue that the former prevailing coordination of student flows through supply is now confronted with the growing influence of demand (Barroso and Viseu 2003; Antunes and Sá 2010). In turn, parents (seen as education “consumers”), are now more challenging. Since 2001, the annual release of school rankings, based on the students’ performance in the national exams became, for parents and students, an important navigation tool in the increasingly more complex education system and a strategic instrument for comparison and competition between schools (Melo 2009). Good grades obtained in a school are a major factor in attracting students (Gouveia 2017).

Largely emphasised by contemporary educational policies, the principle of evaluation (of schools, of the quality of learning, of teachers’ performance, etc.) appears thus as the other side of the autonomy coin (van Zanten 2004; Palhares 2014). Furthermore, evaluation is strongly linked to reputation, a word deriving from the -Latin reputatio, which means pondering, meditating, examining. “Defined in a minimal way, reputation is the result of a set of evaluations” (Chauvin 2013, 132). The concept is explored in the next section.

REPUTATION – SOME THEORETICAL REMARKS

The notion of reputation is present in various social fields and is part of the explanations produced by the social sciences about them. Economics and management (Colonomos 2013; Fombrun 2015; Menger 2013; Brown et al. 2006; Rao 1994), social psychology (Griskevicius, Tybur and van den Bergh 2010), and communication sciences (Cardon 2013), apply the notion of reputation to study such different subjects as the financial activity of States,
the evaluation of companies and products, or the practices of consumers and Internet users.

In sociology, reputation has been traditionally studied in association with the world of arts, culture and their industries (Becker 1982). In his pioneering work, Becker questions the approach of reputation as derived from innate characteristics of the artist, opposing it to the idea of reputation as a social construct and process. This theoretical assumption brings new insights. Firstly, reputations are the product of the collective activity of each specific network of interdependencies (social worlds) in which they act. Secondly, they depend on criteria established by critics/experts, by which the reputed entity can be distinguished and identified. Thirdly, being a social product – not a crystallised feature of the reputed entity – reputation has a historical and a situated dimension: it varies from time to time and from place to place. Lastly, visibility is an important aspect of reputation.

In line with the same theoretical approach, political sociologists such as Gary A. Fine (2007) have also explored the concept, namely within the analysis of political reputation. Beyond the social psychological claim that “reputation constitutes a moral gestalt that is linked to a person” Fine (2007, 3886) points out that they are also collective representations, enacted in relationships. His definition of reputation brings along the idea of recognition: it refers “to the existence of a socially recognised persona: an organising principle by which actions of a person (or group, organisation, or collectives) are linked into a common assessment (Fine 2007, 3886).

In addition to “recognition” (concerning the competence exhibited under a commonly shared convention), it is important to stress that the reputation-making process also includes the communicational manufacture of a name, “renown” (referring to the public visibility obtained by the reputed entity) (Borges 2014). These two aspects are well condensed in Chauvin’s definition of the concept: “Reputation can be defined as a shared, provisional and located social representation, associated with a name and resulting from more or less powerful and formalised social evaluations” (Chauvin 2013, 132).

Embedded in social relations, reputation-making processes thus involve evaluation, judgements and communication. Interestingly, the debate on this topic may benefit from some of the arguments proposed by pragmatic sociologists. Boltanski and Thévenot’s approach to the way individuals justify their actions to others, considers several logics (“cités”) as points of support for “justification regimes”; that is, grammars used by individuals both for
justification and for critical purposes (Boltanski and Thévenot 1991). Those grammars, connected to repertories of pertinent objects for each “cité”, constitute different “worlds”. One of these – the “world of fame” – maintains a close proximity to the phenomena of reputation. According to the authors, this is a “world” whose greatness (celebrity) depends on the opinions of others – that is to say, it depends on the number of people who award their value and esteem to a person, group, or organisation. However, beings in the “world of fame” are “big” insofar as they differ (Boltanski and Thévenot 1991, 223). This is why communication is so important: in order to become renowned, you have to make yourself known, have a name or, in the case of products, a mark (Boltanski and Thévenot 1991, 225). In other words, beings only attain greatness if greatness is made visible, if it can be viewed and compared by others.

One important point must be underlined. With communication being a crucial dimension of reputations, unequal access to visibility may promote inclusion-exclusion dynamics. As Becker cautions, not all potential reputed entities (in his analysis, artistic works) have the same visibility conditions vis-à-vis potential audiences, which affects the (differential) possibility to access reputation (Becker 1982, 362-364). Therefore, “the larger problem has to do not with what the reputation-making process selects, but rather with what it leaves out” (Becker 1982, 367).

In sum, working on reputation in sociology means addressing a set of different but complementary issues. It means accepting the social and relational nature of reputations, that is, to refuse essentialist approaches. It means identifying the criteria (the organising principles) for evaluating the competence with which a given reputation is associated (Cardon 2013). Moreover, it requires unravelling the “reputational work” that individuals, groups, organisations or collectives develop to create, maintain and extend control over their reputation – which can be manipulated (Colonomos 2013; Goffman 1982). Last, but not least, this theoretical construct implies determining the time and the spaces/arenas of a given reputation’s circulation, namely the transferability of reputation associated with a name to other entities/contexts (Chauvin 2013).

SCHOOLS AND THEIR REPUTATIONS

The leading role of education in contemporary societies makes it relevant to extend the analysis of reputational processes to the school world itself.
Portugal is a particularly interesting case: the educational system displays a quite significant liberalisation of selection and admission procedures (except at higher education level), and “school market”/competition between schools seems to be taking important steps (Lima and Melo 2016; Tavares and Cardoso 2013). Furthermore, the annual release of rankings – hierarchy of schools based on the students’ performance in the national exams – produced contrasted images: “trendy schools”, on the one hand; “junk schools”, on the other; the vast majority of schools in intermediate positions would be relatively untouched as far as their image is concerned (Antunes and Sá 2010, 106). This hierarchy gives most schools a margin for image improvement, but may also provoke criticism and resistance reactions to this kind of evaluation criteria (accused of not being truly “objective”) – and reputation making (Barrère 2006; Melo 2009; Zoia 2009).

As stated before, reputations are a collective activity enacted in relationships. Therefore, the reputation of a school is a social process in which a large community (school authorities, teachers, staff, students, families, educational experts, and media) participates. Although the reputation-making process involves several scales of action, in a complex network of social relations – from the macro level (e.g. public policies, education experts) to the micro level (namely, schools, parents and students) – the latter is the one that best illustrates these complex dynamics. Acting in an interconnected local network of schools in comparison with each other (Barroso and Viseu 2003), the demand (understood as the number and the social attributes of parents and students) exerts a clear influence on the reputation of each of them.

However, it is important to realise that this demand has a shared nature (between students and parents) and, in upper levels of the education system, parents and adolescents do not always agree in their assessments (van Zanten 2004).

If reputation is defined as the attractive differential of a school (Costa and Koslinski 2011), the criteria and principles on which it is based vary – namely, according to the parents’ educational priorities. Therefore, those criteria are plural, complex and diverse; and ambivalent, as they often involve objective and subjective dimensions.

Although a school reputation is composed of more than one attribute, using “school choice” criteria as a proxy to reputation criteria is a way to identify the main attractive differential revealed by parents or students. Some contributions to this topic, privileging adults’ perspectives, have been put forward in the
literature. The perception of a safe and pleasant learning environment appears to be a key quality (mark) parents recognise in a “good school” (OECD 2015). Academic excellence (based on objective criteria, such as school performance and students’ results) is for many parents another crucial aspect in building a school’s reputation (Antunes and Sá 2010). The educational values promoted – either religion-centred, or secular, non-denominational inspired – are another factor (Quaresma 2014). Besides, criteria for assessing the attractiveness of a school vary according to specific teaching cycles. In primary schools, the principle of expressivity (meaning an individualised pedagogy, an enriched curricular offer allowing students’ exploitation of skills), may be an important factor in parents’ judgement; whereas in secondary schools, academic results can be a more valued principle (van Zanten 2009). Yet, research also points out that not all parents assign priority or relevance to the reputational evaluation when choosing a given school for their children (Antunes and Sá 2010); other pragmatic criteria such as home/school distance or the existence of collective transportation to school take the lead (Cordeiro 2014).

The distinctive quality (mark) that makes a school reputation also varies according to the student’s perspective. Less explored in academic literature, the criteria and principles mobilised by students for assessing a school’s reputation may match parental criteria but also diverge in dimensions not even considered by adults. Recent research on highly academic achieving students attending a local well-known secondary state school, revealed that the main reasons for choosing that particular school matched those their parents would presumably advocate – “demanding and quality teaching”, “school prepares well for higher education” and “good learning environment” (Torres 2014, 37). However, taking into account sociological literature on adolescents (Breviglieri and Cicchelli 2007; Cavalli, Cicchelli and Galland 2008; Pappámikail 2013), other kinds of reasons may also be envisaged. Friends moving to the same school, “youth tribes” present at a given school, or the degree of autonomy and freedom of circulation awarded may be important criteria for assessing a particular school’s attractiveness.

In any case, closely linked to evaluation, reputation leads to classification – and thus, to a hierarchy of beings, objects or institutions. In the case of schools, differentiated reputations promote, simultaneously, integration and exclusion. In fact, the higher the school’s attractiveness, the greater the ability to select and exclude candidates. Exclusion barriers at the entrance reinforce, for the elected ones, the sense of belonging to a privileged learning community.
This chapter discusses “school reputation”, by exploring school actors’ narratives about the subject. Contrasting the voices of students with those of parents, an in-depth analysis of the criteria for evaluating the competence a given reputation is associated with is carried out. What is the organising principle that underlies the identification of a school’s “reputation”? What (informational) resources do individuals use to access the reputation of a school? Given the shared nature of demand, do adults (parents) and adolescents (students) choose the same criteria in establishing a school’s reputation? Do the same reputational criteria mean the same for everyone? These are the theoretical questions guiding the empirical analysis undertaken in the next parts of the chapter.

**METHODOLOGY**

Considering the relational, contingent (in time and space) and largely subjective dimensions of reputation, an inductive approach and a qualitative methodology are the most appropriate ways to empirically approach the criteria and principles behind it.

Data presented in this chapter is drawn from interviews conducted with parents and from focus groups organised with students1 of six Portuguese secondary schools. They are part of a larger research project commissioned by the Gulbenkian Foundation carried out by a team at the ICS/ULisboa (2014-2016) (Almeida et al. 2017). Against the backdrop of a serious financial crisis and the external intervention of the so-called Troika (a group formed by the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund), this study aimed at answering a question: how were non-higher education schools managed and who paid for them in Portugal?

This chapter is based on the qualitative phase of the project, giving parent and student voices a prominent place.

Six schools, publicly or privately run, offering secondary education were selected in the continental part of the country, illustrating distinct educational contemporary tendencies in the Portuguese system. It’s worth mentioning that 3 types of school are available in Portugal: state, private and charter

---

1 Focus group students were appointed by the school director. For ethical reasons, we do not indicate their school of origin to guarantee their absolute anonymity.
schools. State schools, ensuring free education from elementary school to upper secondary and more open to social diversity, are largely predominant: in 2016, they account for 88% in the elementary level and 72.8% in upper lower/secondary levels.

Two schools are located in the Lower Mondego region (the Mondego state School and the White private religious School), three in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area (the Tejo state School, the Blue private religious School and the Green private secular School), and one in the Central Alentejo area (the Montado state School). The first region is characterised by having an excessive supply of private education. Diversity in types of educational offers is at its maximum in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area, offering a complete “school market”. In the Central Alentejo, a rural and depopulated area, the study case was carried out at the Montado state school, the only available upper secondary educational offer in the municipality. Although the parents interviewed were middle class and particularly active in educational issues (they are all members of Parents’ Associations), social criteria were not decisive in the sample. School selection was based on the existence/absence of a local educational market. Yet, pupils access to the three private schools of the sample is restricted by family financial resources, even in the case of charter schools, since funded classes are increasingly smaller.

Although initially chosen due to their appropriateness for the above-mentioned research problems, these six schools are also particularly suitable for a study focused on school reputation issues. Using published school ranking lists as a proxy for an objective dimension of reputation, some of the six schools are placed in the top 10, the others being in intermediate scale positions (Público 2017). None of them is in the lower positions, commonly considered “junk schools” (Antunes and Sá 2010).

In each of these schools, individual interviews were conducted with parents appointed by the parents’ associations or by the school director (8 parents interviewed). In parallel, focus groups were organised with students, boys and girls from 9th and 12th grade (24 students). Due to ethical requirements (protection and confidentiality of students, selected by school directors), pupils are not institutionally identified. General topics related to management and financing of schools were the core of the inquiry, but it also included other questions – the reasons for choosing the current school being one of them. The analytical exploration of this topic will be the focus of the next point.
IDENTIFYING REPUTATION CRITERIA: PARENT AND STUDENT PERSPECTIVES

What (informational) resources do individuals use to access the reputation of a school? Parents and students identify two main sources of information: objective (published school rankings) and subjective ones (word of mouth information obtained from family, friends and other social relations).

The publication of lists of schools according to their academic performance seems to have quite an impact on students. Considering themselves the “elected ones”, they embody the idea of the transferability of a reputation (Strathdee 2009; Quaresma 2014) – in this case, from school as a reputation entity to themselves, as part of its community.

This school is held in high regard. [Isabel, private school]

It’s because our school has always been at the top of the state rankings. [Joana, state school]

We are always well placed in the rankings. [João M., private school]

In what probably seems to be a shared conversation issue in the family, parents also use ranking lists, and compare national results in order to assess the competence of a certain school. But this criterion is not the predominant one, as discussed later:

We had another question … it was one of the issues that the parents spoke about: grades. (…) What happens is that parents compare (academic results). [Parents’ association representative, Tejo (state) School]

I can tell you that the standards here are very high (…) and it is proved by the results that the kids get in the examinations. [Parents’ association representative, White (private) School]

But much more than lists, parents and students rely on other different sorts of information to obtain and to validate a school’s reputation. Rumours, “this continuing flow of information, sometimes erroneous, disseminated by parents about the daily life of schools” (Barrère 2006, 100), as well as more experience-based information (e.g. the former experience of family members as students, peer advice or friends’ recommendations) are the main sources used to access the reputation of a school:
And my uncle attended (this school) a few years ago. And my cousins too … My dad attended until Y12. And my brothers also study here. [Sofia, private school]

Yes, I came to this school because my brothers studied here. They said it was good, and I decided to come here as well. [Miguel, state school]

Yes, I had very good references about [the school] … from friends who came from our former school, or from other schools, that we know and usually talk about this school with. They say good things … they say good things about the environment, the people, the teachers, the teaching methods… [Manuel, state school]

I came to this school because they had already told me it was very good … It was my mother. A friend of hers said her daughter was studying here. So, she [said], “this school is very good” [Laura, state school]

Now the question is: what is considered as a “good school”? What is the organising principle that underlies the identification of a school’s “reputation”? Given the shared nature of demand, do parents and students agree on the same criteria? Or, alternatively, due to the distinct social identity they hold (adult/adolescent), does reputation mean different things for each of them?

For families in the sample, the school’s reputation is indeed one of the main elements presiding over school choice. However, that attribute is far from being based on a single aspect. It seems to be rather composed of various organising principles, despite acquiring different relevance according to the local context (urban/strong school market vs. rural/weak school market).

Even considering the constraints imposed by the available range of options and economic capacity, the brand of a school is crucial when opting for upper secondary education. And what contributes to that “name”? Regardless of the private-state nature of the school, parents and students agree that both scientific and pedagogical criteria, such as the type of courses the school offers, good results in national exams and the quality and stability of its teaching staff are key components in building attractiveness:

Why do parents put their children here? Because of school quality. And why does the school have quality? Because of its teaching staff. And why is our teaching staff so esteemed? Because it’s stable. This was the conclusion that we reached. [Parents’ association representative, Tejo (state) School]
Why do parents come here? They come here for several reasons. They come here because of the results that the children achieve, they come here for the education given to the children. (...) This really is (...) a different type of education. [Parents’ association representative, White (private) School]

In the case of this particular school, I believe (students) choose it because of the subject field they would like to pursue in upper secondary. I believe that when they go to (X, main city in the area), they go to areas that they do not have here. [Parents’ association representative, Montado (state) School]

I came here in my 5th year. My parents put me here (...). They chose this school because – in rankings, in terms of grades – it is very successful. [Isabel, private school]

[Another reason] is the prestige that this school has in the city. Good things are always said about the school, the teaching methods, the school environment, the atmosphere among the students, among the teachers… [João, state school]
I came to this school because I was told that it was very good, which is great: “This school is very good. People are awesome, the teachers…” It has gone down a bit recently but, before that, our school was always at the top of the state school rankings. [Laura, state school]

In fact, time seems to be a key factor in establishing a school’s reputation. This is relational and, as such, time is required to build recognition for the teachers’ scientific and affective work. Leadership, connected with communication ability, is also mentioned by parents:

And then there is another factor here – you will certainly agree with me, that is, who is in charge, who is the boss…The pyramid effect, right? We knock on that door (the door of the school director), and she receives us. And this says it all. The commitment is full. I’m glad we chose her. (...) She is clearly a winner regarding this. She listens, she is not a boss. She is a leader, however, and uncontested. All this impacts on choices. [Parents’ association representative, Tejo (state) School]

The greatest feedback I get from this school is not from the parents, it’s from the school director. She is a person that, when I’m working on some activity is the first to congratulate me or encourage me to do more: “when are you going to do another?” (...) I have no doubt that these organizations need strong leadership to work. Teachers may act collectively
through unions, they can do whatever they want, and have autonomy to decide on programmes. If they have a bad leader in charge, however, the school doesn’t work. [Parents’ association representative, White (private) School]

However, contrastingly, school leadership is clearly not an issue for students when talking about school reputation. Rather, much more valued than stability (meaning the possibility of developing coherent, long-term academic work with students, as the parents seem to favour), the relational, affective quality of (some) teachers (meaning recognition of each student’s uniqueness and the capacity of acting as “significant others”) takes over when adolescents assess the criteria of a school reputation:

Sometimes, if I don’t want to talk to my parents, I can talk to my ballet teacher. And even with some other teachers. I have known them for several years and I have a close relationship with some of them. [Teresa, private school]

Ah, I think this (school) has a very good atmosphere. Most of the students always do well and try to integrate us (the newcomers) to the fullest. And in relation to the teachers, most of them, most of the teachers, we get along well with. There is a small minority with whom we cannot establish such a strong relationship, but, still… [Manuel, state school]

The relational asset indeed appears as a central dimension, from the students’ point of view. Not only teachers, but peers (a typical asset in a youth population) are key to qualifying a school:

I do not have siblings, but I remember that, at that time, I wanted to come to this school, because my classmates and friends were also coming. So very … cool! [Maria, private school]

I have a school in front of my house – right in front – but I prefer to come here because I like this school, the way the school works, and my friends. [Serafim, state school]

If the director is the face of the school, the educational project also plays a role in developing a school’s distinctiveness, in the sense that it signals ideological values that may or may not match the parental ethos. That is why parents refer to it frequently, and students don’t:
This school has a tutorial system, close relationships, and an individual approach to learning. That is something parents also appreciate. [Parents’ association representative, Green (private) School]

It’s the same freedom that Jesus gives us, the one that we want to convey in this school. The school does not impose, it proposes…proposals that cannot be refused! … [Parents’ association representative, Blue (private) School]

The educational project is used as a tool to support the school’s character. But this is far more common in private schools than in state ones, which, following the central state mission of providing lay education to diverse children, are more limited in developing tailored projects. In fact, distinctiveness in private schools is their “mark”, built on a singular, educational “niche”, in contrast with state schools, which have long been dedicated to providing a universal, common public service. However, a strong defined character may sometimes cause conflict and lead to misunderstandings with families who chose that school for other purposes:

Sometimes that happens here. There are some conflicts, some people come here for success and not for culture. I think such conflicts need to be solved by the families themselves. If there is a specific educational project, people sign a consent form, when enrolling, accepting the rules of this establishment. If they do so, they cannot then go against these rules. It’s a bit like this: children have rituals, they have religious celebrations, and all the class attends. [Parents’ association representative, White (private) School]

Hence, competing values may coexist in the same school project, and while success is a goal for all parents, the many different paths to achieve it are not all inclusive, without taking families with distinct values into account. The result is the homogenisation and closure of the school community: including some, excluding others.

Along with educational concerns, parents and youngsters also care for the way a school meets individual logistical needs, namely timetable and geographical convenience – the latter being particularly important in non-urban contexts:

The timetables are good. It’s true, classes are very concentrated [in the morning] at school, and afternoons are free. It has better timetables than the other school down there, it always has! [Parents’ association representative, Mondego (state) School]
The school/home distance. There is transport, there are connections for this school [Parents’ association representative, Montado (state) School]

I chose this school because it was close to my house. I live within fifteen minutes’ walk from here. [João, state school]

Regarding timetables, one of the schools in our study even established special timetables to allow professional sports’ practice, show a willingness to cater for particular student needs.

On the other hand, a growing cause of concern for families is their children’s safety. The school is their main socialising space and all sorts of encounters are possible inside it. Therefore, the school environment must reassure parents:

Parents put their children here because they look for security. My personal interest is also the collective interest of the school, which is, to know who my children are with… [Parents’ association representative, White (private) School]

We have children that come from private schools. They get out of those schools, some for economic reasons, and look for this school because it is clearly the most similar to what they are used to. They don’t go to other schools, they want to come here. The social class that you see here is higher than in other schools, right? And that makes all the difference. [Parents’ association representative, Tejo (state) School]

Regarding security, private schools (at least, those included in this research) seem to offer additional controlling rules positively evaluated by parents, as referred to by students

My parents put us here mainly for safety reasons. It has security systems, it has locks… they find a way to control us here. [João M., private school]

We are in a dome here...no, inside a bubble! [Manuel, private school]

The parental demand for security and safety is then constituted as an argument to exclude many others, considered “undesirable” in the school environment, due to their different socio-economic status, behaviour or values. Parents want to keep their children safe from a presumably dangerous
world. Not surprisingly, the security issue is not shared by pupils, who label it as “controlling” and even “imprisoning”. In fact, young students show quite ambivalent feelings towards control: on the one hand, they agree that it is a legitimate parental concern; on the other hand, they feel that this aspect limits their willingness to explore outside spaces without adult control, as a legitimate adolescent aspiration:

No, that’s the way it is… I think that, for example, the youngest, the little ones (…) cannot go out alone, but we think we (the eldest) could have a little more freedom. [Tiago, private school]

Anyway, it was a change of scenery (from private school to this state school) and it’s important, because I was always in an environment that I think was a bit closed. We used to say we were in a bubble. And it was a bit true. We did not have much freedom, even at school, and sometimes we were a little disgusted by it. Because sometimes, in adolescence, we want … to be ourselves. [Tomás, state school]

Schools can be spaces for social vigilance and exclusion, as Foucault once advocated (Foucault 1975). However, as much as state schools are perceived as more inclusive, they can also exclude students by not paying attention to their particular educational needs – a key attribute in primary education for most parents. Reputation criteria can be thus identified in contrast to what a school should not be, as expressed by the following mother:

[In his first year], my son went to a state school, but after three months, the result was terrible. He had a teacher that at Christmas still didn’t know his name, didn’t know his face, and there were good teachers in that school. And so, at the end of the first term, my son was characterized as someone having learning difficulties by not being able to count to ten, when he had left kindergarten knowing all the basic numbers. [Parents’ association representative, White (private) School]

Although the state schools mission is to provide education for all, they cannot guarantee personal attention for every pupil and, in certain cases, private education appears as a more inclusive option. In rural environments, however, some small size state schools act similarly to private ones, in providing close attention to its population’s individualised needs. From the parents’ perspective, this capacity may well compensate for the lack of other
assets (e.g. good facilities, diversity of educational offer) related to the absence of a local school market:

What defines success, nowadays, are results, unfortunately – or fortunately for some things (…) - , but of course, this school has a great advantage: it is a small school, compared to many others. As it is a small school, obviously, the teaching staff is stable; it has been here for many years (…). Of course, not everything is perfect, but there are many good teachers here in this school. [Parents’ association representative, Montado (state) School]

Although parents and children identify mostly the same criteria as pieces of the school reputation puzzle (convenience, security, quality of content and values), they can take on different meanings, and/or provoke divergent intergenerational attitudes. As noticed before, a reputation has a relational dimension, in the sense that word of mouth and perception of peers counts a lot in the judgement students themselves make about their own choices. But reputation is also positional, an attribute that is more visible in rankings, which students interpret as solid evidence of the quality of a school, when compared to others. However, parents in our study endorse a more critical opinion on these results, even questioning the criteria used in data collection:

Some schools have a renewed infrastructure and appear in rankings with great results, but we know that their students have a lot of private tutoring outside the school [Parents’ association representative, Mondego (state) School]

The rankings, you know, compare a student from one social background with a student from a different social background… They compare a school that has Maths, Portuguese and French with another school that has Maths, English and Japanese (…). Some include the seven disciplines that students attend, others just include the three specific ones that allow them to enter higher education… all newspapers grab the same data and use them applying totally different methodologies (…) but in the end, the message that comes out is the message that remains, do you understand? [Parents’ association representative, White (private) School]

Although the Ministry of Education does not publish official league tables, the press produces rankings based on the results of school exams and other data (such as the socio-economic status of pupils and retention rates). They provide a quick overview of what a successful school is, as if the “quantification” of
such a subjective and shifting variable as reputation was the decisive element that appeals to students (and to the other audiences as well). Being at the top necessarily excludes those that are at the bottom, and rankings operationalise the hierarchy every evaluation process entails.

FINAL REMARKS

Universal education and longer schooling trajectories for all are main gains in Western societies. They are a right for all. Meanwhile, the democratic openness of the system at the entrance has been associated with an enlargement of the social or cultural range of children and young people now attending school. The inner diversity of pupils poses a new question for schools: how to deal with it?

Two tendencies have been favoured by national policies. Territorialisation, on the one hand, has transferred a number of areas and management authority from the central State to schools, embedded in certain social contexts and now benefiting from some degrees of autonomy. Placed at the centre of the system, schools face the injunction to become particular and unique, to discover and reveal their attractive differential, a shift indeed reinforced by the increasing importance of market values and the emergence of competitive scenarios. Against the backdrop of a severe fertility drop, under pressure to maintain or to enlarge their population, competition between them is critical. On the other hand, quality evaluation procedures (under public scrutiny) have been imposed as common routines. Building a reputation has turned out to be a priority. This concept, traditionally used by sociology in reference to the world of arts and cultural industries, can be an interesting tool to explore territorial and social dynamics in the school system. School choice is very often dependent on the reputation a school is able to gain in a territorial recruitment area.

