A philosophical reflection on autonomy and vulnerability in the context of the archaeological practice in the 21st century

Íris Beatriz Borges Teixeira

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Summary

Archaeology plays an important role in the determination and the comprehension of the co-existence of identities between past and contemporary cultures. The archaeologist is required to think beyond temporal and physical borders throughout his studies of the human past, in pursuit of uncovering the material remains of past cultures whose settlement patterns do not reflect the current political and geographical organization into nation-states.

In Part I of this thesis, entitled “Archaeological Practices in the 21st century”, an overview of a wide variety of ethical concerns related to the production of archaeological knowledge will be given first. The overview will be contextualized within the broader framework of the cultural practices and politics of the archaeological practice, understood as both a humanistic and scientific discipline, in the 21st century. For this purpose, the ethical, political and social implications of the choices made by European archaeologists working abroad will be discussed in some detail. The archaeologists’ involvement abroad has an impact on the establishment, maintenance and disruption of relationships between local communities and foreign investigators conducting archaeological research. Likewise, some of the most prominent implications of the practice of archaeology in zones of conflict will be introduced to the reader. Part II, entitled “Archaeology and Philosophy”, constitutes of a philosophical reflection on the current state of the archaeological practice in agreement with the preceding chapters of this thesis. The intention is to develop a philosophical framework within which it is possible to analyze many of the transformations of the last hundred years which have taken place in the archaeological profession. The alterations have taken place both due to the improvement of the technology available for archaeological excavations and because of the conduction of investigations abroad, which are never situated outside of the geopolitical condition of the 20th century and the early 21st century. The philosophical oeuvre of Paul Ricoeur, in particular his writings on history, ideology, utopia and his conception of the capable human being will serve as the background against which to describe the possibility of a different form of dialogue between archaeology and philosophy.

First, the relationship between history, memory and the archaeological study of material cultures will be discussed with reference to Ricoeur’s philosophical thought. Different aspects of the French philosopher’s oeuvre will pave the way for a philosophical reflection on autonomy and vulnerability in the context of the archaeological practice in the 21st century. The illustration of these aspects will include Ricoeur’s conception of the capable human being, the triad of the ethical, the moral and practical reason and a Ricoeurian understanding of the political subject. Lastly, due to the claims and beliefs expressed by different authoritative orders operating within the vast archaeological field questions on vulnerability and autonomy must be reconsidered in light of Ricoeur’s dialectic of ideology and utopia.
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Introduction

Modern archaeology, aided by the technological development of the last two centuries, has significantly shaped today’s common awareness of past identities. Archaeology plays an important role in the determination and the comprehension of the co-existence of identities between past and contemporary cultures. The archaeologist is required to think beyond temporal and physical borders throughout his studies of the human past, in pursuit of uncovering the material remains of past cultures whose settlement patterns do not reflect the current political and geographical organization into nation-states. During the excavations the archaeologist cuts into the ground, across the many stratigraphic layers of past human lives. Since the mid 20th century the rapid development of modern technology inevitably has had a large impact on the modernization of a wide variety of non-destructive and destructive archaeological methods which serve to support the archaeological investigative endeavors.

Hence, it appears increasingly essential for archaeologists and citizens alike to reflect upon how their closer physical proximity to the human and material remains of past inhabitants of the Earth has changed and will continue to alter the relationships between present societies and those past cultures who have become visible. As of consequence, the archaeological discipline is undergoing an extensive process of self-reflection since the late 20th century. In public spaces beyond academic circles many archaeologists have come to suggest through their work that all the present inhabitants of this shared world need to be re-evaluate how one approaches the different forms of life and identities whose absence is being made present through the practice of archaeological work and the endurance of material traces. It is a process of evaluation which many archaeologists consider needs to extend beyond discussions amongst professional archaeologists only.

In Part I of this thesis, entitled “Archaeological Practices in the 21st century”, first an overview of a wide variety of ethical concerns related to the production of archaeological knowledge will be given. The overview will be contextualized within the broader framework of the cultural practices and politics of the archaeological practice, understood as both a humanistic and scientific discipline, in the 21st century. For this purpose, the ethical, political and social implications of the choices made by

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European archaeologists working abroad will be discussed in some detail. The archaeologists’ involvement abroad has an impact on the establishment, maintenance and disruption of relationships between local communities and foreign investigators conducting archaeological research. Likewise, some of the most prominent implications of the practice of archaeology in zones of conflict will be introduced to the reader. One can question whether the wider public has a sufficiently deep insight into the practical repercussions for archaeologists conducting research in current or past war zones. The archaeologists are confronted with serious moral challenges and must fulfill the complex task of treating the living victims with dignity and respect in situations of great suffering, while they simultaneously conduct their studies of past material cultures.

Amongst archaeologists it is an increasingly dominant belief that since the archaeological method physically destroys the present, it cannot be purely retrospective. It must allow for a space of discussion between the rich variety of present cultures who most likely wish to approach and to learn about their past in different ways. In the past two decades more studies have been published which resist the adoption of a merely retrospective perspective in order to be capable of addressing the fragile equilibrium between separate, diverging and often contradicting interpretations of the past, seen in relation to current discussions on the subject of various forms of local and world patrimony.

Part II, entitled “Archaeology and Philosophy”, constitutes of a philosophical reflection on the current state of the archaeological practice in agreement with the preceding chapters of this thesis. The intention is to develop a philosophical framework within which it is possible to analyze many of the transformations of the last hundred years which have taken place in the archaeological profession. The alterations have taken place both due to the improvement of the technology available for archaeological excavations and because of the conduction of investigations abroad, which are never situated outside of the geopolitical condition of the 20th century and the early 21st century. The philosophical oeuvre of Paul Ricoeur, in particular his writings on history, ideology, utopia and his conception of the capable human being will serve as the background against which to describe the possibility of a different form of dialogue between archaeology and philosophy.

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First, the relationship between history, memory and the archaeological study of material cultures will be discussed with reference to Ricoeur’s late work “Memory, History and Forgetting” (2005) and the book “Dark Abyss of Time: Memory and Archaeology” (2011), written by the archaeologist Laurent Olivier. Subsequently, the introduction of different aspects of Ricoeur’s philosophical anthropology will pave the way for a philosophical reflection on autonomy and vulnerability in the context of the archaeological practice in the 21st century. The illustration of these aspects will include Ricoeur’s conception of the capable human being, the triad of the ethical, the moral and practical reason and a Ricoeurian understanding of the political subject. Due to the claims and beliefs expressed by different authoritative orders operating within the vast archaeological field questions on vulnerability and autonomy must be reconsidered in light of Ricoeur’s dialectic of ideology and utopia, addressed primarily through a reference to “Lectures on Ideology and Utopia” (1986).

Part I – Archaeological Practices in the 21st Century

Being confronted with past cultures is clearly not the only situation in which the living inhabitants of this world are confronted with other absent and foreign cultures. Although current communities have largely gained a wider access to once distant contemporary communities through the internet and the easier and faster transportation modes which exist today, it still does not seem possible for a human being to be authentically present everywhere on this world at all times. Today, it remains part of our human mortal condition that we will not be able to meet all the inhabitants of the Earth during our limited lifetimes. Nevertheless, people react very differently to this basic human limitation.

For example, from a cosmopolitan view world citizens must make choices which respect their current shared human existence and that of future generations\(^7\). Accordingly, it is of great importance to study how the ability and the desire of different living communities to live together changes as they gain greater awareness about past cultures. Cosmopolitan archaeologists defend that is necessary to consider that the archaeological profession, both due to its humanistic and scientific aspirations, is accompanied by a significant responsibility to be capable of determining a right, appropriate and just conduct towards past cultures\(^8\).

In general, the wider public must consider how the archaeologists’ performances in the 21st century, the actions they perform under significant constraints, be it temporal, physical or material, are modified by the distribution of financial aid and its relation to new integration policies and legal parameters. With the onset of decolonization, European archaeologists have in greater numbers admitted that their archaeological interpretations of non-European countries in the past were strongly determined by historical, economic and other socio-political factors, which in turn means that these interpretations need to re-evaluated critically\(^9\). Hence, many epistemological and theoretical corner

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8 For example, the cosmopolitan archaeologist Lisa Meskell suggests: “People are different, the cosmopolitan knows, and there is much to learn from our differences. Because there are so many human possibilities worth exploring, we neither expect nor desire that every person or every society should converge on a single model of life. […] Our archaeological responsibilities cannot be limited to beneficence or salvage; they must include respect for cultural difference – even if that sometimes means relinquishing our own research imperatives. Archaeologists no longer have the license to “tell” people their pasts or adjudicate upon the “correct” ways of protecting or using heritage”. (Lisa Meskell, “Introduction – Cosmopolitan Heritage Ethics”. In: Lisa Meskell (Ed.), *Cosmopolitan archaeologies*. Durham, Duke University Press (2009), pp. 2-3).

stones of the archaeological knowledge produced in the 19th and 20th centuries have fallen under scrutiny and need to be re-evaluated in a critical manner. In a series of lectures published in the early 2000’s, the philosopher Étienne Balibar thoughtfully considers that:

“political matters cannot be examined from a deductive point of view (be it moral, legal, philosophical, sociological, or some combination of these), but can only be theorized under the constraints imposed by the situation and the changes in the situation that one observes or tries to anticipate […] We ought to] incorporate as much as possible a reflection on its immediate conditions, which determine the understanding and use of concepts” (Balibar, op. cit., p. vii-viii).

It seems that on closer observation archaeologists act under very similar constraints to those more easily associated with political debates. In a lecture on the many ties between archaeology and politics the German archaeologist Hermann Parzinger, recently appointed as the director of the Berliner Stiftung Preußischer Kulturbesitz and former director of the Deutsche Archäologische Institut (2003-2008), affirmed that the archaeologists often hold the position of mediators between cultures that open doors (they are “Türöffner”). Recent publications such as “Cosmopolitan Archaeology” and “Ethics and Archaeological Praxis” point to the necessity of archaeologists and non-archaeologists involved in heritage practices to possess the capacities to understand and explain to others that the relationship between the past and present is not only affected by certain archaeological scientific requirements. Rather, it is also reflective of how individuals, as members of a community, a nation and as cosmopolitan citizens approach foreign cultures.

In recent years greater attention has been drawn towards the concept of ‘multivocality’ in an attempt to support the view that archaeological knowledge should not be used as a means to obscure diverse cultural values. For example, within the wider context of a restorative justice practice and

13 Idem, p. 9.
14 Meskell 2009, op. cit.
discussions on identity and ancestry it has become an accepted choice by some archaeologists to return human remains to their living descendants as a form of restoration\textsuperscript{17}. As we will see below, the notion of descent is referenced often in the context of discussions regarding collaborative practices between archaeologists and the public, given the importance of a respectful treatment of the sacred, as well as ontological questions regarding the status of the dead\textsuperscript{18}.

The constraints and complex situations within the archaeological field, their ethical and political dimensions have only in the past years been more openly discussed outside of an academic context. For example, the implementation of archaeological air survey photographs, utilized to achieve a more effective recognition of yet unknown archaeological structures, created the possibility for international public collaborative practices between archaeologists and non-archaeologists. In the year 2016 the space archaeologist Sarah Parcak launched a worldwide campaign to recruit volunteers with helping to identify archaeological structures on satellite images\textsuperscript{19}. This open access to the location of archaeological sites implies a very particular form of cross-cultural knowledge exchange between professional investigators and laymen.

Campaigns such as Parcak’s project publicly divulge information about local patrimony, information which each individual community or the responsible scientific or governmental institution might not want to be accessible to the public. Furthermore, they raise questions concerning the autonomy of the archaeologists, particularly of those which are not involved with the open access campaign but have in the past, present or will have planned to in the near future conduct investigations on the archaeological structures revealed by these new forms of analysis\textsuperscript{20}. The archaeological air survey photography campaign and its open access policy has introduced a new form of cross-cultural knowledge exchange into the archaeological practice which interferes with the regular archaeological proceedings since it is still a very uncontrolled form of information divulgation.

The archaeologist Susan Pollock describes the task of allowing multivocality to emerge as “a call to respect and make space for the voices of others, who have as much reason to be interested in narratives as we [the archaeologists] do” (Susan Pollock, “Archaeology as a Means for Peace or a Source of Violence? An Introduction”, \textit{Archaeologies: Journal of the World Archaeological Congress} (2008), p. 365).

\textsuperscript{17} González-Ruibal 2018, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 346.
\textsuperscript{19} González-Ruibal 2018, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 353-354.
To illustrate the increased proximity between past and present as a result of the establishment of less invasive technological methods in archaeology we can study the example of the excavation of Krems-Wachtberg. In the early 2000’s, during the construction of a family home in Krems, Austria, traces of lower paleolithic human remains were uncovered in the ground\textsuperscript{21}. The subsequent archaeological excavations of the “Krems-Wachtberg” site were conducted not only while the house was being constructed, the excavations in the basement of the house also continued for a number of years afterwards while the family was already inhabiting the house.

Technological inventions of the past decades have enabled such co-habitation more often, even though it is certainly still an uncommon situation for there to be such great known proximity between a living family and one that has long passed. Perhaps most well known from this site has become a double burial of infant twins from the \textit{Gravettien} period (27,000 BP)\textsuperscript{22}. The twin skeletons of Krems-Wachtberg lay protected under a mammoth scapula and once identified were removed from the excavation site still in the form of a block of soil and brought to Vienna. To reduce any damages to the skeleton, the Viennese Museum of Natural Sciences ordered the production of a 3D-print of the twins which the archaeologists would be able to study attentively, before proceeding with the actual dismantling of the soil layers around the twins’ skeletons.

The additional knowledge archaeologists have access to through modern non-interventive methods, which protect the archaeological remains through the production of images and copies of the material, also appears to reduce to a certain extend the ability of the archaeologists to have an immediate direct contact with the material remains. Under modern conditions, the archaeologists often can anticipate what exactly they will excavate. This has an effect on their intentions, the process of selection and preparation (time, place, technical methods) and improves the degree of preservation and conservation. However, there will also more likely be a much longer period between the initial identification of the archaeological remains and the actual moment of uncovering the remains. As extraordinary as this 3D-print of the twin skeletons is, models such as these might also provoke a particular kind of doubt, as the responsible archaeologists realize that through this new approach less

\textsuperscript{21} The information on this archaeological discovery was transmitted on-site in the context of an excursion to the author of this thesis in form of a personal note from Prof. Dr. Jürgen Richter, University of Cologne, 26 July 2014.

\textsuperscript{22} Personal note from Prof. Dr. Jürgen Richter, University of Cologne, 26 July 2014.
methodological choices can be left to chance. Consequently, it also appears easier today to use legal measures against archaeologists if their choices have unfortunately led to damages on site.

Excavations such as Krems-Wachtberg make use of modern-non interventive methods, which create a new form of anticipation since the archaeologists no longer have an immediate direct contact with the materials remains and less methodological choices can be left to chance. Many different new forms of technology, including 3D-printing, enable archaeologists to trace uncovered archaeological remains while they are still covered by the soil. As the archaeologists gain more knowledge and of a better quality about the existence of previously undiscovered material and human remains they will also need to adjust their conduct to protect the archaeological remains. In this way they carry a new form of responsibility during the preparation and performance of the excavation, possibly becoming hyper conscious of each step. Certainly, it must be very different for an archeologist to be acutely aware of how the twin skeletons look as they are about to uncover the real twins, having previously studied the 3D copy. We may wonder, if the archaeologists of Krems-Wachtberg are able to approach the paleolithic twins without too many expectations. Is their increased knowledge perhaps a hindrance for approaching the infants’ burial with an objective gaze?

The excavation of Krems-Wachtberg also offers us an example of how through the improvement of technological methods it has become easier to consolidate contemporary quotidian lives with the intrusive and destructive archaeological proceedings which often interrupt the course of the daily activities of the inhabitants from the area being excavated. Considering each excavation both from a local or larger context, it should become a point of discussion within ethical, social, environmental and political debates whether any disruptive archaeological method can be applied despite its possible negative consequences for present and future local human, animal and plant lives.
1. The Ethical Concerns of the Production of Archaeological Knowledge – an Overview

The archaeologist’s task of uncovering the human and material remains of past cultures through the exposure of successive stratigraphic layers on a site brings living human beings into greater physical proximity to the past inhabitants of this planet. The excavations and their discoveries increase the necessity for deeper discussions on the various forms of local and world patrimony. Such discussions have an impact on current models of historicity, as well as on the political and philosophical definitions of identity, violence and vulnerability.\(^{23}\)

In the 1980’s the North-American artist Richard Serra was sued in a federal court case. The intention was to remove Serra’s steel sculpture “Tilted Arc” from the Foley Federal Plaza in Manhattan, New York City. The sculpture had been constructed specifically for this public space and had been placed there in the year 1981. According to research done by the suing party, the larger public found Serra’s piece to be ugly and disruptive to daily public life, claiming that it held the place ‘hostage’. The opponents won, the piece was in removed in the year 1989 and the court case was heavily debated in the art world, culminating in the publication of several newspaper and art magazine articles\(^{24}\). Then and now it would still seem to be an exceptional case, rather than the norm, that an archaeologist would be brought to trial by a local community due to the aesthetic, emotional or otherwise disruptive character of his archaeological actions.

Despite the massive impact archaeologists have on physical spaces and the lives of local communities once they begin to conduct an archaeological investigation, during the 20\(^{th}\) century comparatively few actions received the worldwide attention and led to the legal repercussions that art lawsuits such as in the case of the removal of Serra’s piece had. A very brief reflection on the ties between artists, archaeologists and their relations to forms of social interaction quickly points to the common assumption that for the most part, because artists are acting in a non-empirically defined

23 For example, writing in the context of archaeological practices in zones of conflict the archaeologists Dominic Perring and Sjoerd van der Linde point out that: “Archaeologists and heritage managers play an important role in the exploration and reconstruction of tangible and intangible heritage, which in turn contributes to processes of reconciliation and economic reconstruction. But if we are to be effective in the pursuit of these goals we need to be guided by a vision of cultural heritage that cares not only about the material remains of the past but also about those connected to it. This involves mitigating the worst of the impacts of over-hasty ‘top-down’ approaches to CRM by locating our work within longer-term strategies for social and economic rehabilitation. Whilst we may be employed to help investigate, manage, restore and protect cultural resources, or to train others in how to do so, what matters most is the uses to which these resources are put. This makes us political actors with social responsibilities. Our interventions and actions must therefore be shaped by as full an appreciation of the social impact of our work as possible. We need to be aware of how our work is located and perceived within local socio-political and cultural power structures, and in the context of wider aid and development programmes” (Dominic Perring, Sjoerd van der Linde, “The Politics and Practice of Archaeology in Conflict”, Conservation and Management of Archaeological Sites Vol. 11 no.3-4, (2009), p. 210).

world, in the realm of aesthetics, they are allowed to work following their own intuition to a far larger extent than archaeologists are ever allowed to do. Furthermore, while artists often work individually, most archaeologists are conducting their practice as members of larger collectives, from within an institutional or academic background.

What the actions of archaeologists and artists have in common is first that both practices disrupt existing ties between people and the past. Secondly, both are able to foster forms of ‘memory articulation’ and stimulate the establishment or defense of the right to a remembered presence in a particular place. Archaeologists and artists can through their work support heterogenous versions of the past and present and offer alternative narratives. Given the above, it seems possible to affirm that archaeologists cannot claim to work from a neutral perspective, as a court judge is able to claim. Instead, they operate within a greater proximity to artists, as archaeologists are complicit and defend partisan views through their acts. The archaeologist directly or indirectly expresses a geopolitical affiliation through his choices, actions and the dialogue she establishes between past, present and future communities. Consequently, many archaeologists in an attempt to not shy away from a more honest appraisal of their profession ask fellow archaeologists to cultivate a level of awareness and openness to discuss the impact of their professional practice beyond academic circles and departments of heritage management.

As we will see below, for some archaeologists this has come to mean a distanciation from more widely accepted deontological norms and their replacement by more flexible and inclusive ethical standards. In particular since the start of the 21st century archaeology has come to nurture a position of suspicion towards deontological norms which lack in reflexivity and often significantly limit the archaeologists in their engagement with the local communities living close to the archaeological sites.

28 Perring and van der Linde ask: “Values therefore often confront each other, which is why the act of balancing conflicting values is actually at the core of all heritage management practice. The real questions here of course, are about relative power: who has the power to decide which values are to be upheld in the archaeological process, what is the role and responsibility of archaeologists in this, and finally, against what purpose, or vision, do we prioritise the multitude of values?” (Perring, van der Linde 2009, op. cit., p. 199).
or do not allow for less scientific measures which respect ancestor rights. Several archaeologists have claimed that in order to reduce the bureaucratization or instrumentalization of ethics for nationalistic, economic or otherwise partisan motives it has become urgent to negotiate ethical decisions within both theoretical and practical contexts which reveal a global aspiration, without disrespecting cultural diversity or exclusively promoting universals.

