Intellectuals in the Latin Space during the Era of Fascism

This volume investigates a galaxy of diverse networks and intellectual actors who engaged in a broad political environment, from conservatism to the most radical right, between the World Wars. Looking beyond fascism, it considers the less-investigated domain of the ‘Latin space’, which is both geographical and cultural, encompassing countries of both Southern Europe and Latin America.

Focus is given to mid-level civil servants, writers, journalists and artists and important ‘transnational agents’ as well as the larger intellectual networks to which they belonged. The book poses such questions as: In what way did the intellectuals align national and nationalistic values with the project of creating a ‘Republic of Letters’ that extended beyond each country’s borders, a ‘space’ in which one could produce and disseminate thought whose objective was to encourage political action? What kinds of networks did they succeed in establishing in the interwar period? Who were these intellectuals-in-action? What role did they play in their institutions’ and cultural associations’ activities?

A wider and intricate analytical framework emerges, exploring right-wing intellectual agents and their networks, their travels and the circulation of ideas, during the interwar period and on a transatlantic scale, offering an original contribution to the debate on interwar authoritarian regimes and opening new possibilities for research.

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Intellectuals in the Latin Space during the Era of Fascism
Crossing Borders

Edited by Valeria Galimi and Annarita Gori
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8 Atlantic crossings

Intellectual-politicians and the diffusion of corporatism in thirties Latin America

António Costa Pinto

In 1941, a New York Times journalist visited ten Latin American countries and wrote an article expressing his concerns about Catholic sympathies towards corporatism, dictatorships and even ‘totalitarian’ fascism, across the continent. After many conversations with bishops, priests and lay Catholic leaders, some of whom were critics of the United States, he concluded: ‘Repeatedly one heard from priests and laymen throughout South America the view that the Salazar dictatorship in Portugal was an almost ideal state, and this seemed to be accepted as a fairly general Catholic view.’ More thorough research could have added further European references, namely the Primo de Rivera dictatorship in Spain and Italian Fascism, but the predominant association between Catholicism and authoritarianism was obviously well captured by this American journalist.

Corporatism as an ideology and as a form of organized interest representation was promoted strongly by the Roman Catholic Church, from the late-nineteenth through to the mid-twentieth century, as a third way of social and economic organization in opposition to both socialism and liberal capitalism. Much of the model predates the Papal encyclical, Rerum Novarum (1891), and was due to the romanticizing of medieval Europe’s feudal guilds by nineteenth-century conservatives who had become disenchanted with liberalism and fearful of socialism and democracy. Indeed, corporatist ideas increasingly became the vogue among younger Catholics frustrated with ‘parliamentary’ political Catholicism. However, ‘the church’s explicit endorsement surely moved corporatism from seminar rooms to presidential palaces’, especially after the publication of the encyclical Quadragesimo Anno (1931). Pope Pius XI assumed that as a result of the Great Depression liberal capitalism and its associated political system was in decline and that new forms of economic and social organization were now needed. The powerful intellectual and political presence of corporatism in the political culture of Catholic elites both in Europe and Latin America paved the way for other more secular influences.

In this chapter I deal with the main transnational agents of diffusion of corporatism in Latin America, giving particular salience to the Catholic Church, and the main intellectuals and intellectual-politicians that introduced
and developed corporatist proposals. The concept of intellectual-politician will be used here to define those intellectuals who were participating in the institutional crafting of these regimes as formal or informal members of the decision-making elite (i.e. as advisers, deputies, cabinet members or party leaders). They provided space for interaction among politicians and the transnational intellectual arena, cementing ideological and political relations and models.

During the interwar period, corporatism permeated the main political families of the conservative and authoritarian political right: from the Catholic parties and social Catholicism to radical-right royalists and fascists, not to mention Durkheimian solidarists and supporters of technocratic governments associated with state-led modernization policies. Royalists, republicans, technocrats, fascists and social Catholics shared ‘a notable degree of common ground on views about democracy and representation’ and on the project of a functional representation as an alternative to liberal democracy, namely as constituencies of legislative chambers or councils that were established in many authoritarian regimes during the twentieth century. However, there were differences between the Catholic corporatist formulations of the late-nineteenth century and the integral corporatist proposals of some fascist and radical-right-wing parties. When we look at fascist party programmes and segments of the radical-right, like the Action Française-inspired movements, the picture is even clearer, with many reinforcing ‘integral corporatism’ vis-à-vis the social corporatism of Catholicism.