With Becker (1982), we advocated that reputation, applied to schools, is a social and relational construct, engaging networks of actors such as families, peers and media embedded in local settings. More qualified and informed parents, the influence of peer groups and of word of mouth forms of communication allied to the annual display of national rankings by the media put pressure on schools to stand out from the whole. Following pragmatic sociologists (Boltanski and Thévenot 1991), we enter the “world of fame” in
full, as reputation mostly involves information and subjective judgements, expectations or ideals.

But families are not homogeneous. We can anticipate that their capacity to be informed and to engage successfully in the school game, closely associated with their social origins, is very different. Territorialisation, therefore, has certainly contributed to reinforce social inequalities between those who have and those who have not the needed informational resources and a wide range of educational offers to choose from. Meanwhile, even if school choice seems to proceed from a shared decision between parents and their children, they very often diverge in the prioritisation of criteria that define a “good school”. Giving voice to students evidenced generational differences. Overall, complex and subtle inclusion/exclusion processes are deployed at the local level, between differently reputed private and state schools, and even between state schools themselves. The exclusion tendency is at its peak in densely populated urban centres where a school market truly exists (the cases of Lisbon and Coimbra in our sample). And it reaches its minimum in the depopulated ageing countryside (the case of the southern Central Alentejo).

The school reputation analysis in this chapter aimed at answering two main questions: how is relevant information gathered by parents and students? And which criteria makes a school’s reputation?

Using school choice rationales as a proxy for reputation criteria led us to outline the standards that make schools visible for their audiences. For parents, it’s the scientific and pedagogical quality, along with a stable and available teaching body, that founds a school’s recognition. The identification of a differentiated school project is a criterion that is used to select, more than to attract, as private school cases have illustrated, in contrast to state schools that are constrained to follow widening participation values that suit a vast majority of social groups. For pupils, a specific educational project is not mentioned as a premise for reputation, although teaching quality is a must. Logistical concerns are also shared by parents and students, since they enable the performance of complementary educational and leisure activities that would otherwise be impossible. The greatest intergenerational cleavage emerges around the security issue, regarded as a priority for parents but considered as a constraint for young people, who feel deprived of their autonomy (patent in the daily liberty of leaving school unattended, for instance). Finally, while parents occasionally refer to rankings, but in a rather critical way, recalling that private tutoring and diverse methodologies make their results not so
trustworthy, rankings are perceived by young people as visible evidence of the quality of a school.

Universal school access would apparently depict an equalitarian landscape. However, even if social divides are not so sharp at the main entrance gate, fine cleavages are progressively introduced inside the system, with institutional differentiation operating as a segregation tool. As shown, “school choice” (certainly limited to certain territories and groups) based on school reputation serves as a strategic observatory to describe and explain inclusion/exclusion phenomena, which shape contemporary societies.

MARIA MANUEL VIEIRA
Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa
Av. Prof. Aníbal Bettencourt 9 — 1600-036 Lisboa, Portugal
mmfonseca@ics.ulisboa.pt
orcid.org/0000-0002-2544-9694

ANA NUNES DE ALMEIDA
Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa
ana.nunes.almeida@ics.ulisboa.pt
orcid.org/0000-0003-3174-3870

ANA SOFIA RIBEIRO
Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa
sofia.ribeiro@ics.ulisboa.pt
orcid.org/0000-0001-6648-611X

§ REFERENCES


BARROSO, J., V. S. Viseu. 2003. “A emergência de um mercado educativo no planejamento da rede escolar: de uma regulação pela oferta a uma regulação pela procura”. 


*Communications*, 2 (93): 173-186.


*Communications*, 93: 131-145.

COLONOMOS, A. 2013. “La notation financière des états. Une question de réputation”. 
*Communications*, 93: 187-202.


*Cadernos de Pesquisa*, 41 (142): 246-266.


GRISKEVICIUS, V., J. M. Tybur, and B. Van Den Bergh. 2010. “Going green to be seen: Status, reputation, and conspicuous conservation”. 


DOCUMENTS


CITE THIS CHAPTER AS:


https://doi.org/10.31447/ics9789726715030.16
Inclusions and exclusions in the production and circulation of scientific knowledge: the case of the Royal Anthropological Institute (RAI) and of the Portuguese Society of Anthropology and Ethnology (SPAE)

Patrícia Ferraz de Matos
INTRODUCTION

This text examines and demonstrates why the activity of two European scientific societies carried out approximately from 1918 to 1960 (although both are still active today) enables us to study inclusion and exclusion dynamics. These dynamics will be analysed based on the study of the relationship between the Royal Anthropological Institute (RAI) – created in 1871 and still recognised and renowned internationally today – and the Portuguese Society of Anthropology and Ethnology (SPAE, Sociedade Portuguesa de Antropologia e Etnologia) – founded in 1918 and whose activity is nowadays considered peripheral. Nevertheless, during the first half of the 20th century, these societies shared some of their members, exchanged ideas, research and publications, and cooperated in the organisation of several international events.

The research presented in this text is related to two wider research projects: one entitled “The weavings of science: an anthropological view on the networks underlying the forging of scientific knowledge”, which I am working on at the Institute of Social Sciences of the University of Lisbon; and another on the history of the RAI, sponsored by this same institution. My project at ICS aims to contribute towards the study of the institutionalisation of anthropology in Portugal, based on an analysis of the people and knowledge networks connected to SPAE and the University of Porto, up to the 1970s. On the other hand, the RAI project, encompassing the history of the institution itself, is a long-term study on which specialists from several countries are currently working. The analysis presented here is therefore set out as work in progress and not as an account of final results, since both projects are still running. This is, as yet, an under-explored subject, mainly from the perspective of the social studies of science, and some of the materials used, and which I intend to leverage, are widely unknown, or have been scarcely studied. This can also be due to the difficulty in accessing and working on a significant part of those primary sources.

The reason why I decided to widen my research to the RAI archive is the fact that this institution has played a central role in the history of anthropology, gathering around it a set of people who have organised several activities related to this field. It has also been a starting point for several initiatives, both

---

1 My sincere thanks to Sarah Walpole (archivist at the RAI) for the support given to me during my research. I also thank SPAE’s board, particularly its chairman, Vítor Oliveira Jorge, for allowing me to access the archive.
at a national and international level. Its archive has a considerable volume of correspondence sent by people and institutions from all continents, which could be the possible basis for mapping a relationship.

Although this analysis is focused on the relationship between these two institutions, in some instances it can be widened, considering other Portuguese institutions with which the rai has had connections, namely the Universities of Coimbra and Lisbon, as well as institutions in other territories once administated by the Portuguese, such as Goa (in the then Portuguese India and under Portuguese dominion until 1961). The material held by SPAE and the rai may offer us much useful information for the study of the institutionalisation of anthropology, as a discipline, both in Portugal and in England, but also at a global level.

My methodology is inspired, among others, by the work of Bruno Latour (1987), but it is not strictly guided by it, as in other studies (Bastos and Barreto 2013), and considers its limitations. Concerning the analysis of a network of people, it is important to keep in mind the boundaries of the actor-network theory and of the social studies of science and technology (Mendes 2010). On the other hand, we cannot forget that there are individuals and events forced into silence and invisibility. Any critical analysis must bear in mind the limitations of the scientist’s scope and the circumstantial character of its conclusions, when studying the way scientific knowledge has been built and disseminated.

The matter of invisibility may also be related to processes of appreciation, selection and sponsoring. Some authors have classified the Portuguese scientific system as peripheral. For example, João Arriscado Nunes and Maria Eduarda Gonçalves (2001, 19) consider that “from the point of view of the capitalist economy/world and of the interstate system, Portugal is a peripheral country” and that this condition is one of the “keys to understanding the specific features of the history of science in Portugal”. As regards anthropology, we realise that some examples have been shown to play a more central role in the history of this area. This is the case of British social anthropology, of American cultural anthropology and also of anthropology in France, which, during the 1960s and 1970s, gained important status, mainly due to authors such as Claude Lévi-Strauss (1908-2009). On the other hand, with respect to the institutionalisation of anthropology, not all contributors to this process are

---

2 On the challenges brought to these theories by the new technologies, see Matos (2017).
considered as such, and surely not as precursors, or as having presented work that deserves to be remembered. These are the ones Richard Handler (2000) designated as “excluded ancestors,” that is, those authors who, despite having played a role that was considered important during their lifetime, were fated to oblivion or to the denial of their contribution.³

For the reasons presented above, to study the way the two scientific societies (spae and rai) were related at some time is a contribution to confirming Portugal’s peripheral status, although, in some circumstances, it has played a prominent role in comparison to other countries.⁴ I will start by characterising the particularities I found in both archives, rai’s and spae’s. I will then describe the context in which these societies were born and the activities they carried out, as well as their publications. In a later section, I will analyse the relationship between these societies, based on institutional and personal correspondence, on the exchange of research and publications, on the invitation of foreign scientists to become honorary or correspondent members, and also on the organisation of scientific meetings.

This analysis was based, not only on the archival documentation of these societies (in London and Porto, respectively), but also on their periodical publications, that is, the Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute (formerly Man) and Trabalhos de Antropologia e Etnologia (tae). Within the scope of the work exchange and of the cooperation in the journals published by both societies, I will approach some of the subjects incorporated in these publications that are directly related to the historical context where they were brought to life. Furthermore, I will analyse the correspondence exchanged between the rai and other Portuguese institutions besides spae, as well as the joint efforts at organising events, such as international congresses, or the formation of scientific committees devoted to specific matters. We will see, in the period under analysis, that both societies have contributed to the specialisation of a greater number of people in a specific scientific domain – anthropology –, as distinguished from other areas, as well as to spreading the knowledge produced by this new study field.

³ An example of these authors in the Portuguese scientific world, and particularly in the history of anthropology, is Mendes Correia (1888-1960), whose life and work I analysed in my doctoral dissertation (Matos 2012).

⁴ On the relationship between Portugal and Brazil, for example, from some of the most renowned scientists of this period (1910s – 1960s), see Matos (2013a).
The analysis of the RAI and SPAE’s relationship will allow us to determine the inclusion and exclusion dynamics regarding the production and circulation of scientific knowledge. This relationship, which involved the selection of actors and areas, or the promotion of initiatives, shows us that some structures have revealed greater strength (by being associated with countries like the United Kingdom or France) and eventually determined the standards based on which attitudes were stated, positions held and power strategies consolidated, and which were later on reproduced. Even today we still find some remnants of those phenomena.

THE FIELD AND THE CONTEXT

The challenges an archive research presents to us are huge, but according to Tristan Platt, it can be as focused as fieldwork. Documents refer to the same people and the same places we find in the chaotic fieldwork notes, relating them to others, as unknown places (Platt 2012, 31). Therefore, similarly to the life of individuals, the archive sources are open. They answer certain questions but raise further ones that remain unanswered (Platt 2012, 32).

The RAI archive is comprised of a great variety of materials (documents, photographs, films and objects). It is in a multi-storey building, is well organised and accessible to researchers; and my research there was an interesting and productive experience (Figure 17.1).

When I went to SPAE, however, I did not find an organised archive (Figure 17.2). My study forced me to create the necessary conditions for an archive or, in this case, for my own field. This material included monographs, periodicals, multimedia documents, the archive section itself, and a set of publications by the society. Given its importance, I stressed its value to the members of this society and the need for its due preservation, inventory and accessibility for other researchers. Following several measures taken since 2013, the material was inventoried for the first time in 2015\(^5\), in a procedure that involved the President of SPAE, the Rectory of the University of Porto, the Director of the Faculty of Humanities of this university, as well as the support of two assistants with archive training.

\(^5\) Once the inventory was completed, in October 2015, with minimal information (author, date, and edition), we realised that it contained 36,403 records, divided into 27,921 periodicals, 8,470 monographs and 12 multimedia units. Additionally there are 12,048 volumes of publications by SPAE, gathered in 902 boxes.
Figure 17.1  rai Archive, London, 2016.

Figure 17.2  spaE Archive, Porto, 2015.

All photographies © Patrícia Ferraz de Matos.
The part pertaining to archive material has not yet been inventoried, but I have already started consulting it (Figure 17.2). From the monograph and periodical inventory, we can conclude that the number of exchanges, as well as the number of individuals and places that have had contact with SPAE are higher than predicted. This will allow me to make a wider and more complete mapping than initially planned.

The appearance of RAI and SPAE, as well as the activities these institutions have fostered and developed, must be seen in the context of the historic period in which they occurred. On the other hand, both the local and global focus are important, as well as considering the dynamics at a formal and informal level. Besides this, it is important to understand what was decided to be included and excluded within this context. As mentioned by Adam Kuper:

Earnest science stories, such as good ethnographies, must encompass the practices of its actors, institutional structures, social networks, intellectual and material resources, as well as the relationships to other disciplines and foreign schools or with official bodies. (…) We must not reflect only upon what anthropologists speak of, but also upon who they speak to and who they exclude from that interaction.

The period analysed in this text runs from the end of the First to that of the Second World War. This period also witnesses the foundation and affirmation of SPAE as a scientific society, which stimulated the development of anthropology and sought its recognition in the university environment as an independent study domain. In England, the period from 1918 to 1945 was marked by the emergence of functionalist ethnography, the division of anthropology into sub-disciplines and the definitive institutionalisation of anthropology in universities. The RAI was connected to these processes and followed their evolution by organising conferences and publications. At the same time, it expanded its library, created the International Union of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences, and made several attempts to allow anthropology to also play a role as an applied science. During that period, the RAI was a confluence point for individuals connected to several institutions and sub-areas in anthropology.

The RAI, created in 1871, and SPAE, created in 1918, were preceded by other scientific societies, but sought to benefit from those previous experiences, both in their own, as well as in other European countries and in the USA. In Europe,
the most significant learned society, the Ethnological Society of London, was founded in 1843; and, in 1871, it was merged with the Anthropological Society of London (created in 1862) to form the RAI. Its first members were amateurs and, later on, colonial officers and missionaries followed suit. These members were gradually replaced by professional anthropologists and, in 1992, its membership already reached 2,408 (Urry 2006, 44). To receive full RAI fellowship, potential members must be proposed by Fellows who are personally acquainted with them. RAI Membership is aimed mainly at scholars who have distinguished themselves professionally or academically within the scope of humanities or social sciences. Fellows are elected by the RAI Council and can use the honorific post-nominal letters FRAI. However, the RAI does not include only academic anthropologists, but also individuals interested in anthropology, or qualified in anthropology, who are currently working in other areas.

The RAI publishes three journals: *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*\(^6\) (formerly *Man*); *Anthropology Today*; *Anthropological Index Online* (launched in 1997). Besides these, with the authorisation of the RAI Council, the title *Indian Antiquary* was published, between 1925 and 1932. The RAI’s collection is composed of films, photographs, archive material and manuscripts. Both the archive and the manuscripts correspond to a period of over 150 years. The RAI still maintains a close relationship with the British Museum’s Anthropology Library, which incorporates the former RAI Library donated to the Museum in 1976.

The RAI encompasses all fields in anthropology (at a biological, evolutionary, social, cultural, visual and medical level) and shares interests with other areas, such as archaeology, linguistics and human genetics. Its field of action is diversified by seeking to combine academic tradition with the services offered to the anthropological community. The activities promoted by the RAI seek to reach a wide audience and inform on the benefits anthropology may offer in the resolution of current, concrete issues. Among these activities are conferences, workshops or events on specific topics. One of the most appreciated is the International Film Festival, taking place every two years in partnership with United Kingdom universities.

---

6 The title used between 1907 and 1965 was *The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland*. From 1995 onwards, it bore the title *The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*. 
Such rai activities, individually and partnered by other institutions, have contributed to the diffusion of this society and its consolidation internationally. The publishing of several journals has allowed it to take in new authors and trends, and to reach more diversified audiences. The same applies to the organisation of events directed at a specialised audience, but also at the public in general.

In the Portuguese case, the institutionalisation of anthropology was parallel to the affirmation and institutionalisation of other areas. This occurred in a similar manner to other European and North American countries, but did bear its own specificities both at a local and regional level (Matos 2016). On the other hand, this process was influenced by the political and ideological context towards the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century (Matos 2012).

spae was founded in Porto in 1918. Considering the dates of other anthropological societies created in Europe – in Paris (1858), Berlin (1869), Vienna (1870), London and Italy (1871), and Sweden (1872) – spae (1918) was rather late in appearing. It is, however, important to note that spae had important predecessors in Portugal, namely the Carlos Ribeiro Society, created in Porto in 1888 (which included four departments: Geology and Palaeontology; Zoology and Botany; Anthropology; Ethnography), and the Society of Anthropology, created in Coimbra in 1896. spae was founded on the initiative of Mendes Correia (1888-1960), who graduated in Medicine from the Porto Medical and Surgical School in 1911 and would become the primary mentor of the Porto School of Anthropology, which existed as such in the first half of the 20th century. In the process of creating spae, Mendes Correia counted on the support of more experienced personalities, connected to the Faculty of Medicine and to the Faculty of Sciences of the University of Porto, and to the Polytechnic Academy in Porto. However, despite the predominance of academics in its directive bodies, spae has always counted on the presence of individuals from outside academia, that is, from the military, religious and business domains (Matos 2016).

The name of the society illustrates the initial division between anthropology (the study of the human being in terms of their physical and biological dimension) and ethnology (the study of the human being in terms of their social and cultural dimension). spae operated at the Institute of Anthropology of the University of Porto (iaup), organised several scientific meetings and regularly published the journal Trabalhos de Antropologia e Etnologia (tae).
Similarly to some of its counterparts in Europe and in the USA, SPAE gathered a small group of specialists with common academic and social interests. Besides, it grew to be an institutional space with a considerable scientific dynamic, as well as a place for debate and the exchange of ideas. SPAE is still active, promoting monthly conferences and debates, not only on historical issues, mainly related to anthropology and archaeology, but also on current matters. And it still publishes its journal, nowadays on an annual basis.

Therefore, both the RAI and SPAE have contributed to the institutionalisation process of anthropology as a science. Both have stimulated and been participative bodies in study missions in the countries where they were based and also in their respective colonies. On the other hand, they have contributed, each in its own way, to the spread of knowledge connected to anthropology, including several sub-domains.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SPAE AND THE RAI

In the period under study, Portugal still occupied a marginal spot as regards scientific production. However, in the case of SPAE, a considerable effort was made towards internationalisation. SPAE sought to widen its relationship with older and already prestigious institutions, by means of an institutional and personal correspondence, through the exchange of research and publications (books and articles), and by inviting foreign personalities to become honorary or correspondent members. This wider scope was also materialised with SPAE’s participation in the creation of the International Institute of Anthropology (IIA), founded in Paris in 1920, and in organising several international events.

The RAI was among the institutions to which SPAE was connected. There are several examples of the exchange of correspondence between the RAI and SPAE, as well as between the RAI and the University of Porto, since some of SPAE’s members were connected to the university’s faculties of humanities, science and medicine. SPAE invited some RAI members to participate in the society. For example, Arthur Keith, member of the RAI, was proposed as SPAE’s correspondent member on December 26th, 1918. Later on, some of SPAE’s

---

7 On the production of scientific knowledge on the Portuguese colonies, see Matos (2013b, 2018).

8 Livro de Actas da Sociedade Portuguesa de Antropologia e Etnologia I, 1918-1924.
members, connected to the University of Porto, also became members of the RAI. This is the case of Mendes Correia, elected an honorary member of the RAI in 1956. This fact was considered of great importance in Portugal, since the RAI was referred to as “one of the most highly-ranked aeropaguses in the world” (AAVV 1957, 125), which became the reason for organising an event honouring Mendes Correia, at Lisbon’s Geographic Society on April 4th, 1957 (Matos 2012, 31-32).

The cooperation between SPAE and the RAI included the exchange of publications and cooperation in the journals published by both societies – the _jrai/Man_ and the _tae_. The promise by SPAE’s directive council to set up links and exchanges with the RAI was kept as early as in 1919 (report dated January 22nd, 1920). Among SPAE’s material, we can find several copies of periodicals originating from the RAI and also copies that were exchanged. One of the articles included in those exchanges and that appears isolated (that is, it is not simply integrated in a journal volume, but is there also as an offprint sent by the author himself) is by Arthur Keith, and is entitled “On certain factors concerned in the evolution of human races”, having been published in volume 46 of the _jrai_, in 1916, pp. 10-34.

The oldest of RAI’s editions we can find at SPAE is number 3, from volume 20, of _The Journal of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland_ dated 1891. And the most recent seems to be volume 35, numbers 198 to 217, dated 1935. I cannot fathom the motive for this interruption in sending the volumes to SPAE. It was the middle of the 1930s, four years away from the beginning of the Second World War and, back then, there were several subjects of interest for both societies. In any case, this exchange reflects the importance that SPAE, and its members, had attributed to RAI’s publications since its inception.

Bearing this in mind, the analysis of the subjects published by the RAI that caught the attention of Portuguese authors is one of my ongoing lines of research towards a full assessment of the impact of RAI’s publications, expressed as quotes and references in articles, books and papers presented at conferences. In other words, I intend to determine which subjects attracted Portuguese authors, at the expense of others, which ones were excluded or ignored, despite the relevance they might have once had in other contexts.

One predominant area, for both the RAI and SPAE, was physical anthropology. In the case of the RAI, the presence of the racial issue, the efforts by Miriam L. Tildesley (from the late 1920s) to encourage the creation of a standardisation
technique (in the area of anthropometric measurements), and the creation of projects on blood groups, stand out.\textsuperscript{9} A further important topic was eugenics. In fact, in the late 1920s and during the 1930s, ideas on “race” and eugenics reached their peak in the whole of Europe.\textsuperscript{10} For example, Miriam L. Tildesley (1883-1979)\textsuperscript{11} wrote, on June 26\textsuperscript{th}, 1930, to foreign anthropologists to invite them to the meeting of the International Federation of Eugenic Organisations and proposed international cooperation between anthropologists. Tildesley took the occasion to convey one of her greatest interests: the establishment of standardisation at the level of anthropometric techniques:

You will have received (…) an invitation from the Secretary of the International Federation of Eugenic Organisations to take part in a conference which is being held in England from September 10\textsuperscript{th} to 14\textsuperscript{th}. The Eugenists are anxious to systematise and develop the anthropometric side of their work, and are making this matter one of the special subjects to be dealt with at their conference. They are therefore inviting leading anthropometrists from various countries to take part in the discussion of this matter.

The standardisation of anthropometric technique is a subject in which I myself am greatly interested, to the extent of having formulated a plan by which we might achieve agreement upon a standard minimum list of characters and a standard technique, in measuring the living.\textsuperscript{12}

The \textit{rai} published articles on physical anthropology by authors connected to several institutions, as was the case of F. Rozprým of the Anthropological Institute of the Masaryk University (created in 1919, in Brno, the Czech Republic). F. Rozprým published “Eyebrows and Eyelashes in Man: Their different forms, pigmentation and heredity”, in volume 64 of the \textit{JRAI} dated 1934 (pp. 353-395), and this was one of the texts exchanged with \textit{SPAE}.

\textsuperscript{9} See on this topic: “Report to the Council of the Royal Anthropological Institute by M. L. Tildesley” (\textit{RAI} Archive: Congrès International des Sciences Anthropologiques et Ethnologiques, 1912-34; 1937-9 (A62, 3 of 6, 151/1).

\textsuperscript{10} On the subject of eugenics in Portugal, see Pereira (2001), Matos (2010), and Cleminson (2014).

\textsuperscript{11} Member of the Royal College of Surgeons, London, and member of the \textit{RAI} Council 1933-59. She was strongly influenced by mathematician and biostatistician Karl Pearson (1857-1936), author of the biography of Francis Galton (1822-1911).

\textsuperscript{12} \textit{RAI} Archive: Congrès International…, 1912-34; 1937-9 (A62, 3 of 6, 151/8).
I do not intend to carry out a survey of all countries connected to the authors who published through the RAI, but I’m interested in the activity of the authors who had a relationship with Portugal. And actually, so far, among RAI’s publications, I have not found articles by Mendes Correia nor by other authors related to SPAE, the University of Porto or other Portuguese institutions. Even if they exist, I believe that there will be only a few examples. It therefore appears that these authors, and authors generally connected to Portugal, were not exactly included in the RAI’s publishing activities. The analysis thus far leads me to conclude that this relationship was unequal, since it seems to have been more proactive on the Portuguese side, and several examples show an apparent protagonism from their British counterparts.

ORGANISATION OF CONGRESSES AND EXCHANGE OF CORRESPONDENCE

The cooperation between members of these societies has been recorded mostly in the regular correspondence and within the scope of the organisation of events, such as international congresses. There are also letters received by the RAI from individuals connected to Portugal (at the then metropolis or in the colonial territories), which were sent primarily from Porto and Coimbra, although there are also several examples from Lisbon. The Portuguese António Aurélio da Costa Ferreira (1879-1922), for example, graduated in Medicine at the University of Coimbra, subsequently connected to Lisbon, was a local correspondent of the RAI from 1910.

The question of being, or not being included as a member of these societies, institutions or scientific committees of events should not be underestimated, since this membership is precisely what allowed them to attend congresses, publish in journals or take part in decisions on future initiatives. Perhaps for this reason, some Portuguese scientists endeavoured to obtain that membership. For example, concerning the standardisation of anthropometric techniques, there were two competing committees that organised activities separately.

13 However, concerning the jrai, I found a document in the RAI’s archives (A25 – 4 of 4) related to an article entitled “Les indices Robustesse chez les Mahrattes de l’Inde portugaise”, by Alberto Carlos Germano da Silva Correia (Panjim [Goa], 1888 – Lisbon, 1967), director of the Goa Surgery and Medical School (located in the then Portuguese India). This article was probably sent to Herbert John Fleure, from the RAI, on November 23rd, 1934, but was not even registered.
According to the documentation kept in the archive by Aleš Hrdlička\textsuperscript{14}, at the Smithsonian Institution, in Washington D.C., Mendes Correia belonged to these two committees, simultaneously, which is rather surprising.\textsuperscript{15} This Portuguese author was in fact connected to several networks, in various countries, that could be dedicated to different domains and even be rivals.