Archaeology possesses an educational component, since knowledge is passed down many generations and is transmitted to new archaeologists it is necessary to re-affirm the purpose of archaeology and the necessity of the discipline’s existence and consequently guarantee its continuation in the future. In recent years the preconception that archaeology is primarily about unexpected discoveries has shifted towards a more balanced understanding which raises an awareness for how particular excavation sites, archaeological projects and topics are given greater prominence above other alternative projects due to a strong rejection of possible alternative narratives and interpretations which consequently are labelled as unacceptable or illegitimate. Thus, in agreement with a self-critical gaze, it becomes easier to discuss archaeological ethics, the trade of antiquities, as well as indigenous, forensic or decolonial archaeological practices and other related subjects amongst archaeologists and cultural heritage circles. Many archaeologists have come to accept that an ethical reflection will allow for the rise of questions of a practical and political nature from a philosophical perspective that does not restrict itself to the confinements of deontological obligations, prescriptions and norms advocated by different policies of archaeological institutions after WWII, in particular during the 1960’s and 1970’s.

The late 1980’s and the 1990’s, after the post-processual paradigm shift, were the decades during which archaeologists experienced the transformation of scientific paradigms and moral perspectives which have influenced the discussions held today. The historiography of archaeological research, more specifically the progression of technical advances within the discipline determines not only the current scientific identity of archaeologists, its framework has also been utilized to write the history of the archaeological discipline. Given this correlation, according to which the development of the archaeological practice is discussed primarily through references to particular technical advances and the improvement of scientific methodological processes, we may conclude that we are.

30 Olivier 2011, op. cit., p. 110.
experiencing the culmination of the archaeological potential since the late 20th century. However, while archaeologists have certainly benefited from any scientific and technical improvements which facilitate the collection, analysis and preservation of archaeological material remains this appears to be quite a reductive claim which overlooks any parallel non-technological development which shaped the archaeological profession in the last three decades.

Given the specificity of the writing of the historiography of archaeology it does not surprise one that any type of collaborative practices between different potential recipients and readers of archaeological knowledge tends to stir hot debates amongst onlookers and the different parties involved. The ethical mandate of collaborative practices extends across several areas, aside from the field of restoration practices and indigenous archaeology it might also refer to the collaboration between first and third world archaeologists and stakeholders or the establishment of local community projects in European countries. One serious problem remains that despite the increased attention paid to such collaborative projects on a national or international scale they often still serve to obscure underlying structural inequalities which affect the redistribution and access to knowledge or property.

Many collaborative projects have not yet been stripped entirely or at all of paternalistic undertones or an ideological rhetoric of development. We therefore must ask: What entails true collaboration? Furthermore, forms of excessive hospitality or unrestricted responsibility might put too much of a burden on the archaeologists working on the field and consequently overlook the respect for each individual actor involved in these kinds of debates.

As we will see in the following chapter, there has been an increasing amount of discussion within archaeological circles concerning forms of domination which still occur today whenever a European team, since it is funding the excavation, makes all the important decisions concerning the archaeological investigation without consulting the local archaeologists and responsible institutions. Unfortunately, such open discussions are more likely to be held within a purely historical revision of the relation between Imperialism, Colonialism and archaeological excavations by Europeans in Africa or Asia in the late 19th and throughout the 20th centuries. It is now the practice of some European archaeological institutions to implement the requirement of the participation of local archaeologists and members of the community in the actual excavation of archaeological sites outside of Europe, but which are conducted by European archaeologists. Foundations and institutes are interested in obtaining

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32 Pollock 2016a, op. cit., p. 225.
evidence of said integration during the organizational phase of the archaeological investigation in order to distribute financial aid exclusively to archaeological teams which respect this condition. However, it remains unclear whether these rights of participation place the foreign and local archaeologists on the same hierarchical position.

The establishment of ‘indigenous archaeologies’ and the processes of the decolonization of the archaeological profession can be seen as parts of multicultural debates, enabling indigenous communities and ethnic minorities to have serious discussions within different circles of the scientific academia. Often these dialogues have aimed at alerting archaeologists to their unethical and irresponsible treatment of post-colonial or indigenous communities and their descendants. This dialogue has had a significant impact on the implementation or modification of ethical codes, legal obligations and the general conduct of heritage management institutions. Since the onset of the 21st century most of the stakeholders involved in archaeological investigations have paid more attention to forms of reparation, collaboration and multivocality.

A significant obstacle for positive collaborative practices between Western and non-Western partners remains the epistemological assumption that even though different actors can agree on the idea that the past is heritage the different actors involved still do not find common ground easily when making decisions on which scientific method or philosophical position might be the most appropriate to study the past from given the deep underlying ontological differences. For example, while archaeologists might approach heritage from an empirical scientific perspective, a non-Western community will approach a sacred place through rituals and everyday lived practices. Consequently, even multicultural frameworks have been criticized by some for offering a reductive perspective on diversity and for not offering sufficient support to the practice of indigenous or decolonial archaeologies.

The problematic of ancestral claims and indigenous archaeologies has been addressed in the wider context of debates regarding collaborative practices between archaeologists and the public, since the public often attributes a different degree of importance to the respectful treatment of indigenous communities and the dead. However, indigeneity as a concept can both support or serve to oppress and justify the marginalization or extermination of minorities such as the Roma and Jews. Also, the

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35 EAA, op. cit., p. 21.
term “indigenous” might have a homogenizing effect which equalizes non-Western and Western minorities with different ontologies\(^{40}\). Consequently, the archaeologist Alfredo González-Ruibal considers that the common denominators between migrants and marginalized indigenous groups ought to be described with care.

Another relevant question on which the opinions of archaeologists and the wider public tends to differ is the status of the archaeological excavation itself. There is a significant difference between a rescue or research excavation and will determine the purpose of each individual archaeological project. In the former case, the archaeologists’ work begins as a result of different kinds of construction work occurring on the site and the accidental or deliberate uncovering of material remains. In such situations the extent of the task is defined by the construction developer, rather than the archaeological excavation team. Since there is wide array of heritage legislations which vary according to the site’s geographical region the care and degree of importance attributed to the protection of physical remains also differs and is often dependent on the economic framework and the responsibilities of the developers and local authorities involved in the project\(^{41}\). It is under such conditions that contract archaeology developed in the 20th century.

Within archaeological circles the emergence of contract archaeology and the implementation cultural resources management (CRM) strategies have had a significant impact on the rising critique of neoliberal influences on the archaeological method\(^{42}\). Contract archaeologists working on rescue projects have been criticized for not aiming to meet research standards, supporting capitalism and treating local or indigenous communities disrespectfully as their activities can cause the displacement and the destruction of these communities\(^{43}\). Moreover, archaeologists working in this branch are often themselves treated disrespectfully, since they are more likely in a position to be obliged to accept precarious working conditions that are not acceptable from an ethical standpoint. These inferior working standards undermine the entire profession as they can alienate workers, support lack of skill, reduce quality levels and lead to low payment rates.

Heritage conservation has been a central topic discussed in the context of wider ethical debates outside of archaeological circles, in particular the conservation of monuments and the social impact of heritage management have been topics of public discourse since the 1970s. One serious issue has been

\(^{40}\) *Idem*, pp. 351-353.


the commoditization of the past by the production of archaeological knowledge. While archaeological information can be helpful for the local community to promote touristic sites, this might indeed not be an ethical way of supporting the community since it is a form of marketing the past, which might misrepresent a culture or identity. Supportive voices of the thriving tourism market suggest that the profits made from tourism might improve the living standards of a community surviving on precarious conditions.

With the increasing professionalism of archaeology during the first half of the 20th century and later on in a post-colonialist context there have also been many new legal regulations concerning the allowance for archaeological material to leave the country of origin and to be analyzed in foreign laboratories or exhibited abroad. In particular the establishment of the UNESCO World Heritage convention in the year 1972 was seen as a marker for the development of a Western “universal” heritage consciousness. Another milestone was the Malta Convention in the year 1992 (The European Convention on the Protection of the Archaeological Heritage) in which different minimum European standards for the preservation of archaeological material were established. For example, it subsequently became more common to preserve remains in situ instead of removing all material to archaeological departments and museums.

As the concept of heritage becomes more inclusive, all citizens are asked to consider critically how heritage policies can not only protect and conserve objects of the past but also protect the more ‘intangible qualities’ of human life. Many archaeologists consider that archaeology ought to support the development of policies which include the evaluation of the different social aspects which relate the archaeological practice in a broader context with other aspects of cultural resource management. For example, the archaeologist Randi Håland has commented that the relationship between European and non-Europeans stakeholders will only be more balanced once we see African scholars as the leaders of archaeological collaborative projects in European countries.

44 Ibid.
46 Parzinger 2012, op. cit., pp. 11-16.
49 Andersson, Scholkmann Kristiansen 2011, op. cit., p. 31.
50 EAA, op. cit., p. 27.
2. Archaeology in Zones of Conflict

The involvement and work of archaeologists in zones of war has shed light on a wide range of ethical questions related to the appropriate conduct of archaeologists within the context of modern warfare. Archaeologists are very often involved in areas of ongoing conflict or sites where there are traces of violence from previous wars. Such archaeological activities involve archaeologists and different stakeholders in complex debates on the subjects of mourning or the respectful treatment of the dead. One of the main questions within such debates is whether or not archaeologists can cooperate with stakeholders such as the military, since such partnerships can have serious legal or political repercussions for both the archaeologists and the local communities.\(^{51}\)

In current or past war zones archaeologists are confronted with serious moral challenges and the task of treating the victims with dignity and respect in situations of great suffering.\(^{52}\) The archaeologists Reinhard Bernbeck and Susan Pollock have questioned whether archaeology can and ought to take up the task of exposing the perpetrators of war crimes. More generally, this kind of involvement in historical or current conflict zones leads to the merging of several memories and people with different religions and cultural backgrounds under conditions of extreme physical and emotional pain.\(^{54}\) Thus, in postconflict scenarios archaeologists ought to pay increased attention to the misuse of their data for the construction of postconflict narratives and avoid concepts of heritage resources which are reflective of some kind of partisan appropriation by a government.\(^{55}\)

One common view amongst archaeologists themselves is that archaeologists, anthropologists and other heritage practitioners need to become aware of the ethical assumptions underlying their decision to collaborate with military forces labelled as ‘archaeological stewardship’.\(^{56}\) Pollock claims that it cannot be overlooked that any involvement with the military might suggest that scholars, through their participation in a war, are ‘supporting illegitimate wars’ by upholding a disguise which falsely produces humanitarian claims in situations of deep aggression.\(^{57}\) Further, in postwar situations it remains an equally critical point to consider that archaeological information might be misappropriated to decide whether or not collaborators should be purged or rehabilitated in the aftermath of war.

Archaeologists which defend a type of partnership with the army which aims to protect cultural

\(^{52}\) Pollock 2016b, *op. cit.*, pp. 726-727.
\(^{54}\) Pollock 2016a, *op. cit.*, p. 217.
\(^{56}\) *Idem*, pp. 200-203.
\(^{57}\) Pollock 2016a, *op. cit.*, p. 218.
heritage as an enactment of the deontological code military forces have been obliged to follow. Yet, again other critical voices within the international archaeological community have commented that these more recent interactions with soldiers cannot be compared to secret counterinsurgency operations which archaeologists and anthropologists took part in during the 20th century58.

Furthermore, it has been acknowledged that often increased clandestine digging can be observed in war zones. Archaeologists and other heritage caretakers have continuously discussed forms how to reduce the traffic of antiquities and how to gain a better overview of the political economy behind clandestine digging activities59. Unfortunately, it has been noted that looting quite often is a subsistence practice in areas recovering from wars. Since Western forces have directly or more indirectly played a part in most wars of the 20th and 21st centuries many archaeologists consider it to be impossible for Western archaeologists to keep an overview of the situation from a position of moral high ground60. Archaeologists cannot judge the impact of looting practices from an entirely neutral perspective. Thus, for more or less obvious reasons the practice and repercussions of looting and the trade of antiquities have been permanent topics discussed within archaeological sciences. Perhaps archaeologists would do best to step down from their moral high grounds and remember that throughout the 18th, until the 20th century (and most likely still today), many collections were in fact illegitimate as they where collected in less morally respectable or even illegal ways.

60 Pollock 2016a, op. cit., pp. 219-223.
3. European Archaeology Abroad

The “European Association of Archaeologists”, within the context of a series of annual conferences, has in recent years promoted the discussion on what might classify specifically as ‘European archaeology’. The association has shed light on a debate which studies the values or motivations which might qualify one kind of archaeology and not another as ‘European’. While such kind of discussion can fall prey to the presupposition of a geopolitical unity within European countries that can and ought to be challenged at times, this simplified term which unites different types of ‘European archaeology’ has nevertheless served as a fruitful ground for several conversations between European and non-European archaeologists within the academic field. In the year 2012 this discussion was followed up by the publication of the book “European Archaeology Abroad”, which rather than challenging the premise that there exists a ‘European archaeology’ intended to shift the focus onto various manners in which European archaeologists and their work practice have impacted and continue to exert points of view in countries ‘abroad’⁶¹.

The ACE-project “Archaeology in Contemporary Europe. Professional Practices and Public Outreach” was a project conducted and subsidized by the European Union between the years 2007 and 2013. The ACE brought together in a collaborative manner thirteen different archaeological institutions from ten European countries: the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, as well as from Hungary, Italy, France, Spain, Poland, Germany, Belgium and Greece. The project’s partners met repeatedly on the occasion of a series of workshops, one of which was organized in September 2010 as a dedicated session during the 16th annual meeting of the European Association of Archaeologists in Den Haag, the Netherlands⁶². The research and the analysis of the documentation gathered by the various ACE partners was divided into four research areas: the research of the significance of the past, a comparative study of practices in archaeology in historical and contemporary contexts, the discussion of the current state of the archaeological profession and the public outreach of archaeology.

The opening chapter of the publication, to which we will make repeated reference will be made in the following paragraphs, was written by the four archaeologists from the University of Leiden who also edited the book and is entitled “European Archaeology abroad: global settings, Comparative

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⁶¹ EAA, op. cit., p.17.
⁶² “The ACE project […] aims to promote contemporary archaeology at a European wide level, by emphasizing its cultural, scientific, and economic dimensions, including its manifold interest for the wider public. With the acceleration of infrastructure and development works throughout the continent in the past decades, contemporary archaeology has become particularly important and challenging. While the process of development poses severe threats to archaeological heritage, it can also provide new opportunities for increasing our knowledge about the past and for enhancing sustainable archaeological heritage management for the benefit of all European citizens” (Idem, p. 19).
Perspectives. The editorial preface introduces the reader to various forms of myth building, the construction of narratives and the resourcefulness of ideologies within the context of different finance and research models used by European archaeologists working ‘abroad’.

Given the current deep economic divide between Western societies and third-world countries an in-depth study on the topic of ‘international collaboration’ is decisive for the progression of any current discussion on the archaeological practices performed by European archaeologists abroad. Therefore, the publication’s methodological approach is to offer both comparative overviews on the cooperation between foreign and local archaeologists at one fixed moment, as well as several analyses on how this engagement might have developed over time, depending on the combination of European and local stakeholders in each individual example discussed. Consequently, the book’s readers are invited to evaluate which and how particular values derived from 20th and 21st century theoretical, administrative and socio-political European frameworks have been or have not been translated into local values used by host countries.

The book broadly captures impressions of the reception of European value systems abroad, in the context of archaeological practices, post-colonialism, globalization and language policies, by offering several contemporary case-studies which inform the reader on the past and current development of international and transcultural collaborations. On the one hand, the publication compares how different European countries have worked within various international collaboration schemes with non-European host countries. On the other hand, the book offers a collection of documents which reflect on the reception of European archaeological practices by different archaeologists abroad and which opinions they have formed on the subject of international collaboration.

The book’s editors consider that it remains necessary to discusses how, where and during which periods of time archaeologists have been directly or indirectly influenced by colonialism. More specifically, archaeologists should pay greater attention to how the establishment of colonies, considered “extra-European lands” enabled the access to remote sites and the transportation of luxury goods and other material resources, which in turn increased the implementation of archaeological

63 *Idem*, pp. 21-32.
64 The book “European Archaeology Abroad” discussed in the present chapter was the result of a cooperation between researchers from the French National Institute for Preventive Archaeological Research (INRAP), the University of Leiden and the Römisch-Germanischen Kommission (RGK). Part of the research for this publication was the completion of a detailed questionnaire which analyzed the participation of European practitioners in archaeological projects conducted abroad, as well as the compilation of an extensive bibliography on the same topic (*Idem*, p. 19).
65 *Idem*, p. 29.
practices in these exploitative schemes. Quite evidently, the processes of localization, exploitation and the later redistribution of the archaeological resources benefited from the colonial jurisdiction framework of the 19th and 20th centuries. Aside from having an easier access to the sites or local dealers, there were particular paths of commerce and negotiation between local stakeholders, diplomats and museums which benefited from the transference of non-European archaeological material to Europe67.

An analysis of the role of collectors and museums in European countries will bring into discussion different concepts of responsibility and custodianship which guide the professional conduct of the different heritage practitioners involved. Given the overpowering influence of European heritage practitioners during the 20th century on the conservation of cultural material abroad their choices need to be re-evaluated to determine now the future development of measures which promote the value and the conservation of archaeological findings abroad. Only a highly self-critical view on past heritage concepts and policies will allow for a more honest appraisal of the archaeological practices exercised from within a colonial framework and the impact they continue to have on different archaeological practices exercised in a post-colonialist framework labeled as ‘rescue’, ‘salvage’ or other forms of ‘preventive’ archaeology68. For example, the inauguration of the World Archaeological Congress (WAC) in the year 1986 was in part the creation of a platform to discuss the reciprocal impact between apartheid and the archaeological practice69.

From a methodological perspective, particular theoretical distinctions can aid in drawing a clearer image of the impact European archaeological interventions have had abroad, such as the distinction between ‘exploitation’ or ‘settlement’ colonies. The Belgian Congo would be an example for an ‘exploitation’ colony, which in general emerged at the end of the 19th century. In such contexts the colonizer acted with the purpose to exploit the land in a fast manner and transport natural and human resources to Europe70. In contrast, it is often the case that European settler populations intended to stay in the discovered land masses, which led to material and ideological investments in these areas over an extended period of time71.

Another helpful distinction while analyzing past archaeological practices would be to differentiate between European actors who claimed a great ‘proximity’ to the non-European people and

67 Idem, p. 25.
68 Ibid.
70 EAA, op. cit., p. 22.
71 Ibid.
their heritage, in comparison to several European stakeholders who repeatedly emphasized the ‘distance’ they had towards the past of the ‘other’. To claim a relation of proximity to the past of ‘others’, European actors tend to identify historical and scientific facts which bring them and the chosen non-European culture closer together. Examples of such attempts are the discovery of ancient monuments and material traces which are illustrative of past affinities and part of a ‘common’ heritage. Hoping to legitimize present realities in this way, many European actors have shown an interest in establishing a level of close proximity to their colonial subjects.72

Conversely, in situations where the interest of European actors was to emphasize the great, if not altogether insurmountable, distance between them and the ‘other’ non-European people, generally many different measures are taken to demarcate and rank the non-European people lower than the Europeans. In the mid-19th century this evolutionist paradigm had a significant impact within the archaeological practice, since archaeological findings ‘appeared’ to legitimize a barbaric and savage treatment of African or Polynesian people.73 As different civilizational entanglements, the merging and overlapping of cultural circles and different migrational routes became more well known in the 20th century, the archaeological discourse shifted insofar as one of its main topics became the European expansion. Great efforts were made to find material evidence that supports narratives of a successful European conquest and paths of cultural dispersal which highlight the superior position of European over non-European people.

Nevertheless, despite the necessity for a self-critical approach informed by a post-colonial discourse it is also not fair to assume that all the practitioners working within the frameworks of European archaeological institutions have worked with the intention of solidifying a hierarchical structure which places European cultures above all, or even that their curiosity for the archaeological past of non-European people is never motivated by a “genuine interest in the historical emergence of human societies worldwide”.74

Therefore, the authors of the introductory essay also underline that not all Europeans conducting archaeological research abroad, their motivations and practices, can be described in the same mode. Differences in ideological and moral perspectives, social and economic backgrounds and national identities need to be taken into consideration, since the “plurality of actors and motivations

72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
74 Idem, p. 23.
make it difficult to consider European colonizers as a homogeneous group, identically disposed towards the native’s past and its archaeological heritage.”

As we have seen above the political, financial and legal parameters related to archaeological excavations and research projects differ considerably in Europe and outside. An archaeological research project can easily become an instrument for the legitimization of existing or past relations of domination between Europeans and non-Europeans. Partly responsible for the prevalence of these relations are the practical repercussions of poor working conditions which Western archaeologists created for their local collaborators during the 20th century. By organizing the infrastructure of non-European excavation sites in favor of the European group members’ interests, there were many different manners of hiring salaried employment from the local communities which disrespected the necessities and the rights of the local partners.