Although cut from the same ideological cloth, social and political corporatism did not necessarily follow the same path during the twentieth century. The historical experience with corporatism has not been confined to dictatorships, and in liberal democracies ‘implicit tendencies towards corporatist structures developed both before and concurrently with the emergence of fascism’. In fact, occupational representation was not limited to the world of dictatorships, with several democracies discovering complements to the typical parliamentary representation. Corporatist ideology was a particularly powerful influence in Ireland’s 1937 Constitution, for example, while several other interwar bicameral democracies introduced corporatist representation to their upper chambers.

Many ideologists of social corporatism – particularly within Catholic circles – advocated a societal corporatism without the omnipresent state, but the praxis of corporatist patterns of representation was mainly the result of an imposition by authoritarian political elites on civil society. In fact,

whatever pluralist elements there were in corporatism (notably the stress on the autonomy of corporations), they were annihilated by a foundational commitment to a supreme common good, infusing with a sense of purpose and direction a complex pyramidal edifice that had the state at its apex.
Under interwar dictatorships, social corporatism became synonymous with the forced unification of organized interests into single units of employers and employees that were tightly controlled by the state thereby eliminating their independence, especially with regard to the independence of the trade unions. Social corporatism offered autocrats a formalized system of interest representation with which to manage labour relations: legitimizing the repression of free labour unions through the co-optation of some of its groups in state-controlled unions, often with compulsory membership. Last but not least, corporatist arrangements also sought to ‘allow the state, labour and business to express their interests and arrive at outcomes that are, first and foremost, satisfactory to the regime’.

However, during this period, corporatism was also used to refer to the comprehensive organization of political society beyond state-social groups’ relations seeking to replace liberal democracy with an anti-individualist system of representation. As Williamson noted, ‘what did unite the corporatist was their indifference to the concept of democracy and democratic norms’ and from this it was just a small step to corporations as a representational structure.

Despite some intellectual-politicians being associated with dictatorships, legitimizing themselves with a corporatisme d’association that was closer to social Catholicism, or which contained some modernizing projects, the model adopted by the great majority of dictatorships was much closer to fascist statism. As one French observer noted in 1942, after studying the practices of five dictatorships, ‘corporatisme d’association is seen as the only true corporatism […] and it does not exist!’ In practical terms, the institutionalization of social corporatism in most dictatorships followed models close to the proclamations contained in the Italian Labour Charter (Carta del Lavoro), thereby demonstrating its primacy, even if blended with Catholic corporatism. State intervention, a large imbalance between business and labour associations (with the former having greater influence and the independence of the latter eliminated) and the creation of strong para-state institutions, was typical of almost all the corporatist experiments. In fact, the elimination of free unions and their forced integration into the state was the dominant characteristic.

8.1 Catholicism and corporatism between Europe and Latin America

Social Catholicism pre-empted the spread of corporatism in Latin America. The Roman Catholic Church and its associated lay organizations, and intellectuals, following the publication of the Papal encyclicals, became central transnational agents in the introduction of corporatist alternatives to the excesses of liberal capitalism. As in other parts of the world in the first half of the twentieth century, the official Church looked for ways to regain its role in society and the proliferation of lay Catholic organizations was crucial for the spread of corporatism. Organized and directed by Catholic clergymen, associations such as Catholic Action sought to enhance the
involvement of Catholics in social and political structures. Part of the Church’s response to secularism, socialism and Protestantism, in the words of Pope Pius X in 1903, was to attempt to bring about the ‘re-Christianization’ of society. During the 1930s, the official Church and its thinkers made corporatism an alternative to communism and liberal democracy, and ‘the task of the era was to forge a modern Catholicism that could make its peace with the new authoritarianism’. A 1936 letter from French Cardinals, celebrating ‘corporation, with its cadres, its hierarchy, its regulatory power, its jurisdiction and its right of representation in government’, was without doubt repeated in various forms across Europe and Latin America.