Regarding the organisation of events in the studied period, I found materials related to the International Congress of Prehistoric and Protohistoric Sciences (Congrès International de Sciences Préhistoriques et Protohistoriques), and to the Congrès International des Sciences Anthropologiques et Ethnologiques.

These congresses are related to the story of the International Union of the Prehistoric and Protohistoric Sciences. It began in 1865 when the Congrès paléoethnologique international (\textit{cpi}) was created, during a meeting of the Italian Society of Natural Sciences. In 1867, the \textit{cpi} took the name of Congrès International d’Anthropologie et d’Archéologie Préhistoriques (\textit{ciaap}). Between 1866 and 1912, fourteen congresses were organised. At the session of the \textit{ciaap} in Lisbon, in 1880, a Permanent Council was created. The last pre-war meeting of the \textit{ciaap} took place in Geneva in 1912.

In its turn, the International Institute of Anthropology (\textit{iia}), founded in 1920, and which tried to reunite anthropologists and archaeologists after the First World War, was mainly French-inspired. The \textit{iia}, however, differed from the \textit{ciaap}: its focus was anthropology, in a wider sense (the study of communities, comparative religion, folklore, among other subjects); prehistoric archaeology comprised a smaller section and, moreover, the researchers from the war’s defeated nations were excluded from the \textit{iia}’s activities (Nenquin and Bourgeois, n. d.). Several anthropologists and prehistoric historians chose, therefore, not to join the \textit{iia}. Some of them, such as Marcellin Boule (palaeontologist) and René Verneau (anthropologist), both from the Paris Museum of Natural History and correspondent members of \textit{spae}, Hugo Obermaier (German palaeontologist, correspondent member of \textit{spae}) and Pedro Bosch-Gimpera (Catalan archaeologist who published in \textit{tae}), tried to continue \textit{ciaap}’s international path.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{14} Aleš Hrdlička founded and became the first curator of physical anthropology of the USA National Museum (now the Smithsonian Institution National Museum of Natural History) in 1903. He was also the founder of the American Journal of Physical Anthropology.

\textsuperscript{15} Archive of Aleš Hrdlička at the Smithsonian Institution Archives Collections (Accession 05-123, Personal Records, 1892-1952, Box 11 of 22).

\textsuperscript{16} On these authors and their influence in Portugal, see Matos (2012).
The cooperation between the members of the CIAAP Permanent Council and the IIA Executive Committee led to the decision (in October 1928) to host the 15th session of the CIAAP and the 4th session of the IIA in Portugal, during September 1930, under the denomination Congrès International d’Anthropologie et d’Archéologie Préhistorique. However, on the IIA’s initiative, only the members of the Congrès that were simultaneously members of the IIA would be allowed to vote at that meeting. As a consequence, the 15th Congrès was suspended. A small committee was then formed in Porto (September 27th, 1930), composed of the members who still belonged to the Permanent Committee, the Presidents of the IIA and of the RAI, and other members, with the aim of assessing the relationship between the IIA and the Congrès. At that committee’s meeting in Paris, on December 22nd, 1930, John Myres (1869-1954), President of the RAI, argued that a separate management of the two organisations was fundamental, and the majority of the attendees agreed that the 1928 agreement had been a mistake.17

In 1929, during the International Congress of Archaeology, in Barcelona, a separate development took place that led Bosch-Gimpera to summon a conference in Bern, on May 28th 1931, to discuss the future organisation of international congresses, exclusively on prehistoric archaeology, with a truly international character and with no exclusions. The following was decided in Bern: (i) to separate prehistoric studies from general anthropology; (ii) to not reinstate the former pre-war Congrès, but rather create a new one called Congrès International des Sciences Préhistoriques et Protohistoriques (CISPP). On the initiative of the Society of Antiquaries and of the RAI, the first meeting of the recently created congress took place in London in 1932. The new Permanent Council was then formed by archaeologists from 35 different nations. Therefore, it is also from the organisation of scientific meetings that anthropology began to have some autonomy from areas such as archaeology and pre-history.

The demise of the old Congrès also resulted in the establishment of the new Congrès International des Sciences Anthropologiques e Ethnologiques. The first meeting of this congress took place in London and Oxford, in 1934; and, at the time, it was to be held every four years. The second one took place in Copenhagen in 1938; the third one could not be held in 1942 (due to the Second World War), and was rescheduled to 1947, in Prague, but was only held

in 1948, in Brussels and Tervuren. Subsequently, it was organised every four years, as initially planned. Therefore, the fourth meeting happened in 1952, in Vienna, the fifth in 1956, in Philadelphia, and the sixth in 1960, in Paris.

This congress had a Permanent Council that coordinated the event. It included four members of each country, assisted by one or two National Secretaries. The members of this Permanent Council were elected, and it also included authors connected to Portugal. For example, at the congress’ London Session, in 1934, the following Portuguese representatives were present: Mendes Correia, Eusébio Tamagnini (professor at the University of Coimbra), and the National Secretaries, Vítor Fontes (President of the Anthropology Committee of the Lisbon Geographic Society), and J.R. dos Santos Júnior (professor at the University of Porto). Of these four, only Mendes Correia and Vítor Fontes took part in the event. The consulted document states that “Fontes is a physical anthropologist and read a paper on ‘Sur la morphologie du cou’”. According to the previous document, the rai has no record of who were the representatives of Portugal and the usa in the Permanent Council of the Copenhagen Meeting in 1938. The analysis of these documents suggests that Portugal exhibited a certain neutrality, while other countries, such as the United Kingdom or France, fought among themselves for protagonism. This attitude may nevertheless be related to the goal of the scientific community in Portugal, at least partly, to be recognised internationally, without leveraging national rivalries.

Portugal, and the individuals connected to this country, may also be included in the topics dealt with in documents they were not directly involved in. This happened, for example, in a letter written by E. J. Lindgren (Liaison Officer, from the British Council) to David Shillan (British Council), on April 14th, 1944, where he mentions that he intends to deal with “Portuguese affairs”:

18 The Permanent Research Committees are: “Standardisation of anthropological technique”; “International research on Arctic peoples and culture”; “Organisation and employment of films in anthropology and ethnography”; “Compilation of a comparative vocabulary of anthropological and ethnological terms”, later called “The study and definition of anthropological and ethnological terms”. The subsequent Committees included: “The conditions of anthropological and ethnological teaching in the countries represented at the Congress”, and “the obstacles to the admission of these studies in public education and Conservation of Aboriginal peoples whose modes of life are scientific interest”.


20 rai Archive: Congrès International… Conseil Permanent (A93, papers 1934-54, 93/3/1).
I am taking the liberty to enclose, for your personal use, a copy of a confidential account by Sir John Myres of the present position regarding the international congresses of prehistory and anthropology which he did so much to establish between the two wars. His references to the mauvais congrès may be explained by saying, briefly, that (as I have been told) after the last war the French insisted on substituting for a previous, ‘truly international’, series one dominated by the French and their Eastern European allies, and excluding ex-enemy scientists. The British delegates fought this in meeting after meeting, of the executive but, on being finally defeated towards the end of the twenties, decided to sponsor another series, of this old type. The Prehistoric ones met in 1932 and 1936 and the one for ‘Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences’ in 1934 (London) and 1938 (Copenhagen). The latter two I attended and they were a conspicuous success; their influence indeed spread far beyond their particular sector of the social sciences.

You will see from Sir John’s remarks that, very wisely, he wishes us to avoid the mistake the French made before, and that is why he favours our accepting the earlier Portuguese invitation (if renewed) rather than suggesting that we start afresh once more, and once more in London. In any case I shall, as you see, be sounding out the Congress officials in USA, and, if I do return via Lisbon (which is probably), also the Portuguese anthropologists who were in Copenhagen in 1938.

According to this letter, the organisation of congresses dedicated mainly to a scientific domain, in this case anthropology (separately from archaeology and prehistory), could actually be a success. In a conflictive atmosphere between the United Kingdom and France, it is the president of the RAI himself, John Myres, who favours the acceptance of Portugal’s offer to host the following International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences, and not London; so that other countries might be given an opportunity and to display a truly international attitude. This example was yet another result of the Portuguese scientific community’s efforts towards being included in the international meanders concerning the organisation of large events.

These letters sometimes unveil comments and confidences related to the context in which they were written and include matters related to politics and war. Among them, I sought to determine if these matters altered or disrupted the relationship between Portugal and the United Kingdom. During the Second World War, some reminders arise reinforcing the idea that science should be above political interests. This happens, for example, in a letter by

21 Underlined in the original.
John L. Myers (RAI Hon. Secretary), dated April 6th, 1944, to E. J. Lindgren (British Council), on reconstructing the international congresses, where he mentions that he hopes “to get scientific problems and organisations free from political considerations”.

Also in a letter from Stallman (RAI Assistant Secretary, 1941-52), dated July 3rd, 1944, to John L. Myers, it is stated that “care must be taken over ‘political’ aspects”.

On the other hand, the research produced during that period, and the changes and limitations it brought, were among the subjects dealt with. The topic of war was also the main theme of the article, “Anthropology on the continent of Europe in war-time” by William Buller Fagg (Hon. Secretary of RAI). Published in Nature in 1946 (London, vol. 158, July 6th), it talks of the meeting of the Permanent Council that took place in England that same year, and begins by saying:

As has already been reported in Nature of May 18, p. 665, the Permanent Council of the International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences visited England during April at the invitation of the Royal Anthropological Institute, and a most success meeting was organised at Oxford by Sir John Myres, one of the joint secretaries of the Congress, to make arrangements for next full meeting and to advance the work of the standing committees. The Royal Anthropological Institute took advantage of this gathering to invite the delegates to read short papers at informal meetings of the Institute in London, on the days immediately preceding and following the Oxford meetings, as a means of making better known in Britain and among the delegates themselves the progress made in anthropological science in their several countries since the outbreak of war brought international contacts to a stop. (Fagg 1946, 1)

The article by Fagg highlights the meeting of the congress’ Permanent Council and stresses the fact that this opportunity allowed some of the international delegates to read their papers at informal meetings. Among them was the Portuguese Eusébio Tamagnini, who presented the paper entitled, “Progress in Portugal in anthropological and ethnological studies”. Fagg is very positive about Tamagnini’s text and the work of other Portuguese in the domains of physical anthropology and archaeology:

22 RAI Archive: Congrès International… Conseil Permanent (A93, papers 1934-54, 93/3/2).
23 RAI Archive: Congrès International… Conseil Permanent (A93, papers 1934-54, 93/3/9).
24 RAI Archive: Congrès International… Conseil Permanent (A93, papers 1934-54, 93/4/8).
In physical anthropology, as in domestic ethnography, Great Britain lags at present far behind, and Prof. Tamagnini’s talk on April 18, outlining remarkable progress made in Portugal, was fresh salutary proof of this. After a short sketch of the history of anthropological studies in Portugal (with their emphasis from the beginning on the physical side), he summarised current research activities at Lisbon (under Héleno, de Vilhena and Barbosa Sueiro), Porto (Mendes Corrêa and Pires de Lima) and Coimbra (the speaker himself and Serra). Finally, he described his own Institute’s very large and important statistical undertaking, in which the genealogical method is being applied in the study of blood groups and other characters among great numbers of families in the Department of Coimbra. (Fagg 1946, 7)

Therefore, the circumstance of war does not seem to have influenced, at least apparently, the relationship between Portugal and the United Kingdom, nor cooperation in scientific production. The correspondence with authors connected to Portugal, or with references to this country, also appears in some folders of the RAI’s manuscript collection concerning the following authors: William Crooke (1848-1923), ethnologist and folklorist; Arthur Keith (1866-1965), anatomist and anthropologist; and Herbert John Fleure (1877-1969), zoologist and geographer. The names of these scientists and the areas they were focused on reinforce the idea that, despite the endeavour on behalf of anthropology’s autonomy, the input received from specialists in other areas also contributed to further deepening some of its subdomains.

CONCLUSION

From the study of the relationship between the RAI and SPAE, with a focus on the production, legitimation and knowledge circulation processes, we are able to study inclusion and exclusion dynamics. The RAI has allowed several individuals to internationalise their work and has consolidated its position in the international context. During the period under study, Portugal was a peripheral country in terms of scientific production. Nevertheless, examples such as SPAE reveal the effort of the Portuguese scientific community towards internationalisation. SPAE’s internationalisation strategy included contacts with the RAI. It invited members of the RAI to be its own members and collaborators. Later on, some of SPAE’s members and/or people connected to the University of Porto became members of the RAI. There was also
mutual collaboration in the organisation of events, such as international congresses.

Both the rai and spaé have fostered scientific studies, not only in the countries where they were created (Portugal and England), but also in the countries under their colonial administration. The activities developed by the rai and spaé demonstrate the role of scientific societies in contributing to the development of anthropological studies and to the consolidation of anthropology as a university subject, in the period from 1918 to 1960. Both societies have risen as spaces of reflection on issues regarded as pertinent and have allowed an ever greater number of people to specialise in a new scientific area. Furthermore, both the conferences these societies have organised, and the editions they have published have contributed to the diffusion of the knowledge produced within the scope of anthropology.

In this process, however, over time we observed strategies of inclusion and exclusion (of individuals, institutions, scientific domains and subjects). Within anthropology, I concluded that one of the most frequent areas in correspondence and publications was physical anthropology. Among this area’s main topics we found “race”, the standardisation technique, blood groups and eugenics. However, despite the interest several Portuguese authors showed in these topics, these authors’ presence does not stand out and seems almost inexistent in rai’s publications.

The study of the relationship between the rai and spaé allows us to understand other dynamics. Over the years, for example, the designation of large international congresses kept changing, sometimes emphasising anthropology, sometimes archaeology and pre-history, or else including them all. My research has revealed how some researchers have refused to cooperate with the iia, due to the latter’s imposed rules (exclusion of researchers from the First World War’s defeated nations and the disdain towards archaeology), and favoured their relationship with the ciaap, more inclusive at an international level. However, the rivalries between the iia and the ciaap, which led to disputes sometimes between authors and institutions, sometimes between the United Kingdom and France, paved the way for Portugal, as a peripheral country, to be able to leverage these circumstances and reach some prominence. This was also a consequence of the Portuguese scientific community’s attempts at internationalisation. Furthermore, and despite national disputes, the organisation of large congresses led to autonomy for anthropology, through a differentiation from subjects such as archaeology and pre-history.
Finally, the matters related to politics or the Second World War have apparently not influenced the relationship between Portugal and the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, it appears that several dynamics existed (internal and external) that promoted certain scientific domains and subdomains, as well as their sponsors, but neglecting others. This is due to factors that involve sometimes associations, sometimes rivalries (personal, institutional, national), but also motives influenced by the international context, namely the two world wars. The situation also meant some studies, such as those related to “race”, to anthropometric standardisation techniques and to eugenics, until the end of the Second World War (1945). At a later stage, there was also the major promotion of studies related to “culture” and biological studies that turned away from racial (and racist) analyses. The study of these subjects allows us therefore to reflect on the way the historical, social, economic and geopolitical context influences, not only the formation of networks in the academic and scientific environment, but also the construction of knowledge, its diffusion and its recognition at a national and international level.

**ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

This study was supported by FCT under Grant SFRH/BPD 91349/2012, and by the Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa, under Grant UID/SOC/50012/2013.

---

**REFERENCES**


ARCHIVES

ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL INSTITUTE, London.
CONGRÈS INTERNATIONAL DES SCIENCES ANTHROPOLOGIQUES ET ETHNOLOGIQUES, 1912-34; 1937-9 (A62, 01 of 06, 11), (A62, 3 of 6, 151/1; 151/8).
CONGRÈS INTERNATIONAL DES SCIENCES ANTHROPOLOGIQUES ET ETHNOLOGIQUES, Conseil Permanent (A93, papers 1934-54, 93/3/1), (A93, papers 1934-54, 93/3/2), (A93, papers 1934-54, 93/3/7), (A93, papers 1934-54, 93/4/8), (A93, papers 1934--54, 93/3/9).
SOCIEDADE PORTUGUESA DE ANTROPOLOGIA E ETNOLOGIA, Porto.
LIVRO DE ACTAS DA SOCIEDADE PORTUGUESA DE ANTROPOLOGIA E ETNOLOGIA II, 1925-1944, Porto: Sociedade Portuguesa de Antropologia e Etnologia.
SEVERAL DOCUMENTS NOT YET INVENTORIED OR CATALOGUED.

CITE THIS CHAPTER AS:
https://doi.org/10.31447/ics9789726715030.17
Inclusion processes in work cultures and their impacts: a comparison of Portuguese and Mozambican cases

Paulo Granjo
João Feijó
It is not uncommon to hear, in the speech of managers and politicians, expressions connecting “work” to “culture” or “ethics”. In English, the phrase “work ethic” comes up often, with some people claiming to have learnt it from their parents, or demanding it from their employees. In Portuguese, and especially in Mozambique, the *cultura do trabalho* (lit. “labour culture”) is also often demanded from employees and “the People”.

An interesting point in this usually acritical emission and reception of words and meanings is that, in both cases, ethics and culture are not used in the plural. In fact, the speaker presupposes that there is only one “work ethic”, only one “labour culture”, with the characteristics they believe are the positive ones. These are claimed for themselves, and demanded from others in order to make them become “good workers”, or a “good People”.

So, the economically and/or politically powerful person encourages the dominated and poorer ones to adopt attitudes and concepts which they claim (or implicitly suggest) are at the root of their success. *This is the path to being included* in a group of wealthier and empowered people, although obviously not in the speaker’s own group. Therefore, in such speeches, it is the dominated and poorer people’s fault (and not the fault of the leaders and the rich, nor of the economic or political systems) that they are *excluded* from wealth and power, due to their lack of labour ethics and culture that, besides being the correct ones, are also unique.

Although we will return to this subject – when analysing the historical and socio-economic contexts that produced speeches accusing the Mozambican People of “laziness” – the focus of this article is not the normative, hegemonic\(^1\) and putatively unique labour “ethics” and “culture”. It is rather on the actual and multiple labour cultures and ethics that we can observe in specific working contexts, their deep connection to labour conditions and to the local processes of inclusion within the working group, and their consequences for the safety and production.

We will therefore explore the continuities and contrasts between three labour contexts studied by the authors over recent decades\(^2\): the shop floor of

---

\(^1\) In the Gramscian sense of ideology produced by the dominant classes in order to legitimate their domination, and integrated by the subordinated into their own ideology (Gramsci 1971).

\(^2\) Despite employing different disciplinary frameworks (anthropology and sociology) each of the three long-term research studies used multiple methodologies, with a predominance of direct observation and interviews. Such similarities, together with the authors’ critical empathy for the workers’ points of view, have probably enhanced the comparative potential of the studies. The fieldwork periods for
the larger Portuguese and Mozambican industrial corporations, the Petrogal oil refinery at Sines and the Mozal primary aluminium smelter, and smaller companies with Mozambican, Portuguese or Chinese management, operating in the metropolitan area of the Mozambican capital, Maputo.

The comparisons will be based on two aspects. By comparing the large Portuguese and Mozambican industrial plants, we will focus on the different processes and aims of the new workers’ *inclusion* in the companies and their daily work, and the effect of such differences on labour attitudes, the concepts and practices regarding labour hazards and industrial safety. By comparing the large aluminium smelter and the smaller companies in the Maputo area, we will focus on how different labour conditions, wages and management policies innovate within or reproduce the locally predominant labour cultures, and promote *inclusions* and *exclusions* from the workers’ role models desired by managers and politicians.

In the process, we will both analyse the factors for the striking differences we can observe, and the ambiguity and multiplicity of *inclusion* meanings, according to the contexts and people involved.

THE AUTONOMOUS OIL REFINERS OF SINES

Back in 1978, a new oil refinery was built near Sines, on the southwestern Portuguese coast. The first workers hired were experts from Angolan and Mozambican refineries, returning to Portugal after the independence of those new countries. Some of their friends from colonial times were then hired from colonial times and, finally, some local youngsters with certificates from “industrial high schools”.

The *inclusion* of newcomers presented the experienced workers with a problem that persists today: there is no teaching or training for oil refining

---

3 Until 1976, Portuguese high schools were divided into “industrial”, “commercial” (both focused on professional training) and *liceus*, the latter allowing access to university. The data for this subject was collected by Paulo Granjo during the research project “Power and risk in the rational and symbolic production of labour in an industrial corporation”, in 1994/1997, coordinated by José Fialho Feliciano and financed by *jnict* (for broader approaches to this field, see Granjo 1998, 2002, 2004, 2006 and 2007).

The research were undertaken in the second half of the 1990s (Petrogal, see Granjo 2004), in the early 2000s (Mozal, see Granjo 2003; 2008a) and in the early 2010s (Maputo, see Feijó 2015).
labour, outside or inside the company. New workers must learn while performing their jobs in a very hazardous technological environment, where they can jeopardise themselves and their co-workers due to ignorance or negligence.

The solution they found, and which has been followed by subsequent generations of workers, is unusual in industrial factories (Granjo 2004, 2007) and unexpectedly fits the model of legitimate peripheral participation, proposed by Jean Lave (1991).

In short, the professional training is organised by the workers themselves, who supervise the newcomers and show them how to do the various aspects of the job. They are gradually allowed to perform tasks of rising responsibility and danger – at first under supervision, later on their own. This goes along with the recurrent repetition of the sentence, “If you don’t know, you don’t touch”.

However, the explicit or tacit authorisation for performing a new task does not only depend on the acknowledgment, by the experienced worker, that the newcomer already knows how to do it correctly. It also demands acknowledgment that the new worker is already assimilated and respects the notions and attitudes towards labour and danger that the community of experienced workers believes to be correct – or, at least, that they have assimilated and respect them sufficiently to perform that specific task without putting everybody else in danger.

So, the professional training and inclusion is achieved through a centripetal participation in current labour activities, whose speed depends on the acquisition of both technical knowledge and group identity. In this rite of passage-like process (Gennep 1978; Turner 1969), the newcomer endures a situation of integrative liminality, which will lead to their full inclusion in the workers’ group, usually after facing “their” first emergency shutdown with proficiency, selflessness and courage: one of the most dangerous and complex events in an oil refinery (see Figure 18.1).

In fact, this worker training and inclusion process produces six complementary and direct consequences.

In the short-term, it neutralises the new workers’ potential to become a factor and source of danger. But it also produces lasting and structural effects, through the transmission and imposition of the key representations and emotions shared by the group:

By making the surrounding hazards and their relative importance clear, it reinforces the conditions for accident avoidance.
By emphasising the permanent possibility of an emergency and what to do if it occurs, it reinforces the ability to detect abnormal situations, and the individual and collective response to them.

By conveying the necessity to react immediately to accidents when they happen, in order to avoid uncontrollable and worse outcomes, it reduces their consequences.

By imposing mutual co-worker responsibility and solidarity, it inhibits dangerous actions and reinforces trust and help during emergency situations.

Last but not at all least, by reproducing a non-probabilistic notion of “danger” – which states that many hazards are unpredictable and may turn into accidents any moment and everywhere – it induces and maintains a precautionary attitude and avoidance of risk amongst the workers.

Therefore, this inclusion process moulds the workers’ representations and feelings, together with the labour practices. But it also moulds other labour groups inside the refinery, and interacts with a social factor of danger potentiation, which is central to the factory *modus operandi* and safety.

The moulding of other labour groups arises from the fact that, in order to gain promotion in a refining career, almost everybody⁴ has, beforehand, to have been a regular “exterior worker”, dealing directly and physically with the huge

---

⁴ As an experiment, however, some technical engineers were occasionally hired as “control operators”.

---
refining machinery and, consequently, have been moulded by the inclusion process described. The subsequent posts in the refining hierarchy are the “control operators”, who survey the functioning parameters of the machinery through a computer system, detect abnormal temperatures, pressures and fluxes, and decide when and how to change them, or if emergency action is needed. Next, we have the “shift supervisors”, who are both administrative chiefs and the ultimate safety and technical decision-makers during each eight-hour labour shift, since the refinery must be operated continuously.

The other labour group in the production area are the engineers, who work from 9 am to 5 pm and are responsible for one “unit” (aggregates of machinery that perform a specific function in the production process) or for a sector of the factory, where they are both the technical and hierarchical chiefs. They have never worked on the shop floor, but were socialised and moulded at university. For that reason, they have a detached and abstract relationship with the technical hazards. They don’t share the worker-rooted values and feelings of personal responsibility for everybody else’s safety. Moreover, although they would not be able to calculate the probabilities for a specific hazardous situation to become an accident, they perceive and evaluate the hazards according to a notion of probabilistic “risk”.

The engineers at various hierarchical levels are pressed to maximise production, and their evaluation as “good engineers” and their subsequent career depend on it. The factors we have just mentioned therefore induce a hierarchical tendency to face dangerous casuistic situations according to impressionistic evaluations about the low probability of them causing a serious accident. Consequently, there is a tendency to put pressure on their subordinates to keep working under (or to adopt) abnormal or more dangerous proceedings, if this will keep production levels high, avoid a safety shutdown, or speed-up the process of resuming production.

Of course, the submission to such pressures would induce new hazards, which would be primarily faced by the workers who actually operate the

---

5 To deepen the conceptual differentiation between probabilistic “risk” and non-probabilistic “danger”, as different social representations and models in a continuum of diverse “domestication of uncertainty” possibilities, see Granjo (2004; 2008a and 2008b).

6 Most “units” take more than a day to stabilise and start manufacturing products to commercial standards after a shutdown and, in the meantime, crude is wasted. So, besides the loss of production while they stop, both the shutdowns and the resuming processes are very expensive.
machinery. Being aware of that and continuing to share (to varying degrees) the concepts, values, feelings and practices conveyed to them during their process of inclusion in the workers’ group, the shift supervisors or the control operators may and do resist such pressures, when they believe the increase in danger to be too high to take the risk.

In contrast, if they assess such an increase in danger as being acceptable (or, at least, acceptable enough when compared to the damage that a firm refusal to obey may cause their reputation and chances of promotion), they will usually submit to the hierarchical pressures, and reproduce such pressure over the workers of the sector they are in charge of.