While generally the working conditions were not a form of forced labour, they still seem highly unprofessional under a critical eye, given that the level of payment might depend on such loose factors as the condition of the finds recovered or the quantity of time spent working on the site. As long as there are no fixed parameters for payment, a proper and just management of the local human resources gathered for an archaeological research project will remain problematic. Consequently, one prevalent problem which still affects current archaeological projects is the search for a qualified workforce. If no local partners have an adequate level of professional expertise individuals are usually selected according to their intuitive skills and work experience, which continues to make it very difficult to qualify the workforce according to fixed parameters. Such logistical questions will affect the interpretations produced by the archaeologists, since the quality of the work force excavating the site in part determines which questions “can be asked” and which “can be answered.”

As noted above, after WWII the voices of local and indigenous scholars became louder, giving voice to underrepresented and marginalized groups and their claims to their past. Archaeology is the discipline par excellence in which humans study themselves and consequently, as with all other human subjects, conflicts arise and a diversity of interpretations compete for attention. These new claims for ‘multivocality’, the practice of indigenous archaeologies and the development of alternative narratives had a direct impact on the management of archaeological resources in former colonial settings.

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75 One form of distinguishing between actors in a post-colonial context is to differentiate between ‘professional’ or ‘antiquarian’ archaeologists. The latter are archaeologists who might be considered amateurs, such as missionaries, settlers or administrators driven by economic interests or an ‘autodidact curiosity’, while the former generally work within academic institutional boundaries (Ibid.).

76 Idem, p. 25.
However, the willingness of foreign archaeologists to transmit knowledge, power and operational skills to local scholars, their own work force and to the local communities living in close proximity to the archaeological excavations has been slow to emerge. Rather, it was easier and preferable for many European archaeologists during the late 20th century to continue to work in isolation. Within the African continent, an example for an early cooperation between European scholars and African historians and archaeologists would be Senegal77.

Many forms of international cooperation maintained former colonial structures, European archaeologists were still the dominant voice and modes of practice established during the colonial periods were continued until the 1990s. Given this slow, or even non-existent progress until the very end of the 20th century, it is not surprising that in the 21st century many voices in academia have appealed to more transparency and the writing of a critical history of the archaeological practice during the 20th century in South America or Africa78.

Part II – Archaeology and Philosophy

“Politics is not a science, it is an art of orienting oneself among conflicting groups. The concept of politics must remain polemical; there is a place for polemics in life, and to acknowledge this is the honest import of the problem. 

*Politics is not a descriptive concept but a polemical concept provided by the dialectics between utopia and ideology*. 

Paul Ricoeur\(^9\)

1. History, Memory and the Archaeological Study of Material Cultures

Archaeology studies the material present in which the past is inscribed\(^0\). Particular archaeological events are inscribed in the material which at the time of the events had a significant impact on certain contemporary spacial boundaries. These boundaries are the marks and contours of the past which still structure our landscapes today. Archaeology ‘resurrects’ material objects and biological matter, which had disappeared over the years, as things which are brought “back to the present”\(^1\). As such, archaeology uncovers the memory of past eras that have remained buried underneath our current ground surface for many years. According to the french archaeologist Laurent Olivier, time is recorded in the hidden traces where memory resides\(^2\).

One purpose of archaeology is to study the changes which have determined the ways in which human societies and their material cultures have undergone perpetual cycles of transformations during the past 2.5 million years\(^3\). It is through the contemplation of the different cycles of birth, maturity, aging and death that humans come to understand the passage of time and their own mortal condition. Archaeologists search for and analyze human, zoological and other material remains which will increase their understanding of the processes which determine human evolution, the “gradual expansion in human settlement and the ability to cope with varied and changing environments” which

\(^{9}\) *LIU, op. cit.*, p. 179.  
\(^{0}\) Olivier 2011, *op. cit.*, p. 63.  
\(^{1}\) *Idem*, p. 192.  
\(^{2}\) *Idem*, p. 3.  

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have led to the current social and geographical conditions and the modes in which humans inhabit the Earth today\textsuperscript{84}.

The common consensus is that archaeologists derive their knowledge principally from archaeological excavations, the study of objects and buildings, while historians derive their knowledge from images, maps, oral and written sources. It is a significant limitation for the archaeologist that an archaeological “excavation is an unrepeatable experiment[…, each] archaeological excavation is unique, and a sod can only be turned once”\textsuperscript{85}. Even though different archaeologists may return to an excavation to study the site again and can implement different methods to collect other kinds or more evidence than their predecessors had done at the site, the reliance on destructive methods and the inevitable process of natural degradation which progresses rapidly once the excavation surface is exposed means that the archaeological site is under constant change. The conditions under which archaeologists operate are never the same as to their predecessors.

Given the uniqueness of each site and the singularity of each moment during the process of excavation archaeologists must work with a high level of meticulousness and choose the methods for excavation and recording carefully. Ideally, for each excavation a problem has to be formulated, followed up by the development of an explanatory design which intends to provide a path to the solution of a problem. However, each design must be sufficiently flexible to allow for the unexpected to appear and give the archaeologists permission to set their old questions aside if new, more interesting

\textsuperscript{84} The recently published handbook “The Human Past”, edited by Chris Scarre, introduces the discipline of archaeology with the following words: “Far from being ancillary to history, archaeology is our main source of knowledge for the human past, covering liter- ate and non-literate peoples alike. It is the only field of enquiry that allows the broad canvas of the human past to be viewed as a whole. It illustrates the full diversity of human culture and society and shows how humans have changed and adapted, both to external factors such as climate and environment, and to new social circumstances and technologies. It reveals the degree to which humans have created themselves, in the form of culture and innovation; it studies how they coped with the demands of subsistence and reproduction, and how within the past few thousand years they have adjusted to the inexorable pressures of demographic increase. For while it is clear that few earlier societies have witnessed such a population explosion as we have seen over the past 30 years – a period during which the world’s population has doubled in size – the steady growth in human numbers since the end of the last Ice Age can be judged a significant measure of human success as a species. As habitat loss and global warming make clear, however, population growth has brought social and environ- mental problems, and human societies through time have been forced to adapt, to find new ways of doing things, or perish. All of this is illustrated by the study of archaeology […] Material culture is often presented as one of the hallmarks of humanness; several other species use found objects such as twigs or stones to probe for food or to break open nuts, but none manufacture tools on a regular basis. The reliance on material culture, on tools, is hence distinctively human, and has given humans a substantial advantage in coping with a wide range of environments. Without key items of material culture such as clothing and shelter, humans would still be restricted in distribution to the tropical regions, where our closest primate relations, the gorillas and chimpanzees, live today. It is mate- rial culture that has allowed humans to populate the globe, and to develop large and complex settlements and societies. Material culture also makes humans what we are today: we are in many respects the product of the material world we have created. Thus, in a real sense, the rudimentary stone tools made in Africa 2.5 million years ago were a vital step in enabling the development of human potential, the results of which we see around us in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century.” (Idem, pp. 25-26).

\textsuperscript{85} Andersson, Scholkmann Kristiansen 2011, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 31.
questions arise during the actual excavation period. There are several handbooks and guidelines which address the different methods and the necessarily knowledge in order to investigate and record as much data as possible. Since it is never possible to capture everything much attention is given to conduct a thorough process of documentation, the analysis of data, which will allow for the continuation of the investigation once the excavation site has been closed\(^\text{86}\).

Archaeological systems change because “the perpetuation of archaeological manifestations is based on a complementary relationship between structures already in place and those that are subsequently added to them”\(^\text{87}\). Archaeological structures evolve over time as they are either discarded, altered by some form of biological degeneration or are actively incorporated into innovative processes of restructuring taking place on the same site, or through the recycling of past material. The present introduces new elements into the inherited pre-existing archaeological structures. Any system of archaeological structures is marked both by the disappearance of the deposited matter of the past and the formation processes happening in the present. Therefore, aside from being a play between absent and visible structures archaeological constructs are also places of innovation and deterioration\(^\text{88}\).

If we look at time as what is here and now, we will notice that the ruins of the past allow us to establish a relationship to the meaning a past life gave or attributed to the things which the ruins once were and which now have perished. We know that time has passed immediately when we look at ruins and debris, yet we do not recognize immediately how the “evolving present” is also “constantly accumulating and breaking down”\(^\text{89}\). Material memory is both present in the realm of the visible and the invisible. Vestiges of the past can be hidden or uncovered\(^\text{90}\). More importantly, most materials are only found because they were buried and consequently protected from a faster process of deterioration which takes place when materials are exposed to human and natural forces. Nevertheless, despite all efforts to conserve and preserve material creations, as time passes they too will eventually deteriorate and fall in oblivion\(^\text{91}\).

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86 Ibid.
87 Olivier 2011, op. cit., p. 66.
88 Olivier writes: “At bottom, innovation and change are introduced through repetition, which is what allows what is new to be inscribed in what came before; in other words, in this “past in the present” that defines the things around us” (Idem, p. 69).
89 Idem, p. 4.
90 “Erosion, recycling, repair, alteration, destruction, and abandonment are direct manifestations of the repeated processes of material transformations that are evidenced in vestiges of archaeological activity” (Idem, p. 131).
91 Idem, p. 191.
The present contains the information we can access of the past, while any information of the past which itself lies in the past is not accessible. For Olivier, archaeology analyses the matter in which memory is contained, however these pieces of memory are themselves not witnesses of the past, but rather signs and surviving traces of the past. Material creations have their own timeline which often extends beyond the lifetimes of their makers and the things become the possessions and inheritance of subsequent generations, which is why investigations on history’s meaning also ought to address the endurance of material traces and the forms in which these challenge written and oral testimonies.

Olivier differentiates between historical memory and an internal archaeological memory which is intrinsic to the archaeological matter itself. In archaeological memory we recognize the irreversibility of what has been, the continuous effects of time, and the translation and re-configuration of traces from the past, due to the continuous emergence of new circumstances. Archaeological processes possess their very own dynamic, since we observe phases which are separated from one another by irregular intervals. Archaeological sites are altered by an adaptive process, which means that what memory can do is to introduce an organizational process in which past forms can be regenerated in order to return to a particular state in which places or objects and their functions where formerly organized.

By retrieving the past archaeologists are referencing past organizational systems and also repeating past structures in response to the transformations that have taken place since. Hence, uncovering vestiges of the past on archaeological sites can be understood as the “re-affirmation of the specifically archaeological organization of structures”. Nevertheless, since archaeological structures can have various functional identities, any successive transformative process impacts the deterioration process of archaeological sites.

Olivier believes that: “In fact, rather than speaking of palimpsests in regard to the memory recorded in archaeological remains – that is, in material structures – we would be better served to speak of memory objects. A memory object is one in which time is inscribed, or better stated, a material entity in which the memory of a moment in time is recorded […] The essential feature of a memory object lies not so much in the recording of how the present physically alters matter, as in how the stages of deterioration are recorded, or if you will, memorized. In effect, because changes are preserved in the matter of archaeological objects, they continue to bear witness to their older, now non-existent states”

92 Idem, p. 132.
93 Idem, p. 184.
94 Idem, p. 185.
95 Idem, p. 64.
96 Idem, p. 65.
97 Idem, p. 67.
According to Olivier, the re-arrangement of present structures, in agreement to past vestiges, is the consequence of the workings of time’s subconscious. To repeat identity is possible through a process of re-transcription, in which individual events are reconstructed and painstakingly preserved over time. We observe that the process of recording the past can only ever progress sequentially and in order for memory to be preserved we need to reiterate what has been. Therefore, the archaeologist relies heavily on the documentation of the stratigraphy.

If the archaeologist had only immutable artifacts before him, he could not know how much time had passed. The traces of the perpetual processes of deterioration are indispensable in order to interpret the past. If there have been no traces of the continuously evolving present, artifacts and structures of inhabited spaces such as dwellings, cemeteries or fireplaces, no information can be gathered about the individual acts which made it possible for this place to remain functional or determine what the causes of its abandonment were. However, repetition without transformation leaves no traces from which to deduct what happened in the past either. Archaeologists need to identify which innovations took place, the traces of processes of translation and re-transcription need to be visible in order for archaeologists to become aware of them. Older structures can be re-activated on a site and given new existence, but the traces of the interruptive period in between must be visible too in order for archaeologists to be able to understand and explain the superimpositions and transformations that archaeological memory undergoes.

Moreover, any operation which transforms matter is itself a new act and a re-activation of past potential. For example, old music instruments have to be played again in the present by living musicians in order for us to capture the sounds of the past in a live format. However, the musicians cannot play exactly the same way as musicians did in the past, since they are firmly rooted in the present and despite all their efforts to play according to the principles of a historical performance practice. We all are caught in this conundrum, since we cannot travel back in time and can also not repeat the exact gestures of past people. We are translating, rather than copying. The changes to the identity of things are irremediable. In all attempts to preserve the past we are actually transforming it.

Prehistorical archaeological time is equally dependent on the notion of time derived from the social sciences and the calculations of natural time conducted by professionals in the natural sciences. The study of historical time focuses primarily on the study of cultural time, the history of civilizations.

98 Ibid.
99 Idem, p. 69.
100 Idem, p. 68.
101 Idem, p. 70.
Differently, prehistoric archaeologists, given the lack of written sources, study human progress by consistently referencing the study of nature’s evolution and the progression of natural time.\(^{102}\)

The traditional concept of time is heavily indebted to the differentiation between a cultural timeframe and natural time. Prehistorical archaeology has resorted to methodologies which are greatly influenced by the natural sciences. For example, to determine processes of causality the Swedish 19\(^{th}\) century archaeologist Oskar Montelius attempted to understand the morphological relations of types of archaeological objects by using a methodology applicable to the sequencing of living species. The archaeological remains were treated in a similar mode to biological creations, in order to comprehend which formal characteristics were transmitted over time. Archaeological creations were described, compared and placed into a typological sequence through the “construct of a biology of forms”.\(^{103}\) Consequently, Olivier points out that by focussing on the study of typological evolution the primary information archaeologists obtained then was the archaeological object’s position in the sequence to which it belongs, rather than the date of the specific archaeological objects. By implementing such sequences, archaeologists can either observe trends of simplification and the standardization of forms or that a range of objects has become more diverse over time as the forms are deconstructed. They observe that forms are recreated over time and that there is a process of renegotiation and innovation. The history of cultural forms that is specific to each sequence is the kind of history that “archaeological creations generate themselves, through memory”.\(^{104}\)

Olivier considers that to study a process of stylistic evolution is to presuppose the chronological continuity of this particular phenomena. It presupposes the transmission of knowledge over time and the divergence between a path of innovation and one of preservation which maintains the inherited characteristics. The return to the past leads to a memorization process and the accumulation of stylistic capital. As new things are created, the identity of present creations is developed by referencing typological lineages and traditions.\(^{105}\)

\(^{102}\) *Idem*, p. 90.

\(^{103}\) *Idem*, p. 158.

\(^{104}\) *Idem*, p. 168.

\(^{105}\) *Idem*, p. 170.
2. Paul Ricoeur’s “Memory, History and Forgetting”

In his investigation on the human past and cultural memory, which culminated with the publication of “Memory, History and Forgetting” (2000)\textsuperscript{106}, Ricoeur raises the following question which will serve as the point of orientation for his decade long study: What does it mean, that something has taken place in a past we did not experience ourselves, before we can remember and speak of this event?\textsuperscript{107} As history is studied both in relation to our memory of the past, as well as the imagination of the unreal, Ricoeur is pointing us towards the following paradox: that the present co-constitutes itself through the absence of the absent.

Parting from the dialectic between the two states of no-longer-being and having-been, the dissolution of the past and the becoming of a future, Ricoeur studies the plurality of historical times and collective memories and the multiplicity of ‘explicative’ perspectives which have determined the historiographic discourse\textsuperscript{108}. In his multiple publications on the subject of the relation between epistemology, the understanding and explanation of historical knowledge, time and narration, Ricoeur alludes repeatedly to the importance of questioning whether it is possible through the study of history to acquire a knowledge of the futureness of the future\textsuperscript{109}.

A central element of Ricoeur’s philosophy of history is his critique of historical objectivism. For Ricoeur, there was a lack of awareness for the separation between objectivity and objectivism amongst historians of the 20th century\textsuperscript{110}. Thus, the processes of legitimation of forms of historical knowledge which strive for objectivity must be re-evaluated critically. On the one side, Ricoeur underlines that it is our duty to not forget that the object of history, before everything else, is the human subject\textsuperscript{111}. On the other side, Ricoeur underlines that the strict periodization of history favored by Western societies leads to the dominating practice of the attribution of a meaning to the occurrence of particular events of the past, making the historiographic discourse at large a re-interpretation of the past by certain individual historians.

We will see below why this conundrum became a decisive reason for Ricoeur to pay particular attention to the relation between the evocation of memories, the acts of remembrance, the writing of

\textsuperscript{106} \textit{Memory, History and Forgetting} (MHF, op. cit.) demonstrates the culmination of Ricoeur’s interest in a philosophical treatment of the historical reflection is already evident at the beginning of his career, marked by the publication of the book “Histoire et Vérité” in the year 1955 (See Paul Ricoeur, \textit{Histoire et vérité} [HV]. Paris, Seuil (1955) [1964]).


\textsuperscript{108} \textit{MHF, op. cit.}, pp. 141-148, pp. 399-400.


\textsuperscript{110} \textit{HV, op. cit.}, p. 43.

\textsuperscript{111} \textit{Idem}, p. 44.
history and our shared condition of being affected by the past\(^{112}\). Also, since Ricoeur understands memory to be a social, collective and public phenomena we will briefly study the relation established by Ricoeur between an individual conscience of the past, a collective awareness and its implications for the phenomena of memory. The philosopher attributes to collective memory a significant role in the constitution and recognition of collective identities. It is a valuable contribution to current archaeological debates, as those presented in Part I, to situate specific archaeological questions in the broader philosophical context Ricoeur draws out on the subject of the past and on the complexity of a collective awareness of acts of remembrance.

\(^{112}\) MHF, op. cit., p. 280.
2.1. History, Truth and the Distortion of the Past

A quick glance across the wide *ouvre* of Ricoeur’s studies on the dialectic of history and memory will reveal his particular attentiveness towards the relation between the past and future, as well as the philosopher’s deep engagement in uncovering the entanglements between the reinvidications of the fidelity of memory and the truth of history\textsuperscript{113}. Early on, at the beginning of his decade long investigation on history and memory, Ricoeur recognizes that he is still focusing primarily on the reinividication of the truth of history. To accomplish this work the philosopher considers that it is necessary to step into the wide and dark net of broken promises and suspicions which have cast a shadow on our contemporary vision of the human past\textsuperscript{114}. More specifically, Ricoeur questions what meaning our historical existence can possess after the traumatic events of the 1\textsuperscript{st} half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century. We ask, with Ricoeur, in which forms is it possible to express a responsible attitude towards the future, which demonstrates a sense of openness, despite the horrific events of WWI, WWII and the Cold War?

Subsequently, in an attempt to discover a less distorted interpretation of the past, Ricoeur dedicates himself to the study of memory, considering that it is memory, rather than history, that can adopt the decisive role of the mediator between lived time and the narrative configurations of the historical discourse\textsuperscript{115}. Throughout the decade long endeavor it remains the philosopher’s intention to be loyal to the reinvidications of memory, without ignoring the lack of credibility which befalls memory and thus the need for a level of scientific precision to structure memory\textsuperscript{116}. In this context, Ricoeur is determined to conceive of a concept of history which does not simply equal an accumulation of scientific data on the past. For Ricoeur, it is necessary to think of our confrontation with lived time from the present to the past, in a way that is capable of producing a meaning which refers specifically to the future\textsuperscript{117}.

Hence, Ricoeur intends before everything else to go beyond a merely retrospective historical reflection. The object of the historical reflection, the elaboration of a theory of historicity, should not be defined as the study of something concluded and absolutely determined. The philosopher criticizes that the traditional historian has a fascination for a false objectivity of the historiographic writing which represents a history of forces, structures and institutions. Such approach does not pay sufficient attention to the treatment of individual people and human values\textsuperscript{118}. This is a grave mistake since the

\textsuperscript{113} *RV*, op. cit., pp. 21-24.
\textsuperscript{114} *Idem*, pp. 60-61, 128-130, 155-156.
\textsuperscript{115} *Idem*, pp. 72-73.
\textsuperscript{116} *Idem*, pp. 41-44.
\textsuperscript{117} *Ibid*.
\textsuperscript{118} *MHF*, op. cit., pp. 294-305.
subject of history is the human subject himself. Yet, the encounter with history cannot be a lively dialogue, since there is no one from the past who will answer our call. Consequently, history operates through a form of communication with no reciprocity. Given the condition of such limitation, for Ricoeur history will always ever be a special kind of unilateral friendship, in the same way that we sometimes fall in love, yet are not loved back.

An ontological reflection of history provides a structure to the forms of being in the world and the existence. Ricoeur expresses two ideas:

“on the one hand, a situation in which each person is in each case implicated, Pascal would say, “enclosed” (enfermé); on the other hand, a conditionality, in the sense of a condition of possibility on the order of the ontological, or, as we have said, the existential, in particular in relation to the categories of critical hermeneutics. We make history, and we make histories (nous faisons l’histoire et nous faisons de l’histoire) because we are historical” (MHF, op. cit., p. 281).