In Argentina during the 1930s, such influential figures as Monsignor Gustavo Franceschi articulated a type of reactionary ‘national Catholicism’ that was based on a ‘home-grown right-wing ideological posture that equated Argentine national identity with Catholicism’. In Brazil, convergence between the authoritarian corporatism of the Church and politics was also clear, even with some convergence with the fascists of Plínio Salgado’s Brazilian Integralist Action (AIB – Ação Integralista Brasileira) In particular, Cardinal Sebastião Leme, archbishop of Rio de Janeiro from 1930 to 1942, viewed Getúlio Vargas and his corporatist New State (Estado Novo) as being ‘consistent with the Church’s hierarchical vision of society’. It is important to remember, though, that the Church and state conciliation did not proceed without conflict and that there were versions of social Catholicism that were more compatible with liberal democracy. In Chile, the split between the young Catholics, Manuel Antonio Garretón with his hispanismo and corporatism and Eduardo Frei, future leader of the Christian Democratic Party, and Tomaz Brenna in Uruguay, are just two examples.

It is in this context that Catholic intellectuals, in many cases priests and friars, frequently crossed the Atlantic Ocean and Latin American borders. The Catholic press gave voice to an impressive process that spread social and political corporatist ideas throughout Latin America. Among the names mentioned on both sides of the Atlantic were those of two Spanish Jesuits, Father Palau and Joaquín Azpiazu, who were ardent defenders of Catholic corporatism. The Jesuits were important in the spread of corporatist ideas in Latin America, so much so that other names could be mentioned: men such as Felix Restrepo in Colombia and Miguel Bullrich and Luis Chagnon in Argentina. Azpiazu, whose writings constantly appeared in the Catholic press, was probably the most important. The more moderate Restrepo Colombia did not eliminate democracy from his corporatism, which was, strangely enough, associated with Oliveira Salazar’s New State in Portugal. For Restrepo, ‘corporatism re-establish the lost equilibrium, realizing the project of the Creator in the world of labour’. Azpiazu, however, claimed corporatism was the basis of the ‘totalitarian state’: ‘Strong […] without the weakness and hesitations of the liberal and socialist state’.

Of course, the Catholic Church was not alone in fanning the flames of corporatism in Latin America. The influence of new European traditionalist
radical-right thinking was also very important, and this was not in conflict, since the Catholic milieu ‘was the main recipient of Maurassianism’ after the First World War, in a strict association with the ‘Catholic revival’. In Argentina, for example, the synchronicity was clear from the 1920s in such magazines as *Criterio* and the writings of Monsignor Franceschi. In Brazil, the magazine *A Ordem* and Jackson de Figueiredo’s Dom Vital Centre promoted the same Catholic restoration programme, and called for the ‘regeneration of the nation’, which it claimed was being threatened by mass ‘immigration, Judaism and communism’. Again, ‘the movement of men from both sides of the Atlantic is the decisive factor in the spread of Maurrassianism in Latin America’. When we examine the corpus of the new authoritarian nationalist constructs in Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Peru and many other Latin American countries, we see a very impressive influence of *Action Française*, blended with the corresponding Iberian elite movements – Spanish Action (*AE – Acción Española*) in Spain and Lusitan Integralism (*IL – Integralismo Lusitano*) in Portugal. Many Latin American intellectual-politicians who collaborated closely with the dictators who were associated with the institutionalization of corporatism in Latin America came from this cultural background: from José de la Riva-Agüero in Peru to Leopoldo Lugones and the Irazusta brothers in Argentina.

The Spanish intellectual Ramiro de Maeztu (1875–1936), one of the most influential in Latin America, is probably the clearest example of these transatlantic cultural transfers. The principal ideologue of the Primo de Rivera dictatorship and a critic of liberal democracy, who unified *hispanismo* and corporatism, Maeztu was a towering intellectual presence in Latin America. An ambassador to Argentina of Primo de Rivera in the late 1920s, he was even more important because of the union between traditionalist Catholicism with *Action Française*-inspired intellectuals in the Iberian-Latin American conservative milieus during the first half of the twentieth century, to which was added active anti-US views.