When this happens and the workers who deal directly with the machinery evaluate the danger as being too high to face, they will tend to resist. Preferably (in order to protect their reputation and future career), using tricks that impose the output they want without explicitly confronting the hierarchy. For instance, the walkie-talkies may “stop” functioning correctly, or their experienced knowledge about the details of the machinery may be capitalised on in order to deceive the alarm sensors and impede the operations continuing under conditions and parameters which they reject. If there is no other way, they may exceptionally refuse to obey, after arguing why.

Therefore, the worker inclusion process – and particularly the representation of non-probabilistic danger and the values it reproduces – provides, besides the safety consequences mentioned above, the reduction of extra danger through hierarchical pressures. By doing so, it increases safety and has probably prevented several major accidents in this oil refinery.

THE MOZAL SMELTER “MINERS”

At the turn of the century, a state-of-the-art aluminium smelter started production near the Mozambican capital, Maputo. Its managers wanted to integrate the future workers, moulding them from a “blank sheet of paper”. Therefore, they did not contract candidates with previous industrial experience,7 and implemented a long school-like training programme. In the classes, they used to teach every future job action according to a dossier of “Best Operation Proceedings”, each one of them listing in detail all actions to

7 Or “with bad vices”, in a manager’s own words.
be performed in a single working task, how to do them and their sequence. Much attention was also given to safety proceedings and to the repetition of the slogan “Safety comes first, production comes second.”

The workers-to-be were glad to attend such classes because, while doing so, they started getting salaries some 10 times higher than in other factories. Besides, completed high school education was required to become a worker at Mozal and most new workers had finished their school days recently, so it didn’t seem strange to them to learn how to work in a classroom. On the contrary, their idea of their future job added to their self-esteem, since it was “so demanding that you have to learn it like you learn maths”.

A few years later, when one of the authors started his fieldwork on the shop floor, the level of workers’ expertise, productivity and proceedings compliance was indeed quite exceptional, by local or international standards. However, some strange and recurrent details called for his attention.

On the floor of the potrooms (1 km long galleries, each one of them with a line of 144 pots where the aluminium is extracted from the rough mineral by a 335 000 Amp electrolysis, at 960º C), a line was painted dividing the areas where it was compulsory, or not, to wear a very uncomfortable gas and dust mask. However, most of the workers wear them all the time, in both areas, from the moment they enter the potroom. Many of them even wear masks when operating a crane inside a hermetic cabin, which they know to be protected by air conditioning with gas and dust filters.

Even in the open air, outside the potrooms, a worker was once seen wearing a mask while driving a vehicle where a suspended container with 23 tons of melted aluminium was shaking in front of him. He had forgotten, however, to close the container safety cover and could have been killed by even a splash of the liquefied metal.

It was even more puzzling that, although workers were usually overzealous about mask wearing and other safety proceedings, nobody seemed to fully comply with an established rule which was crucial for environmental safety inside the potrooms. Since the air (and the toxic gases and dust resulting from

8 Reduction Operator (the key expertise in the potrooms), 2003.

9 The data for this subject was collected during Paulo Granjo’s post-doctoral research “Social appropriation of danger and industrial technology: comparative perspective Mozambique/Portugal”, supported by a grant from FCT, between 2002 and 2004, with ulterior monitoring until 2015. For a detailed description of this subject, see Granjo (2003).
the melting process) is permanently vacuumed from the pots and filtered in another area of the factory, the doors and hoods that access the interior of the pots must only be opened to perform some necessary operation, and kept carefully closed both afterwards and between distinct phases of this process. Nevertheless, the doors of several potrooms were kept open when routine operations had to be performed consecutively in all of them, and up to 1/4 of the lateral hoods of the pots were put back roughly in their place, allowing the air to freely escape from the pots to the working area.

Therefore, one could observe an – internationally very rare (Duclos 1991; Granjo 2004) – focus of workers’ attention on their personal protection from invisible dangers whose effects can only be noticed in the medium and long term. This, however, went hand-in-hand with less attention both to visible dangers that can harm or kill immediately, and to collective protection of the labour environment. In order to understand such practices, we need to take into account the local social representation about this smelter and about industrial labour.

No worker, of course, is a “blank sheet of paper”; nor is their labour representation locked inside the factory walls. They are daily members of diverse communities, in a society that shares and reinterprets many cultural benchmarks. In this case, a society which devoted a great deal of speculation to make sense of this 1.340 million USD investment in a poor country.

The announcement of such huge foreign investment, just 3 years after the Civil War, raised the folk belief that the factory would be built in Mozambique because it was very pollutant, so nobody else wanted it in their country. This image was a key element in the conceptual model adopted for perceiving the plant and the work performed there.

In fact, the previously established industries were not a suitable model for this new situation. They were popularly seen as national, obsolete, falling to pieces, managed in an easy-going or even corrupt way: characteristics that were the opposite of what was being said about the big factory to come.

On the other hand, the folk labour conceptualisations have, since colonialism, highlighted the experience of mining migration to South Africa,

---

10 Most Maputo inhabitants are familiar with (and reinterpret and mobilise differently, according to the contexts and circumstances – Granjo 2008a) diverse cultural references, such as those from “traditional” rural origins, the scientific conveyed by schools, those shared by several religions, and those arising from different daily inputs, including the Brazilian soap operas.

11 For a literary example of such folk images back in those days, see Chiziane (2000).
a massive and long-lasting phenomenon which induced major social changes (First 1977; Vletter 1998; Harries 1994; Covane 2001; Granjo 2005). Those shared representations ascribe four main characteristics to the mining labour: (i) it is hard and a “man builder”; (ii) it is a well-paid but temporary situation; (iii) there is a huge danger of accidents during working time and the lungs get destroyed after it; and (iv) it happens in a special space, subjecting the worker to different rules and to abuses from “white” South-Africans.

From the outside, almost all those representations could be tagged to Mozal, as well. The conviction that the smelter was pollutant implied the idea that working there was very dangerous, with the same kind of dangers ascribed to the external impact of the plant: pollution by contaminative dust and gases – so, the same kind of deferred danger that is usually related to mining labour.

It was also known that salaries would be exceptionally high by local standards, so the combination of two such ideas led to the jobs at Mozal, such as mining, being seen as a tough but short term means of guaranteeing a financially secure and healthier livelihood elsewhere.

Besides, although the company capital is transnational and the main stockholder is officially British,\textsuperscript{12} Mozal is systematically mentioned by the media and the general public as a “South African plant”, as a result of the conspicuous initial presence of South African staff and managers.

Those metaphorical potentialities were manipulated and reinforced during the strikes of February and October 2001. The press references to the “South African plant” went, then, together with its presentation as a separate space, set apart from national labour rules, including the use of English as its official labour language, and with the rumours about racist verbal abuse from the “Boers” on the shop floor (\textit{Expresso da Tarde} 2002, 4). By February, the references to work conditions mainly stressed their toughness, due to the high temperatures of the smelting pots, but in October the main issue was already the lung hazards (\textit{Correio da Manhã} 2001, 3; \textit{Imparcial} 2001, 3).

In the process, what started as a metaphor became the matrix guiding the perception and analysis of everything people heard about the company. The use of the mines as a comparative base to interpret this industry called public attention towards other analogies, which in turn invited \textit{mutatis mutantis}

\textsuperscript{12} \textit{BHP} Billiton, a fusion of two mining companies, one Australian and the other part of the previous Gencor Corporation, from South Africa. The other stockholders are the Japanese conglomerate Mitsubishi, the South African \textit{idc} and, with a small percentage, the Mozambican State.
comparisons. Finally, in a typical import of “societal references” (Duclos 1991), the workers talked about the plant in the way the miners normally talked about the mines.

Those were the grounds for overzealous mask wearing. Like a group of workers explained during a shop floor conversation in 2003, “if managers acknowledge that the dust and gases are dangerous, they must be really very dangerous. I need to protect myself, because I don’t know what else they may be hiding from us”. When one points out that the hazards they fear the most are silicosis-like, their answer is eloquent: “But this is like a mine. In the open air, but it is the same. This is an open-sky mine.”

However, merging high salaries, an image of imminent danger, youth and high education sets up your job as a temporary situation providing the means for a better life, through which one must try to pass unscathed – like in mining migration. This was indeed the case of most potroom workers in the mid-2000s, and a young operator who eloquently expressed his plans in 2004 had the same intentions eleven years later, although he has grown older and is still working at the plant.

This enduring attitude induces two observable effects. On the one hand, each worker focuses on safeguarding his individual physical integrity from the most feared dangers. Since, however, human attention to surrounding threats is limited (Duclos 1991; Granjo 2004) and they believe in just “passing through”, this fits with less attention towards other job hazards and, especially, towards the dangers that might affect the labour environment and all their co-workers. On the other hand, this attitude weakens the potential for a collective workers’ safety culture and for the reinforcement of labour safety, since spreading feelings of individual responsibility for everybody’s safety is crucial for collectively shared prudence skills (Dejours 1987).

Therefore, the company management tried to include new workers by moulding them from scratch, through their corporate values, into a “big happy family” of well-paid people who produce a lot and protect each other. However, societal notions reinterpreting the historic memory of mining labour induced a different sense of “inclusion” in the workers. (see Figure 18.2).

13 “The work is too dangerous and will harm my health more and more. I really don’t want to stay here for the rest of my life, but I couldn’t go on with my studies. Now I have money and, later on, I’ll go to university and I’ll get a good job, even if with a lower wage.”
What they desire is a liminal and temporary *inclusion*, an *expelling liminality*, and they act accordingly when protecting themselves. This has significant consequences for the cohesion of the group, for industrial safety and even for their own individual vulnerability towards labour hazards with more immediate and lethal effects.\(^{14}\)

**WORKERS IN MOZAMBIкан, CHINESE AND PORTUGUESE COMPANIES IN MAPUTO**

The implementation of the Mozal project was followed by a large investment in other sectors of the economy, namely in building firms, hotels, restaurants and banking, as well as other services. Due to its openness to foreign investment, many organisations from various parts of the world invest in the capital of Mozambique, turning Maputo into a multicultural city. However, the analysis of Chinese, Mozambican and Portuguese companies in the Maputo area does not really show the existence of integrative and homogeneous organisational cultures, based on the nationality of capital.

\(^{14}\) For other consequences of *societal references* in this factory, see Granjo (2008a; 2012).
What it reveals instead is mostly differentiated cultures, depending on the sector of activity or according to the hierarchical power of individuals in the organisations (Feijó, 2017).

Although this phenomenon is most evident in the restaurant and security sectors, or in the small and medium scale industries (characterised by the employment of a low-skilled workforce in Taylored tasks), a dirigist and coercive management culture predominates in all organisations, regardless of nationality, based on a strong hierarchical distance between managers and subordinates. In contrast, regardless of the nationality of managerial or specialised cadres, the more their individual power increases in the organisations, the more their discourses tend to be oriented towards production and productivity, and highlights issues such as the “relaxed attitude” or “laziness” of Mozambican workers. Simultaneously, among both the leading national and foreign cadres, there are clear strategies for creating proximity to influential individuals with economic or political capital, in a clear clientelist strategy. The enrichment of the leaders has often been publicly associated with illegal behaviour, related to the corruption of the local authorities or to the disrespect of Mozambican laws. In fact, concerns about production or quality control has not invalidated, in many situations, investment in a network of social contacts, easily capitalised on for economic purposes.

Concerning salary policies, in a neoliberal scenario which is also marked by highly asymmetrical qualifications, the wages in Mozambican companies have two main characteristics:

On the one hand, salaries of the less skilled workers are very low, representing less than half of the so-called “basic basket”\textsuperscript{15} and, therefore, of survival needs. Daily survival is therefore only possible with the cutting of numerous essential expenses related to food, health and transport; so many workers arrive at work without having eaten, after having travelled long distances on foot. In fact, in a business environment usually evaluated as “bad” by international reports, one of the investment attractors is the existence of a cheap labour force. But by paying below the basic needs, employers transfer the responsibility for finding formal and informal ways (often illegal) to complete the remaining part to the workers and their families.

\textsuperscript{15} The basic basket is a set of products and services, indispensable for the survival of a “standard” family of five persons, which mainly consists of food products (mostly rice and flour), energy and transport expenses. The basic basket does not include health, clothing and education expenses.
On the other hand, wages are characterised by high asymmetries. Often, while salaries of normal workers are paid in meticais, those of highly qualified staff are calculated in dollars. In 2011, while an operative worker received normally a salary of 3,000 meticais, a specialised foreign worker could easily earn (with bonuses) 3,000 dollars, a value some 30 times higher, using the exchange rate at the time (Feijó 2015). Although not so significant, asymmetries are also striking amongst undifferentiated and specialised national cadres.

The emerging consumer society in Maputo is contrasted with extreme poverty, turning the town into a “socially seismic” territory (Serra 2008) and a source of conflict and social upheaval. However, the high unemployment rates, the fear of dismissal, the widespread corruption of labour inspectors, and the political manipulation of union leaders make the strategy of confronting employers very risky. The option of avoiding direct conflict, disguising dissatisfaction through social cynicism, feeds the dominant social representation of the “peaceful” and “relaxed” Mozambican, often constructed in opposition to the “violent” South African. In fact, “humility” represents the safest attitude in a scenario where “arriscar é arriscado” [it is risky to risk], and a conscious strategy to obtain benefits. This is something justifiable for very pragmatic reasons: the need to keep the job, the avoidance of being reported by opportunist co-workers and, above all, the attempt to take advantage of a collaboration with managers, both materially (in cash, clothing and food) and immaterially (managers’ friendship and trust, greater tolerance for error or new professional opportunities). Humility stands out in the tensest working moments: during recruitment and selection, when receiving working instructions, during inspections or when facing the threat of dismissal. Known among Mozambicans as “puxa-saco”17, this is an important strategy for gaining the manager’s trust and, through it, a greater relaxation of professional vigilance. Humility or sympathy represent strategies to adapt to adverse realities, through which it is possible to obtain a set of benefits.

16 Due to a fast devaluation of the national currency over the last couple of years, this difference has suddenly increased to a value 60 times higher. However, many private companies have abandoned, in the process, the parity to USD in the wage calculation of top ranked employees, so even the so-called “medium-high classes” have seen their previous income being significantly reduced.

17 The “puxa-saqueiro” or the “escovinha” is a worker who is more concerned with pleasing their director (taking personal benefits from it) than with the group’s well-being or their professional performance.
However, in this scenario marked by fear and generalised subservience, there are disguised forms of protest. These subtle strategies can take the form of small robberies, sabotage, gossip or anonymous threats.

Frequently performed in groups and often in an ingeniously creative way, small robberies are an increasingly common phenomenon in Mozambique. Although they can be the object of abstract criticism as an immoral and incorrect process, robberies are also seen as a legitimate way of surviving and compensating for extremely low wages (Feijó 2011a). This attitude can be illustrated by the vulgarisation of the term “matreco”, used to classify a person unaware of the daily opportunities and too attached to moral principles, such as honesty and loyalty.\(^{18}\) However, it should be noted that there is actually no linear relationship between economic disadvantage and illegal practices. In fact, although low salaries stand as the ethical legitimation for robberies, such practices are transversal to several sectors and wage levels inside the same company, illustrating a neo-patrimonial reality: if according to the local aphorism, “o cabrito come onde está amarrado” [the goat eats where he is tied], he also ties himself where he can eat.

A second phenomenon, the sabotage of working mechanisms and procedures (surveillance systems, attendance records, stock management, etc.), aims to reduce managers’ supervision, to circumvent regulations and to allow workers to rest, regaining control over rhythms and working conditions. As Cohen (1987, 127) demonstrates, these attitudes produce a discontinuity between modes of artisanal production or of rural origin, and those manufactured industrially or under bureaucratic routines. For Cohen, sabotage is seen as a mean of reducing inequalities, a way of compensating differential reward systems, inherent to the capitalist labour process. As can be commonly heard in Maputo, “eles fingem que nos pagam, nós fingimos que trabalhamos” [they pretend to pay us, and we pretend to work].

Thirdly, gossip, through fofoça, nicknames or irony constitute subtle mechanisms of manifesting dissatisfaction, particularly when there is competition for scarce power resources, such as a promotion, a wage increase, or a symbolic distinction. Finally, anonymous threats, via sms, written notes or witchcraft, can weaken a hierarchical superior, making him more flexible.

\(^{18}\) Finding a mobile phone in a chapa (semi-collective passenger transport) and returning it to the owner, having autonomy to leave the job earlier and not do it, or not being able to divert an amount of money may be commonly called typical “matreco” behaviour.
in controlling his subordinates, thus regaining control of rhythms and work processes.

These contouring strategies have increased managerial mistrust of local workers, expressed through the reinforcement of control and supervision mechanisms. All Maputo economic units are protected by bars, padlocks, sound alarms and, often, armed private security with military training. Several complex worker control and surveillance systems have been instituted, such as the inspection of employees leaving the establishment, the existence of supervisors, sometimes overseen by security guards. Ironically, many *manobras* imply the connivance of these officials, which tends to subvert all the security logic.

**CAPITALIST PENETRATION, CABRITISMO AND THE MYTH OF THE LAZY MOZAMBICAN**

The described workers’ reactions show the existence of two different rationales (from capital and labour), reinforcing the stereotype of the lazy and work-averse Mozambican, who must be closely controlled under Taylorist ways. It is an often-used stereotype harking back to the dominant social representations in the colonial period.

In fact, at the time of colonial capitalist penetration (late nineteenth and twentieth centuries), population density was much lower than in the Europe of the Industrial Revolution, as was the availability of a surplus labour force of rural origin. The autochthonous population was embedded in non-capitalist economic rationales, only sowing and doing what was necessary for subsistence and exchange, through plausibly available external products and with minimally acceptable terms of trade. There was, therefore, no apparent reason to become employed: receiving very low wages, in emerging projects with arduous and risky conditions, such as the construction of infrastructures, the extractive industry or in plantations. Since the colonial State had no available capital for the introduction of mechanised processes, it could only count on abundant cheap labour, which was the fundamental concern of Administrators in their official reports (Vail and White 1980; Serra 1995). In times when these colonial capitalist expectations were frustrated, often incapable of understanding local thinking, the “lazy African” discourse was reinforced. The dominant idea was that Africans must be forced to work
through specific legislation, through *chibalo* (forced labour) and with foremen in control.

In the current neoliberal scenario, where a large number of rulers are in a strategic alliance with great capital\(^{19}\) (or representing it) and where the State refrains from carrying out many of its functions, work is presented again as the solution for development, regardless of the existing production relationships. In the official discourse, the origin of poverty is in people’s heads, in their laziness and lack of love for work, lack of self-esteem or creativity (Chichava 2009; Feijó 2017) and not in the capitalist relations. The worker is encouraged to commit to fulfilling their role (to work), regardless of the possibility of survival and reproduction.

However, if we consider the dynamism evidenced by African entrepreneurs, especially in the informal sector, as well as the dominant representation of the Mozambican worker in South Africa\(^{20}\) (where wages are comparatively higher), the “lazy Mozambican” assumptions must be questioned. Indeed, the alleged *laziness* deserves to be understood as a strategy of passive resistance, in a context understood as non-meritocratic, socially unjust and even prejudiced. The belief predominates among many Maputo workers that social mobility is based not on individual merit but, above all, on a series of aspects related to individuals’ political and family relationships (clientelism and nepotism), with their somatic characteristics, illegal practices (Feijó 2011a) or magical-traditional mechanisms (Granjo 2008b). Marked by such uncertainty, where effort is not always financially rewarded, the workers’ strategy tends to be orientated towards quick and opportunistic enrichment, which does not mean investment in professional brio.

It should be noted that, despite the existence of strong social asymmetries and intensive exploitation, there is no clear confrontation between capital and labour. The opportunities for rapid enrichment (accessible only to the

---

\(^{19}\) As Castel-Branco (2016, 151) explains, from socialist discourses based on the “liberation of man and land” new visions emerge “based on the possibility that previously colonised peoples could become capitalists”, freeing themselves from the obstacles that colonialism represented for the development of national capitalism.

\(^{20}\) By the time of independence more than 100,000 Mozambican miners were recruited annually for South African mines (First 1977). As opposed to their South African counterparts, the Mozambican workers were represented as humble and disciplined. However, after *apartheid*, with the intensification of undocumented migration of Mozambicans and Zimbabweans to South Africa and an increase in crime, Mozambicans also started being associated with robbery and informality.
most attentive and insightful), coupled with the presence of familiarity ties in many working relationships, act as important “conflict dampers” that prevent open confrontation. On the other hand, many workers who find themselves in a disadvantaged working situation also create their own parallel businesses, where they reproduce the exploitative relations with other workers – their employees. Similarly, widespread criticism of corruption or illicit enrichment does not invalidate the fact that many protesters benefit from opportunistic practices. Indeed, struggle and resistance are not exactly against the system, but against one’s relative position in the system.

COMPARING “INCLUSIONS”

Looking back on the three cases of inclusion processes, a first pertinent comparison concerns the Sines oil refinery and the Mozal aluminium smelter.

In the Portuguese refinery, the management’s inaction towards the training and integration of new employees – apparently expecting some automatic inclusion, or hoping that things would keep on working, since they always had before – meant the experienced workers had to organise the inclusion and control of the newcomers, in order to safeguard everybody’s safety.

Such a process sets up centripetal participation from the novices, which eventually includes them in the labour group through progressive integrative liminality (Figure 18.1). This mechanism is guided by prudence skills, the ethics of mutual responsibility and the non-probabilistic notion of “danger” shared by the group. However, it is also a powerful tool to reinforce and reproduce those values, concepts and practices, even providing the bases for the workers’ resistance against dangerous management tendencies. So, the newcomers’ inclusion is not within an abstract corporation, but in the specific group of refining workers, who build their identity in opposition to the other groups coexisting in the factory (Granjo 2002).

The process produces positive consequences for the factory’s and workers’ safety. However, this is an occasional and socially-constructed virtuous effect of management negligence and, therefore, unavailable to reproduce elsewhere.

At the Mozambican aluminium smelter, the management attitude towards the newcomers’ inclusion is almost the opposite. Nevertheless, the strategy of

---

21 In the sense of positive “perverse effect” (Boudon 1979).
recruiting and training the workers from a “blank sheet of paper” – formatting them according to the desired technical knowledge and precautionary attitude, while presuming their immediate inclusion in an ideal labour group, stimulated by high wages – clashed with the reproduction, by such workers, of dominant societal references that equate the factory, the labour inside it and their hazards, to those existing in a South-African mine.

As a consequence, the workers see themselves as having a liminal and temporary kind of inclusion: an expelling liminality corresponding to a desirably transitory job (Figure 18.2), which leads them to focus their attention on their individual safeguard against “mining” dangers, therefore neglecting both the other labour hazards and collective protection. This restricts group cohesion and, in the long term, both the development of collective prudence skills and general safety.

This perverse effect (Boudon 1979), however, does not counteract another outcome arising from management strategies. The policy of high wages by local standards, the corporate valuing of the workers’ functions and skills (also reinforcing their self-esteem), and the highlighting of meritocratic criteria for promotions were powerful stimuli for a conspicuous high level of commitment, proficiency and compliance amongst the workers.22

As seen above, both the Mozal labour policies and the resulting workers’ attitudes contrast strikingly with what we can usually observe in the Maputo region, or are even without being opposite to the usual ones in smaller local companies. This calls for a second comparison.

We have highlighted that, despite the recurrent official discourse accusing potential workers from the Maputo area of lacking a “work culture” and arguing for their inclusion, through a change in their mentality, as an ideal type of worker (committed, disciplined, effective and productive); the actual labour relations stimulate such workers to engage in a very different work ethics and culture. The labour conditions, the low wages, the socio-economic asymmetries, or even the authoritarian and indignant practices that try to neutralise the employees’ abusive actions stimulate a work culture and ethics characterised, instead, by high pragmatism and scepticism. Workers

22 The relevance of such factors is evident both in the workers’ speech and by external observation. Moreover, for that very end, the first managers of the factory deliberately emphasised, in words and practices, the contrast between the corporate rules and the habits of the surrounding labour environment – including the corporate intolerance towards nepotism and clientelism, besides clear evaluation criteria for promotions and bonuses.
calculate the effort to devote to the organisation according to the rewards that may arise from it, as well as the costs that it implies for other spheres of life, especially for parallel jobs, school activities or family relations. In terms of organisational performance, the coexistence of such different rationales leads to low commitment, passive resistance and anonymous subversions.

So, if the employers and the public powers\textsuperscript{23} claim a subjective \textit{tour-de-force} that \textit{includes} employees in an ideal group of “good workers” (similar, after all, to those we can find at Mozal), the work culture shared by their addressees places them, instead, in a position of \textit{structural liminality} regarding their inclusion in the model of the committed and disciplined worker (see Figure 18.3).

In many individual labour stories, such \textit{liminality} also includes periods of \textit{exclusion} by unemployment, due to the instability of jobs and employing companies, or to employees’ resistance, robbery or sabotage practices that went too far and, being disclosed, led to their dismissal.

In contrast, as \textit{cabritismo} shows, although the basis and legitimation for this work culture/ethics are the dominant labour relations and material conditions, it is also reproduced amongst high ranked and well-paid positions, becoming the standard for expected labour attitudes.

And, in fact, at Mozal during the early 2000s, there were also workers who tried to manipulate work schedules and rhythms, or to find more relaxed proceedings for the regular technical tasks. Nonetheless, digital control of the staff circulation and the abnormal production parameters resulting from such alternative proceedings were easily detected, making it pointless to jeopardise a well-paid job in the pursuit of small gains in effort or free time.\textsuperscript{24}

So, again, the wages and labour conditions stand out as the key factors in this comparison. As mentioned, besides the Mozal workers, the local “informal” entrepreneurs and the reputation of Mozambican emigrants in South-Africa undermine both the image of the “lazy Mozambican”, and the inevitability of the work culture/ethics we have been debating. Nevertheless,

\textsuperscript{23} These are often the same people or share partnerships and similar interests in the economic arena (Cortês 2018).

\textsuperscript{24} Another phenomenon induced by this corporation’s policy concerns the suppliers and their business culture. Mozal is a large contractor of, for instance, transportation services for personal and cargo. Their suppliers know they pay better and faster than other clients, but also that they undertake frequent and demanding controls of the vehicles’ safety and technical maintenance, besides controlling the drivers’ alcohol consumption. In order to keep their advantageous contracts, they make sure the material and staff they provide to Mozal is in good order – like, in fact, it should be everywhere.
as happened during the capitalist colonial penetration, once a work culture is settled and sedimented, the first relevant question faced by the people who share it, when instigated to change it, is “Is it worth it?” If it is not, in terms of immediate advantages or in plausible future gains, why do it?