The notion of the historical condition which is raised by a reflection on history from an ontological perspective, in comparison to epistemological reflections, is intimately related to other Ricoeurian reflections on the human condition. As historical beings we are affected by what occurs in historical time and we ought to perceive ourselves as agents who produce history and reflect upon it. Ricoeur intends to find a point of reconciliation between the hopes which we hold for our projected future and the potentialities of the past expressed by past living beings which were not realized during their lifetimes or even after their death. Thus, our finitude is determined by our “spaces of experience” and “horizon of expectation/hope”121. There exists a duality between the space of experience and the horizon of expectation since each conditions the other significantly. The historical sense emerges from an interplay between these two spaces, the project of history points us forward towards possible futures and relates us to the memory of the lived past. Thus, from a Ricoeurian perspective we can identify two distinct forms of being affected by the past if we distinguish between the history we receive, which is related to a hopeful dimension, and a history we suffer, related to our ethical conscience and sense of guilt.

119 RV, op. cit., p. 44.
120 “L’histoire est ce secteur de la communication sans réciprocité. Mais, sous la condition de cette limite, elle est une espèce d’amitié unilatérale, à la façon de ces amours jamais payées de retour”, HV, op. cit., p. 40.
121 MHF, op. cit., pp. 289-308, 547n93, 560n50.
122 Idem, p. 136.
Ricoeur believes that the deep problematic of interpretation in history reveals the “impossibility of the total reflection of historical knowledge on itself and the validity of history’s project of truth within the limits of its space of validation”\textsuperscript{123}. Ricoeur outlines the necessity of a space of meaning to provide the interested historian with the tools to situate meta-historical concepts within the broader context of an hermeneutical route. The purpose of choosing a hermeneutical route is to be able to determine the “nature of the understanding that passes through the three moments of the historiographical operation” – the archive, representation and explanation/understanding\textsuperscript{124}. More specifically, it is the adoption of an hermeneutical route which guides us towards the philosophical critique of the historical judgment.

A philosophical critique of the historical judgment enables the reflection on the process of legitimization underlying the study of the claims made by a form of history which considers itself in a position of absolute knowledge, a total reflection\textsuperscript{125}. According to Ricoeur, it is characteristic of the apology of modernity that history, whenever understood as a total reflection, driven by an ambition of self-knowledge, will make the self-celebrative claim that the present age is different from any other prior period of time and also the most preferable historical period to live in\textsuperscript{126}. This pursuit of historical singularity raises the complex question of how one can characterize and self-designate the epoch in which one lives today as postmodern. The philosopher believes that the concept of postmodernity is imbued with a strong polemical charge and is driven by an “incontestable rhetorical force of denunciation”\textsuperscript{127}.

As we will see below, there are particular internal limitations which are an obstacle to the ambition of self-knowledge of historians. Historiographical operations possess both a project of truth and an interpretative component which are impacted significantly by the degree of the subjective involvement on the part of the historian during the writing of the historical record\textsuperscript{128}. For Ricoeur, the writing of history is dependent on the establishment of a compromise between discontinuous emergent events, as the emergence of individual events marks the encounter between something new and

\textsuperscript{123} Idem, p. 333.  
\textsuperscript{124} Idem, p. 293.  
\textsuperscript{125} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{126} Ricoeur questions “whether an argumentation purely in terms of values can avoid the equivocation of a discourse that claims at one and the same time to be universal and to be situated in the historical present[...] In one way or other, historical singularity reflecting on itself gives rise to an aporia symmetrical to that of the historical totality knowing itself absolutely” (Idem, pp. 294-295).  
\textsuperscript{127} Idem, p. 314.  
\textsuperscript{128} Idem, p. 295.
something of the past\textsuperscript{129}. The lively continuity of memory stands in opposition to the discontinuity introduced by the work of periodization inherent to the task of producing historical knowledge. This degree of discontinuity highlights the revolted character of humanity’s past\textsuperscript{130}. The most memorable events of history are markers which organize and structure history, as they function as centers of signification which acquire their meaning from the events themselves. Hence, history can be understood as a perpetual process of development which produces meaning and which is structured by a multitude of organizing points from which meaning irradiates. Without these points the historian would not know how to orient himself\textsuperscript{131}. It is for such reasons that archaeologists today ought to evaluate critically which points of orientation have structured the archaeological practices of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century and to which extent these practices are reflective of partisan or nationalistic interests.

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{129} Idem, p. 241.
\bibitem{130} Idem, pp. 157-159, 301.
\bibitem{131} HV, op. cit., p. 42.
\end{thebibliography}
2.2. The Tasks of the Historian

To understand Ricoeur’s appraisal of the historian’s field of work we must first comprehend the philosopher’s view that the singularity of historical events cannot be replaced by a concept of moral singularity. It is precisely due to this dilemma that archaeologists currently find themselves in conflict with their own practices. From a Ricoeurian perspective, to solve such conflict we must separate concepts of historical judgment from different forms of moral judgment132. Each historical event is singular, yet the fear that the past will repeat itself keeps haunting living people. To be more precise, to consider each event as singular means that we cannot compare historical events between each other, since each event develops in a unique way133.

On an epistemological plane Ricoeur’s study of the historiographical operation includes, in this order, the three stages of the archives, the moments of explanation and understanding and the task of historical representation134. According to the philosopher, our theoretical approximation of the past and the methods of historical knowledge production and transmission ought to include a moment of recognition that the human beings of the past, were, like us today, subjects of initiative, who had their own particular visions of the past and the future. We ought to understand that they formulated plans for a future according to their own hopes, fears and wishes135. Innumerable wishes have been pronounced by human beings of the past, and most expectations are actually never met. In that sense, “the distance which separates the historian from the people of the past, appears [to be] like a cemetery of unkept promises”136.

For Ricoeur, history is seen in relation to truth, while memory is associated to fidelity, to the free use of thoughts related to the traditions of collectives137. The historian has to formulate judgments in situations of irreconcilable conflict and find viable paths between the two realms of explanation and comprehension. Since history intends to determine the true knowledge of the past, the historian, in his position to deliberate upon historical events, ought to be able to distinguish between his own personal historical condition and the historical knowledge he produces and transmits. The historian, by liberating the potentials of the past, is able to comprehend and re-interpreat history138. Yet, the historian is limited by the impossibility to write one history of traumatic events which incorporates the history of

133 Ibid.
134 Idem, p. 293.
137 Idem, p. 67.
the victims, the perpetrators and all the witnesses. The only possibility at hand for the historian is to resort to some form of partial consensus which pays respect to all of the different narratives that describe the events that took place139.

The philosopher believes that we have constructive conversations only if we allow ourselves to look at a situation from the perspective of the other140. However, if the central intention of a dialogue becomes the recognition of the values of a given group on the basis of how the members themselves of this particular group perceive their own values it will be necessary to abandon a position of suspicion towards the other. One’s own relationship to others improves once one welcome’s the values of others in a positive way. For Ricoeur, the task is essentially to converse with one another141. Yet, the philosopher is well aware that any dialogue has an “interpretative attitude”142. Thus, any notion of creating and sustaining possibilities for conversations, any attempts to deconstruct suspicions and support cultural value-free judgments, will always stand in the shadow of the greater conflict between different interpretations143.

According to Ricoeur, we must recognize that historians are human beings with professional academic capabilities, yet that they are also motivated by personal convictions to a smaller or greater degree.

“What indeed is underscored, in the canonical vocabulary of “subjectivity versus objectivity,” is, on the one hand, the historian’s personal commitment to the process of knowledge and, on the other hand, the historian’s social – and more precisely, institutional – commitment. The historian’s twofold commitment constitutes a simple corollary to the intersubjective dimension of historical knowledge considered one province of the knowledge of other” (MHF, op. cit., p. 334).

There will always be a conflict of interpretations and historians must content themselves with finding moments of consent. Moreover, the philosopher criticizes the reduction of the historical reflection to a merely retrospective practice, in part because it prevents the historian from recognizing himself as an agent acting within historical times. Rather, historians have to exercise their ability of

140 LIU, op. cit., p. 255.
141 Ricoeur considers that: “We always speak in a context where it has already been spoken. In this sense, we are already preceded both as individuals and as a collectivity. We don’t know a language that comes from the anima cry. We are already in language[…] As soon as there is the human, there are in fact three things: tools, norms, and language; and perhaps there is fourth, with burial, a specific relationship with the dead” (Suzi Adams (Ed.), Ricoeur and Castoriadis in Discussion – On Human Creation, Historical Novelty, and the Social Imaginary. London, New York, Roman & Littlefield (2017), pp. 12-13).
142 Ibid.
143 MHF, op. cit., p. 199.
self-awareness in order to recognize their own subjective motivations. Beyond this, Ricoeur considers that it is essential for the historian to, while acting out his profession, have the freedom of also being capable of acting out his role as an interested citizen.\textsuperscript{144}

Beyond the task of denouncing the claims of a total reflection of the historical record, as we have seen above, we also need to address the polarity between judicial judgements and historical judgements. Despite their shared vow of impartiality both kinds of judgement are deeply affected by opposing practical constraints.\textsuperscript{145} The conflictual situation between the historical and the judicial appraisals of the same facts must be made explicit. Impartiality is an intellectual and a moral virtue which is common to anyone who claims to fulfill the function of a third party. This impersonal viewpoint is both moral and epistemic and Ricoeur considers it to be a kind of intellectual virtue which the historian strives for.\textsuperscript{146}

The judgments of judges and historians constitute two distinct forms of decision-making which, respectively, take place in the courtroom or in the archive. Both processes involve the use of different kinds of testimony and proof. However, the final sentence at the end of a trial translates into a judicial judgment concerning a particular form of individual responsibility, while the purpose of historical judgements is often the appraisal or critique of collective actions.\textsuperscript{147} Of course, there have been major historical crimes, which aside from falling under the judgement of historians are also subject to the penal justice system in the context of great trials. On such occasions, courts and judges penetrate into the investigative field of the historian up until the point where their verdicts become part of history themselves. In such instances the historian operates under the significant pressure of the possibility of moral, legal or political condemnation. Hence, historians can through their judicial agency reinforce, attenuate, displace or subvert the verdict of the criminal court. However, according to Ricoeur they cannot “ignore it”.\textsuperscript{148}

Ricoeur explores on more than one occasion the structure of judgment in comparative fields. Aside from discussing the problem of decision-making in the context of judgments performed by a historian or judge, the philosopher also closely analyzes the act of judgment performed by medical doctors. The latter two are particularly shaped by the structure of the tragic, since both courts of judicial and medical institutions are places of great conflict, suffering and violence on a physical and

\textsuperscript{144} RV, op. cit., p. 26; MHF, op. cit., pp. 258, 295, 314-315.
\textsuperscript{145} MHF, op. cit., p. 295.
\textsuperscript{146} Idem, p. 315.
\textsuperscript{147} Idem, p. 295.
\textsuperscript{148} Idem, p. 322.
emotional pain. In judicial institutions the process of decision-making leads to a sentence, while in medical institutions the doctor has to decide on a prescription\textsuperscript{149}.

In all types of judgments there is the entanglement of the interpretative and argumentative components during the process of decision-making. There is an inherent conflict of interpretation in all types of judgment. In the case of judiciary judgments, the necessary combination of legal discourse with narrative interpretation is a great source for conflict. Laws are applied to cases, which means that the judge must choose between different jurisprudential interpretations of laws and select the one that fits the case best. Thus, whenever the judge chooses the most appropriate interpretation, he is in fact taking a law “under the consideration of this or that tradition of interpretation”\textsuperscript{150}.

Furthermore, to determine the alleged qualifications of the acts to be judged, the judge must differentiate between different narrative descriptions according to which one can interpret the facts in different manners. Consequently, a narrative interpretation and a legal interpretation must be brought together in order for the judge to be capable of pronouncing a legal sentence and thus the word of justice\textsuperscript{151}.

Differently, the idea of a criterion for agreement changes greatly depending on the scale at which the historian choses to operate. To his analysis of the discordance between historical and judicial judgments Ricoeur adds that the historical discourse tends to prioritize the narration of societies and larger communities, which is why it will, in opposition to judicial judgments, evaluate the importance of a single testimony differently, while the judge attributes great importance to the testimonies of individuals\textsuperscript{152}. The philosopher observes that the importance of local history: “the mark left by individual interventions upon the smallest of societies contains [most likely only contains] any historical significance” for the locals\textsuperscript{153}. Then, the just is often determined by local forms of agreement, which must bridge the gap between apparent insurmountable differences and which are woven into little narratives\textsuperscript{154}.

\textsuperscript{149} EHC, op. cit., p. 279.
\textsuperscript{150} Idem, p. 289.
\textsuperscript{151} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{152} MHF, op. cit., p. 322.
\textsuperscript{153} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{154} Idem, p. 314.
2.3. Memory and Acts of Remembrance

If we study the conjunction between memory, acts of remembrance and history from a Ricoeurian perspective we must do it by considering first the state of being affected by the past. For Ricoeur, such intended gaze must include the study of diverse topics such as the possibility of forgetting, the act of pardon, the fragile condition of memory and the role of social imagination. The past is intimately related to our posterior evaluation of lived experiences. Generally, singular memories are localized within a particular time frame and space. Ricoeur’s intention is to free memory from a purely retrospective and thus restrictive conception of memory. The philosopher considers that it is a grave error made repeatedly in public cultural or political spaces to speak of memory in such terms which reference the past solely from the perspective that it “has been.”

Ricoeur raises four main questions which allow him to discuss the problematic relation between memory and the past. In the first place, Ricoeur studies the difficulty of establishing a path of transmission of individual memory, which is the guardian and carrier of a private, private and inner experience, to a form of collective memory understood as social and public. In the second place, Ricoeur underlines the complexity of the imagination of something absent of the past, without any temporal reference, in comparison to a memory with a temporal reference. The latter is, like imagination, an act of representation, while it also intends to be loyal to the object of the past that it represents. The French philosopher identifies forms of mal-practice of memory in situations were memory is too present, or were conversely, memory is not evoked sufficiently.

In the third place, Ricoeur intends to differentiate between the construction of an individual identity or a collective identity in relation to the workings of memory. In the fourth place, the French philosopher determines a mode of distinguishing between individual memory or collective memory which allows him to ask to which extent it is possible to speak of collective memory with reference to

155 RV, op. cit., p. 27.
156 Ricoeur’s consideration of the social imagination has emerged as a central topic currently discussed amongst scholars interested in Ricoeur’s philosophy. See for example Elżbieta Lubelska’s recent paper “La temporalisation de l’utopie vers la fin du XVIIIe siècle: en quoi cela change-t-il notre compréhension de l’imaginaire social?”, Études Ricoeuriannes/ Ricoeur Studies vol. 9, no. 1 (2018), pp. 42-54 and the different contributions by Ricoeurian scholars to Suzi Adams’ publication Ricoeur and Castoriadis in Discussion – On Human Creation, Historical Novelty, and the Social Imaginary (Adams 2017, op. cit.).
157 RV, op. cit., p. 21; MHF, op. cit. pp. 53-54.
158 RV, op. cit., pp. 22-23.
159 Idem, p. 27; MHF, op. cit., pp. 342, 350, 342.
160 RV, op. cit., p. 72.
161 Idem, p. 73.
162 Ibid.
groups, collectives or nations. Does a form of collective memory that is transferable exist? 163 The Ricoeourian perspective on the social, collective and public dimension of memory is informed by the study of the process of the construction and the recognition of collective identities, seen in relation to the ethical mandates of memory.164

If we intend to study the equation between individual consciousness, collective forms of consciousness and memory, one option is to follow Ricoeur’s analysis of the phenomenology of subjective consciousness on which basis the philosopher will defend a theory of the sociology of memory articulation. Ricoeur begins by discussing the *Fifth Cartesian Meditation* of Edmund Husserl165. Husserl denies any form of originality to which collective memory could have any claim, since he considers it primarily to be an operative term used often within the context of his phenomenology of intersubjectivity166. The German philosopher describes collective entities as “personalities of a higher order” (*Personalität höherer Ordnung*) involved in a process of objectivation of intersubjective relationships167. The collective entities Husserl is evoking are groups of subjects which have in common a set of characteristics similar to ours and which are first attributed to an individual consciousness. Ricoeur underlines that it is only possible to use the character of analogy which Husserl attributes to each *alter ego* if we take as the starting point, as its basis, the relation the subject has to his own ego, in order to subsequently constitute a form of collective memory.168

According to Ricoeur, through the use of the analogy we are led to believe in the products of processes of objectification which form and shape intersubjective relationships as collective entities. It is within this specific framework that we can make use of the first person plural form: “we”169. Within this framework it becomes possible, independently from whatever issue we are discussing, to attribute a collective identity to all the characteristics with which we define our own memory as such, for example continuity, the *jemeinigkeit*, the ability to make references to the past, the present and the future.170. Hence, it is possible to move away from the individuality of memory, through the use of this analogy,

163 *Idem*, pp. 74, 81-84; *MHF*, op. cit., p. 393.
165 RV, op. cit., p. 79.
166 Ibid.
167 Ibid.
169 RV, op. cit., p. 80.
170 Ibid.
towards the representation of the shared and collective properties of intersubjective memories\textsuperscript{171}. However, one ought not forget that as the starting point for such path which allows one to constitute the history of different cultures and mentalities, will still remain being the existence of an individual consciousness\textsuperscript{172}.

Thus, we gain the impression that for Ricoeur forms of collective memory play a significant role in the elaboration of personal memories\textsuperscript{173}. On the one side, collective memories are frequently kept in the form of narratives of lived experiences that are expressed through rituals and other festivities performed by an heterogenous group. On the other side, individual memories can insert themselves into collective narratives, which occurs naturally through the accumulation of distinct points of view about the same event.

\textsuperscript{171} In his study of intersubjective relations and its objectivation in the social realm Ricoeur remebers Hannah Arendt, who nominates the will to live in conjunction as the origin and well for political power (\textit{Idem}, p. 83). Overall, one can claim that Arendt’s thinking plays a significant role in Ricoeur’s writings on politics, intersubjective relations and human dignity.

\textsuperscript{172} RV, op. cit., p. 81.

3. Paul Ricoeur’s Philosophical Anthropology

3.1. The Capable Human Being

The philosophical task to which Ricoeur committed himself can be difficult to grasp. For example, if one glances only briefly over the wide variety of problems the philosopher addressed. In no particular order we can list: the concept of selfhood, Freud’s psychoanalysis, the voluntary and involuntary, metaphor, the role of institutions in public spaces, symbols, justice, ethics, memory, history, finitude and guilt, meaning and understanding, fiction and reality, narratives and their temporal dimension. Ricoeur is the first to acknowledge the dispersion of topics, however he reminds readers that “specific problems have a history of their own which calls for accurate scrutiny. Philosophers are, to my mind, first of all responsible for the exact formulation of specific problems”174. There is a heterogenous aspect to his work, nevertheless this multifaceted approach can only be beneficial for Ricoeur’s devotion to the overarching problematics of human capability, “the realm of the theme expressed by the verb I can”, understood as a “cornerstone” of the kind of philosophical anthropology Ricoeur intended to write 175.

In his essay “Ethics and Human Capability” written some years after “Oneself as Another”, the french philosopher offers a survey of the human capabilities referenced by the verb I can, set in relation to some complementary terms, which form the red thread which connects the ten chapters of “Oneself as Another”176. The verb I can is related to a series of other verbs to imply a form of actualization, a reference to particular capabilities or potentialities. Furthermore, the verb modifies the four following verbs: “I can speak, I can do things, I can tell a story, and I can be imputed, an action can be imputed to me as its true author”177.

For Ricoeur, the two ideas of capacity and imputability are the two complementary anthropological presuppositions with ground his ethical reading of the just178. By being deeply rooted in a philosophical anthropology, any conception of justice and thoughts on the question “who is the subject of rights?” ought to make reference to those capacities which define a capable human being.

174 EHC, op. cit., p. 279.
175 EHC, op. cit., p. 280.
176 This essay is based on the transcription of a talk by Ricoeur held on the 22nd of October, in the year 1999, as part of the conference “Ethics and Meaning in Public Life: Paul Ricoeur and Contemporary Moral Thought”, at the The University of Chicago Divinity School (Idem, p. 290).
177 Ibid.
namely the capacities to speak, act, give an account oneself, holding oneself responsible for one’s own acts or to remember past events\textsuperscript{179}. Furthermore, by an act of \textit{imputation} it ought to be possible for an action to be assigned to an agent, who sees him- or herself as its actual author. According to the philosopher, by taking into consideration these two categories it will then be possible within any moral, juridical or political framework to describe with precision the development of a capable subject towards becoming a subject of actual rights\textsuperscript{180}.