In the following section, we deal with some national experiences, namely Chile, Peru, Uruguay, Mexico and Colombia.

8.2 Revisiting some national experiences

Latin America participated in what has been called the first wave of democratization, and in the subsequent reverse wave that by 1942 had significantly reduced the number of democratic regimes in the world. Between 1930 and 1934 there were thirteen successful coups, followed by a further seven towards the end of the decade. The role of corporatist intellectual-politicians was central in some of these regimes, even though, in many cases, they did not have the last word in authoritarian processes of political reform.

In Chile during the 1930s, corporatism filtered into several political parties and elites, ranging from conservatives to fascists, as well as important
segments of the forerunners of the Chilean Christian Democratic Party. It had long had a presence within the Conservative Party and at its 1932 convention, for example, the party called for an ‘organic’ society organized along ‘functional’ lines, although in a less statist manner than supported by its authoritarian counterparts. Papal encyclicals and fears of communism were ever-present in its political discourse. Corporatism was particularly evident in the youth organization that gave birth to a pro-fascist, authoritarian and Catholic current – the Falange Nacional – of which future leaders of Chilean Christian Democracy, such as Eduardo Frei and Manuel Garretón, were members. During the 1930s, authoritarian corporatism was supported by such Catholic intellectuals as Jaime Eyzaguirre whose magazine Estudios perhaps ‘represented the maximum expression of the authoritarian-corporative project in Chile’ during that decade, expressing a great deal of sympathy for the Dollfuss regime in Austria and the Salazar regime in Portugal. Estudios was perhaps 1930 Chile’s most outspoken promoter of the Portuguese New State’s authoritarian corporatism. In it, they saw a ‘hierarchical and corporatist regime’ emerging from the ruins of liberalism.

In Peru, a Catholic party, the Popular Union (UP – Unión Popular), was founded in 1931 to contest that year’s elections and was dissolved shortly afterwards. Both social and political corporatism were part of its political programme, but with a mixture of admiration for and demarcation from Italian fascism, which was much commented upon in the contemporary Catholic press. Associated with the programme of social Catholicism, its manifesto envisaged a Senate with corporatist representation operating alongside a chamber of deputies elected by universal suffrage. The model was very close to that proposed by Víctor Andrés Belaúnde, the most important Catholic intellectual-politician of that time in Peru. In one of his books, published in 1931, Belaúnde defended corporatism and his ‘democracia social’ contained a synthesis of liberal elements with ‘functional’ representation.

The 1933 Constitution thus created, in its own words, a ‘functional Senate’ in a bicameral system and an advisory National Economic Council (CEN – Consejo de Economía Nacional). Víctor Baluande was one of the main contributors to this Constitution. Sánchez Cerro’s successor did not institutionalize this ‘functional Senate’, which was supposed to be elected by the regions and a corporatist vote. The CEN, which some authors claim was inspired by the Weimar Constitution, ‘consisted of representatives of consumers, capital, labour and the liberal professions’.

Another important intellectual-politician supporter of corporatism in 1930s Peru was José de la Riva-Agüero, a renowned historian and politician who in the late 1920s, after a prolonged stay in Europe, abandoned liberalism to become a prominent sympathizer of Action Française and maintained close ties with the Acción Española. He saw Mussolini as Italy’s ‘new Richelieu’, filtered by traditionalist Catholicism and elitism. As Prime Minister during Benavides time and President between 1933 and 1934, the aristocratic Riva-Agüero tried to institutionalize corporatism from
above but Benavides forced his resignation in May 1934. In 1935, he founded Patriotic Action (AP – Acción Patriótica), the first manifestos of which outlined a clearly radical right-wing version of corporatism that associated state economic interventionism and a corporatist political representation that no longer complemented that of liberal democracy. For this 1930s Peruvian ‘modern right’, corporatism was the model of the future. While Riva-Agüero was an admirer of Mussolini and was convinced Il Duce’s model could have universal application, he recognized that the most feasible model for Latin America was the Portuguese New State ‘because it was more in line with our aims and customs’.