Although complex and ambiguous, the work culture that is dominant in the Maputo region is eloquently expressed through a sentence which also states its ethical grounds: “They pretend to pay us, and we pretend to work”. Our data and analysis strongly suggest that, in order to make the employees stop “pretending to work”, it is indispensable to, first, stop “pretending to pay them”.

This is, however, only one part of the equation. Since the dominant work culture is also a calculated strategy to take advantage of dysfunctional and abusive labour relations, salary fairness would have to go along (as our data also suggests) with two other factors: the implementation of conspicuously effective principles of meritocratic management, and the evidence of a “good labour example” from the leadership. In many important areas of the Mozambican labour market, however, such requirements are the most distant from reality and the most difficult to implement.25

25 For instance, in the State apparatus the best paid supervising officials are usually the most absent employees, due to delegating their responsibilities and undertaking parallel activities.
Besides noticing and characterising the diversity of forms and meanings of labour *inclusion*, as well as the significance of such processes for the labour cultures and safety, those are probably the most significant conclusions of this comparative study.

PAULO GRANJO  
Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa  
Av. Prof. Aníbal Bettencourt 9 — 1600-036 Lisboa, Portugal  
paulo.granjo@ics.ulisboa.pt  
orcid.org/0000-0003-1567-5839

JOÃO FEIJÓ  
Observatório do Meio Rural, Mozambique  
joaofeijo@hotmail.com

In public companies, the leading posts are filled through political trust, so the first priority of such corporate leaders is not the functional content of their jobs, but to invest in the clientele networks that allow those who have them to keep them. This is also the case (and a major part of the tasks) of the leaders from corporations that largely depend on State contracts (Feijó 2015; Cortês 2018).
§ REFERENCES


Imparcial. 2001. 18/10: 3.


cite this chapter as:


https://doi.org/10.31447/ics9789726715030.18
PART VII

Spaces and boundaries
With or without you: models of urban requalification under neoliberalism in Portugal

Sónia Alves
Rosa Branco
INTRODUCTION

Goals that underpin policies in the fields of housing and urban requalification, as well as the policy instruments through which these policies are carried out, have been problematised from numerous perspectives. Regarding the mismatch between policy goals and their outputs, Elsinga (2017, 149) argues that “many current housing policies are based on wrong (explicit or implicit) assumptions”, while, in a study of the Portuguese case, Alves (2017a) questions the rationality of policies that in countries with high levels of income inequality and poverty support the commodification of housing and the development of debt-driven ownership. Likewise, Mendes (2014) and Queirós (2015) question the morality of strategies of urban renewal that, under adverse socio-economic circumstances, use housing as an investment asset within a globalised financial market.

The relationship between housing and social exclusion has been analysed from different perspectives, for example, psychological, economic, political, or ideological. On the one hand, the experience of housing affects every aspect of well-being. Room (1995, 105), who claims that the notion of social exclusion focuses primarily on relational issues such as inadequate social participation (e.g. in terms of social, political or civil rights), identifies several forms of social exclusion that go beyond merely material factors and involve aspects of democratic empowerment.

Anderson and Sim (2000), Harvey (2003), Lefebvre (1996) also put forward the need for a more comprehensive understanding of how vulnerable groups are excluded and marginalised; as well as under what conditions the denial of the fundamental right to a decent house occurs, and the denial of the-right-to-the-city. In other words, the right to not be displaced and excluded from one’s previous location, social networks etc.

In terms of globalisation and capitalism, in which there is an increasing commodification of housing, and widening social and economic divisions, housing and urban policies have to be scrutinised in relation to the outcomes they produce. Are they generating just and inclusive outcomes? To what extent are they providing for the right to affordable, adequate and secure housing tenure? Alves’ (2017b) studies confirm the existence of forms of institutional discrimination against people perceived to belong to different racial or ethnic groups, or that lack material and symbolic power. As indicated by Madanipour, Cars and Allen (1998), social exclusion can
best be understood at the micro-level by locating individuals in their social context and understanding how policies and institutional practices targeting neighbourhoods can affect their homes, the built environment, social networks and everyday lives.

Several studies confirm that area-based initiatives can contribute to the further marginalisation and impoverishment of already vulnerable families/groups (Knox and Pinch 2010; Alves 2017c).

To address these issues, and the impacts of policies and institutional practices on neighbourhoods and their residents, the article is organised in the following manner. The first part presents a literature review on the topics of gentrification, entrepreneurialism and displacement. The second part summarises the theoretical insights drawn from an empirical study on the implementation of the SRU (Sociedades de Reabilitação Urbana) model in the municipality of Porto. The Cardosas operation was the specific focus, driven by elite priorities, while disregarding the needs and expectations of sitting tenants. The third part justifies the choice of title, drawing upon discussion of the role of urban and housing policies as an inequality factor in relation to housing policy and the housing market.

This research presents two main theoretical contributions. On the one hand, it illustrates how urban requalification policies based on public-private partnerships and a laissez-faire approach to the housing market cause widespread displacement of former sitting tenants, fuelling social and economic inequality within the city. On the other, it supports the claim that crisis and austerity should not be used as an alibi for the formation of neoliberal strategies, which disregard people’s rights and preferences. It should rather demand the search for a middle-ground strategy, such as the inclusionary housing model requiring developers to set aside, in market-rate development, a certain percentage of dwelling units for sale or rent to low-income households (Tulumello 2016).

THEORIES OF GENTRIFICATION, ENTREPRENEURIALISM AND DISPLACEMENT

Much literature has been published on the topic of gentrification, a significant part of which attempts to explain the mechanisms that underlie the transformation of traditionally residential working-class areas into middle-class
neighbourhoods. The debate on the concept of gentrification has mostly revolved around the causes and consequences of this phenomenon when there are unequal power relations between the state, the market and citizens. The first academic studies typically focused on the causes of gentrification by looking at the characteristics of the gentrifiers and the gentrified areas (Vázquez 1992). More recent studies, however, have tried to relate gentrification processes to, on the one hand, a broader set of transformations operating in economic and occupational structures (Hamnett 2004); and, on the other, to the role of the state and of neoliberal policies regarding social struggles over urban space.

In the literature review, it is possible to distinguish different explanatory theories that establish the connection between gentrification and other contemporaneous processes. The phenomenon of gentrification has been explained: (i) by the transition from an industrial society to a post-industrial society, in which the social structure of the industrial city (dominated by manual workers with weak economic resources) gives rise to a social structure dominated by employees of financial services and the public sector (Hamnett 2004); (ii) by changes that occur at the level of production, related to the decision to reinvest in the market, aiming to capture the rent-gap that exists in certain areas, that is, the difference in value between the actual and the expected profitable rent; and (iii) by changes that occur at the level of consumer preferences, related to changes in values and lifestyles of a new middle class.

The relationship between neoliberal urbanism, property-led renewal, and gentrification as regards globalisation and financialisation of home-ownership, has also been highlighted by several authors, who claim that gentrification is an integral part of urban policies worldwide (Uitermark and Loopmans 2013; Janoschka, Sequera and Salinas 2014). With national and local administrators emphasising the relevance of market-based solutions to solve social and urban problems, gentrification, typically used as an economic tool to promote urban renewal, is explained not simply as an economic phenomenon resulting from

---

1 The concept of gentrification was formulated by sociologist Ruth Glass in 1964 to describe the invasion of working-class London neighbourhoods by the middle-classes. Sociologists and geographers in Portugal have used the terms “nobilização” (nobilisation), “aristocratização” (aristocratisation) and “touristificação” (touristification) (Rodrigues 2010; Mendes 2012) as synonyms of gentrification.

2 The rent-gap theory continues to be seen as a useful means to explain gentrification, as it looks at cycles of investment and disinvestment in the built environment, and specifically at processes of economic depreciation of real estate value that lead to the possibility of processes of profitable reinvestment (Smith 1979, 1987; van Loon and Aalbers 2017).
the existence of a rent gap, but as a political phenomenon, with mainstream media and politicians constructing gentrification as a practical solution to deal with urban decline (Chum 2015; Slater 2009). Lauermann (2016) claims that the ‘entrepreneur’ of the entrepreneurial city is a municipal government that has internalised neoliberal imperatives and motivations that are closer to profit, specifically: “investing public funds with simultaneous objectives of achieving public policy goals and expanding public revenue” (Lauermann 2016, 7). He claims that use of the label “entrepreneurial” is relevant because it offers a more precise description of the type of governance practice that is correlated but not identical to neoliberalism (Lauermann 2016, 8). Moreover, he explains that contemporary entrepreneurial cities deploy well-established entrepreneurial toolkits, such as public-private investment ventures, municipal real estate speculation, place-branding and inter-urban competition.

Ponzini (2016) observes the relationship between crises and neoliberalism, noting that: “when both public and private resources become scarce, policymakers tend to lower the standards for regulation, to strip-off planning powers and authorities, to try to de-politicise and streamline choices and projects, to promote new strategies” (Ponzini 2016, 1238). The negative effects of the use and promotion of gentrification as an urban strategy that uses public money to pursue market interests have been extensively set out. It is argued that gentrification is likely to harm the interests of the poor (Pugalis 2016) and, more broadly, it can damage the social fabric (Paton and Cooper 2016). The upgrading and replacement of existing building stock, namely of low-rent housing by expensive housing, has an impact on different forms of displacement (Shaw and Hagemans 2015). Marcuse (1986) distinguishes between direct and indirect forms of displacement. While ‘direct displacement’ represents a process in which tenants move because of rent increases or pressure from landlords, “exclusionary displacement”, an indirect form of displacement, reflects the inability of low-income residents to move into gentrified neighbourhoods because of changing conditions in the housing market, for example, higher rents or a reduction in the number of affordable rental dwellings (Hochstenbach and van Gent 2015). As emphasised by Shaw and Hagemans (2015), the mere presence of middle-class people in a gentrifying neighbourhood represents the loss of affordable housing stock and the ongoing reduction of housing options, favouring displacement.

We contribute to this debate by examining how, under neoliberalism and austerity, and with the withdrawal of the state in favour of the private sector,
the municipality of Porto has promoted urban governance modes in the field of housing requalification, favouring gentrification and displacement processes (Sequeira 2011). In this regard, it is worth noting that, in Porto, the relation between gentrification, entrepreneurialism and displacement has been analysed from different perspectives. Fernandes (2011) claims that tourism has brought new economic value to the historic parts of cities, and this new economic value encourages reinvestment related to tourism (guest house accommodation, hotels and hostels, restaurants and cafés, craft shops). Queirós (2013), bringing class relations and inequalities into focus, claims that models of neoliberal urban governance have played a decisive role in displacing former sitting tenants of low socio-economic status and promoting real estate speculation related to “commercial gentrification” (an expression also used by Doucet 2014, 127).

MODELS OF URBAN REQUALIFICATION AND CITY CENTRE REVITALISATION IN PORTUGAL

With a poorly developed welfare state system, Portugal, like other southern European countries, has experienced low levels of public spending on housing and has chosen models that mainly favour the construction of new housing at the expense of housing requalification, and market-driven housing provision for purchase, rather than for rental and by non-profit housing organisations.

This predominant (liberal) conception that the market is the best provider of housing and that intervention should be restricted to individuals with greater and means-tested needs, has played a crucial role in Portuguese housing policy for two reasons. First, the provision of social housing was insufficient to respond to the needs of a large percentage of the population that needed housing in cities (the main destination of the rural exodus), leading to the non-planned and non-authorised constructions, with precarious housing conditions becoming evident in many cities. Second, between 1987 and 2011, the state spent most public funds on housing to support interest rate subsidies

3 Figures on government spending show that levels of state expenditure are very low, equivalent to only 0.1% of the GDP in 2015 (FFMS 2017).

4 In the 1970s a large percentage of permanent housing accommodation in Portugal still had no basic facilities, such as running water (47% of total housing stock), bath or shower (32%), sanitation (58%) and sewers (60%) (Alves 2017a).
on bank loans for the construction and purchase of homes (about three-quarters of all public spending in this domain); at the expense of housing requalification, which received only 1.7% of the total funding (iHRU 2015). As a result, owner-occupancy became the dominant tenure, with 73% of all persons living in a privately-owned dwelling (INE 2011).

Owing to housing policies that mainly supported the production of new buildings, and to land-use planning policies that favoured the expansion of urban sprawl to the peripheries (through the transformation of rural areas into built-up areas), the historic centres of Lisbon and Porto – where the implementation of the so-called first generation of rent controls (Haffner, Elsinga and Hoekstra 2012) was prolonged over time-, created urban decline.

The physical and demographic decline of the historic centre of Porto is attested to by statistical data. Between 1991 and 2011, the population of the historic centre of Porto fell from 20,342 to 9,334 individuals, a loss of about half of the total resident population (INE 2011). In 2011, the share of vacant buildings was about 19% of all housing stock and much of this was in a poor state. Of the 1,800 buildings in the historic centre of Porto in 2011, 34% were in poor condition, requiring major works, while 51% required small and medium-scale repair (INE 2011).

At the same time, the private rental sector decreased abruptly between 1981 and 2011: in Portugal from 40% to 20%, a reduction from 1,074,590 to 545,710 dwellings (INE 2011), in the municipality of Porto decreased from 67,373 to 43,302 dwellings. In 2011, when 43,302 contracts of private rental were registered, half of these dwellings (equivalent to 21,084) still had rents below 100 euros. In contrast, the segment of contracts signed after 1990 has been increasingly dominated by higher rents, which has raised issues of affordability for middle and low-income families.

Following legal reforms in rent regulation (Urban Lease Act Law nr. 31/2012) aiming to eliminate tenant security under new leases, and the transition from the old (pre-1990) lease contracts to a new regime of rents, the state has created a situation in which the interests of landlord and tenant could be more effectively balanced, but also in which remaining sitting tenants are exposed to various forms of displacement.

The current period of liberalisation, which we name “a pro-gentrification phase” comes after an anti-gentrification phase (1974-1998); and a gradual shift towards gentrification (1999-2004), in which it was no longer possible for the vulnerable families to remain in the area/properties after requalification.

During this phase, public policies clearly sought to maintain and assist populations installed in the historic districts. Social and physical objectives were closely associated, as initiatives aimed to improve the housing situation of working-class families, while avoiding forced removal and displacement. Decisions were taken by municipalities with the participation of local residents. The Local Support Ambulatory Service (Serviço de Apoio Ambulatório Local – SAAL, 1974-1976) is a good example in this regard as well as the “Programme of Urban Requalification” (1985) that created Gabinetes Técnicos Locais (GTL) to develop integrated plans of urban requalification. In addition, to support the requalification of private rented dwellings with old contracts and poor housing standards, the central government launched several programmes, such as the RECRIA (Portuguese acronym for Special Reimbursement Scheme for the Recovery of Leased Property), or the REHABITA (Regime to Support Housing Recovery in Ancient Urban Areas) that provided funding for landlords (to support the upgrading of buildings) and housing allowances for sitting tenants (to cover rent increases following housing requalification). In some cases, municipal housing services provided housing for the temporary relocation of sitting tenants during periods of housing requalification, which was considered a great incentive for landlords to rehabilitate their properties (Costa 2010).

In Porto, the government agency CRUARB (Portuguese acronym for Committee for the Urban Renovation of the Ribeira/Barredo Area) was created in the mid-1970s (after the implementation of democracy) to ensure that the working-class population which inhabited the historic centre of Porto “for a long time, in the worst conditions of housing and exploitation” could remain in the area (Alfredo 1997, 78). The goal was to avoid evicting the poor because of rising property values deriving from the requalification of buildings. First as a government agency, later as a GTL, and subsequently as a municipal office, the CRUARB worked for over 30 years to develop an approach based upon: (i) buying degraded properties, through negotiation or expropriation; (ii) developing rehabilitation architectural engineering

---

5 The expropriation of buildings was justified, allegedly because private landlords did not invest in the maintenance of their properties, although they were legally obliged to do so. Therefore, the public sector had to act in order to prevent the degradation of the historic centre.
projects; and (iii) implementing them. This model allowed the provision of many refurbished rental units with rents below market values. However, it also had several drawbacks, such as the lack of resources to sustain the cycle of expropriation, requalifying and renting. In fact, only a lack of resources explains why many of the expropriated buildings had been not refurbished for decades and that most of the sitting tenants who lived there were eventually rehoused on suburban housing estates (Alves 2010).

In this regard, it is worth noting that in the 1990s, following the accession of Portugal into the European Union in 1986, the country began to receive European funding to support national and local investment in several domains, such as slum clearance, conservation of historic monuments and sites, provision of social infrastructure etc. However, as responsibility for housing policies remained a national and – to a lesser extent – municipal matter and the EU had no direct competence (nor funding available) for this policy, area-based initiatives supported by the EU had only indirect influence on housing renewal. The historic centre of Porto participated, for example, in the initiatives Poverty III and Urban Pilot Projects (launched by the European Commission in 1996) that addressed a wide range of urban problems, such as traffic congestion, waste management, derelict buildings (residential buildings were not eligible for funding), economic decline etc. Projects in this phase tended to adopt an integrated approach to tackle these problems, combining hard infrastructure with environmental, social and economic support measures. Target areas and populations were clearly defined, along with intervention measures. For example, in the disadvantaged neighbourhood of Morro da Sé, in an attempt to promote the citizens’ quality of life, the Urban Pilot Project allocated resources to train the long-term unemployed, support for children and seniors at risk of poverty etc. Activities and services substantially increased the quality of life of residents, and several forms of participation and empowerment were implemented (Gros 1993).


The growing understanding that a 100% publicly funded intervention would not be enough to solve the problems of physical dereliction, which were extensive in the historic centres, led to the recognition that: (i) it would be necessary to put the market of housing requalification and private rental to
work; (ii) tourism and culture could be a driving force for urban requalification, and (iii) that the renovation of public spaces in rundown inner-city areas or waterfronts would generate trickle-down effects associated with the creation of new businesses, housing requalification etc.

The combination of government subsidies in the form of loans directed at homeowners and tax-exemption subsidies to owner-occupiers led to a decline in the private rental sector in major city centres in Portugal. The lack of fiscal and financial support to landlords led not only to the dereliction of the housing stock but also to a reduced supply of affordable dwellings, diminishing the possibility of entry for low- and middle-income households.

The impact of globalisation tends to become apparent at the implementation stage of large-scale urban development projects such as waterfronts, exhibition halls, business centres and international landmark events, as part of an effort to reinforce the competitive position of cities globally (Swyngedouw, Moulaert and Rodriguez 2002).

The organisation of large cultural events, such as the World Exhibition in Lisbon in 1998, or the Porto European Capital of Culture in 2001 (Alves 2017c), as well as the Polis programme that was characterised as a “state-led urban rehabilitation and environmental improvement programme” (Baptista 2013, 596), had several features in common. On the one hand, such events reflect the growing magnitude and deepening impact of inter-regional flows of people and investment (e.g. real estate), which has led to the perception of cities as platforms to attract tourists and investment in real estate. In Portugal, attention to public investment shifted to the public space (urban renewal projects involving streetscaping, pedestrianisation, etc.), as well as the construction of emblematic cultural buildings/facilities seen as necessary to boost the cities’ international presence. The events/programmes mentioned above operated under a regime of exception that provided new management authorities with discretionary planning and development powers. The subsequent phase, represented by the srū model, has come to consolidate this approach of privatisation, deregulation and marketization, in which area-based initiatives do not address issues of social inclusion and cohesion but rather issues of economic global competition.
A PRO-GENTRIFICATION PHASE (FROM 2004 ONWARDS)

Crisis and austerity provided a legitimate alibi for the formation of neoliberal narratives grounded on the virtues of the market. Two legal initiatives were crucial in this regard. First, in 2004, the state enacted a new model of “urban requalification”, enabling the creation of Urban Requalification Societies (SRU, in the Portuguese acronym) and economic and fiscal benefits to market-oriented strategies. Second, in 2012, the state enacted a new Urban Lease Act Law (Law 31/2012), which paved the way for greater flexibility in the renegotiation of open-ended residential leases between private landlords and tenants, phasing out rent control mechanisms for old leases and imposing stricter limits on the possibility of transmitting the contract to first degree relatives (Mendes and Carmo 2016). With this new law, in which rent increases are established based on property values and landlord/tenant negotiations, tenant protection is reduced.

Elderly householders who entered the sector in the 1950s and 1960s and have faced poor housing conditions over time, now face the threat of seeing their contract terminated by the landlord, for example, in the case of major works in the building, or if their incomes are not low enough for them to be protected from eviction. Furthermore, younger householders, who have low incomes or are unemployed, are often unable to afford the increase of rents in private lets, while at the same time not qualifying for social housing.

The SRU model maintained the preference, already witnessed in the previous phase, for more entrepreneurial and discretionary models of decision and delivery outside existing state bureaucracies. This included the possibility of new agencies, the SRUs, to initiate forced intervention through expropriation (see next section for details).

With the strong reduction of national and local resources directed at housing, the European Bank of Investment (EIB) has become one of the most significant funding sources for urban requalification and the provision of affordable housing. In 2008, the Portuguese authorities and the EIB signed a Memorandum of Understanding for the application of the Joint European Support for Sustainable Investment in City Areas (JESSICA), which was deployed for Portugal’s structural funding programme (ERDF) from 2007-2013 (Deloitte and Parque Expo 2009). This instrument that funded municipalities, SRUs, banks, investment funds, or private entities supported urban regeneration projects. The national framework to guide these investments
was the programme “Partnerships for Urban Regeneration”, implemented during the period 2009-2013, when initiatives were mainly directed at historic centres and waterfronts. In 2012, a new financial instrument using EIB funds was launched by IHRU, the programme Reabilitar para arrendar (Rehabilitate to rent), aiming to provide loans for the rehabilitation of old buildings (more than 30 years old) which, following rehabilitation, would be used mainly for housing purposes and rental with conditioned rents below market values. This programme has been used in Lisbon and Porto to provide non-profit rental housing to families, although with limited impact, as the public funding amounted to only €50 m for the whole country until 2017.

THE ROLE OF PORTO VIVO SRU IN HOUSING POLICY AND HOUSING MARKET INEQUALITIES

The critical analysis of the srú model is developed in this section and draws upon empirical research developed on the cases of Porto and Lisbon (Branco and Alves 2015). Besides legislation, strategic plans and execution reports, the research involved six semi-structured face-to-face interviews conducted with local politicians, managers and technicians at different levels of governance: srú, local administration, central administration (Table 19.1). In order to maintain confidentiality and protect the identity of the professionals from whom we gathered information, the list was anonymised and no further details on age, previous jobs, or gender were provided. The interviews were

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID</th>
<th>INSTITUTION</th>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>ROLES</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>INT. TIME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PS1</td>
<td>Porto Vivo SRU</td>
<td>Senior officer</td>
<td>Project implementation; Management</td>
<td>16-01-2015</td>
<td>00h55m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS2</td>
<td>Porto Vivo SRU</td>
<td>Technical staff</td>
<td>Project implementation</td>
<td>15-01-2015</td>
<td>01h32m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS3</td>
<td>Porto Vivo SRU</td>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>Policy making; Management</td>
<td>16-01-2015</td>
<td>01h02m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LG1</td>
<td>Porto Municipality</td>
<td>Political staff</td>
<td>Policy making</td>
<td>17-01-2015</td>
<td>01h25m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG1</td>
<td>IHRU (Central office)</td>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>Policy making; Management</td>
<td>02-03-2015</td>
<td>01h02m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG2</td>
<td>IHRU (Porto delegation)</td>
<td>Senior officer</td>
<td>Management</td>
<td>17-01-2015</td>
<td>01h35m</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
anonymous to encourage the respondents to be as open and transparent about their views as possible.

The interviews were after transcribed and coded according to the main themes and topics of the questions that were asked in the interview. In this chapter we only present the main conclusions regarding the unit of analysis Cardosas operation. For more details on the research methodology and results see Branco and Alves (2015) and Branco and Alves (2018).

Following an initial analysis of the statutory model of SRU, in this section we develop a deeper analysis of the SRU Porto Vivo. We discuss the main works carried out by this agency over the last decade in the historic centre of Porto; along with the Cardosas operation, a paradigmatic example of a systematic, wide-ranging strategy of urban restructuring, which proved highly controversial due to its rationale, means and results.

THE STATUTORY MODEL AND THE POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF PORTO VIVO SRU

With limited funding for housing policies and urban requalification (Alves 2016), and of increasing pressure by property developers, business elites and investors to accommodate tourism-related activities through housing requalification, the Urban Requalification Law (Legal Decree no. 103/2004) promulgated a special regime of urban requalification and urban governance to support pro-growth strategies and real estate development (Branco and Alves 2015).

The SRU model, a state-sponsored strategy voluntarily applied by the municipalities, allows a transference of powers from the municipalities to companies who are then able to employ staff, contract commercial loans, define requalification strategies, license private operations and expropriate or force the sale of buildings in the case of restructuring operations etc.

The statutory framework allowed for the creation of two types of SRU, that is, (i) as a municipal company, or (ii) as a partnership between the central state, namely the Institute of Housing and Urban Rehabilitation (IHRU in the Portuguese acronym), the government-run body responsible for implementing government housing policy in Portugal and a municipality. The later institutional model was implemented only in Porto, Coimbra and Viseu, all of them remaining active to date, while the former was implemented in
several local authorities. Many have been dismantled since, as in 2012 the central government approved legislation that stated that the municipalities should incorporate the deficits and bank loans of their companies, and those not financially sustainable would have to be closed down.

The research presented in this chapter focuses on the policies and practices of Porto Vivo sru and the Cardosas operation. These choices can be justified on several grounds. On the one hand, regarding Porto Vivo sru, because this agency was created as a partnership between the central state and the municipality, with the central state (through IHRU) owning 60% of the capital and the Porto municipality the remaining 40%. This management structure raised several issues of vertical and horizontal governance, but Porto Vivo sru enjoyed substantial freedom to define its strategies in terms of areas of intervention and typologies of operation (Table 19.2).