When Ricoeur cast a retrospective glance at his work, he considered that imputability is the fundamental concept which relates the descriptive elements of his work to the prescriptive elements\textsuperscript{181}. The concept plays a crucial role in his philosophy of language, as well as his philosophical reflection on action and on narrative theory. Thus, the concept allowed Ricoeur to define the threshold between his ethics and his anthropology. With respect to language, imputability refers to the word, but also the sentence and the work. In the realm of action, we can speak of imputability when we speak of decisions and motivations or how human intentions impact the world.

Differently, in the wide field of narrativity, the concept is relevant for the reconfiguration of the temporal experience in life from an historical or a fictional perspective. Consequently, the concept can, aside from the structuring function, fulfill a cumulative function too, since each of the different stages above can be read as the condition which opens the possibility for the next condition. For example, given that action is symbolically mediated and that language is the condition of the possibility for any meaningful human capabilities to develop it is in fact language which acts as the mediator of action\textsuperscript{182}. Yet, the linguistic structure particular to the concept of imputability cannot be studied separately from the kind of narratives related to ethical statements or commitments. Imputability, by standing at the ending point of the Ricoeurian anthropological phenomenology, constitutes the threshold which leads us to the triadical structure of his "little ethics"\textsuperscript{183}.

\textsuperscript{179} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{180} Idem, p. XV.
\textsuperscript{181} \textit{EHC}, op. cit., p. 280.
\textsuperscript{182} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{183} Idem, p. 285.

To better understand the complexity of the cumulative problematics of ‘I can’ Riceour provides us with a reflection on the complexity of the problems of the methodology itself. More specifically, the philosopher studies the shift of problematics which affect the concept of imputability by creating a survey of the methodological shifts he undertook. The initial methodology operated within the boundaries of a descriptive phenomenology, as Ricoeur intended to expand Husserl’s essential eidetics from the field of representation and perception to also cover acts of memory and imagination – practical and emotional fields. However, the consideration of the problem of the bad will, evil and the speculative fantasies of the symbolism of evil led Ricoeur beyond phenomenology, towards the fields of jurisprudence or philology (Idem, p. 281).
Thus, we see how the different themes of action, narration, language and prescription are all well represented in his systematic work “Oneself as Another” (1992)\(^{184}\). The main feature of the work is precisely the oscillation between objectivity and reflexivity, as well as modes of distanciation and appropriation\(^{185}\). For example, within the wide field of ethics, the objective side of the good life is represented by a norm and the subjective side of ethical life refers precisely to the wish for a good life.

We will now focus on Ricoeur’s revisions of the three chapters in “Oneself to Another” dedicated to his ‘little ethics’. For the french philosopher, a reflection of the problematic of ethics cannot be anything other than an exploration of the moral or ethical capability of human beings. We stand divided between the moral and the ethical, as the two competing concepts do not merge happily despite their shared relation to customs, the ethos as the etymology might infer. In fact, morality, the realm of projects, testing programs and maxims, appears to be the most appropriate intermediary level of reference which separates the two possible uses of the term ethics. As we will see below, namely when we experience the bifurcation of the concept of ethics between one level, constituted by the grounding foundation of ethics, and another level which refers to the ethics of practical wisdom, the realm of applied ethics\(^{186}\).


This work is a compilation of Ricoeur’s Gifford Lectures in Edinburgh in the year 1986. Paul Ricoeur’s major work *Oneself as Another* bears not only influence from descriptive phenomenology, hermeneutical interpretation, it also moves across the fields of semantics and the pragmatics of discourse of analytical philosophy. Ricoeur reflects upon how the governing hermeneutical and phenomenological study of language, action, narration and prescription converge and allowed him to merge a philosophical anthropology governed by the concept of capability with Aristotelian ontology. Nevertheless, in the context of this thesis, we will not go further into Ricoeur’s move away from epistemology, towards an exploration of the grounds of a philosophical anthropology in ontology (EHC, op. cit, pp. 282-285).

For an in-depth commentary on this major publication by Ricoeur see the following compilation of essays:


\(\)\(^{185}\) EHC, op. cit., p. 282.

\(\)\(^{186}\) Idem, p. 285.


3.2. The Ethical, the Moral and Practical Reason

Ricoeur first presents us his ‘little ethics’ in three of the ten sections which make up his important publication “Oneself as Another” (Studies 7, 8 and 9). These three sections form the nucleus of Ricoeur’s contribution to moral philosophy, which grew exponentially over the following two decades until his death. In the preface of “The Just” (2000) Ricoeur re-formulates the key arguments of his ‘little ethics’, in order to introduce us to his own approach to different themes concerning justice, the law and the just. As we will see below, all the themes explored in “The Just” and the subsequent volume “Reflections on the Just” (2007) are structured according to two intersecting axes.

The first axis, the horizontal one, concerns the “dialogical constitution of the self”, with respect to the ipseity rather than the mere sameness of selfhood. While describing the horizontal axis, the French philosopher affirms that the self can only come to constitute his identity by making reference to a relational structure, instead of a monological structure such as had been the traditionally dominant view in reflective philosophy. The vertical axis, which comes second, describes the hierarchical constitution that structures any predicates which describe human actions that are related to morality. The meeting point of these two axes is where Ricoeur situates the just and any philosophical reading concerning this broad theme.

Within this discussion, it is possible for the expression of the other to represent two distinct senses. In the realm of interpersonal relations the expression ‘the other’ will be referring primarily to the face or voice through which the other addresses the subject and comes to designate him as the second person singular. Within the virtuous context of friendly relations, the dialogue between the subject and the other establishes a series of roles for each individual to fill in and create relations where each individual cannot be easily substituted. However, this cannot be the primary field where justice is attained or engendered as a virtue, since justice is achieved with greater ease once there is a relation of distance from the other and consequently less intimacy between the individuals.

For the philosopher, this particular relation at a distance is mediated by the institution. Within this institutional field the other may be “anyone” rather than “you”. Having establish this less

187 Paul Ricoeur, The Just [TJ], op. cit..
189 TJ, op. cit., p. XII.
190 TJ, op. cit., p. XIII.
191 Idem, p. XII.
192 Idem, p. XIII.
intimate field where justice can and ought to be attained, Ricoeur comes to define society as an enterprise which distributes “roles, tasks, benefits, and obligations”\textsuperscript{193}.

The vertical axis, which was first elaborated in more detail in the three corresponding sections of “Oneself as Another”, refers on a first level to a teleological reading of the moral constitution of action. At this point, the predicate which qualifies human action in a moral context is the “good”, which in turn refers to the telos of a lifetime, the “crowning achievement” which guides the quest of human agents\textsuperscript{194}. In the realm of his philosophy of action and as the basis for his other views on morality, Ricoeur stresses that we never ought to forget that any human action is driven by the desire for or a lack of desire for “the wish for a full life”\textsuperscript{195}. This wish defines ethics, both in the context of any personal ties of friendship or in relation to institutional relations. In “Oneself as Another” we are presented with the following guiding formula: “the wish for a fulfilled life in and with others in just institutions”\textsuperscript{196}. Ricoeur’s conception of political philosophy parts from his understanding that the unfolding of a subject’s relationship to the other enables a “mediation of the institution” and consequently the two-fold “I-you” is extended and becomes “I-you-them”\textsuperscript{197}.

Moving forward from this understanding of the basic level of ethical life, the French philosopher addresses various topics surrounding questions of justice in subsequent publications. Justice is an integral element which enables the fulfillment of the wish for a good life. Before becoming an imperative, the just, as an ethical aspiration, is itself the object of a desire or a wish. Hence, “the first question in the moral order is not “What must I do?” but rather “How would I like to lead my life?”\textsuperscript{198}.

The second level of the horizontal axis is the deontological level which implements norms, duties or interdictions and is defined by the predicate “obligatory”\textsuperscript{199}. At the transitory moment, from the wish for a good life to the imperative, we come to realize that actions are carried out on an interactive plane where power is exercised by an agent over another agent. Any power relation exposes

\textsuperscript{193} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{194} Idem, p. XVI.
\textsuperscript{195} “It is as citizens that we become human. The wish to live within just institutions signifies nothing else” (Ibid.).
\textsuperscript{196} Idem, p. XV.
\textit{In fact, the philosopher considers that his understanding of the basic structures of ethics, in the sense of the grounding foundation, “are so deeply rooted that they need what Hannah Arendt would call a public sphere of appearance to become readable, visible. [In fact,] their deeprootedness makes them hidden to the moral look” (EHC, op. cit., pp. 286-287).}
\textsuperscript{198} TJ, op. cit., p. XV.
\textsuperscript{199} Ricoeur considers that “In the case of the law or the norm, two characteristics, universality and constraint, are introduced, which are summarized by the term obligation. Hence I propose to retain the term ethics for matters relating to the good and that of morality for matters relating to obligation” (MEP, op. cit., p.13).
the parties involved to a wide range of possible forms of violence. As we cannot negate that there are situations where one agent harms another, willfully or by accident, the moral judgment of actions requires the implementation of duties and interdictions to protect less powerful agents. “A specific form of power, [refers to] a power-over that consists in an initial dissymetric relation between the agent and the receiver of the agent’s action.” In the most extreme scenarios of estrangement, Ricoeur considers that humans are reduced to their mere physical existence.

While describing a series of possible feelings of indignation towards situations where there is a more or less visible abuse of power, situations which stir in us the necessity of implementing obligations, Ricoeur suggests that we ought to be capable of creating a condition of impartiality for ourselves and for others. We must try to free us of any desire for vengeance, despite all the possible different kinds of unequal distribution of the crucial ability to act or any hierarchies of authority in society which flourish by depriving certain people of their power. It is this position of impartiality that in the legal system is filled by the judge. In this sense, what obliges us to act in one way and not another “is the claim for universal validity attached to the idea of the law.”

Ricoeur’s understanding of the common moral experience is heavily indebted to Kant’s moral philosophy, as it derives from it the “kind of formalization of common experience – that is, the ordinary experience connecting together the two sides of the concept of imputability.” By the normative side of imputability the philosopher understands the objective consideration that imputability necessarily implies that an action has already been interpreted or evaluated as being an action which is forbidden is or allowed. The subjective side of imputability refer to the subject who has placed herself “under the

200 TJ, op. cit., p. XVII.
201 RJ, op. cit., p. 77.
202 “Because of the human vocation to be self-creative, self-asserting, the fact of alienation cuts very deep. To be submitted to the power of another is the contrary of the creation of oneself. Estrangement is fundamentally a reversal, the inversion, of the human capacity for the creative process of objectification. Humanity’s species being is the depository of the identity between objectification and self-creation. In estrangement this essential being is transformed, becoming merely the means to existence in the sense of survival. What was formerly the means for self-assertion becomes the “end”: to exist physically” (LIU, op. cit., p. 44).
203 “People do not simply lack power; they are deprived of it” (RJ, op. cit., p. 77).
204 TJ, op. cit., p. XVII.
Cf. Gilles Marmasse & Roberta Picardi (Eds.). Ricoeur et la pensée allemande: de Kant à Dilthey. Paris, CNRS Éditions (2019);
Fernanda Henriques, “Paul Ricoeur Leitor e Herdeiro de Kant.” Revista Portuguesa De Filosofia vol. 61, no. 2, (2005), pp. 593-607.
206 EHC, op. cit., p. 286.

51
rule of the norm” and consequently implies the existence of a subject who is capable of such positioning, regardless of the content of the norm. The basic structure of common moral experience relates this capability with the evaluation and prescription of human actions as being allowed or forbidden. Nevertheless, it is important to note that Ricoeur is not necessarily implying an individual subject when he addresses the importance of the subjective side. Rather, the dialectic structure of the imputation derives from his conception of imputation as a particular form of “a dialogical act” which can take place between two individuals or between a community and one single individual, as a form of internalized dialogue, as a “dialogue with itself”.

Ricoeur’s interpretation of the relationship between deontological and the teleological, which goes beyond the mere description of the opposition of the two levels, points to the significance of the relation between norms, understood as the objective side of imputability, and commitments which make up its subjective side. The french philosopher considers that the opposition between the teleological and the deontological has been overemphasized. With reference to Kant, Ricoeur considers that we ought to question until which extent the “opposition is implied by the basic texts themselves” or rather “more or less a construction of the tradition” of Kant’s successors. In fact, Ricoeur admits that both Aristotle and Kant are in need of a more accurate reading, philosopher’s today need to liberate their work from “the prejudice of lazy interpretations, among I could include my own, despite the work of so many commentators! If we proceed from common experience and the problem it raises, we will be more attentive to the smooth transitions from one realm to the other”.

How can we understand this approximation between Kant and Aristotle proposed by Ricoeur? On the one hand, Ricoeur considers that Kant places great importance on respect, within the context of rational motives of action, as the one single moral feeling on which the subjective side of imputation relies. The french philosopher considers further that moral philosophy ought to “enlarge” this field of moral feelings. This could be achieved by allowing for the inclusion of different feelings related to the human dignity of a moral subject, such as indignation, shame, veneration, admiration or enthusiasm.

On the other hand, the teleological approach, with its roots in good will, for Ricoeur informs the main structures of moral action, since they impact the different possible readings of what constitutes the wish for the good life and the basic structures of rational desire, deliberation, preference and choice.

207 Ibid.
208 Ibid.
209 Idem, p. 287.
210 Idem, p. 288.
211 Ibid.
which are necessary to ground the underlying concept of “virtue as [a] rational habit”\textsuperscript{212}. The french philosopher considers that these virtues might in fact be delineating a variety of fields of application in agreement with cultural traditions, such as those of the Greeks, Homer and other tragic poets. The virtues are entrenched in the canon of a particular historical community and are reflective of an historical allegiance of belonging. According to Ricoeur, within teleological ethics, Aristotle’s golden mean could be considered a type of pre-imperative, a pre-normative concept. Yet, to determine the transition from a general conception of virtue towards a plurality of virtues it is necessary to comprehend what might be the mean between the excess or the deficiency which the radical categorical imperative forecasts\textsuperscript{213}.

For the french philosopher, within the wide field of applied ethics, the relation between justice and equality, which the Greeks referred to as \textit{isotes}, needs to be studied both from a political perspective, were equality expresses a desire for recognition, and from a practical linguistic level. Interactions enable the construction of narratives and life stories, as well as a degree of self-evaluation which in turn lead us back to the ethical aspiration of a good life\textsuperscript{214}. For Ricoeur, it is sufficient to think back to Aristotle’s remarkable distinction between an arithmetical or proportional equality to realize that the problem of justice, in relation to equality, is also not easily solved from the \textit{moral} dimension, despite its normative content. It is no simple task to define equality in the context of one’s own relationships with other subjects, where what each subject “\textit{respect[s]} in the other is his humanity”\textsuperscript{215}. Justice, from a normative perspective, is installed to establish conditions of equality in order for these interpersonal relations to be able to prosper.

Nevertheless, once brought to a level of formalism and the study of the deontological sense of justice, Ricoeur states that in fact this second theorem of his theory of the just is not autonomous and will always require a reference to the good. The primary reason for such lack of independence in real life is that there is a real heterogeneity of goods distributed amongst the citizens of our shared world\textsuperscript{216}. Consequently, there is great difficulty in obtaining any form of a just distribution\textsuperscript{217}. Due to such a “tragic dimension of action”, each agent, guided by his moral conscience, must elaborate “unique decisions” which in moments of incertitude or deep conflict offer us a “\textit{practical wisdom}”\textsuperscript{218}. This is the

\textsuperscript{212} \textit{Ibid}.
\textsuperscript{213} \textit{Ibid}.
\textsuperscript{214} MEP, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 16.
\textsuperscript{215} \textit{Idem}, pp. 19-20.
\textsuperscript{216} In this sense, Ricoeur’s conception of citizenship refers to “the modes of belonging to a political body” (\textit{TJ, op. cit.}, p. XX).
\textsuperscript{217} \textit{Idem}, p. XIX.
\textsuperscript{218} \textit{Idem}, p. XXI.
third level of Ricoeur’s horizontal axis and it relates strongly to Aristotles’ conception of the virtue of phronesis\textsuperscript{219}.

If we follow the french philosopher’s lead, only when what is just is formulated by having listened to a “heartfelt conviction”, has been studied from the perspective of a “procedural formalism” and is motivated by “the wish to live in just institutions” can one attempt to determine a position of impartiality\textsuperscript{220}. The practical wisdom which grounds the third theorem of the conception of the just preserves its rootedness in the wish for a good life, as well as in the rational formulation of universal norms. It facilitates a possibility for flexibility during the moment of the application of a norm and the exercise of a judgement in a singular situation\textsuperscript{221}.

The importance Ricoeur attributes retrospectively to his conception of practical wisdom cannot be overstated\textsuperscript{222}. We observe that he states that the process of universalization, as the stage at which the universal capability of the projects of individual human beings is tested, belongs specifically to the field of practical wisdom\textsuperscript{223}. It appears that although Ricoeur considers that the problem of the test of

\textsuperscript{219} Ricoeur continues : “This middle zone can be designated by many names, depending on the strategy used: rhetoric, to the extent that rhetoric, following Aristotle’s definition, consists in giving a “rejoinder” to dialectic, itself understood as a doctrine of probable reasoning; hermeneutic, to the extent that this joins application to understanding, or explanation; poetic, to the extent that the invention of an appropriate solution to the unique situation stems from what, since Kant, we have called the productive imagination, in order to distinguish it from the merely reproductive imagination” (\textit{Idem}, p. XXII).

\textsuperscript{220} \textit{TJ}, op. cit., p. XXI.

\textsuperscript{221} \textit{Idem}, p. XXII.

\textsuperscript{222} Maureen Junker-Kenny writes on the importance of Ricoeur’s ‘practical wisdom’ in relation to his thoughts on human dignity: “The ability for independent, principled judgment [… and for the expression of dignity requires] the concrete capability to discern and defend what is morally relevant also at a cost to oneself. […] Dignity is identified with singularity in the conflict that erupts between regard for the rule and doing justice to the individual. It is the reason why a third level, ‘practical wisdom’, is introduced: it has the task of judging in conflicts of duties which course of action is relatively the best to protect persons as ends in themselves, in their irreducible plurality, also from rigoristic applications of norms. These need to be tested not only for their universalizability, but also for their equity in relation to agents in their particularity. This level will allow questions to surface that could not be known at the theoretical level of constructing the architecture of ethics: about the self, who is more than the sum of his (successful or failed) acts; about the role of asymmetry, of love in relation to justice, and of the gift of a unilateral initiative; about religious and cultural traditions that can reinvigorate their own heritage of supporting dignity by addressing their unkept promises” (Maureen Junker-Kenny, “Dignity, fragility, singularity in Paul Ricoeur's ethics”. In: Marcus Düwell et al. (Eds.), \textit{The Cambridge Handbook of human dignity: interdisciplinary perspectives}. Cambridge, United Kingdom, Cambridge University Press (2014), p. 292).

\textsuperscript{223} It is important to note that Ricoeur, while revisiting \textit{Oneself as Another}, mentions that: “In\textit{my petite ethique}, my chapter devoted to practical wisdom still looks like an appendix, and it should become the crucial chapter. It is, in the language of Hannah Arendt, “the public sphere of appearance”, and precisely the basic structure of human action, the basic structure of desire, action, preference, choice and judgment, and so on. The largely invisible structure, the basic structure of the ethical unconscious, requires the screening of norms in order to be brought to the field of application where they are put to test at the level of what Martha Nussbaum called “tragic situations”, the agonistic side of action” (\textit{EHC}, op. cit., p. 288).
universalization, the practice of testing out the universal capability of human projects, is unsolvable, he is nevertheless considering that any inchoate universals should be put the test due to the dialogic structure which determines public discourse and the alleged universality of different norms inseparable from one another. Whenever the prudential component of ethics is operating during the moment of testing, it may be that different tests of universality must be distributed to different spheres of application, since a radical plurality of the field of dialogical testing must be recognized given that there are exist a wide variety of spheres of applied ethics

Ricoeur names four different fields of applied prudentiality, the political field and the three fields of historical judgment, judiciary judgment and medical judgment. Within the wider context of the practical sphere, divided into the four fields of applied prudentiality, this would be the space in which to test the concept of judgment. We have discussed the difference between three of these kinds of judgments in a previous chapter, however, it is worthwhile to extend our discussion to include the role of political judgments seen in relation to the complex subject of citizenship. The public exercise of all types of judgment raises the question of the possibilities for civic dissensus to assume a therapeutic or pedagogical role, given the content and quantity of controversies discussed within public spaces only on the subject of the entanglement of history and collective memory.

Thus, we observe how the citizen stands between the judge and the historian as the third party, despite his inability of making a vow of impartiality. As we have seen in an earlier chapter, it is important to situate the comparison between the task of the historian and the task of the judge within the framework of a critical reflection on the limits of historical knowledge. Both the historian and judge ideally aim for truth and justice and consequently take up the position of a third party which studies the protagonists of social actions interacting in a public space. However, Ricoeur suggests that aside from the judge or historian other actors can claim such position of impartiality attached to the third-party position. Educators, state officials and citizens can step into the position of impartiality which is necessary for the protection of the aims of truth and justice in those areas which limit claims of legitimacy.