In Uruguay, the associational corporatism that was close to social Catholicism was disseminated by the Catholic parties, such as the Uruguay Civic Union (UCU – Unión Cívica del Uruguay), during the 1910s. One of its main ideologues, Tomás G. Brena, was a critic of the corporatist statism promoted by fascism, although he did not move away from other European and Latin American counterparts, especially from Salazar and Dollfuss. A more authoritarian Catholic dissent was expressed in the El Democrata newspaper, which in 1933 proposed a constitutional project that would create a ‘legislature composed of a chamber of guild representatives in such a way that all corporations are represented in a proportional and qualified manner’. Brena and the UCU, however, were critical of the Axis and were active promoters of social corporatist structures, like the so-called ‘Brena report’ of 1940, which was produced by a parliamentary commission with neo-corporatist social concertation proposals.

In the case of Mexico, due to the strong secular division, introduced by the Mexican Revolution, Catholic corporatism became one of main alternatives to the corporatist arrangements of Cárdenas in the 1930s. What alternative did the mostly Hispanophile radical-right propose? With some variations, it put forward a model that upheld the organic social model, the central ideas of which were representation ‘via intermediate bodies (church, family, university, professional groups, unions, municipalities)’ was dominant. This reinforced the difference between the organicist model and official corporatism since while the post-revolutionary state sought to organize society in a vertical and coercive way, the conservatives appealed to the medieval model […] allowing limits to state power, stopping the progress of liberal individualism and harmonizing the economic interests of workers and owners.

For these reactionary Hispanicists, their alternative to Cardenism involved anti-liberal organicism and proposed a corporatism that enhanced limits to state intervention. A striking example of this discourse was that of such intellectual-politicians as Salvador Abascal Infante, leader of successive
traditionalist, legal and clandestine Catholic movements. Another example was Manuel Gómez Morín, founder of the National Action Party (PAN – *Partido de Acción Nacional*) in 1939, who had a more modernizing and less clerical outlook.

Corporatist Catholicism in Mexico developed in a manner similar to that in many Latin American countries and was eventually radicalized by the anti-clerical and secularizing component of the Mexican regime, although with tensions and reconciliations. As highlighted in various contexts,

*Rerum Novarum* was also a source of inspiration for non-religious movements that shared the hostility to liberalism and socialism, and that saw in the notion of ‘organic democracy’ or in the proposal of the corporate organization of society, useful elements for the integration of an authoritarian model.

The primacy of more radical organizations associated with political Catholicism became more evident during the 1930s. The National League for the Defence of Freedom of Religion (*Liga Nacional de la Defensa de la Libertad de la Religión*), for example, expressed a clearly integralist, ultramontane nationalism that was profoundly influenced by the project for a Catholic, hierarchical and corporatist society. Founded by a former League member, the clandestine Legions, which were supported by radical factions within the clergy which were later moderated, based its programme on an electoral system established on ‘corporatist plebiscites’. The same could also be said of the *Unión Nacional Sinarquista* (NS), which called for the establishment of a corporatist Christian order in Mexico in 1937. With powerful support from sections of the Catholic hierarchy and with a more peaceful political mobilization strategy, the UNS, with its paramilitary parades of Green Shirts and its internal authoritarian structure, acquired a character that was close to fascism. Its political programme was not very different from its predecessors, expressing a view that was more anti-state intervention, anti-socialist – especially in education – and anti-democratic, reinforcing the organic and corporatist model. ‘Synarchism became the main representative of a conservative, traditionalist, Hispanicist, nationalist and Catholic society, that did not find a place in the new order of life that post-revolutionary modernity was imposing’. The UNS had peasant support, which led to it becoming a mass organization. Salvador Abascal, UNS leader from 1940, gave the UNR a look that was more Fascist-Falangist, with its hierarchical-militarized organization and its hint of leadership cult.