The Cardosas operation was chosen because it raises interesting ethical and moral issues related to the role of local authorities, here represented by Porto Vivo sru, with regard to public-private partnerships. This is because the Cardosas operation involved controversial high financial deficits and outcomes associated with the displacement of sitting tenants, for the construction of a luxury hotel, a condominium (of 50 housing units and 19 commercial units), an underground parking lot for 355 cars and a new plaza.

The next section presents evidence regarding the Cardosas Operation. Regarding the other two intervention typologies (see Table 19.2), it is worth noting that the operation, which targeted the physical requalification of public space, the Mouzinho-Flores Operation, is contiguous to the Cardosas quarter, representing a high concentration of resources in a relatively small area of the city centre. The Mouzinho-Flores Operation, which targeted the requalification of the public space near the Cardosas quarter, supported the pattern of transformation in local commerce and housing towards high-end niche markets and tourist demands.

Regarding the direct requalification of buildings owned by the sru or by the municipality, it is interesting to note that, following refurbishment, the option to place the dwellings on the rental market was used mostly

---

6 Porto Vivo sru was involved in the acquisition of buildings through expropriation or negotiated purchases, infrastructures, and granted reductions and exemption from licensing fees and taxes on property ownership or transaction.
in the Morro da Sé neighbourhood, a deprived area which contained a high level of mainly publicly owned derelict and vacant buildings. Of all housing stock in Morro da Sé, 40% was public property (srú/municipality), which before being rented required substantial work, while most buildings were occupied by tenants (80% of the total). Of these, 32 buildings were requalified with funding from a €7.5 m loan granted by the European Investment Bank, most of them turned into affordable rental units for middle-class families.
THE CARDOSAS OPERATION

This section discusses the main ideas, assumptions and discourses associated with the Cardosas Operation.

First, revision of the strategic official documents that supported the operation show that the need for a comprehensive restructuring of the Cardosas quarter, located in the heart of Porto city centre, was justified both by the levels of physical degradation of the area, and the potential for leveraging a wider area in central Porto. The intention to target a more affluent population, if possible tourists and investors interested in a second home, is explicit; whilst the production of affordable housing at controlled costs and for rental was never envisaged by the document. The decision to relocate the existing population elsewhere was justified by the fact that sitting tenants would not be able to afford the “higher standard” quality housing that was envisaged for the area (Porto Vivo sru 2007, 21).

Second, regarding modes of implementation, a public-private partnership was created between Porto Vivo sru and two private partners. A real estate
investment fund, designated First Oporto Urban Regeneration Fund (4F), was involved.

The planning agreement signed between the parts envisaged the requalification of a luxury hotel, a housing complex with 50 new luxury dwellings (mostly one- or two-bedroom units), qualified commerce and services (on the ground floor), and an underground car park, that aim to meet the needs of an affluent population.

Although the public partner supported the costs with expropriations, demolition and construction of new buildings and semi-public spaces, developers were not required to set aside a percentage of dwelling units for sale or rent to low-income households. Planning permissions were approved without local authorities requiring a percentage of affordable housing units in the new development from developers. As a result of this “exclusionary” strategy, sitting tenants were displaced and rehoused by local authorities elsewhere.

As for implementation on the ground, interviewees claimed that the main purposes of sru was/is the rehabilitation of public spaces, the rehabilitation of their own buildings and, foremost, the facilitation of private investment by cutting back bureaucracy and supporting their projects. The prevailing view of Porto Vivo sru’s role in public-private partnerships is that it plays an instrumental role in the implementation of projects: “it serves as a mere tool to expropriate the properties which were not in the private partners’ possession so that they could execute the works” (PS1). Accordingly, the interviewees’ view on strategies and goals seems to favour private investors’ interests: “the owner can bring ideas into the project or an investor can appear who is not the original owner and has a given project in mind and all this is flexible. We have changed various situations according to market dynamics” (PS1).

When asked about the need for more diverse social composition of the quarter, interviewees disregarded inclusiveness. In one case, it was argued that the inclusion of other social groups (low-income groups) occurred in a nearby quarter – “50m from the Cardosas we have the Morro da Sé” (PS3), a district where the intervention of Porto Vivo sru targeted low-middle income families.

Regarding outcomes, it is undisputed that the Cardosas Operation transformed the profile of the quarter’s housing stock in terms of tenures and typology structure, rent values, the state of conservation of the buildings and residents’ socio-economic profiles.
Whilst some interviewees attempted to legitimate the strategies and operational choices made by sru bureaucrats, others questioned the rationale and results of the operation in terms of benefits, costs, and disadvantages.

One particular aspect was paradigmatic of the lack of intervention from public partners regarding the social exclusion aspects of the intervention: the privatisation of the open area of the quarter, a gated condominium that is closed by night. Whilst admitting that this is undesirable, all sru staff members considered it necessary to preserve the new residents’ interests.

CONCLUSION

Social exclusion is a multifaceted process by which individuals and their communities become polarised, socially differentiated and unequal (Levitas 2006). Social exclusion can have profound effects on some aspects of social participation.

In this chapter, the interpretation of social exclusion in relation to housing is developed through the analysis of discourse and national and local policies; in other words, analysis of their embedded rationalities, aims, and outcomes.

The title of the paper refers to the need to evaluate policies from a more humanitarian perspective, from that of the impact they have or might have on people’s lives/trajectories. Are policies promoting the economic, social, and political participation of individuals and groups, or are they instead contributing to processes that distance persons, groups, and communities?

By scrutinising the different phases of urban policy targeting urban decline, we have shown that, after an anti-gentrification phase in which policies were closely linked to the provision of decent housing for working-class populations and the fight against poverty and social exclusion, a subsequent phase, focusing upon the improvement of public spaces and the organisation of large cultural events, paved the way for a more aggressive phase of gentrification which coincided with severe austerity policies that mainly affected spending on housing and social policies.

Neoliberal ideas, which were dominant among policy-makers during this period, framed the new legal and institutional framework designed to boost housing requalification. The sru model, specifically that implemented by Porto Vivo sru, diverged from the fundamental principles and goals of previous
public institutions (e.g. CRUARB), whose strategies focused on requalification to secure affordable housing in order to maintain less resourceful families in the city centre (Alves 2017a). In contrast, the new wave of entrepreneurial neoliberal urbanism developed by SRU claims that gentrification is a necessary urban strategy to bring investment and activities back to the city, disregarding social aspects related to displacement and the increasing commodification of housing.

By looking at the discourses and practices of urban requalification policy in Porto Vivo SRU, this research illustrates how gentrification and a new revanchist urbanism has overtaken urban policies in Portugal so that the state has gone from being a regulator to being an agent or promoter of market-led initiatives and financialisation.

The interconnectedness of global capital and local housing markets, along with neoliberal policy in Porto has also shown that SRU strategies are reinforcing a rising rent pattern, which is likely to intensify the poverty trap and underlining inequalities in Portugal.

The prevailing ideology of liberalism favoured the creation of public-private partnership that, with the Porto Vivo SRU governance, provided favourable conditions for market-led interests. Results show that national and local authorities made no effort to limit profit and to capture spill-overs and the increase of value that resulted from public spending on infrastructure and licensing. Redevelopment permission was not negotiated to secure the provision of affordable rental housing *in situ*, the creation of mixed communities, and to regulate the use of dwellings for non-permanent accommodation (e.g. short rentals for tourism).

Public policy should mitigate rather than aggravate poverty dynamics, as they reinforce social and spatial inequality. Public policy should support negotiations and legal agreements with private developers to promote tenure diversification, not to produce a landscape of gentrification that, by increasing land and housing values, exposes households to greater market risks related to indebtedness, interest rate fluctuations, and house price volatility. We argue, with Harvey (2003), that the right to the city should not be: “the right of access to what the property speculators and state planners define, but an active right to make the city different”. In other words, a city with inclusionary zoning practices requiring a percentage of affordable housing units to be built on-site, enabling the provision of affordable housing with different price ranges and tenures, facilitating social inclusion.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Within the framework of a Marie Sklodowska-Curie Individual Fellowship, Sónia Alves is currently developing the project planaffho (planning for affordable housing) at the Cambridge Centre for Housing and Planning Research, Department of Land Economy, University of Cambridge. This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No. 747257.

SÓNIA ALVES
Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa
and Cambridge Centre for Housing and Planning Research,
Department of Land Economy, University of Cambridge
Av. Prof. Aníbal Bettencourt 9 — 1600-036 Lisboa, Portugal
sonia.alves@ics.ulisboa.pt
orcid.org/0000-0003-1231-8588

ROSALIND BRANCO
Interdisciplinary Centre of Social Sciences – CICS.NOVA
Faculdade de Ciências Sociais e Humanas – NOVA FCSH
rmbranco@fcsh.unl.pt
orcid.org/0000-0001-8319-8531

REFERENCES


**CITE THIS CHAPTER AS:**

Inclusive communities, exclusionary city, planning N/A?

Mapping condomínios fechados semi-quantitatively in Lisbon, Cascais (and Barreiro)

Simone Tulumello
Alessandro Colombo
INTRODUCTION: MAPPING URBAN INCLUSION/EXCLUSION?

If one is seeking a prototypical exemplification of exclusionary urban development, the gated community is what they are looking for. Gated communities are residential developments, originating in the USA and flourishing all around the urban planet. They are characterised, first, by spatial seclusion with respect to the outer urban space – more often in the form of multi-villa fenced estates; and, second, variable degrees of social homogeneity. Gated communities are idealised and advertised as inclusion spaces among peers sharing the same class – and typically, if silently, the same self-perception of race/ethnicity – and exclusion spaces with regard to urban “outsides”, considered to be dangerous, chaotic or simply too mixed. In the USA, the success of gated communities after the Second World War was associated with the “white flight”, the abandonment, by white middle and upper classes, of “inner cities” where black (and poor) immigrants were settling in; and hence suburbanisation.

The flourishing of gated communities in the USA and around the world, particularly in metropoles in the Global South, has been studied at length.¹ Pow’s recent review (2015) of critical scholarship on gated communities emphasises the tendency to project one stereotype, the USA prototype, worldwide; and the risk that this may end up foreclosing a more nuanced understanding of gated residential developments in different contexts.² In line with this warning, we will engage the inclusion/exclusion dichotomy from a socio-spatial perspective by exploring condomínios fechados (cfs, literally “enclosed condominiums”), the Portuguese version of gated communities. CFS arrived in Portugal relatively late, in the 1980s, and, as we shall show, though conceptually adherent to the USA gated communities, have many peculiar characteristics, which will help us rethink the inclusion/exclusion dichotomy as framed in theories based on cases in the USA and the Global South.

This endeavour is in line with discussions about the capacity of Southern European cases to problematise universalistic urban theories (Baptista 2013; /Caldeira (2000), Low (2003), Atkinson and Flint (2004), Glasze Webster and Frantz (2006), Petti (2007), and Akgün and Baycan (2012). /Pow (2015), interested in building a less dismal account of gated community developments and seeking an “epistemology of hope”, ends up dismissing some critical accounts rather lightly.

¹ To get a sense of the variety of geographical contexts and disciplinary/theoretical perspectives, see Caldeira (2000), Low (2003), Atkinson and Flint (2004), Glasze Webster and Frantz (2006), Petti (2007), and Akgün and Baycan (2012).

² Let us remark that Pow (2015), interested in building a less dismal account of gated community developments and seeking an “epistemology of hope”, ends up dismissing some critical accounts rather lightly.
Southern European cities show quite peculiar patterns of urban development when compared to the experiences of other European and Anglophone countries, and particularly the way late processes of suburbanisation have been accompanied by restructuring patterns made up of counter-urbanisation and gentrification (Morelli Rontos and Salvati 2014). As a result, the contemporary socio-spatial patterns found in contexts characterised by low levels of segregation (Arbaci and Malheiros 2010), together with the dimensions of spatial inequality associated with them, can only partially be accounted for by dichotomic discussions of spatial inclusion/exclusion.

Against this backdrop, we have three goals. First, to present a socio-spatial picture of CF proliferation patterns in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area by presenting a “semi-quantitative” map (Tulumello 2017b and below) of CFs in Lisbon and Cascais (and Barreiro, where none were found). Second, to discuss the role of urban policy and planning – and of the latter’s “absence” or reluctance to steer urban development – in opening and closing the space for CFs. And, third, to use the Portuguese case to review explanatory and analytical concepts generally associated with gated residential developments – above all the association of gated communities with suburban life. In conclusion, we should open the way to further discussion by suggesting that the concepts of fragmentation and polarisation can provide a looser, though not less rigorous, framework to complement the inclusion/exclusion dichotomy in the conceptualisation of contemporary spatial (in)justice patterns.

The chapter is organised as follows. We begin by presenting the spatial inclusion/exclusion dimensions international scholarship associates with gated community developments; and the peculiarity of the Portuguese case. We then discuss the changes in planning law that made CF production possible during the 1990s. After the methodological remarks, we present the results of the CF mapping in Lisbon and Cascais (and Barreiro). Finally, we set out some explanatory arguments for the different patterns found in the three cities, before a theoretical discussion on inclusion/exclusion and fragmentation/polarisation.

**INCLUSIVE COMMUNITY, EXCLUSIONARY CITY? FROM GATED COMMUNITIES TO CONDOMÍNIOS FECHADOS**

The socio-economic production of us gated communities can be understood from two converging perspectives. From the supply side, gated communities
were one component of the suburbanisation of American cities, a carefully planned developmental strategy fuelled by, on the one hand, economic support for home ownership and private transportation started with the New Deal and, on the other, the discursive construction of “inner cities” as dangerous places (see Beauregard 2003 [1993]). From the demand side, gated communities were therefore one answer, among many,\(^3\) to the request for “safe spaces” (Epstein 1998) for the emergent middle-classes, increasingly concerned by the growing diversity in cities restructured by industrialisation and black immigration from the rural South. Gated communities offer middle-class suburbanites a sense of inclusion within homogeneous social communities\(^4\) – a sense of community hardly achieved in suburbs, where public spaces are virtually inexistent. The achievement of such an inclusion is therefore grounded on the secession from the outer urban space – granted by the physical seclusion of the settlements, the offer of common services that reduce the need to go into in the urban space and the car as a safe “bubble” (Amendola 1997, 169) for the unavoidable movements within the outside; in other words, on the exclusion of dangerous “others” (Sibley 1995).

However, things are more complicated. For one, aspirant buyers have to accept a series of restrictions, such as the prohibition to practice certain activities, the possibility to receive guests at certain hours of the day only or the de facto governance by the developer. To get into a gated community, one has to accept being excluded from the fruition of certain rights (within the community) and spaces (the urban spaces from which to ideally secede). Locking out dangers and diversity is paid for by locking oneself in: by one’s own “enclosure” (Tulumello 2017a, 56). As such, the gated community constitutes a peculiar space where inclusion/exclusion are continuously negotiated and contradicted – even within the paradigmatic USA example.

The Portuguese case adds further layers. To begin with, CFS have appeared relatively late, since the 1980s. This is partly because of the relatively late emergence of patterns of consumption associated with the suburbanisation of the main urban regions of Lisbon and Porto. Raposo (2002; 2008), the author of the most comprehensive research on the social production of CFS, showed how they share some spatial and social characterisations with USA gated

---

\(^3\) For a discussion of the variety of urban forms emerging in connection with fears of crime, disorder and diversity, see Tulumello (2017a, chapter 4).

\(^4\) See Low (2003) for a rich anthropology of the construction of community in USA gated communities.
inclusive communities, exclusionary city, planning n/a?

Inclusive communities while, at the same time, having their own particular features. On the one hand, CF advertising analysis shows the centrality of the dyad security/privacy, as exemplified by one slogan: “it’s a jungle [selva] out there. It’s great you’re in here” (Quinta da Graciosa advertisement, quoted in Raposo 2002, 334). On the other, however, advertising promises do not seem to be completely kept. Consider this excerpt from an interview with a CF resident:

I was born in a village in Trás-os-Montes, I’ve lived in Angola for a long time… I need space and light. So, when I found out about it, I came here. Of course, there are things I like that I don’t have here: the neighbourhood grocer, the butcher… If I like it or not? There’s no point in wondering whether I like it or not… It’s better to like it. Among the horrible available places… (Fátima, interviewed in Câncio 2008 [2005], 124; our translation).

Not only is Fátima not really excited by life in a CF; she feels her inclusion in a “non-neighbourhood”, without the traditional features of Portuguese towns, as a loss – the cost to be paid for the inclusion in the CFs may be more expensive than for us suburbanites. But there is more, the very aspiration to be included in a gated community seems a bit at odds with a different societal context, in which, for instance, the very construction of the local “community” is less central than in the USA. As such, the demand for gated communities needs be understood on different grounds: the possibility, for a growing but not yet affluent, middle-class to access some facilities it could not afford outside CFs (Raposo 2002, 349); and, due to the low levels of segregation in Portuguese cities, the idea of the urban territory being “insufficiently segregated” (Raposo 2008, 126). From a supply side, then, CFs offered the possibility to expand the market of semi-luxury facilities to wider social classes, hence fostering urban accumulation processes. With regard to spatial dynamics, CFs can be studied for their role in metropolitan restructuring over time, and their implications for urban policy and land-use management patterns. Indeed, CF production (may have) had relevant consequences in other urban assets. This shall be explored when discussing institutional processes; or rather, the spatial planning dimension.

---

5 In general, and cutting a very long story short, European societies have a common political and cultural tradition that is more centred on the role of society (and hence on the social pact and welfare state), on the one hand; and individual positive rights, on the other, than on the value of the local community. See, for instance, the debate between Tonnies (1887) and Weber (1968 [1958]), and the USA-Europe comparison by Norton and Bieri (2014).
THE ROLE OF PLANNING: CFS FROM SEMI-INFORMAL REALITY TO UNCOMFORTABLE FACT

Though CFS are linked with general, ultimately global, social transformations, they do not happen independently of local institutional processes. Specifically, being a product of urban development and the construction industry, CFS happen within a framework of regulations and planning practice (Le Galés and Vitale 2015; Tulumello 2015), whose analysis says much about CFS’ social production. In particular, it is worth discussing the way, during the 1990s, planning laws made the development of CFS formally possible; and the role of spatial planning in the management of CFS production more generally.

Up until the early 1990s, Portuguese regulations about land ownership and urbanisation procedures made the production of typical gated communities impossible. On the one hand, the legal regime for allotment operations, as defined in Decree-Laws 289/1973 and 400/1984, obliged developers, in the name of the land’s social function and urbanisation being seen as an eminently public function, to transfer the unbuilt parts of the developed parcels (streets, public spaces, green spaces and public facilities) to the municipality. On the other, the regime of propriedade horizontal, (horizontal ownership), instituted by Decree-Law 40333/1955 to regulate the ownership of private and common parts of residential dwellings, only applied to individual multi-storey dwellings. In practice, the regimes foreclosed the possibility to create multi-apartment building or multi-villa fenced allotments with shared common areas and facilities – while CFS made up of individual apartment buildings with fenced areas were possible if licensed as “private works” (obras particulares). Multi-dwelling CFS already existed at that time, so they were being promoted in a semi-informal framework (Raposo 2002).

Things changed in the early 1990s. First, Decree-Law 448/1991 introduced the possibility to exchange the transfer of unbuilt areas with either plots of land outside the parcel or urbanisation fees. Second, Decree-Law 267/1994 amended the propriedade horizontal by explicitly extending it to multi-dwelling estates. In short, the new regimes introduced and regulated the

---

6 The following is based on the discussion by Raposo (2002, 335-363), and on the analysis of the legislative documents referred to.

7 Literally, by allowing the parcelisation in horizontal sections (i.e. the flats of a multi-storey dwelling) owned individually and prescribing the shared ownership of common parts.
production of fenced estates with several dwellings, common areas and services.

Raposo (2002, 335-363) discusses how the introductory parts of the aforementioned laws systematically refer to the need to adapt the legislation to new social realities, the reforms being justified by the need to adapt the legislation to the “evolution that happened in the meanwhile” (Decree-Law 267/1994). Though it was not made explicit, this evolution can be seen in the semi-informal emergence of the phenomenon of CFS. As such, legislation approached the issue as a sort of inevitable trend, which maybe was not to be endorsed, but would not be enforced or fought – after all, the decade of 1985-1995 was characterised by a continuity of centre-right governments (led by Aníbal Cavaco Silva), which strongly pushed for a neoliberal transformation of the Portuguese state.

What legislation made possible still had and has to go through local planning regulations. The 1990s were also the decade of the first generation of comprehensive masterplans in Portugal and, more generally, of the development of spatial planning as a systematic practice, after the deregulation of the 1980s. So let us take a look at the municipal masterplan regulations adopted by the places focused on in this study: Lisbon (1994), Cascais (1997)

---

8 The original regime of propriedade horizontal had been introduced during the dictatorship of Estado Novo (1933-1974). At that time, legislation also mentioned the necessity to adapt to new social realities. The Decree-Law 40333/1955 referred to the “grave problems” associated with common property, including the promotion of “promiscuity”, the idea of Portugal as a country of “owners” being central to the self-representation of the dictatorship. As such, the introduction of the propriedade horizontal to some extent marked the acknowledgement, by the legislation, of the impossibility of giving all citizens full access to property (Raposo 2002, 342-343).

9 It is interesting to note that the early 1990s were characterised by different attempts to solve the issues of informal and semi-informal urbanisation. Informal settlements (bairros de lata) were addressed by the Special Programme for Rehousing (PER, Programa Especial de Relojamento), which provided financial resources for the clearing up of the settlements and the provision of social housing; Illegal allotments were addressed through upgrading and registration under the provisions for Urban Areas with Illegal Genesis (AUGI, Áreas Urbanas de Génese Ilegal). The different approaches to different issues – clearing “slums”, upgrading illegal allotments and legalising CFS – are telling of the different power of actors at stake, an issue that deserves discussion that we have not space for here.

10 The municipal masterplans (Planos Diretores Municipais, PDM) were introduced in 1982, but only during the 1990s, when, for instance, the masterplans became a compulsory instrument to apply to EU funds, they were systematically adopted all around the country.
and Barreiro (1994). In general, the issue of CFS is not explicitly mentioned in the plans. As far as regulations are concerned, there is a distinct approach in Lisbon and Cascais, on the one hand, and Barreiro, on the other, with regard to operations of allotment. While Lisbon and Cascais fully embraced the changes of Decree-Law 448/1991, the Barreiro plan meant transferring the unbuilt lands in allotted areas to the municipality, making the production of multi-apartment building or multi-villa CFS de facto impossible – and this begins the explanation as to why we did not find any CFS in Barreiro, as will be discussed below.

We shall now focus on Lisbon and Cascais by using the interviews we conducted for comparative research on spatial planning and urban security (Tulumello 2017c). Planners in these cities, much in line with the early 1990s’ legislators, consider CFS something perhaps undesirable but inevitable. A planner in Cascais stated “if CFS appeared, there must have been a necessity, namely with regard to security”. An interesting point is the peculiar (Portuguese) vision of enclosed collective spaces, something that, all around urban Europe, is not automatically associated with CFS – think, for instance, of the Italian and German tradition of courtyards in collective residential buildings. The planners we interviewed seem to share the general idea that unbuilt spaces should remain public, as exemplified by an interview with a planner in Lisbon about a detailed plan, in a social housing district, which introduced enclosed blocks with semi-public courts. Asked whether this was considered an instrument to improve the hierarchisation of open spaces, the planner remarked: “we don’t want to make CFS!” It is quite telling how the planner felt the need to justify a decision that, elsewhere, would be regarded as absolutely normal: “sincerely, we felt that a private use and management by the residents could be interesting when compared to spaces open to everyone”. The planner added that they did not feel this was an attack on the fruition of public space, particularly in a neighbourhood where public spaces are very “generous”.


12 This is at the very least problematic in a country and metropolitan region where crime rates are historically among the lowest in the world – and particularly in Cascais, which has among the lowest in the region (Tulumello 2017c).
Notes on Methodology and Context: Mapping CFS semi-quantitatively

Against the backdrop set out in the previous sections, our empirical contribution to the discussion is presenting and discussing the first systematic map of CFS in two, plus one, municipalities: Lisbon and Cascais, and Barreiro where there were none (see discussion below). Roitman and colleagues (2010, 9) remind us how the literature on gated communities has not systematically addressed the study of the way these developments transform urban fabrics by “segmenting the physical city […] and creating physical and emblematic barriers”. Indeed, in the vast literature about gated communities and similar developments, besides our own work on gated residential estates in Palermo (Tulumello 2017a, 60-62), we were only able to find two examples of systematic maps of gated communities (De Duren 2006; Akgün and Baycan 2012) – where, by the way, the maps only represent the location, and not the shape or size, of the developments. The point is probably that mapping CFS and gated communities is an extremely complex task, for the very simple reason that systematic data about these developments are collected by planning and local authorities virtually nowhere. This is certainly the case in Lisbon and Cascais, as the planners we interviewed confirmed. This problem extends to urban fortification and privatisation processes in general (Tulumello 2017b) – see also a recent report in The Guardian (2017) on the difficulty of mapping privatised public spaces in London.

When we started to engage with this topic in Lisbon in 2011, we soon realised that the only way to move towards a systematic mapping of gated residential developments was to use a plurality of sources to compensate for the absence of a complete single source. This meant that only through a long-term engagement could we expect to collect a reasonable amount of data, and we ended up deeming the preliminary maps produced during a six-month research period in 2011 unsatisfactory (Tulumello 2017b). After several rounds of updating and integrating data between 2013 and 2016, we are now confident that the maps we present here rigorously depict the state-of-the-art of CFS in Lisbon and Cascais, but without being able to affirm once and for all that we have mapped all of them. This is why we call these maps, which offer a comprehensive and systematic representation of the problem, or at the very

13 And available in Tulumello’s PhD dissertation (2012).
least the most comprehensive and systematic representation possible, “semi-quantitative” (cf. ibidem).

So, how were the maps created? We started from existing works (see Appendix), which, by the way, confirmed the existence of deep methodological problems, as shown by the very different numbers – e.g. Ferreira and colleagues (2001) counted more than double the CFs of Raposo (2000) counted roughly at the same time. The data we started with were the lists produced, and successively updated, by the group of researchers led by Rita Raposo (Raposo 2002; Pereira 2010; Raposo, Cotta and Martins 2012; see Appendix). The methodology of these studies was the collection of CF advertising in newspapers, real estate magazines and, more recently, websites. This is a sensible approach because, as we shall see, it is sometimes hard to distinguish a CF from a condominium by its spatial features – especially in Lisbon, where the typology of a single-apartment building CF is the most common. As social construction is central to CF production, we have only included residential developments explicitly advertised as CFs or the synonymous condomínios privados.