224 Idem, p. 289.
225 MHF, op. cit., p. 295.
226 Idem, p. 314.
Regardless of the type of judgment, the determination of what is a just judgment undergoes three stages. With respect to the first level, the teleological perspective which reveals to us the wish to live well, the just will be determined by something good in relation to something other, while from a deontological perspective, the just is determined by the proceedings of the legal system and the implementation of universal obligations. With respect to the last level, in the realm of practical reason, any judgment must occur in situation and therefore determines what is equitable, rather than just or good.  

227 Ricoeur writes: “The equitable is the figure that clothes the idea of the just in situations of incertitude and of conflict, or, to put it a better way, in the ordinary – or extraordinary – realm of the tragic dimension of action” (TJ, op. cit., p. XXIV).
3.3. Social Bonds and Actions

Ricoeur’s conceptual framework is strongly determined by an intersubjective element which includes the account of other agent’s motives, as well as the subjective dimension of the agent’s action. As we have stated previously, his conceptual framework unites the different dimensions of action and meaning, understanding and explanation and the respect for oneself and the orientation towards others\textsuperscript{228}. The agent takes into account the other and to a smaller or larger degree will orient his own actions towards the other. For Ricoeur, passive acquiescence is an equally valid form of social action in comparison to any active part – because a belief in an authority might convince the agent to respond to the authority’s power by submitting himself to the authority in a more passive or more active manner: “not doing is part of doing”\textsuperscript{229}.

When we study the dimension of meaning attached to an action we learn that actions do not exist first without their representations, they emerge together since “meaning is an integral component of the definition of action”\textsuperscript{230}. As we will see in the discussion on ideology and utopia in the last chapter of this thesis, it is precisely at this stage of the formation of a meaning that ideology can have a dissimulating impact. From this we gain the impression that Ricoeur wishes to conclude that the action performed by the agent must be meaningful to him. However, since actions can be read both from subjective and intersubjective perspectives – actions should not only make sense to the agent himself, but also ought to make sense to other subjects.

Thus, it seems that from a Ricoeurian perspective actions have an inherently social component, they possess both subjective and intersubjective meanings which take into consideration both the behaviour of other agents, as well as the reception of the impact of the agent’s action on others. For the french philosopher the subjective meaning of an action always ought to always reflect an intersubjective orientation towards others.

At this point, we wish to describe how Ricoeur’s view relates back to the work of Alfred Schütz, who in his own right studied how our actions are not only oriented towards their contemporaries, but also to their possible ancestors and any successive generations\textsuperscript{231}. Schütz asks: how does it become possible for us to comprehend and explain the meaning of the actions of others have for each individual himself across several generations? How can the living generation relate its own conduct to the conduct of other living and past generations? In other words, how to explain the essence

\textsuperscript{228} LIU, op. cit., p. 184.
\textsuperscript{229} Idem, p. 185.
\textsuperscript{230} Idem, p. 184.
\textsuperscript{231} Ricoeur references Alfred Schütz’s work in \textit{MHF}, as well as in the third volume of \textit{Temps et Récit}.
of social action and social relationships? In attempt to formulate satisfying answers to these difficult questions Schütz suggests that it is fundamental to question what is relevant for the other, since one’s own wishes and needs rarely coincide with those of others, in the same manner that one cannot be both here and there at the same time. More importantly, it is important to not treat the other as a mere “utensil” who facilitates one’s own life achievements.

Schütz concludes that we do not have to limit ourselves to the idea of a uni-lateral relationship between the observer, oneself, and the observed, the other. A dialogue between two subjects takes place in an exterior world and in an exterior temporal frame, which can coincide with the interior world of each individual subject. Schütz is describing a relation of simultaneity, the moment in which one subject speaks, the other listens and both witness a moment of “co-performing subjectivity”. We conclude that for Ricoeur, this chronological development best reveals action’s social dimension.

In the context of his discussion of man’s ability to create himself, Ricoeur adds that through a process of emancipation humans are able to recover their forces and re-establish the connection to all their senses in situations where they had lost or been deprived of such forms of power. It is interesting to note that the philosopher believes that each individual process of emancipation guarantees collectively the conduction of critical social sciences and re-affirms that human beings are capable of observing, describing and analyzing their own living situation. Within a historical movement humans gain the capacity to move towards appropriation by developing projects of emancipation which drive them forward. It is in such sense humans are meant to re-invent what acts of creations can become. It is by re-discovering what creativity means – that humans learn to exist together.

233 Idem, p. 198.
234 Idem, p. 189.
235 Idem, p. 185.
236 LIU, op. cit., p. 64.
237 Idem, p. 65.
3.4. Autonomy and Narrative Identity

In an essay on “Autonomy and Vulnerability”238, Ricoeur affirms that while autonomy has to be the “prerogative of the subject of rights”, the reality of vulnerability that afflicts humans turns autonomy into a condition of possibility which in order to be fulfilled needs the judicial practice239. Therefore, even though human beings are hypothetically autonomous and consequently “must become so”, there is always an ambivalence surrounding such conception of autonomy, since it is a presupposition and “a goal to attain” while also being a “condition of possibility and a task”240. We will discuss in the last chapter of Part II precisely how complicated it has become for archaeologists to act in an autonomous manner, while respecting the autonomy of the individuals’ whose lives they are interrupting once they bring back the past in one form or another.

To understand Ricoeur’s complex understanding of what autonomy is, it is important to return to his conception of imputability and the capable human being. As mentioned above, the concept of imputability is understood in relation to a bundle of capacities through which a subject can take himself as the author of his own acts and consequently identify himself as a subject and the “one who can” perform an action241. The most vulnerable and fragile human beings are those subjects who, for one reason or another, have partially or entirely lost this bundle of capacities and it is through this “inability or a lesser ability that human fragility first expresses itself”242. Consequently, one of the primary forms of equality must be the installation of the possibility for each subject to be capable of speaking, explaining, arguing and discussing on his own and designating himself as the author of his own actions243.

Ricoeur underlines that questions concerning the autonomy of a subject cannot be seen separately from questions concerning identity, yet there are two perspectives from which to see this relationship. On the one hand, we can view the relationship taking into consideration a temporal dimension which addresses the subject’s personal narrative identity. This will facilitate our recognition of the singularity of each irreplaceable personal identity244. On the other hand, when we speak of identity there is also a wide range of historical identity references which refer us back to possible

238 RJ, op. cit., pp. 72-90.
239 Idem, p. 72.
240 Idem, p. 83.
241 Idem, p. 75.
242 Idem, p. 76.
243 Ibid.
244 Idem, p. 78.
religious, linguistic, and genealogical contexts and these may distance us from the personal identity of each singular subject.\(^{245}\)

The determination of a subject’s narrative identity enables our recognition of something which remains the same, by pointing us to “a permanence in time [and] an immutability of things”.\(^{246}\) Relating the theme of narrative identity to the ideas of imputation and capabilities, according to the French philosopher the narrative identity of a subject is something the subject himself must be capable of claiming. Consequently, the narrative identity may be seen both as “a mark of power”, being a particular form of “attestation”, as well as “a term for impotence” as it equally refers to all possible threats and “signs of vulnerability” to which the subject is potentially or in reality exposed.\(^{247}\) There is a particular “threat that time brings […] the claim for an identity divest itself on its narrative mark and claim the kind of immutability we have placed under the idem heading”.\(^{248}\) From such position, Ricoeur questions if subjects, which for any sort of reason are not able to construct their own narrative identity are particularly vulnerable, since they are possibly neither capable of identifying who they are through understanding history or of identifying themselves with a particular part of history.\(^{249}\) Thus, being able to construct a coherent narrative, for someone else other than oneself also, but most importantly for oneself, is an ability which is one of the central components of a subject’s autonomy.\(^{250}\)

Ricoeur underlines that the question of autonomy asks of us to see a perspective which is the subject’s own malleable, but not irreplaceable, singular view. Speaking of autonomy points us to the idea that one must dare to think for oneself, rather than allow for someone else to speak in one’s own place. This idea points us to a “test of alterity”, as we are constantly introduced and confronted with different perspectives which most likely will contradict each other at times.\(^{251}\) For the French philosopher, the idea of alterity refers us to a much greater problem, it leads us towards a “reflexive relation of the self itself, which has its moral and psychological legitimacy on the plane that institutes and structures the human person”.\(^{252}\) Because we are permanently confronted with someone else, a

\(^{245}\) Ibid.

\(^{246}\) Ibid.

\(^{247}\) Idem, p. 79.

\(^{248}\) Ibid.

\(^{249}\) Idem, p. 80.

\(^{250}\) Ricoeur continues: “To learn how to tell the same story in another way, how to allow our story to be told by others, how to submit the narrative of a life to the historian’s critique, are all practices applicable to the paradox of autonomy and fragility. Let us say therefore that a subject capable of leading his or her life in agreement with the idea of narrative coherence is an autonomous subject” (Ibid.).


\(^{251}\) RJ, op. cit., p. 80.

\(^{252}\) Ibid.
subject of actual rights must possess and act according to the ability of saying “I am capable of taking the test of the confrontation” with another subject and accept the “interconnectedness of life”\textsuperscript{253}.

For Ricoeur, the conception of the unsubstitutability of individuals is central to any attestation of a subject’s capacity to act and designate himself as the author of his own actions. Consequently, different kinds of fragility and threats to the singularity of each person inevitably point to a confrontation between the subject’s ability to chose for himself, various types of social pressure and of his respect for others\textsuperscript{254}. The French philosopher considers that each subject, through the establishment of a \textit{coherent narrative} and the affirmation of his \textit{personal narrative identity} is able to enter into a \textit{symbolic order} that is shared by many subjects and through which each experiences in his own way the interconnectedness of life. However, for Ricoeur it appears problematic that:

\begin{quote}
“the authority of the symbolic order is both the very site of the strongest connection between the self and the norm and the very principle of its fragility. The vulnerability that stands in counterpoint to responsibility can be summed up in the difficulty that everyone has in inscribing his or her action and behaviour into a symbolic order, and in the impossibility a number of our contemporaries have in comprehending the meaning and necessity of this inscription, principally those whom our sociopolitical order excludes” (\textit{RJ, op. cit.}, p. 86).
\end{quote}

We believe that this consideration of a variety of symbolic orders in which subjects can inscribe themselves points to Ricoeur’s view on fundamental anthropological differences which influence how or whether subjects are at all capable of entering into forms of discourse or relations of power. These anthropological differences in the nature and culture of humans separate different subjects from one another through potentially violent and oppressive methods. As we have seen above in Part I, many voices within the archaeological discipline have come to consider that it is the task of archaeologists to uncover both these violent and oppressive methods, as well as to respect and celebrate these differences which make up human and all other biological diversity.

\textsuperscript{253}\textit{Ibid.}

In his discussion on the relationship between memory and psychoanalysis, Ricoeur suggests that a linguistic transmission cannot be understood as a derivation of an original form of consciousness. On the contrary, discourse is from the start by nature social and public. The philosopher comments that while we are young children, adults tell us stories about us, which means that before we are capable of speaking coherently and dominate the art of narration we listen to stories. Consequently, we first allow someone else to tell us our story before we ourselves are capable of telling our own story in our words (\textit{RV, op. cit.}, p. 82).

\textsuperscript{254}The philosopher claims that there are two poles between which each subject moves in multiple forms throughout his life: “the effort to think for oneself and the domination or rule by the other. The identity of each person, and hence his or her autonomy, is constructed between these two poles. It is the task of education to bring about an interminable negotiation between our seeking singularity and the social pressure” (\textit{RJ, op. cit.}, p. 82).
3.5. The Political Subject

What determines the political subject as such is most visible in the different situations each subject experiences during his practical life. In certain moments it becomes possible for himself and others to distinguish who has performed which action and thus possible to attribute actions and their consequences to a particular subject. Consequently, the subjects involved may be morally and legally held responsible for these actions by others. However, Ricoeur makes clear that according to his view, the relationship between an action and an agent is in the first place not derived from an observation which reveals who has performed said action, but rather it is determined by which capacities an individual agent believes in255.

In other words, actions are analyzed from the point of view of each subject and his confidence in performing particular actions that he believes are within his power. It is this latter argument on which Ricoeur constructs his conception of the political subject. Thinking about the ties between the identity of a speaking subject, the political subject and that of an ethico-juridical subject, for Ricoeur they all relate back to his conception of the narrative identity. Hence, its study will always remind us of the temporal dimension of our existence256.

According to the french philosopher, the identity of the ethical subject is determined by his performance of actions which are considered either ethically good or bad. The subject allows himself to be judged in relation to the idea of the good and his aspiration for a good life, while he also continuously performs a certain degree of self-evaluation257. The subject’s appraisal of his own actions, refers precisely to his ability to evaluate his own actions and his comprehension of the predicates good and bad, as well as the hierarchy of ethical values and virtues. Within a society structured by just institutions, such an ethical subject, capable of self-appraisal, is given the just conditions to act, to exist and live his own unique history258.

For Ricoeur, the faculty of judgment and the act of judging, which are inherent to any ethical-moral discussion and unavoidable in a procedural formalist context, unfolds on the grounds of a fragile equilibrium which aims at maintaining a balance between what separates the subject’s own share or part from everyone else’s and all their shares. Perhaps even more importantly, this equilibrium

256 Idem, p. 15.
257 MEP, op. cit., p. 15.
258 Ibid.
constantly brings to our attention that each subject “shares in, takes part in society”\textsuperscript{259}. Ricoeur is addressing the complicated theme of participation, as he considers that “in sharing there are shares, that is, those things that separate us. My share is not yours. But sharing is also what makes us share, that is, in the strong sense of the term, share in…”\textsuperscript{260}.

The Ricoeurian conception of the political subject and his own abilities must be studied in the context of a discussion on the relation between the affirmation of power and the role of the political subject in society. In addition, this will refer us back to Ricoeur’s study of the capable subject\textsuperscript{261}. On the one hand, political power seems to be a necessary condition which creates the conditions for capable subjects as citizens of this world to exercise their individual powers. Nevertheless, on the other hand, it also appears that “political power, because of the fragility revealed by the paradoxes of power, is only “redeemed” by the vigilance of these very citizens whom the polity has in some way created”\textsuperscript{262}. We will see below how archaeologists currently struggle to redeem the impact of political power on the archaeological record through their own scientific and humanistic professional practices.

\textsuperscript{259} TJ, op. cit., p. 132.
\textsuperscript{260} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{261} RJ, op. cit., p. 75.
\textsuperscript{262} MEP, op. cit., p. 23.
4. Power Struggles within Archaeology

As we have seen in the chapter above, in our preoccupation for the duration of human beings’ lives and their human made things Ricoeur considers that we must bring to our attention that to support the continuation of action throughout time we have to adjust our ethical actions accordingly. For the French philosopher, since we are mortal beings and public institutions extend their impact beyond individual human lives it will be such institutions which provide a temporal framework for human action. Consequently, we may affirm that archaeologists ought to act in agreement with the dialogical constitution of the self and address political and cultural debates concerning the just and the law from such informed position. The archaeologist ought to constitute his professional and personal identity by making reference to the relational structure of I-you-them.

According to Ricoeur’s vertical axis of his ‘little ethics’, human actions that are related to morality are structured according to a hierarchical constitution best described by the guiding formula: “the wish for a fulfilled life in and with others in just institutions”. Thus, to determine what is a just action or judgment in a particular situation the archaeologist has to first ask what the just as an ethical aspiration might be. It is at the subsequent stage, when archaeologists speak in imperatives, that their operations become more rigid, since the implementation of the predicate “obligatory” translates into power being exercised by an agent over another agent.

We have seen in Part I of this thesis how within the context of archaeological practices different power relations help to propagate different forms of violence. In fact, it was precisely because of the greater archaeological debates of the 20th century where archaeologists, willfully or by accident, harmed living communities and their ancestors that many archaeologists in the later decades of the 20th century asked for the implementation of moral duties and interdictions, in form of legal codes, to protect the less powerful local communities and the interest of the deceived.

The visible abuses of power in archaeological practices revealed how easily archaeologists, despite their daily preoccupations with human behaviour, forgot that each individual is living under certain conditions and that these conditions themselves are part of the structure which define the individual as himself. These conditions do not only inform what the individual imagines he himself is and they are not something what he has himself conceived of alone, they also relate to a wider reaching ontological structure to which he and other individuals belong. Different ontological structures

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264 TJ, op. cit., p. XV.
determine different modes of being together and they precede the development of forms which allow humans to represent their own practical necessities and wishes.\textsuperscript{266}

As the remains of past cultures become visible, archaeologists are faced with the challenge of deciding who shares in such cultural narrative identities and who all the participants in such narratives are. Archaeologists need to evaluate which impact the absence of past identities now made present for living societies has on present day narratives, since the present is modified or destroyed through the archaeological method. For such reasons, it is interesting to view the archaeologists’ acts of judgment and the institutions’ motivations from a philosophical perspective which discusses the relationship between the role of participation and that of judgement. By introducing Ricoeur’s ‘little ethics’ and his philosophical reflections on the just, on narrative identity, autonomy and vulnerability, as well as his thoughts on the relation between history and memory, it will now be possible to develop a structure which could facilitate a critical analysis of how specific identity formations are reflective of the archaeologist’s act of judgment and the institutions’ motivations which act in the background.

Generally, as we have seen in Part I, the ethical concerns of the archaeological practice and its implications for professionals and other stakeholders have received increased attention in the late 20\textsuperscript{th} century. This shift was in part due to the archaeologists’ recognition that the sociopolitical context of the archaeological profession is largely determined by the engagement of archaeologists with living people, rather than with a particular group of anonymous people from the past or future. Consequently, there is currently taking place a transference from the primary concern of the archaeological practice to conserve archaeological material remains and the establishment of scientific standards, supported by the implementation of deontological codes structuring the archaeological discipline, towards the creation of a reflexive ethical discourse between collaborators.

Within this transformation many archaeologists have begun paying greater attention to the specific necessities of local communities, the claims of ancestors and the responsibilities of archaeologists during conflict and post-conflict conditions. However, professional archaeologists are only a small part of a much wider net of local communities, national and international institutions living and operating in war zones or in regions affected by climate catastrophes. As has been explained in the introductory chapters, such involvement has motivated some archaeologists to re-evaluate their efforts in controlling the practice of vernacular digging and collecting, their interests in heritage

\textsuperscript{266}LIU, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 75.
management policies and their support of ethical codes which promote a morally acceptable conduct towards human being, animals and plants\textsuperscript{267}.

A wide variety of different ethical mandates adopted by archaeologists during the second half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century have been greatly beneficial for the development of social ties across the world, yet they run the risk of being too restrictive and support oppressive measures once they turn into categorical imperatives and legal norms. Archaeologists are faced with the complex task of comparing the claims of moral authorities and reasoned arguments supported by other forms of authority that are not necessarily of a factual or normative kind. Consequently, the archaeologist Alfredo González-Ruibal considers that “a desire to help others, advocacy, collaboration, or activism should not be automatically considered as proof of ethical practice and therefore impervious to criticism”\textsuperscript{268}.

Following González-Ruibal’s reflection, shared by other archaeologists, means to go beyond policy debates of a deontological kind. Crossing this threshold allows archaeologists to, aside from raising ethical questions, challenge a broad variety of modern Western traditional concepts, as well as discuss ontological questions on the nature of being human and the ways in which we can describe the relationships between the dead and the living or between human beings and things. While the performance of the archaeological practice permits the scientific investigator or otherwise interested individual to ‘travel back in time’, our view of such ability should not be reduced to the expression of a certain kind of ‘wanderlust’ that befalls the human spirit\textsuperscript{269}.

Throughout history this ‘wanderlust’ has served higher authoritative powers, whether private or of the state, to engage in more or less manipulative schemes of the discovery or retrieval of past cultures. States and institutions with particular cultural affiliations have made use of the interest humans have about their past and the origins of life on Earth to legitimize their own authoritative powers. For example, the construction of “narratives of common origins” or scientific attempts have been utilized to reveal and claim “material affinities” or differences between particular past and present cultures\textsuperscript{270}. The result of such actions has been the demarcation or the questioning of certain territorial boundaries of past, contemporary and future peoples.

Thus, a self-critical approach towards the archaeological practice cannot be only a question of trying to understand how archaeologists gain access to remote and foreign cultural spaces, but rather ought to motivate archaeologists and non-professionals alike to question in which position the

\textsuperscript{267} González-Ruibal 2018, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 345.
\textsuperscript{268} \textit{Idem}, p. 355.
\textsuperscript{269} \textit{EAA, op. cit.}, p. 23.
\textsuperscript{270} \textit{Idem}, pp. 21-23.
archaeologist perceives herself to be when establishing a dialogue with ‘foreign’ people. As we have seen above, several archaeologists have come to consider that their approach to the past will inevitably place them in the position of an intruder or a violent visitor, rather than in the role of a neutral observer271.