Initially sharing some of the same ideological references, while recruiting from among the less religious urban middle class, was PAN, which was founded in 1939 under the leadership of Manuel Gómez Morín and Efraín González Luna, with support from lay Catholics and financial backing from some of the interest groups that opposed Cardenism. While its
militant base included many who had come up through the Catholic associations, unlike the UNS, PAN did not present itself as a confessional party and distanced itself from the symbolic radicality of the UNS.70

Nonetheless, as noted above, the most important group of PAN’s founders was that of conservative Catholic activists and Hispanists, while some technocrats that had been associated with the banking and industrial elite were also part of the founding matrix, attracted as they were by its organic model, defence of private ownership and rejection of nationalizations. Morín was quite clearly influenced by and an admirer of the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera in Spain, which struck him as the model of modernizing authoritarianism to follow, particularly the idea of the corporatist state represented by a National Assembly composed of trade unions, the Church, employers’ associations and the universities.71 It was this more modernizing corporatism of Primo de Rivera that Gómez Morín held up in contrast with the official corporatism of Cárdenas.72 Morín had a much clearer idea of what a political party was and of the functions of government and administration of the country than Luna, who had been a product of social Catholicism and the Catholic CCT union.

PAN’s political programme had more in common with the right-wing corporatism found in European and Latin American political culture, and it accused Cárdenas of ‘preserving the constitutional liberalism of the Mexican state by making only the party corporatist, while original members of PAN wanted the entire Mexican state to be corporatist’.73 PAN’s political programme clearly represented the other pole of a third way between liberalism and socialism, culminating in a project in which Morín’s modernizing authoritarianism united with Luna’s more Catholic matrix.74 PAN’s Minimum Political Action Programme (Programa mínimo de Acción Política) distanced itself from the principle of liberal democracy, proposing instead corporatist representation in which the Chamber of Representatives would be occupied by ‘the intermediate communities and the economic, social and cultural interests of the nation’.75 In 1945, its newspaper, La Nación, called for ‘organic and Catholic democracy’, with Luna referring to the regimes of Franco in Spain and Salazar in Portugal.76

The most paradigmatic case of coincidence between Corporatism and Catholicism is the one of Laureano Gómez in Colombia, head of the Conservative Party (Partido Conservador PC) in the 1930s. Educated at a Jesuit school in Bogota, Laureano Gómez was profoundly affected by Catholicism and the Jesuits. As PC leader, Laureano Gómez’s discourse became increasingly ultramontane as he set about forging, with the Catholic Church, an opposition alliance that he associated with atheist freemasonry.

As in other Latin American countries, Catholicism pre-empted the cultural spread of social and political corporatism. The Catholic Church and its charity and elite education institutions were important for introducing corporatism to Colombia. In the 1930s, the clear cultural convergence of Laureano Gómez and the Catholic Church cemented the opposition to liberal secularism and
social reform. The fascists’ secular or technocratic-modernizing versions, while present within elite political culture, were overshadowed by the Catholic hegemony. Félix Restrepo and other Jesuits were important in spreading the ideas of social and authoritarian political corporatism, and were close to the CP throughout the 1930s, playing an important role in the failed reforms of 1950–1953.77 Restrepo was perhaps the most important supporter of corporatism, both in his writings and the positions he held at the Javeraniana University, in Catholic associations and through his political and intellectual proximity to members of the conservative elite.78 The hegemony of liberal, reformist and secularist governments in Colombia during the 1930s led to the dominance of corporatist ideologies that in the Iberian models found a conservative corporatist reaction to both liberalism and secular fascism. While the Spanish corporatism of Primo de Rivera and the polarization of the Spanish civil war had a profound effect on the political culture within the CP, and on Laureano Gómez in particular, Salazar’s Portuguese model and his 1933 Constitution were among those mentioned most positively in the Catholic press, including Revista Javeriana.79

In common with other Catholic ideologues, Restrepo legitimized his corporatism in Thomist teachings and the social doctrine of the encyclicals. He was creative in his attempts to avoid the accusations of statism levelled at him by his critics, often seeking refuge in his imagined model of the Catholic dictator, Salazar.80 Offering corporatism as an alternative to liberalism and communism, Restrepo opposed the creation of a single party; rather, he called for the powers of political parties to be diluted through the creation of corporatist institutions.81 In the early 1940s, he once more denied any link between corporatism and fascism.82 While Laureano Gómez’s constitutional reform was underway in 1951, Restrepo held a number of radio debates that were discussed by the commission responsible for the reform.83

The main novelty of this constitutional reform was, without doubt, the return of the Catholic Church to the state sphere and corporatism. The family, as the primary cell of society, and the syndicate as units of employers and workers introduced the organic concept of society into the Constitution, with the state becoming increasingly confessional. Catholicism once more received state protection and special access to public education and several other institutions, following the model of the Iberian dictatorships.