We then researched real estate agencies and developers’ websites, together with web GIS services (Google Maps, Google Street View, Bing Maps), to (i) find and map the CFs listed in the aforementioned works and (ii) look for further CFs. In some cases – four in Lisbon and 23 in Cascais – we found confirmation of the existence of CFs listed in previous works, but were not able to find their geographical location, so they were left off the maps but are included in our final numbers.

We integrated the maps through two other sources: first, field visits to places with a high concentration of CFs – e.g. Alta de Lisboa in Lisbon and Quinta da Marinha in Cascais; and, second, a screening of the authorisations for CCTV systems in residential developments conceded by the Portuguese Authority for the Protection of Personal Data (Comissão Nacional de Proteção de Dados, CNPD)\textsuperscript{14} – we checked case by case whether the developments had been advertised as CFs.

\textsuperscript{14} All authorisations are made public on the Authority’s website: www.cnpd.pt/bin/decisoes/decisoes.asp.
The maps were originally designed on Google Maps for convenience, then exported and developed in GIS software (ArcMap and Quantum GIS), making use of the atlas produced for the project experts and available cartography.

The selection of Lisbon, Cascais and Barreiro as case studies was due to our aiming at an approach with maximum variation (Flyvbjerg 2006), with the goal being to explore the phenomenon of CFS amid a range of different socio-economic and territorial contexts (Figure 20.1). As shown in Table 20.1, the three cities exemplify quite different socio-territorial contexts. Lisbon, centre of the metropolitan region and capital of Portugal, is, despite some decades of population loss due to suburbanisation, a very dense city that centralises much of the economic capital of the region and the country –
### Table 20.1

**Main socio-economic and territorial indicators**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Resident population</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lisbon</td>
<td>663,394</td>
<td>564,657</td>
<td>547,631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cascais</td>
<td>153,294</td>
<td>170,683</td>
<td>206,429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barreiro</td>
<td>85,768</td>
<td>79,012</td>
<td>78,764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unemployment rate (%)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lisbon</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cascais</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barreiro</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Professional-managerial employees (%)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lisbon</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>42.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cascais</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>33.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barreiro</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>One-person households (%)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lisbon</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cascais</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>24.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barreiro</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>24.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Illiteracy (%)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lisbon</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cascais</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barreiro</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>High education attainment (%)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lisbon</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>33.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cascais</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>27.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barreiro</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population density (inhabitants/km²)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lisbon</td>
<td>7,840</td>
<td>6,673</td>
<td>6,448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cascais</td>
<td>1,577</td>
<td>1,756</td>
<td>2,120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barreiro</td>
<td>2,680</td>
<td>2,468</td>
<td>2,164</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* Rate of civil servants, managers, executives, and specialised professionals (with technical and scientific charges) over the employed population.
about a million workers commute to Lisbon every day. Cascais, which has grown demographically since the 1960s, is among the most socio-economically developed municipalities of Portugal, despite the polarisation between the more developed coastal local councils\textsuperscript{17} and the inner ones. The recent history of Barreiro, on the southern bank of the River Tagus, has been characterised by phases of industrialisation and deindustrialisation towards the end of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, with demographic contraction and efforts to reconvert the local economic system during recent decades. Cascais and Barreiro are much less dense than Lisbon, with urbanisation patterns typical of suburban rings. The three cities are quite different with regard to the social composition of their populations. On the one hand, Lisbon has the highest concentration of professional-managerial employees, one-person households and educational attainment; while, on the other, Barreiro, is characteristic of a more traditional social composition. Cascais falls in between the two. A further important distinction concerns political and planning cultures (Tulumello 2017c): during the last two decades, Lisbon and Cascais have seen the alternation of centre-left and centre-right parties, while the Communist party has governed Barreiro with continuity. As regards planning, Barreiro represents a more traditional approach to statutory land-use planning, while Lisbon has seen a deep shift toward strategic planning during the last two decades; with Cascais again falling in between the two.

**MAPPING CFS IN LISBON, CASCAIS (AND BARREIRO)**

In this section, we shall present the results of the CF mapping in Lisbon and Cascais. Another “finding” is the absence of CFs in Barreiro: we were not able to trace any CF and the planners we interviewed confirmed that no CFs existed to the best of their knowledge. A previous study (Ferreira et al. 2001) had found one in the 1990s, but it did not provide any detail.\textsuperscript{18} We shall set out some possible explanations for this absence in the next section.

\textsuperscript{17} Sub-municipal administrative unit, freguesias in Portuguese.

\textsuperscript{18} Ferreira and colleagues (2001) may have adopted a more extensive definition of CF than the one we are using and the group led by Raposo used, as the difference in the number of CFs they found roughly during the same years as Raposo (2002) suggests (see Appendix). Though Ferreira and colleagues (2001) refer to advertising as the main source of evidence, we can only speculate that they may have included estates spatially secluded or equipped with security 24/7 but not explicitly advertised as CFs.
We shall now move on to the discussion of the findings in Lisbon and Cascais, starting with the general numbers, summed up in Table 20.2, which suggest the two cases are significantly different. On the one hand, Cascais has a much higher concentration of Condomínios fechados, also considering that its population is roughly 40% of that of Lisbon. On the other, Lisbon is characterised by the absence of “typical” gated communities – multi-villa developments; and this is reflected in the smaller average CF surface. In contrast, the average number of units per CF is double in Lisbon – as we shall see, we found many small developments in Cascais.

Against this general background, the first couple of maps show the CF spatial distribution in the two municipalities (Figure 20.2). In Lisbon, CFs tend to be spread all around the municipality, with concentrations in the most affluent areas of the city: the historic centre, and the districts of Avenidas Novas (central), Belém (south-west) and Parque das Nações (north-east, built for Expo 98). In Cascais one can observe, on the one hand, a concentration of small developments on the densely urbanised southern coastline; and, on the other, a number of very large CFs, located on the outskirts of the city.

Concerning typology (Figure 20.3), as expected, apartment buildings are dominant in the most densely urbanised areas (in other words, in the entire municipality of Lisbon and the southern part of Cascais), while we found multi-villa CFs in the suburban parts of Cascais only. With regard to the size, in terms of housing units (Figure 20.4), in Cascais we found a great number of small developments, plus some big multi-villa ones (three with more than two hundred units plus nine with more than a hundred). In Lisbon, we did not

---

Table 20.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>LISBON</th>
<th>CASCAIS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CFs (count)</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(77 mapped)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(102 mapped)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of which:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>multi-villas</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>apt. building(s)</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mixed</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average # of units</td>
<td>92*</td>
<td>49***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average surface (ha)</td>
<td>1.21**</td>
<td>4.96****</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Average of 42 CFs. ** Average of 78 CFs. *** Average of 68 CFs. **** Average of 111 CFs.

---

19 The biggest of which, Quinta da Penha Longa (198 ha) and Quinta da Marinha (166 ha), include a resort and a golf course in their area.
find as many small developments and a number of large apartment building developments (five with more than two hundred units plus 10 with more than a hundred, roughly a sixth of all CFs).

The following maps show the temporal stages of CF production (Figure 20.5). First, the maps show how, though a few CFs existed before the new regulations in the early 1990s, the phenomenon boomed afterwards. In Cascais, one can observe how earlier developments were located along the coastline and next

**Figure 20.2**  
*Condomínios Fechados in Lisbon (left) and Cascais (right)*

**Figure 20.3**  
*CF Typologies (multi-villas, apartment building and mixed developments) in Lisbon (left) and Cascais (right)*

Source: our elaboration.
to the historic centre, in the western part of the town; while CFSs only spread towards the interior at a later stage. In Lisbon, the main expansion after the 1990s happened in the central development axes, only spreading around the city after 2005, with a concentration in the district of Alta de Lisboa, and, amid regeneration and gentrification processes, reaching the historic centre. Alta da Lisboa, located in the north of the municipality and to the west of the airport, is a particular case. The original plan for the district, designed

**Figure 20.4**

*Number of housing units in CFSs in Lisbon (left) and Cascais (right)*

![Map of Lisbon and Cascais showing the distribution of housing units in CFSs.]

Source: our elaboration.

**Figure 20.5**

*Temporal stages of production of CFSs in Lisbon (left) and Cascais (right)*

![Map of Lisbon and Cascais showing the temporal stages of production of CFSs.]

Source: our elaboration.
during the 1980s, envisaged a mixed district made up of social and free market housing. While during the 1990s, social housing was built thanks to funding by the national Special Programme for Rehousing, the management company had trouble in launching the free market developments. Only in the late 2000s were the first developments completed and, in a territory that had long been marked by the presence of informal settlements being by that time seen as a “social housing district”, their being advertised as cfs seemed an appropriate way to overcome the concerns of the middle and upper classes.20

Finally, we have compared the geographical spread of cfs with the historical progression of the professional-managerial employee rate – whose geography we consider a good indicator of social polarisation – broken down at the local council level (Figure 20.6). The maps show increasing rates over the last three decades, confirming the economic growth and specialisation of both

---

20 See the website of the management company for the development advertising: http://sgal.altadelisboa.com/en/.
cities. The patterns of polarisation, however, are quite different. In Cascais there is strong polarisation and, in fact, socio-economic segregation, between the wealthier coastal areas and the inner ones, with gated-community-like CFS almost exclusively concentrated in the least wealthy areas. Though one reason must be the availability of more land for multi-villa developments, the perception of these areas as the least homogeneous and the presence, for instance, of large social housing neighbourhoods, must play a significant role in the production of more fortified estates. In Lisbon, polarisation patterns are very different, and show a complex blend of different situations, with different axes of wealth, much more spatially mixed with areas less economically developed and social housing neighbourhoods. Though earlier stages of CF development are located, as we suggested, in wealthier zones, there has been a progressive spread into different areas.

DISCUSSION: (UN)PLANNED SPACES OF INCLUSION/EXCLUSION

Our mapping in Lisbon, Cascais and Barreiro has confirmed the existence of a number of peculiar traits of CFS and their production in Portugal. With regard to the role of CFS and similar developments in reshaping urban and metropolitan territories, while gated communities are generally considered to be a suburban phenomenon, we have seen how they can become, and indeed are mostly used in metropolitan Lisbon as, instruments for restructuring dense urban areas. This is particularly evident in a central, dense city such Lisbon, but even in Cascais, in coexistence with typical examples of “prime” suburban development. With regard to temporal stages, we have seen the CF phenomenon booming after 1995. Though we have no definitive data to make conclusions on causal relationships, this raises the question as to whether the legislative and planning changes intended and did regularise, or rather produce, the CF phenomenon in the first place. Mirroring discussions about gentrification (Hamnett 1991), it is at the intersection of supply and demand side explanations that this discussion should focus. For our purposes, suffice to say that, during the early 1990s, national legislation and municipal planning (in Lisbon and Cascais) did open up the space for CFS, at the very least.

Besides emphasising the peculiarities of the phenomenon in metropolitan Lisbon, we adopted a comparative perspective in order to discuss other explanatory dimensions. The differences among our three cases are
significant and add layers to the discussion of the conditions necessary for CF developments.

Cascais is, overall and despite the abovementioned peculiarities, the case where we found a more typical pattern of gated communities, us style: the presence of large, suburban multi-villa CFs provided with amenities and spatially secluded from a segregated urban fabric – indeed, an example of a wealthy, if (and!) unequal, town.

In Lisbon, CFs are instead a component of urban restructuring processes; and concentration (in wealthy areas), diffusion and “mix” patterns (in the case of Alta de Lisboa above all) also coexist due to the denser socio-economic polarisation, almost in absence of segregation. Against this background, it is worth coming back to the issue of the social production of CFs. In Lisbon, in absence of the physical seclusion from the urban fabric and of the typical spatial amenities of gated communities, this is largely limited to the provision of security, which we can now consider in perspective. On the one hand, security devices are not exactly “tough” in some cases: a good example is the condominium DueDomani – located in Chelas, a dominantly social housing district – advertised as a condomínio semi-privado (semi-private condominium) and surrounded by a one metre tall fence without locks (Tulumello 2015, 496). On the other, during our fieldwork we found a great number of condominiums with 24/7 patrolling and CCTVVs, very similar to neighbouring CFs but not advertised as such – and therefore not included on our maps. It is very hard, when not impossible, to distinguish between CFs and non-CFs in Lisbon, if not for the fact that some are labelled so. This makes us reflect on the fact that CFs in metropolitan Lisbon are often nothing more and nothing less than a promotional strategy (supply side) and hence an instrument for middle class self-representation (demand side).

This should be kept in mind while thinking about the absence of CFs in Barreiro. On the one hand, we cannot downplay the role of planning. As we discussed, the 1994 municipal masterplan made the construction of multi-dwelling CFs impossible and, more generally, the dominance of a statutory approach to land use management (Tulumello 2017c) may have had a role in preventing semi-informal developments such CFs. At the same time, however, land use management failed in preventing another dimension of informal urbanisation, and specifically illegal allotments, which can be found throughout Barreiro – to the extent that a special taskforce for their upgrading and regularisation exists in the municipal planning department. Moreover, as
the case of Lisbon shows, one does not really need much more than advertising and some security devices to produce and sell CFS. As such, other dimensions must come into play, above all the fact that Barreiro is among the least (possibly the least) suitable municipality in the metropolitan region for CFS. As far as location is concerned, Barreiro is among the municipalities worst served by highways and connections to Lisbon – being in the least favourable position with regard to the two bridges connecting the southern bank of the River Tagus to central Lisbon. As far as socio-economic composition is concerned, the history of Barreiro, its characterisation as an industrial hub and recent post-industrial decline, have not helped in drawing the middle and upper classes towards the municipality.

CONCLUSION: FROM INCLUSION/EXCLUSION TO FRAGMENTATION/POLARISATION

Two dimensions stemming from the mapping of CFS in metropolitan Lisbon are particularly useful when considering the inclusion/exclusion dichotomy. First, we have seen how some peculiar traits of the Portuguese planning tradition and urbanisation regulations have impeded the creation of privately owned collective spaces in modern times, in the name of a modernist conception of urban planning and of land as public competence. We cannot help but notice how this is in contrast with the historical development of Portuguese cities through blocks (quarteirões), where dwellings enclose open spaces that can be shared or divided among the single residences (quintais, backyards). In a way, some CFS typologies, and the legal amendments that opened up the space for them, ended up (re)creating the possibility of a healthy instrument for urban design and planning. As the planner in Lisbon reminded us, when public spaces are already generous (as is the case in metropolitan Lisbon generally), privately owned common open spaces are good for both the residents (who enjoy the protected open spaces) and the city (in terms of management of public space).

21 The idealisation of the city as a continuous, verdant public space pinpointed by high-rise dwellings was one of the central aspects of Le Corbusier’s work.

22 See Tulumello (2015; 2017a, 88-91) for critical discussions of the implications of the modernist conception of public space for meeting otherness and feelings of safety in the public space.
Second, we have seen how CFs are often a simple “label” attached to quite ordinary real estate products. In these cases, then, the double movement of inclusion (among peers) and exclusion (of others and from others) loses spatial meaning, while social meaning becomes purely symbolic – and here lies the starkest peculiarity of the Portuguese case in the global arena. On the one hand, this makes sense in metropolitan fabrics where spatial segregation is relatively low and the encounter with otherness is much more common than in those contexts where gated communities were born and are flourishing. On the other, we find here further evidence of the secondary, if marginal, role of the construction of “community” in CF production, Portuguese style.

Though these arguments add some nuances to mainstream critical discussions about gated communities as inclusive/exclusionary devices, our point is not to underplay the critical implications of gated residential developments for urban justice. For instance, the fact that the possibility of collective private spaces remains limited to those who can afford access to luxury and semi-luxury housing shows how CFs, in scarcely segregated contexts, are capable of reshaping inclusion/exclusion patterns to certain benefits – such as access to protected open spaces – in complex and nonlinear ways. As such, rather than searching for “epistemologies of hope” (Pow 2015) with regard to exclusionary urban developments, our concern is to deepen the understanding of the complex ways exclusion/inclusion is (re)produced.

Three agendas for empirical research and theoretical/methodological development emerge. First, we see little engagement with planning as an institutional practice in international literature about gated communities; in other words, with laws, norms, and plans, programmes and policies. Our work – and that of Raposo (2002) –, however, has shown the centrality of national and local institutional and regulatory frameworks in the understanding of how CFs can spread, and inclusion/exclusion patterns be reshaped, in different contexts.

Second, we have shown some limits that the inclusion/exclusion dichotomy itself has in explaining socio-spatial phenomena in contexts where segregation is low. In the methodological approach of semi-quantitative mapping, and in the theoretical concepts of polarisation and fragmentation, we therefore found the grounds for a looser, but not less rigorous, framework for research. By visualising the micro-relations of inequality with regard to urban development (polarisation) and the cracks generated by spatial entities such as CFs (fragmentation), we were able to explore the grain of socio-spatial
phenomena on a scale that traditional segregation analysis fails to understand. This opens up virtually unlimited possibilities for further discussion, for instance, in the study of proximity/connectivity relations between cfs and social housing neighbourhoods, or the concentration/diffusion of cfs and public space and facilities.

In conclusion, let us return to the role of cfs in recent regeneration and gentrification processes in Lisbon. As our data is comprehensive only up until the period 2013/2015, we are fully aware that many changes may be taking place now that Lisbon has suddenly become a centre of attraction for tourists, international students, middle-class foreign pensioners and startuppers, but also international real estate groups and platform capitalism behemoths such AirBnb (see Vieira et al. 2016). Amid a turbulent socio-economic restructuring that started from the historic neighbourhoods and is spreading fast towards and beyond the consolidated urban core, new forms of exclusionary development are reshaping the urban fabric: luxury blocks of flats, prime student apartment blocks, hybrid forms of short-rental dwellings, to give just a few examples. These new developments, though inserted in the urban core, are creating new forms of inclusion/exclusion, which link the city to global networks of wealth, capital and mobility, while creating local disconnections – e.g. by making housing unaffordable for virtually every “regular” worker in Lisbon, or pushing for a social cleansing of historically mixed neighbourhoods. Against this backdrop, even the scale of analysis that we have presented here may become too wide to explore new dynamics of inclusion/exclusion – and the restless search for new systematic and fine-grained methodological approaches is therefore much needed.

23 Collegiate Marques de Pombal is a perfect example, www.collegiate-ac.pt/en/.
### Available works about CFS in the Lisbon metro, with the total number of CFS found per municipality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Timeframe</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type of data</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>Count and list with further data</td>
<td>Approximate count</td>
<td>Count and list with further data</td>
<td>Count and list with further data</td>
<td>Count, list and map</td>
<td>Count and map</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Source of data</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Original research</td>
<td>Original research</td>
<td>Ferreira et al. 2001, slightly updated</td>
<td>Raposo 2002 and original research</td>
<td>Raposo, Cotta 2007, slightly updated</td>
<td>Raposo 2002 and original research</td>
<td>All the former and original research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lisbon</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>45-&lt;x&lt;90</td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
<td>49</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cascais</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>~90</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>91</td>
<td></td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Amadora</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Loures</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1&lt;&lt;x&lt;22</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mafra</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1&lt;&lt;x&lt;22</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Odivelas</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Oeiras</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>~45</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sintra</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1&lt;&lt;x&lt;22</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>V Franca de Xira</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total metropolitan north</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>207</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Barreiro</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alcochete</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1&lt;&lt;x&lt;22</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix

Continuation...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Almada</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1&lt;x&lt;22</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>——</td>
<td>——</td>
<td>——</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montijo</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1&lt;x&lt;22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>——</td>
<td>——</td>
<td>——</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palmela</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1&lt;x&lt;22</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>——</td>
<td>——</td>
<td>——</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seixal</td>
<td>——</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1&lt;x&lt;22</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>——</td>
<td>——</td>
<td>——</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sesimbra</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1&lt;x&lt;22</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>——</td>
<td>——</td>
<td>——</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Setúbal</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1&lt;x&lt;22</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>——</td>
<td>——</td>
<td>——</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total metropolitan south</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metropolitan Lisbon</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The CF numbers are represented on a map of the metropolitan region with circles proportional to the count for each municipality, grouped in classes, resulting in the values presented here.
This chapter stems from cooperation between Simone Tulumello’s post-doc project (“Which “secure cities”? A critical approach to security and feelings of fear in urban planning in Southern Europe”, funded by FCT, SFRH/BPD/86394/2012) and the project “experts – Making sense of planning expertise: housing policy and the role of experts in the Programa Especial de Realojamento (PER)” (funded by FCT, PTDC/ATP-EUR/4309/2014FCT).

SIMONE TULUMELLO
Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa
Av. Prof. Aníbal Bettencourt 9 — 1600-036 Lisboa, Portugal
simone.tulumello@ics.ulisboa.pt
orcid.org/0000-0002-6660-3432

ALESSANDRO COLOMBO
ISCTE-IUL, Dinâmia-CET
colombourb@gmail.com
orcid.org/0000-0002-9910-8999

§ REFERENCES


CITE THIS CHAPTER AS:
https://doi.org/10.31447/ics9789726715030.20
Physical, geographical and social access: the neglected dimensions of food security

Mónica Truninger
Sónia Goulart Cardoso
Fábio Rafael Augusto
Vasco Ramos
INTRODUCTION

Food insecurity is increasingly recognised as a social problem in industrialised countries, bearing severe social, economic and health costs for governments and individuals. Across European countries, the rise in food insecurity has been closely linked to rising unemployment and falling wages (Loopstra, Reeves and Stuckler 2015). Under Austerity, such effects have been amplified and become ubiquitous. There has also been a sharp increase in the number of individuals and families resorting to emergency food help (food banks and others) across Europe. And in several countries, there have been reports of an increase in the number of children arriving at school hungry. Additionally, there is growing concern about the long-term effects of food insecurity on the well-being of individuals and families and/or specific age-groups such as children or the elderly.

Over recent decades, the very concept of food (in)security has also evolved from a mainly productionist definition, which addressed the sustainability of food systems, to a broader definition, which includes the issues of access and consumption (Borch and Kjærnes 2016; Truninger and Díaz-Méndez 2017). Nonetheless, as a dimension of food insecurity, access is too often defined as merely reliant on income, when, in fact, food security entails sociability and social networks. Food is a key element of social participation; it has symbolic meaning as a marker of inclusion/exclusion from socially acceptable activities and common practices, such as eating in/out or being able to acquire food in a socially and culturally appropriate way from different sources (e.g. State, community, family and market). Be it involuntary or self-imposed, withdrawal from such activities can be conceived as limiting social participation and excluding individuals from active citizenship and collectively shared food practices that convey a sense of normality to everyday routines. Based on a critique of access as a merely economic issue, our aim is to contribute to broadening how access is framed when addressing food (in)security. To do so, we will discuss the physical/geographical and social dimensions of food security by engaging with the literature on food deserts and social exclusion.

The chapter is organised in four main sections. We start with an up-dated definition of food security/insecurity, which emphasises the multi-layered nature of these concepts. We then proceed with a brief historical account, highlighting the social, economic and political dynamics that shaped their currently accepted definitions. This is followed by a discussion of the main
features of access as a key dimension of food (in)security. To do so, we engage with two different bodies of scholarly work: food deserts and social exclusion. In the last section, we summarise the main arguments, offer pointers for future research, and reflect on the inherent difficulties of bringing together vastly different approaches to grasping the concept of food (in)security.

FOOD (IN)SECURITY: DEFINITION AND A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CONCEPT

DEFINITION AND MAIN DIMENSIONS

Food insecurity is usually defined in terms of its contrasting concept: food security. The latter has had a long history of conceptualisation and refinement over the last four decades, with a prominent contribution by the Food Agriculture Organisation (fao). As we will see below, in this period the concept has suffered configurations apropos changes in agriculture and food policies. The current definitions of food insecurity and security according to fao (2001) are the following:

*Food insecurity*: A situation that exists when people lack secure access to sufficient amounts of safe and nutritious food for normal growth and development and an active, healthy life. It may be caused by the unavailability of food, insufficient purchasing power or the inappropriate distribution or inadequate use of food at the household level. Food insecurity, poor conditions of health and sanitation and inappropriate care and feeding practices are the major causes of poor nutritional status. Food insecurity may be chronic, seasonal or transitory.

*Food security*: A situation that exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.

(fao, 2001)

The above definition of food security is one of the most popular and emerged after diplomatic negotiations at the 1996 World Food Summit. If the concept of food security represents a desire, ambition and expectation; the concept of food insecurity represents a problem, a threat or a risk (Midgley 2013, 25). Both the concept of security and insecurity can be understood
as being situated at the ends of a continuum, and the word (in)security is sometimes used to convey an idea of process.

As conceptualised by FAO, food security consists of four key dimensions (Table 21.1). Food availability is necessary but not sufficient to ensure food security (as there may be famine in societies where food abounds), and access is necessary but not sufficient to ensure use, since food can be prepared and cooked (Webb et al. 2006). Stability seems to be the criterion that is transversal to all dimensions. In some approaches, risk (which is also part of phytosanitary and hygiene issues – food safety) is seen as an additional factor in food safety as “a cross-cutting issue affecting all components of the food security structure” (Webb and Rogers 2003).

These definitions of food security and insecurity proposed by FAO reflect the reconfigurations and conceptual revisions implemented since the 1970s. The successive revisions of the concept of food security add to the pluralisation

---

**Table 21.1**

*The main dimensions of the food security concept*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MAIN DIMENSIONS</th>
<th>DEFINITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Availability</td>
<td>Food availability addresses the “supply side” of food security and is determined by the level of food production, stock levels and net trade.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access (physical, economic and social)</td>
<td>An adequate supply of food at the national or international level does not in itself guarantee household level food security. Concerns about insufficient, socially and culturally inadequate food access have resulted in a greater policy focus on incomes, expenditure, markets, prices, and social innovation initiatives to achieve ‘proper’ access to food.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use and Utilisation</td>
<td>Utilisation is commonly understood as the way the body makes the most of various nutrients in the food. Sufficient energy and nutrient intake by individuals is the result of good care and feeding practices, food preparation, diversity of the diet and intra-household distribution of food. Combined with good biological utilisation of food consumed, this determines the nutritional status of individuals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stability</td>
<td>Even if your food intake is adequate today, you are still considered to be food insecure if you have inadequate access to food on a periodic basis, risking a deterioration of your nutritional status. Adverse weather conditions, the threat of climate change and forced displacement, political instability, or economic factors (unemployment, rising food prices) may have an impact on your food security status.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from FAO, 2008.
of perspectives regarding the associated risk factors and the most appropriate intervention possible. At the same time, several methodological proposals have emerged, associated with different analytical conceptions of food security.