As such, a critical analysis of the current state of the archaeological profession and its historical development must include a discussion about which role the archaeologist assumes in her conduct and how precisely her role might be indicative of or conceal nationalist motivations once archaeologists chose or are obligated to act in agreement with the particular institutions operating in the background. This type of critique is particularly necessary in situations where a foreign culture will not fit into any archaeological concepts which where first established for the European context. Western archaeologists have had to find new concepts which allow them to describe “the past of the ‘others’” in an appropriate manner, without treating the past of ‘others’ as inferior to any European cultures272. The greater difficulty lies precisely in determining what exactly an ‘appropriate’ approach and terminology could look like.

Adopting a Ricoeurian perspective allows us to see how the concept of authority stands precisely at the transitional point between the primary integrative function of ideology and the other two functions of ideology as legitimation and dissimulation273. Therefore, in order to better comprehend the repercussions of power struggles within the archaeological context and to deepen our understanding of Ricoeur’s concepts of authority, legitimation and power, it is worthwhile to study his three-part

271 Pollock, speaking specifically about the ethical struggles of archaeologists working in war zones, asks critically: “Whether it is logistically feasible or not, is it ethically appropriate to pursue research in the midst of a war? Does our presence ‘around the edges’ in violence-plagued situations exacerbate problems for ‘native’ archaeologists, villagers, and others with whom we work? Or might our presence provide some kind of security or help to foster cross-cultural understanding? Can we ameliorate some elements of structural violence by bringing resources, training, and so on to colleagues and students in the countries where we do our field research? More generally, do attempts to stay aloof from politics, to immerse ourselves instead in our scholarship and pursuit of scientific aims, bespeak a noble (even if naive) goal, or does it simply paper over neo-colonial interests? Is it better to stay in touch with archaeological colleagues abroad, working to maintain the idea of a scholarly community that is not bound by political borders, or is doing so just an illusion that does little more than soothe our guilty consciences? And most troubling of all, might archaeology sometimes be a contributing source of violence, thereby implicating us more directly in death and destruction than we wish to acknowledge?” (Pollock 2008, op. cit., p. 357).
272 EAA, op. cit., pp. 21-23.
273 LIU, op. cit., p. 260.

The French philosopher considers that: “What is at stake in all ideology is finally the legitimation of a certain system of authority; what is at stake in all utopia is the imagining of an alternate way to use power. […] Whatever the utopia’s definition of authority, it attempts to provide the alternate solutions to the existing system of power. The function of ideology, on the other hand, is always to legitimate the given, the actual system of rule or authority” (Idem, p. 192).

model of the distorting, the legitimating and the integrative functions of ideology. Given Ricoeur’s interest in the relationship between power, vulnerability and ideologies we will subsequently reconsider the ethical concerns of the production of archaeological knowledge previously introduced in Part I. This will include addressing the different power struggles in the archaeological profession to which these lead from the perspective of Ricoeur’s discussion on the dialectic of ideology and utopia.

274 LIU, op. cit., p. 259.
4.1. Ideology and Memory

In “Lectures on Ideology and Utopia” (1986)\textsuperscript{275} Ricoeur begins his exposition with a description of the function of ideology as distortion, as seen in relation to acts of domination, power and authority. The philosopher introduces the constitutive function of ideology as integration in order to better establish the differences between ideology and utopia\textsuperscript{276}. Ricoeur considers the third level of ideology as integration, first determined by Clifford Geertz, to be the only non-pejorative concept of ideology, since it is the concept of ideology as integration which reveals best how ideology can be understood on the basis of the symbolic structure of action\textsuperscript{277}. In addition, according to Ricoeur, Karl Marx offered an important insight into how ideology functions by making the distinction between how things really appear and the way in which they appear as representations (Vorstellungen) of something else\textsuperscript{278}. Ricoeur remarks that in his view the term Vorstellung transmits best the notion of what “ideology really means”\textsuperscript{279}.

Interestingly, we can observe that in his first lectures the purpose of Ricoeur’s extended exposition of Marx’s concept of ideology is not to deny the validity of Marx’s concept of ideology as distortion and dissimulation\textsuperscript{280}. Rather, the french philosopher claims that the dissimulating function of

\textsuperscript{275}LIU, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{276}Throughout our reading of Ricoeur’s Lectures on Ideology and Utopia it is helpful to remember the following distinction made by Ricoeur – that while ideology always enables the preservation of the identities of an individual or group, utopias direct us to new possibilities. Ricoeur states that: “Whether distorting, legitimating, or constituting, ideology always has the function of preserving an identity, whether of a group or individual. As we shall see, utopia has the opposite function: to open the possible. Even when an ideology is constitutive, when it returns us, for example, to the founding deeds of a community – religious, political, etc. - it acts to make us repeat our identity. Here the imagination has a mirroring or staging function. Utopia, on the other hand, is always the exterior, the nowhere, the possible. The contrast between ideology and utopia permits us to see the two sides of the imaginative function in social life” (Idem, p.182).
\textsuperscript{277}Idem, p. 253.

\textsuperscript{278}Ricoeur references the following passage from Marx: “The social structure and the State are continually evolving out of the life-process of definite individuals, but of individuals, not as they may appear [erscheinen] in their own or other people's imagination [Vorstellung], but as they really are; i.e. as they operate, produce materially, and hence as they work under definite material limits, presuppositions and conditions independent of their will” (Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, Part I, C. J. Arthur (Ed.), New York, International Publishers, 1964, pp.46-47; as quoted in LIU, op. cit., p. 75).
\textsuperscript{279}LIU, op. cit., p. 75.

For Ricoeur, Marx’s concept of ideology can be summarized as representing the dissimulating and distorting function of ideology, according to which ideology offers an inverted image of man’s reality (LIU, op. cit., p.4). According to the french philosopher, in Marx’s early work ideology and any vague ideas which are developed in a disassociated manner from reality are opposed by Marx to reality, understood as praxis. Thus, praxis will always oppose ideology (Idem, p. 6). Ricoeur considers that at a later stage Marx places ideology in opposition to science, meaning that any body of knowledge defined by science must exclude prescientific ideas, even though they both have an impact on social reality. In the latter stage everything nonscientific is separated from science. Hence, the french philosopher suggests that given that utopias are nonscientific or pre-scientific, they too become ideological and stand in opposition to science (Idem, pp. 9-12). Thus, Ricoeur considers that praxis immediately possesses a symbolic dimension which allows humans to
ideology must be incorporated into a less narrow perspective which allows for the recognition of the underlying symbolic structure that gives shape to any form of social life. For Ricoeur, without a symbolic structure humans would not be capable of understanding how they live or do things, as they would not possess the means to formulate ideas based on the past or the present reality and would also not be capable of projecting activities into a future. Furthermore, without a symbolic structure it would not be possible to recognize situations in which reality is producing illusions which are deceitful. Consequently, a progression of events would become incomprehensible for those individuals experiencing it.

According to Ricoeur, it is not possible to adequately organize the psychological factors involved in the meeting of beliefs and claims into the two separate structures of infrastructure and superstructure. For example, an authority cannot operate exclusively by sheer violence, as it derives its strength from ideological forces as well as the application of 'meaningful' procedures which are understood by the individuals involved in that situation. On the basis of such shared comprehension authorities can successfully make their claims to a group or a class of authority. Thus, from the very beginning an ideological layer has been incorporated into the concept of authority. We observe an interesting development whenever any component of praxis has become distorted by ideology and are reminded that “ideology affects the individual’s action at [even] the [most] basic stage of its organization.”

Since Ricoeur wishes to go beyond the confines of a negative function of ideology, he considers that Marx’s concept can only adequately describe some of the abilities humans possess thanks to their imaginative activities. Social imagination can do much more then produce only a distorted image of formulate and share ideas in praxis.

282 *Ibid*.
284 From a Ricoeurian perspective, if we analyze any combination of different modes of praxis we will quickly realize that they all incorporate certain institutional frameworks which draw upon the knowledge of different systems of conventions. Ricoeur remarks that the distinction made by Marx between superstructures and infrastructures cannot be adequately applied to a description of praxis because the concept of praxis includes something of what superstructures themselves are. It is not possible to say that an individual first has a praxis and then ideas about this praxis which constitute the ideological component (*Idem*, p. 223).
286 *Idem*, p. 223.
reality. For Ricoeur, Marx’s two oppositions, which form the basis of the negative function, do not attribute sufficient importance to the creative and productive force of mankind. Moreover, questions of order and power inevitably bring us back to questions of legitimacy and the relationship between beliefs and claims.

As we will see below, the function of ideology is fundamentally transformed whenever we confront claims of legitimacy with beliefs in legitimacy. Ricoeur analyses the role of beliefs in relation to claims and determines in which manner the problem of ideology can be addressed by discussing the supplement which fills the gap between claim and belief. It is the philosopher’s objective to comprehend in what ways we can comprehend individual ideologies better if we rationally understand the belief which supports the authority’s claim to legitimacy in particular situations.

Throughout processes of legitimation ideology mediates between the authoritative figures claiming their own legitimacy and the citizenry living under the domination of this authority. In an ideal situation, the claim or the belief of both parties ought to be equivalent to each other. However, in reality any total equivalence will be a cultural fabrication, since in reality the claims expressed by the authoritative figure tend to exceed the beliefs of the citizens submitted to this authoritative power. According to Ricoeur, to absolute equilibrium can be achieved between both positions without the help of ideology.

Assuming that the claims to legitimacy made by an authority are always in some form an exaggeration with exceed the belief expressed by the citizenry it is impossible for ideology under such conditions to consolidate these two positions from a neutral vantage point. Consequently, rather than integrating both sides into a larger context ideology resorts to forms of distortions to fill the gap between claim and belief and provide the justifications of the current system of authority in power. For the French philosopher, a viable alternative to a political concept of dissimulation or legitimation would only be possible if in each particular structure of power and field of domination we could find ways to

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288 In this context, Ricoeur differs between creative and productive forms of imagination: “What drew me to the concept of the productive, rather than the creative imagination, is that I attached something infinitely more primordial to the idea of creation, something that would have a relationship with the order of a foundational sacred, whereas on the human scale, we are always in an institutional order. That is where I encounter a producing that is not a creating. The word ‘production’ should be paired with the ‘reproduction’, it seems to me. In contrast with an imagination that only reproduces a copy of something that is already there, production is essentially a production of new syntheses and new configurations” (Adams 2017, op. cit., p. 4).

290 Idem, p. 201.
292 Idem, p. 200.
show how to close the gap between the belief and claim by an act of mediation, rather than by filling the gap with surplus-value\(^{293}\).

Moreover, from a Ricoeurian perspective a debate between different beliefs cannot be addressed exclusively by establishing a classification of beliefs, but also necessitates a classification of claims. To successfully analyze the credibility gap between an authoritative force and the citizenry one must address the manner in which the surplus-value is related to power\(^{294}\). In the context of an elaboration of a concept of power the german sociologist Max Weber, to which Ricoeur dedicates two lectures, describes what constitutes a legitimate order in agreement with the premise that order should not be defined solely by the roles of force involved\(^{295}\). There is no order which is enforced without any claims of legitimacy being expressed too. Claims, regardless of how strong their impact, are always made when an order is put in place. Thus, claims of legitimacy can only be guaranteed from within a system of motives.

For Ricoeur, Weber’s analysis demonstrates how any problem of domination involves the workings of a system of motivation by which the claims to legitimacy made of an authority are meant to become equivalent to the belief of the society’s members expressed in the legitimation process of an authority. Systems of power or authority strive to legitimate themselves. Consequently, ideology finds its place within a system which legitimatizes an order of power\(^{296}\).

Ricoeur’s intention is to extend Weber’s analysis to better comprehend how systems of legitimation appeal to forms of motivation and to demonstrate why they cannot be adequately addressed in terms of causation which place infrastructure are superstructure in opposition to one another\(^{297}\). The french philosopher states that one has to study the relationship between an interest and

\(^{293}\) Idem, p. 14.

\(^{294}\) It is such analysis which will permit us to understand that “there is always more in the claim of a given system of authority than the normal course of motivation can satisfy, and therefore there is always a supplement of belief provided by an ideological system” (Idem, p. 202).

\(^{295}\) Idem, p. 188.


The french philosopher introduces the listener to Weber as follows: “In turning now to Weber, I am interested in one aspect of his theory, his concept of *Herrschaft*. Two of the principal ways this concept has translated into English are as authority and domination, and for our purposes the relationship between authority and domination is precisely the issue. Weber's approach to *Herrschaft* is important to our discussion for two reasons. First, he provides us a better conceptual framework to deal with the problem of domination than the orthodox Marxists. […] The alternative Weber proposes to this mechanistic perspective is a motivational model. […] Weber is important, second, because he provides within this motivational framework a complementary analysis on the relation between the ruling group and ruling ideas” (Idem, pp. 182-183).

\(^{296}\) Idem, p. 82.

\(^{297}\) Idem, p. 89.
the expression of this interest within the context of a system of legitimation through the analysis of certain motives and the roles of individual agents who act upon these motives\textsuperscript{298}. According to Ricoeur, Weber’s own understanding of authority and domination, his concept of \textit{Herrschaft}, is grounded on a motivational framework which provides the appropriate tools to analyze the relation in which a ruling group and ruling ideas stand in relation to each other\textsuperscript{299}.

In order to respond to the question of the legitimation of an authority Ricoeur, through his reading of Weber, states that while systems of leadership can make use of brutal forms of physical force to dominate their members physical submission will not function successfully without any form of consent or cooperation. Leaderships wish to have the consent and respect of their members. Even though a leadership might force itself into a position of domination it will want its position of authority to be accepted as legitimate by the citizenry. Ideology provides a leadership with the right or appropriate perspective and code of interpretation from which to view and to justify its system of power and authority\textsuperscript{300}. Ricoeur, building on Weber’s conception of a motivational framework, believes that ideology can function efficiently when it is placed appropriately in a position to fill the gap between a human’s response, in form of a belief, to a claim to legitimacy expressed by a figure or system of authority\textsuperscript{301}.

Given the increased preoccupation of archaeologists with the implementation of deontological norms, it is worthwhile to discuss the acceptance expressed by citizens of particular beliefs on which legality builds. According to Ricoeur, acceptance is both a form of belief and a form of recognition. Legal norms appeal to the interests or the personal commitments of the individuals involved. The commitment to the system involves a form of belief, since at the point when a system is formalized the system requires the belief of the individuals in the legitimacy of this process of formalization\textsuperscript{302}. Hence, several stages of a legal system of rules can be considered as ideological.

The structure of legal systems of rules confirm that authority can be described well by a motivational model, since legal institutions also require the belief of their objects in its claims of authority. For the french philosopher, it is precisely at this point that it becomes possible to imagine a non-pejorative meaning of ideology, as it can only be a positive meaning which allows us to best comprehend the nature of legitimacy within a legal system of rules. The positive ideological aspect

\textsuperscript{298} \textit{Idem}, p. 95.
\textsuperscript{299} \textit{Idem}, p. 183.
\textsuperscript{300} \textit{Idem}, p. 13.
\textsuperscript{301} \textit{Idem}, p. 183.
\textsuperscript{302} \textit{Idem}, p. 203.
stands in strong opposition to the negative ideological aspect which shows us how each system of formalization can be a means to dissimulate the real practices of the legal system and cover up its real intentions.

Consequently, it is necessary to compare the real practice of the authoritative forces in question against the alleged system of rules brought forward by the authority, meaning that archaeologists should evaluate critically a system of power which relies on a particular set of rules. There is a fundamental discrepancy between the alleged rules of most authoritative systems and their modes of practices. This point needs to be addressed, since forms of authority might chose to comply with the appearance of legal system, in order to put in use a different kind of power than the one they openly advocate. Legal systems can hide the truth and citizens must become aware of the possibility that an ideology uses a formal system to provide the illusion of a legal course, while it is in fact covering up a different kind of power structure and another, non-normative practice of authority.

According to Ricoeur’s analysis of Clifford Geertz’s thoughts, Geertz states that whenever we speak of the constructions of ideologies we are at the core holding a discussion on power – the establishment of social orders and the definition of man as a “political animal”. Ricoeur considers that for Geertz the function of ideology is to provide authority and consequently to enable political bodies to become and remain autonomous. Furthermore, culture has to be understood as a multitude of interlaced systems of construable signs. A cultural system serves as a context and not a power which determines the occurrence of particular social and historical events or processes. Hence, culture is the context within which one can adequately describe power dynamics.

It is under such premise that Ricoeur considers that the concept of ideology as integration cannot be entirely separated from the problem of a system of authority – since whenever ideologies are discussed in politics one evidences that politics offers a platform where particular individuals and groups obtain a particular set of rules which dictates how to use power, according to the system’s image as a group and the identity they transmit to outsiders. Thus, Ricoeur concludes that within politics the question of identity is the frame for any discussion on the power struggles between different authoritative figures and systems of order.
Ricoeur’s analysis of the integrative function of ideology can be summarized in three main points. First, it is the philosopher’s intention to transform the way in which ideology as a concept is generally construed as something negative. In this context, the French philosopher underlines the symbolic mediation of action, as he considers that “there is no social action which is not already entirely symbolically mediated”\textsuperscript{310}. To fully grasp this statement, we must pay attention to the following: while for Geertz both language and action are inherently symbolic, Ricoeur prefers to conceive of action as something which is symbolically mediated. For example, for the latter literature or a theater play are symbolic actions.

What Ricoeur intends to convey through this opposition to Geertz’s symbolic actions is that actions are “construed on the basis of fundamental symbols”\textsuperscript{311}. As mentioned some paragraphs before, the opposition of superstructure and infrastructure vanishes since symbolic systems are inherently part of the particular infrastructure which determines the most basic constitution of human life. Nevertheless, what remains valid for the concept of superstructures in Ricoeur’s thought is the understanding that the symbolic is something “extrinsic” - which does not belong to organic life, but is a constitutive element of human life\textsuperscript{312}.

Ricoeur’s second main point is that we must study the correlation between ideologies and rhetorics, since the rhetorics used in forms of basic communication cannot be removed without disempowering language altogether. Rhetorics and ordinary language belong together, as rhetorics are a basic and irreplaceable component of language\textsuperscript{313}. The philosopher’s third main point is to questions if it is in fact ever possible to entirely separate the distorting and the integrative functions of ideology. Ricoeur asks if the integrative function can exist first on a pre-ideological level, outside of a context of conflict between different existing ideologies. Will one ideology, as an integrative model, not always have to be challenged by other alternative ideological models within a cultural system?\textsuperscript{314}

The French philosopher concludes that integrative concepts of ideology allow one to better comprehend the norms or images which are projected in agreement with a particular group’s identity.

\textsuperscript{310} \textit{Idem}, p. 258.
\textsuperscript{311} \textit{Idem}, p. 256.
\textsuperscript{312} \textit{Idem}, p. 258.
\textsuperscript{313} \textit{Idem}, p. 259.
\textsuperscript{314} \textit{Ibid}.

More specifically, for Ricoeur has in mind different cultural groups and epochs which do not derive their basic ideals from a post-Enlightenment context but cultivate alternative ideals. However, even though it is correct of Ricoeur to demand for spaces which allow models of integration and forms of conflict which occur on a pre-ideological level, in light of the discussion we have had above on archaeological practices it would be wrong to assume that all past communities and cultural groups prior to the European Enlightenment era must have operated without ideological concepts.
The philosopher believes that there is a social group image which can be read in the same way that body language can be read, since it is particular to each single social group. Interestingly, for Ricoeur ideology can maintain its integrative function beyond a political field, as its function will always extend further than the political does. Conversely, no identification of a group or an individual is possible if the integrative function of ideology is eliminated or blocked.

If we think back to the previous chapter on “History, Memory and the Archaeological Study of Material Cultures” and more specifically of Ricoeur’s great esteem of memory, in opposition to historical truth, it is interesting to note that for the philosopher an important, both positive and negative, aspect of ideology’s function as integration is that ideology can support the integration of a social group across space and time. Ideology can do this precisely because it possesses both synchronic and diachronic dimensions. An example for the latter would be the articulation of the memories of founding events of a group through their commemorative practices and the subsequent reenactments of the founding events. This memory articulation is an ideological act, since the origins narrative is repeated.

Indeed, in a pathological sense all ideological processes begin with such repetition. Commemorative practices have a character of reification because the celebratory practices are utilized by a system of power in a defensive manner, as a device to preserve its power. While a celebration might have a more or less mythical side, the philosopher suggests that the permanent memory of the founding events and the founders of the group may have a continuous positive impact on the group’s internal and external human interactions. Yet, ideology is almost always pathological in one way or another due to its intention to preserve what exists and its resistance to change.

To recapitulate, it is precisely because a symbolic structure can be perverted and reality is capable in such conditions to produce shadows that there must be from the start “a symbolic structure at work in the most primitive kind of action.” Thus, if we look beyond the distorting function of ideology we may come to understand that symbols already exist before they can be distorted. Reality

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315 *Idem*, p. 264.
319 Ricoeur states: “Something becomes ideological – in the more negative meaning of the term – when the integrative function becomes frozen, when it becomes rhetorical in the bad sense, when schematization and rationalization prevail. Ideology operates at the turning point between the integrative function and resistance” (*Idem*, pp. 255-256).