8.3 Conclusion

During the 1930s, a wave of dictatorships swept over Latin America, each adopting new authoritarian institutions that were created in the political laboratory of the interwar world, particularly the personalization of leadership, the single or dominant party and the ‘organic-statist’ legislatures based on corporatist models. Latin America participated in what has been called the first wave of democratization and in the subsequent ‘reverse wave’
of the interwar period. Corporatism had its first global moment during this period and Latin America was an integral part of this political dynamic.\textsuperscript{84}

Catholic intellectual-politicians gave voice to an impressive process that spread social and political corporatist ideas associated mainly with Iberia throughout Latin America, thereby avoiding association with Italian Fascism. When we examine the corpus of the new authoritarian nationalist constructs in Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Peru and many other Latin American countries, we see the influence of \textit{Action Française} blended with the corresponding Iberian elite movements – \textit{Acción Española} in Spain and \textit{Integralismo Lusitano} in Portugal. For example, the Argentinian nationalists were the main creators of an authoritarian version of Argentinian national identity: one that was corporatist, Catholic, Hispanic and Latin, and which placed great stock on values such as hierarchy, anti-liberalism and anti-communism. To emphasize the instrumental and transitory nature of his authoritarianism in Brazil, Oliveira Viana differentiated his project from the Italian Fascist model, stressing the technical-juridical nature of his approach and restating both Manoïlesco and the New Deal jurists, while all the time maintaining the authoritarian model. Many of the other Latin American intellectual-politicians who collaborated closely with the dictators that were associated with the institutionalization of corporatism in Latin America hailed from this cultural background. As in Europe, and with the obvious exception of the paradigmatic case of Mexico under Cárdenas, the most important models were Italian Fascism, the Primo de Rivera dictatorship in Spain and Salazar’s New State in Portugal. In 1943, in one of the many accounts of the spread of corporatism during the ‘fascist era’, Mario Gianturco underlined the relationship between social and political corporatism in Latin America was as in Europe:

In Brazil, as elsewhere, the problem of the corporatist organization of the national economy has been dominated by the reaction to parliamen­
tarism, namely by the degeneration of the representative system, and by the need to ensure a stable and strong government.\textsuperscript{85}

Latin America in the 1930s was integrated into that wave and intellectual-
politicians were central elements in process of cultural and political diffusion of authoritarian versions of corporatist models.

Notes


17 Williamson, *Varieties of Corporatism*, 63.


20 Lisa M. Edwards, “Messages Sent, Messages Received? The Papacy and the Latin American Church at the Turn of the Twentieth Century,” in *Local Church, Global Church: Catholic Activism in Latin America from Rerum Novarum to Vatican II*, eds. Stephen J. C. Andes and Julia C. Young (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2016), 3–20.

23 Cit. in Chappel, *Catholic Modern*, 87.
34 Compagnon, “Le maurrassisme,” 287.
40 On his influence in Chile, see José Díaz Nieva, *Chile: De la Falange Nacional a la Democracia Cristiana* (Madrid: Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia, 2000).
57 Tomás G. Brená, Corporativismo de Asociación (Montevideo: Mosca Hermanos, 1937), 178–94.
58 Proyecto constitucional de El Demócrata. Implantación del régimen corporativo (Montevideo: Talleres Gráficos “El Demócrata,” 1933), cit. in Alfredo Alpini,


61 Ibid., 617–18.


69 Serrano Álvarez, Ibid., 216.


72 Manuel Gómez Morín, El Régimen Contra la Nación (Mexico City: Partido Acción Nacional, 1939).


78 Restrepo, Corporativismo.
81 Ibid.
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