It is a complex concept and not always capable of generating global consensus. Since it takes different forms, it is affected by issues of scale (global-local) and, above all, it stems from different factors depending on the situated context for which it is mobilised. A brief genealogy of the concept is important to understand the evolution of such differences.

BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CONCEPT

In its inception, the main concern encompassing food security was to increase food production and make food available to feed the world population. It was a question centred on food “availability”. This view was galvanised especially in the post-World War II reconstruction, in the late 1940s and continued into the following three decades, wherein agriculture policies revolved around intensive food production for mass consumption, with the help of chemical inputs to increase crop yield (epitomised by the “Green Revolution”). This was the time when military technologies and scientific innovations were transferred and adapted to help the blooming of intensive agro-food industries (Truninger 2013). When it became clear that increasing crop yields were not necessarily solving the spread of hunger and famine in the world, the focus turned to access and markets and how to solve the vagaries of unbalanced food distribution between industrial and less developed countries (e.g. in Africa, Asia and Latin America). This was in the 1980s, when the work of Amartya Sen (1982) would lead to the concept of food security being revised, bringing the issue of food rights to the debate. Sen’s conceptual contribution stems from the assertion that food insecurity does not necessarily come from the unavailability of food in the market, but rather from the existence of constraints on people’s access to food (Truninger et al, forthcoming). However, with a market driven agenda tarred with the neo-liberal ideology of the 1990s access was practically restricted to an economic dimension. The productionist paradigm of increasing food output (to the detriment of the environmental and health impacts) was still discernible, this time with a concern for making food cheap and affordable for consumers. Thus, as Lang and Barling (2012, 7) claim: “The productionist old paradigm accepted a culture of choice shaped by price. Reducing prices was the goal”. For that to happen, the power geometry
of the food system shifted and big distribution companies started exercising pressure to squeeze production costs and pass value throughout the food chain onto consumers, while getting the lion’s share. Such debates around the need to secure not only physical and economic access, but also social access intensified and leaked into the definition of food security. Despite such efforts to broaden the dimension of access beyond the market mechanisms, physical and especially social access are still the weakest links of the “access” dimension.

With the publication of the *World Bank Report on Poverty and Hunger* (World Bank 1986) the debates on food security reflected concerns about the temporal dimension and unexpected events that may affect the population to different degrees of food insecurity. Crises, wars, conflicts, forced displacement of people due to the scarcity of natural resources, income and employment fluctuations in people’s lives may throw them suddenly into situations of food insecurity. It is important to distinguish between chronic food insecurity wherein the population is affected by long-lasting poverty, and episodes that are transitory, associated with events that have, nevertheless a strong impact on shifting food practices. Thus, securing stability in the supply and access to food is fundamental, it being an important dimension of the concept included in its 1980s’ reformulations.

The use/utilisation dimension was the last to be included in the concept. In the 1990s, attention to an increasing population both in the Global North and South suffering either from malnutrition and hunger or overnutrition, excess weight and obesity brought in the need to guarantee everyone’s access to nutritionally and culturally appropriate foods bearing in mind the importance of access to food quality as part of a healthy diet and lifestyle. Such concerns with diet, nutrition and health shaped the extension of the notion of food security to nutrition as well. In Brazil, these ideas became concrete through the approval of an innovative strategy on food security and nutrition. This innovative policy model is now being extended to other countries around the world, namely the CPLP countries (Portuguese Language Countries, e.g. Mozambique).

With the global crisis of 2007-2008, debate intensified on food security with the combined increase of fuel and food prices, revealing the vulnerabilities of the global food system. The agricultural commodity spikes triggered conflicts over food resources in developing countries, with the population clearly struggling to have access to affordable food. However, the aggravation of the financial and economic crises in Europe and other developed countries, due, to some extent, to the impact of measures for public debt control was a wakeup
call to the problems of food access and distribution among rich nation states. Suddenly, the problem of food insecurity was not far away and out of sight, but was very much visible in the streets of many European cities with its long queues of disadvantaged groups waiting for free hot meals on cold nights. The 21st century economic crisis brought the problem and reality of food insecurity to European shores and obliged the rethinking of adequate access to food, focusing the debate on consumption and not only on production (Truninger and Díaz-Méndez 2017; Borch and Kjaernes 2016).

Finally, the connection between food security and sustainability issues (regarding either natural resources depletion, climate change effects or gas emissions from the agro-food industry) has brought to the fore a new configuration of this concept encapsulated in the notion of “sustainable food security” (Sonnino, Moragues-Fau and Maggio 2014). Indeed, the combined effects of climate change and forced displacement (due to conflicts, wars, resource scarcity) imposes further pressure on European countries to open their borders and accommodate climate change refugees (or war refugees), putting greater stress on allocating and distributing food in a more socially just way. Some of the issues that will become more prominent with the dramatic scenarios of people circulating from the Global South to the North relate to social access and ensuring multi-culturally adequate diets to populations on the move.

ACCESS – AN OVERLOOKED DIMENSION OF FOOD SECURITY?

As already outlined, food insecurity is a multi-layered phenomenon, which can range widely in severity. When individuals and families are dependent on food aid, one can easily grasp that their livelihood is severely constrained: in such cases, individuals lack agency concerning mundane everyday activities, such as choosing what to eat/cook. But even in its less severe forms, food insecurity affects or restricts individuals from fully participating in several spheres of social life, e.g. consumption and sociability around food.

While access constitutes a key dimension of food (in)security, most accounts stress the economic features of access. In the Global North, food insecurity is often associated with relative poverty, defined as the inability/affordability of obtaining an adequate and nutritious diet (Dowler 1998). In this context, famines and severe food shortage due to wars, disasters or
drought, are mostly a distant memory. Availability of foodstuffs is not the key issue but rather possessing sufficient economic means to buy/procure food. Even in the Global South, as Sen (1982) brilliantly showed concerning the Great Famine that ravaged India in the 1940s, the problem was never shortage of food but rather the way it was distributed, both geographically and socially. The physical/geographical and social dimensions of food security are less often addressed, when framing the discussion concerning western industrialised societies. In the following sections, we propose to articulate food insecurity with two different literatures to contribute to the broadening of this issue, going crucially beyond the economic access dimension. Such bodies of work are encompassed by the food deserts and social exclusion concepts.

PHYSICAL/GEOGRAPHICAL ACCESS AND FOOD INSECURITY THROUGH THE FOOD DESERT LENS

A large amount of literature concerning physical/geographical access to food revolves around the concept of food deserts (Adams, Ulrich, and Coleman 2010). However, there is no consensus concerning how to characterise and measure what constitutes a food desert. Intuitively, the metaphor could easily refer to a “food provisioning sociotechnical infrastructure” approach, wherein “deserts” stand for areas lacking food stores (such as markets, supermarkets, restaurants, coffee-shops, etc.). In fact, for the most part, research on food deserts has taken this approach and limited analysis to specific geographical areas (e.g. cities, neighbourhoods, boroughs). Most studies rely heavily on quantitative measures like density and/or distance measures, such as the number of stores (per residents or census area) or shop distance (Block and Kouba 2006; Hendrickson, Smith and Eikenberry 2006; Larsen and Gilliland 2008). Other researchers have been stressing that geographical access to food cannot rely solely on physical/geographical analysis: area based approaches examine potential access and not actual usability, while ignoring individual or social factors that also hinder access to food (USDA 2009).

For instance, Laurence (1997 cit in Kennedy 2001) defined food deserts as “those areas in inner cities where cheap, nutritious food is virtually unobtainable; car-less residents, unable to reach out to supermarkets, depend on the corner shop where prices are high, products are processed and fresh fruit and vegetables are poor or non-existent”. As defined by this author, addressing
food deserts also involves a multi-layered analysis of issues such as health inequalities, social exclusion, availability and price of food, food consumption habits, transportation or food poverty (Wrigley 2002). Additionally, this theoretical proposal encourages qualitative analysis and assessment. Moreover, it opens the theoretical spectrum, encompassing broader perspectives, such as “foodways” or “foodscapes”, which conceptualise “the ever-changing, social, relational, and political nature of landscapes of urban food consumption and provision” (Miewald and McCann 2014, 539).

Although difficult to define and measure, food desert became a popular concept in both academic and policy-making circles, particularly after the 1990s (Wrigley 2002). Since then, a large body of evidence, mostly accumulated in the USA, has shown that healthier foods are more difficult to obtain and cost more in disadvantaged areas than in affluent areas (Hendrickson, Smith and Eikenberry 2006). Living in food deserts severely constrains the type and quality of food that individuals can obtain. As highlighted by Drewnowski and Specter (2004), areas where quality foods are lacking expose residents to more energy-dense foods (filled with empty calories), which are usually available at convenience stores and fast food restaurants. Unsurprisingly, research has shown that those living in areas with easier access to supermarkets have a higher household fruit intake (Rose and Richards 2004) and are less prone to health problems (Giang et al. 2008). Nevertheless, a strict and linear causal relation is hard to define.

Several authors that focus on the USA emphasise that food deserts are particularly worrying for those living with a low income. In fact, in the American context, the lowest income neighbourhoods had nearly 30% fewer supermarkets than the highest income neighbourhoods (Weinberg 1995 cit in Walker, Keane and Burke 2010, 878). Racial issues are also extremely relevant, since predominantly black neighbourhoods have four times fewer supermarkets and more prevalence of fast-food restaurants than predominantly white neighbourhoods (Morland et al. 2002; Block, Scribner and DeSalvo 2004). Moreover, within food deserts, prices tend to be higher and there are fewer food options in type, number and quality (Hendrickson, Smith and Eikenberry 2006). This could help explain why only 2 to 3% of the total food expenditures of low-incomers are made in convenience stores (USDA 2009). On the other hand, constrains of access among low-incomers are heightened by the cost of transportation, which make it difficult to reach supermarkets outside the immediate vicinity (Rose and Richards 2004). Others still, like
Whitley’s (2013) qualitative study in rural Perry County, found that residents of food deserts with strong social networks were less likely to suffer food insecurity.

There have been fewer European studies and results have been more contradictory. For instance, one of the largest and most systematic studies conducted in the UK, compared areas with different socioeconomic deprivation levels within Glasgow, concluding that those living in the more deprived areas of the city were not substantially disadvantaged in terms of cost and availability of food (Cummins and Macintyre 2002). However, while less expensive food was available in deprived areas, it contained more sugar and fat, when compared with the cheaper products available in well off areas.

Another study used a pre-post intervention design to examine the impact of a large supermarket (Tesco) on a deprived area of Leeds (Wrigley, Warm and Margetts 2003). Most residents switched to the new store and ¾ of the residents with the poorest pre-intervention diet increased their fruit and vegetable intake. Also, a non-statistically significant relation was found between physical access to the new store (proximity) and dietary changes. However, Cummins and colleagues (2008) using the same pre-post design in Glasgow obtained conflicting results. These authors did not find a major fruit and vegetable consumption effect on switchers with the opening of a new supermarket. Nevertheless, there was improvement in their psychological health and on how they perceived impact on the community (more employment and community support).

In Northern Ireland, research showed 82% of the consumers assumed that corner shops were disappearing. Nevertheless, 70% of consumers shopped in the town centre closer to their homes. However, those that did their shopping outside the town were more satisfied with the price of products. Feelings of social exclusion were reported for 22% of the consumers, an effect of having insufficient local stores within an acceptable distance (Furey, Strugnell, and McIlveen 2001).

A recent study carried out in Amsterdam (The Netherlands) rejected the existence of food deserts within the city. Nonetheless, it was shown that areas with a lower share of native Dutch had lower supermarket density; although opposite results were obtained concerning proximity to supermarkets and variety (Helbich et al. 2017).

Food deserts remain an almost unexplored issue in Portugal. However, studies by Nogueira (2010) and Santana, Santos and Nogueira (2009) have made a lateral contribution to this debate. Nogueira (2010) investigated the
availability of resources in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area (LMA) in 2001-2005, including food retail, education, family support, health care, physical activity, recreation, diverse local resources and public transport. Results were aligned with the “deprivation amplification model” and showed that residents in more deprived areas lacked social and educational resources, facilities for physical and cultural activities and public transportation. Concerning food retail, results showed that the most deprived neighbourhoods had a lower density of supermarkets but a higher prevalence of small grocery stores and greengrocers. These results were consistent with those obtained by Santana, Santos and Nogueira (2009) a few years later: grocery shops are more prevalent in more deprived neighbourhoods of LMA and are negatively associated with a healthy diet. In contrast, less deprived neighbourhoods have more supermarkets and a greater fruit and vegetable intake.

Given the lack of consensus concerning what constitutes a food desert, researchers mention the importance of privileging mixed-methods (Walker, Keane and Burke 2010). Other authors appeal to increase the studies within a social science framework, particularly sociology (Adams, Ulrich and Coleman 2010).

In fact, the analysis of food environments of low income populations requires considering their unique social (e.g. social norms, violence), economic (e.g. purchasing power) and physical setting (e.g. stores, public transports) (Gittelsohn and Sharma 2009). Moreover, Macintyre, Mcdonald and Ellaway (2008) argue that the socio-spatial development of cities could also be informative and highlight a more context-based view of deprivation areas and residents’ relation with the existent resources. Also, Battersby (2012, 155) stresses that although research on food deserts could be a “useful starting point for considering a re-framing of urban food security” and provide input on weaknesses in retail food systems, it does not “focus enough on how people actually navigate their foodscapes”. For instance, by not recognising the existence of other forms of food provision beyond the market place (e.g. State, community, family and extant social networks).

SOCIAL EXCLUSION AND FOOD INSECURITY

As a concept, social exclusion acquired a strong presence in political and intellectual discourses during the 1990s (Littlewood and Herkommer 1999).
With the increasing use of the concept in different contexts, there was a need to answer some questions, such as: what is social exclusion? What does it mean to be socially excluded? What are the dimensions of the phenomenon? What processes can lead to it?

Several social scientists have focused their attention on the analysis of social exclusion and its interconnectedness with other issues (e.g. poverty and social inequalities). In fact, one of the problems arising from a lack of conceptual clarity concerning social exclusion was the possible confusion with other concepts, such as poverty, inequality, marginalisation, segregation and stigmatisation (Rodrigues 2000). Additionally, the fact that these phenomena can coexist for the same individual or household make it difficult to establish a clear distinction (Diogo, Castro and Perista 2015).

Historically, the concept of social exclusion emerged in France during the mid-1970s (Lenoir 1974). It was associated with poverty and was used to characterise those who were excluded from benefiting from the progress achieved by modern societies. However, it was when the term was adopted by the European Union during the 1980s, that it became popular in Europe, giving rise to multiple definitions (Capucha 2005; Rawal 2008). Later, the concept would eventually gain worldwide visibility, especially after the First World Summit in 1995 (Rawal 2008; Diogo, Castro and Perista 2015).

In the scientific field, different theoretical approaches have assigned different meanings to social exclusion. One of these approaches originated in France and emphasises relational aspects, i.e. the analysis of issues related to the concepts of social solidarity and social bonds, a theoretical perspective based on Durkheim’s (1977 [1993]) contributions (Capucha 2005; Rawal 2008). Authors such as Xiberras (1993), Castel (1996) and Paugam (1996) have made important contributions to the development of this approach, namely by framing social exclusion as a process associated with the disruption of social bonds connecting individuals to multiple social systems. In this approach, the concept of social exclusion is broader than the concept of poverty, since all the poor are excluded, but not all the excluded are necessarily poor.

Another approach focuses on issues related to the rights of individuals to participate in different spheres of social life (citizenship rights). From this point of view, poverty is related to the way resources are distributed among individuals, while social exclusion is related to the opportunities for social participation (Capucha 2005). Thus, authors such as Room (1988, 1989), Sen (1999) and Burchardt (2000) stress the material dimension of social exclusion,
concluding that the unequal distribution of economic resources is the main factor of exclusion in modern societies.

Therefore, social exclusion is defined, on the one hand, as a process leading to the dissolution of social bonds, or as a process associated with the disruption of the social contract (Capucha 2005). In the same line of thought, Room (1999) points to the existence of two theoretical traditions, the British and the French, where the former focuses on distributive aspects and the second on relational aspects.

At a certain level, the dissimilarities between these theoretical approaches reflect differences in how societies are organised in different countries (e.g. the role of the Social State, type of social benefits and political ideologies) (Haan and Maxwell 1998). Concerning this issue, Silver (1994) pointed out the existence of three paradigms: (i) a solidarity paradigm, originated in France, where the relationship between the concepts of exclusion and solidarity is analysed; (ii) a specialisation paradigm, with expression in the USA and UK, where the relationship between the concepts of exclusion and discrimination is analysed; and (iii) a monopoly paradigm, mostly Western European, where exclusion is related to group monopoly formation.

Authors such as Bruto da Costa (1998) preferred using “social exclusions”, in order to account for the complexity and heterogeneity of the concept. In fact, the phenomenon has multiple dimensions, namely: (i) economic, which concerns poverty, i.e. multiple deprivations due to lack of resources; (ii) social, related with the disruption of social bonds; (iii) cultural, based on social discrimination and labelling processes (e.g. minorities or former prisoners); (iv) pathological, where psychological or mental disorders can lead to family breakdown; (v) self-destructive behaviour, such as alcoholism, drug addiction, prostitution and other types of risk behaviour (Bruto da Costa 1998). Another conceptualisation, such as Babajanian and Hagen-Zanker’s (2012), mentions three types of exclusion: (i) exclusion from income, (ii) exclusion from services; and (iii) exclusion from participation. This conceptualisation is close to that formulated by Aasland and Flotten (2001), when they point to four types of exclusion: (i) exclusion from formal citizenship rights; (ii) exclusion from the labour market; (iii) exclusion from participation in civil society; and (iv) exclusion from social arenas.

In sum, the concept of social exclusion is complex and varies according to the context, which may limit its understanding. However, its multi-dimensional nature allows a one-dimensional vision of social reality to be overcome.
Although food-related issues are not often directly addressed by the social exclusion scholarship, the connection between food and social exclusion seems straightforward, and can be linked to the idea that those who suffer from involuntary starvation “can be seen as being excluded from access to food” (Sen 2000, 9). However, as pointed out by Sen (2000), this connection does not add anything new; we need to move beyond this approach and look at the relational aspects. In this sense, it is important to use the concept of social exclusion to understand the impact that the disruption of social bonds can have on food-related issues (and vice versa).

Food practices encompass social participation, whether through celebrations (e.g. Christmas and birthday parties), business meetings or just casual encounters between friends. It has a strong symbolic value that goes beyond the mere satisfaction of biological needs. In this regard, Dowler states:

> those who cannot afford to eat in ways acceptable to society; who find food shopping a stressful or potentially humiliating experience because they might have insufficient money; whose children cannot have a packed lunch similar to their friends; who do not call on others to avoid having to accommodate return calls – these are people excluded from the ‘minimum acceptable way of life’. Food is an expression of who a person is and what they are worth, and of their ability to provide their family’s basic needs; it is also a focus for social exchange. Food is, of course, a major contributor to health and well-being. But it is not just health that is compromised in food-poor households: social behaviour is also at risk. (Dowler 1998, 58)

It is not just a matter of having access to food, but also of being able to participate actively in society, i.e. of leading what is collectively understood as a ‘normal’ life. One of the advantages of framing problems such as food insecurity in the context of social exclusion “is its simultaneous emphasis on multi-dimensional aspects of deprivation and their causes” (Babajanian and Hagen-Zanker 2012, 4). Likewise, individuals establish a complex and multi-dimensional connection with food, which entails multiple facets: biological, cultural, psychological and social. In this way, it is possible to avoid simplistic readings that only look at one side of the problem (e.g. the economic dimension).

In any case, food insecurity and social exclusion do not represent the same reality, as stated by Adhikary and Sarkar:
Both these problems are multifaceted and so we cannot define them in a single word. In some cases food insecurity gives birth to social exclusion and in some other cases social exclusion leads to food insecurity; also sometimes both food insecurity and social exclusion grow simultaneously. (Adhikary and Sarkar 2012, 766)

Thus if, on the one hand, a disruption of social bonds (social exclusion) can lead to significant changes in the way individuals interact through food and, therefore, in how it affects their social participation; on the other, changes in how individuals relate to others through food can lead to the disruption of social bonds.

This subject can also be related with commensality – the practice of eating together – which has long been a core topic in sociological and anthropological food scholarship. Cultural codes include provisions concerning how meals should be taken, shared, and eaten, the order of dishes, who should be served first, and so forth. Sharing a meal is a deeply charged social engagement, layered with signs (Goody 1982). It is widely accepted that commensality promotes communal solidarity and meals play a role in the regulation of social life and individual behaviour (Fischler 2011, 534). For example, family meals are “social interactions centred on food” entailing preparation and planning, in which food itself has different levels of centrality (Rotenberg 1981 cited by Yates and Warde 2017, 98). Insofar as social exclusion(s) relates with individuals’ and households’ access to specific or preferred types of food, it is plausible that such a limitation may severely impinge on their social participation around food. Impacts are likely to be felt not only during feasting and ceremonial commensality occasions (e.g. Christmas, Easter, and birthdays) but also in everyday meals. Despite the fact that increasing difficulties are visible regarding orchestrating family-work-children leisure activities around family meals, eating together is still a highly valuable feature of doing “family” and “motherhood/fatherhood”. Symbolically, many families still think it very important to make the extra effort of eating together, even if daily activities and schedule coordination becomes a challenge for that to happen in a systematic way. Thus, low income families also strive to maintain commensal practices, even if they struggle with the quality and quantity of food they have to provide to their families and the frequency they can afford a “proper” family meal.

Additionally, food is also central to individual identity, “in that any given human individual is constructed, biologically, psychologically and socially by
the foods he/she chooses to incorporate” (Fischler 1988, 275). In fact, it is because food plays a central role in the construction of identities that food deprivation and changes to dietary routines and habits have a profound impact on people’s lives (and in everything they encompass).

CONCLUSION

The double term food (in)security has been gradually refined in its conceptualisation, especially in the 2nd half of the 20th and beginning of the 21st century. Although the concept has gained more clarity in recent years, its access dimension tends to be overlooked, especially its physical/geographical and social aspects. In this chapter, we have suggested that these aspects have the potential for better empirical clarification with cross fertilisation with the literature on food deserts and social exclusion. Together with other scholars, we also agree that it is important to privilege mixed-methods and multi-layered approaches to capitalise on such conceptual refinement and empirical operationalisation. However, the connecting points between the various sub-dimensions of access (physical, economic and social) are almost unquantifiable, and are difficult to untangle. For instance, socioeconomic deprived neighbourhoods are frequently disadvantaged in terms of food cost and availability (at least in the USA), representing a challenge particularly for low income families, that see themselves excluded, not only from access to cheap and nutritious food, but also from the social sphere (shopping, eating out and social participation). In some social settings, both urban and rural, territorial organisation is engendered into highly segregated spaces, some of which lacking easy physical access to food. Living in a food desert doesn’t necessarily entail exclusion from food, consumption or social participation. But, for some families, difficulty in access can be a key dimension of exclusion. Thus, the analytical focus on the configuration of exclusion at different and multiple levels (e.g. income, services and participation) should be more explored in future studies to better understand the access dimension of food insecurity.

As to social exclusion, it is also possible to establish bridges with the concept of food insecurity. The disruption of social bonds can have an impact on people’s eating habits and on the social interactions that are established around food, in the same way as the phenomenon of food insecurity can lead
to the disruption of social bonds. Moreover, the relationship between the concepts of food insecurity and social exclusion goes beyond the idea that food insecure people are excluded from access to food. The way individuals relate to others through food has an impact not only on lifelong relationships, but also on how these relationships influence individuals and define them. Thus food represents a strong element of social inclusion and identity.

By focusing more on the physical and social aspects we enable the refinement of the concept of access that has been biased towards privileging the economic arena. More international and national studies are a welcome addition, especially if they further examine the dimension of physical and social access, and problematise more issues around food insecurity, consumption and social participation.

**ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Research Council under the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013)/ERC grant agreement n.º 337977. We are also grateful for the valuable time kindly given by our participants in the interviews. The international research team comprises Rebecca O’Connell, Julia Brannen, Abigail Knight, Laura Hamilton, Charlie Owen and Antonia Simon (UK); Silje Skuland and Anine Frykholm (Norway) and Monica Truninger, Karin Wall, Vasco Ramos, Sónia G. Cardoso, Fábio R. Augusto and Manuel Abrantes (Portugal). This research reflects only the authors’ views and the European Union is not liable for any use that may be made of the information contained therein.’

Fábio Rafael Augusto wishes to gratefully acknowledge the financial support from the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT), under the PhD grant SFRH/BD/130072/2017, co-funded by the European Social Fund (FSE) and national funds of the Portuguese Ministry of Science, Technology and Higher Education (MCTES) through the Human Capital Operational Programme (POCH).

Vasco Ramos wishes to acknowledge funding receiving from the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology, within the framework of a post-doctoral project (SFRH/BPD/116221/2016).
REFERENCES


BABAJANIAN, B., J. Hagen-Zanker. 2012. “Social protection and social exclusion: an analytical framework to assess the links”. In Background Note, ed. by ODI. London.


THE NEGLECTED DIMENSIONS OF FOOD SECURITY


CITE THIS CHAPTER AS:
In 2016, the Institute of Social Sciences (University of Lisbon) decided to prepare a three volume publication in English based on its 2015/2020 Strategic Programme: *Changing Societies: Legacies and Challenges*. Each volume focuses on one of the programme’s main research areas: *Inclusion, Citizenship* and *Sustainability*. The publication foregrounds the Institute’s work and, through the 48 texts included, disseminates its researchers’ innovative contributions to the social sciences. This publication is a clear sign of the ICS community’s remarkable collaborative vitality. This high quality research, now accessible to a vast international readership, highlights the virtues of interdisciplinarity in science practice, one of the pillars of ICS-ULisboa.

ANA NUNES DE ALMEIDA