320 *LIU, op. cit.*, p. 8.
possesses an inherently social dimension that we can only comprehend thanks to the recognition of its underlying symbolic structure.

According to Ricoeur, the underlying concept of ideology as integration, which is essential for the establishment of identities, is followed by the other two functions of ideology as legitimation and dissimulation. Here we evidence a hierarchy of concepts which can be studied both upwards and downwards. In fact, on second thought Ricoeur concludes that even though the existence of ideology as integration is necessarily presupposed by the two other concepts of ideology as legitimation and distortion, in fact, the function of ideology as integration is only valid within the context which already presupposed the other two functions as well. Otherwise we would be speaking of integration on a pre-ideological level, a process of integration devoid of any claims of legitimation and authority which could only be grasped once one in fact then references the functions of ideology as legitimation and distortion.

321 LIU, op. cit., p. 259.
322 Idem, pp. 265, 312.
4.2. Utopia

We can gain a deeper insight into the three complementary functions of ideology if we relate their respective roles to the role imagination fulfills within social life and the strength it exudes. At a more general level, Ricoeur presupposes that imagination can work in two ways. Its function might be to preserve an order, by staging a process of identification which references the order to be re-established and preserved. In this case, imagination operates as a mirror and takes on the appearance of a picture. However, since imagination can also have a disruptive quality, there is also another function – that of instigating a breakthrough. The imagination is productive if we can imagine something else, from a different place then our current one. At this particular point it is indifferent for Ricoeur whether ideology is integrative, distorting or legitimating, given that all three ideological functions represent imagination as a form of conservation, as fulfilling the task of preservation.

Consequently, something other will have to function as the trigger for the imagination’s breakthrough – Ricoeur believes this to be the task of utopias, as they allow one to gaze from a place of nowhere onto one’s current position and particular situation.

Ricoeur’s innovative methodological step is to consider utopias as an autonomous problem, not only as a concept which stands in relation to ideology. The philosopher considers that too often, utopias are criticized because they are impossible to realize. Such criticism overlooks any possible finer distinctions in methodological approaches to the dialectic of ideology and utopia. For example, while ideological critiques are constructed in agreement with particular sociological and political questions, utopias tend to be seen from a historical perspective which focuses primarily on particular past known utopias which form part of the long literary canon. By expanding on Weber’s conception of formalized systems of authority, as we have discussed above, in relation to his own analysis of the relations between the pair utopia and ideology the french philosopher is able to affirm that to speak of all ideologies is to question the legitimation of a particular system of authority, while to discuss utopias

324 *Idem*, p. 265.
325 *Idem*, p. 269.
326 *LIU*, op. cit., p. 270.

326 *LIU*, op. cit., p. 270.
Both essays were published in volume 9 of the bi-lingual *Études Ricoeuriennes/ Ricoeur Studies*, an issue dedicated entirely to Ricoeur’s concept of utopia.
327 *LIU*, op. cit., p. 271.
implies acts of imagination which bring to our attention alternative ways of putting power to use in a meaningful manner\textsuperscript{328}.

In such context, it is Karl Mannheim who for Ricoeur first identifies the importance of utopias above ideologies\textsuperscript{329}. Ricoeur considers that for Mannheim, ideologies provide us only with the false consciousness of the real situation, whereas utopias are always an inherent element of society – since there cannot be a society which does not aspire for something different. There will always be dreams and goals which motivate and move history along and which attribute meaning to the historical events of the past\textsuperscript{330}. Ricoeur, in his reading of Mannheim, remarks that any logic of action takes its time to reveal its truth. Even more, there are goals determined by individuals and groups which are incompatible with the nature of human and biological life and which society needs to relinquish in some way. Different to reality, within a utopia all is “compatible with everything else” and no conflict will arise between the different goals being pursued\textsuperscript{331}. Consequently, in utopias all obstacles are dissolved through acts of social imagination. This magic of thought is what Ricoeur identifies as the pathological side of all utopias.

On the positive side, Ricoeur also suggests that utopias can de-institutionalize relationships with the purpose of leaving them de-institutionalized, or they can re-institutionalize them in a way that is more humane, by instituting a form of more rational power. Regardless of the particular contents and form of particular utopias and their individual definitions of what authority is, the unifying element of different utopias is their function to evoke alternative models of systems of power which can replace the current one. In opposition to utopias, ideologies serve to support processes of legitimation of actual systems of authority\textsuperscript{332}. One may ask, would Ricoeur suggest that in order for archaeologists to

\textsuperscript{328} Idem, p. 192.

Mannheim states that: “Whereas the decline of ideology represents a crisis only for certain strata, and the objectivity which comes from the unmasking of ideologies always takes the form of self-clarification for society as a whole, the complete disappearance of the utopian element from human thought and action would mean that human nature and human development would take on a totally new character” (Mannheim 1936, *op. cit.*, p. 263; As quoted in *LIU, op. cit.*, p. 283).

On this note, Ricoeur continues: “If we call ideology false consciousness of our real situation, we can imagine a society without ideology. We cannot imagine, however, a society without utopia, because this would be a society without goals. Our distance from our goals is different from the ideological distortion of the image of who we are” (*LIU, op. cit.*, p. 283).

\textsuperscript{330} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{331} Idem, p. 296.
\textsuperscript{332} Idem, p. 192.
innovate current systems of authority and disrupt their legitimation processes they have to create their own utopia?

As we have shown above, Ricoeur proceeds from studying Marx’s concept of ideology as a systematized process of dissimulation, towards a discussion of the problem of authority inherent to all political bodies, placing particular value on a second concept of ideology as legitimation. Ricoeur, appears to consider that in particular situations where one is describing the claims of legitimacy made by different figures of authority in the context of archaeological practices one ought to be primarily preoccupied with the study of the different motivational processes which stand behind different claims expressed through the development of particular interpretations of the archaeological record. What Ricoeur would possibly to answer to archaeologists in a process of self-evaluation would be that despite any efforts ideology cannot become something that we can ever learn to overcome, since it is a system of motivation we need in order to function and which “proceeds from the lack of a clear distinction between the real and the unreal.” It appears that for human societies to operate successfully ideologies need to act in the background.

Thus, according to our reading it is through the study of the ideological dimension that one understands and explains best the different claims to authority expressed by archaeologists operating within different political fields. As we saw in Part I of this thesis, one of the main activities of the ACE network was to study how values and motivations deriving from particular sociopolitical contexts of different European states affect the treatment and distribution of archaeological resources abroad. Inevitably, differing values and motivations between Europeans and non-Europeans will influence the different ways in which archaeologists interact between each other, with political institutions and with the wider public. It becomes evident that the treatment of local communities or other interested parties is directly related to the sociopolitical context of the host country. As such, the aim of the ACE-project “was to provide insights into an ethical and sustainable framework for undertaking archaeological heritage projects abroad, targeted at fostering benefits for archaeological resources and stakeholders alike.”

Given that very often old power disymmetries between foreign researches and local communities are continued despite the choice of ‘collaborative practices’ in the context of transnational

333 Ricoeur notes: “In conversation we have an interpretative attitude. If […] we want to recognize a group's values on the basis of its self-understanding of these values, then we must welcome these values in a positive way, and this is to converse” (Idem, p. 255).
334 Idem, p. 137.
335 EAA, op. cit., p. 17.
and intercultural projects of the 21st century the book’s editors argue for the support of writing of self-
reflexive ethnographies. The purpose of their book is to examine the conduct of archaeological her
age professionals when developing projects in ‘host-countries’. In an attempt to increase the aware
ness on the different manners in which international and transcultural projects are conducted
today and were conducted during the 20th century, the book’s editors wish to provide an overview of
some past or present premises and policies which have determined the impact of European archaeology
on the culture and politics of non-European countries. The contributions to this book are reflective of
the different kinds of dialogue, exclusionary or inclusive, which are the basis for a wide variety of
collaborative practices between European and local stakeholders. In this way, the editors reveal a
similar concern to Ricoeur’s by describing the different motivations of the various stakeholders
involved in archaeological investigations. The editors’ shared hope is that divulging this knowledge
might lead to the transformation of future archaeological projects conducted abroad by European
professionals, as well as to the critical re-evaluation of different archaeological interpretations of past
cultures which have been shared by archaeological practitioners in the past and then entered into public
common trivia.

Furthermore, the publication’s editors comment on how a study of the impact of European
archaeological practices abroad includes, but cannot be reduced to, the study of the repercussions of the
European colonialism in Africa and South America throughout the 20th century. While questioning the
various roles of archaeology “in a globalizing world” all of the book’s contributors also make an effort
to bring to our attention the possibility that archaeologists must recognize and accept the role they play
in contemporary politics “in globalizing the world”.

336 Ibid.
337 Idem, p. 29.
338 Idem, p. 17.

As such, the collection of essays and interviews aims at offering a series of critical reflections on the role of European
values in the establishment of motivations and the development of collaboration projects between European and non-
European actors.

The book’s editors come to the chilling conclusion that: “The power base in research, management, decision making
and benefits often continues to be skewed towards researchers from abroad, who are well endowed but usually do not
stay long. Although it is widely acknowledged that concepts such as ‘capacity building’, ‘community archaeology’,
‘partnerships’, ‘skills transfer’ and ‘multivocality’ are all important factors in the conduct of archaeology abroad, such
notions are often abstract and difficult to implement […] We need to question more seriously whether the values and
concepts behind, for instance, European ethical codes and ‘Malta’ policies, are actually applicable to local
circumstances in the host countries. […] Despite efforts to turn archaeology into a more] multidisciplinary and
international [practice], it is often still carried out through institutional, financial and political frameworks on the
national level of individual European nations states, each with their own specific historical legacies and international
relationships” (Idem, p. 28).
Overall, in the past two decades different archaeologists and other voices within the professional field have come to urge their fellow archaeologists to make greater efforts to go beyond the construction of affinities of an analogical or homological kind between past civilizations and contemporary societies. For example, archaeological research can be utilized to deconstruct negative stereotypes about Africa, while it disvalues other cultural regions. Africa is the place of origin for many evolutionary stages of the history of mankind, such as the making of art, the human use of fire and the production of different tools. Making such distinctions between Africa and other geographic regions in a comparative kind of discourse can isolate other minorities which were not the first to invent something. Origins narratives are not the only thing that archaeology can uncover and it should not become the main purpose of its practice. For this reason, González-Ruibal suggests that “perhaps it would be better to emphasize that human ingenuity is expressed in many ways and that being the first to do something is just one of those ways”\(^{339}\).

Conclusion

In order to capture the ephemeral resonances of the past archaeologists must first acknowledge that the internal memory of an archaeological structure is created by the repetition of the actions and organizational structures. As matter disintegrates it has to be actively reworked and transformed to prevent the disappearance of the past. When changes are ephemeral and will not become tangible through the study of the materials archaeologists have great difficulties, as they must interpret what the absences in a stratigraphy can mean. A palimpsest of artifacts in stratified sites can be re-interpreted as the layered accumulation of memory which visibly shows the relation between memory formation and the fragile impermanent existence of beings and matter.

Since the 1990’s archaeologists have actively created spaces to conduct debates on the roles of archaeological expertise, power struggles and authority within the discipline. The outcomes of such discussions have been that archaeologists can no longer primarily concern themselves with the conservation and preservation of past cultures for the benefit of future generations interested in culture. Rather, archaeologists have learned to consider that their actions are reflective of subjective and contextual motivations of people living today. A greater level of public awareness has meant that more archaeologists are willing to admit that their professional practice is an act of balancing, demonstrative of relative power relations between past, present and future generations and carefully chosen actions which in fact ought to, but still rarely do, lead to the identification of shared value systems between individuals, communities or generations.

As such, archaeologists have had to let go of the extensive implementation of universalized codes of practice, the primacy of empirical evidence and in place have devoted time and energy to the translation of concepts, which in turn enable the critique of exclusive forms of memory articulation. By opening up about how their personal responsibilities stand in relation to any collective responsibilities, archaeologists have become more honest about the role intuition plays in their scientific practice. Such greater awareness has in turn inspired greater bonds of trust, higher levels of transparency and made space for the toleration of discords between archaeologists, other heritage caretakers and the wider public.

A more inclusive environment has increased the possibilities for a wider variety forms of knowledge transference in an historical context otherwise marked by deep discord. Sharing knowledge improves the functioning of collaborative practices, enables a greater variety of shared decision making processes and enables an open discussion on the participation rights and the empowerment of local
communities and interested volunteers with no archaeological training. The consequences of different forms of more inclusive archaeological practices which are more or less accepted by archaeologists have included the partial abandonment of scientific universal standards. This has largely been due to the development of collaborative practices between foreign professional archaeologists and local non-professional capacities, as well as the criticism of the colonial background of many archaeological investigations of the 19th and 20th centuries in the academic realm. Western archaeologists have had to accept the establishment and conduct of different forms of indigenous archaeological practices who quite often advocate for the respectful burial of their ancestors. Differently, other living communities in zones of conflict and surviving under precarious conditions advocate for the preoccupation for living people, above the concerns for the rights of the dead, above the necessity of following scientific standards, the collection of empirical data or the respect of the interests projected onto future generations.

Such engagement with different communities has resulted in a greater visibility of cultural diversity and the creation of spaces for multivocality within the professional field and the wider context of heritage practices. The discussions on the legitimization of claims of cultural ascendancy or the role of the archaeologist in bearing witness to past and present conflicts have forced the archaeologist into a less supremacist, authoritative position. In some cases, archaeologists have had to accept, or still need to find ways of accepting occasions where locals reject any external interference in their own sense of place and history. In an increasing number of individual cases, not respecting local communities has been recognized as an act of violation or desecration.

Consequently, it has become a less disputed practice to criticize archaeologists for performing acts of dispossession, marginalization, expropriation or displacement. Realizing that archaeologists might be defending hegemonic structures by enabling specific forms of collective identity building has shed light on the archaeologist’s role in the legitimization of national exclusionary identities and the reinforcing of ideological rhetorics. Such awareness has been particularly relevant whenever archaeologists work in war zones or take an active part in the re-development of post-war zones. Beyond the safeguarding of cultural heritage, the implementation of measures to reduce physical destruction and the prevention of looting and the illegal trade with antiquities archaeologists have taken part in long term risk-and-disaster plans which foster possibilities for the rehabilitation and recognition of war victims.
Furthermore, archaeologists have had to promote an honest appraisal of the human impact on climate change, more specifically their own influence on the public discussion of the human factor in global warming. However, while for some archaeologists this has led to the implementation of an openly advocated cosmopolitan approach, there are still many archaeological professionals who with less or greater effort, and with only a small or larger outreach, refuse to take on many of these responsibilities and do not acknowledge their impact on present, past and future human generations and on the lives of other living creatures.

Ricoeur’s writings on history and memory, as well as his contributions to moral philosophy and the lectures on ideology and utopia are a rich source for archaeologists to re-orient their practice. Given the claim for universal validity attached to the legal codes which emerged in the late 20th century, archaeologists would benefit to consider the fine distinction Ricoeur establishes between the normative side of imputability, which is determined by the allowance or prohibition of a particular action, and the subjective side of imputability which is concerned with the commitments, rather than with the norms, which archaeologists make when they exercise their professional judgments. It is the latter which implies the existence of a subject who is capable of positioning himself under the rule of the norm. Moreover, the philosopher considers that imputation is a form of a dialogical act, which can either be between two people or an internalized dialogue. As archaeologists have to preoccupy themselves deeply with the wishes of the past inhabitants of the Earth, the rights of the dead, it is worthwhile to note that any dialogue between past and living subjects must be internalized by the archaeologists since the dead cannot respond.

Moreover, according to Ricoeur, the opposition between the teleological and the deontological has been overemphasized. The deontological morality occupies the intermediary level between the grounding structure of ethics and the possibility of applied ethics. For the French philosopher a plurality of virtues is necessary in order for a subject to comprehend what might be the mean between the excess or the deficiency which a radical categorical imperative would forecast in each individual situation. Thus, one can argue that archaeologists act according to different feelings related to the human dignity of the individual moral subject, which includes respect, but also indignation, shame, admiration or enthusiasm. Between preoccupations for the self, the close and the distant other, from a Ricoeurian perspective archaeologists could reconsider their political commitments in light of these virtues.

In agreement with Ricoeur’s ‘little ethics’, in the context of archaeological practices the just and the equitable have to be studied from a critical perspective which encourages a self-evaluative practice
which pays great attention to the ethical aspiration of having a good life. Taking into consideration the difficulty of obtaining any form of a just distribution, archaeologists will have to acknowledge the tragic dimension of action and respond to moments of great incertitude or conflict by appealing to their own practical wisdom.

Any judgment must occur in situation and therefore determine what is equitable to protect different kinds of fragility and the singularity of each human being. By drawing wisdom from their productive imagination, by listening to a heartfelt conviction, archaeologists are then capable of inventing an appropriate solution to the unique situation. Furthermore, Ricoeur considers that a certain degree of skepticism towards the implementation of legal codes could be of significant value for archaeologists, since the law stands under the influence of a particular tradition of interpretation too and in an archaeological context legal codes merge narrative and legal interpretations in order to pronounce the word of justice and protect scientific standards.

The practice of archaeology is politically and ethically ambivalent due to the claims of moral authorities and reasoned arguments supported by other authoritative figures and institutions in power. The professional and personal identities of archaeologists can never be fully separated from one another, given the relational structure of I-you-them which determines the dialogical constitution of the self. Archaeologists have to respond to their own practical necessities and wishes, as well as to the demands and wishes of past, living and future generations. Inevitably, given the temporal obstacle which hinders a successful communication between living and past or future inhabitants of this Earth, archaeologists are confronted with the wishes of living communities, their very own contemporaries, with great regularity. These conversations take place in particular political spaces and the different power relations which are present there help to propagate different forms of violence. Deontological norms and political affinities translate into power being exercised by an agent over another, more fragile, agent.

Throughout the entire history of archaeological practices it has been possible to observe how the ‘wanderlust’ of particular individuals was useful for higher authoritative powers, whether private or of the state, and their engagements in more or less manipulative schemes of the discovery and retrieval of past cultures, their material and intellectual remains. Very often, archaeological investigations were used as a means to legitimize authoritative powers. As we saw above, Ricoeur moves across Marx’s concept of ideology as a systematic process of dissimulation and his study of how a ruling idea impacts and gives rise to the problem of authority, towards Weber’s concept of ideology as legitimation.
Ricoeur, with Weber, assumes that in cases where we are describing the claim to legitimacy made by different forms of authority we are no longer studying primarily forms of class interest, but rather considering the different motivational processes which stand behind different claims. Ricoeur considers that complementary to the Marxist notion of ideology, as a form of distortion, it is a function of ideology to add a certain degree of surplus-value to the beliefs held by individual, in order to raise their level of belief until it meets the level of claims expressed by the system of authority in question.

Within the vast archaeological field, authorities do not operate exclusively by sheer violence, as different archaeological operations are strengthened significantly by ideological forces, as well as through the application of meaningful procedures which are understood by the different stakeholders involved. On the basis of such shared comprehension authorities can successfully make their claims to a local community group or alternative authority. Through processes of legitimation ideology mediates between the authoritative figures claiming their own legitimacy and the local communities living under the domination of this authority. In an ideal situation, the claim of the belief of both archaeologists and local communities ought to be equivalent to each other. In reality any total equivalence is a cultural fabrication, since the claims expressed by the archaeological authorities tend to exceed the beliefs of the citizens submitted to this authoritative power. No absolute equilibrium can be achieved between both positions without the help of ideology.

Systems of power or authority strive to legitimate themselves. Consequently, ideology finds its place within a system which legitimatizes an order of power. Ricoeur believes that ideology can function efficiently when it is placed appropriately in the position to fill the gap between an individual’s response, in form of a belief, and a claim to legitimacy expressed by a figure or system of authority. Within archaeological politics the question of identity is the frame for any discussion on the power struggles between different authoritative figures and systems of order. As such, human reality possesses an inherently social dimension that we can only comprehend thanks to the recognition of its underlying symbolic structure.

From a Ricoeurian perspective, to identify the level of symbolization involved in distorting something one has to look at how ideology, understood as integration and identity, operates within archaeological practices. To act in a political space humans require a cultural system, constituted by a

340 LIU, op. cit., p. 255.
341 Idem, p. 183.
342 Ibid.
symbolic dimension, because existing systems of leadership in a social order have to overcome problems of legitimation.

In an archaeological context, during any process of legitimation of a system of power and the validation of particular authoritative figures we are in fact confronted with four separate problems. There are problems of power, authority, domination and the hierarchization of social life which need to be addressed in all realms of the archaeological profession. Throughout the practice of their profession archaeologists today ought to consider seriously Ricoeur’s third concept of ideology as integration and remember that it is the role of ideology to enable the existence of autonomous political bodies. It is ideology that provides the necessary authoritative concepts which attribute meaning to the autonomy of individual political bodies.\(^{343}\)

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343 *Idem*, p. 12.
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Philosophy

PAUL RICOEUR


Secondary Literature


